Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

The role of personality in positively and negatively

framed risky health decisions
Marco Lauriola a,*, Paolo M. Russo b, Fabio Lucidi b,
Cristiano Violani b, Irwin P. Levin c
a

Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, La Sapienza University of Rome, Via dei Marsi 78,
00185 Rome, Italy
b
Department of Psychology, La Sapienza University of Rome, Via dei Marsi 78, 00185 Rome, Italy
c
Department of Psychology, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
Received 17 April 2003; received in revised form 8 January 2004; accepted 26 March 2004
Available online 25 May 2004

Abstract
Two hundred and forty research participants of varying ages completed a two-part procedure in which
framing experiments were conducted and personality factors were assessed. We operationally dened
information framing according to the attribute-, goal-, and risky choice-framing paradigms and made our
tasks as similar as possible to everyday risky health decisions. Individual dierence variables were measured
by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised, the Carvers BISBAS scales, the Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale, the Multidimensional Health Questionnaire, and Coronary Heart Disease specic items. Framing
valence eects were in keeping with the literature, with more risk-taking in the negative risky choice framing
valence condition and more negative health status evaluation in the negative attribute-framing valence
condition. Respondents personality, in particular Impulsiveness, Anxiety, Health Involvement and Health
Negative Aect, correlated with message eectiveness in the goal-framing task and with the observed risk
attitude in the risky choice task. These ndings expand the literature on personality and risk-taking by
demonstrating the joint role of personality factors and situational factors on decisions to promote good
health or prevent bad health.
2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Personality traits; Information framing; Risk-taking; Health behavior

Corresponding author. Tel.: +39-649917560; fax: +39-64451667.

E-mail address: marco.lauriola@uniroma1.it (M. Lauriola).

0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2004.03.020

46

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

1. Introduction
Recent contributions (e.g., Bromiley & Curley, 1992; Lauriola & Levin, 2001) help ll in the
current gap between reference to personality-like concepts in modeling preferences under risk
(e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Kahn & Sarin, 1988) and psychometric conceptions of risktaking (e.g., Zuckerman, 1994). In the next sections, we summarize how behavioral decision
scientists dene risk, risk-taking and its determinants. Then, we review personality literature
aimed at investigating risk-taking tendencies in laboratory studies of decision-making and
in studies of risky health behaviors. Finally, we introduce the motivation for the present study in
which selected personality scales were related to individual dierences in decision-making in
positively and negatively framed risky health decisions.
1.1. Framing eects and risky decision-making
Behavioral decision scientists test the psychological adequacy of Expected Utility Theory (Von
Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944) by asking research participants to make a choice between a sure
amount of money and an alternative gamble of equal expected value. We call this the two-outcome
Risky choice task. From a normative standpoint preferences in tasks like that are expected to be at
chance level if the agents making the choice have a so-called risk neutral attitude. However, such
risk neutral attitudes were found to be very rare in experimental studies of decision-making (e.g.,
Budescu & Weiss, 1987; Cohen, Jaray, & Tanios, 1987) as well as in everyday risky decisions.
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) challenged the
assumption that people are usually risk-averse and that risk attitude is a stable characteristic of
the decision-maker. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that even small changes in wording
the decision problem may result in remarkable reversals of risk attitude. The classical Asian
Disease problem shows how this framing eect works in risky choice. The problem states that
the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 people,
and that there are two alternative programs to combat this disease. In the positive (negative)
framing condition, the two options are described in the following way. (1) If program A is
adopted, 200 people will be saved (400 people will die). (2) If program B is adopted, there is 1/3
probability that 600 people will be saved (nobody will die) and 2/3 probability that no people will
be saved (600 people will die). In each condition, people are required to make a choice between the
sure thing (option 1) and the risky choice (option 2). Results showed that people were risk-averse
in the positive condition (i.e., the majority chose option 1) but risk-seeking in the negative condition (the majority chose option 2).
During the past two decades many variants of the Asian Disease task proliferated in the literature. After an extensive literature review, Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) came to the conclusion that one can distinguish between dierent types of framing eects based on their unique
features in terms of what is framed, how it is framed and how the eect is measured. Thus, Levin et
al. (1998) complemented the standard risky choice framing paradigm with the goal-framing (e.g.,
Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987) and attribute-framing (e.g., Levin & Gaeth, 1988) paradigms.
An attribute-framing eect is found when the evaluation of a given attribute (e.g., the composition of meat) diers depending on whether that attribute is described in positive terms (e.g., %
lean ground beef) or negative terms (% fat). Levin et al. (1998) hypothesized that the processes

