EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992.]

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, (Second District of Bataan),
petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

2.
TAXATION; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; CUSTOMS DUTIES;
NAME GIVEN TO TAXES ON THE IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION
OF COMMODITIES. Customs duties which are assessed at the
prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently
imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus,
it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes
on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax
assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a
foreign country."

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; AUTHORIZED BY
CONGRESS TO FIX TARIFF RATES AND OTHER DUTIES OR IMPOSTS.
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President,
that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2]
of Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]
may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other
duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and
401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions
which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478.

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AFFORDED TO LOCAL INDUSTRIES.
The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in
some measure the effect of protecting local industries where
such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable
goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties
inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues.
Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever,
designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly,
customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the
proceeds of which become public funds have either or both the
generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social
activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult
to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal
objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces
ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here,
the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on
imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have
some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the
effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At
the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for

the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff

rates or special duty.
4.
ID.; ID.; GENERAL STANDARDS SET FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO THE PRESIDENT. Section 401 of
the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with
which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to
the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised
in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection
of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be
secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that
therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the
alpha and omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously
such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and
policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that
the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great
bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension
of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as
the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be
reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient
service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may
otherwise impose upon the community.
5.
ID.; ID.; TARIFF RATES AND CUSTOM DUTIES; LEVIED UPON
ARTICLES NOT PRODUCED IN THE PHILIPPINES. Tariff rates are
commonly established and the corresponding customs duties levied
and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and
not produced in the Philippines. In such cases, customs duties may

be seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or

perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the
items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are
levied and imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are
any competing local industries to protect.
6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE ORDERS
NOS. 475 AND 478, CONSTITUTIONAL. Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the
desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that
reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not
successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and
legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J p:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No.
438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,
an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional
duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased from
five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the
promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff
Commission to initiate the process required by the Tariff and
Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and

other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10

and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as
amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the
procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity
to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective
positions.
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on
15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported
articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem,
except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%)
ad valorem. cdtai
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission
submitted to the President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil
and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration and
appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued
Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in
addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%)
ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty
of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. prLL
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as
follows:

"Section 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments."
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact
revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power
of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which
Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to
increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional
duties only when necessary to protect local industries or products
but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the
legality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to
restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will
examine these questions in that order.
Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent
promulgation of Executive Order No. 517 did not render the instant
Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is
dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:
"Section 1.
Lifting of the Additional Duty. The additional duty
in the nature of ad valorem imposed on all imported articles
prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No. 443, as

amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the selected

articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, subject of Annex `A'
hereof, shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine
(9%) percent ad valorem."
Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products
continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%)
ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special duty
of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of
imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478. prcd
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It
does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,
are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead
by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides as follows:
"(2)
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government."(Emphasis supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to
authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions

as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates

. . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions
thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly
invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section
104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:
"Sec. 104.
All tariff sections, chapters, headings and
subheadings and the rates of import duty under Section 104 of
Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued
under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby
adopted and form part of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles
the rates of duty indicated in the Section under this section except
as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that,
the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad
valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to
Section Four Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic
investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the
President upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.

a.
In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed,
the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby
empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective
rates of import duty (including any necessary change in
classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but
in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the
basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased
rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred
(100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or to ban
imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose
an additional duty on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic
investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the
NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection
levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code,
including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
LexLib
b.
Before any recommendation is submitted to the President
by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the
imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the
course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested
parties shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present,
produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear
the views and recommendations of any government office, agency
or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their

findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days

after the termination of the public hearings.
c.
The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of
import duty within the limits fixed in subsection `a' shall include the
authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty,
the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty
with respect to imports from the principal competing foreign
country for the most recent representative period shall be used as
bases.
d.
The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the
Commission a copy of all customs import entries as filed in the
Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized
representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all
liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended
thereto as finally filed in the Commission on Audit.
e.
The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of this section.
f.
Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall take effect thirty (30) days after
promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not
exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect at
the discretion of the President." (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated
authorizations found in Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act
under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries

and products for the sake of the national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:
"E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the
protection of local industries and products for the sake of national
economy, general welfare and/or national security. On the contrary,
they work in reverse, especially as to crude oil, an essential product
which we do not have to protect, since we produce only minimal
quantities and have to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the
government to raise government finances, contrary to Sections 24
and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to Section 401
of the Tariff and Customs Code." 3 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the
language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority.
The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2)
words, one found in Section 401 (a) (1): "existing protective rates of
import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of
Section 401 (a): " protection levels granted in Section 104 of this
Code . . . ." We believe that the words "protective" and "protection"
are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing
limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very
practical fact of which this Court may take judicial notice that the
Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code,
is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of

governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal

Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that
generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the
government The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation
[PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the
prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently
imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. 4
Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to
taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff
or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a
foreign country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported
goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local
industries where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very
same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing
governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes
are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only.
Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the
sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds 6
have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of
economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently,
it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the
dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the
crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates
and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products
may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil
production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil

products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that

substantial revenues for the government are raised by the
imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build
into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general
standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that
provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must
be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the
"protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that
can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that
therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the
alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take
seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative
standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for
instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute
the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as
important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare
and national security" as the protection of local industries. And so
customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the
purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy
quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized
local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly
established and the corresponding customs duties levied and
collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and not
produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete

with such articles and commodities: among the more interesting

examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from
the beaver (Chapter 5, 5.14); olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or
European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7,
Notes); dates (Chapter 8, 8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar
(Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.01); special diagnostic
instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery
(Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes; X-ray screens,
etc (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be
seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps,
in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items
involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any
competing local industries to protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the
desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that
reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not
successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and
legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled. 7
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to
deal with petitioner's additional contention that, should Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal,
there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products
equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be needed to
adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949.]

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers
similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
L-2044

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949.]
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of
First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of
Manila, respondents.

Paredes, Diaz & Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and

Araneta & Araneta for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo and Assistant City
Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos & Fernando as amici curiae.

[G.R. No. L-2756. August 26, 1949.]

L-2756

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs.

EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.

Araneta & Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.

Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.

[G.R. No. L-3054. Agosto 26, 1949.]

Claro M. Recto as amicus curiae.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido
Nacionalista, recurrente, contra EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS,
recurrido.
[G.R. No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949.]
LEON MA. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.

L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.

Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and
Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and
Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique Fernando, Ramon
Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano
R. Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M.
Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio
Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW,
HOW ASCERTAINED. The intention of an act is to be sought for in
its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be

subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of

the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as
additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
2.
ID.; ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined
to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive
bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope. The words "limited
period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to
mean restrictive in duration.
3.
PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF
DELEGATION OF. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of
emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be
an emergency."
4.
ID.; LEGISLATURE HAD RESTRICTED THE LIFE OF
EMERGENCY POWERS. In the language of section 3 of Act No.
671, The National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought
on by war.
5.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION
OF ACT NO. 671; CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and
"would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote
automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain
period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary
to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that

period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to
be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
6.
ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT NO. 671;
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION. When it became evident that
we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be
discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers
upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the
inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor
than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so
vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive
of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been
conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption
and dislocation of the normal processes of government.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID. The period that best comports with the
constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general
context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not
the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive
with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
convening of that body.
8.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE
WHEN CONGRESS MET IN REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS
THEREAFTER ISSUED, VALIDITY OF. Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law.

