COURSEBOOK ON THE LAW ON LAND OWNERSHIP

AND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Atty. Pedro Jose F. Bernardo

This text is for limited and exclusive use, and is intended only for
the class in Land Titles and Deeds taught by Atty. Bernardo at
the FEU La Salle Joint MBA-JD Program. It is still a work-inprogress.
Unauthorized copying and distribution is strictly
prohibited.

PART I
OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN THE PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER I
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUTION
1. THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
The Regalian Doctrine or Jura Regalia is a principle in law that requires
persons claiming private ownership over land to show incontrovertible title
thereto that must be based on some grant, express or implied, from the
Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and
thereafter, the Philippine Republic. 1 It was initially applied to the Philippines
under the Novisima Recopliacion de Leyes delas Indias,2 which asserted that
the King of Spain, as the Head of State, and by discovery and conquest, had
the supreme power and ownership over anything of value, including the land,
waters, and natural resources in the islands.
We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all
lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by
our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining
to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving
before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled,
taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain
free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
With the change in sovereignty from the Spanish Crown, to the American
colonial government to the present constitutional system of government in
the Philippines, the concept of Jura Regalia was adopted to vest ownership
from King to State. This was initially expressed in the 1935 Constitution when
it asserted that [a]ll agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. . .3 At a time when the Philippines was still under the United States as
a colonial power, the purpose of this provision was to nationalize and thereby
assert sovereignty over the use and disposition of natural resources,
reserving their ownership to the State, and allowing utilization only to citizens
of the Philippines.4
1

2
3
4

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15, cited
in separate opinion of Kapunan, J. in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources.
Law 14, Title 12, Book 4
Article XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution.
Cruz case

The present 1987 Constitution, like the 1973 Constitution, reaffirms this
adherence to the Regalian Doctrine by providing: All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or time, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. 5 This ownership, according to the
case of Lee Hong Hok v. David, reflects the capacity of state to own or
acquire property and is understood under the concept of dominium.
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, ET AL. v. ANIANO DAVID, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-30389, 27 December 1972
FERNANDO, J p:
Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court
judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title of
respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes
the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support
for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through
accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without
such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is
therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government
through the appropriate public officials exercising the
competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at
naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not
otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of
by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled
principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We
affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the
lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification for
nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed
lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent
officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired
lawful title thereto pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application in accordance with which an order of award and for
issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on
June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226
square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of
Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on
October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the
filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual
5

Article XII, Section2, 1987 Constitution.

issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants

did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is
fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public
land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes
under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein . . . Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based
on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based
thereon becomes indefeasible . . . In this case the land in
question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always
sustained the public character thereof for having been formed
by reclamation. . . . The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud.
In this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendantappellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land
involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V26747, entered in the records of the Bureau of Lands
[Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was
done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the
land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official
acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely
a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said
deceased occupied the land since 1938."
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of

outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law
between the government authority possessed by the state which
is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its
capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to
pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the
medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the
existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as
the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by
Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular Government, a case of
Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the concept of jura
regalia, which was adopted by the present Constitution,

ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than

the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm
a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading
case of Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the royal
decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired in sovereignty
over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in
our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is
our will that all lands which are held without proper and true
deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us,
in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places
which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their
present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of
said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
of as we may wish."
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government
that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the
public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in
Congress, . . ." They continue to possess that character until
severed therefrom by state grant. Where, as in this case, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the
result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public
land is undeniable. What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands finds application. Thus: "There being no
evidence whatever that the property in question was ever
acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title or by any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." For
it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of
a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine,
found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The
applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the
northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present
controversy, and there being no showing that the same has
been acquired by any private person from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part
of the public domain." To repeat, the second assignment of error
is devoid of merit.

xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of

January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
The application of the Regalian Doctrine on the ownership by the State of the
public domain implies that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the
public domain must be able to show title from the State according to any of
the recognized modes of acquisition of title. Thus, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEXANDRA LAO
G.R. No. 150413, 1 July 2003.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review assails the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land
Registration Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application
for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770,
consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349)
square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged
that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings
Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who
inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited
the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same
from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded
to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and
her predecessor's open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona
fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the
following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the

ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente

Laudato, who testified on respondent's purchase of the property
from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag,
who assisted respondent in her application for registration.
Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 3 dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria
in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the
property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as
well as her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to
wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and
containing an area of nine thousand three hundred
forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by
its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of
legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino
citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory,
the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001,
the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 6
Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:
xxx

xxx

xxx

In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not

respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence
mandated by law, that she met the required period of open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept
of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not

respondent was able to show that the land subject of her

application was disposable and alienable land of the public
domain.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that

the land subject of her application is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian
doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In De Ocampo v. Arlos, it was held that:
. . . a title may be judicially confirmed under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains
to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such
assets are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that
the latter applied only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent.
Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical
descriptions of the land, which contained no information
regarding the classification of the property. These documents
are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any
certification stating that the land is open for disposition because
no opposition to her application was ever made by the
appropriate government agencies. She claims that in the
absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain
are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to private
ownership.

As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent

had the initial obligation to show that the property involved is
agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon
her to prove that the land being registered is indeed alienable or
disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was
agricultural and, therefore, alienable part of the public domain.
Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar, we held:
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to
rule that after an applicant files his application for
registration, the burden shifts totally to the
government to prove that the land forms part of the
unclassified forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69)
governs applications for confirmation of imperfect
title. The applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government
agencies is of no moment because the State cannot be estopped
by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land
and its conversion into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive
act from the government. It cannot be presumed; but must be
established by convincing proof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original
registration of title over Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land
Registration Case No. TG-719 before the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUDOLFO V. MUOZ
G.R. No. 151910, 15 October 2007
AZCUNA, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside
the August 29, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as well as its January 29, 2002

10

Resolution, which affirmed the October 3, 1997 Decision 2 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13, granting
the application for land registration of respondent Ludolfo V.
Muoz.
The following facts prompted the present controversy.
On June 14, 1996, respondent filed an Application for
Registration of Title of a parcel of residential land before the RTC
of Ligao, Albay containing an area of 1,986 square meters
situated, bounded, and described as follows: xxx
In his application for registration, respondent averred that no
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects his property and
that no other person has an interest, legal or equitable, on the
subject lot. Respondent further declared that the property was
acquired by donation inter vivos, executed by the spouses
Apolonio R. Muoz and Anastacia Vitero on November 18, 1956,
and that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession thereof since time immemorial for more than
70 years.
On November 7, 1996, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application on the following grounds:
(1) That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48[b], C.A. 141 as amended
by P.D. 1073).
(2) That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s
receipt/s of application/s, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands acquired for
or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto. Said muniment/s of title as well as
the title do not appear to be genuine and that the tax
declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicate the
pretended possession of application to be of recent vintage.
(3) That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February
16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. From the records, it
appears that the instant application was recently filed.

11

(4) That the parcel applied for is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to
private appropriation.
(5) That this application was filed beyond December 31, 1987,
the period set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073 and
therefore, is filed out of time.
In respondent's Answer to Opposition, he professed that the land
in question is a residential lot originally owned and possessed by
Paulino Pulvinar and Geronimo Lozada. Sometime in April 1917,
Pulvinar sold his share of the unregistered land to the spouses
Muoz and Vitero, respondent's parents. In June 1920, Lozada
likewise sold his remaining part to the parents of respondent.
Thereafter, the ownership and possession of the property were
consolidated by the spouses and declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Muoz in 1920. Furthermore, it was stated that
during the cadastral survey conducted in Ligao, Albay in 1928,
the land was designated as Lot No. 2276, as per Survey
Notification Card issued to Muoz dated October 2, 1928. Finally,
respondent contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of
application, the land taxes for the property had been fully paid.
xxx

xxx

xxx

During the trial, respondent was presented as the sole witness.

Respondent, who was 81 years old at that time, testified that he
acquired the property in 1956 when his parents donated the
same to him. He presented as Exhibit "H" 9 Tax Declaration No.
048-0267, evidencing the payment of realty taxes for Lot No.
2276 in 1997. A Certification from the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer 10 was likewise introduced by the respondent showing
the payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to the year 1997.
He further declared that the property is a residential land with
improvements such as a house made of solid materials and fruitbearing trees. In 1957, respondent told the court that he
constructed a concrete wall surrounding the entire property.
Respondent also narrated that he grew up on the subject lot and
spent his childhood days in the area.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On June 16, 1997, the trial court noted a Report submitted by

the Director of Lands, which informed the court that as per
records of the Land Management Bureau in Manila, Lot No. 2276,
CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of
Anastacia Vitero.
The RTC rendered a Decision dated October 3, 1997 granting the
application for registration. xxx

12

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject lot because: (1) the notice of initial
hearing was not timely filed; (2) the applicant failed to present
the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
registered during the trial; and (3) the applicant failed to present
evidence that the land is alienable and disposable.
Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo.
The appellate court explained that there was conclusive proof
that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been
complied with as mandated under Section 24 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Furthermore, the failure to present in evidence
the tracing cloth plan of the subject property did not deprive the
lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in
question. Lastly, the CA ruled that respondent need not adduce
documentary proof that the disputed property had been
declared alienable and disposable for the simple reason that the
lot had once been covered by free patent application; hence,
this alone is conclusive evidence that the property was already
declared by the government as open for public disposition.
The petitioner, through the OSG, raises the following grounds for
the petition:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
II.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
PROPERTY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Anent the second issue, petitioner stresses that in proving the

alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be
a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO).
The CA is of the opinion that respondent need not adduce
documentary proofs that the disputed property has been
declared alienable and disposable because of the fact that it had
once been covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 in
the name of respondent's mother, which was unfortunately not
acted upon by the proper authorities. The CA declares that this
is proof enough that the property was declared by the
government as open for public disposition. This contention was

13

adopted by the respondent both

Memorandum filed before the Court.

in

his

Comment

and

Notwithstanding all the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the

argument of respondent that the subject property was already
declared alienable and disposable land.
Petitioner is correct when it remarked that it was erroneous for
the appellate court to assume that the property in question is
alienable and disposable based only on the Report dated May
21, 1997 of the Director of Lands indicating that the "land
involved in said case described as Lot 2276, CAD-239 is covered
by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero."
It must be pointed out that in its Report 26 dated March 6, 1997,
the LRA stated that:
3. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the
parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by land
patent, previously approved isolated survey and is within forest
zone.
WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles
covering the same parcel of land and the issuance of titles for
lands within the forest zone which have not been released and
classified as alienable, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to
the Honorable Court with the recommendation that the Lands
Management Bureau, Manila, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Lands Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, all in Legazpi City, be ordered to submit a
report to the Court on the status of the land applied for, to
determine whether or not said land or any portion thereof, is
already covered by land patent, previously approved isolated
survey and is within the forest zone and that should the instant
application be given due course, the application in Cad. Case No.
53, Cadastral Record No. 1404 with respect to Lot 2276 be
dismissed.
Noteworthy is the fact that neither the Director of Lands nor the
LRA attested that the land subject of this proceeding is alienable
or disposable.
For clarity, applications for confirmation of imperfect title must
be able to prove the following: (1) that the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain;
and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.

14

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, other
than timber and mineral lands. 29 Section 6 of CA No. 141
empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain
into "alienable and disposable" lands of the public domain,
which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the
President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government
can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that
are "officially delimited and classified."
Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Therefore, all
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the
person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.
In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification
from the proper government agency to prove that the land
subject for registration is indeed alienable and disposable. A
CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have
evidenced the alienability of the land involved.
Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of
the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for,
the Court cannot approve the application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision dated August 29, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 58170, as reiterated in its resolution of January 29,

15

2002, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for

registration filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muoz is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
2. LIMITATIONS ON, AND EXCLUSIONS FROM,
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
a. Constitutional Limitations
By virtue of the States power of dominium over the public domain, it could
thereby exercise its rights of ownership, which include the power to exploit,
develop and alienate such natural resources. The Constitution, however,
provides for specific limitations to such power of dominium. These are
enumerated in Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII.
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

16

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use
of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
by law according to the uses which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology,
and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.
These constitutional limitations on the State's power to alienate agricultural
lands of the public domain is intended to prevent monopoly and foreign
control of our natural resources, as well as to enable the government to
control the exploitation, development and utilization thereof for the benefit of
all.6 Thus, with reference to the Regalian Doctrine and applied to lands of the
public domain, these Constitutional provisions provide that while no public
land can be acquired or held by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain may be the subject of such grant. Furthermore, the grantees
of such land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the citizenship
requirements prescribed by the Constitution. Similarly, the Constitution
provides for restrictions on the size or area of public land that may be
transferred to or held by qualified persons, subejct to further regulation by
Congress. These Constitutional restrictions can therefore be summarized, as
follows:
(a)

Only agricultural lands of the public domain are alienable.

Heirs of Gamos, et al. vs. Heirs of Frando, et al., 447 SCRA 136 [2004].

17

(b)

Only Filipino corporations and citizens, whether natural-born or

naturalized, may hold agricultural lands of the public domain;
provided, that:
(i)

Filipino corporations can only lease agricultural lands of the

public domain for a period of twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
(1,000) hectares in area; and,

(ii)

Filipino citizens can lease agricultural lands of the public domain

in an area not to exceed five hundred (500) hectares, and own
not more than twelve (12) hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.

b. Ancestral Lands
It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian
Doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine did not intend to strip the
natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them before the
Spanish conquest. This was the ruling in the landmark case of Cario v.
Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909), where the United States Supreme
Court ruling upon an appeal from the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Benguet, said:
[W]hen, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest and never have been public land.
Consequently, such land, if not owned by the State at the time of the Spanish
conquest, could not have been ceded by Spain to the United States through
the Treaty of Paris, and later, to the Philippine Government by the time of the
Commonwealth.
MATEO CARINO v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an application to the Philippine court of land
registration for the registration of certain land. The application
was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the court of first instance of the province of Benguet, on
behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on behalf
of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The
court of first instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed by

18

the supreme court (7 Philippine, 132 ), and the case then was
brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff
in error is an Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land
lies. For more than fifty years before the treaty of Paris, April 11,
1899 [30 Stat. at L. 1754], as far back as the findings go, the
plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His
grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences
sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of
the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much
earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts
for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn.
They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he
had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance
with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued
from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894, and again
in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless,
perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be
conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had
been designated,-a purpose that has been carried out by the
Philippine government and the United States. In 1901 the
plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage
law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided

below,- namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position
of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so
far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there
was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited
time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not
registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and
so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government
is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention
is so far correct that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title
to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which the United
States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that
the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier
decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to

19

the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization

with themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory, sovereignty
is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United
States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall
insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in
the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters
for it to decide.
The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the
Solicitor General, in his argument, characterized as a savage
tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have
made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been
the technical position of Spain, it does not follow that, in the
view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native
titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at
least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not
have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of
the white race in the United States. Whatever consideration may
have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant
purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is
obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that,
so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object
in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the
organic act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. at L. 691, all
the property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It
is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the
United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is
also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The
same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of
the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that
we have quoted from, it is hard to believe that the United States

20

was ready to declare in the next breath that 'any person' did not
embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by
'property' only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association,-one of the profoundest
factors in human thought,-regarded as their own.
It is true that, by the government of the Philippines is
empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting
titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions
had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more
than 16 hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native
or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section
perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the
occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not
continued for such a length of time and under such
circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the
occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose
that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper
title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes
afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the provision
that we have quoted as to the administration of the property
and rights acquired by the United States, such land and property
as shall be designated by the President for military or other
reservations, as this land since has been. But there still remains
the question what property and rights the United States
asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go
no further than the necessities of decision demand, every
presumption is and ought to be against the government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient
to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the
import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle
examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the
attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary
to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes
of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and
inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet
sanctioned the same course as the proper one 'for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof.'

21

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do

not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to
satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error
seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized
as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants
of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will.
For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, while it commands viceroys and
others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants,
directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The
fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to
the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October
15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546: 'Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription.' It may be that this means possession from before
1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As
prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the
laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit
that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880,
for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual
theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have
been a grant by competent authority; but instantly descends to
fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who have been
in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For
cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into
effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very
terms of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to
require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it
described, and in that way to require every one to get a
document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been
entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been
applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made 'for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals.' (We follow the translation in the government's
brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was royal land or
wrongfully occupied. In Article 6 it is provided that 'interested

22

parties not included within the two preceding articles [the

articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may
legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership
of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be
conducted in the following manner.' This seems, by its very
terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by
lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not
asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully
enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the
treasury 'will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands,'
and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. The
applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any
such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Finally, it should be noted that the natural construction of the
decree is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That
report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view
of the condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is
important to fix its status by general rules, on the principle that
the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession;
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted
in the decree; and then suggests that interested parties not
included in those articles may legalize their possession and
acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to
those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time, and
we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may
prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in
any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited
titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880,
for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be
construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege.
As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This
same decree is quoted by the court of land registration for
another recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty
years as still running against alienable Crown land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the
Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts

23

of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that

account to notice the possible effect of the change of
sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and
justice require that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through
a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.
OH CHO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. 48321, 31 August 1946
PADILLA, J p:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a
residential lot located in the municipality of Guinayangan,
Province of Tayabas, in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the
applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as
alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the application for
registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the
opponent and adds that the lower court committed an error in
not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or
should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for
the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may
be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show
that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the
lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under
the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information
under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption

24

that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.)
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question
is whether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under
the provisions of the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141). Under the
provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled
to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections
48, 49, C. A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to prove title to the lot and has invoked
the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to
make pronouncement in this case on the nature, character or
classification of the lot sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land
Act the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest would
have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or
acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessors in interest to
a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been
acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest are or constitute
a grant or concession by the State; and before they could
acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition
precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which
they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This
the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title
which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked
to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person
as the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have
been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and
vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement
would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is
void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.

25

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for

registration dismissed, without costs.
Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
The doctrine laid down in Cario was subsequently cited by members of the
Supreme Court in upholding the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8371 or
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (the IPRA). In a suit filed by former
Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz, the constitutionality of IPRA was assailed
on the ground that it deprived the state of ownership over lands of public
domain and natural resources contained therein, in violation of the Regalian
Doctrine. The votes were deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the validity of
the IPRA was upheld.
ISAGANI CRUZ AND CESAR EUROPA v.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000.
PER CURIAM p:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions

of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands; TECcHA
"(2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which
defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

26

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of

the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
These provisions are:
"(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest
on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of
the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;

27

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions

and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in
favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous
peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1
of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President's power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court

voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66

28

of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific

cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and De Leon, Jr., join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, YaresSantiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
In upholding the Constitutionality of the statute, Justice Raynato Puno, calling
the IPRA a novel piece of legislation, recognized the presumption that land
(1) as far back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private
ownership to never have been public land. Thus tracing the development
of the States treatment of indigenous peoples from the Spanish period to the
present, Justice Puno recognized the concept of native title of indigenous
peoples over lands held since time immemorial.
This was echoed by Justice Santiago Kapunan noted that title to land by
indigenous peoples in the Philippine has been recognized since colonial
times. Justice Kapunan said:
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino
landholdings including native land occupancy.
Thus, the
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred
ownership of lands already held by the natives. The royal
decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land
in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880,
provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands"
must legalize their possession by means of adjustment
proceedings, and within the period specified. The later royal
decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura
Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under
the royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not
sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura
Law, it was held in the case of Cario that the royal decree of

29

1894 should not be construed as confiscation of title, but merely

as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such title.
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the
Philippines to the United States, contrary to petitioners'
assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain,
including the latter's rights over lands of the public domain.
Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of
the Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at
the time. During the American colonial regime, native title to
land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902
provided that property and rights acquired by the US through
cession from Spain were to be administered for the benefit of
the Filipinos. In obvious adherence to libertarian principles,
McKinley's Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902,
contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US
Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable
rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial
government in the Philippines, was that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902
were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause of
the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the
indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral
domains were firmly established in law.
In undermining the strength of the doctrine laid down in Cario, Justice Vitug
argued that the judicial pronouncements in the case antedate the provisions
of the 1935 Constitution which first categorically declared the States
ownership of all lands and natural resources in the Philippines. In the mind of
Justice Vitug, a judicial decision, such as the case of Cario, cannot override
the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. This was also
the view of Justice Artemio Panganiban who considered the doctrine in Cario
modified or superseded by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its
ratio, according to Justice Panganiban, should be understood as referring
only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by
citizens.
Pertinently, the IPRA defines ancestral lands as land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous
cultral communities since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and
tree lots.7
c. Ecclesiastical Property

30

Republic Act No. 8371, Section 3(b).

In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands
held by persons through native title, properties of the Roman Catholic Church
prior to the American occupation are also not considered public land or land
owned by the State. The reason is because it was the Church and not the
King of Spain that was the owner of such ecclesiastical property during the
time of the Spanish occupation. Therefore ecclesiastical property was never
public land and could not have been transferred to the United States by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris.
JORGE BARLIN v. VICENTE RAMIREZ AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
LAGONOY
G.R. No. L-2832, 24 November 1906
WILLARD, J p:
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the
pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since
1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent
were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There
was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial
governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was
performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the
cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in
the pueblo was required to work for the government, without
compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the
reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the
forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in
part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in part
was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the
completion of the church it was always administered, until
November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion
and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and
belonged to that church.
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff
parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July,
1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his
superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor
having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this
defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and
other property of the church. The defendant, by a written
document of that date, refused to make such delivery. xxx
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the
defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the
Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building,
the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property
belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of

31

the property which he had received and which was retained by

him, and for other relief.
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general
denial of the allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in
the possession and administration of the property described
therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of
the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the
said property. After this answer had been presented, and on the
1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a
petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and
join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This
petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of
December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant,
Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the
complaint under the authority and with the consent of the
municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the
owner thereof.
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and
the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The defendants then
brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.
That the person in the actual possession of the church and other
property described in the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is
plainly established by the evidence. It does not appear that the
municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any action in
reference to this matter until they presented their petition for
intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for the defense,
when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say that they
are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the
president, said that the municipality as a corporation had
nothing whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution
adopted on the 14th of November, and which has been quoted
above, was not the action of the municipality, as such, is
apparent from an inspection thereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be

affirmed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership

ever admitting that the Spanish Government was the owner
of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the
American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a
matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the treaty

32

of peace was signed, was not the owner of this property, nor
of any other property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the
parish churches in the Philippine Islands were built by the
Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the
Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:
"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and
parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our
Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and
expense of our royal treasury, and applied for their
service and maintenance the part of the tithes
belonging to us by apostolic concession according to
the division we have made."
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial
churches such as the one in question. That law is as follows:
"The parish churches which was erected in Spanish
towns shall be of durable and decent construction.
Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts:
One by our royal treasury, another by the residents
and Indian encomenderos of the place where such
churches are constructed, and the other part by the
Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a
city, village, or place there should be any Indians
incorporated to our royal crown, we command that for
our part there be contributed the same amount as the
residents and encomenderos, respectively, contribute;
and the residents who have no Indians shall also
contribute for this purpose in accordance with their
stations and wealth, and that which is so given shall be
deducted from the share of the Indians should pay."
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
"We command that the part of the tithes which
belongs to the fund for the erection of churches shall
be given to their superintendents to be expended for
those things necessary for these churches with the
advice of the prelates and officials, and by their
warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and
charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in
the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard
these structures."
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:

33

"In all settlements, even though the Indians are few,

there shall be erected a church where mass can be
decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key,
notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or
separate from a parish."
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines
erected by the King and under his direction, but it was made
unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King.
This provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is
as follows:
"Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found,
and maintain all cathedrals, parish churches,
monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious
and pious establishments where they are necessary for
the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the
doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid
to this effect with out royal treasury whenever
possible, and to receive information of such places
where they should be founded and are necessary, and
the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging
to us:
"We command that there shall not be erected,
instituted, founded, or maintained any cathedral,
parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches,
or other pious or religious establishment without our
express permission as is provided in Law 1, title 2, and
Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any
permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other
ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make
null, void, and of no effect."
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the
Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies were given by the
former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the
fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1,
which is as follows:
"Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies
belong to us by the apostolic concessions of the
supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our
royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause
to be collected all tithes due and to become due from
the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in
which it has been the custom to pay the same, and
from these tithes the churches shall be provided with
competent persons of good character to serve them
and with all ornaments and things which may be

34

necessary for divine worship, to the end that these

churches may be well served and equipped, and we
shall be informed of God, our Lord; this order shall be
observed where the contrary has not already been
directed by us in connection with the erection of
churches."
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of
the Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by
the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal
order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the
construction and repair of churches, there being authority for
saying that the latter order was in force in the Philippines.
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the
Philippines, having been erected by the Spanish Government,
and under its direction, the next question to be considered is,
To whom did these churches belong?
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of
things and, after discussing what can be called public
property and what can be called private property, speaks, in
Law 12, of those things which are sacred, religious, or holy.
That law is as follows:
Law XII. HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN
NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.
"No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the
service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any
man, nor can it be considered as included in his
property holdings. Although the priests may have such
things in their possession, yet they are not the owners
thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or
servants, or because they have the care of the same
and serve God in or without them. Hence they were
allowed to take from the revenues of the church and
lands what was reasonably necessary for their support;
the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted to
pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of
the poor, the support of orphans, the marrying of poor
virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because
of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives
and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of
chalices, clothing, books, and others things which they
might be in need of, and other similar charitable
purposes."
And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in
to which this law has divided these things, it defines in Law

35

13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as

follows:
"Sacred things, we say, are those which are
consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the
altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments,
books, and all other things which are in tended for the
service of the church, and the title to these things can
not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we
have already shown in the first partida of this book by
the laws dealing with this subject. We say further that
even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground
upon which it formerly stood shall always be
consecrated ground. But if any consecrated church
should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it
shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the
enemy has it under control, although once recovered
by the Christians, it will again become sacred,
reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it
and shall have all the right and privileges formerly
belonging to it."
xxx

xxx

xxx

The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession
of the Philippines to the United States, churches and other
consecrated objects were considered outside of the
commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could
they be subjects of private property in the sense that any
private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a
kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that it
was devoted to the worship of God.
But, being material things was necessary that some one
should have the care and custody of them and the
administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom,
under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and
administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there
was only one religion. That was the religion professed by the
Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that
religion and for the observance of its rites that this church
and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. The
possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the
maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily,
therefore, intrusted to that body. It was, by virtue of the laws
of Spain, the only body which could under any circumstances
have possession of, or any control over, any church
dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those laws this
possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It
is not necessary or important to give any name to this right

36

of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic

Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to
1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a
juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient
to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control
of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with
reference to the churches in the Philippines, did not give him
any right to interfere with the material possession of these
buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies
treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in
any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which
in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of
the churches in the Indies because he had constructed them.
These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical
charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title
commences as follows:
"Because the patronage and right of presentation of all
archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates,
and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and
ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us, no other
person can obtain or possess the same without our
presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of
this title."
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage
vesting in private persons, but there is nothing in any one of
its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private
patron is the owner of the church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown
of Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and
had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power
of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every
government, it might have appropriated this church and
other churches, and private property of individuals. But
nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of
Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive
right to the possession of this church and it had the legal
right to administer the same for the purposes for which the
building was consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful
possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these
rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear.

