IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 1

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999)

QURAT UL AIN
44

Institute of Communication Studies,

University of the Punjab,
Lahore.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 2

1998s
Policy Framework in 1998
Pakistan Educational Policy
The current National Education Policy (1998-2010) was framed in the light of historical
developments, modern trends in education and the newly emerging requirements in the country.
The policy aiming Education for All (EFA), included elementary education, adult literacy and
early childhood education. The stress to the National Education Policy is on three categories of
education discussed above.
Aims
and
objectives
of
Education
and
Islamic
Education
Education and training should enable the citizens of Pakistan to lead their lives according to the
teachings of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and to educate and train them as a true
practicing Muslim. To evolve an integrated system of national education by bringing Deeni
Madaris and modern schools closer to each stream in curriculum and the contents of education.
Nazira Quran will be introduced as a compulsory component from grade I-VIII while at
secondary level translation of the selected verses from the Holy Quran will be offered.
General Sales Tax (GST)
In the 1998/99 Budget, all fixed tax schemes were abolished, and the GST was extended
to the retail sector a full year ahead of schedule. Administration of the GST in the textile sector
will be improved in 1998/99 and the GST will be formally extended to services, petroleum
products, electricity and agricultural inputs in 1999/2000. These actions, which are ahead of the
schedule of the original policy framework, will constitute a major strengthening of the GST base,
promote a much larger degree of documentation in the economy, and impart beneficial effects on
other taxes. To reduce the burden of compliance under the GST, the return and payment forms
have been simplified, restrictions on the crediting mechanism have been removed and the refund
system will be reformed by March 1999 to ensure expedited payments of refunds to exporters.
The government remains fully committed to the implementation of a meaningful
agricultural income taxation.. All four provinces will strengthen their collection mechanisms and
ensure achievement of the 1998/99 budgeted revenue target of PRs 2.5 billion.
Issue of Kala Bagh Dam:
In 1998, the issue to built Kala Bagh dam was raised by the government. The court had
earlier called for records of meeting minutes of the CCI on the construction of Kalabagh dam. In
reply, a senior CCI secretary of the ministry of inter-provincial coordination on Thursday
informed that two decisions had been taken by the CCI regarding the Kalabagh Dam project.
The first of these was on September 16, 1991 when express approval for construction of
Kalabagh Dam multipurpose project was given.
Later on May 9, 1998 the CCI re-visited the project when the Natural Water Resources
Development Program (NWRDP) headed by the ministry of water and power was directed to

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 3

prepare for detractors a document explaining the issues involved in the construction of Kalabagh
Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, whos province has pushed for the construction of the dam
However, it believes that the construction of Kalabagh Dam should only be undertaken
after a broad national consensus. According to the party, if the people of all the provinces are not
taken on board and their consent not obtained for new water reservoirs particularly Kalabagh
Dam, it would lead to unhappiness and unrest. Sindh, which has long opposed the Kalabagh
dam, reiterated that the dam deeply splits public opinion and faces more opposition than takers.
Khuhro urged the Supreme Court to set aside the LHCs judgment in larger interest of the
country. He also asked the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Chief Mian Nawaz Sharif
to get a resolution passed against the Kalabagh Dam project.
Thus Kala Bagh dam issue stayed unresolved and the plan of its construction was
postponed.

Motorway:

Motorway was formally inaugurated in 1998 under Nawaz sharifs 2 nd government whose plan
was made but remained unconstructed in Nawaz Sharifs 1st government (1990-1993).
Resolution to rename NWFP as KPK:
According to 1998 census, mother tongue of 74% people in NWFP and 99% in Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was Pushto which is also the second largest language, next to
the Punjabi, in the country. Hence it was a legitimate demand of the people of the province to
demand that the name of their province should reflect the language and ethnicity of its people
just like Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh.
In 1997-1998, sparked an acrimonious argument between the Awami National Party (ANP) and
the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group).Pakhtunkhwaresolution, was supported by the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the JamiatUlema-i- Islam (JUI) (F) while the PML (N)
abstained. It was opposed only by two members from the PML (J) SalimSaifullah and
HumayunSaifullah. By February 1998, the situation in the NWFP reached a point of acute
polarization between the pro-Pakhtunkhwa campaigners, particularly those from the ANP, and
the opposing group led by veteran Muslim Leaguers.

