The Meaning and Use of the Term 'Competence'

in Linguistics and Applied Linguistics

DAVID S.TAYLOR
University of Leeds

One of the most controversial and confusing terms in use in the fields of
Linguistics and Applied Linguistics is 'competence'. The confusion arises from
the fact that different writers use the term in different ways, very often
apparently unaware that their use of the term differs sometimes in quite
fundamental ways from that of others working in the same or closely related
fields. The reader or student may be forgiven for thinking that the same term
refers to the same thing. The result of these divergent uses of the term is that it is
very difficult to know precisely what it means in any given context.
The basic difficulty seems to be that some writers use the term to refer to
something absolute whereas others appear to mean by it something relative.
This latter group seem to include the idea of 'ability' within competence, thus
equating it with 'proficiency', which clearly admits of degrees. They consequendy misinterpret Chomsky and his followers who use the term in a strictly
absolute sense. This has caused great confusion, and indeed much of the
criticism of Chomsky turns out to be invalid because it is based on this
fundamental misunderstanding.
The source of this difficulty is the widespread interpretation of competence to
include the idea of ability. I hope to show that Chomsky's original definition of
Applied Linguistics, Vol. 9, No. 2 Oxford University Press, 1988

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

The term 'competence' has been used so widely and so divergently in so many
different contexts that it has ceased to have any precise meaning. Different
writers interpret it in different ways for different purposes. As a result there is
great confusion about what the term refers to in any given instance. Writers
frequently discuss the concept without taking into account the fact that
interpretations of it differ greatly.
The article explores the different ways in which the term 'competence' has
been used, beginning with Chomsky's originalformulation of the concept. It is
shown that many current uses of the term refer to something quite different
from this original concept. A major problem is that subsequent writers, such as
Hymes, while claiming to be merely extending the notion, are in fact changing
it in ways that are not always immediately apparent to the reader. An attempt is
made to elucidate these changes and to point out in particular the grave
difficulties that arise when the concept is applied outside the domain for which
it was originally intended. A confusion between state and process is noted in
these extended applications of the term. It is suggested that making a clear
distinction between 'competence' and 'proficiency' helps to resolve many of
these difficulties.

DAVID S.TAYLOR

149

Linguistic theory is primarily concerned with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely

homogeneous speech community who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected
by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts
of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his
knowledge of the language in actual performance. (Chomsky 1965:3)
Chomsky's concern here is clearly with idealization. Let us accept the necessity
for idealization in scientific investigation without further argument. The issue
has already been sufficiently discussed by, among others, Fodor and Garret
(1966:135-8) and Chomsky himself (1980:219-20). But there is more to
competence than that. Chomsky goes on to say:
We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer's
knowledge of the language) and performance, the actual use of language in concrete
situations. (Chomsky 1965:4)
Later he refers to 'intrinsic tacit knowledge or competence' (1965:40).
Thus is established the basic distinction between knowledge on the one hand
and use of that knowledge on the other. So far things seem relatively straightforward. The question is, does 'intrinsic tacit knowledge' include the idea of
ability! It seems to me that Chomsky sufficiently clearly equates 'competence'
with 'knowledge' to exclude it. There is, after all, a clear enough distinction
between 'knowledge' and 'ability to use knowledge'. Later, of course, notably in
Rules and Representations, Chomsky explicitly addresses himself to this
problem.
The term 'competence' entered the technical literature in an effort to avoid entanglement with the slew of problems relating to 'knowledge', but it is misleading in that it
suggests 'ability'an association I would like to sever. (Chomsky 1980:59)
The clarity of the distinction drawn by Chomsky between 'knowledge' as
represented by competence and 'putting to use that knowledge' is furthermore
firmly established by such statements as the following:
A person who has learned a language has acquired a system of rules that relate sound
and meaning in a certain specific way. He has, in other words, acquired a certain
competence that he puts to use in producing and understanding speech. (Chomsky
1970:184)

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

the term always excluded this idea, and that much confusion has been caused by
the failure of many succeeding writers, starting with Hymes, to realize this.
In what follows I am going to try to clear up the confusion by considering
carefully what is meant by competence in different contexts. We can do this by
exploring the ways in which the term is used by different writers in different
fields, or even within the same field, and by making a clear distinction between
competence in an absolute and competence in a relative sense.
Let us first go back to the beginning and consider Chomsky's ideas about
competence as originally set out in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax and
elaborated, but not fundamentally changed, in later writings. He makes the
original distinction, between competence and performance, as follows:

150

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

It is sometimes said that Chomsky is in fact working with two definitions of

competencea 'strong' version and a Veak' version. This idea can be traced
back to Campbell and Wales (1970), who, in a rather confused discussion,
distinguish between three versions of competence. Their account is difficult to
follow, but the main thrust of their argument, is, I take it, to deplore the fact that
Chomsky's conception of competence, whether supposedly Sveak' or 'strong',
leads to a very restricted view

They are clearly trying to extend the term 'competence' to cover 'communicative competence', a term which they in fact use. We shall come back to this
question later when discussing the work of Dell Hymes. As far as the 'weak' and
'strong1 versions of competence are concerned, if the Campbell and Wales
discussion is hard to follow, then I suggest that it is at least partly because they
confuse competence with ability, as is already apparent in the quotation above.
But earlier (1970:246) they explicitly state that 'competence in any sphere is
identified with capacity or ability' and later on speak of 'those linguistic abilities
explicitly accounted for by recent transformational work', failing to recognize
that it is not the abilities that are being directly accounted for, but the knowledge
underlying those abilities.
A better discussion of the so-called Sveak' and 'strong' versions of competence is to be found in Greene (1972). The weak or neutral version is purely
descriptive and
such an analysis would have nothing to say about the actual rules or operations by
which a language user achieves this output (...) What this amounts to is that there is no
necessary connection between the set of rules providing the best descriptive account of
a speaker's intuitions and the set of operations by which the speaker himself arrives at
these same intuitions. (Greene 1972:95-6)
Chomsky himself has been at pains to point this out (1965:9). But Greene goes
on to say:
However, despite this logical distinction, it is very difficult not to slip into the
assumption that, if a language user's intuitive knowledge is best described by a set of
rules, then these rules must in some way be represented in his mind, even though he
may not be consciously aware of them. But this involves a shift from the neutral
definition of competence to the stronger interpretation that the rules of grammar are
internalized in the head of the speaker and provide the basis for his understanding of
linguistic relations. In other words, a step has been taken from a description of what the
linguistic usage consists of to a hypothesis about how he. operates when using language.
(op.citl972:96)
But this does not follow at all. Even if 'the rules of grammar are internalized in
the head of the speaker' (and it is not necessarily the rules of grammar that are