37

That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as

follows:
"And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding
paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful
possession of property of all kinds, or provinces,
municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations
having legal capacity to acquire and possess property
in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of
private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be."
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that
treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the
Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way
to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church
had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the
Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been
caused by private individuals, acting without any authority
from the Government. Against such interference by private
persons with the rights of others, redress is given in the
courts of justice without reference to the provisions of the
treaty of Paris.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any
distinction should be made between the church and the
convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the
church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1,
of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply. That
law is as follows:
"We command that the Indians of each town or barrio
shall construct such houses as may be deemed
sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios
may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of
the place where that may be built for the benefit of the
priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the
education and conversion of their Indian parishioners,
and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other
purpose."
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the
cemetery. It is always mentioned in connection with the
church and convent and no point is made by the possession
of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover
possession of the cemetery. So, without discussing the
question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are

38

all respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose

of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the
cemetery that he has to the church.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of

this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of
twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be
remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

39

CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION AND DISPOSITION
OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Understood in its general sense, lands of the public domain refer to the mass
of land belonging to the State. It can be considered synonymous to
government land. Public lands, on the other hand, refer to such lands of
the public domain which are subject to alienation and disposal by the State in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act.
Accordingly, government land and public land are not synonymous terms;
the first is more extensive and embraces not only the second by also other
lands of the government already reserved to public use or subject to private
right.8
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
a. Power to Classify
Government land or lands of the public domain can be classified in various
ways. For example, government land can either be alienable and disposeable
(i.e., public land) or inalienable. Government land can also be characterized
as lands of public dominion which are held by the State in its sovereign
capacity, or patrimonial property.
However, if we are to follow the
classification prescribed under the 1987 Constitution, lands of the public
domain are classified as (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3) mineral and
(4) national parks. This list departs from the 1935 Constitution which
identifies agricultural, timber and mineral lands, 9 and the 1973 Constitution,
which additionally enumerates industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, and grazing lands.10

8
9

10

40

Monsanto v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 1572 [1909].

Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. SECTION 1.
All
agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. SECTION 10. Lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, industrial, or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing lands, and such
other classes as may be provided by law.

From this Constitutional classification, Congress has, in turn, enacted

legislation providing for the use, exploitation, preservation and, when
allowed, alienation and disposition, of each classification of government land.
In general, these laws are the following:
(a) Agricultural Land the Public Land Act of 1936 (Commonwealth Act No.
141)
(b) Forest land - the Revised Forestry Code (Presidential Decree No. 705)
(c) Mineral land - Mining Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7942)
(d) National parks - National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS)
Act of 1992 (Republic Act No. 7586)
At the same time, Congress, through the Public Land Act, has delegated the
power to classify such government lands to the Executive Branch of the
government. Thus, Section 6 of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 58867, 22 June 1984.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a
review of the Decision and Resolution of the then Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel
of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question,
identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre,
under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and
has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the
Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a
fishpond.
In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private
respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the
co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through
inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that

41

it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that

the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on
the principal ground that the land applied for is within the
unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637
dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified
region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of
the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject
land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by
respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through
indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona
fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing
of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It
further opined that "since the subject property is entirely
devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part
of forest lands."
Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether
or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and (2)
whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of
title.
The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the
land is within an unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, as
shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. No
evidence has been submitted that the land has been released or
subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated
November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of
Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:
"Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be
within the Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC
Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot
inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, it
disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and
forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing
fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the
area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
"In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the
investment introduced therein this Office believes that the
release is in order.

42

"Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance

with the Public Land Law."
The Government's cause is meritorious.
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the
subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond
their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public
lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of
the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This
should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is
also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of
subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate
word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated
March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the
unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not
operate against the State considering the stipulation between
the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot
be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or
agents, if omission there was, in fact.
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been
cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands
comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A
survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to
any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land
is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register it under the Torrens System.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants,
or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its
present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing
that there are titled lands around the subject property,
petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the
matter of classification of the land in question.

43

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the

application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N-299V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment by the
applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Plana Relova and De la Fuente, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., * J ., took no part.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. v. YAP, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 167707 and 173775, 8 October 2008
REYES, R.T., J p:
At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.
167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is
G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 3issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its
powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped
island's three barangays.
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of
Boracay Island, which identified several lots as being occupied
or claimed by named persons.
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other

44

islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones

and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 9 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad
Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In
their
petition,
respondents-claimants
alleged
that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in
their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest", which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to
judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated
on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently
in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other
natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more

45

or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty
(50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land
they were occupying for tax purposes.
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution
was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the
case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.
The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344,
were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222)
in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those
similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay,
in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of
Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute
a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that
lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land
Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision, disposing as follows:

46

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment

is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced
by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
26 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred
twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of
roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,
Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay filed with this
Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They
have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is
deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitionersclaimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest,
the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only
the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and

47

disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act

in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on
the land classification of Boracay Island.
Issues
xxx

xxx

xxx

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants

(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitionersclaimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands
of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in
their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in relation to Act No. 926, later
amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;
(b) Proclamation No. 1801 38 issued by then President Marcos;
and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest
and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided
by law, 41 giving the government great leeway for classification.
Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No.
1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

48

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public

domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their
exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown. The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in
the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain."
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set
forth in said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an
informacion posesoria or possessory information title, when duly
inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse, from the date of its inscription. However, possessory
information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime
could only be founded on royal concessions which took various

49

forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion

especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine
Bill of 1902. 60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The
act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system). 62 It also provided the definition by
exclusion of "agricultural public lands". 63 Interpreting the
meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:
. . . In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . .
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission
passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act
introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.
Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No.
2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.

50

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended

Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.
Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act
No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last
amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued
the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD
No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was
enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property. It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141
limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which
have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still
be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable

51

and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application

for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.
Ankron and de Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay
Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants
posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands
(1919) and de Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909). These
cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases
that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."
Private claimants' reliance on Ankron and de Aldecoa is
misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the
whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It
should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural
depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. This was
the Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca
and Soterranea Rafols Vda. de Palanca v. Republic, in which it
stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

52

. . . Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land

need not be formally released by an act of the Executive
before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing
the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron
v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural
so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act
No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown."
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and
De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain
had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That
would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would
be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the longentrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926,
or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the

53

benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained

unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to
be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for nonagricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the
particular land in question belongs to one class or another
is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of the forestry and of
the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture", "forestry",
and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question
of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is
more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and,
by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa,
by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery
of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today
may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that
it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that
the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar
[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to
decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land.
It may perchance belong to one or the other of said

54

classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,

under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter
case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral,
is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of
the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) (Emphasis
ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the
classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those
that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141,
gave the Executive Department, through the President, the
exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since then, courts no
longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of lands of the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who
were issued their title in 1933, 98 did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the
property's land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property's land classification.
Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, which was decided in
1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a
totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was
whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien
could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien,
Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution 104 from

55

acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,

the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in
Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment
of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa. As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to
classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants' continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private
claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in
Collado v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion
of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands", for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands". In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,

56

mere possession by private individuals of lands creates

the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable. (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3 (a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not". Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are
ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest
land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multimillion peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island's tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks", do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is
particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to

57

be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy

areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands
of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court
is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and
not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover
has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did
not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then
President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among
other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as
a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert
the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing
in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private
lands" and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" does
not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and
areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3
provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands
are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public
lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the
Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141.
In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of

58

Forest Development's authority to declare areas in the island as

alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the
positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation
No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private
sectors in the development of the areas' tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment.
Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address
the areas' alienability.
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only
Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands
in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de
Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of
Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas
mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared
part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only
the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify
lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing
vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive

59

prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of

the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on
each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657
barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They
claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural
land without running afoul of Section 4 (a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No.
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted
to
or
suitable
for
agriculture.
No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural
lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD
No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

60

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea

Rafols v. Republic, the Court stated that unclassified lands are
public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition. (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the
opinion of the Department of Justice on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the
prohibition in Section 4 (a) is the word "reclassification".
Where there has been no previous classification of public
forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which
are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest
uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the
CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits
of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those
lands of the public domain, denominated as "public
forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not
been previously determined, or classified, as needed for
forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Forestry Code.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they
have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or

61

from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island
into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified
land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording
of the law itself. 129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to
those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private
claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a
tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of
private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right
in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to
the land they are presently occupying. This Court is

62

constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence

presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for
the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the
local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private
claimants' plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at
ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may
not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not
denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments
on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or
protect their possession. For another, they may look into other
modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt
them from certain requirements under the present land laws.
There is one such bill now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a
law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the
step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This
gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which
view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees,
however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.

63

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation's survival.

Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for
politicians and activists. These are needs that become more
urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez
in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in
adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any
country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our
lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of
serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust
bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is
washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and
highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed,
the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumberman's decalogue.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and
the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., is on official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated
September 19, 2008.
Nachura, J., took no part. Justice Nachura participated in the
present case as Solicitor General.
b. Manner and effect of Classification

64

In Republic v. Court of Appeals 11 the Supreme Court said that rights over the
land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. For this reason, the Court ruled that any classification of land made
by the Executive should be categorical: the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. Furthermore, the classification given by
the Executive pertains to the legal nature of the land, and not into the
physical characteristics or appearance of the land thus classified. Thus, in
Spouses Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals,12 the Supreme Court said that the
cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest does not
automatically convert the land of the public domain from forest or timber
land to alienable agricultural land. This means that the classification of land
does not change when the nature of the land changes: a positive act of the
executive is still nonetheless needed. A party claiming the change in
classification, therefore, must nonetheless be able to show an act by the
Executive demonstrating such reclassification. 13 This positive act, however,
need not necessarily be express, such as, for example, the issuance by the
President of a Special Patent over land previously unclassified as alienable
land.14
SPOUSES PAGKATIPUNAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 129682, 21 March 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals nullifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Gumaca, Quezon which confirmed petitioners' title over the lots
subject of the instant petition. Petitioners further seek to annul
and set aside the resolutions 3 of the Court of Appeals denying
their urgent motion to recall the judgment entered in the land
registration case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners' predecessors-ininterest, spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon an
application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title
11
12
13
14

160 SCRA 228 (1988).

G.R. No. 129682, 21 March 2002.
See Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G..R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002, where the Supreme Court said: PD No. 1085, coupled with President
Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands
are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.

65

to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu112066, all located in San Narciso, Quezon.
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of
default against the whole world, except spouses Felicisimo
Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten (10) days to
file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu174406. Upon motion of petitioner's predecessors, Lot No. 2 of
Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the coverage of the
application. The remaining parcel of land covered by Lot No. 1
has an area of 3,804.261 square meters.
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a
decision confirming petitioners' title to the property. On October
23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issued in the name of
petitioners.
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court an action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G,
LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of First Instance of
Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and
void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates of
title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public
domain.
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land
registration case and of rendition of the decision on June 15,
1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under LC
Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No.
LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject to registration.
Moreover, petitioners' title thereto can not be confirmed for lack
of showing of possession and occupation of the land in the
manner and for the length of time required by Section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners
have any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No.
496, as amended. Consequently, the Court of First Instance did
not acquire jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had
therein were null and void.
On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of
indefeasibility of title and res judicata. They argued that due to
the lapse of a considerable length of time, the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon in the land registration case
has become final and conclusive against the Republic. Moreover,
the action for reversion of the land to the public domain is
barred by prior judgment.

66

In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate

Appellate Court held that the land in question was forestral land;
hence not registrable. There was no evidence on record to show
that the land was actually and officially delimited and classified
as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. Therefore,
the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the application for registration and to decide the
same. Consequently, the action to declare null and void the June
15, 1967 decision for lack of jurisdiction did not prescribe. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners claim that their title to the land became

incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year after issuance of
the decree of registration. Hence, the Republic's cause of action
was barred by prescription and res judicata, proceedings having
been initiated only after about 18 years from the time the
decree of registration was made. Contrary to the appellate
court's findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and
classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as
timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest who have been in open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of the land in
question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30)
years prior to the filing of the application for registration in
1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed grave error when
it denied their motion to set aside entry of judgment in the land
registration case.
The petition lacks merit.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of
the application for land registration and issuance of the
certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of
petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the
public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development on April 1, 1985, thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang,
San Narciso, Quezon, containing an area of 3, 804.261 square
meters as described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-117618 .
. . registered in the name of Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and

67

Rosalina Magas is verified to be within the Timberland Block-B,

Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared
as such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The land is,
therefore, within the administrative jurisdiction and control of
the Bureau of Forest Development, and not subject to disposition
under the Public Land Law.
[Sgd.] ARMANDO CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the
proceedings before the court a quo on March 10, 1986, when
they confirmed that the land has been classified as forming part
of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955. Since no
imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein petitioners is
considered void ab initio.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land
has been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on
the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable
agricultural
lands
of
the
public
domain.
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be
ignored nor deemed waived. It calls for proof.
The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners
based on the Republic's failure to show that the land is more
valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes, a finding
which is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of land
of the public domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive of
what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a

68

classification for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out as

a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of
trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees and
the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert
the land of the public domain from forest or timber land to
alienable agricultural land.
The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is
descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 32 A person
cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating
a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual
confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first
declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes
of an imperfect title.
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act, which took effect on December 1, 1936,
expressly provided that only agricultural land of the public
domain are subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:
Section 48. . . .
(a)
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-

69

six, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented

by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must prove that the
land is alienable public land. 35 In the case at bar, petitioners
failed to do so.
Petitioners' contention that the Republic is now barred from
questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to them
considering that it took the government almost eighteen (18)
years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that
prescription does not run against the State. The lengthy
occupation of the disputed land by petitioners cannot be
counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial
property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is
inalienable and indisposable.
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it
set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the court a quo and
ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the public
domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any
proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is void and is not
entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners'
motion to set aside the judgment rendered on December 12,
1986, in the land registration case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., is on official leave.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., v. JUAN P. AQUINO AND THE
ABRA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 31688, 17 December 1990.

70

FERNAN, C.J p:
The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on
certiorari is a limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66
hectares of which are, according to petitioners, within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity),
a duly registered corporation established for the purpose of
setting up a cement factory, claims on the other hand, to be the
owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare area indicated in
survey plans PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a
total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on September 23,
1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an
application for registration in its name of said parcels of land
under the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under Sec.
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly
been in possession thereof since July 26, 1894.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On July 22, 1966, the lower court favorably acted on the

application and ordered the registration of the parcels of land
under the Land Registration Act. It ruled that although said land
was within the forest zone, the opposition of the Director of
Lands was not well-taken because the Bureau of Forestry, thru
the District Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to exclude the
same area from the forest reserve." It found that the parcels of
land had been acquired by purchase and AIC's possession
thereof, including that of its predecessors-in-interest, had been
for forty-nine (49) years.
The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that except
for a 4-hectare area, the land covered by PSU-217518, 217519
and 217520 fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that
although it had been denuded, it was covered with massive,
corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to yield 200,000,000
metric tons about a fifth of which was suitable for the
manufacture of high grade portland cement type and that the
limestone, being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of
cement a day for 1,000 years. He contended that, while the land
could be reclassified as mineral land under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Mines, the process of exclusion from the Cordillera
Forest Reserve had not yet been undertaken pursuant to Sec.
1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and therefore it was still part of

71

the forest zone

Constitution.

which

was

inalienable

under

the

1935

AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration,

the lower court denied it on September 28, 1967 holding that
the grounds raised therein were relevant and proper only if the
Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to the
case. It added that the motion for intervention filed by the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines was improper in land
registration cases.
The Director of Lands filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals but the same was dismissed for having been filed out
of time. Hence, on December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of
Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and
118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of land in the
name of AIC.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting

the application for registration of the parcels of land
notwithstanding its finding that they are within the forest zone.
The District Forester's failure to object to the exclusion of the
area sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not
enough
justification
for
registration
because
under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude an area from
the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and not the District Forester or even the Director of
Forestry.
Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in denying
the petition for review based on actual fraud because under
Section 38 of Act No. 496, a decree of registration may be
reviewed not only by reason of actual fraud but also for a fatal
infirmity of the decision upon which the decree is based,
provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced.
We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again, we reiterate
the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry vs.
Muoz and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases the
more recent of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, that forest
lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation
and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian
doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
but also in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides
that:

72

"Sec. 2.
All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal . . . forests or timber, . . . and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated."
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must first be
released from its classification as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land in accordance with the certification issued by
the Director of Forestry as provided for by Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code. This is because the classification of
public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not of the courts. Moreover,
a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest
land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
Being the interested party, an applicant for registration of a
parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. In this case, AIC asserts that the land in dispute is no
longer part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because the
communal forest in Bucay, Abra which had been established in
1909 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-298, had
been "cancelled and de-established" by Forestry Administrative
Order No. 2-622 dated October 1, 1965 and issued by then
Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y.
Feliciano. AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the fact
that as there was no longer a forested area, the same area had
become alienable more so because its actual occupants, who
had been devoting it to agriculture, had relinquished their rights
over it in favor of AIC "to give way for greater economic benefits
for the people in the locality."
It should be emphasized,
however, that the classification of the land as forest land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Hence, the fact
that the contested parcels of land have long been denuded and
actually contains rich limestone deposits does not in any way
affect its present classification as forest land.
While it is true that under Section 1839 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, with the approval
of the Department Head, may change the location of a
communal forest, such executive action does not amount to a
declassification of a forest reserve into an alienable or
disposable land. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, it is no less
than the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands. The President shall also declare from time to time

73

what lands are open to disposition or concession. AIC therefore,

should prove first of all that the lands it claims for registration
are alienable or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not only failed
to prove that it has a registerable title but more important]y, it
failed to show that the lands are no longer a part of the public
domain.
The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of the
decision ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in
view of its patent infirmity. The lower court closed its eyes to a
basic doctrine in land registration cases that the inclusion in a
title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. 31 Its
decision to order the registration of an inalienable land in favor
of AIC under the misconception that it is imperative for the
Director of Forestry to object to its exclusion from the forest
reserve even in the face of its finding that indeed a sizable
portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is involved,
cannot be allowed to stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent
infirmity which must be corrected.
WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969 denying the
petition for review under Section 38 of Act No. 496 and the
decision of July 22, 1966 insofar as it orders the registration of
land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made permanent. Costs
against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
c. Administration of Public Land
While the authority to classify lands of the public domain has been vested by
Congress on the Executive, and particularly in the President, the
administration of public land has been granted under the Public Land Act to
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (formerly the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce), through the Director of Lands, who shall act
under his immediate control. 15 Thus, the Director of Lands is the official
vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of lands of the
public domain. He has the authority and control over:
(a)

15

74

The survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of

concession or disposition and management of lands of the public
domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive
when approved by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources (formerly the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce); 16
and,
Section 3, CA No. 141.

(b) The preparation and issuance of forms, instructions, rules and

regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Public Land Act.17
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
a. Brief history of public land laws in the Philippines
The law on the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine, through which all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. This was decreed under the Novisima Recopliacion de
Leyes delas Indias.18 The Novisima Recopliacion was followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893 which provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. 19 The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law, which was effective on 13 February 1894,
partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Novisima Recopliacion by
establishing possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land.
Through these royal issuances, therefore, private ownership of land under the
Spanish regime, which was based on royal concessions, took the following
forms: (a) titulo real or royal grant; (b) concesion especial or special grant; (c)
composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (d) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (e) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.20
With the defeat of the Spain during the Spanish American War, sovereignty
over the Philippine islands, including lands of the public domain owned by the
King, was transferred to the United States through the Treaty of Paris of 1898.
The Philippine Bill of 1902,21 thereafter classified lands of the public domain
as agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. 22 The act provided for,
among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). It also provided a
definition, by exclusion, of agricultural public lands, which the Supreme
Court, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,23 interpreted to mean:
16

17
18

19
20

21

22
23

Section 4, CA No. 141, as amended by Executive Order No. ____, or the

Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 5, CA No. 141.
Collado v. Court of Appeals, 390 SCRA 343 [2002], citing Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002].
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 5 11,
cited in Secretary of the DENR, et al. vs. Yap, et al., G.R. No. 167707 & 173775, 8
October 2008.
Entitled, An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of
Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes, issued on July
1, 1902,
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598, 601 [1989].
10 Phil. 175 (1908).

75

those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. . . .
The first Public Land Act, Act No. 926, was then issued by the American
colonial government in pursuance of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The Act
introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of
public lands. It also permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public
domain.
Act No. 926 was replaced by Act No. 2874 on 7 October 1903. This new,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges.
With the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth and the 1935
Constitution which adopted and applied the Regalian Doctrine to our
republican system, Congress passed the present Public Land Act on 1
December 1936 in order to make all pre-existing public land laws conform to
the nationalistic provisions of the 1935 Constitution. 24 Through the Public
Land Act, all pre-existing laws relative to the disposition of public lands were
complied in a single instrument.
b. Coverage
Section 2 of the Public Land Act provides for the laws application and
coverage:
SECTION 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of
the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be
governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall
be understood or construed to change or modify the
administration and disposition of the lands commonly called
friar lands and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter
be enacted.
Excepted from the coverage of the law are the disposition, use and
administration of timber and mineral lands, which, as earlier mentioned, are
today respectively governed by the Revised Forestry Code and the Mining Act
of 1995.
Also excepted are the so-called Friar Lands, which are lands acquired by the
government during the Taft Administration in 1903 from religious corporations
or orders, for administration, temporary leasing, and eventual sale to actual
occupants of the land. By express provision of Act No. 1120, friar lands are
24

76

PEA, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 30 at 18.

not considered public lands in the sense in which this word is used in the
Public Land Act, and are, instead, considered private and patrimonial property
of the State.25 Thus, their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the
Public Land Act, but instead by Act No. 1120, and later, by Commonwealth
Act No. 32,26 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 316.27
Also excluded from the coverage of the Public Land Act are lands within big
landed estates acquired by the government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII
of the 1935 Constitution28 which have been sold to tenants under provisions
of Commonwealth Act Nos. 20 29 and 539.30 These are also considered private
lands of the government.31
It should be underscored that when ownership over public lands are
transferred under any of the methods provided by the Public Land Act (i.e.
homestead, sale, judicial confirmation of imperfect title, etc.), these lands are
no longer to be governed by the provisions of the said Act, and are
considered private lands.32 This notwithstanding, the Supreme Court ruled
that even if the lands so acquired have become private property, these lands
still remain subject to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Public
Land Act on alienation, mortgage, or repurchase. 33
b. Classification of Public or Alienable Lands of the Public Domain

25
26

27
28

29

30

31

32
33

Jacinto vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853 [1926].

Entitled, An Act providing for the subdivision and sale of all the portions of
Friar Lands Estates remaining undisposed of, issued on 15 September 1936.
[LOOK FOR TITLE].
Section 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation,
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.
Entilted, An Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to order the
institution of expropriation proceedings or to enter into negotiations fo rthe
purpose of acquiring portions of large landed estates used as homesites and
reselling them at cost to their bona fide occupants, appropriting funds therefor,
and for other purposes, issued on 11 July 1936.
Entitled, AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO
ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS FOR RESALE IN SMALL LOTS; PROVIDING FOR THE
CREATION OF AN AGENCY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT; AND
SETTING ASIDE FUNDS AND AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS FOR THE
PAYMENT OF SAID LANDS, issued on 26 May 1940.
Commonwealth Act No. 20 authorizes the President to order the institution of
expropriation proceedings or to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
acquiring portions of large landed estates which are now used as home sites and
reselling them at cost to their bona fide occupants.
Meanwhile, Commonwealth Act No. 539 allows the President to acquire private
lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide
them into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices to their bona
fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands
themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, GR No. 40399, 40 Phil. 883 (1920).
Francisco, et al. vs. Certeza, Sr., et al., 3 SCRA 565 [1961].

77

As we have seen previously, only agricultural lands of the public domain can
be transferred or disposed of to qualified persons. Section 8 of the Public
Land Act defines such lands as those which satisfy the following
requirements:
(a) The land must have been declared open to disposition or concession;
(b) The land must have been officially delimited and classified, and, when
practicable, surveyed; provided that, the President may, for reasons of
public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established, or been
surveyed; and,
(c) The land must not have been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property.
These public agricultural lands are further classified under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act as:
(a)
(b)

Agricultural,
Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;

(c)

Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d)

Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

In turn, alienable lands classified as residential, commercial and industrial

lands under Section 9 of the Public Land Act are further classified as:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means,
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or
bank of navigable lakes or rivers; and,
(d) Land not included in any of the foregoing classes.
It should be noted that while Section 9 of the Public Land Act classifies
agricultural land separate from residential, commercial, educational,
reservations, etc., all lands enumerated under the said provision all
correspond to agricultural land as understood under Section 3, Article XII of
the Constitution as open to alienation or disposition. The classification under
Section 9, therefore, is for purposes of administration and disposition, or
according to the purpose to which said lands are especially adapted.

78

Notwithstanding this classification, all of said lands are essentially agricultural

lands which may be alienated.
MODES OF DISPOSITION OF ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
As we have learned under the Regalian Doctrine, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government. In other words, it is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title form the State. One claiming private rights must prove that he has
complied with the Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as
the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. 34
Furthermore, the party asserting ownership over land must similarly prove
that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.35 In Menguito v. Republic,36 it was held that unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title.
a. Disposition of agricultural lands
Under the Public Land Act, land classified as agricultural under Section 9(a)
may be disposed of through the following manner, and not otherwise: 37
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and,
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Except for lease concessions which do not transfer ownership over land, the
result of the foregoing dispositions is the issuance by the government of what
is known as a land patent which is generally understood as a grant of land
from the government. Applications for these patents, whether by homestead,
sale or free patent as outlined in Section 9, are purely administrative in
nature and are not proceedings in rem. Thus, a title issued to a grantee,
while sufficient to transfer ownership, is not conclusive proof thereof and
confers no better right than that conferred by the patent. Instead, under
Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No.
1529), such patents are merely evidence of a contract between the
Government and the grantee, and are subject to prior vested rights. 38 In
34
35
36
37
38

AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 19.

AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 20.
348 SCRA 128 (2000).
Section 11, Public Land Act.
QUOTE SECTION 103 of PD 1529.

79

order to be conclusive or binding as against third parties, therefore, the

grantee is required by law to register such patents under the Torrens
System.39 It is only upon such registration that actual conveyance of the land
is effected.40
Furthermore, under the Public Land Act, all patents issued pursuant thereto
are subject to the following limitations:
(a) Patents or certificates issued shall not include nor convey the title to
any gold, silver, copper, iron, or other metals or minerals, or other
substances containing minerals, guano, gums, precious stones, coal, or
coal oil contained in lands granted thereunder. These shall remain to
be property of the State.41
(b) All persons receiving title to lands shall hold such lands subject to the
same public servitudes as exist upon lands owned by private persons,
including those with reference to the littoral of the sea and the banks
of navigable rivers or rivers upon which rafting may be done. 42
(c) The said lands shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding
sixty (60) meters in width for public highways, railroads, irrigation
ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines and similar works as
the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprise,
including mining or forest concessionaires, may reasonably require for
carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only. 43
(d) The said lands shall also be subject to such rules and regulations as
the Government may issued for the beneficial use of water found on
these lands,44 including the right to use water flowing through such
land for the purposes of power generation. 45
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for
mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes have vested and
accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local
customs, or by the laws and decisions of the courts, the possessors
and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected,
and all patents granted shall be subject to any vested and accrued
rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water
rights as may have been acquired. 46
(e) All lands, including homesteads upon which final proof has not been
made or approved, shall, even though and while the title remains in
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

80

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

103,
107,
110,
111,
112,
113,
114,
113,

PD 1529.
Public Land
Public Land
Public Land
Public Land
Public Land
Public Land
Public Land

Act.
Act.
Act.
Act.
Act.
Act.
Act.

the State, be subject to the ordinary taxes, which shall be paid by the
grantee or the applicant, beginning with the year next following the
one in which the homestead application has been filed, or the
concession has been approved, or the contract has been signed, as the
case may be, on the basis of the value fixed in such filing, approval or
signing of the application, concession or contract. 47
1. Homestead Settlement
By homestead is meant the home, the house and the adjoining land where
the head of the family dwells; the home farm; the fixed residence of the head
of a family, with the land and buildings surrounding the main house. 48
Technically, and under modern homestead laws, it is an artificial estate in
land, devised to protect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against
the claims of his creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and
forced sale, so long as the land is occupied as a home. 49
Qualification and application
In order to qualify for a homestead settlement, which must not exceed twelve
(12) hectares of agricultural land of the public domain following Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, 50 the applicant must satisfy the following
specific requirements:
(a) He must be a citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen (18)
years, or is the head of a family; 51
(b) He does not own, or has not received by gratuitous allotment from the
government, more than twelve (12) hectares of land in the
Philippines.52
Under the Public Land Act, the applicant is only entitled to one homestead
entry, and no person to whom a homestead patent has been issued
regardless of the area of the original homestead may again acquire a
homestead. However, pursuant to Commonealth Act No. 456, any
person who had been previously granted a homestead of less than
twelve (12) hectares may enter into a subsequent homestead provided
that the total area of the homesteads do not exceed twelve (12)
hectares.53

47
48
49
50

51
52
53

Section 115, Public Land Act.

Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 825, 43 Am. Rep. 388.
Buckingham v. Buckingham, 8 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Section 12 of the Public Land Act.
Section 12 of the Public Land Act.
Section 19 of the Public Land Act.

81

(c) He must cultivate and improve at least one-fifth (1/5) of the land
continuously within one year and not more than five (5) years from the
approval of the homestead application; 54
(d) He must reside in the land for at least one year in the municipality in
which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same; 55
(e) He must commence work on the homestead at least six (6) months
from the approval of the homestead application 56 and,
(f) He must make the application in his own name and that of his family,
and not in representation of another person.
It has been ruled in the case of Addu vv. De Yro,57 that a homestead
applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his
own and his familys benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else.
If he occupies it and cultivates it on behalf of another person and
obtains title thereto on the understanding that a portion thereof would
be transferred to the latter, such agreement is invalid. It is a ground
for cancellation of the entry and bars the issuance of a patent.
Upon filing and approval of the homestead application with the Director of
Lands, the applicant shall be authorized to take possession of the land upon
payment of the corresponding application fee. At the option of the applicant,
payment of the fees required for the application may be made to the
municipal treasurer who shall, in turn, forward them to the provincial
treasurer. In case of delinquency of the applicant, the Director of Lands may,
sixty (60) days after such delinquency has occurred, either cancel the
application or grant an extension of time not to exceed one hundred and
twenty (120) days for the payment of the sum due. 58 Pertinently, it was held
in Diaz and Reyes vs. Macalinao, et al. 59 that a homestead entry having been
permitted by the Director of Lands, the homestead is segregated from the
public domain and the Director Lands is divested of the control and
possession thereof except if the application is finally disapproved and the
entry annulled or revoked.
Furthermore, approval of the homestead applicantion grants the applicant a
right to occupy the land subject of the homestead. This means that the
applicant shall have the right to exercise all rights of legal possession granted
to him under the law, including the right to bring an action of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, or any other suitable remedy provided by law. 60
Entitlement to a homestead patent
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

82

Section 14 of the Public Land Act.

Section 12 of the Public Land Act.
Section 13 of the Public Land Act.
No. 29449-R, 31 March 1965.
Section 15 of the Public Land Act.
102 Phil. 999 [1958].
Pitargue v. Sorilla, G.R. No. L-4302, 17 September 1952.

Should the applicant comply with the qualifications and obligations

prescribed by the Public Land Act, he shall acquire a vested right to the land,
and will be entitled to receive a final deed of conveyance called a homestead
patent. The execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to a
particular parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial acts
of the officer charged with that duty.
Before final proof is submitted by an applicant of his compliance with the
requirements, however, the Public Land Act requires that due notice must
first be given to the public of the applicants intention to make such proof,
stating therein the name and address of the homesteader, the description of
the land, the names of the witnesses by whom it is expected that the
necessary facts will be established, and the time and place at which such
proof shall be made.61
Proof of possession and cultivation in accordance with the requirements of
the Public Land Act is a sine qua non for the grant of a homestead patent, or
a vested right in the land. In this regard, it has been held that a mere
investigation report submitted by an official of the Bureau of Lands who drew
the sketch of the land showing the improvements existing thereon is
insufficient to establish the right of an applicant to the land. 62
QUINSAY v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
195 SCRA 268 (1991)
REGALADO, J p:
In a verified complaint dated January 27, 1975, herein private
respondents filed Civil Case No. Br. V-216 in the former Court of
First Instance of Isabela for annulment of patent, reconveyance
and damages against herein petitioners Benito Quinsay, Meliton
Caberto and Pastor Olalan, and impleading therein the Director
of Lands as a co-defendant of the said petitioners.
We quote the antecedents which spawned the present
controversy, as found by the trial court and thoroughly narrated
in its decision of December 13, 1980:
"The facts of the case are undisputed. Lot No. 1105, Cad. 211,
situated at Divisoria, Santiago, Isabela was the subject of
Homestead Application No. V-11083 (E-V-10060) of Beatriz Bayle
filed with the Bureau of Lands. Later, she transferred her rights
thereto to Sylverio Valdez who, on January 2, 1950, in turn
transferred his rights to Fermin Guy Yoche (Exhibits 'F' and 'F-1').
These transfers were approved by the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in his Order of January 31,
61
62

Section 17, Public Land Act.

Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 268 (1991), citing People
v. Sibayan, 116 SCRA 180 (1982)

83

1951 (Exhibits 'G' and 'G-1'). Obviously, Guy Yoche's homestead

application was opposed by defendant Benito Quinsay who was
occupying the lot. It was not established how or why it came
about but in the course thereof Fermin Guy Yoche and Benito
Quinsay entered into an amicable settlement (Exhibits 'A' and
'A-1') concerning the land, agreeing that the northeast corner of
the lot, with an area of 1,500 square meters, designated as
portion B, shall pertain to Benito Quinsay while the rest of the
lot, with an area of 48,765 square meters, designated as portion
A, shall pertain to Fermin Guy Yoche. By virtue of such
agreement, Benito Quinsay filed on January 20, 1950 a
Miscellaneous Sales Application (Exhibits 'L' and 'L-1') over
portion B of the lot while Fermin Guy Yoche filed on January 2,
1950 a Homestead Application (Exhibits 'H' and 'H-1') over
portion A. The Director of Lands approved the amicable
settlement on January 8, 1951 (Exhibits 'B' and 'B-1') and
accepted both the Miscellaneous Sales (new) Application of
Quinsay and the Homestead Application of Fermin Guy Yoche by
decreeing that they shall be 'given further action in accordance
with standing rules and regulations on the matter.' On May 22,
1951, plaintiff Urbana Tapiador Vda. de Guy Yoche, in her own
behalf and in behalf of the other heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche, filed
with the Bureau of Lands their Final Proof (Exhibits 'I' and 'I-1')
on the homestead application of her deceased husband. In
connection therewith, Asst. Public Land Inspector Hilarion
Briones submitted, through the Acting District Land Officer of
Isabela, to the Director of Lands his final investigation report
recommending the survey and the issuance of a homestead
patent to and in favor of the Heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche. This is
the last action of the Bureau of Lands taken in so far as the
homestead application of Guy Yoche is concerned. xxx
"In the meantime, Benito Quinsay and his children, intervenor
Julio Quinsay and Florida Quinsay, continued to occupy and
possess the whole Lot 1105. Fermin Guy Yoche or any of his
heirs never attempted to take possession thereof. Quinsay and
his children cultivated and converted into riceland portions
thereof in which they planted palay. They also planted
vegetables and fruit trees thereon. Then, on March 6, 1972,
Benito Quinsay sold to Pastor Olalan 1,250 square meters
portion of the land. Likewise, on January 31, 1974, he again sold
another portion, with an area of 3,013 square meters, to Meliton
Caberto. There is no showing that Pastor Olalan and Meliton
Caberto knew of the homestead application of Fermin Guy Yoche
over the land, much more the existence of any amicable
settlement over it. What was established is that during all the
time that Olalan and Caberto stayed in Divisoria (and they are
still there), they only saw Benito Quinsay to be the owner and in
possession of the land. After the sales, Olalan and Caberto took
actual possession of the portions bought by them, declared their

84

respective portions in their names for taxation purposes and

paid real estate taxes thereof. Afterwards, they filed their
separate free patent applications (Exhibit 'K' and 'J') over their
individual portions with the Bureau of Lands on March 23, 1974
and March 1, 1974, respectively. For purposes of their
applications, they submitted the plans (Exhibits 'M' and 'N') of
the portions they bought. The District Land Officer of Isabela
acted favorably on their applications and in due time issued the
corresponding patents thereto. On the strength of these patents,
Original Certificate of Title No. P-26759 (Exhibits '9'-Caberto to
'9-B'-Caberto) was issued by the Register of Deeds of Isabela to
Meliton Caberto on May 24, 1974 while Original Certificate of
Title No. P-27214 (Exhibits '11'-Olalan and '11-A'-Olalan) was
issued to Pastor Olalan on August 16, 1974. It is these two titles
which are sought to be annulled by the plaintiffs as Heirs of
Fermin Guy Yoche, maintaining that the portions covered
thereby was sold by Benito Quinsay to the titled holders in
violation of the amicable settlement entered into between him
and their predecessor-in-interest. xxx
The court a quo, after due ratiocination, and holding that
". . . In Republic vs. Diamonon, et al., 97 Phil. 843, it
was held that 'the right of a homesteader to the
land granted to him ripens into a vested right after
the filing of the final proof and approval thereof by
the Director of Lands (emphasis ours). This doctrine
was reiterated in the cases of Lucas vs. Durian, 102
Phil. 1157 and Ingaran vs. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 503,
which stated in no uncertain terms that 'an
applicant may be said to have acquired a vested
right over the homestead only when his application
has been perfected by the presentation of the final
proof and its approval by the Director of Lands'. In
the case at bar, while it is true that the plaintiffs
already submitted final proof, the same has not yet
been approved by the Director of Lands. As a
matter of fact, the Bureau of Lands is still
investigating the contending claims of several
persons over the land. With more reason then, that
the plaintiffs cannot say that they have any vested
right over the land. Moreover, the right of the
homesteader to a patent does not become absolute
until after he has complied with all the
requirements of the law (Vda. de Delizo, et. al. vs.
Delizo, et al., L-32820-21, January 30, 1976, 69
SCRA 216; Quiaoit vs. Consolacion, et. al., L-41824,
Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 208). . . ."

85

rendered judgment (1) dismissing the complaint of private

respondents, as plaintiffs therein; (2) upholding the validity of
Free Patent No. 8223 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-27214
issued in favor of petitioner Pastor Olalan; (3) upholding the
validity of Free Patent No. 1110 and Original Certificate of Title
No. P-26759 issued in the name of petitioner Meliton Caberto;
(4) ordering private respondents not to disturb and molest
petitioner Olalan and Caberto in the possession and occupation
of the portions owned by the latter; (5) dismissing the
counterclaims of petitioner; and (6) dismissing the intervention
filed by intervenor Julio Quinsay.
Private respondents elevated their case to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court seeking reversal of said decision on the
contention that the trial court erred in not holding that they and
their predecessors had acquired vested rights to the homestead
in question. Their plaint found favor in the eyes of respondent
court which rendered the following judgment, and what it
considered the rationale therefor, in AC G.R. CV No. 68253:
"There appears to be two (2) schools of thought on
the matter. The first adopted by the trial court and
defendant-appellees, including the Director of
Lands, is to the effect that for vested rights to exist
the final proof must be not only filed but must be
approved by the Director of Lands, citing the cases
of Republic vs. Diamonon, 97 Phil. 843, Lucas vs.
Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, and Ingaran vs. Ramelo,
107 Phil. 503. The second, subscribed to by
plaintiffs-appellants, merely requires a finding by
the Bureau of Lands through its proper officials that
the homesteader has complied with all the terms
and conditions which entitle him to a patent,
invoking the landmark doctrine laid down in the
case of Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, reading as
follows:
'When a homesteader has complied
with all the terms and conditions
which entitle him to a patent for a
particular tract of land, he acquires a
vested interest therein, and is
regarded as the equitable owner
thereof. Where the right to patent has
once become vested in a purchaser of
public land, it is equivalent to patent
actually issued. The execution and
delivery of the patent, after the right
to a particular parcel of land has
become complete, are the mere

86

ministerial acts of the officer charged

with that duty. Even without a patent,
a perfected homestead is a property
right in the fullest sense, unaffected
by the fact that the permanent title to
the land is still in the Government.
Such land may be conveyed or
inherited. No subsequent law can
deprive him of that vested right.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"While we do not decide that there is a divergence

of opinions between the cases cited by appellees
and the case of Balboa vs. Farrales, supra., We vote
to follow the Balboa doctrine. Plaintiffs-appellants
have already submitted their final proof of
possession, residence and cultivation. They have
paid the legal fees and charges. Hilarion Briones of
the Bureau of Lands in Ilagan, Isabela has
recommended survey of the land and the issuance
of patent to the heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche, it
appearing that all the requirements of law on the
matter have been complied with.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"WHEREFORE, we hereby reverse and set aside the

decision appealed from and render another one
annulling as null and void the Free Patents and
Original Certificates of Title issued in the names of
defendants-appellees Pastor Olalan and Meliton
Caberto, ordering defendant-appellee Director of
Lands to approve the final proof submitted by
plaintiffs-appellants and issue a patent covering Lot
'B', Lot 1105, Cad. Lot No. 211 situated in Divisoria,
Santiago, Isabela, with an area of 48,765 square
meters, more or less, in the name of the Heirs of
Fermin Guy Yoche, and ordering private defendantsappellees, jointly and severally to pay plaintiffsappellants the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees
(Mabutol vs. Mabutol, G.R. No. 60898, September
29, 1983; San Miguel Brewery vs. Magno, 21 SCRA
292; Cabungal vs. Cordova, 11 SCRA 584)."
Hence the present appeal by certiorari, petitioners posing for
resolution the issues as to whether or not:
1. Private respondents have acquired a vested right over the
lots in question;

87

xxx

xxx

xxx

On the first issue, respondent court rejected the theory,

submitted by petitioners and the Director of Lands and adopted
by the trial court, to the effect that the approval of the final
proof of the homestead application of private respondents by
the Director of Lands is necessary for vested rights to exist in
favor of said respondents over the land in question. Respondent
court relied upon some pronouncements in Balboa vs. Farrales
where it was allegedly held that where the Bureau of Lands finds
through its proper officials that the homesteader has complied
with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent,
this suffices for vested rights over the lot to exist in favor of the
homestead applicant.
A perusal of Balboa, however, convinces us that the reliance
thereon of respondent court is misplaced as, in that case, there
was approval by the Director of Lands of the final proof of the
applicant. Furthermore, what was involved there was a
homestead application filed and approved under the aegis of Act
No. 926, before its repeal by Act No. 2874.
As explained therein, in 1913, Balboa filed a homestead
application under the provisions of Act No. 926, and "in 1918,
Balboa submitted final proof, showing his residence upon, and
cultivation of said land, as well as his compliance with all of the
other requirements of Section 3 of said Act No. 926, which final
proof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 15,
1918 (Exhibit 3). On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed
by Act No. 2874." Thus the Court took pains to specifically point
out in said case that
"Section 3 of Act No. 926 provides, inter alia, that
upon the final proof by the applicant and the
approval thereof by the Director of Lands, 'he (the
applicant) shall be entitled to patent' or certificate
of title. Therefore, on February 15, 1918, after
Buenaventura Balboa had submitted his final proof
and after the same had been approved by the
Government, and while Act No. 926 was still in
force, he became the owner of the land and entitled
to a patent. At least on that date his right to the
land, as owner, had ripened into a vested right . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The fact that the homestead patent or certificate

of title was issued on September 10, 1920, after the
repeal of Act No. 926, and under the provisions of

88

Section 116 of the repealing Act No. 2874 cannot

prejudice
the
vested
right
acquired
by
Buenaventura under the provisions of the former
Act. (Emphasis supplied.).
This had to be so clarified since in said case Balboa sold the land
on August 11, 1924, which was within the 5-year prohibition
therefor in Section 116 of Act No. 2874, and said sale was
sought to be nullified. Hence, the need for the Court to expound
on the fact that, under the law and the circumstances obtaining
in said case, Balboa had acquired vested rights to the land even
before the approval of his final proof. That was the rule adopted
under the law then in force, and the reason for the judicial
discourse on vested rights in the decision in said case
supposedly because the provisions of Act No. 926 did not negate
the same. Obviously, however, said pronouncements, albeit in
effect obiter dicta, were further truncated and applied out of the
context by respondent court. We need not repeat the contrary
and present rule under the subsequent law and jurisprudence on
the matter, as catalogued by the trial court and set out earlier in
this opinion.
Now, in the case at bar, the homestead application and the final
proof submitted by the heirs of Fermin Guy Yoche on May 22,
1951 remain unapproved up to the present. From what has
been said, therefore, vested rights over the land cannot be
validly claimed by private respondents since the approval by the
Director of Lands of their final proof for a homestead patent is
now a condition sine qua non for the existence of such vested
right. Thus, in the aforecited case of Republic vs. Diamonon, et
al., this Court, noting that in espousing the contrary view
Diamonon invoked the provisions of Act No. 926 and sought
refuge in Balboa, rejected that submission since "(t)he fallacy of
appellant's argument lies in the failure to consider the facts of
his citation, wherein final proof was approved by the
Government while Act No. 926 was effective. In the case now
before us, it was only on November 9, 1933, that the Director of
Lands approved the appellant's final proof or about fourteen
years after the enactment of Act No. 2874 on November 29,
1919."
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Intermediate

Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

89

After approval by the Director of Lands of the applicants final proof for a
homestead patent, the applicant perfects his right to a homstead, and
obtains a vested right over the land. Thus, even without a homestead patent,
a perfected homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by
the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in the government. Such
land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can deprive him of
that vested right.63
Cancellation of homesteaders right of entry
If at any time before the expiration of the period allowed by law for making of
final proof of compliance with the requirementsof the Public Land Act, and it
has been proven, to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, and after notice
and hearing, that the land entered is not entitled to a homestead entry, or
that the homesteader has actually changed his residence, or voluntarily
abandoned the land for more than six (6) months at any one time during the
years or residence and occupation required, or has failed to comply with the
requirements of the Public Land Act, the Director of Lands may cancel the
entry.64
Assignment of homesteaders application
The Public Land Act allows an applicant, after approval of the applicantion, to
assign his rights to the homestead if he should be underable to continue
through no fault of his own.65 In this case, the Director of Lands, after
confirming that such transfer is not for speculation, shall allow a bona fide
purchaser to acquire the rights and improvements of the applicant, provided
that such transferee is himself qualified to enter into a homestead. The
purchaser shall thereafter file a homestead application in place of the one
originally filed, and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and
obligations beginning with the date of the approval of the application of the
subsequent purchaser.
Any person who has so transferred his rights may not again apply for a new
homestead. Furthermore, every transfer made without the previous approval
of the Director of Lands shall be null and void and shall result in the
cancellation of the entry and refusal of the patent.
Conditions and limitations on the rights of the grantee of a homestead patent
In addition to the general conditions applicable to grantees of patents
provided in Chapter XIII of the Public Land Act and enumerated above,
holders of homestead patents are similarly subject to the following special
conditions and limitations:
63

64
65

90

Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 [1928]; Mesina vs. Sonza, 108 Phil. 251
[1960]; Ireneo Roque vs. Director of Lands, 72 SCRA 1 [1976].
Section 16 of the Public Land Act.
Section 20 of the Public Land Act, as amended by C.A. No. 456 and R.A. No.
1242.

(a) Land covered by a homestead patent cannot be alienated or

encumbered from the date of the approval of the application and for a
term of five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent,
except if such alienation or encumbrance is made in favor of the
government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or to legally
constituted banking corporations.66
(b) Land covered by a homestead patent cannot be held liable in
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the said period. However,
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified perons,67 who, in accordance with Section 122, 68 must be
Filipino citizens or corporations.
(c) Land covered by a homestead patent shall not be alienated,
transferred or conveyed after five (5) years and before twenty-five (25)
years after issuance of the patent unless approved by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, which approval cannot be denied
except on Constitutional grounds. 69
(e) Land covered by a homestead patent, or any permanent improvement
thereon, cannot be alienated or transferred to a corporation,
association or partnership without the consent of the grantee and
approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and
solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or charitable
purposes or for a right of way.70
(d) Every conveyance of land acquired under a homestead patent shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within
a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance. 71

66

Section 118 of the Public Land Act.

Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
68
Section 122 of the Public Land Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who
may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
67

Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally

acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this
Act, or any permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or
assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement
thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of
his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer,
assignment, or lease made in violation hereof, shall be null and void.
69
Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
70
Section 121 of the Public Land Act.
71
Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

91

In Evangelista v. Montano, et al.,72 the requirement of obtaining approval from

the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources for sales of land covered
by homestead patent after five years from the issuance of the title was held
to be merely directory, and may be complied with at any time in the future.
Thus, in one case where a homestead was sold after the expiration of five (5)
years and transfer took place before the expiration of twenty-five (25) years,
from the issuance of the patent, the failure to secure the requisite approval
from the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources did not render the
sale null and void.73
On the other hand, unless made in favor of the government, or any of its
branches, units or institutions, or to legally constituted banking corporations,
the sale of land within the 5-years from the issuance of the homestead patent
renders such sale null and void. The reason for this prohibition is to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public
land which the State has gratuitously given to them. Thus, in Egao v. Court
of Appeals,74 the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of a homestead patent
within the 5-year prohibited period if null and void. In this case, the Supreme
Court allowed the heirs to recover the said parcel of land, notwithstanding the
possible application of the pari delicto doctrine. The Court reasoned that the
application of the pari delicto doctrine does not apply in cases where the sale
is void ab initio under the Public Land Act, as when its enforcement or
application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantees right
to the land under the homestead patent.
EGAO, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
174 SCRA 484 [1989.]
PADILLA, J p:
This is a land dispute which culminated in the filing by private
respondents Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao of a verified
complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and
Ownership before the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, * against
petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao.
Private respondents' complaint alleged that they are the
legitimate owners and possessors of two (2) parcels of land
situated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, per deed of
absolute sale dated 21 December 1979 which, among others,
recited thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Allegedly, upon purchase of Lot No. 662 from Roberto Marfori,

improvements were introduced and taxes paid by private
72
73
74

92

G.R. No. L-5567, 29 May 1953.

Flores, et al. v. Plasina, et al., L-5727, Feb. 12, 1954.
174 SCRA 484 [1989].

respondents. Sometime in June 1983, herein

allegedly occupied illegally portions of the land.

petitioners

Petitioners' answer to the complaint asserted that Apolonio Egao

is the registered owner of the parcel of land known as Lot No.
662, Pls 854 with an area of 3,451 sq. meters evidenced by OCT
No. P-3559 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon
pursuant to Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965; that
he (Apolonio Egao) and his family have been in actual, physical,
adverse, open and continuous possession thereof even before
the issuance to him of the free patent; that the land has never
been sold by reason of the prohibition against alienation under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law); and that the
instant case was the fourth in a series filed against the Egaos
and is part of respondents' scheme to grab said parcel of land
from the petitioners.
Judge Felicidario M. Batoy ruled in favor of the Egaos, herein
petitioners (defendants in the court a quo), ordering respondent
Severo Bontilao (plaintiff in the court a quo) to immediately
deliver to the Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3559. Said trial judge held:
"In the instant case, granting arguendo, that
defendants executed the 2 documents in favor of
Marfori (Exhs. A & B) after the filing of the
application for free patent but before the issuance
of the latter, without the approval of the Director of
Lands, upon issuance of Free Patent No. 298112.
On August 12, 1965, the said deeds of sale (Exhs. A
& B) were ipso facto cancelled or superseded by
said free patent. Moreover, it appears from the
evidence that defendants never vacated or
abandoned their possession of Lot No. 662 as they
have continuously lived on said lot since 1950, a
fact admitted by the plaintiffs themselves. And as
long as Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559
remains in the name of defendant Apolonio Egao,
married to Beatriz Menoza Egao, this is the ultimate
and best evidence of title granted by the
government which must be honored and respected
by the courts. In a nutshell, the plaintiffs miserably
failed to present or show any title to Lot No. 662,
PLS-854 which should be quieted or freed from any
cloud of doubt as prayed for in their complaint and
they further failed to show that they are entitled to
the ownership and possession to Lot No. 662, PLS854."

93

Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

09539. Setting aside the RTC decision, the appellate court **
held, in part, thus
"That the land is titled in the name of defendant
Apolonio Egao is not in question. The main point in
issue is whether defendants could validly sell the
land to Marfori who in turn transferred ownership
thereof to the plaintiffs."
Marfori and Egao were both held by the Court of Appeals in pari
delicto for violating the five (5) year restriction under Sec. 118,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Act No. 496 against
encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under a free patent
or homestead; hence, they cannot, according to the appellate
court, seek affirmative relief, but respondents on the other hand
were declared innocent purchasers for value who obtained the
owner's duplicate copy of the OCT (still in the name of the
Egaos) from Marfori who transferred to them (respondents)
physical possession of the property. Finally, the Court of Appeals
held:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Validity of the Deeds of Sale executed between Marfori (as

purchaser) and the petitioners (as sellers) is the main issue to be
resolved, in determining respondents' right over the disputed
land, the respondents being the transferees of Marfori.
It is undisputed that Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to
petitioner Apolonio Egao over Lot No. 662 on 12 August, 1965.
Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits
the alienation or encumbrance, within a period of five (5) years
from the date of issuance of the patent, of lands acquired under
free patent or homestead. Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity
of the Deeds of Sale executed by the Egaos in favor of Marfori
over portions of Lot No. 662 (the land in question), dated 7 May
1964, 14 January and 6 October 1965, it clearly appears that all
deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five (5)
years. As correctly found by the appellate court
"Section 124 of the Public Land Act provided [sic] that any
acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of
Sections 118, 121, 120 122 and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful,
null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit
originally issued, recognized or actually or prescriptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the
state."

94

Petitioners deny the authenticity and due execution of the

notarized deeds of sale in favor of Marfori, asserting continued
ownership over the land by virtue of a Torrens Certificate of Title
issued in their name. While the Court is not satisfied with
respondents' explanation of their failure to present the notaries
public (who were residents of a neighboring province) to affirm
their participation in the preparation of the Deeds, the Court also
finds as insufficient the mere denials by petitioners as to due
execution and authenticity of said Deeds of Sale. A notarial
document is evidence of the facts in clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. The
question of authenticity being one of fact, the Court will not
disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the matter.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 over the land in dispute
was issued on 1 March 1966, a few months after the execution
by the Egaos of the last Deed of Sale in favor of Marfori. The
OCT is registered in the name of the Egaos, herein petitioners.
A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by
adverse open and notorious possession. A registered title under
the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title,
once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, respondents are not
innocent purchasers for value. An "innocent purchaser for value"
is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. Where a
purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes
his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his
vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect
in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making
any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser
in good faith for value.
Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have the effect of cancelling
a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby
will again form part of the public domain, as only the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are
equally at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the
law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent

95

contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act,
when its enforcement or application runs counter to the public
policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land under the
homestead law.
Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529),
formerly Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)
expressly provides that the registration of the Deed is the
operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third
persons are concerned. The law requires a higher degree of
prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, when the land object of the transaction is
registered land. While one who buys from the registered owner
need not look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from
another who is not the registered owner is expected to examine
not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title
of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to
exercise caution of any kind whatsoever is tantamount to bad
faith.
Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited
five (5) year period are null and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act).
No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly
transferred to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo
dat quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that which does not
belong to him).
While the government has not taken steps to assert its title, by
reversion, to a homestead sold in violation of the Public Land
Act, the vendor or his heirs is better entitled to the possession of
the land, the vendee being in no better situation than any
intruder.
Accordingly, respondents who are not innocent purchasers for
value have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land
and to file an action for quieting of title.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 09539 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Meanwhile,
petitioners as registered owners are entitled to remain in
physical possession of the disputed property. Respondents are
ordered to deliver the owner's duplicate copy of the OCT (No. P3559) to petitioners, without prejudice to an action for reversion
of the land, which may be instituted by the Solicitor General for
the State.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.

