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REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Ong won the Congressional Election of Second District of Northern Samar.
The other electioneers were Balinquit and Co. The two questioned the
citizenship of Ong contending that he is not a Filipino citizen before the
House Electoral Tribunal. HRET decided in favor of Ong and Balinquit and Co
brought the petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong is a natural born Filipino citizenship.
RULING:
Yes, Ong is a natural born Filipino Citizen. Ong became a Filipino Citizen
through his mother and not through his father. It is unnecessary to trace the
citizenship of Ong to his father since his father was already a Filipino citizen
when he was born. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he
came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father
were Filipinos. Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he
first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign
nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
In this case, Nottebohm had forfeited his German nationality and thus only
had the nationality of Liechtenstein. However, the Court pointed out that he
always retained his family and business connections with Germany and that
there is nothing to indicate that his application for naturalization in
Liechtenstein was motivated by any desire to dissociate himself from the
Government of his country. There is thus the absence of any bond of
attachment with Liechtenstein, but there is a long-standing and close
connection between him and Guatemala, a link which his naturalization in no
way weakened. For these reasons the Court held the claim of Liechtenstein
to be inadmissible.
NATIONALITY DECREES IN TUNIS AND MOROCCO
Advisory Opinion of 7 February 1923 (Series B No. 4)
FACTS:
A decree was promulgated by the Bey of Tunis which enacts that: Every
person born in the territory of the Kingdom of parents one of whom was also
born there is a Tunisian. The President of the French Republic likewise issued
a Decree which states that: Every person born in the Regency of Tunis of
parents of whom one who was also born there is French. Similar legislation as
introduced in Morocco (French Zone).
The British Ambassador in Paris protested to the French Government against
the application to British subjects of the decrees promulgated in Tunis and
also stated that his Government was unable to recognize that the decrees
put into force in the French Zone of Morocco ere applicable to persons
entitled to British nationality. The British Government then proposed to the
French that the matter should be referred to the Court. However the French
Government refused to submit the matter to arbitral or judicial settlement,
thus, the dispute as submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dispute, international law, solely a matter of domestic
jurisdiction.
RULING:
The exclusive jurisdiction of States embraces matters which are not in
principle regulated by international law. The extent of this jurisdiction, which,
in the opinion of the Court, includes in principle, questions of nationality,
varies with the development of international relations; it is therefore a purely
relative question. Moreover, even as regards matters falling within this
domain, the right of a State to use its discretion may be restricted by the
effect of international obligations. Nevertheless, a dispute, which, in
principle, falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, is not removed from
that domain simply because international engagements are invoked.
From this point of view, the Court considers the contention that France
enjoys in Tunis and Morocco the same exclusive right to legislate on
questions of nationality as in France itself, and that the local sovereignty of
the protected State in conjunction with the public powers exercised by the
protecting State may be equivalent to full sovereignty. Thus, the Court
arrives at the conclusion that the dispute in question does not relate to a
matter which, by international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of France; the Council therefore is competent to deal with the dispute laid
before it by Great Britain regarding the nationality decrees in Tunis and
Morocco.
RULING:
The International Court of Justice held that Belgium had no legal interest in
the matter to justify it bringing a claim. Although Belgian shareholders
suffered if a wrong was done to the company, it was only the company's
rights that could have been infringed by Spain's actions. It would only be if
direct shareholder rights (such as to dividends) were affected, that the state
of the shareholders would have an independent right of action. It was a
general rule of international law that when an unlawful act was committed
against a company, only the state of incorporation of the company could sue,
and because Canada had chosen not to, this was the end. The idea of a
"diplomatic protection" of shareholders was unsound because it would create
confusion and insecurity in economic relations as shares are 'widely
scattered and frequently change hands'. The court also said that a state is
bound to give the same legal protection to foreign investments and
nationals, either for natural or legal persons, when it admits them to its
territory.
ROBERTS CLAIM
United States of America v. United Mexican States
02 November 1926
FACTS:
Harry Roberts is an American citizen who was arbitrarily and illegally arrested
by Mexican authorities, who held him prisoner for a long time in
contravention of Mexican law and subjected him to cruel and inhumane
treatment throughout the entire period of confinement. He was imprisoned
for nineteen (19) months. Thus, the United States asks that an indemnity be
paid by the Government of Mexico in the sum of $17,650 for the wrongful
treatment, loss of income and attorneys fees of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government of United States may claim indemnity for the
mistreatment done by another State to their citizen.