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

47

accounting for attribute-framing eects are associative processes which lead to a more favorable
attribute evaluation when primed by positive labels rather than negative ones.
A goal-framing eect is found when the appeal of a persuasive message (e.g., avoiding high-fat
foods) diers depending on whether the message highlights the benet of attaining a goal (i.e., if
one succeeds in avoiding high-fat food, then he or she will reduce the chance of a later CHD) or
the detriment of not attaining a goal (i.e., if one fails to avoid high-fat foods, then he or she will
not reduce the chance of a later CHD). Levin et al. (1998) hypothesized that the process
accounting for goal framing is loss aversion; that is, losses loom larger than gains.
1.2. Personality and risky decision-making
Studies of Personality and Risk-Taking may be classied as follows: experimental studies aimed
at investigating to what extent personality aects ones willingness to take risks in hypothetical
decision tasks; correlational studies aimed at evaluating to what extent personality is associated
with ones decision to undertake risky behaviors in real life situations. Lauriola and Levin (2001)
recently reviewed the literature on personality and risk-taking in experimental tasks and reached
the following conclusions: (1) Relatively few studies were conducted during the past decades. (2)
Sensation-Seeking, Impulsivity and Anxiety were the most investigated traits. (3) Task variables
shown to be important in decision research tended to be neglected (e.g., studies did not distinguish
between gains and losses or between positively and negatively framed information). However,
some common aspects were identied. First, dierent Sensation-Seeking scales positively predicted risk-taking in many studies of gambling and economic behavior (e.g., Wolfgang, 1988;
Wong & Carducci, 1991). Second, impulsive, hostile and antisocial tendencies (including Psychoticism and lack of conscientiousness) were found to be positive predictors of risk-taking not only
in studies of gambling (Dahlb
ack, 1990a, 1990b) but also in activities aimed at achieving some
important goal (Zaleskiewicz, 2001). Evidence for a consistent positive relation between Impulsivity/Sensation Seeking and dierent type of risk-taking behavior support the view of Zuckerman
(Zuckerman, 1993, 1994) that blended into a single Impulsivity-Sensation Seeking trait (IMP-SS)
previously distinguished personality characteristics.
A third common aspect in the literature is that negative aective states generally lead to
overestimating the chance of bad outcomes in probability judgment tasks (e.g., Butler & Mathews, 1987; St
ober, 1997). In the view of Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), a single temperamental trait (Neuroticism) accounts for all negative aective states and it is therefore expected
that this trait should also exert an inuence on risky decision-making in terms of risk-averse
behavior. However, some recent contributions suggest a possible twofold role of negative aective
states in decision-making that either increase or decrease the likelihood of engaging in risk-seeking
behavior. For instance, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) conducted several experiments in which
induced sadness and anxiety (i.e., two dierent facets of the broader Neuroticism trait) accounted
for opposite risk attitudes, with sadness exerting a motivational inuence toward high-risk-highreward options and anxiety exerting an inuence toward low-risk-low-reward options.
Task variables are also important in understanding the twofold role of negative aective states
in risky decision-making. Lauriola and Levin (2001) documented an interaction between ones
overall Neuroticism score and ones risk attitude in gain and loss trials. High Neuroticism scores
were associated with preference for a sure gain when uncertain larger gains were the alternatives

48

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

(i.e., risk-averse behavior), but were also associated with preference for an option oering the
chance of avoiding a loss when a sure loss was the alternative (i.e., risk-seeking behavior).
Individual dierences in susceptibility to signals of incoming punishments (e.g., loss trials in
decision-making studies) and rewards (e.g., gain trials) are the cornerstone of Grays model of
personality (1987). Gray hypothesizes the existence of two main conceptual nervous sub-systems: the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS). The
BAS regulates approaching behavior to rewards and it represents the biological underpinning of
the Impulsivity trait. The BIS regulates behavior aimed at avoiding a punishment and it is considered as the biological underpinning of Anxiety. In this perspective, dierent task variables (such
as gain and loss trials) may activate either the BIS or the BAS or a combination of the two systems,
thus interfering with the tendency of anxious individuals to overestimate the chance of threatening
events and to be risk-averse. To the best of our knowledge, no studies in the literature addresses the
issue of the relation between BISBAS activity and task variables in decision-making.
1.3. Personality and risky health behavior
A dierent line of research is aimed at investigating the extent to which personality is related to
risk-taking in real life situations, particularly in the health domain. Within this line of research a
distinction is made based on the kind of risky behavior and the kind of personality variables under
investigation.
Studies of young adults and adolescents exposure to health risks related temperamental traits
(e.g., Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism) to cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse and
marijuana dependence (e.g., Vollrath & Torgersen, 2002), HIV prevention and sexual risk-taking
(e.g., Donohew et al., 2000), bad driving habits (Booth-Kewley & Vickers, 1994), and violent or
delinquent behavior (e.g., Caspi, Begg, Dickson, & Langley, 1995; Goma-i-Freixanet, 1995).
Studies of older adults focused on non-temperamental individual dierence variables grounded in
the cognitive-behavioral approach to personality. Many of these so-called Health-related Tendencies (e.g., Health Locus of Control, Self-Ecacy, and Optimism) were studied as the main
psychological correlates of irregular exercising (e.g., Marks & Lutgendorf, 1999), inappropriate
drug-taking behavior (e.g., Juergens, Smith, & Sharpe, 1986), unhealthy nutrition (e.g., Duy &
MacDonald, 1990), and dropping out of regular medical checkups (e.g., Gallant & Connell, 1997;
Myers et al., 1994). (See Artistico, Baldassarri, Lauriola, & Laicardi, 2000 for a more complete
review of the role of health-related tendencies in the elderly; Adler & Mathews, 1994 for a more
general review of individual dierences in health behavior).
1.4. The present study
The literature we examined so far provided convergent evidence that conceptually similar
personality factors aected both risk-taking in decision-making tasks and in real-world health
behaviors. Our literature review also pointed out that studies of personality and risk-taking neglected the distinction between risk-taking to achieve a gain and risk-taking to avoid a loss, which
is considered a major component of risk-taking in behavioral decision theory. The present study
combines elements of the two approaches by separately relating personality to positively and
negatively framed risky health decisions. Based on existing literature (e.g., Levin et al., 1998), we