96

Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.
This rule applies even if approval from the Secretary of Enviroment and
Natural Resources is subsequently obtained. Such approval did not have the
effect of curing the violation of a mandatory provision of the law. 75
DE LOS SANTOS VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MIDSAYAP, ET
AL.
94 Phil. 405 [1954]
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
On December 9, 1938, a homestead patent covering a tract of
land situated in the municipality of Midsayap, Province of
Cotabato, was granted to Julio Sarabillo and on March 17, 1939,
Original Certificate of Title No. RP-269 (1674) was issued in his
favor.
On December 31, 1940, Julio Sarabillo sold two hectares of said
land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap for the sum of
P800 to be dedicated to educational and charitable purposes. It
was expressly agreed upon that the sale was subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In December, 1947, a request for said approval was submitted in
behalf of the Roman Catholic Church by Rev. Fr. Gerard Mongeau
stating therein that the land would be used solely for
educational and charitable purposes. The sale was approved on
March 26, 1949, and on March 29, 1950, the dead of sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Cotabato. No new title was issued in favor of the Roman
Catholic Church although the deed was annotated on the back of
the title issued to the homesteader.
In the meantime, Julio Sarabillo died and intestate proceedings
were instituted for the settlement of his estate and Catalina de
los Santos was appointed administratrix of the estate. And
having found in the course of her administration that the sale of
the land to the Roman Catholic Church was made in violation of
section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the administratrix
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato praying that the sale be declared null and void and of
no legal effect.

75

De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al., 90 Phil. 405
[1954]

97

In their answer defendants claim that the sale is legal and valid
it having been executed for educational and charitable purposes
and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. They further claim that, even if it be declared null
and void, its immediate effect would be not the return of the
land to appellee but the reversion of the property to the State as
ordained by law. Defendants also set up as a defense the
doctrine of pari delicto.
xxx

xxx

xxx

After the parties had submitted the case on the pleadings, in

addition to the report of the clerk of court as to the value of the
improvements existing on the land, the court rendered decision
declaring the sale null and void and ordering the plaintiff to
reimburse to the defendants the sum of P800 which was paid as
purchase price, plus the additional sum of P601 as value of the
improvements, both sums to bear interest at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the complaint, and ordering defendants
to vacate the land in question. Dissatisfied with this decision, the
case was taken to the Court of Appeals but it was later certified
to this Court on the ground that the appeal merely involves
questions of law.
It appears that the patent covering the tract of land which
includes the portion now disputed in this appeal was issued to
the late Julio Sarabillo on December 9, 1938, and the sale of the
portion of two hectares to the Roman Catholic Church took place
on December 31, 1940. This shows that the sale was made
before the expiration of the period of five years from the date of
the issuance of the patent and as such is null and void it being in
contravention of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The
fact that it was expressly stipulated in the deed of sale that it
was subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the approval was sought and obtained on
March 26, 1949, or more than ten years after the date of the
issuance of the patent, or the fact that the deed of sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds only on March
29, 1950, and was annotated on the back of the title on that
date, cannot have the effect of validating the sale for the reason
that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources does not have any valid curative effect. That approval
is merely a formality which the law requires if the sale is
effected after the term of five years but before the expiration of
a period of 25 years for the purpose of testing the validity of the
sale on constitutional grounds. But, as was ruled by this Court,
the absence of such formality will not render the transaction null
and void (Evangelista vs. Montao, G. R. No. L-5567). What is
important is the period within which the sale is executed. The
provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of

98

the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is
mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval is
granted beyond the expiration of that period, because the
purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is
"to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to
him." [Pascua vs. Talens, 2 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9, (Supplement)
413.]
The claim that the sale can be validated because it was made
with the avowed aim that the property would be dedicated
solely to educational and charitable purposes is likewise
unmeritorious even considering the law invoked by counsel for
appellants in favor of its validity. It is true that under section
121, Commonwealth Act No. 141, a corporation, association, or
partnership may acquire any land granted as homestead if the
sale is done with the consent of the grantee and the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and is solely
for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable
purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no
limitation therein as to the time within which such acquisition
may be made. But this provision should be interpreted as a mere
authority granted to a corporation, association or partnership to
acquire a portion of the public land and not as an unbridled
license to acquire without restriction for such would be giving an
advantage to an entity over an individual which finds no legal
justification. It is our opinion that the authority granted by
section 121 should be interpreted as subject to the condition
prescribed in section 118, namely, that the acquisition should be
after the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the
patent.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
Furthermore, the 5-year prohibition on the sale of land subject of a
homestead patent has been extended to improvements on the land as well.
Thus, in Basaltos v. Esteban, Jr., et al.,76 the Supreme Court said that
improvements on lots applied for as homestead cannot be transferred, on
pain of nullity, without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources (formerly, Minister of Natural Resources), and the duty to
secure such approval devolves upon the vendor because it is he who should
give the vendee a clear title to the property he is conveying.
76

No. L-09121, 11 April 1956.

99

In the same manner, as the Public Land Act grants homestead patent holders
a right of repurchase by him, his widow or legal heirs, within a period of five
(5) years from the date of the conveyance. This right cannot be waived, and
any waiver so made shall be considered void as against public policy. 77
Furthermore, this 5-year right of redemption is counted separately from
redemption rights provided for in other laws, such as Act No. 3135 78 which
grants a mortgagor, his successors, or any judicial creditor a period of one (1)
year from an extrajudicial foreclosure sale to redeem a subject property. 79
The five-year period fixed in Section 119 begins to run from the expiration of
the one-year redemption period. Thus, in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,80 the Supreme Court said:
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial
foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead
statutes may be summarized as follows: . . . If the land is
mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may
redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of
the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do
so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five (5)
years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant
to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
In various cases,81 the Supreme Court held that this right of repurchase is
available at any time land subject of a free patent is conveyed to third
parties. In Santana, et al., vs. Marinas, 82 however, the Supreme Court denied
the right of repurchase under Section 119 because its exercise, under the
circumstances set forth in the case, was contrary to the philosophy behind
Section 119.
SANTANA, ET AL. VS. MARINAS
94 SCRA 853 [1979]

77
78

79

80
81

82

100

Isaac vs. San Juan Leon,

Entitiled, An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers
Inserted in or annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages
Pertinently, Section 6 provides:
SECTION 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special
power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any
judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien
on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year
from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the
provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six,
inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act.
217 SCRA 554 [1993].
Isaac, et al. v. Tan Chuan Leong, et al., 89 Phil. 24 [1951]; Francisco v. Certeza,
Sr., 3 SCRA 565 [1961]
94 SCRA 853 [1979]

SANTOS, J p:
This is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the decision dated September 5, 1972
of the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals composed
of Justice E. Soriano, M. Barcelona and L.B. Reyes in CA-G.R.
37292-R, entitled "Sotero Marias vs. Francisco Santana and
Jose H. Panganiban", Soriano, J., ponent, which (1) reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint of Sotero Marias plaintiff below and private
respondent herein - for recovery of the property in litigation
under Section 119 of Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as
Public Land Law and (2) ordered Francisco Santana and Jose H.
Panganiban defendants below and now herein petitioners
to reconvey the aforesaid property to respondent Marias upon
payment by him of the repurchase price in the amount of
P4,128.60, without special pronouncement as to costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The procedural, as well as the factual, antecedents that

spawned the present case are not in dispute. On April 21, 1960,
private respondent Sotero Marias as plaintiff filed in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint to recover a real
property alleging, insofar as material to this petition, (1) that he
acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 217, Rizal Registry, a parcel
of land containing an area of four hectares, twelve ares and
eighty-six centares (41,286 sq. m.); that on January 16, 1956, he
sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco Santana
one of the defendants below for a sum of P4,128.60; that the
other petitioner Jose H. Panganiban also a co-defendant below
- was included in the complaint because he is a subsequent
lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold
to him by Santana on March 25, 1956 for the same amount of
P4,128.60; that the land has an annual produce worth P400.00;
and praying (2) that judgment be rendered: (a) allowing him to
repurchase the property for the sum of P4,128,60 and (b)
awarding to him P400.00 annually from date of filing of the
complaint until the property is delivered to him, with costs.
On May 26, 1960, herein petitioners, defendants below, filed
their respective answers admitting some material factual
allegations in the complaint; but denied the right of private
respondent to repurchase the property, and interposed the
following affirmative defenses: (1) that at the time the absolute
sales were entered into, they were totally ignorant of and had no
knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to
repurchase by private respondent, who assured petitioner
Francisco Santana that he (Santana) could sell the land in

101

question absolutely and free from any encumbrance and is not

subject to any right of repurchase as he (respondent Marias)
had been in possession of the property for over twenty-five (25)
years; (2) that they (petitioners) have always been of the honest
belief that they acquired absolute ownership of the property,
free from any lien or encumbrances whatsoever and, hence, are
purchasers in good faith; (3) that being innocent purchasers for
value, they acquired absolute ownership over the property and
private respondent cannot enforce against them any right of
repurchase of whatever nature; (4) that as absolute owners and
possessors in good faith, they (petitioners) incurred necessary
and useful expenses thereon in the total amount of not less than
P10,000.00; and (5) that the property in question now a
residential area with real estate subdivisions and roads in front
and at the back thereof and its present increased value is no
less than P2.50 a square meter. Petitioners interposed a
counterclaim for moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00
and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the total sum of
P5,000.00. In their prayer petitioners asked for the rendition of
judgment absolving them completely from the complaint, with
costs, and sentencing private respondent to pay them moral
damages of P10,000.00 and attorney's fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P5,000.00; or in the remote
possibility that repurchase by private respondent were allowed,
to require the latter to pay the reasonable market value of not
less than P2.50 per square meter.
As stated at the outset, the trial court ruled out private
respondent's right to repurchase the property and dismissed the
complaint but that on appeal, the Court of Appeals Special
Sixth Division reversed the trial court's decision of dismissal
and ordered petitioners to reconvey the land to private
respondent upon payment to the former of "the repurchase price
thereof in the amount of P4,128.60, without special
pronouncement as to costs."
xxx
2.

xxx

xxx

Petitioners next assail the order of the appellate court

directing them to reconvey the subject land to private
respondent. Put thus in issue is the proper construction
and application of Section 119 of the Public Land Law,
Com. Act No. 141, which provides:
"Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent
or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs,
within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance."

102

Petitioners' specific contention that it could not have been

the intention of the Legislature to subject to the right of
repurchase a free patent or homestead conveyed 25
years after the issuance of the title is without legal basis
and is contrary to jurisprudence laid down on the matter.
Thus, in Isaac, et al. v. Tan Chuan Leong, et al. the sale
took place more than 27 years after the issuance of the
original title; while in Francisco v. Certeza, Sr., one of the
2 lots was sold more than 41 years after it was acquired.
The right to repurchase was upheld in both cases despite
the fact that the above lots were acquired under Act No.
296 which contained no provision on the right of
redemption. For the right of repurchase was provided for
only later, under Section 117 of Act No. 2874, approved
on Nov. 29, 1919, and incorporated in Com. Act No. 141
as Section 119.
However, We uphold petitioners' proposition that to allow
the repurchase of the subject land, under the peculiar
circumstances obtaining herein, would be repugnant to
the philosophy behind Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 and the
jurisprudence laid down on the matter.
The findings of fact of the trial court the then CFI Judge,
Cecilia Muoz Palma, later a member of this Court,
presiding are clear and duly supported by the evidence.
We quote:
"Evidence has been adduced by the
defendants that this property of Sotero
Marias has ceased to be in the nature of a
homestead, and that instead it has been
transformed into a growing commercial and
residential area. The vicinity of the property
is now a vast expanding business empire, the
lands
having
(been)
converted
into
subdivisions which are sold to the public at
fantastic prices. Close to this particular
property of Sotero Marias the subdivision
being developed by a son of the plaintiff who
has extensive business interests centered on
construction of buildings such as the Rizal
Provincial Capitol and development of
subdivisions. (See Exhs. "1" to "1-G"). By
plaintiff's
own
admission
on
crossexamination he is 78 years old and sick with
a lung ailment; while from the testimony of
his son, Antonio Marias, it is shown that the
sons
of
plaintiff
are
all
financially
independent from the latter and have their

103

respective
properties
and
means
of
livelihood. Under these circumstances it is
evident that to grant plaintiff the right to
repurchase the property at this time would
be not for the purpose of giving him back the
land for his house and cultivation but for him
to exploit it for business purposes at the
expense of the defendants who are innocent
purchaser(s) in good faith and for value."
In Simeon vs. Pea We analyzed the various cases
previously decided, and arrived at the conclusion that the
plain intent, the raison d tre, of Section 119, C.A. No. 141
" . . .is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance
to preserve for himself and his family the land that the
state had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his
labor in cleaning and cultivating it." In the same breath,
We agreed with the trial court, in that case, that "it is in
this sense that the provision of law in question becomes
unqualified and unconditional. And in keeping with such
reasons behind the passage of the law, its basic objective
is to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and
decent living for destitutes, aimed at promoting a class of
independent small landholders which is the bulwark of
peace and order."
As it was in Simeon v. Pea, respondent Marias' intention
in exercising the right of repurchase "is not for the
purpose of preserving the same within the family fold",
but "to dispose of it again for greater profit in violation of
the law's policy and spirit." The foregoing conclusions are
supported by the trial court's findings of fact already
cited, culled from evidence adduced. Thus respondent
Marinas was 71 years old and a widower at the time of the
sale in 1956; that he was 78 when he testified on Oct. 24,
1963 (or over 94 years old today if still alive); that . . . he
was not living on the property when he sold the same but
was residing in the poblacion attending to a hardware
store; and that the property was no longer agricultural at
the time of the sale, but was a residential and commercial
lot in the midst of many subdivisions. The profit
motivation behind the effort to repurchase was
conclusively shown when the then plaintiff's counsel, in
the case below, Atty. Loreto Castillo, in his presence,
suggested to herein petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rafael
Dinglasan, " . . . to just add to the original price so the
case would be settled." Moreover, Atty. Castillo
manifested in court that an amicable settlement was
possible, for which reason he asked for time "within which
to settle the terms thereof" and that "the plaintiff . . . Mr.

104

Marias, has manifested to the Court that if the

defendants would be willing to pay the sum of One Peso
and Fifty Centavos (P1.50) per square meter, he would be
willing to accept the offer and dismiss the case."
Respondent Marias' admission is on record that the
money with which he would repurchase the property was
not his but belonged to his children one of whom is Felix
Marias, owner of Cristimar Subdivision. Furthermore, the
trial court found that Marias' ones "are all financially
independent from the latter and have their respective
properties and means of livelihood."
The respondent Court of Appeals anchors respondentappellee Marias' right of repurchase on "old age and
tuberculosis having caught up with appellant, and the
land in question being his only property." Allowing the
repurchase would, thus, "help tide over the needs of his
remaining days." according to respondent court.
It could be true that the land in question is the only land
owned by respondent-appellee. But this is not the
determinant factor in allowing the repurchase of land
acquired through homestead or free patent. The doctrine
in Simeon v. Pea, supra, is explicit that what is
"unqualified and unconditional" is the right of the
homesteader or patentee to preserve the land "for himself
and his family. We can, therefore, properly inquire into the
motives behind the repurchase and convinced as We are
in the instant case, that the intention is not so, but to
exploit it for business purposes or greater profit, We can
deny the repurchase. To sustain respondent-appellee's
claim under the circumstances would put a premium on
speculation contrary to the philosophy behind Sec. 119 of
Com. Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Law. Thus, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, held in Santander, et al. v. Villanueva that the law
discourages homesteaders from taking advantage of the
"salutary policy behind the Public Land Law to enable
them to recover the land in question from (vendees) only
to dispose of it again at much greater profit to
themselves."
xxx

xxx

xxx

ACCORDINGLY, the Court of Appeals decision appealed from,

directing the reconveyance of the subject homestead lot to
respondent Sotero Marias is hereby REVERSED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

105

SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.
2. Sale
Qualification and purchase
Under Section 22 of the Public Land Act, the following are allowed to acquire,
by purchase, agricultural lands of the public domain:
(a) Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen (18) years, or
any such citizen not of lawful age who is the head of a family
(b) Any corporation or association of which at least sixty (60) percentum of
the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belowing wholly
to citizens of the Philippines.
Section 22 further provides that individuals may purchase a tract of land not
to exceed one hundred forty-four (144) hectares while Filipino corporations
and associations may acquire no more than one thousad twenty-four (1024)
hectares. However, Section 22 should be read in line with the requirements
of the 1987 Constitution, which only allows ownership of alienable lands of
the public domain to Filipino citizens, and only up to an extent of twelve (12)
hectares in size.
To therefore be entitled to a sales patent under the Public Land Act, the
applicant should satisfy the following specific requirements:
(a) He should be a citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen (18)
years, or any such citizen not of lawful age who is the head of a family;
(b) He should submit an application form with the Director of Lands
seeking to purchase the subject land;
(c) He must participate in a bidding process to be conducted by the
Director of Lands, which must take place no earlier than sixty (60) days
from the completion of the publication of the notice of sale once a
week for six consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, two (2)
newspaper of general circulation, one in Manila and the other in the
province or municipality where the land is located, or in a neighboring
province.
(The same notice is also required to be posted on the bulletin board of
the Bureau of Lands in Manila and the municipal building of the
province and municipality, respectively, where the land is located, and
if practicable, on the land itself.)

106

(d) He must submit, together with all other persons seeking to bid for the
land, sealed bids, enclosing therewith an amount equivalent to ten
percentum (10%) of the amount of the bid. The highest bidder shall be
awarded the land.
If there are two or more equal bids which are higher than the others,
and one of such equal bids is the bid of the applicant, the applicants
bid shall be accepted. If, however, the bid of the applicant is not one
of such equal and higher bids, the Director of Lands shall at once
submit the land for public bidding, and to the person making the
highest bid on such public auction the land shall be awarded. In any
case, the applicant shall always have the option of raising his bid equal
to that of the highest bidder, and in this case, the land shall be
awarded to him.
(e) Once awarded, the purchaser must pay the purchase price for the land
either: (1) in full or (2) in ten equal annual installments from the date
of the award;
(f) The purchaser must prove actual occupancy, cultivation and
improvements of not less than one-fifth (1/5) of the land within five (5)
years from the date of the award, and
(g) The purchaser has not previously purchased more than twelve (12)
hectares of public land in the Philippines83
The Public Land Act authorizes only one purchase of the maximum
amount of land by an individual. However, any such purchaser of
public land, after having made the last payment upon and cultivated at
least one-fifth (1/5) of the land purchased, if the same shall be less
than the maximum 12 hectares allowed by the Constitution, may
purchase successively additional agricultural public land adjacent to or
not distant from the land first purchased, until the total area of such
purchase shall reach 12 hectares, provided that the required bidding
requirements shall have also been satisfied.
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 730, which took effect on 18 June
1952, permits the sale without public auction of public lands for residential
purposes to any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home
lot in the municipality in which he resides and who has, in good faith,
established his residence on such parcel of land which is not needed for
public service. The area of the grant should not exceed 1,000 square meters,
and should be sold at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the
approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. The law
further makes it an essential condition that the occupant has constructed his
house on the land and actually resided therein. Pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 2004, lands acquired pursuant to Republic Act No. 730 are not
subject to any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation before and after
the issuance of the patents thereon.
83

Section 32 of the Public Land Act.

107

Cancellation of purchase
If at any time after the date of the award and before the issuance of the
patent, it is proved to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, after due
notice to the purchaser, that the purchaser has voluntarilyi abandoned the
land for more than one (1) year at any time, or has otherwise failed to comply
with the requirements of the law, then the land shall revert to the State, and
all prior payments made by the purchaser and all improvements existing on
the land shall be forfeited.84
Special limitation on the rights of the grantee of a sales patent
In addition to the foregoing obligations, the grantee is also not permitted to
convey or encumber any of his rights over the land to any person,
corporation, or association without the approval of the Secretary of
Environment and National Resources, and provided that such conveyance or
encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the government in the
land. This limitation shall subsist for a period of ten (10) years from the title
is granted to the patentee. 85 Notably, any sale or encumbrance made in
violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void, and shall
procedure the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property
and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price
made to the government shall be forfeited.86
3. Lease
Strictly speaking, lease is not a mode of acquiring ownership of lands of the
public domain. Ownership remains vested in the State, but by virtue of the
grant, qualified holders are allowed legal possession over the land for such
period of time and under such conditions as set forth in the lease title.
Qualification and application
Under Section 33 of the Public Land Act, any Filipino citizen of lawful age, or
any corporation or association of which 60% of the capital stock or of any
interest in said capital stock belongs wholly to Filipinos may lease land of the
public domain of an area not exceeding 1024 hectares, or, if to be devoted to
grazing land, not to exceed two thousand (2000) hectares. Again, the area
provided by law should be read in connection with the 1987 Constitution,
which allows the lease of lands of the public domain to an area not to exceed
one thousand (1,000) hectares for private Filipino corporations, and five
hundred (500) hectares for Filipino citizens. 87
Thus, in order to lease lands of the public domain under the Public Land Act,
the applicant should satisfy the following specific requirements:
84
85
86
87

108

Section
Section
Section
Art. XII,

30 of the Public Land Act.

29, Public Land Act.
29, Id.
Sec. 3, 1987 Phil. Const.

(a) He must be a Filipino citizen of lawful age, or a Filipino corporation;

(b) He should submit an application form with the Director of Lands
seeking to lease the subject land;
(c) He must participate in a bidding process to be conducted by the
Director of Lands, which must take place no earlier than sixty (60) days
from the completion of the publication of the notice of lease once a
week for six consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, two (2)
newspaper of general circulation, one in Manila and the other in the
province or municipality where the land is located, or in a neighboring
province.88
(The same notice is also required to be posted on the bulletin board of
the Bureau of Lands in Manila and the municipal building of the
province and municipality, respectively, where the land is located, and
if practicable, on the land itself.)
(d) He must submit, together with all other persons seeking to bid for the
land, sealed bids, enclosing therewith, by cash, certified check,
Treasury warrant, or post-office money order payable to the order of
the Director of Lands, a sum equivalent to the rental for at least the
first three months of the lease. No bid shall be considered in which the
proposed annual rental is less than three percent (3%) of the value of
the land according to the appraisal made of the land.
The highest bidder shall be awarded the land. If there are two or more
equal bids which are higher than the others, and one of such equal
bids is the bid of the applicant, the applicants bid shall be accepted.
If, however, the bid of the applicant is not one of such equal and higher
bids, the Director of Lands shall at once submit the land for public
bidding, and to the person making the highest bid on such public
auction the lease of the land shall be awarded. In any case, the
applicant shall always have the option of raising his bid equal to that of
the highest bidder, and in this case, the lease of the land shall be
awarded to him.
(e) Once awarded, the lessee must cultivate at least one-third (1/3) of the
land within five (5) years after the date of the approval of the lease.
However, if the land leased is to be devoted to grazing, it shall be
sufficient compliance with this condition if the lessee shall graze on the
land as many heads of cattle as will occupy at least one-half (1/2) of
the entire area at the rate of one head per hectare. 89
Lease term
88

89

Section 34 of the Public Land Act provides that the auction for the lease of
public lands shall follow the procedure set by law for the sale of lands of the
public domain.
Section 39 of the Public Land Act.

109

In conformity with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Public Land Act
provides that lease of the land shall run for a period of not more than twentyfive (25) years, but may be renewed once for another period of not to exceed
twenty-five (25) years, in case the lessee shall have made important
improvements which, in the discretion of the Secretary of Environmental and
Natural Resources justify a renewal.90
Rental amount
The Public Land Act fixes the annual rental of the land to be leased at no less
than three percent (3%) of the value of the land, with the exception of leases
covering grazing land, the rental amount shall not be less than two percent
(2%) of the lands appraised value.91
For this purpose, every contract of lease shall contain a cause to the effect
that allows the government to conduct an appraisal of the land leased every
ten years from the date of the approval of the lease. Should the lessee not
be agreeable to the reappraisal and prefers to give up his contract of lease,
he shall notify the Director of Lands of his desire within the six months next
preceding the date on which the reappraisal takes effect, and in case his
request is approved, the Director of Lands may, if the lessee should so
desire,92 be reimbursed for the improvements and crops on the land, after
deducting the total amount of any indebtedness to the Government and the
expense incurred by it in the transfer of the improvements or crops and in the
new concession of the land.93
Application for additional leases
As a rule, an applicant for the lease of lands of the public domain may only be
granted a single lease, and those previously granted a lease concession can
no longer apply to lease additional land of the public domain. However, by
way of exception, a grantee who has (a) paid rent for at least the first two (2)
years of the lease, (b) cultivated at least one-third (1/3) of the land by the
end of the second year of the lease term and (c) leases an area less than the
maximum area allowed by law and the Constitution may lease additional land
adjacent to or near the land originally leased in an amount to complete the
area allowed. All conditions required of the original lease shall be similarly
applicable to all successive leases applied for by qualified lessees. 94
Additional restrictions on use, disposition and encumbrance
90
91
92
93

94

110

Section 38 of the Public Land Act.

Section 37 of the Public Land Act.
Ibid.
Section 100 of the Public Land Act provides: In case the cancellation is due to
delinquency on the part of the applicant or grantee, the same shall be entitled to
the reimbursement of the proceeds of the sale of the improvements and crops,
after deducting the total amount of his indebtedness to the Government and the
expense incurred by it in the sale of the improvements or crops and in the new
concession of the land.
Section 42 of the Public Land Act.

The lease of any lands may not remove or dispose of any valuable timber
except as provided in the regulations of the Bureau of Forestry for cutting
timber upon such lands. Neither may lessees remove or dispose of stone, oil,
coal, salts or other minerals, or medicinal mineral waters existing upon the
same. Any violation of the forestry regulations by the lessee shall result in
the forfeiture of his last payment of rent and render him liable to immediate
dispossession and suit for damage.95
Furthermore, the lessee is not allowed to assign, encumber, or sublet his
rights to the leased land without the consent of the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources. Any violation of this condition shall render such
assignment, encumbrance or sublease void.96
Effects of expiration of lease term
Upon the expiration of the lease, all buildings and other permanent
improvements made by the lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, or assigns shall become the property of the Government, and the
land together with the said improvements shall be disposed of in accordance
with law.97
During the life of the lease, however, any lessee who shall have complied
with all the conditions required for the lease of lands oft the public domain
and shall be qualified as a grantee of a sales patent, shall have the option of
purchasing the land leased.98
4. Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
As a rule, no title or right to, or equity in, any lands of the public domain may
be acquired by prescription or by adverse possession or occupany. 99
However, the Public Land Act recognizes that persons already in possession
of alienable lands of the public domain may be constituted owners of the said
parcels of land by the mere passage of time or failure to obtain title through
no fault of their own. This recognition is made through what is known as
confirmation of imperfect title, which may be done (a) through administrative
confirmation via the issuance of a free patent, or (b) by judicial confirmation.
Thus, similar to the grant of a homestead or sales patent, when an applicant
conforms to all the requisites for confirmation, he obtains the right to a grant
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. His right is thereby
considered a vested right, and application for confirmation becomes a mere
formality. As a consequence, the land ceases to be of the public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The lack of a
95
96
97
98
99

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

41 of the Public Land

40 of the Public Land
38 of the Public Land
43 of the Public Land
57, Public Land Act.

Act.
Act.
Act.
Act.

111

certificate of title does not affect the legal sufficiency of his right of ownership
as would be evidenced by a patent.100
SUSI VS. RAZON, ET AL.
48 Phil. 424 [1925]
VILLA-REAL, J p:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of
land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b)
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property;
(c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to
said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff
the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied
each and every allegation contained therein and, as special
defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and
control of that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela
Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment
declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From
this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning
thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the
judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is
controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled
to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment
of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and
the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of
deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of
said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new
trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac
sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession
thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been
100

112

Herico v. DAR, 95 SCRA 437 (1980).

destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September

5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the
right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the
deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood
gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had
paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,
adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on
September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land
(Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at
the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi
and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E).
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director
of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit
C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed an
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his
possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After
making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of
Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land
to Angela Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said grant the register
of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document,
Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought an action for
forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the case being one of title to real property (Exhibits F and M).
Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the
questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been
in possession of the land in question openly, continuously,
adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the
Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and
rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When
on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of
said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already
made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18,

113

1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and

occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariilo
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1 ), is
applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter
VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant
in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government,
for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of
the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an
action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private
property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction
of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to
recover the possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the
judgment appealed from the same is hereby affirmed in all its
parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
ABEJARON VS. NABASA, ET AL.