RULING:
Facts with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and national may be
important in determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment of an
alien. But such equality is not the ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of
authorities in the light of international law. That test is, broadly speaking,
whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of
Whether or not the Commission cannot hear the case for the claim is based
on an alleged non-performance of contract obligations and that the claimant
has no right to submit any claims connected with the contract to an
international commission due to the Calvo clause contained in the contract.
RULING:
The Commission decided that the case as presented was not within its
jurisdiction. The Commissioners construe Article 18 of the contract before the
Commission in this case to mean that with respect to all matters involving
the execution, fulfillment, and interpretation of that contract the claimant
bound itself to exhaust all remedies afforded under Mexican law by resorting
to Mexican tribunals or other duly constituted Mexican authorities before
applying to its own Government for diplomatic or other protection, and that
this article imposes no other limitation upon any right of claimant.
It was further held that said provision in the contract was not intended to and
does not prevent claimant from requesting its Government to intervene in its
behalf diplomatically or otherwise to secure redress for any wrong which it
may heretofore have suffered or may hereafter suffer at the hands of the
Government of Mexico resulting from a denial of justice, or delay of justice,
or any other violation by Mexico of any right which claimant is entitled to
enjoy under the rules and principles of international law, whether such
violation grows out of this contract or otherwise. Therefore, the clause will
not preclude his Government from espousing, or the tribunal from
considering, other claims based on the violation of international law.
and Libya was found to have breached its obligations under the Deeds of
Concessions and was also legally bound to perform in accordance with their
terms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a reference made to general principles of law in the
International Arbitration may be a sufficient criterion for the
internationalization of a contract.
RULING:
Yes. Whenever reference is been made to general principles of law in the
international arbitration context, it is always held to be a sufficient criterion
for the internationalization of a contract. The lack of adequate law in the
state considered and the need to protect the private contracting party
against unilateral and abrupt modifications of law in the contracting state is
a justification to the recourse to general principles. Though international law
involves subjects of a diversified nature, legal international capacity is not
solely attributable to a state. A private contracting party, unlike a state, has
only a limited capacity and is limited to invoke only those rights that he
derives from his contract.
Applying Libyan law or international law in the arbitration proceedings was a
conflict encountered by in this case. Though the contract itself deferred to
Libyan law, the court noted that Libyan law does not preclude the application
of international law, but that the two must be combined in order to verify
that Libyan law complies with international law. Even though the right of a
state to nationalize is recognized by international law, this right in itself is
not a sufficient justification not to regard its contractual obligations.
FACTS:
On 6 February 1987, the United States filed an application with the
International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against Italy in respect
of a dispute arising out of the requisitioning of the plant and assets of
Raytheon-Elsi S.p.A, an Italian company based in Sicily but wholly owned by
two US corporations. The parties requested that the matter be referred to a
Chamber of the Court.
In March/April 1968, the ELSI suffered bankruptcy and as subsequently sold
at a
reduced
price to
the State-owned Industria
Elettronica
Telecommunicazioni S.p.A. (ELTEL). The United States claimed that the
requisition had caused the bankruptcy of the company, thereby violating
several substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the FCN Treaty. On
the other hand, Italy raised a preliminary objection to the admissibility of the
claim on the ground that local remedies had not been exhausted and, in any
event, flatly denied any violation of the Treaty and that supposed that there
is a violation of its obligations, no injury had been caused for which payment
of indemnity would be justified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Italy impaired Raytheons right to manage and control under
Article III (2) of the 1948 FCN and failed to provide the full protection and
security dictated by treaty and international law under Article V (1) and (3).
RULING:
The I.C.J. held that Italy had not violated the FCN Treaty. Despite the court's
broad interpretation of the treaty, the court found that the United States
failed to state a claim absent a direct causal link between the mayor's
requisition order and ELSI's bankruptcy. The court determined that the core
claim was found in article III of the treaty: impairment of the right to manage
and control. Although the Italian courts found the requisition order
unjustifiable, the I.C.J. was left to determine the financial position of ELSI. If
ELSI's position was so precarious that Raytheon and Machlett would not have
been able to manage and control it before the requisition order, then ELSI
was already deprived of the rights allegedly impaired by the order. The court
also considered whether the orderly liquidation plan was still feasible as of
March 31, 1968, after the dismissal of ELSI's employees, and found that the
United States had failed to establish the feasibility of liquidation. Italy's
actions or omissions were found not to have directly impaired the
management and control of ELSI, thereby leaving no cause of action.