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

49

operationally dene information framing according to well-established experimental paradigms

while making our tasks as similar as possible to everyday risky health decisions.
Individual dierence variables were selected to measure Eysencks and Grays basic traits of
personality. Because of its particular clinical relevance and its importance in controlling health
behavior, a more narrow measure of Impulsivitythe Barratt Impulsivity Scale 11 was added to
the set of predictors. We expect Impulsivity and BAS related scales to be positive predictors of
risk-taking as these traits were found to exert a motivational drive to risk-seeking in dierent
domains. We expect that negative aective traits play a dierent role in positively and negatively
framed risky health-decisions, as in previous studies the trait of Neuroticism predicted riskaversion to achieve a gain and risk-seeking to avoid a loss (e.g., Lauriola & Levin, 2001).
In the present study, we also consider Health-related Tendencies within the set of predictors.
These variables whose relevance in predicting health behavior has been shown elsewhere (Adler &
Mathews, 1994; Artistico et al., 2000) were operationally dened either in terms of their more
basic components, such as Health Negative Aect and Health Involvement (cf., Lauriola, Laicardi, Artistico, & Baldassarri, 2000), or in terms of CHD specic items. We expect the Health
Involvement scale and Health Involvement CHD specic items to predict risk aversion regardless
of the framing valence as in previous studies these variables were associated with the tendency to
engage in health promoting behavior and to avoid health risks. However, we expect that measures
of negative aective state such as the Health Negative Aect scale and Health Negative Aect
CHD specic items to play a dierent role in positively and negatively framed decisions.

2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Forty-two trained undergraduate students at the University of Rome each instructed to
interview three males and three females of varying ages (2080 years old) contacted 252 eligible
participants among their acquaintances, who met the following criteria: (1) having at least a
secondary school degree; (2) being in relatively good health (i.e., never admitted to a hospital
during the past 12 months). All of the eligible participants agreed to participate, however 12
dropped out before completing part two. The nal sample consisted of 118 males and 122 females;
mean age 46.99 years (SD 19.01 years).
2.2. Research design
We designed three framing experiments each tapping a specic framing type. The three framing
types were administered in part one of the study in a xed order (i.e., attribute-, goal-, and risky choiceframing) as a repeated factor. Either the positive or the negative valence condition of each framing type
was administered between subjects. We also examined how the eects of framing a particular level of
health state depends on whether that state is related to a prevention or to a promotion health focus.
Half of the participants within each framing condition completed problems about blood cholesterol
level; the other half completed problems about vitamin consumption level. Concern about blood
cholesterol is clearly related to the prevention of Coronary Heart Disease (CHD), while vitamin intake

50

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

is reasonably related to general health promotion. Throughout the paper we will refer to these variants
of the decision problems as prevention and promotion problems, respectively.
2.3. Decision problems and dependent variables
Attribute framing. The prevention condition required subjects to read about a person over the
age of 60 whose blood cholesterol level was 240 mg/dl. That persons cholesterol level was either
described as being 60 mg/dl below an established high-risk level of 300 mg/dl (positive condition)
or as being 40 mg/dl above an established low risk level of 200 mg/dl (negative condition). The
promotion problem required participants to read about a person over the age of 60 whose vitamin
E consumption level was 560 IU/day per day. That persons vitamin consumption level was either
described as being 160 IU/day above an established low-protection level of 400 IU/day (positive
condition) or as being 240 IU/day below an established high protection level of 800 IU/day
(negative condition). Bipolar ratings (110 scale) were used as a measure of attribute evaluation.
The following adjectives were used: (a) healthyunhealthy; (b) goodbad; (c) safedangerous (d)
not worriedworried; (e) optimisticpessimistic. A higher score indicates a more negative attribute
evaluation in terms of either higher perceived risk or lower perceived protection.
Goal framing. The prevention problem required people to read about a person over the age of
60 whose blood cholesterol level was 250 mg/dl. Subjects also read that if that person minimizes
fat intake (positive condition)/does not minimize fat intake (negative condition), he or she will
reduce (positive)/will not reduce (negative) the likelihood of living a shorter life, of having a worse
quality of life and of speeding up the eects of aging. Similarly, the promotion problem required
participants to read about a person over the age of 60 whose vitamin E consumption level was 600
IU/day. Subjects also read that if that person maximizes vitamin E intake (positive)/does not
maximize vitamin E intake (negative), he or she will reduce (positive)/will not reduce (negative)
the likelihood of the same bad consequences as in the prevention condition. A list of high-fat
foods or high-vitamin E foods was provided. Participants were required to rate on a scale of 1
(very little) to 10 (very much): (a) how much that person should comply with the described
behavior; (b) how much they would monitor that persons behavior; (c) how much they would
comply themselves with that behavior, if they were in that condition.
Risky choice framing. The prevention problem required participants to read about two alternative experimental medications (A and B) to reduce blood cholesterol below an established risk
level. The two treatments were said to have been tested on 600 people over the age of 60. Based on
an expert evaluation, Medication A was described as being eective for 200 of the persons (positive condition)/ineective for 400 of the persons (negative condition). Medication B was described as providing a 1/3 chance to be eective for all 600 persons and a 2/3 chance to be eective
for none of the persons (positive); a 2/3 chance to be ineective for all 600 persons and a 1/3
chance to be ineective for none of the persons (negative). (The numbers used here are the same as
in the Asian Disease problem.) The promotion problem was framed similarly to the prevention
problem, except that the participants read about two alternative experimental daily supplements
(A and B) to increase vitamin E consumption level above an established protection level. As a
measure of risk-taking in each problem, participants were required to pick one of the two options.
Option A was coded as the safe choice since it provides a given outcome for sure. Option B was
coded as the risky choice since it can lead to variable outcomes.