9.
ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION IS
PRESERVED FOR CONGRESS ALL THE TIME. The Filipino people by
adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they
share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system,
with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of
government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not
excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the
history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of
the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another
department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even
when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged
in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of
extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to
act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
10.
JUDGES; DISQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SUPREME
COURT; OBJECTION SHOULD BE MADE ON TIME. A motion to
disqualify a member of the Supreme Court filed after the said
member had given his opinion on the merits of the case cannot be
considered because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after
decision has been rendered.
11.
ID.; ID.; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. The fact that a member of the Supreme
Court while Secretary of Justice had advised the Chief Executive on

the question involved in a certain case, does not disqualify him to

act when it is brought before the court, for he cannot be considered
as having acted previously in said case as counsel of any of the
parties when the Chief Executive is not a party thereto.

Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in
exactly the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme Court,
municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be
considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.

12.
ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN
THE ADJUDICATION; RULE 53, SECTION 1 WITH RULE 58, SECTION 1,
INTERPRETED. One who is not a member of the court at the time
an adjudication is made cannot take part in that adjudication. The
word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only
by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value
and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated
(Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act
No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court).
Promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of
Court for filing and publication.

16.
ID. Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance
of the power delegated to him under section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations.

13.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. One who is no longer a member of this
Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot
validly take part in that decision.

TUASON, J p:

14.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF
THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPLY WITH ITS OWN DUTY.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge
victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the
great branches of the Government, within its own allocated sphere,
complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and
regardless of difficulties.
15.
EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS. Executive Orders,
even if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief

17.
JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OF VOTES TO ANNUL
EXECUTIVE ORDERS. There is nothing either in the Constitution or
in the Judiciary Act requiring the votes of eight justices to nullify a
rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President.
Hence, a mere majority of six members of the Supreme Court is
enough to nullify them.
DECISION

Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other
two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them
present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is
decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we
will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of
interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No.
L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a
discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the
cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of
the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling
authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance

to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly

and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821.)
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the
President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62,
which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this
Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is
Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the
Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of
mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office
and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of
shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required
export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054
relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the
operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an
elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to
defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the
holding of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The
petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks

this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or

otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the
constitutionality of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the
point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case
chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and
effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this
question that we will presently address ourselves and devote
greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the
constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any
dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that
hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in
furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF
WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET
SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1.
The existence of war between the United States and
other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines,
makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the
Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the

existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and

regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other
things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the
Commonwealth including the determination of the order of
precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create
new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already
existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or
suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend
or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance
of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the
proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or
municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he
may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
"SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable
upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the
powers herein granted.
"SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until
the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by
law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy."
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its
nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of
the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as
additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined
to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive
bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The
words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond
question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in
order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be
temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust
Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L.
R., 937, 938.)
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved
with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the
constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new

legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with

the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been
correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and
uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary
emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d],
912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would,
the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and
the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore,
this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate
its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President:
Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature
may not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that
legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between
delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by
rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of
the delegate; . . ."
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of
Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of
the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued
in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the

National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the

former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the
Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly
failed to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it
did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the
delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the
rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was
to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones
already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the
Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its
authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each
adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a
two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn
could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws
enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two
instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by
the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former
President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and
the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export
control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the

language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National
Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding
sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the
war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon
the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all
the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers
herein granted."
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one
meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account
of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it
could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the
National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in
section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the
convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what
reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and
clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the
President was expected to continue making laws in the form of
rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement
regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should
carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the
carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National
Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of
the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who

was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in

his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for
a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted."
These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the
conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new
legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after
the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a
different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the
same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.
He said he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was
to open on January 1, 1942." (Italics ours.) It can easily be discerned
in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the
President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the
National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this
inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as
to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive
of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been
conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption
and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if
we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its
duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite,
limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports
with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the
general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main

if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period
ending with the convening of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth
Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular
session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the
first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session
which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we
are giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate."
(Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of
deciding the question as to which department of government is
authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is
predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to
declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of
fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly
call that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power
and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of
interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied
the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it
is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to
say that war has not ended, and may act on the strength of his
opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have
construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the

proposition. There is no pretense that the President has

independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as
those under review. We take it that the respondents, in sustaining
the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No.
620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on no other
source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this
connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly
derived from the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the
opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts
Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that
they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and
regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600
and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6,
1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless
sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical
deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the minds of the
lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse
not later than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for
the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was
predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous
repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the
curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the
Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the
President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them
into force and to issue new ones independently of the National
Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against

the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671

equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the
question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If
we were to assume that actual hostilities between the original
belligerents are still raging, the conclusion would not be altered.
After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved
if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was
desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of
the Emergency Powers Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of
total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble
referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the
Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization
of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National
Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for
immediate action and with which the National Assembly would not
be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and
calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the
National Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of
the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in
one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamentary government have given notice that they share the
faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of
government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not
excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the

history of the United States, the basic features of whose

Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of
the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another
department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even
when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged
in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of
extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to
act, are called upon "to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this
decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea
that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his
extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or
indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In
order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the
normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to
depart in these cases from the ordinary rule relative to the period
for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby
decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of
the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the
Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be
charged.
Moran, C.J., concurs in part.

Ozaeta, J., concurs.

Feria, J., concurs in so far as the decision is not in conflict with his
separate opinion.

the resulting emergency," and authorized the President "during the

existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in the Act." To be constitutional, this Act must be
construed to be for the limited period fixed or implied therein.

EN BANC

2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPRESS REPEAL UNNECESSARY. Express
repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 671 is not necessary; otherwise it
would be unconstitutional since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto.

Paras, J., concurs and also in separate opinion.

[G.R. No. L-6266. February 2, 1953.]

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR. ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. VICENTE
GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P.
Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT;
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671; LIMITED DURATION.
Commonwealth Act No. 671, passed in pursuance of section 26 of
Article VI of the Constitution, declared the national policy that "the
existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary
to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HOUSE BILL NO. 727 CONSIDERED
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. Although House Bill No. 727,
approved by the Congress, repealing the Emergency Powers Acts,
had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a
regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent
resolution formally declaring the termination of the emergency
powers.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMERGENCY RESULTING FROM LAST
WORLD WAR. Commonwealth Act No. 671 lasted only during the
emergency resulting from the last world war which factually
involved the Philippines when said Act was passed on December 16,
1941. That emergency terminated upon the ending of said war.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; KINDS OF EMERGENCIES. Section 26 of
Article VI of the Constitution authorizes the delegation of powers by
the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.
The emergency spoken of in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is one "in
time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that

may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as

widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF PRESIDENT TO MAKE
APPROPRIATIONS. Even under the theory that insofar as the
Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given matter,
the emergency powers delegated in Commonwealth Act No. 671
are pro tanto withdrawn, the President cannot set aside funds for
special purposes, since the Congress has been approving
appropriation acts. If the President had ceased to have powers with
respect to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of
special appropriations; otherwise he may do indirectly what he
cannot do directly.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J p:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion,
on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already passed upon
the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December
16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war
involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five
members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on
May 25, 1946 (when the Congress met in regular session) according
to Justices Ozaeta, Feria, Tuason and the writer, and on June 9,
1945 (when the Congress convened in special session) according to
Chief Justice Moran. Justices Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes
and Torres in effect concluded that the powers delegated to the
President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon

by the Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its

readiness or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21,
1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,
1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the
Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November, 1949, were
therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act
No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted
legislation on the same subjects. 1
More or less the same considerations that influenced our
pronouncements of August 26, 1949 are and should be controlling
in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to
invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November
10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent
and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of
war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section
1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United
States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency,"

and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of

the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section
1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended
it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has
not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a
cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the
result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the
President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken
place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing
all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress
and the President or either as the principal authority to determine
the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in
palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant
thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in
the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of
either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and
did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend
that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect,
would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while
Congress might delegate its powers by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,
it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take

them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."
2
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that
he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that
the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at
the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the
powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last
world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671
was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which
naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the
foresight that the actual state of war could prevent it from holding
its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following
statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we
were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National
Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which
reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their
loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law
granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under
the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war."
3 When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly
meant such factual war as that then raging.

