De Gruyter

Experience as a Source and Ground of Theory in Epicureanism

Author(s): James Allen
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 37, No. 4, REINVENTIONS: ESSAYS ON HELLENISTIC & EARLY ROMAN SCIENCE (December 2004), pp. 89-106
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as a Sourceand
Experience
GroundofTheoryin Epicureanism

JamesAllen

wereindebtedtoan
As has oftenbeennoted,Epicurusandhisfollowers
in epistemology.
Thusthereare many
ofempiricism
ancienttradition
and thepositiondefendedby
pointsofcontactbetweenEpicureanism

as
a
theself-styled
(large
opposedto smalle empiricists),
Empiricists
butwhoseviewsare
medicalschoolwhicharosenearEpicurus'lifetime
to Platoand Aristotle.
Both
based on ideas thatwerealreadyfamiliar
in
of
their
accounts
schoolsassigna place offundamental
importance
of
relations
of
and
to
the
observation
sequence
conjunction
knowledge
amongevents,and laterEpicureansused some ofthesame empirical
Mostnotably,theEpicureansused the
as theEmpiricists.
terminology
'
fortheformof
, whichwas used bysomeEmpiricists
term,epilogismos'
reasoningabout mattersfallingunder experiencethattheyaccept,
thatithas provedveryhardtopindown.
thoughwithdifferences
Yetincertaincrucialrespects,
is aboutas far
Epicureanepistemology
as it is possibleto be. MedicalEmpiricism
removedfromempiricism
'Rationalism'
defineditselfin oppositiontorationalism.
was in factthe
Empiricists'
polemicaltermfora massofdisparateviewswhoseadherents were unitedonlyby the convictionthatmereexperiencewas
togiverisetoa bodyofknowledgethatdeservedtobe called
insufficient
inmedicineoranyothersphere.Itsleadingcharacteristic,
anart,whether
totheEmpiricists,
was a claimedabilitytogo beyondexperiaccording
enceand graspnonevident
entities
and processesbymeansofa special
facultyof reason.These are sometimesdescribedas mattersseen or
Theatomsaboutwhosebehavior
discerned
byreason().
hadso muchtosaywerea paradigmofthiskindofentity.
theEpicureans

90 JamesAllen

causesof
TheEpicureansalso defendedtheoriesaboutthenonevident
and
much
And
like
else
besides.
astronomical
they
phenomena eclipses
orclaimedtoachievethem,byrationalist
means:
achievedtheseresults,
or demonstration
fromsignsor evidencefurnished
inference
by the
a
is formofrationalism.
phenomena.Bythesemeasures,Epicureanism
Theaimofthispaperis tocompareEpicureanviewsaboutexperience
tootherviewsavailableintheHellenistic
period,includingthoseofthe
In thiswayI hopetothrowlightontheEpicureans'
medicalEmpiricists.
an attitude
with
attitude
towardsexperience,
whoseaffinities
distinctive
setsEpicureanism
apartfrommoreorthodoxformsofraempiricism
that
butpermits
theEpicureanstobase on experience
theories
tionalism
wouldrejectas unsupported
orthodox
byexperience.
empiricists

I
. Thewordhas
amountofunclarity
Talkof'experience'
involvesa certain
wouldmakeaninteresting
severalsenses,whosehistory
studyinitsown
discussionsofwhatis giveninimmediate
experience,
Present-day
right.
likebaresensationpriorto interpretation
wherethismeanssomething
use theterm
or aboutthequalityofconsciousexperience,
or inference,
havebeennewtoancientGreekand Latin
in a waythatwould,I think,
withthewords'experientia'
orempeiria.
speakersfamiliar
theancientconception
ofexperiClues thatwillhelpus understand
reflections
abouttheir
ence are furnished
by themedicalEmpiricists'
(Subfiguratio
emprica;henceterminology.Galen's OutlineofEmpiricism

ofthe
forward
emp),whichis meanttobe a faithful
presentation
Subfig
ownviews,makesa pointaboutone termintheEmpiricist
Empiricists'
seeing
vocabularythatis also trueofothers.Thoughthetermautopsia,
he
to be appliedto an activity,
or observingforoneself,oughtstrictly
forknowledge,
tellsus, itwas also used by theEmpiricists
namelythe
emp47,
knowledgeone has as a resultofobservingforoneself{Subfig
translated
used twotermsthataretraditionally
14-26).TheEmpiricists
definesthem
The OutlineofEmpiricism
as 'experience',peiraand empeiria.

but as psychicstatesor formsof knowledge(notitia:

notas activities,
Peirais 'autopticknowledge',i.e.,theknowledgeone has as a
).
ontheotherhand,
resultofan episodeofobservation
(44,6 ff.). Empeiria,
is knowledgeor memoryofwhathas been observedto happenmany
ofmemory
timesinthesameway{Subfig
emp45,24;50,23).Themention
seemtohaveheldthatknowledge
becausetheEmpiricists
is significant