RULING:
Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settling disputes, has long been
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. Foreign arbitration, as a system
of settling commercial disputes of an international character, was recognized
when the Philippines adhered to the United Nations "Convention on the
Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958," under
the 10 May 1965 Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine Senate, giving reciprocal
recognition and allowing enforcement of international arbitration agreements
between parties of different nationalities within a contracting state. The
enactment of R.A. No. 9285 further institutionalized the use of alternative
dispute resolution systems, including arbitration, in the settlement of
disputes. Thus, a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute
between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. Moreover,
the doctrine of separability or severability enunciates that an arbitration
agreement is independent of the main contract.
In this case, Gonzaless argument that the Addendum Contract is null and
void making the arbitration clause therein void is not tenable. First, the
proceeding in a petition for arbitration under R.A. No. 876 is limited only to
the resolution of the question of whether the arbitration agreement exists.
Second, the separability of the arbitration clause from the Addendum
Contract means that validity or invalidity of the Addendum Contract will not
affect the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. Thus, Gonzaless
petition should be dismissed.
factor or owner, 'for the purpose of procuring any negroe, mulatto or person
of color from any foreign country to be transported to any place whatsoever
within the jurisdiction of the United States, to be held, sold, or disposed of as
slaves, or to be held to service or labor,' shall be forfeited to the United
States. It was admitted by the Claimant, that the Caroline came into this
port equipped like any common merchant vessel, that she did, after her
arrival, receive fitments and take on board articles calculated for the slavetrade only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Caroline should be forfeited to the United States for its
violation of either Act of 1794 or the Act of 1807.
RULING:
The Court decided that a libel for forfeiture must be particular and certain in
all the material circumstances which constitute the offense. The vessel is
only liable to forfeiture when she shall have been actually fitted, equipped or
prepared, not while she is fitting, equipping, or preparing. The degree of
equipment ought to have been stated that the Court might judge whether it
were such fitting, or equipment as is contemplated by the law. Upon every
information for a penalty, the offence should be fully proved. This case is like
that of Moodie v. Ship Alfred, in which this Court decided that the ship was
not illegally fitted out, although she had taken on board some articles
calculated for war.
ISSUE:
Whether or not threats or use of nuclear weapons are permitted under
international law.
RULING:
Yes. Under certain circumstance, threat or use of nuclear weapons are
permitted under international law. The threat or use of nuclear weapons in all
circumstances is not authorized or prohibited by either the customary or
conventional international nuclear law.
Under the U.N. Charter, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
considered legal if all requirements of Article 51 which deals with states
rights to self-defense are met. However, in whatever the situation can be, a
state obligation exists to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspect under strict and
effective international control.
passengers on board were killed. Eleven Lockerbie residents were also killed
as the shattered civilian carrier crashed to the ground. The investigation that
followed indicated that Libya and Libyan agents were almost exclusively
responsible for the bombing. On November 14, 1991, the United States
handed down indictments against Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah for their role in the murder of the passengers and crew of
Flight 103.
Libya argued that under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention), Libya could either extradite
or prosecute the suspects themselves. Libya chose to prosecute the suspects
themselves. However, the United States and the UK took the case to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which issued two resolutions that
urged Libya to hand over the bombing suspects.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolutions issued by UN Security Council is binding to
Libya.
RULING:
Under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, it allows the UNSC to take
enforcement actions to restore international peace. It also provided under its
Article 103 that, "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail and under Article 25 of the same charter,
member States must follow UNSC resolutions. Thus, the ICJ found that the
UNSC resolutions were permissible, and the Libya must hand over the
suspects. Moreover, UNSC decisions are binding and cannot be subjected to
judicial review of the ICJ.
FACTS:
The Democratic Republic of Congo filed its application to the ICJ in June 1999,
alleging that acts of armed aggression carried out by Uganda on DRC
territory constituted a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Jurisdiction was found under
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court; the DRC and Uganda have accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
On July 1, 2000, the Court issued provisional measures requiring that both
parties refrain from any action, which might prejudice the rights of the other
party or which might aggravate or extend the dispute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Uganda violated several international laws including
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law.
RULING:
The Court found that Uganda violated the principles of non-use of force in
international relations and of non-intervention. The Court additionally found
that the DRC in turn violated obligations owed to Uganda under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.