As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that

"since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but
not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war
and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction
resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last
war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the
declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium
should be continued in force in a modified form." 4 It is important
to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration
was made bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in
his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what
emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing
rains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common
among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the
thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," an
admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are not
the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the
legislative department on the alleged existence of emergency,
reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred
to, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution, in virtue of
which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers
by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.
The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of
the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other
national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or
from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons,
floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces

and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but
were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At
any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions,
and it cannot let the people down without somehow being
answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress
without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any
emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called
attention to an impending emergency that may be brought about by
present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to the fact
that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of
democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic.
The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the
war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and
Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and
indications are that in the next world war, if any, the communist
countries will be aligned against the democracies. No departure can
be made from the national policy declared in section 1 of Act No.
671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies
contemplated in the Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still
technically at war with Japan pending the ratification of the peace
treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the
second place, the last world war was between the United States and
Japan, the Philippines being involved only because it was then
under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States
had already signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines
has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.

It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is

inconsistent with the claim that the emergency powers are nonexistent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill
had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially because
this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary majority, to
declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen
and Senators and on House Resolution No. 99, urging the President
to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public
works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to
state, in reply, that the said petition and resolution cannot prevail
over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by
two chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the
resolution of one house, there is more reason for accepting the
solemn declaration of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar
as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given
matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been
pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be
declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice
of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been
approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the
Government, public works, and many other purposes, with the
result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed
to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and
to withdraw the same from the President. If the President had
ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none
can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is

significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the
President to that of continuing "in force" appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even
assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the
President can by executive orders make new appropriations. The
specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the
general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem
necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and
to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although
the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been
normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the
President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would
necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President
should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of
speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the
people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a
government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In
line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic
in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless
and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter
and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the
consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between,
inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive
departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt
official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes
must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or
group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution,

however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation

of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times
of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to
the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone
must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not
create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation
lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their
faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared
null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds
set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 45685. December 22, 1937.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad
interim of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG,
respondents.
Solicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.

DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria & La O, Orense & Belmonte and Gibbs &
McDonough for the respondent Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
SYLLABUS
1.
JUDGMENT; STAY OF EXECUTION; WRIT OF CERTIORARI;
SUPERSEDEAS BOND. Section 46 (a) of the Rules of this court
requires that in any civil case in which final judgment has been
rendered by this court, if any party thereto gives notice in writing of
his intention to remove the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States by writ of certiorari, this court shall grant a stay for the
period therein mentioned within which said party may give a
supersedeas bond, the sufficiency of which is to be determined by
one of the members of this court.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
PROCEEDINGS. It is admitted that certiorari and prohibition are
civil remedies but the certiorari and prohibition proceedings
originally instituted in this court were, like the proceedings for
probation, an incident of the criminal case. Apart from this, it will be
noted that the appeal taken is from the judgment of this court
declaring the Probation Act unconstitution and void. That judgment
does not command or permit any act to be done. There is nothing
there to be actively enforced by execution or otherwise. Because of
its negative or prohibitive character, there is nothing to supersede;
nothing, as petitioners assert, upon which the stay bond can
operate.

3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to
operate on the decision and judgment in the criminal case entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al."
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in that case,
rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was
affirmed by this court on March 26, 1935 (G. R. No. 41200, 35 Off.
Gaz., 738. See also resolutions of December 17, 1935). The decision
of this court in that criminal case has already become final and the
petition for a writ of certiorari to review said decision was denied by
the Supreme Court of the United States in November of last year. At
bottom, supersedeas is being sought to stay the execution of the
final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the petitioner will
continue to be at large and this is the status quo desired to be
maintained. The suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate
in this case on the judgment sought to be reviewed and cannot
arrest the execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal
case against the respondent M. C. U. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil and
Criminal, Longsdorf, vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.)
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The public interest and the interest of the
speedy administration of justice demand prompt execution of the
final sentence of conviction rendered against the petitioner. Said
petitioner has had all the time and opportunity which the law can
possibly afford to anyone in self-defense. He had the assistance of
able counsel and had opportunity to appeal to this court and the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the least that can be said is
that he must abide by this judgment and serve his term. It is further
to be observed that the petition for probation of the respondent M.
C. U. has already been denied by the trial court.

5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF FEDERAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES. As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section
8 cd. of the Act of Congress of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940;
28 U. S. C. A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and
enforcement of final judgment or decree which is subject to review
by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari is
discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering the judgment or
decree or by a Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is
reiterated in paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the
United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec. 413, p. 831 et seq.)
DECISION
LAUREL, J p:
After rendition of the judgment of this court in the above-entitled
case, 1 the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, on November 26, 1937,
gave notice of his intention to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of certiorari for the review of said judgment
and, desiring to stay execution during the pendency of the
application for the writ and of the proceedings relative thereto in
the Supreme Court of the United States, now prays that the
corresponding supersedeas bond be fixed, as provided by the rules
of this court. The People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners in the above-entitled
case, oppose the application of the respondent for the granting of a
supersedeas bond.
The original action instituted in this court which resulted in the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the Probation Act (No. 4221)
was for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng,

thru counsel, states that as certiorari and prohibition are civil

remedies, it is mandatory upon this court to stay enforcement of its
judgment in the above-entitled case. (Sec. 46 [a] infra, Rules of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.) He also calls attention to the
principle that probation can not be granted after the defendant has
begun the service of his sentence and to the policy of this court to
encourage review of its decisions and judgments on certiorari by the
Federal Supreme Court. In opposition, the petitioners state that the
judgment of this court declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional
and void is self-executing; that there is no judgment in the instant
proceedings to be executed and that the supersedeas will serve no
useful purpose. The petitioner gave answer to the foregoing
objections raised by the respondents and reiterated the arguments
advanced by him in support of his petition for the fixing of the bond.
Section 46 (a) of the rules of this court provides that:
"Whenever it is made to appear by notice in writing that any party
to a civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by this
court intends to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
a writ of certiorari for the review of the decision and judgment of
this court, and it appears that the case is one which, by reason of
the amount involved or the nature of the questions of law
presented, may be removed to the Supreme Court of the United
States by writ of certiorari, and it further appears that the party
intending to make application for such writ desires to stay the
enforcement of the judgment of this court during the pendency of
the application for the writ of certiorari and of the proceedings in
the Supreme Court of the United States, if such is granted, this court
shall grant a stay, for a term not to exceed ten days, within which