Cenus:

The last census of Pakistan was held in 1981. No census was conducted after that until 1998
because different linguistic groups wanted to show their population greater so they used to
pressurize the government. But, then the fifth census of Pakistan was compiled in 1998 under
Nawaz sharifs 2nd government because he won with 2/3 majority and his government had a
strong hold so he conducted the 5 th census of Pakistan and according to it Pakistan had a
population of more than 13 crore and Karachis population was estimated to be more than 1
crore. Many political parties rejected this census.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 4

Important Political events

15th Amendment:
The Fifteenth Amendment bill to the Constitution of Pakistan was Passed by National
Assembly of Pakistan on 28 August 1998. It was then moved to the Senate where it was never
passed.
The amendments include addition of a new article 2B in the constitution and amendment
in Article 239 of the Constitution of Pakistan. It seeks to impose Sharia Law as supreme law
in Pakistan in light of the Objective Resolution of Pakistan.
Addition of new Article 2B in the Constitution: In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the said Constitution, after Article 2A, the following new
Article shall be inserted, namely: 2B

The Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be the
supreme law of Pakistan.Explanation:- In the application of this clause to the personal
law of any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and
Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.

The Federal Government shall be under an obligation to take steps to enforce the Shariah,
to establish salat, to administer zakat, to promote amrbilma'roof and nahianilmunkar (to
prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong), to eradicate corruption at all levels
and to provide substantial socio-economic justice, in accordance with the principles of
Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

The Federal Government may issue directives for the implementation of the provisions
set out in clauses (1) and (2) and may take the necessary action against any state
functionary for non-compliance of the said directives.

Nothing contained in this Article shall affect the personal law, religious freedom,
traditions or customs of non-Muslims and their status as citizens.

The provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the
Constitution, any law or judgement of any Court".

Amendment of Article 239 of the Constitution:In the Constitution, in Article 239, after clause
(3) the following new clauses shall be inserted, namely:

(3A), Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (1) to (3), a Bill to amend the
Constitution providing for the removal of any impediment in the enforcement of any
matter relating to Shariah and the implementation of the Injunctions of Islam may
originate in either House and shall, if it is passed by a majority of the members voting in
the House in which it originated, be transmitted to the other House; and if the Bill is
passed without amendment by the majority of the members voting in the other House
also, it shall be presented to the President for assent.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 5

(3B), If a Bill transmitted to a House under clause (3A) is rejected or is not passed within
ninety days of its receipt or is passed with amendment it shall be considered in a joint
sitting.

(3C), If the Bill is passed by a majority of the members voting in the joint sitting, with or
without amendment, it shall be presented to the President for assent.

(3D), The President shall assent to the Bill presented to him under clause (3A) or clause
(3C) within seven days of the presentation of the Bill".

Pak-India Relations:

The gear of 1998 was highly significant in the India and Pakistan history because the two
nations became nuclear powers in 1998 and also Kargil issue that was a time when the two
nuclear powers brought to the verge of war. In 1998, the Foreign ministries of both countries had
been initiating peace process to ease up the tension in the region. On September 23, 1998 both
governments signed an agreement recognizing the principle of building an environment of peace
and security and resolving all bilateral conflicts, which became the basis of the Lahore
Declaration
Pakistan becomes Atomic Power:
On May 28, 1998, Pakistan became a nuclear power when it successfully carried out five
nuclear tests at Chaghi, in the province of Baluchistan. This was in direct response to five
nuclear explosions by India, just two weeks earlier. Widely criticized by the international
community, Pakistan maintains that its nuclear program is for self-defense, as deterrence against
nuclear India. A former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, offered justification for
Pakistans nuclear program when he said that if India were to produce a bomb, Pakistan would
do anything it could to get one of its own. It has always been maintained by Pakistan that a
nuclear threat posed to its security can neither be met with conventional means of defense, nor
by external security guarantee. Pakistan announced the moratorium on June 11, 1998, and
offered to join in new peace talks with India. Even long before these tests, Pakistan has time and
again proposed for a nuclear weapon-free zone in South East Asia.
1999 Kargal war
In the summer of 1999, a 73-days military conflict was fought at Kargil unveiling new
insights into an asymmetric conflict wherein opposing combatants employ markedly different
resources and strategies in order to maximize their advantages and exploit the opponents
weaknesses. . The confrontation was manifestation of a 50 year-old Kashmir dispute that
remained limited in terms of time, geographical area, and weaponry. The operation at Kargil was
planned meticulously by the top Pakistani army establishment in a bid to capture the deserted
heights in the Valley left by Indian army during the inhospitable weather conditions and then
taking control of the vital Srinagar-Leh highway. The Pak army contemplated that by capturing
the strategic heights they will be in a commanding position to get the status of the Line of
Control (LoC.) altered. The whole area of Kargil belonged to Pakistan. It was captured by India
in the war of 1965, but restored to Pakistan under Tashkent Agreement. In the 1971 war, Kargil
was again occupied and retained by India by dint of force. Kargil operation was downright an