The Court found that the acts or omission of Ugandan Peoples Defense Force
(UPDF) were attributable to Uganda, even where such acts may have been
outside the scope of a soldiers or officers authority, as the UPDF is a State
organ. It further noted that States obligations under human rights
instruments do not cease in the case of armed conflict. The Court concluded
that the acts committed by UPDF and its officers and soldiers violated
customary international law as reflected in Articles 25, 27, 28, 43, 46 and 47
of the 1907 Hague Regulations, and also violated the following treaty
obligations of Uganda.
The Court also found that the Vienna Convention continues to apply
regardless of whether a state of armed conflict exists, and further requires
accommodation for safe evacuation of diplomatic personnel in the event of
conflict. It also requires the respect of diplomatic property and premises in
the event diplomatic relations are breached between the sending and
receiving States. This principle was upheld in United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran.
Therefore, the Court granted DRCs request for reparations, noting under
prior precedent that it is well established in general international law that a
State which bears responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act. In the
event the parties fail to reach a settlement, the amount of reparations will be
determined by the Court at a future proceeding.
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia v. United States of America
ICJ, 1 June 1999
FACTS:
On 29 April 1999, the (former) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) instituted
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United
States of America for violation of the obligation not to use force, resulting
from the bombing of Yugoslav territory by the United States and other
Member States of NATO. Concurrent to this Application, the FRY submitted a
request for the indication of provisional measures, calling on the ICJ to order
the United States to cease immediately its acts of use of force and to
refrain from any further threat or act of force against the FRY.
In filing the Application, the FRY relied on Article IX of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 1948 and Article 38(5) of the Rules
of the Court. These articles state, respectively, that disputes between
contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of
the Convention shall be submitted to the ICJ, and that applications filed
against States which have not accepted the Courts jurisdiction cannot
proceed unless and until that State accepts the Courts jurisdiction for the
purposes of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the USA violated its obligation not to use force.
RULING:
In delivering its decision on 2 June 1999 the ICJ first sought to emphasize its
deep concern over the human tragedy in Kosovo, and declared its profound
concern with the use of force in the Yugoslav territories, which it deemed to
raise very serious issues of international law. Nevertheless, the ICJ
reiterated the fundamental principle of its Statute that it cannot settle a
dispute between states in the absence of the consent of those states to its
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it reminded the parties that it was unable to
indicate provisional measures without first establishing prima facie
jurisdiction in a case.
On the issue of prima facie jurisdiction, the ICJ ruled that whilst it was
indisputable that both the United States and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia are parties to the Genocide Convention, a reservation made to
Article IX by the United States declaring that its specific consent is needed
before any dispute is submitted to the ICJ, meant that Article IX could not
constitute a basis for jurisdiction. Regarding Article 38(5), the Court said that
in the absence of consent by the United States it lacked even prima facie
jurisdiction. As a result, in rejecting the FRYs request for provisional
measures by twelve votes to three, the Court concluded that it manifestly
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavias Application.
HAMDAN VS RUMSFELD
548 U.S. 557, 29 June 2006
FACTS:
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit offences triable by a
military commission and was granted Habeas Corpus to dispute this charge.
It is alleged that Hamdan was engaged in actions in preparation of the
September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Militia forces in
Afghanistan that were fighting the Taliban captured Hamdan and turned him
over to the U.S. Military in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay, a
United States occupied Military base. After a year of being detained without
any charges being brought against him, President Bush declared that he had
committed acts triable by a military commission. He was charged with one
count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by the commission. This
commission is created by military necessity, not by statute or constitutional
power. This commission has a presiding officer and at least three other
members. The accused is afforded military counsel, and a copy of the
charges against him. This hearing may be conducted outside the presence of
the accused for the accused does not have a right to see all evidence or hear
all witness statement against him for purposes of national security. After
being tried and convicted of conspiracy, Hamdan apply for a writ of Habeas
Corpus stating he deserved all the constitutional rights afforded to him at
trial, the writ was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether Hamdan committed a crime triable by military commissions and
such commission is constitutional.
RULING:
No. The President at a time of war has the power to try and punish crimes
against the laws of nations. This is the constitutional provision used to show
that military commission tribunals are legal. However, this court concluded
that only certain circumstances allow for offense to be triable in a military
commission. Those offenses are; 1) in place of civilian courts when marital
law has been declared; 2) temporary military government in occupied
territory or in lands where there is no government to try cases; and 3) when
the crime is an incident to the conduct of war which violate the laws of war.
The court states that only the 3rd type applies, however the charge of