114

359 SCRA 47, 20 June 2001

PUNO, J p:
With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in
the limited land resources especially so if, as in the case at bar,
one's home of many years stands on the land in dispute. It
comes as no surprise therefore that while this case involves a
small parcel of land, a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block
5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos City, the parties have
tenaciously litigated over it for more than twenty years.
Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to
annul the respondent court's Decision dated April 26, 1988 and
Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing the trial court's
decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the
subject lot.
The following facts spurred the present controversy:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful
possessor and claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City
described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North
by Road, on the South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by
Felix Nabasa, and on the West by Road." In 1945, petitioner
Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter
land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They
fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa
roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their
abode to become a two-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet or
87.78 square meters made of round wood and nipa roofing. This
house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the
same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner's daughter, Conchita
Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in
its stead, petitioner Abejaron built another store which stands up
to the present. In 1951, he planted five coconut trees on the
property in controversy. Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abejaron,
harvested coconuts from these trees. 3 Petitioner Abejaron also
planted banana and avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher
pump. 4 All this time that the Abejarons introduced these
improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa
did not oppose or complain about the improvements.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character,
petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for
taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and 1978. The last two
declarations state that petitioner Abejaron's house stands on

115

Lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Psu 154953. Abejaron paid taxes on the

house in 1955, 1966, and 1981.
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa
resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block
5, Psu-154953. 8 Nabasa built his house about four (4) meters
away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Beatriz Gusila, a
neighbor of the Abejarons and the Nabasas confirmed that when
she arrived in Silway in 1949, Nabasa was not yet residing there
while Abejaron was already living in their house which stands to
this day.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the
area in controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the
survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government
property.
Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent,
however, Nabasa "clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and
unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name" of the
entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, including petitioner Abejaron's
118-square meter portion. Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud
on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the
titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa
represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the
entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square
meter portion despite knowledge of Abejaron's actual
occupation and possession of said portion.
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate
of Title No. P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877
covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the title included
petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion of the lot, his
son, Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron
(petitioner Abejaron's wife), filed a protest with the Bureau of
Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's title and
application. The protest was dismissed on November 22, 1979
for failure of Matilde and Alejandro to attend the hearings.
Alejandro claims, however, that they did not receive notices of
the hearings. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration dated
January 10, 1980. Alejandro also filed a notice of adverse claim
on January 14, 1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of
Lands to treat the motion as an appeal considering that it was
filed within the 60-day reglementary period. The motion for
reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the District
Land Office XI-3 of the Bureau of Lands in Koronadal, Cotabato
to the Director of Lands in Manila on November 24, 1981. But
because the appeal had not been resolved for a prolonged
period for unknown reasons, petitioner Abejaron filed on March
12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of

116

General Santos City. 15 On May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a

notice of lis pendens.
Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner.
Lagsub stated that on March 30, 1980, Alejandro Abejaron hired
him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, the land in
controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring 175 square meters.
Fifty-seven (57) square meters of Lot 1 and a portion of the
adjoining Lot 3 were occupied by Nabasa's house. This portion
was fenced partly by hollow blocks and partly by bamboo. On
the remaining 118 square meters stood a portion of petitioner
Abejaron's house and two coconut trees near it, and his store.
Abejaron's 118-square meter portion was separated from
Nabasa's 57-square meter part by Abejaron's fence made of
hollow blocks. Both Nabasa's and Abejaron's houses appeared
more than twenty years old while the coconut trees appeared
about 25 years old.
Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu154953. He was then hired by the Silway Neighborhood
Association to conduct the survey for purposes of allocating lots
to the members of the association, among whom were
respondent Nabasa and petitioner Abejaron. When the 1971
survey was conducted, both the Abejarons and Nabasa were
already occupying their respective 118 and 57 square meter
portions of Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron,
representative of petitioner, were present during the survey.
Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends
that he had been residing on a 12 x 15 meter or 180-square
meter public land in Silway, General Santos City since 1945. He
admits that petitioner Abejaron was already residing in Silway
when he arrived there. Nabasa constructed a house which
stands to this day and planted five coconut trees on this 180square meter land, but only two of the trees survived. Nabasa
never harvested coconuts from these trees as petitioner
Abejaron claims to own them and harvests the coconuts. In
many parts of respondent Nabasa's testimony, however, he
declared that he started occupying the 180-square meter area in
1976.
Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in
possession of portions of Lot 2, Psu-154953. This lot was
subsequently surveyed and divided into smaller lots with the
area of petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2, Block 5, Psu154953 measuring one hundred eighty (180) square meters,
while his was designated as Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with an
area of one hundred seventy five (175) square meters.

117

Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner

Abejaron gave this lot to his daughter Conchita Abejaron-Abellon
and allowed her to file the application with the District Land
Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato.
Conchita secured Free Patent No. (XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2.
Pursuant to this, she was issued Original Certificate of Title No.
P-4420. On April 27, 1981, Conchita's title was transcribed in the
Registration Book of General Santos City.
Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for
Free Patent over Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with the District
Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South
Cotabato. While the application was pending, petitioner Abejaron
forcibly encroached upon the northern and southwestern portion
of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-159543. Abejaron fenced the disputed 118square meter portion of Lot 1 and despite Nabasa's opposition,
constructed a store near the road. Petitioner Abejaron then
transferred his old house constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu154953 to a portion of the disputed 118-square meter area.
Petitioner's daughter, Conchita, patentee and title holder of Lot
2, constructed her own house in Lot 2.
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued
to respondent Nabasa on September 24, 1974. But before the
patent could be transcribed on the Registration Book of the
Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the District Land
Officer of District Land Office No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation
of an administrative protest filed by the petitioner. The protest
was given due course, but petitioner Abejaron or his
representative failed to appear in the hearings despite notice.
On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was
dismissed by the District Land Officer for failure of petitioner
Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings despite
notice. Respondent Nabasa's Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 was
then re-transmitted by the District Land Officer of District Land
Office XI-4 to the Register of Deeds, General Santos City, and
the same was transcribed in the Registration Book of the
Registry of Property of General Santos City on December 13,
1979. Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140, covering Lot 1,
Block 2, Psu-154953, was issued to respondent Nabasa.
On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent
Nabasa an action for reconveyance with damages seeking
reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953.
xxx

118

xxx

xxx

On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioner Abejaron, viz:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court
hereby renders judgment as follows:
1.

Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio

Abejaron over 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby declaring the
inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P4140 erroneous and a mistake, and for which, defendant
Felix Nabasa is hereby ordered to reconvey and execute a
registerable document in favor of plaintiff Pacencio
Abejaron, Filipino, married and a resident of Silway,
General Santos City, his heirs, successors and assigns
over an area of one hundred eighteen (118) square
meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, situated at
Silway, General Santos City, on the Western portion of
said lot as shown in the sketch plan, Exhibit "R", and the
remaining portion of 57 square meters of said lot to be
retained by defendant Felix Nabasa;

2.

Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of

this judgment, the Clerk of Court shall executed (sic) it in
the name of Felix Nabasa, widower, and will have the
same effect as if executed by the latter and the Register
of Deeds, General Santos City, is hereby directed to issue
New Transfer Certificate of Title to Alejandro Abejaron
over 118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953,
and New Transfer Certificate of Title over 57 square
meters of same Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, in favor of
Felix Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-4140 of
Felix Nabasa cancelled accordingly."

Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been

denied, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 26, 1988,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent
Nabasa, viz:
xxx

xxx

xxx

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name after one year from the date of the
decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration

119

but only purports to show that the person who secured the
registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner
thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for
reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the
party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu154953. He in fact admits that he believed the land in dispute
was public in character, thus he did not declare it for taxation
purposes despite possession of it for a long time. Neither did he
apply for title over it on the mistaken belief that he could not
apply for title of a public land. In his Complaint, he stated that
respondent Nabasa's fraudulent procurement of Free Patent No.
(XI-4)-2877 and OCT No. P-4140 over the disputed land deprived
him not of ownership, but of his "right to file the necessary
application thereon with the authorities concerned" as long-time
possessor of the land.
Nonetheless,
petitioner
contends
reconveyance is proper, viz:

that

an

action

for

". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of

land to prosper, it is not necessary that the
proponent be the absolute owner thereof. It is
enough that the proponent has an equitable right
thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff had been in
lawful, open, continuous and notorious possession,
occupation and control in the concept of an owner
of a greater portion of the subject lot since 1945
and have (sic) thereby acquired an equitable right
thereon protected by law. Possession of public lands
once occupation of the same is proven, as the
herein plaintiff did, under claim of ownership
constitutes a grant from the state (Republic vs.
Vera, 120 SCRA 210). A portion of the public land
ceased to be public as soon as its claimant had
performed all the conditions essential to a grant
(Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA. 875)."
Petitioner's contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief
Justice Teehankee's dissent in the Villanueva case, is similar to
the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina v. Vda. de Sonza, et
al. In that case, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija an action for cancellation of the original certificate
of title procured by the defendant by virtue of a homestead
patent. The title covered a public land which she claimed to own
through public, open, and peaceful possession for more than
thirty years. The law applicable in that case, which petitioner
Abejaron apparently relies on in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of

120

Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, viz:
"SECTION 48.
The following-described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the
province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act (now
Property Registration Decree), to wit:
xxx
(b)

xxx

xxx

Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter." (italics supplied)

Citing Susi v. Razon, the Court interpreted this law, viz:

". . . where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical possession openly,
continuously, and publicly with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions
of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth
Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have
already acquired by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts an application therefor being
sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act
No.
2874
(reproduced
as
Section
50,
Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of

121

the public domain and had become private

property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. (Italics
supplied)"
The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar, another
action for cancellation of title issued pursuant to a free patent.
Again, the Court ruled that under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, with the plaintiff's
proof of occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessor-in-interest, title over
the land had vested in him as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thenceforth, the land was no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent. The Court
held, viz:
"As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, et
al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v. Pineda Vda. de Sonza,
G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960) when the
conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of public domain, and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent."
In citing Republic v. Villanueva, et al., petitioner Abejaron relied
on the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Teehankee. However,
the en banc majority opinion in that case and in Manila Electric
Company v. Bartolome, departed from the doctrines enunciated
in the Susi, Mesina, and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez, the
Court ruled that "the right of an occupant of public agricultural
land to obtain a confirmation of his title under Sec. 48(b) of
Com. Act. No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, is
'derecho dominical incoativo' and that before the issuance of the
certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State."
The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are
different from the oft-cited Susi case as the latter involved a
parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial, while the land in dispute in the Villanueva and
Meralco cases were sought to be titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended. In explaining the nature of

122

land possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh

Cho v. Director of Lands, viz:
"All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest."
In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., this Court en banc recognized the strong dissent
registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in the Villanueva case and
abandoned the Villanueva and Meralco ruling to revert to the
Susi doctrine. Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court
ruled:
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself [Sec.
48(b)] that the possessor(s) '. . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in
truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already effected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete." (Italics supplied)
This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case
of Rural Bank of Compostela v. Court of Appeals, a ponencia of
now Chief Justice Davide, Jr., viz:
"The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942), is
that when the conditions specified therein are

123

complied with, the possessor is deemed to have

acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
government grant, without necessity of a certificate
of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part
of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands."
The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not
petitioner Abejaron has satisfied the conditions specified in Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. Sec.
48(b) has been further amended by P.D. No. 1073 which took
effect on January 25, 1977. Sec. 4 of the P.D. reads as follows:
"SECTION 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and
Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act,
are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945."
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No.
1073, now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter." (Italics ours)
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession
and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation
and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant
of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law,
then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this
law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in

124

1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair
vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino
citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest
have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25,
1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942, we now
determine whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the
disputed land. In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade
through the evidence on record to ascertain whether petitioner
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the 118-square meter disputed
land for 30 years at least since January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic
that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive on the parties and upon this Court,
which will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal unless these
findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and
cogent reasons dictate otherwise. One instance when findings of
fact of the appellate court may be reviewed by this Court is
when, as in the case at bar, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in
1945. At that time, he built a nipa house, a small store, and a
fence made of wood to delineate his area. This nipa house was
improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was
also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed
to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house, bigger
store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951,
petitioner planted coconut trees near his house. While the
petitioner
has
shown
continued
existence
of
these
improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later
than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of
the disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and
wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the
absence of this proof, we cannot determine the land he actually
possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the
fact that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and
identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to the
survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds
of the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the
absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.

125

The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra

Doria, Pacencia Artigo, and Beatriz Gusila, could not also further
his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated that they started
residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying whether it was on
or prior to January 24, 1947, while Gusila arrived in the
neighborhood in 1949. While Doria testified that there was a
fence between Abejaron's and Nabasa's houses in 1947, she did
not state that Abejaron's 118-square meter area was enclosed
by a fence which stands to this day. This is confirmed by
Geodetic Engineer Lagsub's 1984 survey plan which shows that
a fence stands only on one side of the 118-square meter area,
the side adjacent to Nabasa's 57-square meter portion. Again,
this poses the problem of determining the area actually
occupied and possessed by Abejaron at least since January 24,
1947.
Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the
disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
the property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax
declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his
case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through
possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since
January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that
lands of whatever classification belong to the State and
evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." As
petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the
land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or
homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action
for reconveyance.
In De La Pea v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan, the
petitioner filed an action for reconveyance, claiming preferential
right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare of land and
imputing fraud and misrepresentation to respondent in securing
a free patent and original certificate of title over the land in
controversy. The action for reconveyance was dismissed by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, viz:
"It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged
to be erroneously titled in another's name. (Tomas

126

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990,

185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. Barlongay, G.R. No.
67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada
v. Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 [1958];
Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92
Phil. 826 [1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil.
261 [1948]). In the case at bench, petitioner does
not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion.
Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential
right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his
actual possession since January 1947 . . . Title to
alienable public lands can be established through
open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at
least thirty (30) years . . . Not being the owner,
petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands
could not question the titles legally issued by the
State. (Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776
[1936]) In such cases, the real party in interest is
the Republic of the Philippines to whom the
property would revert if it is ever established, after
appropriate proceedings, that the free patent
issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to
annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to
comply with the conditions imposed by the law.
(See Sec. 101 of C.A. 141 [Public Land Act]; Lucas
v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 [1957]; Sumail v.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et
al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 [1955]). Not being an
applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot
ask for reconveyance." (italics supplied)
In the more recent case of Tankiko, et al. v. Cezar, et al.,
plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they
were the actual occupants and residents of a 126,112-square
meter land which was titled to another person. The trial court
dismissed the action, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal. Despite the appellate court's finding that plaintiffs had
no personality to file the action for reconveyance, the disputed
land being part of the public domain, it exercised equity
jurisdiction to avoid leaving unresolved the matter of possession
of the land in dispute. On appeal to this Court, we reinstated the
decision of the trial court and dismissed the action for
reconveyance, viz:
". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on
the basis of the action filed and relief sought, has a
clear right that he seeks to enforce, or that would
obviously be violated if the action filed were to be

127

dismissed for lack of standing. In the present case,

respondents have no clear enforceable right, since
their claim over the land in question is merely
inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are
only applicants for sales patents on the land, they
are not and they do not even claim to be owners
thereof.
Second, it is evident that respondents are not the
real parties in interest. Because they admit that
they are not the owners of the land but mere
applicants for sales patents thereon, it is daylight
clear that the land is public in character and that it
should revert to the State. This being the case,
Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically
declares that only the government may institute an
action for reconveyance of ownership of a public
land . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit

for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not
being the owners of the land but mere applicants
for sales patents thereon, respondents have no
personality to file the suit. Neither will they be
directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in

interest must be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas v.
Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by
a party who alleged that the patent was obtained
by fraudulent means and consequently, prayed for
the annulment of said patent and the cancellation
of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the
proper party to bring the action was the
government, to which the property would revert."
Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to
the disputed land, he is not the proper party to file an action for
reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to
the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for
reversion. He has the specific power and function to "represent
the Government in all land registration and related proceedings"
and to "institute actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as

128

lands held in violation of the Constitution." Since respondent

Nabasa's Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title originated
from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.
Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal
standing to sue and is not the real party in interest, we deem it
unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud and the other
issues raised in the petition. These shall be timely for
adjudication if a proper suit is filed by the Solicitor General in the
future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 2492 before the Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato,
Branch 1, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Administrative confirmation of imperfect title: Free Patents
Qualification and application
Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, any natural born citizen of the
Philippines who does not yet own more than twelve (12) hectares of
agricultural land (formerly 24 hectares) may apply for a free patent.
However, before such patent is issued, the Director of Lands must be
satisfied that that:
(a) The applicant, or his predecessors-in-interest, including members of
national cultural minorities,101 has continuously occupied and
cultivated agricultural land of the public domain;
(b) Occupation and cultivation has been (a) for members of national
cultural minorities, since 4 July 1955, whether or not the land occupied
is disposable or not,102 or (b) for all other applicants, for a period of at
least thirty (30) years since 28 March 1990, 103 or that even absent
cultivation, the applicant has paid real property taxes on the land for
the same period that that the said land has not been occupied by any
other person;104

101
102
103

104

As amended by Republic Act No. 3872.

As amended by Republic Act no. 3872.
This is the effective date of Republic Act No. 6940 which amended Section 44
of the Public Land Act.
C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 782, Sec. 44.

129

(c) Notice of the application has been published in the municipality and
barrio in which the land is located and adverse claimants have had an
opportunity to present their claims.105
Under the Public Land Act, applications for free patents must be filed before
31 December 1941.106 This period was extended by subsequent amendatory
laws, with the last extension provided under Republic Act No. 9176 to 31
December 2020.
Conditions and limitations on the rights of the grantee of a free patent
Like homestead patents, holders of free patents are similarly subject to the
following special conditions and limitations in addition to the general
restrictions on patent provided in Chapter XIII of the Public Land Act:
(a) Land covered by a free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered
from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
(5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent, except if
such alienation or encumbrance is made in favor of the government or
any of its branches, units or institutions, or to legally constituted
banking corporations.107
(b) Land covered by a free patent cannot be held liable in satisfaction of
any debt contracted prior to the said period. However, improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
perons,108 who, in accordance with Section 122, 109 must be Filipino
citizens or corporations.
(e) Land covered by a free patent, or any permanent improvement
thereon, cannot be alienated or transferred to a corporation,
association or partnership without the consent of the grantee and
approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and
105
106
107
108

109

Section 46, Public Land Act.

Section 45, Public Land Act, as amedned by Republic Act No. 107.
Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
Section 122 of the Public Land Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who
may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally
acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this
Act, or any permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or
assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement
thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of
his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer,
assignment, or lease made in violation hereof, shall be null and void.

130

solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or charitable

purposes or for a right of way.110
(d) Every conveyance of land acquired under a free patent shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within a period
of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance. 111
Confirmation of imperfect title through judicial legalization
As an alternative to administrative confirmation of imperfect title, both the
Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree allow for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. Unlike applications for land patents under the
Public Land Act, proceedings for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are
considered proceedings in rem, so that a decree of registration issued
pursuant to such proceedings is conclusive, final and binding as against third
parties.
Amendments to the Public Land Act
Under the original language of Section 48 of the Public Land Act, the following
citizens occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, were allowed to apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of
grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees
then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part,
or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or
grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against
the Government, since 26 July 1894, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 47(b) was subsequently amended through Republic Act No. 1942
which removed the limition of claims against the government and provided,
instead of a specific date of 26 June 1896, a thirty (30) year period of
110
111

Section 121 of the Public Land Act.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

131

possession which must precede the filing of any application for judicial
confirmation. The amended Section therefore read, as follows:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."
Section 47 was further amended by Republic Act No. 3872, effective on 18
June 1964, which recognized the right of national cultural minorities to apply
for judicial confirmation of title. A new sub-section to this effect was
therefore included to Section 47, as follows:
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 promulgated on 25 January 1977 made further
amendments to Section 47 by deleting the first sub-section on unperfected
Spanish grants entirely,112 and modifying the remaining sub-sections to apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, two significant amendments were introduced by Presidential Decree No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands in the original law was changed to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Second, the length of
the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June
12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, in Republic vs. Naguit,113 the Supreme Court
noted:

112

113

132

SECTION 3. The judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based

on unperfected Spanish grants such as application for the purchase, composition
or other forms of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees in force prior to the transfer or sovereignty from Spain to the United
States shall no longer be allowed. However, this Section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any person claiming the same land from acting under Section 48(b)
and Section 48(c) if he meets the conditions prescribed for judicial confirmation of
his incomplete title thereunder.
448 SCRA 442 [2005].

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide
claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
Under the present state of the law, therefore, the Supreme Court in Heirs of
Mariano Malabanan vs. Republic,114 declared that through the provisions of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, every
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 has a right to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper
court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Period to apply for judicial confirmation
In the original text of Section 47 of the Public Land Act, applicants for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title were required to file their applications no later
than 31 December 1938. Through subsequent amendments of the law, 115 this
period has been eventually extended to 31 December 2020 under Republic
Act No. 9176.
In Director of Lands vs. Abairo,116 the Supreme Court said that applications
filed after the lapse of the period for applying for judicial confirmation of title,
but before the next subsequent extension of the said period did not warrant
the dismissal by the trial court of the said application. In Abairo, the
applicant filed his petition on 1 March 1971, or after the 31 December 1968
deadline set under Republic Act No. Republic Act No. 2061. The Court noted
that Republic Act No. 6236, a subsequent law which extend the period for
applying for judicial confirmation of title, allowed applicants to be filed even
during the intervening period, and considered such application as having
been filed on time. According to the Court: The extension until 31 December
1976 by Republic Act No. 6236 for the filing of such application, retroacted to,
and covered the applications filed after 1 January 1969 and before 19 June
1971. Moreover, the application which private respondent filed on 1 March
114

115

116

G.R. No. 179987, 29 April 2009.

Commonwealth Act No. 292 extended the expiry date to 31 December 1941.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 107 further extended the time limit to 31
December 1957. Republic Act No. 2061 again prolonged the period to 31
December 1968. Still later, by virtue of Republic Act No. 6236, the time prescribed
was extended to 31 December 1976. Presidential Decree No. 1073 lengthened the
cut-off date to 31 December 1987. This was again amended by Republic Act No.
6940 to 31 December 2000.
90 SCRA 422 [1979].

133

1971 could be considered refiled after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6236
on 20 June 1971, less than four months thereafter.
Furthermore, in Director of Lands vs. Danao,117 the Supreme Court clarified
that the filing of the application for registration within the period required by
law is not a jurisdictional requirement upon courts. Instead, it is only to be
considered a time limitation. Thus, an application filed beyond the period
prescribed by law, but not objected to by the State either in a Motion to
Dismiss or Answer, does not prevent the court from granting such application.
Grounds for entitlement
To be entitled to judicial confirmation under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must prove that:
(a) He is a Filipino citizen
In Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 118 the
Supreme Court ruled that a Filipino corporation may apply for judicial
confirmation under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act if, at the time
of institution of the registration proceedings, the land was already
converted to private land. This is possible when the corporations
predecessor-in-interest, who is a Filipino citizen, has possessed and
occupied alienable land of the public domain for the requisite period
required by the Public Land Act. Recall that under Susi vs. Razon, et
al., the Supreme Court ruled that possession and occupation for such
period required by law grants such citizen a vested right over the
parcel of land ipso jure without need of issuance of a title or grant from
the government. Conquently, vested right converts the land from
public to private property. Thus, the subsequent alienation of such
parcel of land to a Filipino corporation would no longer run counter to
the Constitutional prohibition that Filipino corporations may only lease
lands of the public domain, precisely because the land subject of the
transfer is no longer considered public land.
(b) The land has been declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by the time the application for registration is filed
In Republic v. Naguit,119 the Supreme Court clarified that lands subject
of judicial confirmation proceedings need only be classified alienable
and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for
registration, and not for the entire period of possession. In explaining
this finding, the Court said:
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the
117
118
119

134

96 SCRA 161 [1980].

146 SCRA 509 [1986].
448 SCRA 442 [2005].

words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and

not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) (which
applies equially to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
The conclusions of the Court in Naguit were affirmed in Heirs of
Malabanan vs. Republic,120 where the Court laid down specific doctrines
relating to the registration of lands under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
120

G.R. No. 179987, 29 April 2009.

135

domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since
12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Needless to state, should the land be unclassified, or classifed as forest
land, mineral land or national park at the time of the application for
registration, such application should be denied. 121
(c)

He has possessed and occupied the land since 12 June 1945. 122
In Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,123 the Supreme
Court explained the meaning of possession and occupation to justify
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of possession
and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b)
of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice
Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid
down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil.
175, 180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51
Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the

121

122
123

136

Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 [2000]; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Bernabe, 148 SCRA 480 [1987].
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Lapia, 235 SCRA 567 [1994].
209 SCRA 214 [1992]

application of the doctrine of constructive possession

in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and this
court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is `one particularly relating to the size of
the tract in controversy with reference to the portion
actually in possession of the claimant.' While,
therefore, `possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meters of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession', possession under paragraph 6 of section
54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol
of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. . . .
Special patents
Aside from the foregoing land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act,
special patents may also be issued over lands formerly reserved or
considered inalienable.
These patents are generally issued upon the
promulgation of a special law or act of Congress or by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources as authorized by an Executive Order of
the President and, in themselves, already provide for the reclassification of
the land.124
Under the Public Land Act, a special patent may be granted:
(a) To Non-Christian Filipinos so long as the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government has certified that the majority of the non-Christian
inhabitants of any given reservation have advanced sufficiently in
civilization;125 or,
(b) To authorize concession of lands of the public domain for educational,
charitable or any of the like purposes. 126
They may also be issued in favor of the owner of the landed estate acquired
by the Government.
Pertinently, Republic Act No. 926 authorizes the
President to convey public lands and other properties of a public nature as
payment for the acquisition of such estates. 127 Another example of a special
patent is that issued in favor of the Public Estates Authority through
Presidential Decree No. 1085 over three reclaimed islands in Manila Bay
known as Freedom Islands.
124
125
126
127

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002].

Section 84, Public Land Act.
Supra note 193.
ALUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra 193, at 150.

137

Emancipation patents
Emancipation patents are patents issued pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos.
27 and 266 in furtherance of the governments policy of agrarian reform.
Unlike the land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act, emancipation
patents do not cover lands of the public domain, but instead, involve private
agricultural lands. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the provisions of Presidential
Decree Nos. 27 and 266 have generally been superseded. 128
b. Disposition of residential, commercial or industrial lands.
Under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, lands intended for residential,
commercial, industrial and similar productive purposes may be disposed of by
sale or lease thru public bidding, generally following the procedure prescribed
for agricultural lands. The land or the right to lease is acquired also in a public
auction thru bidding. The difference, however, lies in the fact that where in
agricultural sales, the auction sale is thru sealed bidding with the applicant
enjoying the right to equal the highest bid, the auction sale of residential,
commercial and industrial lands is thru oral bidding where the applicant has
to outbid the other bidders in order to be successful bidder. In other words,
the applicant does not have preferential right, unless he is an applicant who
has introduced improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him
by the Bureau of Lands, in which case he has the right to a sealed bidding.
Lands disposable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes are
classified as:
(a)

Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other

means
(b) Foreshore
(c)
Marshy land or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers.
The conditions of the sale are as follows:
(a)

The purchaser shall enter the land and introduce suitable

improvements thereon within six (6) months, and complete such
improvements not later than 18 months from the date of the award.
(b)
The purchaser shall pay the purchase price of the land in ten
(10) equal annual installments.
In case of lease, the rental shall be 3% of the value of the land plus 1% of the
value of the improvements. Every ten (10) years, the land and improvements
shall be reappraised but the rental shall not be increased by more than 100%
every ten years.
The duration of the lease is 25 years renewable for another 25 years at the
governments option.
128

138

Supra note 200.