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

51

2.4. Personality scales

We measured participants level of Extraversion, Neuroticism, Psychoticism and Social Desirability (Lie) by the well-established Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (Eysenck, Eysenck,
& Barrett, 1985). We measured Grays basic traits of personality by the Behavioural Inhibition
SystemBehavioral Activation System Scales, BISBAS (Carver & White, 1994). This questionnaire allowed for assessing participants level of Anxiety (by the BIS-Anxiety sub-scale) and
Impulsivity-Sensation Seeking (by the BAS-Drive, BAS-Reward Responsiveness and BAS-Fun
Seeking subscales). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) taps more
dysfunctional facets of Impulsivity (e.g., I do things without thinking.) which may indeed more
closely relate to health risk-taking.
2.5. Health-related variables
We administered a short form of the Multidimensional Health Questionnaire (Artistico, Baldassarri, & Lauriola, 1999), providing an assessment of Health Negative Aect (i.e., ones tendency
to be worried, anxious or depressed about health) and Health Involvement (i.e., ones tendency to
be motivated, competent and personally in charge of caring about health). The predictors set also
included specic CHD-related measures, such as ones Perceived CHD Risk and Cholesterol risk
level, ones preoccupation with CHD and Cholesterol level and ones beliefs against consuming
high-fat foods and for consuming high-vitamin E foods.
2.6. Statistical analyses
A factorial analysis of variance, with problem focus (prevention vs. promotion) and framing
valence (positive vs. negative) as independent factors was used to investigate the eect of design
variables on attribute evaluation and message appeal rating. A logistic regression analysis with the
same independent factors as predictors was used to investigate the eect of design variables on
risky choices (the dependent variable was measured as a nominal variate). After we tested the
eect of design variables, we carried out multiple regression analyses and a logistic regression
analysis of selected participants personality characteristics with attribute evaluation, message
appeal rating and risky choices, respectively. Because standardized regression coecients are
computed after the eects of other predictors in the equation have been partialled out, we
compared regression coecients with zero-order Pearsons correlations to evaluate specic and
common contributions of each variable.

3. Results
3.1. Attribute framing
The attribute being framed in the present study was either the described persons blood cholesterol level (i.e., level of exposure to a risk factor) or the described persons vitamin consumption
level (i.e., level of exposure to a protective factor). Research participants judged the described

52

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

persons exposure to risk or protective factors and provided their answers by completing ve
bipolar adjective scales (e.g., saferisky), with higher scores indicating a more negative evaluation.
To investigate the eect of design variables on respondents evaluation, we computed a summated
rating of these adjective scales (Cronbachs alpha 0.93 with ve items) and used it as the
dependent variable in a factorial analysis of variance. The omnibus F -test only approached statistical signicance for the framing valence main eect and for the framing valence by problem
focus interaction eect. However, a planned comparison analysis revealed that there was an overall
tendency to evaluate that persons health status in a more negative way in the negative valence
condition (negative vs. positive average scores 25.50 vs. 22.85; F1;233 3:29, p 0:07), and that
this expected framing valence eect attained statistical signicance in the promotion focus condition (negative vs. positive average scores 26.90 vs. 22.30; F1;234 4:98, p < 0:05). The negative
framing valence produced a negative shift in judging an established vitamin consumption level
below the high protection standard.
The summated rating was correlated with participants temperamental factors, health related
variables, age and gender. This analysis resulted in very few signicant factors. In particular, we
found that participants higher worries about CHD produced a more negative evaluation of the
described persons blood cholesterol level (r 0:34, p < 0:01 and r 0:26, p < 0:05, respectively,
for the negative and the positive valence conditions). Likewise, participants personal perception
of higher blood cholesterol also produced a more negative evaluation of the described persons
blood cholesterol level, but only in the negative valence condition (r 0:33, p < 0:01). On the
whole, however, respondents personality characteristics did not play an important role in
aecting ones evaluation of the described persons exposure to risk or protective factors.
3.2. Goal framing
The health behavior being framed was either increasing the consumption of established healthy
foods (promotion focus) or decreasing the consumption of unhealthy foods (prevention focus).
The messages were presented either describing the positive consequences of attaining the goal
(positive valence) or describing the negative consequences of not attaining the goal (negative
valence). The extent to which research participants were persuaded by dierent health messages
was assessed by measuring: how much they think the described person should comply with the
behavior, respondents willingness to monitor the described person, and respondents willingness
to comply with the described behavior themselves if they were in that condition.
Consistent with our data analysis strategy, we computed a summated rating of message appeal
(Cronbachs alpha 0.72 with three items) and used this rating as the dependent variable in a
factorial analysis of variance. While we did not nd any statistically signicant eect accrued by
the framing valence, we detected a signicant main eect accrued by problem focus (F1;235 4:80;
p < 0:05). The message appeal rating was, on average, 21.30 and 19.67, respectively, for the
prevention focused message and for the promotion focused message. It is therefore concluded that
describing positive versus negative consequences of attaining versus not attaining the prescribed
goal had no inuence on participants reaction to health messages, but prevention focused messages were more eective than promotion focused messages regardless of frame.
The message appeal rating was correlated with participants temperamental factors, non-temperamental health-related tendencies, age and gender. In the prevention focus condition, we found