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

from which by far the most important linguistic ability has been omittedthe ability to
produce or understand utterances which are not so much grammatical but, more
important, appropriate to the context in which they are made. (Campbell and Wales
1970:247)

DAVIDS. TAYLOR

151

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

internalized but rather knowledge that can be characterized by rules of

grammar), this does not imply anything about how the speaker makes use of the
knowledge represented by these rules. No step has in fact been taken (except by
Greene herself, and before her, Campbell and Wales). Greene makes this claim
on the basis of two statements made by Chomsky, the first in Aspects of the
Theory ofSyntax (1965:9) and the second in the 1970 quote given above.
Let us look more closely at what Chomsky actually says. In Aspects he states
that generative grammar 'attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible
terms the knowledge that provides the basis for actual use of language by a
speaker-hearer' (1965:9). Taking this together with the 1970 quote already
given, where Chomsky talks of the 'system of rules' that a person acquires and of
'a certain competence which he puts to use in producing and understanding
speech' (1970:184), Greene maintains that Chomsky is making claims about
cognitive processes (1972:99-100). But Chomsky is merely talking about ways
of characterizing knowledge. He is not talking about using that knowledge or
even the ability to use that knowledge. Clearly, as Chomsky says, the knowledge
'provides the basis for actual use of language', but the way the knowledge is
characterized (in the form of rules) says nothing about the way the knowledge is
used. So, the very quote that Greene appeals to in fact clearly makes the distinction that she accuses Chomsky of failing to observe. And in the passage from
Greene just quoted; she herself makes exactly that distinction when she talks
about 'the stronger interpretation that the rules of grammar are internalized in
the head of the speaker and provide the basis (emphasis added) for his
understanding of linguistic relations' (1972:96). Regardless of whether or not
the actual rules of grammar are internalized, this does not seem to suggest
anything about use. The distinction between knowledge and use is still
preserved. Any alleged 'shift' is made by Greene, and not by Chomsky. This shift
is not surprising in view of the fact that Greene states earlier that 'competence is
taken as referring to language in the sense of what constitutes ability to speak a
language' (1972:94) and refers to 'the speaker's competence, i.e. his ability to
speak a language' (1972:95), thus making the fateful connection between
competence and ability. And so the distinction between the 'strong* and "weak'
forms of competence rums out to be spurious. It is unfortunate that this
incoherent and misleading interpretation has been perpetuated by other
writers, most notably by Munby (1978:7-8).
We have here, then, an early example of the confusion that has bedevilled
nearly all discussion of competence. (Campbell and Wales, as mentioned before
(1970:246), provide an even earlier example.) It is a confusion, on the one
hand, between knowledge and ability to use knowledge, and on the other a more
general confusion between process and state. Greene takes Chomsky to be
saying something about cognitive processes whereas he confines himself to
dealing with cognitive states. For him, competence is clearly a state and not a
process, and has nothing to do with 'capacity' or 'ability'. In some of his later
writings he dwells on this point at some length. In order to clear up the confusion
as definitively as possible it is worth quoting extensively from what he has to say

152

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

in Reflections on Language about the distinction between knowledge and

capacity or ability.

Later in the same passage, Chomsky goes on to say:

The notions 'capacity' and family of dispositions' are more closely related to behavior
and 'language use'; they do not lead us to inquire into the nature of the 'ghost in the
machine' dirough the study of cognitive structures and their organization, as normal
scientific practice and intellectual curiosity would demand. The proper way to exorcise
the ghost in the machine is to determine the structure of mind and its products. There is
nothing essentially mysterious about the concept of an abstract cognitive structure,
created by an innate faculty of mind, represented in some still-unknown way in the
brain, and entering into the system of capacities and dispositions to act and interpret
On the contrary, a formulation along these lines, embodying the conceptual
competence-performance distinction (cf. Chomsky 1965, chapter 1) seems a prerequisite for a serious investigation of behavior, (op. tit. 1975:23-4)
Chomsky returns to this clearly crucial question again in Rules and Representa-

tions:
To know a language, I am assuming, is to be in a certain mental state, which persists as a
relatively steady component of transitory mental states. What kind of mental state? I
assume further that to be in such a mental state is to have a certain mental structure consisting of a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representations
of various types. Alternatively, one might attempt to characterize knowledge of languageperhaps knowledge more generallyas a capacity or ability to do something, as a
system of dispositions of some kind, in which case one might be led (misled, I think) to
conclude that behavior provides a criterion for the possession of knowledge. In contrast,
if such knowledge is characterized in terms of mental state and structure, behavior simply
provides evidence for possession of knowledge, as might facts of entirely different order,
electrical activity of the brain, for example. (Chomsky 1980:48)
Chomsky could hardly make his position plainer. He sets out to describe
knowledge, which he conceives of as a state. On one occasion he refers to a

'steady state' (1980: 234), and on another to an 'attained state' (1981). He is not
particularly concerned with how the state is attained. Indeed he specifically puts
aside this process, making a point of 'abstracting the linguistic system as a
separate object of study' (1980:234). Elsewhere he states that the linguist's
generative grammar is a theory of the knowledge that a person has. ... The

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

(...) I want to consider mind (in the narrower or broader sense) as an innate capacity to
form cognitive structures, not first-order capacities to act. The cognitive structures
attained enter into our first-order capacities to act, but should not be identified with
them. Thus it does not seem to me quite accurate to take 'knowledge of English' to be a
capacity or ability, though it enters into the capacity or ability exercised in language use.
In principle, one might have that cognitive structure that we call 'knowledge of English',
fully developed, with no capacity to use this structure; and certain capacities to carry
out 'intellectual activities' may involve no cognitive structures but merely a network of
dispositions and habits, something quite different. Knowledge, understanding, or belief
is at a level more abstract than capacity. (Chomsky 1975:23)

DAVIDS. TAYLOR

153

Once the steady state is attained, knowledge of language and skill in language may still
be refined, as in the case of learning to see. Wilhelm von Humboldt argued that the
resources of a language can be enriched by a greater thinker or writer, without any
change in the grammar. An individual can expand his facility or the subtlety of his
comprehension of the devices of language through his own creative activities or
immersion in the cultural wealth of his society. But as in the case of the visual system, it
seems quite appropriate to set this matter aside in abstracting the linguistic system as a
separate object of study, (op. ciL 1980:234)