as a Source 91
Experience

was a formof memory(Galen,On Therapeutic

Method;henceforward
butthatis anotherstory.1
MethmedX 36,3 Khn= fr.46 Deichgrber),
is a kindofknowledge
to thesedefinitions,
then,empeiria
According
eachofwhich
thatariseson thebasisofmanyepisodesofobservation,
of
One
has
as
to
an
instance
rise
peira.
empeiria
opposed to peira
gives
oftenenoughfortheknowledgethat
whenonehas observedsomething
one nowhas as a resulttobe expressedin a theorem{Subfig
emp45,24
in
one
a
to
And
the
case
when
is
this
is
ff.).
position say,e.g.,thatthe
administration
ofsuchand sucha remedyin cases ofsuchand sucha
kindis followedbyrecovery
always,forthemostpart,roughlyhalfthe
timeor rarely.In thisfavoredsense,empeiria
appliesto expertknowla cluster(),
when
form
they
edge,manyinstancesofwhich,
henceforward
orart{OnSects
makeup a complete
forBeginners',
expertise
And in whatis perhapsthemost
SM III, 13-16Helmreich).
Sectingred
appliesto theartas a whole
privilegedsenseofall, thetermempeiria
{Subfigemp47, 26; 54, 10-13).This means thatthe contrastbetween
experienceand reasonis indirect.Experienceas knowledgeand the
ofthefaculty
of
thatgiverisetoitareopposedtotheactivities
activities
reason(or a specialformofit) and theknowledgeto whichtheygive
is opposedtothefaculty
orfaculties
which
rise,and reasonas a faculty
forexperience
areresponsible
(cf.Subfig
emp86,23-87,12).
In Empiricist
usage,however,thewordsforexperienceare notreto its
strictedto thesemeaningsany morethanautopsiais restricted
in
in
is
often
used
of
official
meaning.Empeiria, particular,
place peira,
used fortheactivities
ofperception
and obserand botharefrequently
in
and
vationthatgiverisetopeira empeiria thesenseofknowledge,
just
wordslike'autopsy'and 'observation'()are someas activity
timesusedoftheknowledgetowhichtheactivities
emp
giverise{Subfig
thatwe haveseen
thedistinctions
Nevertheless,
47,26-48,4; 48,11-21).2
Artor
are availablemakeit easierto characterize
ancientempiricism.
in
is
and
both
the
sense
of
expertise experience{empeiria) experience,
in
and
that
of
has
its
source
the
and
activities
of
empeiria
peira,
perception
Thisknowledgeis confinedto whatcan be perceivedor
observation.
itemswhicharecalledphenomena,
evidentmatters
orpercepobserved,
One can,however,supplement
tiblesbytheEmpiricists.
theexperience

1 On thispointsee Frede,1990.
2
for
[Galen],On thebestsect,1131,8-9Khn= fr.51 Deichgrber.

92 JamesAllen

one has as a resultof one's own observation

withhistory
()
whatone learnsbyreadingand evaluatingthereportsofotherpeople,
whichis ultimately
based on theirown observations
(Subfigemp47,
14-26).

II
Itshouldbe plainthata rathergenerousconception
ofexperience,
both
in thesenseoftheactivities
and
in
ofperception observation
and the
senseoftheknowledgetheyyield,is presupposed.Thephenomenaor
evidentmattersthatare perceivedor observedare thingslikepeople,
animals,mountainsor treesas well as certainstates,qualitiesand
oftheirslikebeinggreenor running
orhavinga fever.Quesactivities
tionsabouthow observation
conceivedin thisway is ultimately
based
callimmediate
orbaresensaon whatmodernphilosophers
experience
Insteadthefocusisonhowexpertknowledge
tionreceivelittleattention.
enoughto qualifyas an art,e.g.,ofmedicine,
completeand systematic
can ariseout of observationor experienceof people,theiractivities,
andthelike.Nonetheless,
habits,diets,environments,
symptoms
generofexperience
to
knowlous as thisconception
is,itrestricts
experience
edge thatcertain patterns of sequence and correlationamong
phenomenaobtain.The causeswhichwould explainwhythepatterns
occurand recuras theydo can be grasped,ifat all,onlyby meansof
forexperience.
otherthanthoseresponsible
faculties
is
Theidea thatitis onlyfactsthatwhichareaccessibletoexperience
when
we
behinda wayinwhichwe use theterm'empirical',
e.g.,
speak
ofan 'empiricalquestion'.Our pointwhenspeakingin thiswayis less
than
thatthequestionhas beenoris likelytobe resolvedbyexperience
nature
or
laws
of
that,becausethetruthat issueis notdetermined
by
cannotbe
ofideasorthelike- andtherefore
lawsofreasonorrelations
inoneoftheseprivileged
knownbygraspinghowitis determined
ways
- it is a contingent
matterof factthatcan be known,if at all, by
Butitis important
to notethatitis possibleto graspfacts,
experience.
whichare not empiricalquestionsin thissense,as empiricaltruths.
thatwe graspas a factthaton thebasisofexperience
maybe
Something
and
of
the
inalterable
nature
of
thenecessary
things; someconsequence
one in a positionto grasp it as the necessaryconsequenceof first
theoryof
principleswill graspit as morethana factthat.Aristotle's
a
a truth
on
contrast
between
for
grasping
knowledge, example,depends