Under R.A. No. 730 direct or negotiated sale of public land may be resorted to
if: (a) the applicant has occupied the same and has in good faith built a
residential house thereon where he lives, (b) he is not the owner of any
residential lot, and (c) the land is not needed by the government for any
public purpose.
Development of the laws governing foreshore/reclaimed areas
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 is the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. Under this
law, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of
the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. This law
allowed the reclamation of the sea in consequence of works constructed by
the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons. 129 It also provided
that the reclaimed land from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the
reclamation, provided the government issues the necessary permit and did
not reserve ownership over such land.
Act No. 1654 was enacted by the Philippine Commission on May 18, 1907,
which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. This act mandated that the
government should retain title to, and exercise control and disposition of, all
reclaimed lands. Private parties could lease these lands only if they were no
longer needed for public use. Public bidding for the lease of these lands was
also prescribed.
Act No. 2874 also known as the Public Land Act, was approved by the
Philippine Legislature in Nov. 29, 1919. It authorized the lease, but not the
sale, of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and individuals. Under
this law, the Governor-General was authorized to: (1) classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands (2) declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession and (3) to classify further such lands into
government, reclaimed, foreshore, marshy, and other classes of lands. It also
limited alienable lands to those which have been officially delimited and
classified. The land must first be declared not necessary for public use before
allowing lease to private parties. 130
Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, was passed
by the National Assembly which also authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. C.A. No.
141 continues to be the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. Under this law, the President had
the same powers as those of the Governor-General under Act No. 2874
except that the President is not authorized, under this law, to reclassify
reclaimed lands into non agricultural lands. The sale of lands of public
domain was likewise prohibited, only lease was allowed subject to the same
conditions prescribed in Act No. 2874. The government could sell to private
129
130

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, seb. 5.

Act No. 2874, secs. 6, 7, 8, 56 and 58.

139

parties only those agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes not

classified as disposable lands of the public domain.
State policy prohibits the sale of these lands, as they are part of public
dominion intended for public use. This state policy has been embodied in the
1935, 1973 as well as in the 1987 Constitution. Since then and until now, the
only way the government could sell government reclaimed areas to private
properties is through a legislative enactment allowing such sale. The reason
behind this requirement is that government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private properties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations.
c. Disposition of Public Lands for Educational, Charitable and Similar
Purposes
Lands under this category may be disposed of by the Government in favor of
a province, city, municipality or other branches of the Government in the
form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any form.
Such lands may also be sold or leased to qualified private persons for the
purpose of founding a cemetery, church, college, school, university or other
educational institutions for educational, charitable or philantrophical
purposes or scientific research. The Secretary of the DENR has the discretion
to sell the land without auction and to waive the condition requiring
cultivation.
d. Townsite Reservations
The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, may, if public interest so requires, issue a proclamation
reserving lands for townsite purposes to found a new town.
Procedure:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Survey of the exterior boundaries of the site

Drafting the proclamation
Signing of the proclamation
Transmittal of copies of the proclamation to the Director of Lands
and the Register of Deeds
Filing of compulsory registration proceedings to settle and
adjudicate private claims within the townsite
Subdivision of the land according to development plans
Sale of residential lots by oral bidding to the highest bidder

e. Reservations of Public and Quasi-Public Purposes

The President also has the power to designate by proclamation any tract or
tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic
of the Philippines or any of its branches or of the inhabitants thereof, of for
quasi-public uses or purposes when public interest requires it, including

140

reservations for highways, rights-of-way for railroads, hydraulic power sites,

irrigation systems, communal pasture or legua communales, public parks,
public quarries, public fishponds, workingmens village and other
improvements for public benefit.
Preferential Rights of Actual Occupants
If, before the delimitation and survey of a tract of public land and before its
classification as alienable and disposable, such land shall be actually
occupied by a person other than the applicant, the Director of Lands shall
inform the occupant of his preferential right to apply for the land and shall
give him 120 days time in which to file the application or apply for the
concession by any of the forms of disposition authorized by this Act, if such
occupant is qualified to receive a concession under this Act.
PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION

141

CHAPTER III
THE OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF PRIVATE LANDS
A.

Distinction between Lands of the Public Domain and Private Lands

According to Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

Sec. 7 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Our ancestors acquired and physically possessed and held lands which they
considered belong to them. Nobody bothered them. Upon the Spanish
conquest and occupation of the Islands, all lands within the territory of the
Philippine Islands automatically belonged to the Crown of Spain. And, the
land and property laws of Spain, ipso jure, took effect therein. This is the
Regalian Doctrine.131
The Crown Lands were distributed to the inhabitants in accordance with the
laws of Spain, principally the laws of the Indias (Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indias),132 and became lands of private ownership or private lands.
This transformation transpired once more during the American Occupation of
the Philippine Islands in 1898, by way of (1) State Grant the Homestead
Patent; (2) Sale the Sales Patent; and (3) Administrative and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect title the Free Patent. All Free Patent were available
as they are now, under the Public Land Act. 133
Agricultural lands of the public domain are deemed alienable and disposable
and by the foregoing methods of land acquisition, public lands ceased as
such and became private lands of the purchaser, or occupants and
possessors.134
Therefore, private land, may be as it has been, defined as any land of
private ownership. This includes both lands owned by private individuals and
lands which are patrimonial property of the state or of municipal
corporations.135 Property of private ownership includes (1) the patrimonial
property of the State, and (2) property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.136 Most of these private lands emanated from
private agricultural lands that had been, or may still be, sold or granted by
the State to individual citizens, associations and corporation qualified to

131
132
133
134
135
136

142

Piero v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386 (1974).

Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 (1908).
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 168.
Id.
BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11, at 469.
CIVIL CODE, art. 425.

acquire or hold lands of the public domain and subject to the limitations
provided by law.137
Private property and patrimonial property
Private property connotes ownership of an immovable or real property,
and/or a movable or personal property. As abovementioned, it specifically is
comprised of all property that belongs to private persons, natural or juridical,
either judicially or collectively. And real property is described in the Civil Code
as (1) the immovable or property which consists principally of land; (2)
those movables as the buildings, trees plants, statues or other objects
placed on land that reveals the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land; and (3) the real rights over the immovable property. 138
Property ownership, or land of private ownership and private property are
synonymous. It also means, and includes the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities. These are property of public
dominion that are no longer intended or needed: (1) for public use; (2) for
public service; or (3) for the development of national wealth. Some of these
are rivers shores, banks, ports fortresses, roads and street, parks and
others.139
A stone fort on land by the sea, constructed since time immemorial as a
defense against the Moro invasion, that had not been used for many years for
that purpose became private or patrimonial property of the State. 140
San Lazaro Estate in Manila on which stood the San Lazaro Hospital is private
or patrimonial property of the State under Articles 340 and 345 of the
Spanish Civil Code (now Articles 421 and 425 of the Civil Code). 141
Friar lands are patrimonial property of the State under Act No. 1120 and
Commonwealth Act no. 141. In 1906, the Philippine Commission headed by
Governor William H. Taft proposed the purchase of Friar Lands, belonging to
the Dominica, Augustinian and Recoletos Mission. The Philippine Bill of 1902
authorized the purchase of friar lands to be sold to actual occupants and
settlers. Accordingly, Governor Taft proceeded to Rome in 1903, and
purchased form the highest ecclesiastical authorities 410,000 acres of Friar
Lands at $7,230,000. Sometime in 1938, the Philippine Government bought
another Friar Land, a big run-down Riceland, the Buenavista Estate, near
Manila at $1,500,000 from San Juan de Dios Hospital. 142
In Cruz v. Secretary,143 the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act or IPRA was assailed
as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives the State of its ownership
137
138
139
140

141
142
143

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1,

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1,
Id.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES &
PHILIPPINES, VOL. II 32 (1963).
Id. at 34.
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000.

at 80.
at 169.
JURISPRUDENCE

ON THE

CIVIL CODE

OF THE

at 170.

143

over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. The vote
of the Supreme Court was equally divided, 7-7. The opinion defending
constitutionality held the following: (1) Ancestral domain and ancestral lands
are not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to
indigenous people. Cario v. Insular Government144 recognized native title
held by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded from the concept of jura
regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural
resources. The right to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources
covers only exploration to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant
of exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to utilization
as expressly allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right,
not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from entering into coproduction, joint venture, or production sharing agreements with private
entities.
On the other hand, the opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held
the following: (1) the law amounts to abdication of the authority over a
significant area of the countrys patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full control of
natural resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the
provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.
Classification of private lands
The phrase private lands or lands of private ownership have been defined
in our jurisprudence as those lands of the public domain: (1) That are, or has
been in the possession of occupants and their predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial.145 (2) That had been awarded to an applicant with (a) Sales
or Homestead Patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 19-32), or Title
issued by virtue of the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754; or (b) Free Patent
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 47-56); (c) Title by Composition with
the State pursuant to the Mauras Royal Decreed; (4) Possessor Information
issued under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1893 after the composition or
confirmation of imperfect title held by the occupant with claim of ownership.
Private lands may be classified in the same manner as those of public
lands.146
B.

Constitutional Restrictions

As a general rule, only the following may acquire private lands pursuant to
Section 7:
(1)
(2)

Filipino citizens and

Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines, at
least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens as
defined in Section 2.

Exception to the rule

144
145
146

144

212 U.S. 449.

Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 936 (1909).
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW supra note 1, at 184-185.

However, by exception the following may also acquire private lands:

(1)
(2)

(3)

Aliens, but only by hereditary succession.

A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost Philippine
citizenship but only under the terms provided in Section 8,
Article XII which states that, Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship maybe a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. 147
Foreign states may acquire land but only for embassy and staff
residence purposes.

In Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, the Court held to extend the exception to

testamentary succession for otherwise the provision will be for naught and
meaningless.148 Another jurisprudential exception is when an alien acquires
land by hereditary succession, such alien cannot renounce the right to inherit
in favor of one who is not qualified. 149 In the case of Moss v. Director of Lands,
the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution provided that until final
withdrawal of the United States, Americans and American Corporations
enjoyed the same civil rights as Filipino citizens and could therefore acquire
private lands until July 4, 1946.150
As mentioned previously, private land means any land of private ownership.
This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands which are
patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations. 151 In the case
of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, the term private agricultural lands meant
any private land that was neither timber nor mineral land. 152 Again, the
capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. This is because aliens were
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (since the 1935
Constitution), aliens, whether individuals or corporations, were also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The prohibition applies even to a
regime of conjugal partnership in marriage. Thus, an alien spouse in a
conjugal partnership does not have the right to give or not to give consent in
the disposition of the land.153
Exception for former Filipino Citizens:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 7 of this article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to the
limitations provided by law.
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 470.

111 SCRA 704.
Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998.
80 SCRA 269.
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1157.
79 Phil. 461.
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1158.

145

A 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution created another exception in

favor of a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship.
He or she may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. This is now embodied in
Sec. 8. The 1987 provision, however, no longer contains the phrase for use
by him as residence.154
The laws on land ownership by natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship are governed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 (BP 185),
which was enacted in March 1982, and Republic Act 8179 (RA 8179), which
amended the Foreign Investment Act of 1991.
BP 185 stipulates the guidelines on land ownership by former Filipinos for
purposes of establishment of residence while RA 8179 (Section 10) specifies
entitlements and conditions for land acquisition for investment purposes.
The following are the provisions of BP 185 and RA 7042, as amended by RA
8179, pertinent to land ownership by former Filipinos:
BP 185
Particulars
Applies to acquisition of
land
for
purposes
of
residence
Size/Area Coverage Maximum of 1000 m2 for
urban land
Maximum
of
one
(1)
hectare for rural land
Land Acquisition for Either of the spouses
Both Spouses
may
avail
of
this
privilege.

RA 8179
Applies to acquisition of
land
for
purposes
of
business or commerce
Maximum of 5000 m2 for
urban land
Maximum of three (3)
hectares for rural land
Either of the spouses
may
avail
of
this
privilege.

In case both spouses wish

to acquire lands for this
purposes, the total area
acquired
should
not
exceed the maximum
Additional
Land In case he/she already
Acquisition
owns urban or rural lands
for residential purposes,
he/she
may
acquire
additional urban or rural
lands, which when added
to those he/she presently
owns shall not exceed the
authorized maximum area.
Limits to Acquisition A person may acquire not
of Land
more than two (2) lots

In case both spouses wish

to acquire lands for this
purposes, the total area
acquired
should
not
exceed the maximum
In case he /she already
owns urban or rural lands
for
business
purposes,
he/she
may
acquire
additional urban or rural
lands which when added to
those
he/she presently
owns shall not exceed the
authorized maximum area.
A person may acquire not
more than two (2) lots

154

146

BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1166.

which should be situated

in different municipalities
or cities anywhere in the
Philippines, provided that
the total area of those
lots do not exceed 1,000
sq. meters for urban land
or one (1) hectare for
rural land for use as
residence.
An individual who has
already acquired urban
land shall be disqualified
from acquiring rural land
and vice versa.

Use of Land

The acquired land should

not be used for any
purpose other than for
his/her residence

Special
Requirements

In
addition
to
the
requirements provided for
in other laws for the
registration of titles to
lands,
the
transferee

which should be situated in

different municipalities or
cities anywhere in the
Philippines, provided that
the total area of those lots
do not exceed 5,000 sq.
meters for urban land or
three (3) hectares for rural
land for use as residence.
Under Section 4 of Rule
XII of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of
RA 704 as amended by
RA 8179, a transferee
who has already acquired
urban land shall be
disqualified
from
acquiring rural land and
vice versa. However, if
the
transferee
has
disposed of his rural land,
he may still acquire rural
land and vice versa,
provided that this will be
used for business.
A transferee of residential
land acquired under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 185 may
still avail of the privilege
granted under this law.
Section 5 of Rule XII
specifically states that the
land should be primarily,
directly and actually used
in the performance or
conduct of the owners
business or commercial
activities in the broad
areas
of
agriculture,
industry
and
services
including the lease of land
but excluding the buying
or selling thereof.
In addition to the usual
registration requirements
pertinent
to
the
conveyance
of
real
estate,
the
transfer

147

should submit to the

Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the
property is located a
sworn statement showing
the following:

Date and place of

birth

Names
and
addresses of his/her
parents,
his/her
spouse, and children,
if any;

The area, location,

and
mode
of
acquisition of his/her
landholdings in the
Philippines, if any;

His/her
intention
to
reside
permanently in the
Philippines;

Date he/she lost

his/her
Philippine
citizenship and the
country
of
which
hw/she is presently a
citizen.

contemplated shall not

be recorded unless the
transferee submits to the
Registry of Deeds of the
province or city where
the land is situated, the
following:

Certification
of
business
registration
issued by the Bureau
of Trade Regulation
and
Consumer
Protection
of
the
Department of Trade
and Industry;

Sworn statement
same as that in BP
185;

Certification from
the assessor of the
municipality
or
province where the
property is situated
that the subject land
for transfer is in an
urban or rural area;

If an agricultural
land is acquired, a
certification from the
Department of Agrarian
Reform that the land is a
retained area of the
transferor
and
an
affidavit
of
the
transferee attesting that
his total landholdings
inclusive of the land to
be acquired does not
exceed the 5-hectare
limit fixed by RA 6657
(the
Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act
CARP).

A Filipino corporation can acquire land

Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution makes the capacity to acquire private land
dependent on capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private

148

corporations can hold lands of the public domain only by lease. They are
thus not in the same position as aliens who cannot even lease land of the
public domain.155 By analogy, Filipino Corporations, as a creation of the
legislature (The Corporation Code, Batas Pambansa 68) also has Filipino
citizenships as a juridical person. It is also one of the expressed powers of a
corporation as provided by Sec. 36 to wit:
(g) To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease,
pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and
personal property, including securities and bonds of other
corporations, as the transaction of the lawful business of the
corporation may reasonably require.156
In contrast with public lands
The term public lands refer to such lands of the public domain as are
subject to alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with the Public
Land Act. The phrase public land was held to be equivalent to public
domain. It does not by any means include all lands of government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement by homestead and other similar laws.
Accordingly, government land and public land are not synonymous terms;
the first is more extensive and embraces not only the second by also other
lands of the government already reserved to public use or subject to private
right.157
The rules for the disposition of lands of the public domain are the ff: 158
(1)

Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.

All others are inalienable and may be developed and utilized
only according to the rules established in Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.

(2)

Only public corporations and qualified individuals may acquire

alienable lands of the public domain. Corporations can hold
alienable land of the public domain only by lease.

(3)

Private corporations are allowed to lease no more than one

thousand hectares.

(4)

The congress shall determine by law, the size of lands of the

public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that the acquisition of public

agricultural lands by purchase is governed by Chapter V (Sale). Any citizen of
155
156
157
158

Id. at 1161.
The Corporation Code, 36, g
Supra note 30.
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1145-1146.

149

the Philippines of lawful age of the head of a family may purchase any tract
of public agricultural land not to exceed twelve hectares 159 which shall be sold
thru sealed bidding. The land shall be awarded to the highest bidder, but the
applicant may equal the highest bid. The purchase price may be paid in full
upon the making of the award or in not more than ten equal annual
installments from the date of the award. It is required that the purchaser shall
have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five years from the
date of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must show actual
occupancy, cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the land until
the date of final payment.160
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila
79 Phil. 461
FACTS: Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate,
Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of w/c was
interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish
said registration but it was denied on the ground that Krivenko is
an alien. Krivenko then brought the case to the CFI of Manila by
means of a consulta. The court rendered judgment sustaining
the refusal.
HELD: The 1935 Constitution classified lands namely as
agricultural, timber and mineral since this was the basic
classification existing in laws and jurisprudence at that time. The
phrase public agricultural lands includes residential lot & their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. To construe this phrase
as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural,
the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and possess
not only residential lots and houses for themselves but also
other forms of public agricultural lands.
Director of Lands v. Lood
124 SCRA 460
FACTS: Quezon City Development & Financing Corp filed an
application with the CFI of Rizal, seeking the registration of title
under Act. 496, claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a
parcel of land in Taytay, Rizal. The Director of Lands, filed an
opposition, on the ground that the applicant has no sufficient
title to the land, not having acquired the same by composition
title from the Spanish Govt or by possessory information title
pursuant to Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. The CFI ruled
that the applicant has a registrable title over the parcel of land.
HELD: The applicant, being a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply subject property for registration. Limiting the mode of
acquisition of corporations, by purchase, but not by homestead,
159
160

150

PHIL. CONST. art. 12, 3

Public Land Act, 22, 26 & 28

free patent or judicial confirmation, does not offend the

Constitution. Corporations were never intended to acquire lands
by such modes. Further, corporations, as product of statutory
action, the legislative can define the powers of a corporation.
C.

Modes of Acquisition

The conveyance of public land by the government to a private individual is

generally known as a public grant. How the government makes such grant is
well illustrated by what actually took place in the Philippines after its
discovery by Magellan in 1521. It was held by the discovery and conquest of
the entire Philippine territory became the exclusive patrimony and dominion
of the Spanish Crown. With this as basis, the Spanish government began to
handle the direct distribution of public lands to settlers, vassals and other
people by the issuance of royal grants and concessions in varied forms.
It seems but only logical that tile to land must emanate from some source for
it cannot just issue forth from nowhere. And consistent with the general
tendency observed in different countries, the government or head of state is
vested with such power to make public land grants according to existing
statutes.
Republic v. Lee
197 SCRA 13
FACTS: On June 29, 1976, Lee filed before the CFI of Pangasinan,
an application for registration in her favor of a parcel of land at
Magaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, filed an
opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the
Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition
of title. The CFI rendered judgment confirming the title of the
applicants over the said parcel of land pursuant to the Land
Registration Law.
ISSUE: WON public land can be acquired by a private person
without any grant.
HELD: No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, for government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land
openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since
July 26, 1894 or prior thereto.
(1)

Acquisition by Public Grant161

161

PEA, REGISTRATION

OF

LAND, supra note 199, at 15.

151

The Spanish Government, during their colonial rule, issued Royal Grants as
title to the lands, to discoverers, settlers, vassals, and other people in varied
forms.
During the Commonwealth Government, the Public Land Act was passed and
by virtue thereof public agricultural lands were distributed to citizens under
certain conditions specified therein. These lands so distributed became
ultimately the property of the distributees.
In, Aureus v. Secretary of Agriculture & Commerce,162 it was held that the
mere filing by an individual of an application for a permit to occupy a piece of
public land does not create an obligation on the part of the administrative
officer concerned to grant his application. If it does, the Director of Lands or
the Secretary of Agriculture, will be a mere robot of every such applicant. It is
discretionary in the said officials to grant or not to grant such application.
While in Luzuriaga v. Director of Lands,163 it was held that when a municipality
has used a land from time immemorial for recognized public purposes based
upon a public necessity, which purposes and necessity were formerly
recognized by the Government as a basis for a grant of land to a municipality,
a grant from the State in favor of the municipality is presumed.
Proof of acquisition from the state
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express
or implied, from the government, it is indispensable that there be a showing
of title from the State. One claiming rights must prove that he has complied
with the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the
procedural requirements for acquisition of public land. 164
Private Grants of Land Titles
The transfer of title to land by the owner himself or his duly authorized
representative to another by mutual consent is recognized by law. Consent of
the grantor is an essential element. To give effect to the transfer, a deed of
conveyance must be executed to be followed by its registration at the
Registry of Deeds.165
(2)

Prescription

Land ownership and other real rights or obligations may be acquired through
the lapse of time, in the manner and action laid down by law. 166 All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Thus, the peaceful and adverse possession of land that is
continuous and uninterrupted for a certain period of time may be converted
162
163
164
165
166

152

85 Phil. 1.
24 Phil. 193.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 16.
Id. at 17.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1106.

into ownership of the land. 167 However, property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.168
The claim of ownership169 must be in the concept of owners, adverse, public
and peaceful.170 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. 171
The law fixes ten (10) years by ordinary prescription, that is, without need of
title and good faith,172 and thirty (30) years by extraordinary prescription,
without need of title and good faith.173
For ordinary prescription, the following requisites must concur: (1) Capacity to
acquire by prescription; (2) the object must be susceptible of prescription; (3)
The possession must be in concept of owner, public, peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted; (4) The possession must be in good faith; (5) The possession
must be by virtue of a just title; and (6) The period of possession must be 4
years if the object is movable or ten years if it is immovable.
In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the following must concur: (1)
Capacity to acquire by prescription; (2) The object must be susceptible of
prescription; (3) The possession must be in the concept of owner, public,
peaceful, continuous, and uninterrupted; and (4) The period of possession
must be 8 years if the object is movable or 30 years if it is immovable. 174
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.175 In its negative aspect, it consists in the ignorance
of the possessor of any flaw which would invalidate his title or mode of
acquisition.176
For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor
was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 177 Its requisites are: (1) It
must be just; (2) it must be true; (3) it must be valid; (4) it must be proved. 178
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion
of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if
167
168
169
170
171

172
173
174
175
176
177
178

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.

CIVIL CODE, art. 1113.
Supra note 246.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 17.
DESIDERIO P. JURADO, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
653 (7th rev. ed, 1980). [hereinafter JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS].
CIVIL CODE, art. 1137.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1496.
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 656-657.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1127.
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1129.
CIVIL CODE, arts. 1117, 1130-1131.

153

the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. 179 However, the
period of possession in acquisitive prescription may be interrupted naturally,
civilly, or by express or tacit recognition by the possessor of the ownership. 180
In extinctive prescription, interruption may occur (1) when they are filed
before the court, (2) when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the
creditors, and (3) when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.181 With such conversion, property may now fall within the
contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and may be registered
even if the possession commenced on a date later than the date of
enactment of the Property Registration Decree.182
Such does not preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which commenced after the
abovementioned date, considering Section 14(2) of the Decree which governs
and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. While as
a rule, prescription does not run against the State, the exception is where the
law itself expressly provides. An example is said Section 14 (2) which
specifically allows qualified individuals to apply for the registration of
property, ownership of which he has acquired by prescription under existing
laws.183 However, a property registered under the provisions of P.D. 1529 is
not subject to prescription. Also, prescription is unavailing not only against his
hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the
personality of their predecessor-in-interest. 184
Moreover, it was held that a persons possession of a parcel of land covered
by a TCT cannot render nugatory the right of the holders of a certificate of
title. The reason is that prescription does not run against registered land. A
title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and
notorious possession. Moreover, in asserting ownership by donation,
petitioners were in effect assailing the title of respondents. A Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked, the issue on its validity can only be raised in
an action expressly institute for that purpose. 185 A possessor of land who
may not be the owner, after a lapse of a certain period prescribed in the law,
may assert ownership thereof as against anyone except the true owner or
one with a better title based on an earlier possession which he had not
abandoned. Adverse possession or prescription does not run against private
lands brought under the operation of the Torrens system, nor against public
land except where the law expressly so provides. 186

179
180
181
182
183
184

185
186

154

Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175 (1918).

JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.
CIVIL CODE, ART. 1155.
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE, supra note 121, at 657.
Simeona Barcelona, et al. v. Hilarion Barcelon and the Honorable Court o
Appeals, 100 Phil. 251 (1956).
Ong, et al. v. Sps. Cabucos, 356 SCRA 786 (2001).
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 199, at 15-16.

For purposes of prescriptive possession, there is just title (mode) when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property thru any of the modes
allowed by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. These are
enumerated in Titles 1 to 5, Book III of the Civil Code, namely; (a) occupation,
(b) intellectual creation, (c) law, (d) donation, (e) succession (testate or
intestate), (f) in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition, and (g)
prescription.187
In computing for prescription, the present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor-in-interest. It is presumed that the present possessor who was
also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession
during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary. 188
Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be
counted in favor of the adverse claimant. 189
Prescription does not run between husband and wife. Even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlement or by judicial
decree. Neither does prescription run between parents and children during
the minority or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during
the continuance of the guardianship.190
While prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, it may take place where
it is clearly shown that the co-owner has repudiated the co-owership, and
that the other co-owners were appraised of the repudiation. 191
Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already
obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed
to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
imply the abandonment of the right acquired. 192
Laches should not be confused with prescription. Laches is different from, and
applies independently of, prescription. While prescription is concerned with
the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a
matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is
statutory; laches is not. Laches apllies in equity, whereas prescription applies
at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time; laches is not. 193
(3)

Accretion

187

CIVIL CODE, art. 712.

CIVIL CODE, art. 1138.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1136.
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 654.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 19.
CIVIL CODE, art. 1112.
Heirs of Batiof Lacamen v. Heirs of Laman, 65 SCRA 605 (1975).

188
189
190
191
192
193

155

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited. 194 It is the act by which
the land bordering a stream or other body of water increases its area by the
gradual deposit of soil or seaweeds by the current of the river or other natural
process.195
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters. As a mode of acquiring property
under Article 457 of the Civil Code, there are three requisites which must
concur before an accretion is said to have taken place:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The accumulation of soil or sediment must be gradual and

imperceptible;
That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the rivers.196

These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to
owners of lands adjoining he banks of rivers or streams any accretion
gradually received from the effects of the current waters. 197 Alluvion is the
soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank. 198
In order to acquire land by accretion, there should be a natural and actual
continuity of the accretion to the land of the riparian owner. 199 The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effects of the current of
the river is indispensable. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. 200 A
riparian owner then does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. 201
There must be evidence to prove that the addition to the property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the river. 202
In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was
sudden or that it occurred though avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. 203 Acts of
possession exercised over bordering land are always understood legally to
cover that portion added to the property by accretion. 204 One must prove his
claim by a preponderance of evidence.205
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

156

Navarro v Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 39.
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 109.
Republic v Court of Appeals and Tancinco, GR No. L-61647, October 12, 1984
NOBLEJAS, supra note 285.
Hodges v Garcia, G.R. No. L-12730, Aug. 22, 1960.
Cortes v City of Manila, G.R. No. L-4012, March 25, 1908
65 C.J.S. 183

The fact that the accretion to ones land used to pertain to anothers estate,
which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude the former
from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes
in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of
the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land
bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Property Registration Decree. 206
Riparian owners are unquestionably owners of the alluvial deposits on their
lands caused by the current of the river, and the area within the boundaries
thereof prevail over that which the title shows. 207 The reason behind the law
giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river
is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the
location of his land. 208
Accretion does not become automatically registered land just because the lot
which received such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, registration under the Torrens System of ownership
is another.209 As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens system.210
Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and,
therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.
Since the land is foreshore land or property of public dominion, its disposition
falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Lands Management
Bureau. Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer
needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership. The adjoining registered owner of foreshore land
cannot claim ownership thereof by right of accretion. 211
(4)

Reclamation212

This method suggests the filling of submerged land by deliberate act and
reclaiming title thereto. In the Philippines, there is no law, express or implied
which grants to owners of adjacent upland the right to fill the adjacent land
under water. Reclaimed lands may however, be declared by the government
as property of the adjoining owners and as such increment thereto only when
it is no longer necessary for public use. Reclamation projects may be
undertaken for the establishment of residential, commercial or industrial
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Hodges, G.R. No. L-12730.