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

53

that the message appeal rating was positively correlated with participants scores on Health
Involvement, Lie, and Beliefs against consuming high fat foods, and negatively correlated with both
BAS-Drive and the Barratt scale of Impulsivity (Table 1(Panel A)). A similar correlation pattern was
found in the promotion focus condition for Lie and Beliefs against consuming high-fat foods, but the
coecients were smaller and did not attain statistical signicance (Table 1(Panel B)). Thus, people
who are more compulsive, more involved in health matters, more apt to think that avoiding fat in the
diet is a good strategy to stay healthy and with higher social conformity were also more persuaded by
the message asserting that reducing high fat foods is a major strategy to stay healthy later in life.
Overall, individual dierences in personality and health-related tendencies accounted for 22%
of the message appeal variance in the prevention focus condition and for only 6% of the variance
in the promotion focus condition. In the prevention focus condition (Table 1(Panel A)), standardized regression coecients were smaller than Pearsons correlations for the Barratt scale,
BAS-Drive and Lie, while the regression coecients were approximately as large as Pearsons
correlations for Health Involvement and Beliefs against consuming high-fat foods. In the promotion focus condition (Table 1(Panel B)), this latter variable was the only statistically signicant
predictor of message appeal, while none of the personality factors was related to message eectiveness. Overall, it is concluded that while health-related variables accounted for more specic
portions of the message appeal variance, a general impulsive personality appears to be a negative
predictor of the reaction to preventive health messages.
3.3. Risky choice framing
The risky choice-framing task allowed us to test the eect of stable individual dispositions on
risk-taking, in terms of risk-seeking/risk-averse attitudes. A standard logistic regression analysis
was conducted with the choice for the risky option (coded as a risk-seeking attitude) as
the dependent variable and with the framing valence and the problem focus as predictors. The
regression model was statistically signicant (v2 22:18; df 2; p < 0:01). Inspection of the
Table 1
Summary of multiple regression analysis of individual dierence variables on the message appeal rating for (a) prevention-focused and (b) promotion-focused scenarios
Predictors

Beta

t-valuedf1

R2

F5;117

0.22

7.21

<0.01

Panel A: Dependent variable: message appeal in the prevention-focused scenario

Health Involvement
Lie
Beliefs against high-fat foods
Impulsivity (BIS-11)
BAS-Drive

0.24
0.02
0.30
)0.12
)0.14

2.6


0.2
3.6


)1.4
)1.8

0.27


0.20

0.31


)0.25


)0.20

F2;114

Panel B: Dependent variable: message appeal in the promotion-focused scenario

0.06
Lie
Beliefs against high-fat foods

p < 0:05;

p < 0:01.

0.18
0.20

1.8
2.1

0.13
0.18

3.51

<0.05

54

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

standardized regression coecients revealed that the framing valence eect was statistically signicant (Wald Statistic 17.36; p < 0:01), whereas the problem focus eect did not attain statistical signicance. While in the positive frame the preferences for the safe option were more than
twice the preferences for the risky option (73% vs. 27%), in the negative frame the preferences for
the risky option were almost the same as the preferences for the safe option (48% vs. 52%). This
was true for both prevention focus and promotion focus.
The correlational analysis provided us with dierent results in dierent valence conditions. In
the positive condition (Table 2(Panel A)), higher levels of BAS-Reward Responsiveness were
negatively associated with risk-seeking, whereas higher Perceived CHD Risk was positively
associated with risk-seeking. While the positive framing valence induced risk aversion overall,
those participants who picked the safe option perceived themselves to be more vulnerable to CHD
and more focused on rewards than did those who picked the risky option. In the negative condition (Table 2(Panel B)), higher levels of Health Negative Aect, BIS Anxiety, BAS-Fun Seeking,
Perceived CHD Risk and Preoccupation with CHD were all associated with risk-seeking. In
addition, there was a tendency for the Barratt scale of Impulsiveness and for EPQ-R Neuroticism
to positively predict risk-seeking behavior.
The following measures were entered into the regression equation to predict the observed risk
attitude in both the framing valence conditions: BAS-Reward Responsiveness, BIS Anxiety, BASFun Seeking, Health Negative Aect, Perceived CHD Risk, Preoccupation with CHD, Barratt
scale of Impulsiveness and EPQ-R Neuroticism. In the positive valence condition the model accounted for about 10% of the variance and attained statistical signicance with the Wald Statistic
for standardized regression coecients only with BAS-Reward Responsiveness (Table 2(Panel
A)). In the negative valence condition the model accounted for about 20% of the variance and
attained statistical signicance with all predictors entered except BAS-Reward Responsiveness