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

linguist's generative grammar is an effort to capture that knowledge (and to

make it explicit)' (1981). He emphasizes 'that what we loosely call "knowledge
of language" involves in the first place knowledge of grammarindeed that
language is a derivative and perhaps not very interesting concept' (1980: 90). So
far as Chomsk> is concerned, the linguist is concerned with knowledge,
specifically knowledge of language which is to be equated with knowledge of
grammar. And this knowledge is further equated with a mental state, associated
with a particular mental or cognitive structure, which itself is to be distinguished
from any idea of 'capacity' or 'ability', which has more to do with process. In
other words, he is concerned with the product rather than the process.
Chomsky's idea of competence, then, has nothing to say about language use, or
about ability to use the language knowledge represented as competence, or
about how the language user makes use of his knowledge, or even about how
competence is acquired. (Francis (1980) has highlighted some of the difficulties
which arise when the Chomskyan conception of competence is applied to the
study of child language development. For one thing a child is simply not an 'ideal
speaker-hearer'.) Those who interpret competence otherwise are simply
ignoring the evidence, or redefining competence to suit their own purposes.
There would be nothing wrong with that, of course, if writers made it clear that
that is what they were doing, rather than reading into Chomsky's use of the term
elements which he specifically excludes.
Let us now try to draw together all the threads that go to make up Chomsky's
view of competence and draw out the implications. For him, it is a static concept
relating tb individuals. The individuals he has in mind are monolingual native
speakers. Later attempts to apply the concept to non-native speakers or second
language learners are thus fraught with problems. If competence is something
which characterizes individuals, it follows that it has an absolute quality, and
that no comparison is involved or is even possible. In other words, competence
is a property of the individual, similar to the colour of his or her eyes or hair. It is
something that is given. Just as we would not say that brown eyes are 'better'
than blue eyes, it makes no sense to say that one person's competence is 'better'
than another's. Like blue eyes or brown hair, competence is biologically based.
('Ultimately the study of language is a part of human biology.' (Chomsky
1980:226)) Of course, some individuals are better at making use of their
linguistic competence than others, just as some are better at using their eyes.
They may even leant to make better use of them. This does not mean that they
have fundamentally different visual systems. Chomsky puts it like this:

154

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM'COMPETENCE'

For purposes of enquiry and exposition, we may proceed to distinguish 'grammatical

competence'from'pragmatic competence,' restricting the first to the knowledge of
form and meaning and the second to knowledge of conditions and manner of
appropriate use, in conformity with various purposes. Thus we may think of language
as an instrument that can be put to use. The grammar of the language characterizes the
instrument, determining intrinsic physical and semantic properties of every sentence.
The grammar thus expresses grammatical competence. A system of rules and

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

Chomsky is using the term 'competence' as a technical linguistic term. For

him, linguistics is about grammar, and competence, being a technical linguistic
term also concerns grammar, or more precisely knowledge of grammar.
Chomsky has defined this technical term clearly and precisely, for his own
purposes, which are equally clear. We are all entitled to define our technical
terms in our own way to suit our own purposes. If others are to criticize us, then
it must be clear on what grounds the criticism is based, and the criticism must be
based on a firm understanding of how the technical terms are to be understood.
This is where much of the criticism of Chomsky's concept of competence breaks
down, through misinterpretation of what he intends to convey by his use of the
term.
We come now to Dell Hymes, whose contribution to the debate has been so
influential. Hymes first developed his ideas on communicative competence in a
conference paper published as 'Competence and performance in linguistic
theory' (1971), and further elaborated them in the more substantial article
entitled 'On communicative competence' (1972). Hymes was concerned that
Chomsky's notions of competence and performance left no room to account
systematically for the fact that one of the things we know about language is how
to use it appropriately. For him, Chomsky's conception of competence in
particular was far too narrow, leaving performance as a kind of residual
'dustbin' into which all those linguistic phenomena that did not primarily
concern Chomsky were swept. He objects in particular to the 'absence of a place
for sociocultural factors and the Unking of performance to imperfection'
(1972:272).
Hymes's contribution to the development of the idea of competence and
performance is a curious mixture of both positive and negative features. He is,
for instance, quite right to criticize Chomsky's original notion of performance,
pointing out that the notions of theory of performance and theory of language
use are equated under the catch-all term of 'performance'. He deplores 'the
distorting effect of using the one term "performance" for two distinct things, of
the correlative withholding of "competence" from the second of them'
(1971:11). In other words, Hymes is saying that some aspects of what Chomsky
lumps together under performance are systematic, can hence be described in
the form of rules, and can thus be seen as a form of competence. Chomsky
himself later acknowledged this when, in addition to 'grammatical competence'
he recognized 'pragmatic competence', which he conceives of as underlying the
ability to make use of the knowledge characterized as grammatical competence
(Chomsky 1980:59). He later elaborates as follows:

DAVIDS. TAYLOR

155

principles constituting pragmatic competence determines how the tool can effectively
be put to use. (Chomsky 1980:224)
Clearly this corresponds very largely to what Hymes had in mind when talking
about 'competence for use' (1971:19; 1972:279) as a component of his overall
concept of communicative competence. Indeed, he says:

Here, he seems to be saying much the same as Chomsky above. This, then, is the
positive side of Hymes's contribution. He has succeeded in tightening up the
concept of performance, isolating from it that aspect which can be 'characterized by a certain system of rules represented in the mind' (Chomsky
1980:59), thus showing that there are certain aspects of language use that can
be explained in terms of underlying knowledge which we can represent as a
system of rules.
But when Hymes comes specifically to discuss the notion of competence, a
certain degree of confusion creeps in. He starts off well enough, with a clear
definition of linguistic competence that seems to indicate a firm understanding
of the term as used by Chomsky:
Linguistic competence deals with the knowledge that enables the speaker to produce
and understand an infinite set of sentences; this is the meaning of 'creative' when
applied to language. (Hymes 1971:5)
But, at the same time, having displayed this apparently accurate understanding
of Chomsky's position he goes on two pages later to say this:
Since the theory [Chomsky's theory] intends to deal with the 'creative' use of language,
that is with the ability of a speaker to devise novel sentences appropriate to new
situations, it would seem to be retrenchment, if not more, to account for only a shared
ability to understand novel sentences produced by others, (op. cit. 1971: 7)
Here Hymes is clearly introducing an element of 'ability' not present in
Chomsky's formulation of the idea. Having made this shift, he has soon fully
incorporated ability into his idea of competence, as is seen for example when he
talks about 'competence in production' (1972:275), and 'the specification of
ability for use as part of competence' (1972:283).
Further confusion is added when Hymes uses the term 'differential competence' (1971:7; 1972: 274), referring to differences among individuals, and
introducing a comparative and relative dimension, thus losing sight of the fact
that for Chomsky, as pointed out earlier, competence is an absolute notion, the
property of the individual, not allowing of any meaningful comparison. This
whole discussion about differential competence introduces a social element,
which simply confuses the issue. All Hymes is really saying is that different

