Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
NLRC, Rodolfo
Retiso and 165 others (2000)
FACTS:
1. Respondents (numbering around 165) were
employees of AKELCO. They were working at their
main office in Lezo, Aklan and receiving regularly
their salaries.
2. Jan 1992: AKELCO released a Resolution allowing
the temporary transfer of their office to Kalibo,
Aklan since their head office at Lezo was closed
and that the area was dangerous at the time.
Nevertheless, a majority of the employees
still went ahead to Lezo to report for work.
They continued to receive their salaries.
3. Feb 1992: An unnumbered Resolution by the Board
of Director of AKELCO withdrew the earlier
resolution designating the temporary transfer from
Lezo to Kalibo; work was to resume once again in
Lezo. Some returned to Lezo but some of the
employees stayed at Kalibo.
4. Those who were at Lezo received their salaries
from Jan 1992 May 1992. However, in a new
Resolution, they were not paid their salaries from
the period of Jun 1992 Mar 1993
It was only after Mar 1993 that the
employees at Lezo were allowed to draw
their salaries again.
5. Respondents filed suit, trying to claim payment of
salaries, 13th month pay, ECOLA and other fringe
benefits for the said period of Jun 1992 Mar
1993.
6. LA: Complaint dismissed.
7. NLRC: LA reversed; complaint given due course in
favor of respondents.
The NLRC held that the records show that
the respondents had rendered service from
the period of Jun 1992 Mar 1993.
The NLRC took note of the fact that the
management responded to the office
managers request for payment in the
following manner: Rest assured that we
shall recommend your aforesaid request
This payment, however, shall be subject to,
among others, the availability of funds and
the approval of AKELCOs Board of
Directors.
The NLRC treated the reply above as an
admission on the part of AKELCO that the
respondents were indeed entitled to the
compensation they were claiming in this
complaint since the request came from the
office manager, who is most competent to
know whether the employees under him
rendered service and, hence, deserve
compensation.
AKELCOs basis for the non-payment of the
salaries during the interregnum (Jun 1992
Mar 1993) was the principle of no work, no
pay; they allege that the respondents did
not work during the interregnum and hence
deserve no payment. However, the NLRC
notes that AKELCO failed to substantiate
such allegation and hence, the complaint
must be granted in favor of the
respondents.
AKELCO was now ordered to pay the
salaries and other monies pertaining to the
interregnum.
8.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion
when it reversed the LA decision (YES)
RATIO:
The NLRC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion; its decision is reversed and set aside.
AKELCO alleges/argues that:
o Respondents considered the transfer to Kalibo
illegal, even when it did not have the power
to do so, and hence not only objected to the
order of transfer but completely defied the
same by staying in Lezo.
o Respondents defiance of the order of transfer
resulted in the disruption of AKELCOs
business operations.
o Respondents do not have a choice on where
to work and hence, must be considered as
dismissed by the reason of their defiance to
report to Kalibo.
o Respondents illegally collected fees and
charges from AKELCOs customers and
arrogated the same unto themselves
o It was an error for the NLRC to consider that
the computation of claims for wages and
benefits merely submitted by the respondents
as it basis for overruling the Labor Arbiter
when it should have done so only on the basis
of substantial evidence.
The Solicitor-General supported the contentions of
AKELCO because the respondents could not have
possibly worked during the interregnum since all
the records and equipment of AKELCO were
brought to Kalibo from the old office in Lezo and
that the computations submitted by respondents
is not proof of rendition of work.
The Court found merit in the position of AKELCO
and the Solicitor General.
o Respondents have not proven that they had
indeed rendered services during the
interregnum of Jun 1992 Mar 1993 so as to
entitle them to the compensation they claim.
o Respondents base their claim on three points:
(a) the letter-request of the office manager
addressed to AKELCO, (b) AKELCOs reply to
the letter-request, which they consider as
assurance of the payment of their claims, and
(c), the computation of their unpaid wages,
which they submitted themselves to the
NLRC.
o The Court, however, does not consider them
as substantial evidence that can support the
NLRC decision. They do not really establish
the fact that the respondents actually
rendered services during the interregnum.
Moreover:
ISSUES:
WON the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC for reversing the findings of the
ELA (NO)
RATIO:
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC.
In cases of retrenchment, the employer is
obligated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code to provide
separation pay computed to be equivalent to 1
month pay or at least month pay for every
year of service. The question now is what does
the term pay in the provision connote?
Relating Art. 283 to Art. 97, pay and wage
mean/refer to the same thing.
o The Court gave focus to the last part of Art 97
(f): that wage includes the fair and
reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other
facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employee.
o As to the aspect of being customary, the
fact that the allowance is furnished monthly
does not automatically grant it the character
of being customary. The allowances in
question are temporary only because there
are certain conditions that, when met, will
cause these allowances to cease from being
given.
o As to the aspect of facility, Sec. 5, Rule VII,
Book III of the Implementing Rules defines it
as including articles or services for the
benefit of the employee or his family, and
excluding tools of the trade or articles or
service primarily for the benefit of the
employer or necessary to the conduct of the
employers business. In determining what
privilege constitutes facility, the criterion is its
purpose. Since the assailed allowances were
for the benefit and convenience of the
company, it is not considered as facility. This
is supported by the fact that the assailed
allowances were not subject to withholding
tax.
o As for the value being determined by the
Secretary of Labor, it is actually PICOP that
determined the value of these assailed
allowances and were given in lieu of the
actual provisions for housing and
transportation needs whereas the Bislig
allowance was in consideration of the hostile
environment at the time.
o The conclusion is that, as reached by the
NLRC, these allowances do not form part of
the petitioners wages since they are not
regularly received.
The cited cases by the ELA is inapplicable since it
has been determined that these allowances were
not regularly received.
DISP: NLRC affirmed. Petition dismissed.
Phil. Duplicators v. NLRC and Phil. Duplicators UnionTUPAS (1993)
FACTS:
1. PD is a domestic corporation engaged in the sale
of copying machines and other related products. In
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
ISSUE:
WON the 13th month pay computations should include
the commissions (YES)
RATIO:
The 13th month pay granted to PDs employees
should include their commissions received.
Art. 97 (f) defines wage as remuneration or
earnings, however designated for work done or
to be done, or for services rendered or to be
rendered
In the instant case, the sales commissions
received by PDs salesmen is without question a
part of the compensation paid to them for services
rendered and hence is part of the wage or salary,
as defined by Art. 97 (f).
The fact that this compensation is in the nature of
a commission, it does not detract from its