the moving party may give a supersedeas bond, and shall designate
one of its members to determine the sufficiency of such bond."
The foregoing rule requires that in any civil case in which final
judgment has been rendered by this court, if any party thereto gives
notice in writing of his intention to remove the case to the Supreme
Court of the United States by writ of certiorari, this court shall grant
a stay for the period therein mentioned within which said party may
give a supersedeas bond, the sufficiency of which is to be
determined by one of the members of this court. It is admitted that
certiorari and prohibition are civil remedies but the certiorari and
prohibition proceedings originally instituted in this court were, like
the proceedings for probation, an incident of the criminal case.
Apart from this, it will be noted that the appeal taken is from the
judgment of this court declaring the Probation Act unconstitutional
and void. That judgment does not command or permit any act to be
done. There is nothing there to be actively enforced by execution or
otherwise. Because of its negative or prohibitive character, there is
nothing to supersede; nothing, as petitioners assert, upon which the
stay bond can operate. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to
operate on the decision and judgment in the criminal case entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng et al."
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in that case,
rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was
affirmed by this court on March 26, 1935 (G. R. No. 41200). 1 The
decision of this court in that criminal case has already become final
and the petition for a writ of certiorari to review said decision was
denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in November of
last year. At bottom., supersedeas is being sought to stay the
execution of the final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the

petitioner will continue to be at large and this is the status quo

desired to be maintained. We do not think that this should be
allowed. (Sec. 46 [f], Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.)
The suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate in this case
on the judgment sought to be reviewed and cannot arrest the
execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal case
against the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil
and Criminal, Longsdorf, vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.)
The public interest and the interest of the speedy administration of
justice demand prompt execution of the final sentence of conviction
rendered against the petitioner. Said petitioner has had all the time
and opportunity which the law can possibly afford to anyone in selfdefense. He had the assistance of able counsel and had opportunity
to appeal to this court and the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the least that can be said is that he must abide by this judgment
and serve his term. It is further to be observed that the petition for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has already been
denied by the trial court.
There is force in the argument that where the case is appealable
under the Constitution and law to the Supreme Court of the United
States, this court is but an agent of that court and must permit the
case to take its due course. In such a case, the appeal is a matter of
right. But from this premise it does not follow that a stay must be
granted by this court where nothing can be stayed, or that the final
decision in a criminal case which can no longer be appealed from
should be superseded. Upon the other hand, the wide latitude
necessarily possessed by this court in the interpretation of its Rules
must be exercised in favor of what is believed to be a matter of
public interest in the present case.

As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section 8 cd. of the

Act of Congress of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940; 28 U. S. C.
A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and
enforcement of final judgment or decree which is subject to review
by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari is
discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering the judgment or
decree or by a Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is
reiterated in paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the
United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec. 413, p. 831 et seq.) In
Magnum Import Co. vs. De Spoturno Coty (262 U. S., 159, 163; 43 S.
Ct., 531; 67 Law. ed., 922), the Supreme Court of the United States,
through Chief Justice Taft, said:
"The petition should, in the first instance, be made to the circuit
court of appeals, which, with its complete knowledge of the cases,
may, with full consideration, promptly pass on it. That court is in a
position to judge, first, whether the case is one likely, under our
practice, to be taken up by us on certiorari; and, second, whether
the balance of convenience requires a suspension of its decree and
a withholding of its mandate. It involves no disrespect to this court
for the circuit court of appeals to refuse to withhold its mandate or
to suspend the operation of its judgment or decree pending
application for certiorari to us. If it thinks a question involved should
be ruled upon by this court, it may certify it. If it does not certify, it
may still consider that the case is one in which a certiorari may
properly issue, and may, in its discretion, facilitate the application
by withholding the mandate or suspending its decree. This is a
matter, however, wholly within its discretion. If it refuses, this court
requires an extraordinary showing before it will grant a stay of the
decree below pending the application for a certiorari, and even

after it has granted a certiorari, it requires a clear case and a

decided balance of convenience before it will grant such stay. These
remarks, of course, apply also to application for certiorari to review
judgments and decrees of the highest courts of states."
Petition for stay of execution and the fixing of a supersedeas bond is
denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76633. October 18, 1988.]
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL KASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES; RATIONALE; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The petitioner

immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to

move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA
should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be
given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions,
however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has not
objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing
that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to
her prejudice.
2.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION; CREATION; JURISDICTION. The
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under
Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote
and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect
their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier
under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4 (a) of
the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations
on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for
death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such
employment.
3.
ID.; ID.; OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; DEFINED; CASE AT BAR.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment,

overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker

outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels
plying international waters, covered by a valid contract." A contract
worker is described as "any person working or who has worked
overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" or "any person working overseas or who has been
employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign
employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract
and shall include seamen." These definitions clearly apply to
Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a
contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a
foreign country.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 2; ADOPTION
OF A STANDARD CONTRACT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT;
PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED WRITTEN INTO A CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO IN VIOLATION OF SAID CIRCULAR. The award of
P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses
was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2,
which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and
domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for
overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required
by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number
of cases by this Court. The petitioner claims that it had never
entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is
hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so
as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all
parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any

ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment

contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any
other format of employment contract effective that date." In the
second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said
circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with
Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State.
5.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; WHAT CANNOT BE DELEGATED; PRINCIPLE EXPLAINED.
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular
No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can he
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
6.
ID.; ID.; TESTS TO DETERMINE A VALID DELEGATION
THEREOF. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

7.
ID.; ID.; ESPECIAL APPLICABILITY IN CASE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS. The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable
to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially
important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare
when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the
authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that
the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The reason is the increasing
complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to
be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION;
PARTICULAR APPLICABILITY TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. The
reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and

more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority

to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCEPTED SUFFICIENT STANDARDS
ENUNCIATED IN PREVIOUS CASES CITED AT BAR. Parenthetically,
it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards
"public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in
Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in
Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in
Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the
United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security"
in Hirabayashi v. United States.
12.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. It is not denied
that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death
benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also
paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In
addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial
gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These
payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's
claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the
standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under

Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984. The underscored

portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22,
issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12, 1976. The above
provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the
working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the
specific provisions in the Constitution calling for the protection of
the working class and the promotion of its interest.
13.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES;
POWERS; VESTED WITH QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS. One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with
to close this case. Its argument that it has been denied due process
because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2
has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of
administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with
two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The
first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply
such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue
adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its
own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own
rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Department of Natural Resources and so an ad infinitum on their
respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has
been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot
be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights
laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) are observed.

14.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;
INTERPRETATION; CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF LABOR. Whatever
doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this
case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the
express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those
with less in life should have more in law. When the conflicting
interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counterbalanced
by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the under
privileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the
opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not
as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can
negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital
but its active and equal partner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of
P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by
the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no
jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker. cdll
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His
widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner
of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the

POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the
Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that
the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if
any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the
exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are
essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this
Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the
disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created
under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to
promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created
earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4
(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations
on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for

death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such

employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or
that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is
that he was not an overseas worker but a domestic employee and
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with the
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that
Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the
time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment,
overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker
outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels
plying international waters, covered by a valid contract." 3 A
contract worker is described as "any person working or who has
worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has
been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign
employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract
and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to
Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a
contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a
foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts
which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's

employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its

submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power
over overseas employment under Executive Order No. 797. 7 The
second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and
regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was
created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers." prcd
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it
prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the
subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano
Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does
indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the
petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions
considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be
likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although
working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found
it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for
processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers.
Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of
the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen
nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA. LLpr
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for
burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its
Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February

1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted

by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had
earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been
sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner
claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the
deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first
place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which
specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any
Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to
adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984
and to desist from using any other format of employment contract
effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so,
the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written
into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the
State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular
No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of
the Administration (POEA)."

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board,

which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping
contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

a wide and sweeping authority that is not 'canalized within banks

that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers."