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

There are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless. Just as
rules of syntax can control aspects of phonology, and just as rules of semantics perhaps
control aspects of syntax, so rules of speech acts enter as a controlling factor for
linguistic form as a whole. (Hymes 1972: 278)

156

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM'COMPETENCE'

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

people have different competences and that there is a social dimension to

language usewhich nobody would deny. But the damage has been done, and
the social dimension is now there in Hymes's conception of competence. This
can be even more clearly seen when he goes on to equate Chomsky's
competence with Saussure's langue. Hymes says that 'Chomsky associates his
views of competence and performance with the Saussurean concepts of langue
and parole' (1972:273). But this is a total misunderstanding. While it is possible
to equate at least Chomsky's original conception of performance with parole,
competence and langue are completely different, as langue is a social concept
and has nothing to do with the individual ('//e est la partie sociale du langage,
exterieure d I'individu.' (Saussure 1967:31))
On the one hand, then, Hymes has helped to clarify the domain of performance and to isolate the systematic nature of some of the conditions governing
language use. On the other hand, however, he has extended the notion of
competence in subtle and not always recognized ways, so that it conveys
something very different from what was originally intended by Chomsky.
Hymes also manages to give the impression that all aspects of language use fall
within the domain of his communicative competence, thus implying that they
can be accounted for systematically in terms of rules, whereas Chomsky is
categoric on this point. Although he recognizes 'pragmatic competence' he also
maintains that '"the creative aspect of language use" remains as much a mystery
to us as it was to the Cartesians' (Chomsky 1975:138), where by mystery he
means something ultimately beyond human capacity to understand. Therefore,
while Hymes appears to be merely extending the idea of competence, he is in
fact subtly changing it.
What Hymes has done, then, is to 'extend the notion of competence as tacit
knowledge from grammar to speaking as a whole' (Hymes 1971:16). This
involves, as we have seen, incorporating the notion of'ability' and introducing a
social dimension. His extension of the meaning of the term therefore involves
change and at the same time gives it a much more general character. This is very
deliberate on Hymes's part as we can see when he says, 'I should therefore take
competence as the most general term for the speaking and hearing capabilities
of a person' (1971:16). Compare this with Chomsky's very precise and narrow
use of the term. Thus for Hymes the general term competence covers a number
of different elements, ranging from grammatical competence on the one hand to
sociolinguistic competence on the other. (It is to be noted that Hymes's
'sociolinguistic competence' is much wider than Chomsky's 'pragmatic competence'.) The term applies then to something that Chomsky would see as
biologically based (grammatical competence) and at the same time to something
much more socially based (sociolinguistic competence). The former is purely
individual, the latter is mainly social. The former concerns form; the latter
concerns function. The former characterizes a state; the latter involves
processes.
This indeed could be seen as the main complaint against Hymes, that by
including so many disparate elements under his global conception of com-

DAVIDS. TAYLOR

157

petence, he has robbed it of any very precise meaning. Hymes objected to

Chomsky's 'dustbin' view of performance, but one could almost say that it is
Hymes who has a dustbin view of competence. It is interesting to note that other
sociolinguists have gone further than Hymes in this respect. Le Page, for
example, maintains that

Here competence seems to have become an explicitly social construct.

One of the most extensive subsequent discussions of competence is provided
by Munby (1978). He covers much of the same ground as Campbell and Wales,
and Greene, unfortunately perpetuating the mythical distinction between Veak'
and 'strong' forms of competence (Munby 1978:7-8). He takes up Hymes's
valid point, already noted, that aspects of what Chomsky originally called
performance are systematic and can thus be characterized as a kind of
competence (Chomsky's later idea of 'pragmatic competence'). Munby also
points out that Widdowson's work (1971,1975) is based on the same idea that
aspects of a person's use of language are systematic and 'rule-governed'. Hence
Widdowson has 'an essentially Hymesian view of communicative competence,
although deriving more from rhetoric and discourse analysis' (Munby
1978:17). Munby also, however, reiterates some of the misconceptions to be
found in Hymes, notably the incorporation of 'ability for use' into some widened
conception of competence (Munby 1978:15-16). He goes on nevertheless to
make the most valuable point that different writers have different orientations
and different preoccupations. He points out for instance that Campbell and
Wales are cognitive psychologists, concerned primarily with language acquisition, and thus tend to see both psycholinguistic and sociolinguisric features of
language from this point of view, whereas Hymes, as an anthropologist and
sociolinguist focuses on how language use involves judgements and abilities,
which concern sociocultural features (Munby 1978:20). In other words,
different conceptions of competence and of the distinction between competence and performance reflect different aims and interests and it is impossible
to make comparisons without taking this into account. It may be, however, that
one then has to question how far the use of these terms for these different
purposes is justified.
Munby is of course concerned with developing the communicative competence of the second language user, and we will examine later whether it is in
fact appropriate to extend the idea of competence to this domain. For the
moment, let us note that his view of competence, like that of Hymes, specifically
includes some notion of'ability' (1978:26), although of course we need to take
into account his 'communicative' orientation.

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

when we come to the central question of 'competence', we have to ask: 'What is it an

individual needs to know, in order to operate as a member of this society?' A society
only exists in the competence of its members to make it work as it does; a language only
exists in the competence of those who use and regard themselves as users of that
language; and the latter competence is the essential mediating system for the former.
(Le Page 1978:41)

158

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

One of the most helpful discussions of competence is to be found in Canale

and Swain's (1980) article. They point out that
there is some diversity of opinion in the literature as to (i) whether or not the notion
'communicative competence' includes that of 'grammatical competence' as one of its
components and (ii) whether or not communicative competence should be distinguished from (communicative) performance. (Canale and Swain 1980:5)

(...) we hesitate to incorporate the notion of ability for use into our definition of
communicative competence for two main reasons: (i) to our knowledge this notion has
not been pursued rigorously in any research on communicative competence (or
considered directly relevant in such research) and (ii) we doubt that there is any theory
of human action that can adequately explicate 'ability for use'. (Canale and Swain
1980: 7)
This view clearly reflects that of Chomsky quoted earlier (Chomsky 1975:138),
and the fact of stating it so explicitly makes an important contribution to
clarifying the debate. (Unfortunately, but typically in this field, Canale, in a later
article meant to be a refinement of this one, backslides when he explicitly
associates grammatical competence with 'skill' (Canale 1983:7). The rest of
Canale and Swain's article is concerned with the development of communicative competence (including grammatical competence) in second language
learners. As one component of their overall conception of communicative
competence they develop the interesting notion of 'strategic competence' to
deal with the knowledge and ability learners need to develop in order to take
part in communicative interaction. This is clearly important, but on the one