as a Source 93
Experience

as a factof experienceand graspingthatsame truthas requiredand

explainedbyfirst
principles.
and empiricism,
The disagreement
betweenrationalism
as itis usuofcommonassumptions
that
presupposesa framework
allyunderstood,
shared.Theyemergeespeciallyclearly,
was widelyifnotuniversally
for
instance,in the accountof the different
epistemicconditionsat the
ofAristotle's
981a27ff.).
(A 1,980a27ff.,
Metaphysics
beginning
(i) Experience
graspsonlyfactsthat;
(ii) Thecausesthatsupplythereasonswhythesefactsobtain,ifthey
canbe knownat all,aretheobjectofa separaterationalfaculty;
is priortothisrationalfaculty,
ifand
whoseinsights,
(iii) Experience
whenpossible,arenonetheless
somehowbased on experience.
was treatedas uncontroversial
This framework
by manyphilosoin antiquity,
and
scientists
phers
especiallyin theHellenisticperiod,
whenjustabouteveryoneseemsto havebeencommitted
to an epistethat
in
was
the
sense
of
all
broadlyempiricist
mology
taking knowledge
andinthelastanalysis,on a graspoftheevident.
tobe based,ultimately
TheEpicureansseemtohavesubscribed
toan especiallystrongformof
oftheirsto theeffect
thisposition.Pronouncements
thatall knowledge
eitherconsistsin or arisesoutofa graspoftheevidentarenothardto
find(e.g.,Letter
toHerodotus,
I
38;DiogenesLaertiusX,32).Nonetheless
meantoarguethattheuseEpicureanism
madeofthecommonempirical
tradition
led themto takea positionwhichtheframework
could not
orcouldaccommodate
accommodate
onlywithverysignificant
qualifications.One wayofputtingthis- thoughthistoowillrequirequalification- is to say thattheEpicureanswerecommitted
to a stillmore
ofexperience.
generousconception
Ill
We can see this,among otherplaces, in the apparentlyexhaustive
schemeforassessingopinionsas trueorfalseproposedbyEpicurus(DL
X 34; Ep Hdt 51-2;SextusEmpiricus,
M VII 211-16).Attestation
and
non-attestation
and )
to
evident
(
apply
and non-contestation
and
matters;contestation
(
to nonevident
matters.
arises
when
an
)
Falsity
opinion
is eithernotattested
oris contested
truth
whenitis either
bytheevident,

94 JamesAllen

attestedor notcontested
by theevident.The opinionthatthatis Plato
forinstance,
Itcanlegitimately
overthere,
awaitsattestation.
be accepted
itis attested
as trueif,uponcloserinspection,
orrejected
as falseif,under
it is not attested.An opinionaboutnonevident
thesame conditions,
matters
is contested
whenithas an observableconsequencethatobserwhenitsobservable
vationshowstobe false;notcontested
consequences
are not shownto be falseby observation.
Whythemereabsenceof
thetruthofan opinionaboutthenonevicontestation
shouldconfirm
dentis a notoriouspuzzle towhichwe shallturnin a moment;theuse
toeliminate
falseopinions,on theotherhand,seemsnot
ofcontestation
topresenta problem.Thusthefalseopinionthatthereis no void,which
ofthetrueEpicureandoctrine,
is contested
is thecontradictory
by the
that
is
as
would
if
evidentfact
there motion, there
notbe therewereno
voidforbodiestomoveinto- orso theEpicureansmaintained
(EpHdt
1334).
40;Lucretius
in theway
and non-attestation
Butsupposewe connectcontestation
thatseemsmostobvious.Thena falseopinionaboutnonevident
matters
willbe contested
whenoneofitsobservable
is
not
attested
consequences
whentheobservableconseSometimes,
conditions).
(intheappropriate
a
to
be
contested
is
universal
of
the
thesis
negative,
e.g.,thatthere
quence
ofa singlecounterthiscanbe achievedbytheattestation
is no motion,
instance,
assumingthatwe granttheunobjectionable
principlethatif
is attestedthennot-Pis notattested.One observedepisodeofmotion
willbanishthedenialofvoidand vindicateitscontradictory.
Mattersare notalwaysso simple,however.Consider,forexample,
thatnothing
comestobe from
fortheprinciple
theEpicureanargument
at anytime
Ifitdid,thenanything
couldcometobe anywhere
nothing.
withouttheproperseeds,whichis contestedbecausenotattestedby
thatatoms
observation
(EpHdt38;Lucretius1 159ff.).Or theargument
cannotbe ofanysizebecause,iftheywere,therewouldhavetobe visible
atomicbodies,whichis likewisenotattested(Ep Hdt55-6;LucretiusII
and non-attestation
496-9).3Yetas we have seen,attestation
appearto
A classical
matters
offactorempiricaltruths.
establishonlycontingent

3 To be sure,he adds otherreasons,e.g.,thatitis notpossibleto conceivehow an

towhich
tohistheory
ofvision,according
atomcouldbecomevisible.Thismayrefer
atomicfilmsfromtheobjectbeingseento
visionis causedbytheflowofinvisible
with
theeyes.Theproblemwouldthenbe howan atomofthissizecouldinteract
theorgansofvisualperception.