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative

discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this
Court held:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a

valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are intended to prevent
a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

"We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase 'may see fit' is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission,'

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the

three major powers of the Government but is especially important
in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances
when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities
to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power,
however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if
not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has

ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated

problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. prcd
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued
by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a
significant number of cases without challenge by the employer. The
power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in
requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient

standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.

That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to
"fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as
sufficient standards "public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, 15
"justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, 16 "public
convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, 17 and "simplicity,
economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and
experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United
States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a
monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and
that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received
a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically
reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino
seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
"Section C.

Compensation and Benefits.

"1.
In case of death of the seamen during the term of his
Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
"a.

P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

"b.
P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators
and master electricians
"c.

P130,000.00 for ratings.

"2.
It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned
above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to
whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine
laws. . . .
"3.

...

"c.
If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the
owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not
exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses."
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum
Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,
1976, providing as follows:
"Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional
Benefits.
"All compensation benefits under Title 11, Book Four of the Labor
Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund)) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits,
gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be
entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB. If
applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the
Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
beneficiaries in accordance with such laws."

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State

for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and
the specific provisions in the Constitution calling for the protection
of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close this
case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the
same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative
law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables
them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the
second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.
Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its
own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the
Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do
the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board
and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of
Natural Resources and so an ad infinitum on their respective
administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted
as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered
violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by
Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations 21 are observed. LLjur
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties
in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line
with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on

the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must
be counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must
accord the under privileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be
given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his
cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with
which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere
employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10,
1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17122. February 27, 1922.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO,
defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.
ORGANIC LAW. By the organic law of the Philippine
Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers are

vested in the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of

the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive; and of the
Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law; the Executive has no authority to make
or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law.
2.
POWER. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of
each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional.
3.
THE POWER TO DELEGATE. The Legislature cannot
delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law
unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to
authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. One the other hand, if the act
within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and avoid.
4.
No CRIME TO SELL. After the passage of Act No. 2868,
and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a
dealer in rice could sell it at any price and he would not commit a
crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to sell rice
at any price.
5. CRIME BY PROCLAMATION. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it
is the violation of the Proclamation of the Governor-General which

constitutes the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because of the Proclamation by the Governor-General.

construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of

Act No. 2868.

6.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In so far as Act No. 2868
undertakes to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to
issue a proclamation fixing the price and to make the sale of it in
violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional and void.

DECISION

7.
CONSTITUTION. The Constitution is something solid,
permanent and substantial. It stability protects the rights, liberty,
and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and its
construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions.
8.
PRIVATE RIGHTS. In the instant case, the law was not
dealing with Government property. It was dealing with private
property and private rights which are sacred under the Constitution.
9.
PRIVATE PROPERTY. In the instant case, the rice was the
personal, private property of the defendant. The Government had
not bought it, did not claim to own it, or have any interest in it at
the time the defendant sold it to one of his customers.
10.
POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE. By the organic act
and subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate
and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislature, which is
elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands.
11.
OPINION LIMITED. This opinion is confined to the right of
the Governor-General to issue a proclamation fixing the maximum
price at which rice should be sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at
a higher price, and to that extent holds that it is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or undertake to

JOHNS, J p:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of,
and speculation in palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of States. to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and
making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions
of which are as follows:
"Section 1.
The Governor-General is hereby authorized,
whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate, with the consent of the Council of States, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this
Act. to wit:
"(a)
To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation
in, palay rice or corn.
"(b)
To establish and maintain a government control of the
distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such
distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

"(c)
To fix, from time to time, the quantities of palay, rice, or
corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum
sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
"(d)

...

"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in the other

manner obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for
the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said
products as defined in section three of this Act; . . ."
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of
palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not
specify the price of rice of define any basis for fixing the price.
"SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the
regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance
therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of
companies or corporations, the manager or administrator shall be
criminally liable.
"SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires
the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by
proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent
herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
"Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation
was issued, the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of States, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise

terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the

same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent
the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such
termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense
committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation."
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing
the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, NAG
Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as
follows:
"The undersigned accuses NAG Tang Ho of a violation of Executive
Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2
and 4 Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said NAG Tang Ho. voluntarily, illegally and
criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one Janet of rice at the price of
eighty centavos (P.80). which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of
Act No. 2868. Contrary to law."
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in

finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing

the sentence.
The official records show that Act was to take effect on its approval;
that it was approved July 30,1919; that the Governor-General issued
his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was
first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the
proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No.
2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price
at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its
very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Legislature does not undertake reasons the Governor-General shall
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued " for any
cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define
what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General,
"with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and
promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying
out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such
temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and

effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say the Legislature
itself has no in any manner specified or defined any basis for the
order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what
is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to
what a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying
out the purpose of the Act Under this state of facts, if the law is
valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or
without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may
not have been any cause, and the price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if
the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a
proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits
a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of
the United States all power are vested in the Legislative, Executive
and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of
the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe
the law. The Legislature has no authority to executive or construe
the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or executive the law.
Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is
supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to
say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the
power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that
power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by
Act. No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative

power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all legislative

power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon
the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GovernorGeneral, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the
Legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto
itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the
law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is
no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act
within itself does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and avoid.

establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This

was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law,
providing for and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and
determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The
constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by
Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ribs. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the

Grainer Cases (94 U. S.. 183-187; 24 L, ed., 94), first laid down the
rule:

"Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's

tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the
railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and
reasonable fares rates for the transportation of persons and
property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by
mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates
recommended and published by them, no issue can be raise or
inquiry had on that question.

"Railroad companies are engaged in public employment affecting

the public interest and, under the decision in Mun vs. Ill., ante
subject to Legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight
unless protect by their charters.

"Same Constitution Delegation of power to commission.

The authority thus given to the commission to determine, in the
exercise of their discretion and judgment, what are equal and
reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power."

"The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to established reasonable

maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freights and
passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as
being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that
of the State."

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission

expressly provides

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a
public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had power to

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad
commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what
is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the

"That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of

passengers and property shall be equal and reasonable."

violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is

a civil proceeding. It was there held
"That the legislature itself has the power to regulate railroad
charges is now too well settled to require either argument or
citation of authority.
"The difference between the power to say what the law shall be,
and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and
determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already
passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
"The legislature enacts that all freight rates and passenger fares
should be just and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix
these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
"They have not delegated to the commission any authority or
discretion as to what the law shall be, which would not be
allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an authority and
discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under
and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature
itself has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what it shall
be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion
upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmade a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the
law, and with no other power."