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

As they say, 'it is common to find the term "communicative competence" used to
refer exclusively to knowledge or capability relating to the rules of language use
and the term "grammatical (or linguistic) competence" used to refer to the rules
of grammar' (1980: 5). However, they maintain that just as there are rules of
grammar that would be useless without rules of language use (Hymes 1972), so
there are also rules of language use that would be useless without rules of
grammar. Hence they see communicative competence as consisting of grammatical competence plus sociolinguistic competence. Thus, for them, there are
two clearly defined and distinct sub-components of communicative competence. They use the term "communicative competence" to refer to the relationship and interaction between grammatical competence, or knowledge of the
rules of grammar, and sociolinguistic competence, or knowledge of the rules of
language use' (1980:6). This is a welcome clarification, and one is grateful to
have a position so clearly stated. It can be seen that this corresponds very closely
to Chomsky's position, as his 'pragmatic competence' can easily be related to
Canale and Swain's 'sociolinguistic competence'.
Another very welcome clarification (which at the same time brings them into
line with Chomsky) is Canale and Swain's decision to exclude explicitly from
their notion of communicative competence any idea of 'ability for use', unlike
Hymes, who makes this an important feature.

DAVID S. TAYLOR

159

So in an inter-organism perspective there is no place for the dichotomy of competence

and performance, opposing what the speaker knows to what he does. There is no need
to bring in the question of what the speaker knows; the background to what he does is
what he could doa potential, which is objective, not a competence, which is
subjective. (Halliday 1978:38)

Somewhat dubiously, Halliday seems here to be equating individual with

subjective, implying that it is not possible to deal objectively with an individual
psychological perspective. Given his own particular social perspective,
Halliday's rejection of the competence/performance distinction may be
justified, but we must not take this to mean that all other approaches and
perspectives are invalid. From the point of view of the preoccupations of this
paper, HaUiday's distinction between an 'objective' potential and a 'subjective'
competence is useful, however, as it enables him, in discussing Hymes's
communicative competence, to make the nice point that 'Hymes is taking the
intra-organism ticket to what is actually an inter-organism destination; he is
doing "psycho-sociolinguistics", if you like' (Halliday 1978: 38). In other words
Hymes, as pointed out earlier, is introducing a social dimension into what is
essentially an individual concept.
It is not surprising that a number of confusingly different interpretations of
the term competence have arisen when one considers how it is used in other
disciplines, some of which have close connections with linguistics. But perhaps
foremost among the causes of the confusion is the ordinary 'common sense' use
of the word competence, as reflected in current dictionary definitions. A typical
example is to be found in the Collins English Dictionary (1979), which gives as
its main definition the condition of being capable: ability'. Everybody thus has a
natural tendency to associate 'ability' with 'competence'.
The situation becomes even more complicated if we look at the psychological
and educational literature. In psychology the use of the term seems to go back to

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

hand they fail to distinguish between knowledge and ability, or rather they
incorporate both, and on the other hand they do not distinguish between those
strategies which all speakers have, both native and non-native, and those which
are peculiar to non-native speakers. Once again we see the difficulties that arise
when the notion of competence is extended beyond the domain to which it was
originally applied.
It is worth considering briefly at this point the views of Halliday, who is
notorious for rejecting the whole notion of competence and performance and
the distinction between them. Halliday would prefer to distinguish between
what a speaker does and what he could do; in other words he is interested in the
idea of'potential'either 'meaning potential' (i.e. what the speaker can mean) or
'behaviour potential' (i.e. what the speaker can do). This is because he takes
what he calls 'an inter-organism perspective' on language, which he conceives of
as 'part of the social system'. He rejects a psychological level of interpretation as
'unnecessary', no doubt because it emphasizes too much the individual point of
view (Halliday 1978:38-9). He puts it this way:

160

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

White (1959) who uses it to refer to 'an organism's capacity to interact

effectively with its environment' (1959:297). In a review of the psychological
literature on competence Turner (1980) cites White and goes on to distinguish
'cognitive competence' and 'social competence'. The first concerns, among
other things, 'those basic skills which are a precondition for subsequent skills'
(Turner 1980: 39), while the second involves 'certain interpersonal problemsolving skills' (1980:43). Competence, in general, is seen as relating to 'an
underlying organization of skills' (1980:40).
In this tradition, then, competence is clearly associated with 'skills' and
'capacity1, and there is little suggestion of 'mental state' or even of 'knowledge',
although this could be a part of what is meant by competence in this context
(Turner 1980:38). The influence of this tradition is clearly seen in much
educational writing. Wiemann and Backlund (1980), for example, deal with
'communicative competence' from an educational point of view. The idea of
'skill' and 'ability' is strongly present throughout their discussion, and indeed at
one point they speak of competence as 'a combination of knowledge and skill'
(1980:192). In a review of different definitions of competence they note,
interestingly, that there seem to be two perspectives: cognitive and behavioral
(1980:186). The cognitive perspective conceives of competence as being 'a
mental phenomenon distinct and separate from behavior' (1980:187). This
corresponds more or less to our view of competence as exemplified by
Chomsky, and indeed Wiemann and Backlund cite Chomsky as 'the most
influential contributor to the cognitive concept of competence' (1980:187). As
for the behavioral perspective, this 'includes specific reference to actual
communicative behavior. This view of competence has its roots as much in
common usage as in developed theory. Many scholars tie competence specifically to effective behavior' (1980:187). There are echoes here of White's
.definition. Wiemann and Backlund cite Hymes as a good example of one who
takes a mainly behavioral perspective and in fact they themselves take a
generally Hymesian view of communicative competence. For them, 'skills are
the connections between knowledge and behavior' (1980:190), and they
propose that 'proficiency in skills (...) is what is required for the manifestation
of communicative competence' (1980:190). This behavioral perspective on
communicative competence obviously has much in common with what we
referred to earlier as a socially based view of competence, and they specifically
refer to 'communicative competence as a socially judged phenomenon'
(1980:191). In contrast, their cognitive perspective corresponds closely to
what we distinguished earlier as a biologically based view.
Bruner is writing in this tradition when he speaks of 'competence as the
objective of education' (Bruner 1973a: 113). When he says that'(...) what
seems to be at work in a good problem-solving "performance" is some
underlying competence in using the operations of physics or whatever"
(1973a: 111) he seems to have in mind some idea of skill in using knowledge.
For him Vhat is learned is competence, not particular performance'
(1973a: 111) and he goes on to equate learning competence with 'learning to be