as a Source 95
Experience

a Humeandescendentofhis,or indeedanyonewho subempiricist,

scribestotheframework
describedabove,willpatiently
explainthatthe
factthatepisodes of randomspontaneousgenerationor absolutely
unbreakable
and that
objectshave notbeenattestedin ourexperience,
recordedhistory
containsno tracesofthem,does notbyitselfentitleus
to concludethatone has notbeen overlookedor will notoccuror be
foundintenseconds,ortenyearsortenmillionyears.According
tothis
familiar
at
of
no
amount
of
observation
or
way looking things,
experiencebyitselfcanruleitoutas a possibility.
Itappearsthatsomething
moreis requiredtoestablish
opinionsofthe
kindthatarecandidatesforcontestation
andnon-contestation.
Wemust
somehowbe able to tellthatwhatis impliedby thefalseopiniontobe
contested,
e.g.,themanifest
episodesofrandomspontaneous
generation
thatareimpliedby theopinionthatcreationexnihilois possibleor the
visibleatomsthatare impliedby theopinionthatatomscan be ofany
size,arenotthesortortypeorkindofthingthatcanhappenorexist.But
and non-attestation
attestation
throughor by meansoftheevidentdo
notseemtobe equal tothistask.
The same resultappearsto followifwe approachmattersfroma
different
whichcanbe
angle.Theprincipalcandidatesforcontestation,
if
as
false
and
contested
if
as
true
not
are
contested,
rejected
accepted
forexample,thetheories
aboutmeteorological
matters
thatare
theories,
discussedintheLetter
toPythocles
Andthemainsourceofthese
(EpPyth).
isanalogywiththephenomena
withus (')or,as translators
often
'in
our
Hdt
it
often
80). Inevitably
putit,
experience7
(Ep
happensthat
morethanone theoryabout the nonevidentcausationof a natural
(cf.Lucretius
phenomenon
suggestedby analogyremainsuncontested
VI 703ff.).Yetitappearsthatthestatusofsucha theory
is notlikethat
ofan opinionaboutan evidentmatter
awaitingattestation
byremaining
epistemically
possible,i.e.,possibleforall we knoworcan say,as long
as it is not falsified
Rather,Epicurusseems to have
by observation.
withthephenomenaas objectively
regardedall thetheories
compatible
possible.Indeed,he seemstohaveheldthattheyaretrueinthesenseof
beingrealizedeitherat sometimein ourworldorin someotherworld
intheinfinite
universe(Lucretius
V 526-33).
Now supposethatone could somehowbe on themoonin theway
in thePosterior
and see whichaccounts
imaginedbyAristotle
Analytics
of eclipsesor waxingand waningdo not obtainthere(I 31, 87b39;II
on theEpicureanview,thefactthatthesetheories
90a26).Apparently,
are notdirectly
attestedin theseconditionswould notshowthatthey
arefalseas claimsaboutwhatmightbe orwhatis truein someworld.

96 JamesAllen

Yetthisis nothow Epicurustreatedourfailuresto observeepisodesof

or to findatomsof observablesize.
randomspontaneousgeneration
- orobjectsoreventsthatwould
Theserevealedthatcertain
phenomena
- arenotthekind
iftheywerecapableofexisting
havetobe phenomena
certain
theories
onceand
refute
ofthingsthatcanexistatall,andthereby
to determine
whetherthatis, say,
forall.4Tripsto themoonor efforts
matters
offact,serveonlyto
Platooverthere,
byestablishing
contingent
show thatan opinionis falsehereor a theorydoes not applyin this
cosmos.
andnon-attestation,
on
Thewayinwhichthetwopairs- attestation
andnon-contestation,
on theother- are
theonehand,andcontestation
bothsaid to takeplace 'throughtheevident'appearsto conceala gap
betweentwoquitedifferent
waysofgraspingtheevidentand to leave
M VII 216).At
betweenthemin thedark(SextusEmpiricus
therelation
thatI
in
with
the
framework
is
how
someone
this
rate,
sympathy
any
outlinedaboveis likelytofeel.
IV
Thissuspicionis wellfounded,and itreceivesadditionalsupportfrom
theuseEpicurusmakesofanalogieswiththephenomenainestablishing
Thisuse makesthemostsenseifitrests
theoriesaboutthenonevident.
on theassumptionthata graspoftheevidentputsus in possessionof
truths
notonly,as we have seen,aboutwhatcannotbe,butalso about
toHerodotus,
what,inveryrobustsense,canbe.NeartheendoftheLetter
to
be withus
the
like
comes
in
how
manyways
Epicurussays:'seeing
ofastro('),onemusttheorizeaboutthecauses()

intheLetter
toPythodes
88mightseemto
oftheshapesofthecosmoi
4 Thediscussion
countagainstthis.Thereitis said thatmanyshapesare possiblebecausethisis
contested
by noneof thephenomenain thiscosmos,whoseboundaryit is not
possibletograsp.Thiscouldbe takentomeanthatthemanypossiblecosmicshapes
sincewe cannotgrasptheshapeofour own cosmos,withthe
are notcontested
theonethatbelongstoour
that,ifwe could,alloftheshapesapartfrom
implication
herewouldcontest
In thiscase,theirnon-attestation
cosmoswouldbe contested.
tobe that
at all. I takethepointrather
oftheirobtaining
thepossibility
anywhere
thiscosmos,
themanypossibleshapesare notcontested
by phenomenawithin
likethewayinwhicheclipsesandmanyotherphenomena
whoseownboundary,
comeaboutinit,are,as ithappens,unknown.