Table 2
Summary of logistic regression analyses of individual dierence variables on the observed risk attitude in (a) positively
and (b) negatively framed scenarios
Variables in the Equation

Beta

Walddf1

R2

v2df2

Panel A: Dependent variable: risk seeking in the positive frame

0.09
BAS-Reward Responsiveness
Perceived CHD Risk

0.16
0.09

3.9

1.0

7.08

<0.05

)0.23


0.16

v2df8

Panel B: Dependent variable: risk seeking in the negative frame

0.22
Health Negative Aect
BIS-Anxiety
Neuroticism
Preoccupation for CHD
Perceived CHD Risk
BAS-Fun Seeking
Impulsivity (BIS-11)

p < 0:05;

p < 0:01.

0.11
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.20
0.02

3.5

3.1

0.8
0.9
0.9
8.9


0.1

0.26


0.23


0.15
0.22

0.20

0.20

0.11

23.96

<0.01

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

55

(Table 2(Panel B)). Inspection of standardized regression coecients revealed that only the BASFun Seeking scale, the Health Negative Aect scale and the BIS-Anxiety scale attained conventional levels of statistical signicance. These scales were associated with risk-seeking behavior in
the risky choice task and provided unique contributions to the explanation of risk-taking variance. Other predictors, such as EPQ-R Neuroticism, Preoccupation with CHD and Perceived
CHD Risk and the Barratt scale of Impulsiveness, were also associated with risk-seeking in the
bivariate correlational analysis, but did not provide specic contributions to the explanation of
the risk-taking variance.
4. Discussion
The literature we reviewed in Section 1 highlighted the existing gap between seemingly overlapping areas of interest: the study of risk-taking in behavioral decision theory and the study of
risk-taking tendencies as predictors of risk-taking behaviors in real life situations, including health
risk-taking. The present study lled this gap by relating psychometrically assessed risk-taking
tendencies to judgment and decision-making in positively and negatively framed health decisions.
The following conclusions come from this study. Two out of three framing experiments (i.e., the
attribute- and the risky choice-framing) provided us with signicant framing valence eects. These
ndings are in keeping with the literature (cf., Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Levin
et al., 1998) claiming that goal-framing eects are weaker and less extensively replicated than the
eects of other framing types. Consistent with the literature, the Risky choice-framing experiment
produced the strongest framing valence eect and its robustness was supported across both prevention focus and promotion focus scenarios. Even though we attained signicant attributeframing valence eects only in the promotion focus condition, the present study is, to our
knowledge, the rst study in which ones level of exposure to risk or protective factors was the
attribute being successfully framed. Results supported our manipulation of framing valence in
terms of gains or losses relative to established good or bad reference points. This nding expands
on previous attribute-framing studies for which attribute labels such as success rate/failure rate
directly expressed positive or negative valence. In the present case, respondents had to infer valence
by comparing stimulus values to standards of risk or protection. (See also Levin & Lauriola, 2003.)
As to the role of individual factors in risky health decisions, all three framing experiments
provided us with some signicant correlations between psychometrically assessed variables and
empirical indicators of judgment and decision-making in health-related decisions. 1 However, the

Participants age and gender were initially considered within the set of individual dierence variables aecting
health risk-taking behavior. Although we detected eects of demographic variables on psychometrically assessed
individual dierences (e.g., females scored higher than males in Neuroticism, older adults were more concerned about
their health than younger adults), we did not detect any main eect of demographics on participants behavior in the
framing experiments. These ndings suggest that age- and gender-related dierences in personality were more important
than age and gender dierences per se in accounting for individual dierences in responding to positively and negatively
framed health decisions. However, it should be noted that research participants, and in particular older adults, were
admitted to our experimental procedures only if they were in relatively good health and if they had a secondary school
degree. These inclusion criteria might have reduced other eects associated with demographic variables, such as a
cognitive decline with age.