DAVID S.TAYLOR

161

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

skillful with a body of knowledge'. Although competence is seen as something

underlying performance, this is a far cry from Chomsky's conception in that it
involves proficiency in using knowledge. Strangely enough, at other times
Bruner seems to be using the term in a sense similar to that of Chomsky, as when
he explicitly associates 'knowing a rule' with 'having a competence' (Bruner
1973b: 461-2).
Thus, in this literature, the term competence is very closely associated with
the idea of 'skills' (particularly in using knowledge) and has a strong behavioral
orientation, together with an obvious social dimensionso much so that, to add
further to the confusion, in the domain of teacher education notably, it is
sometimes used interchangeably with performance! Perlberg, Kremer, and
Lewis (1979), for instance, treat Competence Based Teacher Education
(CBTE) as equivalent to Performance Based Teacher Education (PBTE).
Given all these various strands and traditions of thinking it is not surprising
that competence has come to be firmly associated with proficiency, particularly
in the domain of Applied Linguistics and its principal concern, language
teaching and learning, which draw on all the disciplines discussed aboveLinguistics, Psychology, and Education. What, then, can competence mean for
an applied linguist, subject as he is to these different influences? Here also
confusion reigns, some applied linguists squarely identifying the notion with
proficiency, or generally taking a Hymesian line with a behavioral perspective,
arriving at a socially based conception incorporating some idea of 'skill in using
knowledge', while others seem to take, at least at times, a more Chomskyan
position.
Corder, in his book Introducing Applied Linguistics, where Applied Linguistics is discussed in relation to language teaching, has the usual discussion of the
competence/performance distinction, together with the by now statutory
references to Chomsky (Corder 1973:90-3). He also deals with communicative competence, which he later describes as 'the general skill which has been
called communicative competence' (1973:126). Corder's discussion of
Chomsky's original use of the term competence is unexceptionable, but
immediately it is widened to include communicative competence we notice the
element of skill creeping in. We must remember, too, that all this is in the context
of second language learning and teaching, and although if we accept, as Corder
does, the notion of communicative competence as a 'skill' (this is appropriate
enough), it is not at all clear how the original, narrower conception of
competence can apply here. After all, Corder himself points out that the aim of
the applied linguist/language teacher is to produce someone who can perform
(1973:197). Presumably, then, the language teacher needs to provide the
learner with the competence he needs in order to perform. In other words, the
notion of competence may be useful in specifying what it is that the learner
needs to know, but it is difficult to see that it can contribute anything to the
process of acquiring that knowledge, being an essentially descriptive term,
applicable to a state or a structure. This is the danger of the over-extension of the
term a la Hymes. People tend to see in it something of relevance to all the

162

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

My own term transitional competence borrows the notion of 'competence' from

Chomsky and emphasizes that the learner possesses a certain body of knowledge which
we hope is constantly developing. (Corder 1981:67)

Here we have the problem in a nutshell. How can we apply the essentially static
idea of competence to a 'body of knowledge which we hope is constantly
developing'? The product and the process are mixed up again, perhaps
inevitably so. This question has arisen whenever a competence-based approach
to the study of 'interlanguage' (as the language of the learner considered as a
system in its ownrightcame to be called), has been tried. For interlanguage is an
essentially dynamic phenomenon, inherently unstable and variable, full of
backsliding and regressions, as Corder himself points out (1981:87-94). Some
have concluded from this that competence is not therefore a valid concept,
while others, such as Hymes, have simply widened the concept to include in it
that which they want to include. Either way, understanding is not really
advanced.
Some of the same problems may be seen in other discussions of the concept in
the context of language learning. A notable example is Stern's wide-ranging and
important survey of the field (Stern 1983). In general, Stern seems to equate
competence with 'proficiency'. He says that 'Among different learners at
different stages of learning second language competence or proficiency ranges
from zero to native-like proficiency' (1983: 341), explicitly identifying competence with proficiency. Even more revealingly, later (1983:344) Stern,
discussing the fact that native speakers use the first language 'creatively', says
that 'competence is active and dynamic, not mechanical or static'. He is thus
clearly linking competence with language use, and confusing state and process.
And when Stern states that 'different first language users are likely to have
competence to a different degree' (1983:345) this recalls Hymes's 'differential
competence' and takes us away once more from Chomsky's original absolute
conception. It is clear that, once the idea of relativity creeps in, the distinction

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

problems of language teaching. Also, as we can see very clearly here, introducing the idea of 'skill' in this connection tends to blur the competence/
performance distinction, as skill is associated with performance, not
knowledge.
In fact Corder himself tried to use the term strictly. In an article originally
written in 1967, he introduced the term 'transitional competence' (Corder
1981:10) in an attempt to use the Chomskyan framework to throw light on
what was systematic about a learner's language. Corder clearly intends to use
the term in a descriptive way, to describe the knowledge of the language learner
at any particular stage, and is fairly faithful to the Chomskyan sense. However,
the use of the term in the second language situation still gives rise to difficulties.
For example, Corder is led to speak of 'errors of competence' (1981:10),
showing a relative and comparative dimension which is not present in
Chomsky's absolute sense of the term (see above). As he later explains in
another article:

DAVID S. TAYLOR

163

between competence and performance is difficult to maintain. Finally, let us

quote Stern's summing up of his position.

While Chomsky would recognize his conception of competence in (1), and

Hymes would recognize his conception of communicative competence in (2)
and certain parts of (3), (4) has no place in any conception of competence which
observes the competence/performance distinction. (Remember that Chomsky
regards 'the creativity of language use' as a 'mystery" probably beyond human
understanding. (Chomsky 1975:138; 1980: 222))
For Stern, then, competence seems to be a very broad concept indeed,
covering knowledge (both linguistic and sociolinguistic) on the one hand, and
skill in putting that knowledge to use on the other. In addition, some sort of
overall meaning like 'ability to perform in the language' seems to be present.
Although Stern explicitly identifies the two terms competence and proficiency,
as we have seen, he really seems to be introducing a new concept altogether.
This may simply be adding to the confusion, but it could be that the term
proficiency, in association with competence, could offer us a way out. We will
take up this point later.
The inevitable and fundamental changes in the nature of competence once it
is associated with any kind of communication come out very clearly in
Savignon's (1983) discussion of the subject. She makes such statements as the
following:
Communicative competence is a dynamic rather than a static concept. It depends on
the negotiation of meaning between two or more persons who share to some degree the
same symbolic system. In this sense, then, communicative competence can be said to be
an interpersonal rather than an intrapersonal trait. (Savignon 1983:8)
Savignon is here spelling out very clearly what follows from Hymes's introduction of a social dimension (see above). More consequences follow:
Communicative competence is relative, not absolute, and depends on the cooperation
of all the participants involved. It makes sense, then, to speak of degrees of communicative competence, (op. cit. 1983:9)
Once again, we are dealing with something very different from Chomsky's
original concept. The problem is that Hymes, and those that follow him such as
Savignon, are apparently claiming to be merely extending the original concept
whereas they are obviously doing more than that. The danger is that even when