as a Source 97
Experience

and everything
nomicalphenomena()
nonevident'
(80).Andin
the Letterto Pythocles,
he offersmultipleexplanationsfora host of
meteorological
phenomenabased on analogieswiththebehaviorof
mediumsizedphysicalobjectsthatwe can observefromcloseup.
If everypossibility
is realizedsomewhereor at some timein the
infinite
ofthephenomena
universe,
analogiessuggestedbyobservation
will
that
a
us
theories
stand
chance
ofbeingtruein
suggest
good
among
thesensethattheyaretrueofsomeepisodesofthephenomenon
tobe
at
in
some
time
or
some
cosmos.
But
is
explained
beingsuggestedbythe
that
a
sufficient
to
show
is
phenomena
theory genuinely
possible,and
therefore
truein thisway?Perhaps,despitehavinga betterchanceof
thanitwould on otherassumpbeingtrueon Epicureanassumptions
a
an
tions, theory
suggestedby analogywiththephenomenahas,so far,
shown
tobe epistemically
been
only
possible.It couldstillhappen,for
all we knowor can say,thatitis notgenuinely
or objectively
possible.
Andifthisis so,we shallbe entitled
toacceptitas a genuinepossibility
Ifit
onlyafterithas survivedthetestofcontestation
bythephenomena.
does notsurvive,thenitonlyseemedtobe genuinely
possible.
Some ofEpicurus'languagesuggestsan interpretation
alongthese
linesor is compatiblewithit (Ep Pyth92, 93, 98-9).But thereis also
evidencesuggestingthatlikenessof therightkindto a phenomenal
to establisha theoryaboutnonevident
causation
analogueis sufficient
toPythocles,
as true.In partsoftheLetter
whereexplanations
based on
with
in
the
our
are
these
discussed,
analogies
phenomena
experience
are
four
times
said
to
bid
or
call
for
the
phenomena
analogousexplanations(87,94,100,113).Thismaybe merelysuggestive,
butin thesame
after
that
and
the
of
the
mooncancome
work,
remarking
waxing waning
aboutin all thewaysin whichwe observesimilarphenomenacoming
aboutin ourexperience,
and notingthatthesameis trueoftheway in
whichthemoongetsitslightand presentsa visagetous,Epicurussays
thatsomeonewhoacceptsoneoftheexplanations
and rejectstheothers
willbe inconflict
the
()withtheevident(96).And,afterreviewing
forthevaryinglengthsofnightsand daysoverthecourse
explanations
oftheyearthatare suggestedby analogousoccurrences
in ourexperience,Epicurusinsiststhatit is necessaryto speak of meteorological
in a mannerthatis consonant
matters
orin agreement
with
()
thephenomena,
beforegoingon to saythatthosewho acceptonlyone
withthephenomena(98).
are,onceagain,inconflict
explanation
It seemsverymuchas ifa theory'ssimilarity
to thephenomenais
sufficient
to ensurethatitis in agreement
withthem,and thatbeingin
withthephenomenaguaranteesthata theoryis true,in the
agreement

98 JamesAllen

senseofbeingpossibleand truesomewhereor at some time,forit is

based on analogywitha
impliedthatto rejectone oftheexplanations
thatitresembles.
ofthephenomenon
is todenythereality
phenomenon
as universal
undergoa doubletest.Whenputforward
Perhapstheories
holdingofall timesandplaces,theyqualifyas trueifthey
explanations,
as
butwhenreformulated
aremerelynotcontested
bythephenomena,
eachhas a contradictory,
claimsaboutpossibility,
viz.,theproposition
thatit
withthephenomenon
thatitis notpossible,whichis in conflict
and whichwas thebasisoftheanalogythatis itssource.This
resembles
- conceivedas claimsaboutobjectivepossiwouldmeanthattheories

bility followfromthephenomenatowhichtheyareanalogous.The
on whichan analogoustheoryis based
groundsthatthephenomenon
thegrounds
furnish
foracceptingthetheorywould thencomplement
the
that
is
not
contested
the
fact
the
furnished
phenomena
by
theory
by
quitegenerally.
ofsigns
Epicurus'use ofthevocabularyofsignsand sign-inference
arebybeingsimilartothem
matters
hownonevident
thatseemtosignify
lendsadditionalsupporttothissuggestion
(EpPyth97;cf.104).To reject
to one is,
whilegivingarbitrary
somepossibleexplanations
preference
to be unableto graspthephenomenaas signsand to be
he maintains,
carriedintoinconceivability
(97). My guessis thattheinconceivability
thathe meansis thatofdenyingthatone instanceofa typeofbehavior
ofitshowthatbehaviorofthat
instances
is possiblewhenothermanifest
is
type possible.
V
mostis thatEpicuruswas ableto
Forourpresentpurpose,whatmatters
partto analogybecausehe did notsharethe
assignsuchan important
aboutwhatcanandcannotfallundera graspoftheevident
assumptions
tothese
setoutabove.According
intheframework
thatareincorporated
onthebasisofsucha graspwe knowonlythatthingshave
assumptions,
behavedas we have observedtheydid. Thisknowledgewillmakean
who reliesonlyon experience,
expectthateventswillcoinempiricist,
cide,followand precedeone anotheras theyhave been observedto,
ButEpicurusseemsto
his expectation.
withoutin anyway justifying
we grasphowthingscanand
supposethat,ingraspingthephenomena,
and saythat,accordingtoEpicurus
mustbe. I am temptedtogo further
the
to graspthephenomenais,withinlimitsand inpart,tounderstand
causes at workby graspingthe naturesin virtueof whichordinary

as a Source 99
Experience

mediumsized objectsact and behaveas theydo. Understanding

how
and whytheybehaveas theydo, we therebysee how biggerobjects
further
likethembysharingthenatureresponawaythatarerelevantly
siblefortheirbehaviormustbehave.The sameholdsmutatis
mutandis
forsmallerobjectswhosedistancefromus maybe negligible,
butwhich
aretoosmallforus toperceive.
aboutthenonevident
extendsanddeepensour
Graspingtruetheories
ofthecauseswhichexplainandnecessitate
thebehavior
understanding
we areabletoobserve,butthesharplinewhichtheframework
takesto
the
of
from
the
of
truths
about
phenomena
separateknowledge
grasp
whatcan and mustbe of thekindthatfigurein causal explanations
Foradherents
oftheframeappearsnottobe a partofEpicureanism.5
thatsmacksofknowledgeofnatures,
thenecessities
work,anything
they
theyopenup, is knowledgeofthenoneviimposeand thepossibilities
orbymeansofanother
dent,tobe had,ifitcanbe had atall,byinference
exerciseofa specialrationalfaculty
distinct
fromexperience.
Butas we
haveseen,thisis notso forEpicurusandtheEpicureans:
thegraspofthe
evident,whichprecedesand securesall knowledgeofthenonevident,
mustitselfalreadybe a grasp,howeverpartial,ofhow thingscan and
mustbe.
Shouldwe thensaythattheEpicureanswerecommitted
toa conceptionofexperience
stillmoregenerousand richer
thantheoneenshrined
- thesuggestion
intheframework
thatI putforward
forconsideration
above?6Perhaps,buttherearereasonstohesitate,
mostnotablythefact
thatthisis notsomething
anyEpicureaneversays or,I suspect,ever
would say. The framework
takes experienceto be coordinatewith
evidentmatters
or phenomena.Theyare accessibleto experience,
and
theknowledgeonehasofthemis experience.
A better
of
way describing
thedistinctive
character
oftheEpicureanposition,
I shallsuggest,
would
be tosaythatthiscoordination
does notobtainin Epicureanism.

