Epiphenomenal QualiaFrank Jackson

Qualia: "certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain
perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes."
--Frank Jackson
Epipenomenal: not causally efficacious with respect to the physical world. -- Frank
Jackson
Central Idea: Once we have a complete description of the brain and how it functions,
will this fully account for consciousness? Jackson says no.
The Knowledge Argument (KA)
** 2 purposes**
1. Show that qualia exist.
2. The KA is an attack on the physicalist claim about the completeness of
physical truths.
Fred
Premise 1: Fred has better color vision than everyone else. Where we see red, he
sees either red1 or red2.
Premise 2: We have all the physical information we need about Fred.
Premise 3: We still do not know what Fred sees when he sees red1 or red 2.
Interpretation: We have a full physical description but still do not know what Fred
sees and still do not understand how it feels to see red1 or red2. This physical
description is incomplete.
Conclusion: Physicalism is false.
Mary
Premise 1: Before her release, Mary was in possession of all the physical
information about color experiences of other people.
Premise 2: After her release, Mary learns something about the color experiences of
other people.
Interpretation: Therefore, Before her release, Mary was not in possession of all the
information about other people's color experiences, even though she was in
possession of all the physical information There are thus truths about other people's
color experience that are not physical.
Conclusion: Physicalism is false.
Questions for discussion, Objections:
If we agree with the Mary thought experiment, then we believe that Mary does gain
something when she leaves. Do you agree with the thought experiment and what do
you think it says about qualia?

How can we make claims based upon the premise that complete physical knowledge
is known when physics is incomplete?
The Modal Argument
Premise 1: There is a possible world with organisms exactly like us in every physical
respect
Premise 2: In this possible world, it is also possible that these organisms have no
consciousness at all
Interpretation: There is more to us than is purely physical, because in our world we
do have consciousness, although the physical is exactly the same
Conclusion: Physicalism is false
1. There is an argument against the modal argument, stating that the
physicalists only make such a claim for some possible worlds - mainly our
world
2. Jackson responds that it is these specific worlds, including our world, that the
modal argument is directed
1. There is another argument that two possible worlds which agree in all natural
respects, must agree in all aesthetic qualities as well
2. Jackson says it is still plausible that the aesthetic qualities do not have to be
reduced to the natural
The What it is like to be Argument or Nagels Bat Argument:
Central Idea: No amount of physical information can tell us what it is like to be a bat.
This is something that can only be understood from a first person point of view.
1. Important to distinguish from KA.
2. KA doesnt have to do with what it is like to be Fred or Mary. It only concerns
a particular aspect of their experience (color vision).
3. If physicalism were true, we would know the things about their color
experience that we do not know.
4. Jackson explains that physicalism could be safe under the what it is like to
be argument because physicalism makes no claims of the imaginative or
extrapolative abilities of humans.
The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism:
1. Jackson defends that it is possible to hold that certain properties of certain
mental states, or what he refers to as qualia, whether the exist or not, must
not necessarily make a difference in the physical world.
2. It may make a difference to other mental states, he contends, but not to
anything physical.
3. Jackson says that there are 3 arguments against epiphenomenalism he will
present, but none of the 3 has any real force.

The 3 Arguments:
1. It is obvious that the existence of feeling pain is partly responsible for the
subject seeking to avoid pain.
2. Following Darwins theory of evolution, it would follow that the ability to
perceive qualia, has been selected as a beneficial trait to the human species,
and that therefore it must have some physical effects pertaining to our
physical survival.
3. We know about other minds, by knowing about their behavior, but an
epiphenomenalist cannot regard behavior or anything physical as an outcome
of qualia.
Jacksons Responses:
1. You cannot tie the effect to the cause, because they may both be effects of a
more underlying cause. For example a certain brain state may be the true
cause of both the qualia of feeling pain, and the behavior that follows. Thus
the behavior was not caused by the qualia, and epiphenomenalism is safe.
2. It is possible within the evolutionary understanding, that an organism may
evolve a trait which is inconsequential to its survival, or in other words, is just
a by-product trait, that managed to remain a trait because it wasnt
disadvantageous to the organism. Thus the organisms continued survival with
this trait, albeit an inconsequential trait, is still possible, and
epiphenomenalism is safe.
3. Qualia causes nothing physical, but are a caused by something physical. So
the epiphenomenalist can argue for the behavior of others, by tracing the
behavior back to its cause in the brain, and then back out to the qualia.
Closing argument: Qualia do nothing, explain nothing, and are still not understood in
any meaningful way.
Jackson: This is true but it is not an objection to epiphenomenal qualia. We are
evolutionary organisms and it is just not important or relevant to our survival that we
may understand every phenomena of the world around us. Especially those which
have no physical consequences.
Physicalism is an extremely optimistic view of our human species power of
understanding.
There must surely be a part of the whole body of information, which evolution
will never bring us to knowing, simply because it is not relevant.
It is astonishing that we know as much as we do, and should be fairly simple
to accept that there should be matters which just fall outside our
comprehension, not just now, but which always will.
We could imagine sea slug organisms, of which a group in the population are
philosophers.
Due to the immediate environment of the slugs, despite their intelligence and
scientific capabilities, they have restricted terms which may not be able to
allow for an understanding of the full world beyond them.

Put in perspective, we may be like these sea slugs in a way when compared
to some even higher beings