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court

of Wisconsin in Doling vs Lancaster Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The
opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.'
"The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.
"The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be
complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substances, it is a law in all its
details in presenting, but which may be left to take effect in future,
if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event."
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court
in United States vs. Grimed (220 U. S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it
was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of

Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve

were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary
of Agriculture " . . . may make such rules and regulations and
establish such service as will insure the objects of such reservation;
namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the
forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the
provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be
punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
"In refusing permits to use s forest reservation for stock grazing,
except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of
Agriculture merely asserts and enforces the proprietary right of the
United States over land which it owns. The regulations of the
Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of
administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of
the landowner's authorized agent to allow persons having no right
in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is
altogether different from governmental authority."
The opinion says:
"From the beginning of the government, various acts have been
passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and
regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for
administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes
could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated
and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under
such general provisions power to fill up the details' by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation

of which be punished by fine imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by

penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
"That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution.'
"If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation the rule, the
defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in
violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of
the government's property. In doing so they thereby made
themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress."
"The subject as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The
lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make
provision to protect them from depredations and from harmful
uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to use
to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable
rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a
crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of
delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Grainer
Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public
corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for
such reasons the Legislature had the power to fix and determine
just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and
reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to ascertain
the facts and determine from the facts what were just and

reasonable rates, and that in vesting the commission with such

power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin
standard policy of fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, .
. . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated.''
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra, dealt with rules
and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. These hold
that the legislature only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate
its legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of
legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin says:
"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the
legislature to any other department of the government, executive
or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete
in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative
only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its
operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action to depend."
"All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P. M. each
day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning,
unless by special permission of the president."
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526 128 A. S. R., 1100, 1 the Supreme
Court of that State says:
"We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons: First, because it
attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and
allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and
groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated;
second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making
power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A
legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer
power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it
shall go into effect or be suspended in its operation upon the
ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative of
board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to
the president to decide arbitrarily, and in the exercise of his own
discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest
legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained."
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and
before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the
Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at

a peso per "Janet," and that he would not commit a crime, because
there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at
any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it
must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was
no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price,
and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not
crime.
The Executive Order 1 provides"
(5)
The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby
fixed, for the time being as follows:
"In Manila
"Palay at P6.75 per sack of 1/2 kilos, or 29 centavos per Janet.
"Rice at P15 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 63 centavos per Janet.
"Corn at P8 per sack of 57 1/2 kilos, or 34 centavos per Janet.
"In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price
shall be the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the
source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of
sale, to be determined by the provincial treasures or their deputies.
"In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other
producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized
price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be,
plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the

necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined

by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
"(6)
Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed
to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from
the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and
proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities,"
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale
price that industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general
law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and
other and different prices in other and different provinces in the
Philippines Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other
and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies.
Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the
Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to
provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed
to communicate with, and executive all instructions emanating from
the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and
proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the GovernorGeneral was the exercise of the power delegation of a power, and
was even a subdelegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not
authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila
and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him fix the
price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is general

and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law,
the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over
the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at
Iloilo. Again, it is a matter of common knowledge, and of which this
court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with
different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide
range in the price, which varies with grade and quality. Act No. 2868
makes no distinction in price for the grade quality of the rice, and
the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of
57 1/2 kilos, or 63 centavo per Janet," and is uniform as to all grades
of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be
noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are
products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut,
chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any law
which singles out palay, rice or corn from the numerous, but is a
local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle,
the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix
the price of meat, eggs chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or
any other of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class
of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be
an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law,
must be equal and uniform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a
floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the
Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.

In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the

Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause"
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under
certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be
sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the
law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when
the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or
define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say
anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale" of one Janet of rice at the price
of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than fixed by
Executive Order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868 in so far as
it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to
issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of
rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and
void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of
rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship, on the
poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question
here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a

statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its

constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. Its
stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and
the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the
wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question
involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine
Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We
make the board statement that no state or nation, living under a
republican form of government, under the terms and conditions
specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the
power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That
power can never be delegated under a republican form of
government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice,
the law was not dealing with government property. It was dealing
with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the
Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same
principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize
the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a
crime to sell any product at any other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason
the provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the
stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full
force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect,
such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the

war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the
price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that
is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the time
was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is
also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United
States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession
of it, either or constructive, and the government itself became the
owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it.
That is not case. Here, the rice sold was the personal and private
property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The
government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or
have any interest in it. and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the
personal, private property of the defendant. It may be that the law
was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this
court have taken a solemn oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing
winds or emergency conditions. Again we say that no state or
nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law
authorizing any executive, under the conditions stated, to fix the
price at which a private person would sell his own rice, and make
the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or
by analogy. will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of
that particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the
terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations,
the power Legislature, which is elated by a direct vote of the people
of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the
authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner and under the
conditions stated is a delegation of legislative power in violation of
the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved,

which is the right of the Governor-General, upon the terms and
conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a
crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portion of the
Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe
the constitutionality of any of the remaining of the Act.

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of

Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike but hear me first!'" It is this
cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. Cdpr

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant

discharged. So ordered.

"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the

interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order
No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987.]
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the

violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef
instead; and.
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of
Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial
movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

DECISION
CRUZ, J p:

"SECTION 1.
Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such
that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to

confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to

charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case
of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2.

This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated
by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery,
and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate

Court, *3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come
before us in this petition for review on certiorari. prcd
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of
the legislative power by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan
v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the
Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In
doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among

others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.

7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made
in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that
presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and
of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant
warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law
when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue
more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded,
there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court. LLjur
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is
really a presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the

force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to

justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner
has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed
to have been made by the President "in his judgment," a phrase
that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this
time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the
charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That
is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was
rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would
remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because
due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own
specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection
open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less
than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege
the reluctant promise that the Crown would thenceforth not
proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its subjects
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land,
they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid
guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The
solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since
then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers,
benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the
stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open
hearing of his cause. prLL
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the
sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion
is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached
based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto

the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after

examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective
only but in its totality. A judgment based on less than this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is
tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of
all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence
of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of
our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.
We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land,"
which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in
the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every
person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process
clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every
case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditious action will justify omission
of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per

se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of
the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense
may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial
hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of
the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. cdll
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
the police power which both restrains and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent
in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of
the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of
the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police
power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him
still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in
practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless.
It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as
the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum

non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests

to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify
Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive
Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under
certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason,
as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions
demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs."
We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of
the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our
farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would
have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19
where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due
process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for
having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit,
and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to
prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the
registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the

questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and

declared in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of
the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by
`the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit
for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary'
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain,
or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio
Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven

years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still
fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion. llcd
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same
lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz.,
that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport
of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented
by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement
of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either
to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were
to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police
only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by
the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and
the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas
bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It
is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a

previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be

corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. cdphil
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action
calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first
in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we
held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by
the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after
trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality
and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by

what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short,
a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police
station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and
it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It
would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of
the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and,
on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial

court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the
order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and
protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged
measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity.
We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the
matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would
have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights. LLpr
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in
the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society,
if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and
the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987.]
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA. LUZ CIRIACO, MA. NIMFA B. ROVIRA,
EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88
and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD
OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER;
BURDEN OF PROOF TO BE DISCHARGED; CASE AT BAR. Article II
of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State
policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote.
The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate

to what extent or in what manner the statute and the

administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is
heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of
necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast,
as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of
basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy
and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not
made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled
to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners. Turning to
Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once
more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and
regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the
contrary we may note in anticipation of discussion infra - that the
statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact
designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of
Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase
of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is
not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons
wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements."