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 6

upshot of the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir is both cause and consequence of the India-Pakistan
conflict and conundrum. From historical, geographical, cultural and strategic point of view,
Pakistan could not remain aloof from the question of liberty of over 13 million people of
Kashmir. Hence Pakistan has always been obliged and committed to support the Independence
movement of the downtrodden people of Kashmir and get the issue resolved as soon as possible
so that they could get their right of self-determination. Kashmir has contributed to the overall
dispute between India and Pakistan. The military establishments on both sides of the border insist
that control over Kashmir is critical to the defense of their respective countries.. The Valley is
strategically important because of the communication links that run through it to Ladakh and to
Siachin, where the Indians and Pakistanis remain frozen in conflict. The threat to Kargil, in 1999,
was more serious than Siachin, because it overlooked the already perilous road from Srinagar to
Siachin and Leh. Pakistan has a quite different view of Kashmirs geopolitics. Its strategists point
out that for years the major access roads to Kashmir led through what is now Pakistan, and that
the proximity of the capital, Islamabad, to Kashmir makes it vulnerable to an Indian offensive
along the Jhelum river. Further, Pakistanis argue that the inclusion of Kashmir would give it a
strategic depth that Pakistan otherwise lacks. . . Finally, Kashmir is the source of many vital
South Asian rivers, including the Indus and the famous five rivers of the Punjab: Jhelum,
Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. . . The second Kashmir, found in the minds of politicians,
strategists, and scholars, is a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against
each other. The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and
history, as it is a conflict over territory, resources and peoples. Competing histories, strategies,
and policies spring from these different images of self and other.
The people of Kashmir have been fighting against Indian occupation for the last 51 years.
Exceedingly disappointed with the fate of the UN resolution that guaranteed their basic right for
freedom and the Indian Governments deceitful tactics and later on their claim of Kashmir as their
atootung, the Kashmiri Muslims started their freedom movement against all the means and
powerful machinery of coercion, aggression and regimentation of 700,000 Indian troops. As
Pakistans nuclear weapons capability grew, the sub-conventional war in the valley kept
escalating. The uprising in Kashmir turned out to be more persistent when the Kargil heights
were occupied and held intrepidly by the freedom fighters who took the Indian troops by surprise
and beat them with strategic ramifications. Indias sharp reaction to the Kargil operation was
based on three major factors. Firstly, there was a change in the tactics, as instead of the usual hitand-run tactics of the guerrilla fighters the Kashmiri freedom fighters were for the first time
holding ground and defying the Indian army to attack and suffer losses. Secondly, they were
interdicting the Srinagar Kargil Leh supply route that provided the main logistics support for
the Indian troops holding the Siachin Glacier. The Indian troops at Siachin ran short of fuel for
heating and ammunition Supplies, as for winter they couldnt stockpile during the few summer
months. Thirdly, the Indian elections were not far off and the present caretaker Indian
government was earnestly keen to take advantage of the Kargil situation to gain some extra seats.
As usual, our freedom fighters successfully attempted a direct and frontal approach to this
extra-ordinary military operation. By taking the heights overlooking Kargil and Drass the
freedom fighters had placed the Indian army at a tactical and strategic disadvantage. The Kargil
sector extends to about 150 km, with Drass at one end and Batalik at the other. The intrusions of
freedom fighters covered over 100 km of the Kargil sector. Tactically the heights were difficult to
clear. Strategically forced to concentrate troops at Kargil for the safety of Siachin, India had