5 Perhapsthisis whatEpicurusis sayingina passageoftheLetter

toPythocles,
where
he notesthat'signsaboutcelestialmatters
arefurnished
in
bycertain
phenomena
ourexperience
whichitis seenhowtheyare'- unlikecelestial
concerning
phenomena themselves
(87;cf.Ep Hat 80).N.B.,however,thatthisreadingis basedon an
emendation.
I havesaidelsewhere.
6 Thisis something
See Allen,2001,196,236-9.

100 JamesAllen

Thisbecomesclearwhenwe trytosee whatEpicurusandhisfollowTojudgebytheavailable

ofempiricism.
aboutancientforms
ersthought
tookmuchofaninterest
itisnota subjectthatEpicurushimself
evidence,
in.7Philodemusis a different
however.On SignsandSign-infermatter,
OnSigns)defendstheso calledmethodofsimilarity,
ences(henceforward
whichwould allow us to infer,
e.g.,thatall humanbeingseverywhere
are mortalfromthefactthatthoseamongus are or thatatomsbehave
mutandis
in theway visiblebodiesdo fromthefactthatvisible
mutatis
bodiesbehavein thatway.Theworkis fulloftermsand notionsfrom
whichretainthemeaningstheyhave in it,e.g.,peiraand
empiricism,
the problemthatarises
historia.
And Philodemusdirectlyconfronts
a finite
in
observation
of
how
sample,however
namely
already Epicurus,
thatall human
entitle
to
conclude
human
can
us
of,
beings,
large, say,
the
work
is
thechallenge
mortal.
The
occasion
for
are
beingseverywhere
this
who
raise
unnamed
opponents
precisely problem.Yet
by
presented
withanymorepowers,or
Philodemusdoesnotcreditpeira,theactivity,
or
taketheknowledgewe have as a resultofit to extendanyfurther
than
does.8
more
empiricism
deeply
any
penetrate

thatwhatcomes
toHerodotus,
7 Consider,
Letter
79,whereEpicurusremarks
however,
doesnot
abouttherisings,
underhistory
()
eclipsesandlikematters
settings,
fearsthatcanblocktheway
becauseitleavesuntouched
contribute
toblessedness
to happiness.His pointis thatit is possibleto have a greatdeal ofastronomical
whichcanbe
to superstition,
vulnerable
knowledgeofthiskindwhileremaining
causes(
banishedonlybya graspofthenatures()and principal
of
thephenomena.
',
)
thoughnottheexclusiveproperty
underlying
was a keytermof theirs,and thispassagereadsverymuchlikea
Empiricists,
in favorof a versionthatsatisfiesthe
of merelyempiricalastronomy
rejection
andcauses,albeitforreasons
demandforexplanation
rationalists'
bywayofnatures
peculiartoEpicureanism.
8 AndinhisworkOn rhetoric,
usinglanguagethatwouldnothavebeenoutofplace
he maintainsthatpracticesgroundedin
in a Platonistinspiredby theGorgias,
arenotarts
whichhecalls,
and,
andhistory,
observation

speaking(RhetII XXX19ff.;butcf.XXXVIII2 ff.).

properly

as a Source 101
Experience
VI
from
How, then,arewe able to inferconclusionsaboutthenonevident
A crucialpartin theEpicureanaccountappearstobe
thephenomena?
which,or at leastthetermforwhich,was, as we
playedbyepilogismos,
also
used
the
noted,
by medicalEmpiricists.
Theystressedtwofeatures:
thatepilogismos
is concernedexclusively
withevidentmatters,
unlike
the
form
of
that
is
the
Rationalists
analogismos,
reasoning
employedby
andwhichallowsthemtodeducenonevident
and thatitis
conclusions;
human
thekindofreasoning
employedbyordinary
beingsineveryday
ofinferring
life.Theyuse it,forinstance,
one evidentmatter,
whichis
from
which
call
nonevident, another,
temporarily
they commemorative
elsewhere,e.g., 'sincethereis smoke,thereis fire'(Sect
signification
10,23-4;11,9-10).
ingred
As I notedabove,however,thisis nothow theEpicureansused the
term.An earliertendency
to renderitas 'empiricalinference'
has been
muchcriticized.
oftheepilogismos
ThoughPhilodemus
speaksfrequently
and even,inoneespeciallybadlypreserved
ofthephenomena,
passage,
oftheapplication
ofepilogismos
towhathasbeengraspedbyexperience
(peira)(fr.4), a surveyofEpicureanusage showsthatitis oftenapplied
toitemsthatarenotobviouslyempirical.
Epicurushimself
speaksofthe
of the end or telos,and one of Philodemus'authorities,
epilogismos
DemetriusofLaconia,speaksintriguingly
ofhis opponents'failureto
totheirownmethodofinference
(XXVIII13ff.).What
applyepilogismos
is more,itis notobviousthattherationalactivity
designatedby 'epiloofinference.
Viewedinisolation,
a fewpassagesseem
gismos'isa matter
to suggestthatepilogismos
is theinference
ofthenonevident
conclusion
fromevidentsigns(XXII37 ff.),butitis plainfroma fullersurveyofthe
evidencethatepilogismos
belongsto a preliminary
phase priorto the
inference
of a nonevident
conclusion,forwhichtheterms'sign-inference'()
or 'reasoning'()
arereserved.9
Philodemus speaks of advancingor makinga transitionto a nonevident
conclusionthrough
orbymeansofepilogismos
becauseepilogismos
is an
for
the
not
the
inference
inference,
indispensable
precondition
proper.
The noun
and theverb
occurin several
different
constructions.
We findtheverbused witha directobjectand