2.
ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY ESSENTIALLY A QUESTION OF
POWER OR AUTHORITY; QUESTIONS AS TO DESIRABILITY, WISDOM
OR UTILITY OF LEGISLATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
PROPERLY ADDRESSED TO POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS OF
GOVERNMENT. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT
prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a
denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just
what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that
passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on
top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the
Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established
by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or
private. Petitioners' arguments thus appear to relate to utility and
wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this
Court has neither commission nor competence to pass upon
questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to
the political departments of the government not to the courts.
3.
ID.; PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; APPLIED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION WHERE STATUTES DEAL
WITH COMPLEX AND TECHNICAL SUBJECTS; PRINCIPLE OF
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION; STANDARDS SET FOR SUBORDINATE
LEGISLATION NECESSARILY BROAD AND HIGHLY ABSTRACT. The
general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both
flows from and reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great

departments of government, must be applied with circumspection

in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with
subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education
and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice
Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission: "One thing, however, is
apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare
or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice
(Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not
only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule
making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta "The
standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What

is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit

upon the roads.'" We believe and so hold that the necessary
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section
5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
4.
ID.; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND OBJECTIVE; REGULATION
OF PRACTICE OF MEDICINE INCLUDING ADMISSION TO RANKS OF
AUTHORIZED PRACTITIONERS A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF. There
is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the
legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them
constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and
needs in a word, the public order of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between
the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation
of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the

practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to

the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion
of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining,
high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is
entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in

the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test

[MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
6.
ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS;
NOT VIOLATED BY MECS ORDER NO. 52, S. 1985. Petitioners have
contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict
with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More
specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the MECS Order which
provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based
on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association
of Philippine Medical Colleges" infringes the requirements of equal
protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year. e.g., 1987-1988, when
subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an,
e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this
argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for
different school years may be dictated by differing conditions
obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for
a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score established the

preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools

during the current year; the average score attained during the
current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the
current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable
cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above
language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure
of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J p:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education,
one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from

proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and

from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in
the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified

in Section 5 of the statute include the following: LLphil

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari

with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge
denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

(b)
To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum
physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including
hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments,
appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes,
operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and
others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with
modern trends;

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and

5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1.
Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as
Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly
authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or
his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the
Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the
Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a
representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as

"(a)
To determine and prescribe requirements for admission
into a recognized college of medicine;

(c)
To determine and prescribe the minimum number and
minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including studentteachers ratio;
(d)
To determine and prescribe the minimum required
curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine;
(e)
To authorize the implementation of experimental medical
curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may
prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall
be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
(f)
To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate;
and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos

each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of

Medical Education;
(g)
To select, determine and approve hospitals or some
departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the
minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b)
hereof; and
(h)
To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary
rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the
foregoing functions." (Emphasis supplied).
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants
to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal
arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed
to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to
the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
. . ."(Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National Medical

Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of

a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order
goes on to state that:
"2.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the
medical schools and is calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation
with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve
as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility
for admission into the medical colleges.
3.
Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical
Education, each medical college may give other tests for applicants
who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the
applicant's personality to complement the information derived from
the NMAT.
xxx

xxx

xxx

8.
No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of
Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first
year student in any medical college, beginning the school year,
1986- 87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for
under this Order." (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent

Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during
the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987,
respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical
colleges during the school year 1987-1988. prcd
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of
constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order.
We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely
needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or
administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality
strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the
presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal
right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked
read as follows:
(a)
Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect of human rights.
"(b)
Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall

inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.
"(c)
Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to
promote total human liberation and development.
"(d)
Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
"(e)
Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select
a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain
"State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and
promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is
heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in
behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of
necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast,
as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of
basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy
and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not

made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled
to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation
impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day

world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service
Commission: 2

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note

that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the
statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision.
On the contrary we may note in anticipation of discussion infra
that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in
fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of
professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to
Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the
latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to
make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."

"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the

principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of
delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest
delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia
edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167)
but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law
(d.17.18,3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation,' not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."
3

2.
In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend
against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary
standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative
power, which both flows from and reinforces the more fundamental
rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three
great departments of government, 1 must be applied with
circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of
1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule

making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta 4
"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the

policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the

Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What
is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit
upon the roads.'" 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in
Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the
same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered
together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle. LLphil
3.
The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again,
petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the
NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They
appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary
requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set
out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus
appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power
or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to
pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of
legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be
addressed to the political departments of the government not to
the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail:

the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them
constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and
needs in a word, the public order of the general community. 6
An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation. 7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps
most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. 8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish
to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. 9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate

exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 10 What we have

before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in
the current stage of our social and economic development, are
widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States
of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] 11 and
quite probably in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the
failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of

incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat

our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. cdrep
4.
Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that portion of the
MECS Order which provides that.
"the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of
Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges." (Emphasis supplied).
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other
words, that students seeking admission during a given school year.
e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than
that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated
against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and
capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by
differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the
appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff
score established the preceding year; the number of places
available in medical schools during the current year; the average
score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the
test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a
permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in
circumstances from year to year, may well result in an unreasonable
rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being
arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with

the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they

change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order
of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965.]
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL,
respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS

1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER OF PRESIDENT TO CREATE
MUNICIPALITIES. Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No.
2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of
Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of
a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This
statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios.
2.
ID.; ID.; NATURE OF POWER TO CREATE MUNICIPALITIES.
Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating
said municipalities - the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR VALID DELEGATION OF
POWER. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law:
(a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF DUE DELEGATION OF
POWER NOT MET BY SECTION 68 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it
grants to the President the power to create municipalities, does not
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABDICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS
IN FAVOR OF THE EXECUTIVE. If the validity of said delegation of
powers, made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a
statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which,
in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest.
Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers
of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by the Constitution.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF POWERS DEALT WITH IN SECTION
68 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. It is true that in
Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil., 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68
Phil., 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public
interest," respectively, as sufficient standards, for a valid delegation
of the authority to execute the law. But the doctrine laid down in
these cases must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions
of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68

of the Revised Administrative Code. The creation of municipalities

being essentially and eminently legislative in character, the question
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such
power is not one of fact. It is purely a legislative question (CarolinaVirginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 21.,
310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 p.
2d., 347-349).
7.
ID.; ID., ID.; ID.; PROOF THAT ISSUANCE OF EXECUTIVE
ORDERS IN QUESTION ENTAILS EXERCISE OF PURELY LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS. The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129, creating thirty-three municipalities, were issued
after the legislative bills for the creation of the said municipalities
had failed to pass Congress, is the best proof that their issuance
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONTROL OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS. The power of control under Section 10(a) of
Article X of the Constitution implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law
in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus or offices of
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as
local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that
of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as
the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He
may not, for instance, suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on

appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. If, on

the other hand, the President could create a municipality, he could,
in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality
and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant (Section 2179,
Revised Administrative Code). Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality, without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in
effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by
the Constitution.
9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 68, REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE, REPEALED BY THE CONSTITUTION. The power of control of
the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices under
Section 10 (a) of Article X of the Constitution implies no more than
the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly,
such control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has
over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that
vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it
reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring
upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
he has over executive departments, bureaus or offices. Even if,
therefore, it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative
powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised

Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be

deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment. (De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 298299.)
10.
ID. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS CONCERNED DULY
REPRESENTED IN PRESENT CASE. It is contented that not all the
proper parties have been impleaded in the present case. Suffice it
to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim,
that the officers of any of the municipalities concerned have been
appointed or elected and have assumed office. At any rate, the
Solicitor-General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent
Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its officers and
agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative
Code), and, in connection with the creation of the municipalities
involved in this case, which involves a political, not proprietary
functions, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or
representatives of the national government. Their interest in the
case has accordingly been duly represented. (Mangubat vs. Osmea
Jr., G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; City of Cebu vs. Judge Piccio,
G.R. Nos. L-13012 & L-14876, December 31, 1960.)
11.
ID.; ID.; ACTION NOT PREMATURE. The present action
cannot be said to be premature simply because respondent Auditor
General has not yet acted on any of the executive orders in question
and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It
is a matter of common knowledge that the President has for many
years issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and

that the same have been organized and are in actual operation, thus
indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures
incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in
audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no
reason to believe that respondent would adopt a different policy as
regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence
of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.

have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several

municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
orders because the latter have taken away from the former the
barrios composing the new political subdivision intervened in the
case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici
curiae.