56

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

role of individual dierences was dierent across framing experiments and dierent personality
scales were associated with the behavior in each of the framing types. In the attribute framing
experiment personality scales accounted for a rather small amount of the experimental variance.
Neither temperamental traits nor health-related tendencies were associated with the evaluation of
the described persons exposure to risk or protective factors. Respondents worries about CHD
and of their own blood cholesterol level produced more negative evaluations in the attributeframing task, but only when the message was prevention focused. It is therefore concluded that
respondents characteristics did not play a very important role in aecting ones behavior in the
attribute-framing task.
By contrast, respondents personality characteristics were more important than information
frame in the goal-framing experiment where the framing valence eect was not signicant. In
particular, personality scales accounted for 22% of the message appeal variance in the prevention
focus condition and 6% of the variance in the promotion focus condition. Consistent with the
literature, health-related tendencies, such as Health Involvement and Beliefs against consuming
high-fat foods positively predicted the message eectiveness. Conversely, scales tapping respondents impulsiveness, such as the BAS-Drive scale and the Barratt scale, negatively predicted the
message appeal. Although it should be acknowledged that other factors, such as bad habits or
physiological needs, are important determiners of inappropriate health behaviors, the lack of
attention paid to health messages by high impulsive-low health involved individuals could be
considered as one of the processes involved in exposing those individuals to health risk factors as
documented in the literature we reviewed in the introduction.
Next we discuss the role of personality in making risky decisions. Overall, respondents personality characteristics played a more important role as predictors of risky choices in the negative
frame than in the positive frame. Our regression analysis provided signicant results in both the
frames, but it accounted for more than twice as much of the variance in the negative frame as in
the positive frame (22% vs. 9%). This nding not only supports the general hypothesis that
personality may account for a non-negligible amount of variance in risky decision-making, but it
also supports the view that task variables act as moderators of the relation between personality
and risky decisions, a view neglected in previous experimental studies of personality and risky
decisions. Of particular interest for further studies is the dierent risk-taking variance observed in
the two valence conditions. In fact, the description of choice options in the positive frame made
the sure alternative very appealing to our participants and may have obscured the role of personality. Conversely, a more conicted decision process in the negatively valence condition may
have facilitated the detection of association between personality traits and risk-taking.
Along with the general hypothesis of association between personality and risky decisions, we
also made specic predictions based on the earlier reviewed literature. First, we expected BASrelated tendencies (e.g., Impulsivity) to predict risk-seeking regardless of the framing valence.
Second, we expected BIS-related tendencies (e.g., Anxiety) and other measures of negative
aective traits (e.g., Neuroticism) to predict risk-aversion in the positive frame and risk-seeking in
the negative frame (cf. Lauriola & Levin, 2001). We did not distinguish between the inuence of
dierent negative aective traits; rather, we expected the framing valence to act as a moderator of
the relation between negative aective traits and risky decisions.
As to the rst hypothesis, our ndings support the claim that BAS-related scales are positive
predictors of risk-taking, but only in the negative frame condition where the BAS-Fun Seeking

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

57

scale was among the best predictors of risk-taking and there was a tendency for the Barratt scale
of Impulsivity to exert a similar eect on risky choices. In the positive frame condition none of the
BAS-related scales attained a signicant positive association with risk-taking. In contrast, we
unexpectedly found a negative correlation between scores on the BAS-Reward Responsiveness
scale and risk-taking. An interpretation of these mixed results is based on the consistency between
item-scale content and our manipulation of information frame. For persons who like to experience novel activities (as measured, for example, by the BAS-Fun Seeking Scale), the description of
the safe option in the negative framing condition as surely leading to an unsatisfactory outcome is
consistent with their willingness to take risks, but the description of the safe option in the positive
framing condition as leading to a satisfactory outcome is inconsistent with their willingness to
take risks. For persons who focus on positive feelings in anticipation of rewards or favorable
outcomes (as measured by the BAS-Reward Responsiveness), the sure option would be especially
appealing in the positive framing condition but not in the negative framing condition where
options are presented in terms of unfavorable outcomes.
As to the second hypothesis, our ndings support the claim that negative aective traits predict
risk-seeking in the negative frame, but not risk aversion in the positive frame. This nding is
consistent with previous studies showing an interaction between ones overall Neuroticism score
and ones risk attitude in gain and loss trials (e.g., Lauriola & Levin, 2001) as well as with the view
that all negative aective traits exert a consistent inuence on decision-making (i.e., there is no
distinction in direction of prediction pattern for health negative aect, neuroticism and anxiety).
Rather, the present study provided evidence that the interaction between negative aective traits
with task variables accounts for peoples tendency to be more or less inclined to take risk.
Overall the present study helped ll the gap between research in personality aimed at explaining
real-world health decisions and basic research in decision-making aimed at determining the
joint roles of situational and individual dierence factors. Health behavior is indeed complex
and multidetermined and many other factors than deliberative processes, such as habits and
physiological needs, are responsible for taking health risks. We demonstrated in this study that
situational factors such as information frame and promotion vs. prevention focus inuence
health-related judgments and decisions, and that individual dispositionsboth temperamental
traits and health-related tendenciesexplain the variance observed across individuals in
responding to health concerns. We suggest that future health researchers consider the usefulness
of incorporating basic decision variables, personality characteristics and specic health-related
attitudes in order to gain a more complete understanding of health risky decisions.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation Grant
No. SES-0001316 awarded to Irwin P. Levin.
References
Adler, N., & Mathews, K. (1994). Health psychology: Why do some people get sick and some stay well? Annual Review
of Psychology, 45, 229259.