9 Cf.Barnes,1988,130-1,Sedley,1978,27-34,andespecially
1996.
Schofield,

102 JamesAllen

oftheend or
thenountakingan objectivegenitive,
e.g.,theepilogismos
ofthephenomenawhichhave alreadybeenmentioned.10
Theverbcan
a subordinate
clausethat,
withwhichwe seemto
be used to introduce
or deduction.11
And thereare
come closestto reasoningas inference
in whichtheverbtakesa directobjectandintroduces
a
constructions
clause- the'considerthelilies,how theygrow'construcsubordinate
inGreekverbs'toknow',wherethesubordinate
tionespeciallyfamiliar
formwhatitis oneknowso/anitemin
clauseunpacksinpropositional
it
On
knowing (Philodemus, SignsXXVIII15-25;cf.Epicurus,Men133,
is implicit).
wheretheconstruction
is rare,thefactthatit is possiblemay
the
last
construction
Though
betweenthematerials
towhichreasonhelpus. Supposewe distinguish
ing is applied and its upshotor result.I hesitateto say 'conclusion'
thereasoning
becauseI do notwanttoprejudgethequestionofwhether
at issueis a formofdeductionor inference,
thoughthepremisesofan
anditsconcluinference
mayperhapsbe viewedas onekindofmaterial
featureof
sion as one kind of upshotor result.The distinguishing
would
then
be
thatthe
the
reasoning,
signaledby prefixepi-,
epilogistic
materialsto whichone appliesit and thataboutwhichone knows,or
as a resultarethesame.12
knowsbetter,
Passagesinwhichepilogismos/epithematea
or
takes
direct
genitive,
signifying
object objective
logizesihai
and
rialto whichepilogisticreasoningis applied,
passages in which
the
a subordinate
introduces
clause,signifying
epilogismos/epilogizesthai
be
would
then
of
the
or
conclusion
incomplete
specireasoning,
upshot
ofpartofa wholeinstanceofepilogistic
fications
reasoning.
I
made
to fitthispattern,
can
be
use
of
Whether
'epilogismos'
every
do notknow.Butifthisis thebasicidea,itmightexplainsomethings
uses oftheterm.Forinstance,
aboutboththeEpicureanand Empiricist
that
distinction
ismarkedinEpicureanism,
far
this
it
is
from
clear
though
fromthe
what
the
to
epilogismos
distinguishes
Empiricists,
according
it
from
the
that
never
is
of
the
rationalists
phenomdeparts
analogismos

10 Witha directobject:Epicurus,Ep Hdt 72,LettertoMenoeceus133,PrincipalDoctrines

XXII; Philodemus,On SignsXIII 32. Withan objectivegenitive:Epicurus,Principle
DoctrinesXX; Philodemus,On SignsXXII 37, XXVII 23.
11 Epicurus,VaticanSayings35, Ep Hdt 73; Philodemus,On SignsXXVIII 16
and analogismossee Schofield,1996,nn. 8 (which
12 For these ideas about epilogismos
containssuggestionsof David Sedley) and 12.

as a Source 103
Experience

ena,whileanalogismos,
thoughitsetsoutfromthephenomena,
proceeds
to theutterly
nonevident{Sectingred
different,
namelythecompletely
106,4-7).13
maintain,
Strictly
speaking,theEmpiricists
nothingcan be
has need of
knownon the basis of somethingelse, but everything
from
itself
(105,27).
knowledge
ofthekindexemplified
To be sure,ifsign-inferences
bytheinference
it mustin some way
fromsmoketo fireare instancesof epilogismos,
permitus to knowone thingfromanother.Indeedin thepartof his
fromwhichthesecitations
accountofEmpiricism
come,Galentellsus
thatthe Empiricistssay thatepilogismos
is useful for the discovery
ofwhattheycalltemporarily
nonevident
matters
(107,34 ff.).
()
Butthereismuchtalkofepilogismos
as thelogosofthephenomena(Subfig
133-5Walzer), and
emp62, 23-7;Sectingred11, 8; On MedicalExperience,

one admittedly
ratherobscurepassage describesitas therationalconMedicalQuestions
ofwhatfollowsoneachthing([Soranus],
50
sideration
= fr.12 Deichgrber).
the
can
be
closed
to
some
extent
Perhaps gap
by
is the
epilogismos
supposingthat,in itsprimarysense,theEmpiricists'
from
applicationofreasonto thephenomena,and thatsign-inference
onephenomenon
toanother,
nonevident
contemporarily
phenomenon
with
it
in
can
also
be
called
because
experience
joined
past
'epilogismos'
inthissense.
itis an applicationofepilogismos
hasproposed'assessment'
or'comparative
MalcolmSchofield
assessof'epilogismos'as it is used by theEpicureans.
ment'as a translation
But perhaps'assessment'or 'rationalassessment'would also cover
conceivedinthiswayas well.Thedifferences
that
Empirical
epilogismos
the
two
remainbetween
schoolsincludethe alreadynotedfactthat
is confined
tothephenomenabytheEmpiricists,
whoseem
epilogismos
to treatthisas partofitsmeaning,
butnotbytheEpicureans.Buteven
whenofthephenomena,
so,bothschoolswould agreethatepilogismos,
cannotbyitselfyieldconclusions
aboutmatters
otherthanphenomena.
further
is
to
infer
nonevident
conclusions.The
required
Something
that
are
confident
we
can
make
such
theEmpiriinferences;
Epicureans
cistsarenot.The criticaldifference
betweenthemconcernstheknowledge that Epicurean epilogismos of the phenomena yields. The
knowsthatcertainphenomenacoincide,precedeor follow
Empiricist