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 7

unbalanced herself. Kargil is at the extreme end of two vulnerable supply routes. By
concentrating 30,000 troops there, other areas were denuded where freedom fighters activity had
increased, as in the Kashmir valley and on the Srinagar-Jammu road. India was so much baffled
that at first it denounced the freedom fighters as Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistani infiltrators.
As Indias military position in Kargil did not improve, the freedom fighters were re-classified as
Pakistan Army personnel. This was a crude attempt to cover up Indian Armys operational
failures in Kargil and to catch the attention of the West. India succeeded in both her objectives.
The armed confrontation in Kashmir was certainly a source of some concern to the world
community as both sides have nuclear weapons though the fighting was restricted to shelling
across the Line of Control. The warriors had occupied areas that were not held by Indian troops.
The main targets for Kargil Operation were to a) Occupy approximately 700 sq km area on the
Indian side of the LoC in Kargil-Turtuk Sector, b) Interdict Srinagar-Kargil-Leh Road, c) Capture
Turtuk and cut off Southern and Central parts of Siachin Glacier Sector, and d) Intensify freedom
fighters activities in J&K
It was enigmatic how the strong Indian army, after 30 days of skirmishes with a band of
few hundred freedom fighters entrenched on one mountain had to scout around the world for
artillery and other ammunition as there was headline in the Indian Express of June 3, 1999:
India shops abroad for ammunition. It was further amazing that India had to deploy a force of
50,000 soldiers in an attempt to dislodge a lightly armed band of a couple of hundred freedom
fighters, a mind boggling ratio of 250 to 1, bogged down on the ground despite the passage of
one full month of combat under Indian Air force and artillery cover.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan met the U.S. President on July 4, 1999 and agreed to use
his influence with the freedom fighters to stop the fighting in Kargil and withdraw from the
heights cutting off Indias strategic supply route from Srinagar to Kargil. In the joint statement
signed by President Clinton and the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif it was once again
agreed that concrete steps would be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance
with Simla Agreement. The War ended on 26 July 1999 when all Pakistani troops were finally
evicted from our side of the LoC
Wajpai visit:
In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Muhammad Nawaz
Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, ShriAtalBihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan from 20-21
February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.
The prime minister of Pakistan received the Indian prime minister at the Wagah border on
20 February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was
hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister
AtalBihari Vajpayee visited Minar-i- Pakistan, Mausoleum of AllamaIqbal, GurudawaraDera
Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in
honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.
The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional
cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that :

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 8

a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual
concern, including nuclear related issues.
b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view
to coordinating their respective positions.
Prime Minister AtalBihari Vajpayee thanked Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif
for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation
and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.
Reaction of military establishment of Vajpai visit:
Even as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief rolled out the red carpet for AtalBihari Vajpayee,
the Pakistani military establishment refused to participate in the historic ceremony at the Wagah
border. Following serious differences with Sharief over his decision to welcome Vajpayee with
such enthusiasm, the three service chiefs boycotted the ceremony in honour of the Indian prime
minister. Reports said General Parvez Musharraf, Air Chief Marshal Parvez Mehdi and Admiral
FasihBokhari protested that the government should not "welcome an enemy nation in this
manner". They also told Sharief their presence at Wagah would send out wrong signals and
jeopardise the prestige, dignity and honour of the Pakistani armed forces. Though Sharief invited
the defence chiefs to join him in welcoming Vajpayee at Wagah, they politely declined to travel
to the border. The military establishment also argued that the three chiefs were duty-bound to
attend a banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz in honour of visiting Chinese Defence
Minister Chi Haotian. The military establishment's opinion is that Chi's visit is more important
than Vajpayee's bus trip.
Last months of Nawaz Sharif and clash with army:
On the morning of 12 October 1999, Nawaz Sharif finally made up his mind. His army
chief would have to go. Like many Pakistani leaders before him, Sharif had surrounded himself
with a tightly woven cocoon of sycophants. Family relatives and business cronies filled the key
posts of his administration. The chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf, did not fit in.
Sharif had appointed Musharraf in October 1998 and quickly came to regret the decision. He
regarded his army chief with distaste. The origin of the antagonism, which was mutual, lay in the
snow-clad, Himalayan peaks of Kashmir. In the spring of 1999 Musharraf gave the final order
for Pakistani troops to cross the line of control that separates the Indian and Pakistani armies in
Kashmir. The soldiers, posing as divinely-inspired Islamic militants, clambered up the snowy
passes that led to one of Kashmirs most strategic locations: the dusty, run-down town of Kargil.
Having caught the Indians off guard, the Pakistani troops made significant territorial gains.
Tactically, the operation was a success. Politically, it was a disaster. As India cried foul, Sharif
found himself in the midst of a major international crisis. And while General Musharraf had sent
the troops in, Prime Minister Sharif was left with the unenviable task of getting them out. For
three decades the Pakistani people had absorbed a steady flow of vitriolic propaganda about the
Kashmir issue: Sharif s decision to withdraw seemed incomprehensible and humiliating. As the
man who had defied world opinion and tested Pakistans nuclear bomb, Sharif had been
acclaimed as a national hero.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 9