58

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

Artistico, D., Baldassarri, F., & Lauriola, M. (1999). Costruzione e validazione di una forma breve del
Multidimensional Health Questionnaire per la popolazione anziana. Rassegna di Psicologia, 16, 133140.
Artistico, D., Baldassarri, F., Lauriola, M., & Laicardi, C. (2000). Dimensions of health-related tendencies in elderly
people: Relationships with health behavior and personality traits. European Journal of Personality, 14, 533552.
Booth-Kewley, S., & Vickers, R. R. (1994). Associations between major domains of personality and health behavior.
Journal of Personality, 62, 281298.
Bromiley, P., & Curley, S. P. (1992). Individual dierences in risk-taking. In J. FrankYates (Ed.), Risk-taking behavior.
Wiley series in human performance and cognition. Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Budescu, D. V., & Weiss, W. (1987). Reection of transitive and intransitive preferences: A test of Prospect Theory.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 184202.
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk perception. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 551
565.
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and aective responses to impending
reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 319333.
Caspi, A., Begg, D., Dickson, N., Langley, J., et al. (1995). Identication of personality types at risk for poor health and
injury in late adolescence. Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 5, 330350.
Cohen, M., Jaray, J., & Tanios, S. (1987). Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and uncertainty
for gains and losses. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 122.
Dahlback, O. (1990a). Criminality and risk-taking. Personality and Individual Dierences, 11, 265272.
Dahlback, O. (1990b). Personality and risk-taking. Personality and Individual Dierences, 11, 12351242.
Donohew, L., Zimmerman, R., Cupp, P. S., Novak, S., Colon, S., & Abell, R. (2000). Sensation seeking, impulsive
decision-making, and risky sex: Implications for risk-taking and design of interventions. Personality and Individual
Dierences, 28, 10791091.
Duy, M. E., & MacDonald, E. (1990). Determinants of functional health of older persons. Gerontologist, 30, 503509.
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1985). Ambiguity and uncertainty in probabilistic inference. Psychological Review,
92, 433461.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and individual dierences. London: Plenum Press.
Eysenck, S. B., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985). A revised version of the Psychoticism scale. Personality and
Individual Dierences, 6, 2129.
Gallant, M. P., & Connell, C. M. (1997). Predictors of mammography use in the past year among elderly women.
Journal of Aging and Health, 9, 373395.
Goma-i-Freixanet, M. (1995). Prosocial and antisocial aspects of personality. Personality and Individual Dierences, 19,
125134.
Gray, J. A. (1987). The psychology of fear and stress. New York: McMGraw-Hill.
Juergens, J. P., Smith, M. C., & Sharpe, T. R. (1986). Determinants of OTC drug use in elderly. Journal of Geriatric
Drug Therapy, 1, 3146.
Kahn, B. E., & Sarin, R. (1988). Modeling ambiguity in decision under uncertainty. Journal of Consumer Research, 15,
265272.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263291.
Lauriola, M., Laicardi, C., Artistico, D., & Baldassarri, F. (2000). Alternative factor structures of health-related
psychological tendencies and their relationship to self-reported health seeking behaviors. Psychology and Health, 15,
539554.
Lauriola, M., & Levin, I. P. (2001). Personality Traits and Risky Decision-making in a controlled experimental task: An
exploratory study. Personality and Individual Dierences, 31, 215226.
Levin, I. P., & Gaeth, G. J. (1988). How consumers are aected by the framing of attribute information before and after
consuming the product. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 374378.
Levin, I. P., Gaeth, G., Schreiber, J. L., & Lauriola, M. (2002). A new look at framing eects: Distribution of eect
sizes, individual dierences and independence of types of eect. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 88, 411429.
Levin, I. P., & Lauriola, M. (2003). A new paradigm for studying the economic and behavioral consequences of framing
health-related decisions. International Business and Economics Research Journal, 2, 2532.

M. Lauriola et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 38 (2005) 4559

59

Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A typology and critical analysis of
framing eects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76, 149188.
Marks, G. R., & Lutgendorf, S. K. (1999). Perceived health competence and personality factors dierentially predict
health behaviors in older adults. Journal of Aging and Health, 11, 221239.
Meyerowitz, B. E., & Chaiken, S. (1987). The eect of message framing on breast self-examination attitudes, intentions,
and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 500510.
Myers, R. E., Ross, E., Jepson, C., Wolf, T., Balshem, A., Millner, L., & Leventhal, H. (1994). Modeling adherence to
colorectal cancer screening. Preventive Medicine: An International Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory, 23, 142
151.
Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 51, 768774.
Raghunathan, R., & Pham, M. T. (1999). All negative moods are not equal: Motivational inuences of anxiety and
sadness on decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 5677.
St
ober, J. (1997). Trait anxiety and pessimistic appraisal of risk and chance. Personality and Individual Dierences, 22,
465476.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297323.
Vollrath, M., & Torgersen, S. (2002). Who takes health risks? A probe into eight personality types. Personality and
Individual Dierences, 32, 11851197.
Von Neuman, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Wolfgang, A. K. (1988). Gambling as a function of gender and sensation seeking. Journal of Gambling Behavior, 4, 71
77.
Wong, A., & Carducci, B. J. (1991). Sensation seeking and nancial risk taking in everyday money matters. Journal of
Business and Psychology, 4, 525530.
Zaleskiewicz, T. (2001). Beyond risk seeking and risk aversion: Personality and the dual nature of economic risk-taking.
European Journal of Personality, 15, S105S122.
Zuckerman, M. (1993). Sensation seeking and impulsivity: A marriage made in biology. In W. G. McCown, J. L.
Johnson, & M. B. Shure (Eds.), The impulsive client: Theory, research, and treatment. Washington, DC: APA.
Zuckerman, M. (1994). Behavioural expressions of biosocial bases of sensation seeking. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.