13 Cf ,
to referone thingto another,
or ,
to reduceone thingto
another.

104 JamesAllen

incertain
andwithcertain
relativefrequencies.
On
oneanother,
patterns
in
a
manner
of
reason
thebasis of thisknowledge,he can,
speaking,
aboutunobaboutthephenomenaand formreasonableexpectations
on
orphenomenatobe. As a resultofhisepilogismos,
servedobservables
the otherhand,the Epicureanhas a grasp,howeverincompleteand
And on
partial,ofthenaturesand powersoftheitemshe is studying.
thatunobserved
andevenunobservable
items
thisbasisheisabletoinfer
mustbe thesameorsimilar.
VII
a stillmoregenerousconception
IftheEpicureanshad,as I putitearlier,
thenit is notone
ofexperiencethanthatadmittedby theframework,
in
the
standard
terms
drawn
from
vocabulary.
empirical
theydescribed
remainedcapable
thatwentundertheheadof'experience'
Theactivities
and explanatory
devoidofnecessity
power.
onlyofgraspingfactsthat,
on
Ifyouwill,Epicureanepistemology
depends a morethanempirical
ofthephenomenaor theevident.It is pretty
graspor comprehension
to whichEpicurushad alreadyappealed,was
clearthatepilogismos,
to close a gap between
enlistedby Philodemus'Epicureanauthorities
and thegraspofthephenomenathatis
ofexperience
thedeliverances
aretobe possible.Itis also
ifsign-inferences
tothenonevident
necessary
reasona fairguessthattheiropponentsrespondedbytakingepilogistic
ordeduction.Havingelicitedtheadmisingtobe a matterofinference
abouthowthingsmustbe,
sionthatexperience
byitselftellsus nothing
from
to
know
how an inference
then
could
demanding
by
proceed
they
can yielda graspofthephenomenawhichis at
thedata ofexperience
and a sufficient
basisforsign-inoncetheupshotorresultofepilogismos
ferences
tothenonevident.
cannotaccommodateEpicureanviews,it is
Thus,iftheframework
disavow the assumptionsthat
not because the Epicureansexplicitly
composeit.Indeedsuchevidenceas we havesuggeststheymighthave
so
beenwillingto endorseclaimsaboutthelimitsofexperience
strictly
with
tobe coordinate
called.Yetthefactthattheydo nottakeexperience
thephenomenaand, as I put it earlier,permita morethanempirical
meansthatthistellsus less
ofthephenomena,
grasporcomprehension
thanitotherwise
aboutEpicureanism
might.Thisis notthecomprehensionofthephenomenathatwe havewhenwe viewtheminthelightof
causesbecauseit is an
oftheirunderlying
firstprinciplesor as effects
to
adherents
toorthodox
foraetiology.
essentialprecondition
According

as a Source 105
Experience

the framework,
experienceplays thispart,whereasforEpicureans,
merelypreparestheway forthemorethanempiricalgrasp
experience
aboutnoneviofthephenomenathatin turnsupportsrationalinsights
dentmatters.If 'experience'were simplythe name forthe graspor
of the phenomenathatprecedesaetiology,thenthe
comprehension
on empiricalknowledge
Epicureanswould disavow the restrictions
imposedbytheframework.
I suggestthatwe look at mattersin thisway. Sometimes,when
likePlato and Aristotledefendedone positionand opphilosophers
another,
positionina disputethat
theywerenottakinga familiar
posed
was alreadybeing conductedalong well definedlines so much as
the issues.Whenthe medical
creatinga new way of understanding
that
defend
the
claim
experiencecan by itselfgive riseto
Empiricists
an
it
is
formofexperience,
artistic
experience
knowledge,
impoverished
Butit
as conceivedand markedofffromreasonby Platoand Aristotle.
is doubtfulthatearlierfigureswho made largeclaimsforexperience
fromthepointofviewofPlato
drewthelinesquiteso sharply.Rather,
it was probablyfairerto say thattheyfailedto see that
and Aristotle,
knowledgeof the kindwhichtheyassumed could be explainedby
experienceand perceptionalone actuallyrequiresa separaterational
withdistinctive
powersofitsown.In thisrespect,as in others,
faculty
of
is
Epicurus something a throwback.14
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fromSigns:AncientDebatesabouttheNatureofEvidence.Oxford:

Press.
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R.H.,eds. 1988.Oxford
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Oxford:
Press.
1988.'EpicureanSigns',inAnnasandGrimm,
eds.91-134.
Barnes,
Jonathan.

De Lacy,P.H. and E.A.,eds. 2ndedn.1978.Philodemus:

On Methods
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Naples:
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14 I amgrateful
forcomments
andcriticism
totheparticipants
intheconference,
tothe
inAssos,July
a paper
2004,whereI delivered
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/AthensSymposium,
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on
intheancient"Empiricists''
MichaelFrede'spaper,'Experience
'.

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