DECISION

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

CONCEPCION, J p:

"Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their

names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress.

During the period from September 4 to October 29,1964 the

President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos.
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. 1 Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964, petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez,
as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon
the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the
present action is premature and that not all proper parties
referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

"All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come
under the provisions hereof.
"Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a
new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be
changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities
in which the proposed barrio is situated. The recommendation of
the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by
at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its
population is less than five hundred persons."
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the

corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the

voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new
municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as,
by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality.
This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be
denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it
cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of
Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to
the passage of Republic Act No. 2370. has been brought to our
attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon
which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
"The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district
or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province,

into such portions as may be required, merge any of such

subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require:
Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature)
Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When
action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in
accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory
under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with
the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department
having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory
of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new
districts so formed.
"Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance
of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds
and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in
such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor)
Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President
of the Philippines."
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved,
not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of
territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to

another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of

and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-520],
in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No.
1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative
nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to
carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority
to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function"
(State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or
"solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs.
Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February
13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the
creatures of statutes."
Although 1 Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a)
be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2 and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 2 Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,

without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to

determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. 2 Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law,
but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances, and, consequently undermining
the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these
well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither
does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact
that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the
President:
". . . may change the seat of the government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require."
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the
phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualifies, not the clauses
preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat
of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more
apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally
Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided, that "whenever in the
judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he
may, by executive order", effect the changes enumerated therein
(as well as in said Section 68), including the change of the seat of

the government "to such place . . . as the public interest requires".

The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which
was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the
powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part
of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place
to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case
at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require", in said Section 68, qualifies all other
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. William (70 Phil. 726)
and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
"public welfare" and "public interest", respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law.
But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific
facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to
promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the
other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel
certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both
cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact.

Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As
above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an
administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question whether or not "public
interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is
"purely a legislative question" (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs.
Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d., 310-313, 315-318), or a
political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the
community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy
and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N. W. 1033,
1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting
undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the
judicial department the power to determine whether certain
territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs.
Severn, supra, 358-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to
determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages
and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the
powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by
statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring
upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village
incorporated, and designate its meter and bounds, upon petition of
a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area
desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs.
Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town,
containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a
town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and

on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the

inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to
determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought
justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the
inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035- 1037); or
creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll
road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the
law had been complied with, in which case the Board shall enter an
order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the
same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S. E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the
President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation
vs. U. S. (79 L. ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the
United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to
him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations
which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to
membership therein and are truly representative," provided that
such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to
eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of
said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
"To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery
Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade,

industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of

conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by
appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules
of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For
that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from
the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad
declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing
codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think
that the code-making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the
President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered", and,
consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is
obvious that "public welfare", which has even a broader
connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would
no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority
to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority
would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of
the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the
democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the
special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question
were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A

better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be
given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
"The President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect
to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local governments or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope
of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the
municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had
thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may
see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or annul
an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not
even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take

any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a

decision of the corresponding provincial board. 5
Upon the other hand, if the President could create a municipality,
he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. 6
Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality
(if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over
them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority
to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does
not include the authority either to abolish an executive department
or bureaus, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged
power of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses
the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him
more power over municipal corporations than that which he has
over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative

powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution,
in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment. 7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely,
respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" referring
to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have been
impleaded in this case", and (b) that "the present petition is
premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not
show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said
municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office.
At any rate, the Solicitor-General, who has appeared on behalf of
respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act
and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and
agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative
Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned
municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function,
said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the
national government. Their interest in the case at bar has,
accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented. 8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has
not as yet acted on any of the executive order in question and has
not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is
however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial

cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive
orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have
been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without
peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto
have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General
Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe,
therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as
regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence
of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared
null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by
the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new
municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth has long been the aim
pursued by all three branches of our Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones
Law was given authority by the legislature (Act No. 1748) to act
upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as

fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme

Court, within the framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that
the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail
abdication of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of
Binangonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid
statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the
present continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking
it to issue executive orders providing for the creation of
municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three
municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation
of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice-President Emmanuel
Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the
respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive
orders aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a
municipality by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant
any such power, is invalid or, at least, already repealed in the light
of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio
Charter).

Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:

"SEC. 68.
General authority of [Governor-General] President
of the Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions.
The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district,
or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province,
into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require:
Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature]
Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When
action by the [Governor- General] President of the Philippines in
accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory
under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines, with
the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department
having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory
of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new
districts so formed.
"Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance
of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds
and obligations of the division thereby affected shall be made in
such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor]

Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-General] President

of the Philippines."

exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the public,
whether so expressed in the statute giving the authority or not."

From such wording I believe that power to create a municipality is

included: to "separate any political division other than a province,
into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created". The issue, however, is whether the Legislature can validly
delegate to the Executive such power.

Under the prevailing rule in the United States and Section 68 is of

American origin the provision in question would be an invalid
attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the
principle of separation of powers.

The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.

American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot
be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create
municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of
facts under which creation of a municipality will result (37 Am. Jur.
628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on
the delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be
created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power
and the statute is invalid (Ibid). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the
President such discretion, since it says that the President "may by
executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore,
Section 5 of the same Code states:
"SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion. The exercise of the
permissive powers of all executive or administrative officers and
bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is
given authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the
doing of the same shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be

It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the

stream of history in mind. A proper knowledge of the past is the
only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted
half a century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition
of our independence and rightful place in the family of nations,
have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic
Act the Jones Law. And under the set-up ordained therein no strict
separation of powers was adhered to. Consequently, Section 68 was
not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered
the situation. For not only was separation of power strictly
ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the
power of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an
explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the GovernorGeneral "shall have general supervision and control of all the
departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine
Islands". Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine
Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general

supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,

and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

Jones Law thereby-became unavoidably inconsistent with the

Philippine Constitution.

In short, the power of control over local governments had now been
taken away from the Chief Executive. Again, to fully understand the
significance of this provision, one must trace its development and
growth.

It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the

power to control local governments. Said relationship has already
been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said
case, it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the
power to create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view,
therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local
governments are "two worlds apart", is untenable. And since, as
stated, the power to control local governments can no longer be
conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that
the power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or
exercised.

As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in

his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the
policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the
least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national
government. Said supervision and control was to be confined within
the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to
secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local
officers". And the national government "shall have no direct
administration except of matters of purely general concern". (See
Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in
the art of self-government, with the end in view of later allowing
them to assume complete management and control of the
administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now
embodied in Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez
v. Montinola, 50 O. G., 4820).
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the
President shall have no power of control over local governments.
Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron
v. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted under the

I am impelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10(1) of Article VII

of the Constitution has repealed Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to
create local governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior
statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained in De los
Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that such
repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the
Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is
academic to ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions
in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any
rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a
barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory
prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities

consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would

preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.

of government, and exercising a function derived from the very

sovereignty that it upholds.

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create

larger political units and unable to create smaller ones. For as long
ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the
smaller of the two political units. The smaller the unit of local
government, the lesser is the need for the national government's
intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical
reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards.
The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power
over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by
exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the
barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for
autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising for
Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios
without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree
with the majority view that because the President could not create
a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a
municipality.

Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur with the opinion of Justice J.P.
Bengzon.

It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act

2370, repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code's
provision giving the President authority to create local
governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the
majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null and
void.
In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our
historic desire to be free and independent under a republican form