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

In review, knowing a language, competence, or proficiency in the first or second

language can be summarized as:
1 the intuitive mastery of the forms of the language,
2 the intuitive mastery of the linguistic, cognitive, affective, and sociocultural
meanings, expressed by the language forms,
3 the capacity to use the language with maximum attention to communication and
minimum attention to form, and
4 the creativity of language use. (Stern 1983:346)

164

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

such writers apply the notion of competence to its original domain, i.e. that of
the native speaker, they introduce their fundamentally different view, as may be
seen in the following extract from Savignon:

Here again we see the identification of competence with proficiency and the
inclusion of elements specifically excluded by Chomsky (see Chomsky
1980:234). What is important is that there does not seem to be any awareness in
any of these instances that a changed concept of competence is being used.
Under these circumstances it is very difficult to know in any given instance what
exactly is meant by the term 'competence'.
As far as the term 'communicative competence' is concerned, it generally
seems to mean, in the context of language teaching and learning, 'ability to
perform' or 'ability to communicate' in the second language. More generally,
associating competence with communication inevitably seems to bring in some
aspects of performance. It is difficult to escape the conclusion, therefore, that
when we talk about communicative competence in the context of language
teaching or learning we are really talking about communicative performance.
Especially when we talk about aims and about specifying them for teaching and
learning purposes, we are interested mainly in performance, no matter what
terms we use. Hence in all these discussions, as we have noted, the distinction
between competence and performance tends to become blurred and the exact
meaning of the terms used is difficult to determine.
One of the few writers to face up to these difficulties is Widdowson, who had
earlier contributed a valuable and helpful distinction between usage on the one
hand and use on the other (Widdowson 1978:1-3). These are similar to
competence and performance but are defined more from the teacher's or
learner's point of view. In other words, in dealing with the pedagogical
perspective Widdowson manages to avoid confusion by introducing two
separate terms to be used specifically in this context. Many teachers have cause
to be grateful for this clarification. Recently he has attempted further clarification by trying to distinguish between competence and capacity (Widdowson
1983:7-8,23-8). This distinction clearly recognizes one of the main difficulties
(the confusion of competence with proficiency) and attempts to deal with it.
Widdowson is very clear about the proper nature of competence and its
necessary limitations, and on the whole supports Chomsky's views on the
matter. In introducing the term 'capacity* he wants to bring in a user's perspective, as he regards the concept of communicative competence (as originally
developed by Hymes) as too 'analytic'. While Hymes undoubtedly intended his
concept to be analytic in character we have seen that, by introducing social and
other dimensions, he in fact changes the nature of the concept so that in fact it

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

The competence of native speakers, well developed though it may be, is relative.
Mother-tongue proficiency varies widelyfromchild to child and from adult to adult
Vocabulary range, articulation, critical thinking, persuasiveness, and penmanship are
but a few of the many, many facets of competence wherein native speakers differ, (op.
cit. 1983: 53)

DAVID S. TAYLOR

165

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

does have a user orientation, despite what Widdowson says. Hence there is
some similarity between Hymes's communicative competence and Widdowson's capacity. As we saw earlier, Munby had already noted the similarity in
thinking between Hymes and Widdowson. The point is, however, that
Widdowson has explicitly recognized and faced up to the problems that arise
when the term competence is associated with learning and use.
His term 'capacity1 inevitably invites comparison with Chomsky's use of the
term. We have already referred to the tatter's various discussions, from which it
is clear that for him capacity has to do with ability to make use of knowledge
(linguistic knowledge in this case). Chomsky is, though, on the whole more
concerned with cognitive capacity in general, whereas Widdowson has in mind a
more precise application of the term to what he calls 'the ability to create
meanings by exploiting the potential inherent in the language for continual
modification in response to change' (Widdowson 1983:8). This, I take it, is
merely spelling out what Chomsky variously refers to as the creative aspect of
language use' (Chomsky 1975:138) and 'the creative use of language'
(Chomsky 1980:222). We can conclude, then, that Widdowson's distinction is
not altogether a new one. Nor is the concept to which he gives the name
'capacity' new. Nevertheless, the discussion is valuable and helpful in that it
focuses attention on crucial issues, although it does leave rather unclear the
place and status of performance .The importance lies in the fact that, almost for
the first time, the limitations of the concept of competence outside its original
sphere are clearly recognized.
How then, can we try to bring some order and consistency to the use of the
term 'competence' and the various associated terms? We have seen that most of
the difficulties arise when competence is extended to include process as well as
product, function as well as formin other words when no distinction is clearly
drawn between states and dynamic processes. This seems to happen automatically when we move outside the original domain of the 'ideal speaker-hearer',
particularly when we move into what might be called the 'applied' domain of
language, which inevitably has to take a broader view and also calls on other
disciplines such as psychology and education. In an important discussion of the
nature of applied linguistics Brumfit (1985:42) warns against the confusion of
procedures which are in essence investigatory and descriptive with those that
are developmental and pedagogical'. It seems to me that this is precisely what
has happened with the concept of competence. It is an investigatory and
descriptive device, valid in a certain domain, but causing many difficulties
outside it. Many writers have pointed out, for example, that Chomskyan
competence cannot cope properly with variation and change (e.g. Milroy 1985).
It is a restricted, narrow, static concept This is not necessarily a criticismit
simply reflects the nature of Chomsky's preoccupations, which he has made
very clear.
But once we try to concern ourselves with matters of language development
(in either a first or second language) and language use, it becomes necessary to
take into account processes and functions, which in this perspective are not

166

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM'COMPETENCE'

easily separable from states and forms. Brumfit, talking about this wider
perspective, has put it well:

Although it is obvious that the classical Chomskyan notion of competence

has only a small part to play in all this, it is equally obvious, from the fact that the
term competence is used so widely and so diversely in so many different
domains, that there is a need for some similar concept or for some such
distinction as the one between competence and performance. One clearly needs
at times to distinguish between what a speaker knows and what he does,
between his knowledge and his proficiency in using that knowledge, between
what is individual and what is social. Unfortunately, because of the way in which
the term competence has been used, and notably has been given in many cases a
social dimension, it has taken on a relative sense and has become equated with
proficiency. It is therefore no longer possible to tell what precisely is meant by it
and hence to make the distinctions that are needed. We have seen some
examples of the confusion that this state of affairs leads to. A further example
that springs to mind is the great misunderstanding that arose over Bernstein's
distinction between elaborated and restricted codes. It is legitimate to speculate
that much of this could have been avoided if the distinction between knowledge
and use had been clearly kept in mind.
If we admit that competence in its restricted sense is still a useful concept (i.e.
referring to some kind of 'knowledge' or, better, 'state of knowledge'), then we
can draw a distinction between competence and proficiency, the latter term
designating something like 'the ability to make use of competence'. Performance
is then what is done when proficiency is put to use. Competence can be regarded
as a static concept, having to do with structure, state, or form, whereas
proficiency is essentially a dynamic concept, having to do with process and
function. We can thus avoid the difficulties that arise from confusing these
things. We can also avoid the confusion between relative and absolute notions,
competence being squarely absolute in character, while proficiency admits of
degrees and of comparison, and is thus a relative notion. Using the terms in this
way would enable us to make the crucial distinctions where necessary and, at the
same time, to adopt the more fluid and dynamic view of language that is
necessary in order to make sense of language as it is used in the world.
Much could be clarified by doing away with the overall term 'communicative
competence' which has been so abused that it has lost all precise meaning. The
vague meaning that it does seem to have ('ability to perform") has no recognizable connection at all with competence as originally defined. We might do better

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

What is beginning to emerge, in other words, is an account of language which is not

static, idealized, and therefore not directly and simply applicable to the needs of
workers of any kind with real problems. Rather it is an account which is dynamic, fluid,
and increasingly motivated by reference to interaction, to active learning and using
strategies associated with learners' responses to social demands. This is an account, in
short, of users' application of language to the problems of the world and being in it.
(Brumfit 1985:45)

DAVID S. TAYLOR

167

REFERENCES

BrumGt, C. J. 1985. Language and Literature Teaching: From Practice to Theory.

Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Bruner, J. S. 1973a. The Relevance ofEducation. New York: Norton.
Brunei", J. S. 1973b. Beyond the Information Given. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Campbell, R. and R. Wales. 1970. The study of language acquisition' in J. Lyons (ed.):
New Horizons in Linguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Canale, M. 1983. 'From communicative competence to communicative language
pedagogy' in J. C. Richards and R. W. Schmidt (eds.): Language and Communication.
London: Longman.
Canale, M. and M. Swain. 1980. Theoretical bases of communicative approaches to
second language teaching and testing.' Applied Linguistics 1:1-47.
Chomsky, N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Chomsky, N. 1970. "Remarks on nominalization' in R. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum
(eds.): Readings in English Transformational Syntax. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn.
Chomsky, N. 1975. Reflections on Language. London: Temple Smith.
Chomsky, N. 1980. Rules and Representations. Oxford: BlackwelL
Chomsky, N. 1981. 'Interview with John Maddox.' Scientifically Speaking. BBC Radio 3.
Corder, S. P. 1973. Introducing Applied Linguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Corder, S. P. 1981. Error Analysis and Interlanguage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. and M. Garrett. 1966. 'Some reflections on competence and performance' in
J.Lyons and R.J. Wales (eds.): Psycholinguistic Papers. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Francis, H. 1980. "Language development and education.' Educational Analysis 2:2535.
Greene, J. 1972. Psycholinguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Halliday, M. A. K. 1978. Language as Social Semiotic. London: Edward Arnold.

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

to replace it instead with 'communicative proficiency', which would have a

number of components, such as 'grammatical competence', together with the
associated 'grammatical proficiency', and 'pragmatic competence' together with
'pragmatic proficiency'. We could perhaps also include 'strategic competence'
and 'strategic proficiency' if it were possible to define closely enough what is
meant by 'strategy' and what constitutes knowledge of a strategy.
It is hoped that this paper has shown the extent of the confusion that has
arisen through the rather indiscriminate use of the term 'competence' and the
necessity of making clear exactly what is understood by it in all contexts. It is
hoped also that the suggested distinction between competence and proficiency
will serve at least as a starting point for a general clarification of the subject, so
that, by giving it back its original meaning, we can make the most of Chomsky's
original conception without distorting it in any way. Only then can we use it as a
clear basis for developing related concepts. In this way we may be able to adopt
a wider perspective on language which will not be in conflict with any of
Chomsky's fundamental insights. Hopefully we can then avoid the conflicts and
misunderstandings that have occurred largely as a result of a fragmentation of
interests.
{Revised version received September 1986)

168

THE MEANING AND USE OF THE TERM 'COMPETENCE'

Downloaded from http://applij.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of California, San Francisco on November 30, 2014

Hymes, D. 1971. 'Competence and performance in linguistic theory* in R. Huxley and

E. Ingram (eds.): Language Acquisition: Models and Methods. New York: Academic
Press.
Hymes, D. 1972. 'On communicative competence' in J. B. Pride and J. Holmes (eds.):
Sociolinguistics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Le Page, R. B. 1978. 'Sociolinguistics and the problem of competence' in V. Kinsella
(ed.): Language Teaching and Linguistics: Surveys. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Milroy, L. 1985. 'What a performance! Some problems with the competenceperformance distinction.' Australian Journal of Linguistics 5:1-17.
Munby, J. 1968. Communicative Syllabus Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Perlberg, A., L. Kremer and R. Lewis. 1979. Towards new teacher education models.'
British Journal of Teacher Education 5: 263-81.
Saussure, F. de 1967. Cours de linguistique generate. Paris: Payot.
Savignon, S. J. 1983. Communicative Competence: Theory and Classroom Practice.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Stern, H. H. 1983. Fundamental Concepts of Language Teaching. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Turner, J. 1980. The development of competence.' Educational Review 2:37-46.
White, R. W. 195 9. 'Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence.' Psychological
Review 66: 297-333.
Widdowson, H. G. 1971. The teaching of rhetoric to students of science and technology'
in Science and Technology in a Second Language. London: Centre for Information on
Language Teaching and Research.
Widdowson, H. G. 1975. TEST in theory and practice' in English for Academic Study.
London: British Council English Teaching Information Centre.
Widdowson, H. G. 1978. Teaching Language as Communication. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Widdowson, H. G. 1983. Learning Purpose and Language Use. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Wiemann, J. M. and P. Backlund. 1980. 'Current theory and research in communicative
competence.' Review of Educational Research 50:185-99.