The generals, though, were also unhappy. By deciding to pull out of Kargil without
negotiating any Indian concessions in return, they argued, Sharif had squandered a militarily
advantageous position and caused a crisis of confidence within the Pakistan army. After the
Kargil withdrawal Musharraf faced a surge of discontent within the army. As he toured a series
of garrisons he repeatedly faced the same question: If Kargil was a victory then why did we pull
back? Musharraf told his men that it was the prime ministers fault and that the army had no
choice but to obey his order. It was a disingenuous response. Musharraf had been fully consulted
on the withdrawal order and had raised no serious objection to it.
Sharif was never in any doubt that removing Musharraf would be a high-risk exercise.
Sharif was furious that his few allies in the military were being sacked and demoted. It
was now just a question of timing. The prime minister knew that Musharraf was due to be out of
Pakistan in October to attend the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of Sri Lankas army. The army
chief was due to return on 12 October; since he would be airborne for four hours, Sharif
calculated, the army would be caught off-balance and left unsure how to react to his sacking. By
the time Musharraf touched down, his removal would be a fait accompli and a new army chief
would have taken his place. Sharif was relying on the element of surprise and felt constrained by
his fear that he was being bugged. On 10 October he arranged a flight to Abu Dhabi ostensibly
for a meeting with Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Nahyan. He took a very limited group consisting of
his son Hussain Nawaz, his speechwriter NazirNaji and the man he wanted to succeed
Musharraf, the ISI chief General Ziauddin. Confident that any conversation on the plane could
not be overheard, Sharif spent the entire flight talking to Ziauddin: the final plot was being
hatched.
On the fateful day, Sharif knew he had to give the appearance of conducting business as
usual. At 10.00 a.m. on 12 October he left Islamabad to make a routine political speech in the
town of Shujaabad, near Multan. Before leaving, Sharif gave instructions that he wanted his
defence secretary, Lt. General (Retd.) Iftikhar Ali Khan, to meet him on his return. He also
scheduled an appointment with President RafiqTarar for that afternoon, giving instructions that
the meeting should not be reflected in his official programmer for the day. The prime minister
again took a small group with him: Hussain Nawaz, NazirNaji and the chairman of Pakistan
Television (PTV), Pervez Rashid. When the plane landed in Multan, Sharif told NazirNaji that he
should remain on board for a discussion with his son and Pervez Rashid. All the crew, Sharif
said, had been told to leave the plane and they could talk in confidence. Once the aircraft door
was closed the three men sat down and Pervez Rashid asked NazirNaji for his mobile phone.
Sharif, he explained, could not afford any of the information he was about to divulge to be
leaked. Naji was then shown a speech written in HussainSharif s handwriting that his father
planned to give on television that evening. Although the punch line the dismissal of Musharraf
was not included in the draft, it was clear that the speech would announce that decision. Naji
then worked on the draft, translating it into Urdu.
Two hours later the prime ministers plane was heading back towards Islamabad and
when he touched down at the military airbase at Chaklala his defence secretary, as arranged, was
there to meet him. As the two men were driven to the prime ministers residence, Sharif declared
his hand. The sacking of Lt. General Tariq Pervez, he said, has started creating the impression
that there is a gap between the government and the army which is not good for the security of
Pakistan . . . I have decided to appoint a new army chief. The defence secretary was shocked: he