Government of the Philippines v. Abaja, 52 Phil. 261 (1928).
Cortes, G.R. No. L-4012.
Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652 (1962)
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 73465, September 7, 1989
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, GR. No. L-12958, May 30, 1960.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 42.

157

sites, construction or extension of roads, wharves or piers, airfields, parks,

playgrounds, plazas, market places, etc.
Republic Act No. 2264, entitled AN ACT AMENDING THE LAWS GOVERNING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY CREATING THEIR AUTONOMY AND REORGANIZING
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, does not expressly authorize local
governments to undertake or carry out reclamation projects. However, such
authority is believed to be included in the general authority granted local
governments to undertake and carry out any public works projects. This
view is grounded on Section 12 of said Act. 213
The reclamation projects in Manila Bay and the coastal municipalities
extending from Pasay City to Cavite City are being undertaken pursuant to
the authority granted by R.A. 2264 to local governments.
Under R.A. 1899, the National Government granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities, the authority to carry out at their own expense, the
reclamation by dredging, filling, and other means of any foreshore lands
bordering on them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities or
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Minister of Finance,
the Minister of Public Works and Highways. Any and all such lands reclaimed
will become property of the respective municipalities and chartered cities; but
the new foreshore along the reclaimed areas shall continue to become
property of the National Government.
(5)

Voluntary Transfer

A private grant is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the
owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Here the consent or
cooperation of the grantor is an essential element. This transfer is given
effect by the voluntary execution of deed of conveyance in certain prescribed
form, completed by the recording or registration thereof in a public office. The
purpose of such registration is to serve public notice at least constructively
and thereby legally bind third persons. Under the Torrens system, it is the
registration that is the operative act to convey the land and affect title
thereto. In other words, the legal title to the land does not pass until the
conveyance shall have been duly registered or made of public record. 214
Filamore called this transfer Tradition. Tradition is the act of delivering the
thing sold to the buyer or vendee by (a) turning over material possession of

213

214

158

R.A. No. 2264, Sec. 12 provides that the implied power of a province, a city or
municipality shall be liberally construed in its favor, and that any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor
of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. It also provided that
the general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to
give more power to local governments in promoting the economic condition,
social welfare and material progress of the people in the community.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 20.

the thing sold, or (b) symbolic transfer of ownership thereof. 215 The former
transfers actual and physical control over the buyer, while the other is done
by executing a public instrument. Filmore said that, according to Melquiades
J. Gamboa, the requisites of tradition are: (1) the transferor is the owner of
the property transferred and has the capacity and intention to grant; (2) the
transferee has the capacity to acquire the property; (3) there is justa causa or
valid means of transfer such as the contract of sale, barter or legacy; and (4)
the actual transfer of possession to the transferee is manifested by some
outward act.216
(6)

Involuntary Alienation

This method of transfer does not require the consent or cooperation of the
owner of the land, and, in fact, is usually carried out against his will. For the
more common forms of involuntary alienation, we have them in connection
with judgments of the courts in expropriation or condemnation proceedings.
Land is forcibly acquired by the state through the exercise of eminent
domain, or by way of escheat or forfeiture. It may also be confiscated, seized
or attached, and subsequently sold at public auction to the highest bidder.
We have the execution sale by the sheriff to satisfy a money judgment, the
tax sale to satisfy unpaid taxes and penalties, the auction sale by a public
officer in foreclosure of mortgage. Some authorities even consider the sale of
property under special order of the court for and in behalf of a minor or a
person under legal disability as falling within the category of involuntary
alienation in the same way as a sale by judicial administrator or executor of
an estate of a decedent. Under this mode of acquiring land, the purchasers
are generally subject to the rule of caveat emptor. 217
(7)

Testate and Intestate Succession

Transfer of title by testate or intestate succession is governed by the Civil

Law. Title to land is acquired by descent in case an heir succeeds the
deceased owner in intestacy or by reasons of certain relationship which
entitles him to succeed by operation of law. To be an heir, it requires a
certain degree or relationship with the decedent.
A landowner may execute his last will and testament designating his heir and
legatee who shall receive the respective portions of his estate pursuant to
law. 218
The testator cannot dispose of that portion of his estate called Legitime which
is reserved for his compulsory heirs, namely: the legitimate children or
descendants, legitimate parents and ascendants, his widow; acknowledged
natural children, and natural children by legal fiction as well as illegitimate
children. 219
215
216
217
218
219

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.

FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 54.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 299.
CIVIL CODE, arts. 884-914.
CIVIL CODE, arts. 886-887.

159

When a person dies without a will, or the will does not institute an heir to the
property or the testator, or no one succeeds under the will, intestate
succession shall take place.220 Under this system, his legitimate children and
descendants succeed him, followed by his parents, mother and father, who
inherit in equal shares; or when they are both dead, the illegitimate children,
or acknowledged natural children, the natural children by legal fiction and
adulterous children succeed in this order. Finally, the State inherits when the
ascendants and descendants of the testator do not exist. 221
Professor Gamboa summarizes the order of intestate succession, thus: (1)
legitimate children and their descendants; (2) legitimate parents and
descendants; (3) illegitimate children and their descendants; (4) surviving
spouse without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters; (5) collateral
relatives within the fifth (5th) degree; and (6) the State. 222
In Austria v. Reyes 223 the Supreme Court enunciated that testacy is favored
and doubts are resolved on the side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate.
Furthermore, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided
and the wishes of the testator allowed prevailing, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
Succession by Devise
One succeeds by devise when he acquires land from one who may not be a
relative, if he is named by the latter in his last will and testament to succeed
as such.
Even a stranger may acquire title by devise if appropriate
disposition has been made in his favor by the testator in the latters will.
Where the heirs entitled would so prefer, title to land under this method may
formally be transferred without proceeding in court. Under the provisions of
Rule 74, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, they may agree upon an
extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the decedent, provided
there are no debts left by him which remain unsettled.

220
221
222
223

160

CIVIL CODE, art. 968.

Arts. 963-1014, ibid.
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 19, at 204.
31 SCRA 754 (1970).

161

CHAPTER IV
PROPERTIES NOT SUSCEPTILBLE OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution provides that only agricultural lands
of the public domain are susceptible of private ownership. Thus, forest lands,
mineral lands, and national parks are said to be outside the commerce of
men. In addition to this list, however, law and jurisprudence heve recognized
additional properties which are not susceptible of private ownership. Any title
obtained by a private individual over these properties is considered null and
void.
1. Property of public dominion
Article 419 of the Civil Code provides that the following are properties of
public dominion:
(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and
others of similar character;
(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
These properties are part of the public domain and are outside the commerce
of man and are therefore, not subject to private appropriation. These
properties, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale.
All other properties of the State, which are not of the character mentioned
above, form part of its patrimonial property. Property of public dominion,
when no longer needed for public use or for public service, shall also form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.
According to Article 5 of the Water Code of the Philippines, the following
belong to the State as well: (1) rivers and their natural beds; (2) continuous
or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and
the bed themselves; (3) natural lakes and lagoons; (4) all other categories of
surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall whether
natural, or artificial, and water form agriculture run-off, seepage and
drainage; (5) atmospheric water; (6) subterranean or ground waters and; (7)
seawater.
Article 6 of the same Code provides that even the following waters found in
private lands belong to the state: (1) continuous or intermittent waters rising
on such lands; (2) lakes and lagoons naturally occurring on such lands; (3)
rain water falling on such lands; (4) subterranean or ground waters and; (5)
waters in swamps and marshes.

162

2. Forest lands
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution, do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooden land or an expanse covered
by dense growth of trees and underbrush. 224 The fact that the disputed land
is not thickly forested and, in any event, it has been in the actual
possession of many persons for many years, it was already private land
which is better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification. Furthermore, the mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry
land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals, which it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes.225
The power to convert a land which forms part of public forest into private
property is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development and beyond the power of the registration court. 226 Possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property.
Ankron v. Government of the Philippines
40 Phil. 10
Facts: An action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its
purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a
certain piece or parcel of land with the following description:
That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the
north, the exact description and extension of which does not
appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four
years prior to the date of this decision.
That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by
Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and
that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that
portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used
as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle,
and horses;
That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of
hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling
house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin
224
225

226

Naguit, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.

Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 14213, Aug. 23,
1919, 40 Phil. 10.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lastimado, 89 SCRA 648 (1979); Director of
Lands v. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975); Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals and
Gallo, 153 SCRA 351 (1987).

163

(storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and

improvements on said land.
The appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be
registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law
for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not
discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however., refers
the court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson
vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to the
argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant
relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation
with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code).
Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall
include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever
age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the
purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character."
HELD: Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the
registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment
that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for
registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is
public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for
registration must be denied. Many definitions have been given
for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These
definitions are valuable so far as they establish general rules. In
this relation we think the executive department of the
Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should,
in view especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act
No. 1148, define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the
end that the people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed
in "the future a continued supply of valuable timber and other
forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry
should accurately and definitely define what lands are forestry,
occupants in the future would be greatly assisted in their proof
and the courts would be greatly aided in determining the
question whether the particular land is forestry or other class of
lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry
and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many

164

definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and

"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land
the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or
the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there
exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof
in that particular case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes.
The courts, however, has the right to presume in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof.
3. Watersheds
A watershed is an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by
a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. 227
Protection of the watersheds is an inter-generational responsibility.
Watershed reservation is not susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation.228
4. Mangrove swamps
Section 4 of the Philippine Fisheries Code defines mangroves as a
community of intertidal plants including all species of trees, shrubs, vines and
herbs found on coasts, swamp or border camps. It is now settled that
mangroves are forestal, not alienable agricultural land and are, therefore, not
subject to disposition.229
5. Mineral lands
DENR defines mineral land as any area where mineral resources are found
and mineral resources as any concentration of mineral /rocks with potential
economic value.230 Ownership by a person of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
227
228
229

230

Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175 (2001).
Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA
598.
Sec 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.

165

said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals
belong.231
6. National parks
Lands reserved for a national park, as well as those within the protected
areas under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, like
the Bataan Natural Park, are inalienable are cannot be registered. 232
7. Military or naval reservation
Lands inside a military or naval reservation cannot be the object of
registration. It was held in Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association,
Inc.,233 that a military reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation
or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and,
therefore, not registrable, unless it is reclassified and declared as disposable
and alienable public land.
Foreshore lands and reclaimed lands234
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation,235
foreshore land has been invariably defined as that strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide or that part of the land adjacent to the sea
which is alternatively covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.
Republic. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998
Facts: Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved
on June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands
by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law,
reads:
Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

231

232
233
234

235

166

Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1980,
160 SCRA 228.
Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005.
G.R. No. 156951, Septempber 22, 2006.
OSWALDO D. AGCAOLI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND RELATED LAWS (LAND TITLES
AND DEEDS) 225-235, (2006 ed.). [hereinafter AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE]
299 SCRA 199 (1998).

On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899,

the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the
reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands
in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter
into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions
therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by
Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City
under certain terms and conditions. Certain portions of the said
lands are submerged lands
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an
Agreement for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay
City.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint
questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC
(Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the subject-matter of such
Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899 with regard to the phrase
foreshore lands
Issue: WON the lands in dispute are considered foreshore
lands and cannot, therefore, be alienated
HELD: The CA ruled erroneously when it opinioned that under RA
1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As
can be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization
aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the
intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal
connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point
of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also,
resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being plain
and unambiguous. Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice
are unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in
the law. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream);
the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

167

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In

so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands.
8. Submerged lands
Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, waters. . . owned by the State forming part of the public
domain and consequently inalienable. These areas, after reclamation, can be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the
only natural resources that the State can alienate. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service and
therefore, alienable and disposable lands open disposition. 236
Republic Act 4850 was passed on June 22, 1957 which authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. On
January 11, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued, repealing all laws
on reclamation of areas under water and vesting solely in the government the
power to reclaim lands.
On February 4, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1084 was issued, creating the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) which was renamed as Philippine Reclamation
Authority in 2004. It authorized PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged
areas of the public domain. It also empowers PEA to hold lands of public
domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute. Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of
public domain.
Executive Order 525 was issued on 1979 which designated PEA as the
national governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation
projects of the government which shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under
such contract, reclamation services rendered to PEA by private parties shall
be compensated. PEA becomes primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects and on behalf of the
National Government.
However, reclaimed areas do not automatically become alienable or
disposable upon acquisition by the PEA. Two official acts are needed before
reclaimed lands become alienable lands of public domain. First, there must be
a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition; and second, there must be a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service. Absent these two official acts, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
236

168

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152.

Nevertheless the requirement of a legislative enactment allowing the sale of

reclaimed disposable lands still applies to reclaimed areas of the PEA. The
PEAs power is further subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of public domain.
However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution, the court clarified that reclaimed
lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal
corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property[and]
may be soldto private properties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations.237
9. Lakes
Republic Act No. 4850 prescribes that lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which
form part of the bed of the said lake. 238 Areas forming part of the Laguna de
Bay are neither agricultural nor disposable lands of the public domain.
10.Navigable rivers
If the land forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the
decree and title in the name of the applicants would not give them any right
or title to it. Like the rest of the non-disposable properties, a land registration
court has no jurisdiction over navigable rivers and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title thereof in favor of a private applicant. Ownership of a
navigable stream may not be acquired under a free patent and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title does not change its public character. 239
It is part of public property and cannot be acquired by adverse possession. 240
11.Creeks
A creek has been defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. Under the Civil Code, a creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 241 It is only
after the government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 242
Constructions of a creek which prevent the water from flowing or convert it
into a fishpond do not alter the nature of the creek as a public property. 243
237
238

239
240
241

242
243

BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11 at 457.

Sec. 41, par. 11, Republic Act No. 4850, An Act Creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Prescribing its Powers, Functions and Duties, Providing
Funds Therefor, and for other purposes.
Mateo v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-21024, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 796.
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557.
An Act to ordain and institute the Civil Code of the Philippines [Civil Code] arts.
420(1) and 502(1).
Celestial v. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595, October 15, 2003.
Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455 (1918).

169

12.Reservation for public and semi-public purposes

The Public Land Act prescribes that a tract or tracks of land of the public
domain may be designated by the President as reservations for the use of the
Republic of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with the regulations prescribed for this purpose. Until
again declared alienable by the President, under Section 83 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or by proclamation, these lands remain part of
the pubic domain and shall not be subject to disposition.
The President may likewise reserve other lands, the use of which is not
otherwise declared by law, for settlement or public use. He shall also have
the power to reserve from sale or disposition any land belonging to the
private domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of which
is not otherwise declared by law. These lands shall thereafter remain directed
to the public use designated by the President. 244
Pursuant to Section 9 of the Public Land Act, the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time make the classification provided for in this section,
and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.245
NOTE: CAN BE REGISTERED AND BROUGHT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PD1529
(consistent with the fact that technically, it is alienable), BUT REGISTERED IN
THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT.

244

245

170

Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Republic v. Octobre, 123 SCRA 698 (1966).

PART II
LAND REGISTRATION

171

I. REGISTRATION OF LANDS IN THE PHILIPPINES

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
WHAT IS A LAND TITLE?
A land title is basically a proof of ownership. It is an evidence of right of
owner or extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and
as a rule assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of property. 246
Commonly, it is taken to mean as (1) ownership or, when used with
appropriate limiting words, a claim of ownership; or (2) the totality of
evidence, i.e., the operative facts which result in such ownership or on which
the claim of ownership is based.247
It is different from possession since one can own a thing without actually
possessing it and one can possess a thing without actually owning it. 248 Title
may imply possession but possession does not necessarily imply title. Title is
more than mere physical possession. It signifies the right of the person over
the property which he is in possession.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all land of the public domain as well as all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to be owned by the State. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented by the landowner that the subject land does not
come within the public domain, or that he has validly acquired such land and
therefore, it is within the scope of private ownership. 249
The land title serves as the evidence that the land has been reclassified and
is no longer part of the public domain and thus, can be validly disposed of or
alienated; and that the applicant has validly acquired such lands through any
of the modes recognized by law.
B. REGISTRATION, DEFINITION AND PURPOSE
Registration in general means any entry made in the books of the Registry,
including registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even marginal notes. In its strict sense, it is the entry made
in the Registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights.250

246

247

248

249
250

172

NARCISO PEA, ET AL., REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 3 (1994 ed.).
[hereinafter PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND].
ANTONIO NOBLEJAS & EDILBERTO NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 23 (2007 ed.). [hereinafter NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION].
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 1, ibid.
Pangkatipuran v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 621.
Po Sun Tun v. Price, GR No. 31346, Dec. 28, 1929, 54 Phil. 192.

Registration, while it asserts ownership, is not a means of acquiring a land.

Rather, it is a species of notice, declaring to the whole world that the person
has previously acquired a land and that he is the rightful owner of it. It is not
one of the modes of acquiring ownership as discussed in the previous section
but a mere confirmation of the ownership acquired through such modes.
It is not a prerequisite for a transfer to be legally binding upon the parties but
is necessary to bind third persons or those who might be interested
purchasers in the future who did not have knowledge of such transfer. The
persons who are bound by any conveyance, notwithstanding lack of
registration are: (1) grantor (2) his heirs and devisees and (3) third persons
having actual notice or knowledge thereof. To these people, registration is a
surplasage.251
It affords some means of publicity so that persons may search records and
thereby acquire security against transactions which have not been revealed.
The system prevents fraudulent claims to lands by concealment of transfers.
Since registration constitutes notice to the whole world, it is presumed that
the purchaser has well examined all records affecting such title. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. 252 The
rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record
contains is a rule of law and must be absolute. 253
In short, the purpose of registration is to make the instruments evidencing
any transactions over the land as binding against third persons, and on the
land itself. The ministerial act of registering is intended to protect the buyer
from all the transactions previously had over the land which have not been
recorded.
Land registration, on the other hand, refers to the proceeding, either
administrative or judicial, for registering title or interest to a land so that such
title becomes a public record which serves as a notice to all persons, even
those without knowledge of such transfer and binds such persons, should
there be no objections on their part.254
BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON THE APPLICANT
Since registration, in general, is a confirmation of the ownership over the
land, the person applying for registration must show a good title in himself as
against the world. Otherwise, his application shall be denied. 255 The applicant
has the burden of convincing the court that he is the rightful owner of the
property. He cannot rely upon the weakness of the evidence presented by his
adversary in ordinary registration proceedings or on the lack of other adverse
claimants in a cadastral registration proceeding.
251
252
253

254
255

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 26.

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 9-10.
Garcia v. Ct. of App., Gozon, et al., GR No. L-48971, and PNB v. Ct. of App.,
Gozon, et al., GR No. L-49011, both dated Jan. 22, 1980; 95 SCRA 380.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 55.
Archbishop v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593.

173

REGISTRATION DIFFERENT FROM RECORDING EVIDENCE OF TITLE

Both registration of title and recording of evidence of title assert ownership
over a parcel of land. What distinguishes registration of title from recording
evidence of such title or from all other systems of transferring title is the fact
that in registration, the State steps in to provide a guarantee of title which
the whole world may rely upon.
In recording, deeds of conveyance or other instruments of transfer are simply
recorded without guaranteeing the title. This means that any subsequent
purchaser or any person interested has the burden of examining such
instruments and to formulate conclusions as to the effects of such title at
their own risk. This is further aggravated by the fact that recording is not
indispensable to prove ownership. Just because a property is not recorded in
favor of the person in possession thereof does not mean that such person is
not the owner. It has been discussed earlier that the person in possession of a
land shall be deemed the owner of it provided that he can show that he
acquired the same, the property is not registered in the name of another, and
that he has been in quiet and peaceful possession thereof. 256
Registration is preferred over recording evidence of title, and is perhaps the
most important contribution of the system that is now in force in the
Philippines. It reduced the risks on the part of landowners and encouraged
the business over transferring titles to lands with the security in the system
guaranteed by the title backed up by the government.
REGISTRATION, WHEN WITHOUT EFFECT
Registration is nothing more but a confirmation of the rights which the owner
already has over the land. Therefore, if the registration is done in bad faith
(i.e., land in issue is public land), the applicant not having validly acquired
ownership over the land sought to be registered, the registration is deemed
to have no effect at all. Moreover, registration does not cure the defect or
illegalities in the instrument. It has also been held that when the registration
was accomplished under the wrong system, such registration is deemed
without effect. Thus, instruments concerning registered lands must be
recorded under the corresponding land registration law governing registered
lands, and instruments involving unregistered lands must likewise be
recorded under Act 3344. Any instrument recorded under the wrong system,
i.e. notice of attachment affecting registered land recorded under Act 3344,
shall not constitute a notice to the whole world and shall therefore, have no
binding effect.257
C. REGISTRATION REGIMES USED IN THE PHILIPPINES
PRODUCTION AND SIMPLE DELIVERY OF LAND TITLE AND DEEDS FROM SELLER TO
PURCHASER
256
257

174

Alo v. Rocamora, 6 Phil. 197 (1906).

Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, Sec. 651.

This first system is effected through the delivery of the instrument evidencing
land ownership by the seller to the buyer. This system is the most natural
way of transferring titles.258
RECORDING OF TRANSCRIPTION
The second system is an improvement of the first, with the requirement that
the transfer of deed be recorded first in order to be binding upon third
persons. Under this system, the title papers are copied and transferred in a
public record in the proper registry. 259
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The third system differs from the first two as it requires judicial intervention in
the transfer of titles. Pea identifies this system as identical to the Torrens
system while Noblejas et al. considers it a different system altogether. Under
this system, transfer of titles take place under the supervision of the court
and the records thereto, in order to be binding, must be included as records
of the court.
TORRENS SYSTEM
Under this system, the title becomes conclusive to the whole world upon
registration in the proper Register of Deeds. Without such registration, the
transfer is binding only between the parties. It is the registration which serves
as the operative fact of the transfer being legally binding against the world
and vesting the owner with a title that is absolute and indefeasible.
The registration regimes used in the Philippines are (a) the system under the
Spanish Mortgage Law; (b) the Torrens system (c) the system of recording for
unregistered lands.
THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW OF 1893
Under this system, a possessory information title is issued to the applicant
after an ex-parte judicial proceeding. Such possessory information is a
prerequisite to obtain a title from, and to be issued by, the General
Directorate of Civil Administration. 260 It is provided in Paragraph 6, Article 393
of the Spanish Mortgage Law that an entry in the proper registry of a record
of possession shall be converted into a record of ownership only upon the
lapse of twenty years.
Unlike in the Land Registration Act, title obtained under this law, even if
converted into absolute ownership, is not indefeasible as it may still be lost
through prescription. This law was abolished by PD 982 in 1976.
258
259
260

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 6.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 54.
ALBERTO E. FILAMOR, PHILIPPINE REAL ESTATE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 258 (1997).

175

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 892

Presidential Decree 892 was issued on February 16, 1976 which decreed the
discontinuance of the operation of the system of land registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, the reason being is the proliferation of dubious
Spanish titles which have raised conflicting claims and tended to destabilize
the Torrens system.261
It provided that all lands which are not registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law and which are not yet covered by the Torrens system shall be
considered as unregistered lands. Therefore, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act 496 within six
months from the effectivity of PD 892 or until August 16, 1976. Thereafter,
Spanish titles will no longer be accepted as evidence in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system. 262
It further provided that all instruments affecting land originally registered
under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. However, such
registration under Act 3344 shall not be valid, except as between the parties
thereto unless it be recorded in the proper registry. 263 Furthermore, any
recording shall not prejudice persons with better rights.
D. HISTORY OF REGISTRATION LAWS
The Torrens system is governed principally by Act 496 or the Land
Registration Act. To bring more lands under the operation of the Torrens
system, subsequent laws such as Act 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral
Act and Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
were enacted.
The essence of the Torrens system is the registration of title which shall be
conclusive upon the whole world. Under this system, the land owner holds a
title that is indefeasible, unassailable and imprescriptible. Such title is
guaranteed by the State such that in case damages are obtained by the
holder because of the operation of the system, an assurance fund shall be
made to compensate for such damages.264 This system will be discussed
further in the following section.
REGISTRATION UNDER ACT 3344

261

262

263

264

176

OSWALDO D. AGCAOLI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND RELATED LAWS (LAND TITLES
AND DEEDS) 30 (2006 ed.).
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 103727,
Dec. 1, 1996, 265 SCRA 733.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, P.D. 1529, Sec. 113.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 8.

The system of recording for unregistered lands was initially governed by

Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code but was later amended by
Act 3344. This system provides for the registration of lands not otherwise
covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law as well as the Torrens system.
However, upon the discontinuation of the operation of the Spanish Mortgage
Law, land recognized or registered under such system were mandated by PD
892 to be recorded under Act 3344, but only within a limited period of six
months from February 16, 1976.
REGISTRATION PURELY VOLUNTARY
Act 3344 was intended to provide landowners a recourse through which they
can register their unregistered lands that are not covered by either the
Torrens system or the Spanish Mortgage Law. This being the intention of the
law, no registration could then be effected without the initiative from the
landowners themselves.
Moreover, since the ownership over the lands subject of registration under
this law has never been settled or adjudicated in any proceeding, the owner
thereof has no title to attest his ownership. Ownership is thus claimed by the
holder thereof on the basis of (a) tax declarations (b) tax titles (c) deeds of
conveyance.265
REGISTRATION WILL NOT PREJUDICE A THIRD PARTY WITH A BETTER RIGHT
A known peculiarity of this system is that unlike in the Torrens system, the
landowner is not provided with absolute security over his land because Act
3344 expressly provides that any right recorded thereunder shall yield to any
third person with better right. This means that the mere registration of a sale
in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold such land to someone
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. 266
Furthermore, any recording under this law shall not be binding against third
persons unless registered in the proper registry. Where the property
registered under the Torrens system is sold but the sale is registered not
under the Property Registration Decree but under Act No. 3344, the sale is
considered not registered and effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the
Civil Code on double sales.
However, in the case of Espiritu vs. Valerio, 267 it was ruled that where the
owner sells an unregistered land to two different persons, the one who
registers first shall have a better right. In these transactions, ownership is
based on tax declarations, tax titles and deeds of conveyance by those who
have no title whatever issued by the government.
265
266
267

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 586.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 586.
GR No. L- 18018, Dec. 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.

177

In short, Act 3344 provides that any instrument effected between the parties
shall be valid and binding upon them, but it shall have no legal effect against
third persons unless such instrument has been registered in the manner
prescribed by law and in the proper registry. Therefore, the failure of the
buyer to register the deed of sale executed does not invalidate the
conveyance of the land. As between the buyer and seller, the unregistered
deed of sale is binding because registration is not a prerequisite to the
perfection of a sale.268
This feature of Act 3344, according to former Commissioner Noblejas, has
neutralized the effect of registration under this system and has rendered it
inefficacious. It has been suggested that corrective measures should be
introduced so as to encourage registration under this system:
(a) New incentives in the form of better protection for the registrant of
unregistered lands should be introduced. Rights granted under
this system should no longer yield to any rights except those
previously granted under either the Torrens system or Act 3344
itself.
(b) Cases of lost titles which cannot be subject of reconstitution under
Republic Act No. 26 should be allowed immediate recourse
under this system.
(c) Amendments should also be done so that tax sales, attachment and
levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claims and other
instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to
unregistered real estate, may be admissible to record under this
system of recording.
(d) Ownership of real estate which has been recorded under this
system for a period of at least ten years should be deemed
sufficient evidence to entitle registrant and his successors-ininterest and assigns to apply for original registration of title
under the Torrens system.269
CIVIL CODE PROVISION ON DOUBLE SALE
Pursuant to Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property and should there be no inscription, to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided also that there is good faith.
This provision did not repeal Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The better right of third persons contemplated in the codal provision, which
should not be prejudiced in the registration under Act 3344, refers to titles
268
269

178

Asilo v. Ramirez, et al., CA G.R. No. 6968-R.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 593.

acquired independently of the unregistered deed, and not any rights granted
thereunder.270
E. ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
Generally, the Torrens system refers to the system of registration of
transactions with interest in land whose object is, under governmental
authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and
indefeasible title to realty and simplify its transfer. This system was devised
and first introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857. 271
PURPOSE OF LAND REGISTRATION UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM
All the commentators agree about the main purpose of land registration
under the Torrens system, which is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, on the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. It is meant to provide the rightful owner of the land security that
once the title is registered, with a very few exceptions, all possibility of losing
such land will be avoided.272
The system confirms and serves as a conclusive evidence of ones ownership
to the land. Such right binds the whole world, whether party or not to the
registration proceedings. Put differently, the system decrees titles which are
final, irrevocable, and indisputable, and to relieve the land of the burden of
known as well as unknown claims. 273
Stated simply, the purpose of registration of property is to: (1) avoid possible
conflicts of title in and to real property, and (2) facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry.274
TORRENS TITLE, NOT A SHIELD AGAINST FRAUD
It does not protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be a shield for
the commission of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of another.275 The title holder is not given any better title than what
he already has. Registration, at most, strengthens such right by enabling the

270
271

272
273
274

275

Arabon v. Director of Forestry, No. 14071-R, April 7, 1960, O.G. Jan. 2, 1961.
Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 58, 60 (1910), citing Hogg on Australian
Torrens System; also Philippine Law Dictionary by Moreno, Third Edition, p. 954.
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 9.
Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60, 69-70
(1963).
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 67.

