Jay Ronwaldo T.

Julia

Property
Case No. 12

De La Cruz vs. Ramiscal

G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner of
18th Avenue and Boni Serano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner-spouses are occupants
of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscals property owned by Concepcion de la Pena,
mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The subject matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by
12.60m long strip of land owned by respondent which is being used by petitioners as their
pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioner had
enclosed the same with a gate, fence and roof. In 1995, a relocation survey and location plan
for the respondents properties were prepared and it was only then that respondent discovered
that the pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her property. Respondent immediately
demanded that the petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said pathway
without her consent but such demand was unheeded.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of
way.
(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way being
used by petitioners.
Held:
(1) Petitioners are entitled neither to a voluntary nor legal easement of right of way.
Petitioners failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that
they and their tenants entered into an argument with the respondent. Likewise futile
are petitioners attempt to show that they are legally entitled to the pathway under Art.
649 of the Civil Code. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under this
article is subject to proof of the following: 1) It is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of proper indemnity; 3)
the isolation is not the result of its own acts; 4) the right of way claim is at the point
that least prejudicial to the servient estate; and 5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway be
the shortest. The first three requirements are not present in the instant case.
(2) Respondent is not barred by laches from closing the right of way being used by
petitioners. Laches is not applicable here since there was no knowledge on the part
of the respondents act for it was only in 1995 that she found out that the pathway
being used by the petitioners was part of her property. Further, delay in the filing of
suit is not a valid contention in this case for respondent immediately demanded
petitioners to demolish their property and reasonably filed in complaint.