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 10

could guess the armys likely reaction. He suggested that the prime minister might want to
discuss the issue with Musharraf but Sharif was adamant. The time for this discussion, he said,
is over.
As the prime ministers car drew up outside his official residence in Islamabad his
principal secretary Saeed Mehdi was, as ever, on hand to greet him. Mehdi was already aware of
the prime ministers plans and Sharif now told him to prepare the official papers for the handover
of military power. As he walked into his office, the prime minister confirmed that the new army
chief was to be none other than the man he had wanted to appoint twelve months before, Lt.
General Ziauddin.
As Sharif s officials got to work, General Musharraf had already completed his official
programmed in Sri Lanka and was preparing to board flight PK 805 which would take him back
to Karachi, along with 197 other passengers and crew, including the pilot, Captain
SarwatHussain. Because the army chief was on board there were extra security checks and the
plane took off forty minutes late at 4.00 p.m. At the very moment Musharraf s plane was
climbing into the sky, the man who confidently expected to replace him was reaching the prime
ministers residence. By the time Sharif went to see him at 4.20 p.m., Saeed Mehdi had
completed drafting the official notification. It stated that:
It has been decided to retire General Pervez Musharraf, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee and Chief of the Army Staff with immediate effect. Lt. Gen. Ziauddin has
been appointed as the Chief of Army Staff with immediate effect and promoted to the rank of
General. Before orders to this effect are issued, President may kindly see.
By 4.30 p.m. Sharif had signed the document. The deed was done.
He told Ziauddin to assume his command and went to the presidents residence to show
him the notification. Perhaps aware that the army might not accept the change, and that Sharif s
days might be numbered, Tarar displayed some of the political cunning that had enabled him to
achieve high office. Rather than writing the word approved on the notification, he employed the
more neutral term seen and signed it. With the formalities completed Sharif told Pakistan
Television (PTV) to broadcast the news of Musharraf s sacking. It did so on the 5.00 p.m.
bulletin. PTV was also told to take pictures of Ziauddin receiving his badges of rank.
Ziauddin was now the de jure army chief, but he knew that to become the de facto leader
as well he would have to move fast. Rather than waste time by driving back to the ISI
headquarters, he stayed in the prime ministers residence and started making phone calls from
there. He thought two men, the chief of general staff Lt. General Aziz Khan and the commander
of the 10th corps Lt. General MehmoodAhmed, were likely to offer him the stiffest resistance.
Both were Musharraf loyalists who, within army circles, had been outspoken in their criticism of
Sharif. Ziauddin decided to remove both of them. He called an old engineering corps friend, the
quarter-master general Lt. General Akram, and offered him the job of chief of the general staff.
Excited by his promotion, Akram said he would come straight round to the prime ministers
house. Ziauddin then called the man who had recently been removed by Musharraf, General
SaleemHyder. Hyder was playing golf and was not immediately available. Eventually the two
men spoke and Hyder was offered General Mehmoods job: 10th corps commander.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN (1998-1999) 11

Having sorted out the two key posts, Ziauddin called round other corps commanders.
Most were non-committal. They were in an awkward position: they did not want to repudiate the
new army chief but were also aware that Musharraf loyalists might resist him.

While Ziauddin was trying to shore up his new position, the two men best placed to stop
him, Lt. Generals Aziz and Mehmood, were playing not golf but tennis. They realised that there
was a problem when both their mobile phones started ringing on the side of the court. The man
who called them was the Peshawar-based Lt. General Syed uzZafar. As the longest-standing
corps commander, he was serving as the acting chief of army staff in Musharraf s absence.
Consequently, Ziauddin had called him to tell him about his own elevation and Musharraf s
sacking. But rather than simply accept Ziauddins statement as a fait accompli General Syed
uzZafar called Aziz and Mehmood in Rawalpindi. The second they were told what was
happening Aziz and Mehmood held a brief conversation and decided to act. As one eyewitness
put it, I have never seen two senior officers move so fast. They sped to GHQ and, as they
changed out of their sports kit, considered their options. One thing, they decided, was beyond
doubt: they could not permit a change of army chief while Musharraf was out of the country. The
first priority, then, was to get the news off PTV. The two generals dispatched Major Nisar of the
Punjab Regiment, together with fifteen armed men, to the PTV building in Islamabad. He was
ordered to block any further announcement about Musharraf s sacking. As the major set off,
Aziz called a meeting of all available corps commanders and other senior officers at army
headquarters in Rawalpindi. Some already knew what was up: they had received the telephone
calls from Ziauddin. And with Mehmood and Aziz determined to resist Ziauddins appointment,
the corps commanders decided to implement the decision they had taken in principle in
September: Sharif had to go. Within minutes, the infamous 111 Brigade was ordered to do its job
AwazHatao move:
Dr. Qadris Agenda in 1999 was Hatao Nawaz Sharif. He was then part of the Grand
Democratic Alliance (GDA), led by PPP, ANP, MQM and Imran Khan. They succeeded in
installing General Musharraf and waited to be rewarded. He supported Musharraf through the
referendum and the elections 2002, and was expecting a big reward for the services rendered, but
got only a seat in the National Assembly. Out of frustration, he left the country and acquired the
citizenship of Canada. For over seven years he preached and propagated the concept of liberal
and political Islam and gained acceptability by the West, and returned to Pakistan, armed with a
mission: Get the elections postponed and restrain Nawaz Sharif, coming to power because he
was not considered a friend of USA as Washington Times then lamented after the 2008 elections.
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