179

holder to exercise such right against the whole world and not only against
those who are actual parties to the proceedings.
Thus, when one registers a title to a land which is not alienable, or which has
not yet been reclassified as part of the public domain, the person does not,
by virtue of the Torrens system, acquire a right thereto. Such title is void and
must be cancelled. Furthermore, if the registration was made in bad faith, as
when the purchaser knew of a prior transfer of a registered land, such
knowledge vitiates his title and gives him no right against the first
purchaser.276
F. HISTORY OF REGISTRATION LAWS UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM
LAND REGISTRATION ACT (ACT NO. 496)
The Land Registration Act is the first law which operated to bring lands under
a harmonious system of land registration, the Torrens system. It was
approved on November 6, 1902 but became effective on January 1, 1903. It
covered all public as well as private lands.
The main features of this law are the indefeasibility of title and the
intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles
and interests. It also created a court of land registration which had exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for registration, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications. The sole function of
the court is to register title. The effects and results of that registration are
determined by the statute.277
Judicial proceedings for the registration are in rem and based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Every decree of
registration shall be indefeasible subject only to the exceptions provided by
law. Such decree shall not be reopened in any proceeding, subject to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud.
An Assurance Fund is provided for to pay for the loss or damage sustained by
any person who, without negligence on his part, is wrongfully deprived of any
land or interest therein on account of bringing of the same under the Act or
registration of any other person as owner of the land.
The nature of proceedings is judicial but voluntary in the sense that
landowners whose lands are not within the scope of the Torrens system are
not obligated to bring them within. In short, it is the private landowners who
initiate the proceedings.

276
277

180

Cruz v. Cabana, G.R. No. 56232, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 14.

Application usually refers to a private land. It may also refer to a public

agricultural land if the applicant asks for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.278
THE CADASTRAL ACT (ACT NO. 2259)
The act took effect on February 11, 1913. The distinguishing characteristic of
this law is that unlike in the Land Registration Act, registration under this law
is initiated not by the private landowner but by the government, when the
president thinks that public interest requires titles to land to be settled and
adjudicated.
It is also in rem, hence binding generally upon the whole world. 279 All classes
of land are included in the proceedings, private lands, public agricultural
lands and lands of public ownership. The title obtained under this law is also
indefeasible and imprescriptible.
THE PUBLIC LAND ACT (COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141)
This law was approved on November 7, 1936 and applies to lands of public
domain which have been declared open to disposition or concession and
officially delimited and classified. It provides for different modes of
government grants like homestead, lease, sale and reservations for public
and semi-public purpose. However, once the public land has been alienated
or disposed of by the government in favor of a private individual, such land is
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree. 280
THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529)
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, was issued on June 11, 1978. It was a codification of all the laws
relative to land registration and thus, broader in scope. It covers original
registration of title- both ordinary registration proceedings and cadastral
registration proceedings, the registration of voluntary and involuntary
dealings with registered lands, as well as the reconstitution of lost or
destroyed originals of Torrens title.281
The laws which P.D. 1529 codified such laws in order to facilitate effective
implementation of land registration laws. It also strengthens the Torrens
system by simplifying registration proceedings.
It was basically the same as the Land Registration Act of 1902, only broader
as it includes judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Proceedings are also in rem. This law also created the Land Registration
Commission, now known as the Land Registration Authority. An Assurance
Fund is also provided for.
278
279
280
281

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 77.

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 16.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 13.
AMADO D. AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 3 (2002).

181

ADVANTAGES OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM

An authority on the subject identified several benefits of the system:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)

It abolishes endless fees.

It eliminates repeated examinations of titles.
It reduces records enormously.
It instantly reveals ownership.
It protects against encumbrances not noted on the Torrens
certificate.
It makes fraud almost impossible.
It assures.
It keeps up the system without adding to the burden of taxation
because the beneficiaries of the system pay the fees.
It eliminates tax titles.
It gives practically eternal title as the State insures perpetually.
It furnishes state title insurance instead of private title
insurance.
It makes possible the transfer of titles or of loans within the
compass of hours instead of a matter of days and weeks. 282

The essence of the Torrens system is the simplification of land registration. It

dispenses with the redundancy of examining titles and the adverse claims
which may otherwise appear, every so often. Being a proceeding in rem, all
controversies all settled in one proceeding and the persons ownership is
perpetually guaranteed. Furthermore, it warrants the backing of the
government through its intervention in the entire proceeding as well as the
furnishing of an assurance fund in case damage is obtained by the landowner.
Moreover, it alleviates the burden of having to deal with those otherwise
endless questions and procedures by hastening the system of land
registration.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE LAW
The constitutionality of the Torrens system has been assailed on several
grounds. It is said to violate due process of law because of the possibility that
an owner may be deprived of his property without his knowing by virtue of
the proceedings being in rem. Since the Torrens system dispenses with
personal notice of the initial hearing on the application for registration, it is
argued that a landowner may be unlawfully deprived of his property.
To this issue, the court had consistently held the view that a proceeding in
rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon the claimants or the state, or notice by name
to those outside of it.283 It was held that the a decree confirming title
constitutes due process of law where the occupant is made party by
publication, the statute particularly providing that the decree shall be
282
283

182

See Cameron on the Torrens System, p. 103.

Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, supra.

conclusive against all persons, whether mentioned by name or included in

the general description to whom it may concern. 284
Another attack on the constitutionality of the laws consists in the deprivation
of property without due process of law by merely failing to register his right
or title in accordance with the prescribed system.
It has been settled that the Legislature can validly provide for a system of
adjudicating titles without going against any substantial right. While it does
not have the power to dispose of a persons property without due process of
law, it does have the power to declare that if the owner of the property does
not record his title papers, and by reason of such failure an innocent third
person, acquires interest in the land and relies on records presented, the
rights of such innocent third person shall be upheld. 285 The law protects those
who are vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
A PROCEEDING IN REM
A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest.
But if the object of the action is to establish a claim against a particular
person, the action is in personam.286
P.D. No. 1529 expressly mandates that judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Therefore, the decree
issued thereafter is conclusive, as well, against all persons, whether
mentioned by name or included in the general description to whom it may
concern.287
Moreover, considering that the purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title
to the land and to stop forever any question to its legality, there would be no
better way to that but through a proceeding in rem which is essentially a
proceeding against the whole world.
II. ADMINISTRATION OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
A. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Section 4 of P.D. 1529 provides that there shall be
Commission, which is created in order to have a more
the land registration laws. This agency, which has been
Registration Authority (LRA) pursuant to E.O. 292, is
supervision of the Department of Justice.
284
285
286
287

a Land Registration
efficient execution of
renamed as the Land
under the executive

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 69.

Merchant v. Lafuente, 5 Phil. 638 (1906).
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 20.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 70.

183

The functions of the LRA are:

(a)

Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of

Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the
implementation of the land reform program of the government;

(b)

Extend assistance to the courts in ordinary and cadastral land

registration proceedings

(c)

Be the central repository of records relative to original

registration of lands titled under the Torrens system, including
subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands. 288

The LRA consists of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners who are
all appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. All must also be members of the Bar. There are also other officials in
the LRA, all of whom are appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon
recommendation of the Administrator of LRA. 289
THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY ADMINISTRATOR
The LRA Administrator exercises the following functions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)

(f)

Issue decrees or registration pursuant to final judgments of the

courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance
by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding title;
Exercise supervision and control over all Register of Deeds and
other personnel of the Commission;
Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from
decision of, Register of Deeds;
Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and
personnel of the Courts of First Instance throughout the
Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and
functions in relation to the registration of lands;
Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated
relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and
regulations therefore;
Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidationsubdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496
except those covered by P.D. 957.290

Pursuant to Section 4 of E.O. No. 649, the LRA Administrator shall have the
same qualifications, rank and salary as those of an Associate Justice of a
collegiate appellate court (then Judge of the Court of First Instance). This does
not mean, however, that the LRA Administrator is a member of the judiciary.
288
289
290

184

P.D. 1529, Sec. 6, Par. 2.

P.D. 1529, Sec. 5.
P.D. 1529, Sec 6, Par. 1.

It has been held that if it were really the intention of the Legislature to
include in the grant of those privileges of a Judge of Court of First Instance
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant would be
unconstitutional since it would violate the principle of separation of powers by
charging the Court with the administrative function of supervisory control
over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of
the Chief Executive over such officials. 291
The LRA Administrator, despite having the same rank and enjoying the same
privileges as those of a judicial officer, remains to be an executive official. His
functions are plainly executive and subject to the Presidents power of
supervision and control.292 His power to resolve consultas, even though
judicial in nature, is but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive
functions and merely incidental to the latter. 293
DUTY OF LRA, MINISTERIAL IN NATURE
The duty of the LRA officials is purely ministerial. They are mandated to issue
decrees, as ordered by the courts. The LRA Administrator is precluded from
exercising discretion in the issuance of registration. He cannot refuse to
register a title on the ground that his personal judgment dictates its invalidity.
It is not the province of the LRA to determine the validity of the title or any
other conflict that may arise regarding the land in issue, i.e. ownership.
Rather, their duty is limited to enforcing the final judgment of the court on
whether or not to issue registration.
However, if the doubt is upon the issuance of the decree by the courts, the
LRA cannot be compelled to issue registration and it becomes their duty to
refer the matter to the court. The LRA Administrator cannot be compelled by
mandamus to issue the decree, even when so ordered by the court, when it
finds that such land has already been decreed and titled in the name of
another.294 This is one exception to the general rule of the duty of the LRA
being ministerial in nature.
LRA, WHEN WITHOUT AUTHORITY
By virtue of Presidential Decree 239, which was issued on July 9, 1973, the
LRA no longer has the authority to approve original survey plans. This
authority has been given exclusively to the Lands Management Bureau. The
reason for such withdrawal is that P.D. NO. 27 has rendered it necessary the
expropriation of big landed estates, which the LRA used to facilitate.
The LRA is also bereft of any authority to represent the government in all land
registration proceedings. That authority is possessed exclusively by the
291
292
293
294

Noblejas v. Teehanke, GR No. L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405.

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 46.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 46.
Ramos v. Rodriguez, GR No. 94033, May 29, 1995, 244 SRCA 418.

185

Solicitor General as
Administrative Code.

counsel

for

the

government,

pursuant

to

the

B. REGISTER OF DEEDS
P.D. 1529 also provides that there shall be at least one Register of Deeds for
each province and one for each city. The Secretary of Justice shall define the
official station and territorial jurisdiction of each Registry upon the
recommendation of the LRA Administrator.
The Register of Deeds shall be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the Deputy Registries and all
other subordinate officials shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice,
upon recommendation of the Administrator. 295 Like the top officials of LRA, the
Register of Deeds and the Deputy Register of Deeds must be members of the
Bar.
In case there is vacancy in the seat of the Register of Deeds, by virtue of
illness, suspension or inability of the incumbent Register of Deeds, he shall be
succeeded temporarily, unless someone is designated by the Secretary of
Justice, by the following persons in the order of priority: (1) Deputy or First
Deputy Registrar; (2) Second Deputy Registrar; (3) Provincial or City Fiscal;
(4) any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal. 296
REGISTER OF DEEDS, REPOSITORY OF RECORDS
The main function of the Register of Deeds is to keep records of instruments
affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the
province or city wherein such office is situated. It is also the duty of the
Register of Deeds to register an instrument when all the requisites for
registration have been complied with. However, if the instrument if nonregistrable, he shall deny registration and duly notify the applicant, in writing,
of the denial and the ground for such denial, and to advise him of his right to
appeal by consulta to the LRA.297
DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL
Like the LRA, the duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. The
task to write an instrument in the records of the office of the Register of
Deeds and to annotate such at the back of the certificate of title is purely
ministerial and does not involve discretion. He may not validly refuse to
register an instrument because of its invalidity. Such matter is left to the
discretion of the court.
This logically follows from the fact that registration, as earlier discussed, is
mere specie of notice. Being a mere notice, questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
295
296
297

186

P.D. 1529, Sec. 8.

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 513-514.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 10.

registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must

first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards.
Gurbax Singh Pabla and Co. v. Reyes
G.R. No. L-3970, Oct.29, 1952, 92 Phil. 182.
FACTS: John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of a parcel of land and on July
23, 1948, he entered into a contract with the petitioner-appellees,
under the terms of which petitioners-appellees were to construct
thereon a three-story building of concrete and of strong materials
valued at from P80,000 to P90,000. The contract also provided that
the building shall become the exclusive property of the owner of the
land, but that the petitioner-appellees were to occupy, hold, or
possess it as lessees. This contract of lease was filed and registered
in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 10, 1948. At
the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing
mortgage over the land in favor of the Calvos which was then
cancelled, and a new mortgage was executed by the owner in favor of
respondents-appellants herein, Honorable Hermogenes Reyes and his
spouse Teodora Tantoco, dated March 8, 1949, which was registered
on the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. This
contract of lease was amended and such amended contract has also
been duly registered in the Register of Deeds.
On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote
respondents-appellants requesting them to allow him to take the
certificates of title to the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for
the annotation of the contracts of lease entered into by the owner
with them, but the respondents refused such request on the ground
that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease between the
owner and the petitioner. They allege that owner could not sell,
assign, or encumber the mortgaged premises without the written
consent of the mortgagees.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have the right to request for the
surrender of such transfer of certificates for purposes of registration.
HELD: Yes. It is not denied that the contracts have been executed by
the registered owner of the land, or that they have been lawfully
executed, or that they have all the qualities of registerable
documents. Indeed, the owner is agreeable to the registration. The
objections interposed by respondents, who are mortgagees merely,
that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, or that their
mortgage has priority, or that they will be prejudiced, are beside the
issue.
The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to
all persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the
proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect
already registered rights over the land, subsisting or existing at the

187

time of the registration. The rights of these parties, who have

registered their rights, are not put in issue when an instrument is
subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects on other
instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of
registration.
Thus, the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they had
no knowledge of the contract of lease before the property was
mortgaged to them, or that the same violates their contract of
mortgage with the owner of the land, these are not passed upon by
the order for the registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of
lease.
The objections, as well as the relative rights of all parties who have
registered their deeds, shall be decided in the proper suit or
proceeding when the opportune occasion arises; but they are not now
in issue, nor may they be adjudicated upon, simply because
petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of their
contract of lease.
On the other hand, the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is
no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof
of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration.
The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments
shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to
know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or
constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose
of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the
effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after,
not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence
that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated
afterwards.
The act of registering an instrument is a mere ministerial act which
does not involve passing upon legal issues over the lands. Validity of
claims as well as other legal issues will have to be dealt with in an
independent proceeding. So long as the instrument is registrable, the
Register of Deeds shall issue registration.
The duty of the Register of Deeds, however, has not always been ministerial
in nature. Under the Spanish Mortgage Law, the duty of the Register of Deeds
can well be considered as judicial in nature. 298 This is pursuant to Article 18 of
the Spanish Mortgage Law, which mandates that the Register of Deeds shall
determine questions of legality as to the documents presented. A purely
ministerial officer cannot be charged with the power of determining questions
of legality. Nevertheless, upon the establishment of the Torrens system, such
duty of the Register of Deeds has been expressly limited to being purely
298

188

PEA, REGISTRATION

OF

LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 516.

ministerial only. This applies as well to registration under Act 3344 and the
Chattel Mortgage Law.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
G.R. No. L-20611, May 8, 1969
Facts: On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of
deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's
certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of
Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on
the title.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
"legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that
previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the
certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land
earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers.
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned
sales contains an additional memorandum stating that "three coowner's duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by
the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of the three buyers.
Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate
of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of
Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
The matter was appealed to the Commission of Land Registration who
upheld the decision of the Register of Deeds.
ISSUE: WON the Register of Deeds can validly refuse to register an
instrument considering that its duty is merely ministerial.
HELD: It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the
property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having
previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different
occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside from
the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three
co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the
three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates
must likewise be surrendered.
There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to
see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance,
or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the
others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain
identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones,

189

affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different
copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole
system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner,
petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized
or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until
otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, since the property subject of the donation is presumed
conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, there should
first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse
may make such a conveyance.
It also appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio
Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well
as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The
matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the
interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis
pendens.
In summary, there are other exceptions to the general rule that the duty of
the Register of Deeds is ministerial. This means that in the following
instances, the Register of Deeds may validly refuse to register an instrument.
(a)

When there are several copies of the title but only one is
presented with the instrument to be registered;

(b)

When the property is presumed to be conjugal but the

instrument of conveyance bears the signature of only one
spouse;

(c)

When there is a pending case in court where the character of

the land and the validity of the conveyance are in issue. 299

The Register of Deeds can also be held civilly liable when acting under the
Torrens Law for any omission, mistake, or misfeasance in the performance of
his duties. However, it is still subject to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by public officials as well as their immunity from suit
for acts performed in their official duty.
C. CONSULTAS
It has been well emphasized that the Register of Deeds is entirely precluded
from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with

299

190

Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, GR No. L-20611, May 8, 1969, 28

SCRA 12.

the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it

is invalid.300
In these cases where the Register of Deeds is in doubt whether to register an
instrument or not, or when any party does not agree with the action taken by
the Register of Deeds regarding registration of an instrument, the latter must
submit or refer such questions to the LRA for resolution. This procedure is
known as consulta.
When the instrument is denied registration, the Register of Deeds should
notify the party, in writing, of the reason why such registration has been
denied and advise him of his right to elevate such matter to LRA, by consulta,
within five days from the receipt of such notice. The Register of Deeds shall
cancel the memorandum of the pending upon: (a) final resolution or; (b)
before resolution, if withdrawn by the applicant. The resolution by the LRA
Administrator as to what steps the Register of Deeds must make, shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Register of Deeds. 301
Should there be any disagreement with the decision of the LRA, the
proper recourse would now be to the Court of Appeals and not by certiorari or
prohibition. This is by virtue of the quasi-judicial functions exercised by quasijudicial agencies like the LRA. 302 The Register of Deeds may neither be
compelled by a petition for mandamus to register an instrument.303
D. REGISTRY OF PROPERTY
It has also been mandated by Sec. 51 of P.D. No. 1529 that registration
of instruments affecting registered lands must be done in the proper registry,
in order to affect and bind the land and, thus, operate as constructive notice
to the world. Such instruments, when properly recorded, shall serve as
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein.304
Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the
time of such registering, filing or entering. 305
III. ORDINARY LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1529
A. INTRODUCTION
As mentioned in the earlier parts of this work, Presidential Decree No. 1529 is
an amalgamation of prior registration laws. It is also known as the Property
Registration Decree. Under it, registration under the Spanish Mortgage law
300
301
302
303
304
305

Almirol v. Register of Deeds, GR No. L-22486, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1152.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 117.
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, GR No. 76265, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
Almirol v. Register of Deeds, supra.
Legarda v. Saleeby, GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590.
P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 52.

191

was discontinued and all lands registered under the said law but not yet
covered by the Torrens System of Registration were considered unregistered
lands. The recording of unregistered lands are governed by Chapter XIII,
Section 113 of the decree.
Under this decree the Land Registration Commission and its Registry of
Deeds were established. Chapter II gives the composition of the respective
agencies as well as imposes qualifications for its officials. It also enumerates
its duties and functions. Under the present state of things, the Land
Registration Commission is now known as the Land Registration Authority.
Original Registration deals with registration of properties which are neither
registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law nor under the Torrens System of
Registration. In this type of registration a person has title to the land but has
not yet registered it under the Torrens System of Registration. Chapter III
provides for the method of registering property either voluntarily or
involuntarily.
Chapter IV presents the provisions which govern the Certificate of Title. It
deals with the entry, furnishing of owners duplicate, and the registration in
the Registry of Deeds of the Original Certificate of title. It also gives the
governing provisions regarding the Transfer Certificate of Title. Aside from
these, this chapter also provides for the effects of possession of title under
the Torrens System of Registration.
Subsequent Registration is concerned about registration of dealings with
registered lands which may either be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary
dealings those which is initiated by the owner of the property and it may be
any of the following: (1) Conveyances and Transfers, (2) Mortgages and
Leases, (3) and Powers of Attorney or Trusts. While involuntary dealings are
those which are done not in the initiation of the owner of the property.
Examples of involuntary dealings are attachments and adverse claims.
Chapter V deals with the registration of voluntary and involuntary dealings
regarding registered property while Chapter VI is concerned with the
registration of judgments, orders, and partitions.
Upon the entry of a certificate of title in the name of the registered owner,
and also upon the original registration on the certificate of title of a building
or other improvements on the land covered by said certificate, as well as
upon the entry of a certificate pursuant to any subsequent transfer of
registered land, there shall be paid to the Register of Deeds one-fourth of one
per cent of the assessed value of the real estate on the basis of the last
assessment for taxation purposes, as contribution to the Assurance Fund.
Where the land involved has not yet been assessed for taxation, its value for
purposes of this decree shall be determined by the sworn declaration of two
disinterested persons to the effect that the value fixed by them is to their
knowledge, a fair valuation. 306 The manner dealing with this assurance fund is
governed by Chapter VII.
306

192

P.D. 1529, Sec. 93.

Two of the modes of acquiring lands of the public domain are through free
patents and emancipation patents. Chapter VIII and IX deals with the
registration of property acquired through these mentioned methods. In
addition to emancipation patents Chapter IX also deals with Certificate of
Land Transfers and affidavits of non-tenancy. Certificates of Land Transfers
are those issued to tenant-farmers of those lands brought under Operation
of Land Transfer. Upon compliance with the requirements of Presidential
Decree No. 27, the tenant-farmer shall be issued an emancipation patent.
While an affidavit of non-tenancy is a document stating that a certain parcel
of land is not tenanted or the land is not primarily devoted for the production
of rice and/or corn. This document is needed in order to register a voluntary
deed or instrument purporting to be a subdivision, mortgage, lease, sale or
any other mode of encumbrance or conveyance of private agricultural land
principally devoted to rice or corn or any portion thereof.
Petitions and actions after original registration are governed by Chapter X.
These actions governed by this chapter are: a) petition to surrender of
withhold duplicate certificates, b) amendment and alteration of certificates,
c) notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificates, d) and reconstitution
of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title.
The next chapter details the fees needed to be paid to the offices involved in
registration property. These offices are: a) the clerk of court, b) the Sheriff, c)
the Registry of Deeds, and d) the Land Registration Authority.
Chapter XII discusses
conveyancing.

the

forms

needed

in

land

registration

and

Section 112. Forms in conveyancing. The Commissioner of Land

Registration shall prepare convenient blank forms as may be
necessary to help facilitate the proceedings in land registration
and shall take charge of the printing of land title forms.
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law
in the form of public instruments shall be registerable: Provided,
that, every such instrument shall be signed by the person or
persons executing the same in the presence of at least two
witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall
acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or
persons executing the same before a notary public or other
public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where
the instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages
including the page whereon acknowledgment is written, each
page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each
page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the
page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the
instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the

193

person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses,

and all the ages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as
well as the number of pages shall be stated in the
acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates
to a sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more
parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in
said acknowledgment.307
Chapter XIV governs the registration of Chattel Mortgages specifically the
manner of its recording, fees needed in its registration. Finally, Chapter XV
deals with Consultas.
B. APPLICATION
There are two types of ordinary registration both are governed by Chapter III
of P.D. 1529. Voluntary registration is governed by the first part of Chapter III
which is entitled Ordinary Registration Proceedings. While involuntary
registration is governed by the second part of Chapter III entitled Cadastral
Registration Proceedings. The difference between the two is that in voluntary
registration it is the person who claims ownership over the property to be
registered is the one who initiates the proceedings. While in involuntary
registration it is the government through the President of the Philippines.

307

194

(1)

When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines public

interest so requires that title to any unregistered lands be
settled and adjudicated, he may to this end direct and order the
Director of Lands to cause to be made a cadastral survey of the
lands involved and the plans and technical description thereof
prepared in due form.

(2)

Thereupon, the Director of Lands shall give notice to persons

claiming any interest in the lands as well as to the general
public, of the day on which such survey will begin, giving as fully
and accurately as possible the description of the lands to be
surveyed. Such notice shall be punished once in the Official
Gazette, and a copy of the notice in English or the national
language shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin
board of the municipal building of the municipality in which the
lands or any portion thereof is situated. A copy of the notice
shall also be sent to the mayor of such municipality as well as to
the barangay captain and likewise to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Bayan concerned.

(3)

The Geodetic Engineers or other employees of the Bureau of

Lands in charge of the survey shall give notice reasonably in
advance of the date on which the survey of any portion of such
lands is to begin, which notice shall be posted in the bulletin
board of the municipal building of the municipality or barrio in
which the lands are situated, and shall mark the boundaries of

P.D. 1529, Sec. 112.

the lands by monuments set up in proper places thereon. It shall

be lawful for such Geodetic Engineers and other employees to
enter upon the lands whenever necessary for the purposes of
such survey or the placing of monuments.
(4)

It shall be the duty of every person claiming an interest in the

lands to be surveyed, or in any parcel thereof, to communicate
with the Geodetic Engineer upon his request therefor all
information possessed by such person concerning the boundary
lines of any lands to which he claims title or in which he claims
any interest.

(5)

Any person who shall willfully obstruct the making of any survey
undertaken by the Bureau of Lands or by a licensed Geodetic
Engineer duly authorized to conduct the survey under this
Section, or shall maliciously interfere with the placing of any
monument or remove such monument, or shall destroy or
remove any notice of survey posted on the land pursuant to law,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 308

JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER

LAND REGISTRATION CASES BEFORE P.D. NO. 1529
Even before the explicit grant of general and exclusive jurisdiction over
original registration of title to lands and over petitions filed after such original
registration by P.D. No. 1529, the special and limited jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts which did not extend to cases involving issues properly
litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil acts had time and again
been relaxed by the Supreme Court. 309 Such exceptions were based not alone
on the fact that the land registration courts are likewise the same Regional
Trial Courts, but also under the following conditions: (1) the parties have
mutually agreed or acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid issues for
determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) the parties
have been given full opportunity in the presentation of their respective sides
of the issues and of the evidence in support thereof; and the court has
considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is
sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues. Whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited jurisdiction was then held to
be not in reality a jurisdictional question but a procedural question involving a
mode of practice which may be waived.310
JURISDICTION UNDER P.D. NO. 1529

308
309
310

P.D. 1529, Sec. 35.

Florentino v. Encarnacion, 79 SCRA 193.
Moscosa v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 705; Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA
740; Santos v. Ganayo, 116 SCRA 431.

195

Section 2, paragraph 2 of the Property Registration Decree or P.D. 1529

provides that Regional trial courts,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications original for
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petition. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission with two certified copies of all pleading, exhibits,
orders and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions
for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes,
within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
Regional Trial Courts therefore no longer have limited jurisdiction in original
land registration cases so that there is no more distinction between its
general jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction conferred by the Land
Registration Act.311 In Averia v. Caguioa,312 the Supreme Court held that the
aforequoted Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between
the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law (Act 496) when acting merely
as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts
the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also
over all petitions filed after original registration title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. 313
Under P.D. 1529, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such
non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues
which were beyond its competence before. It has removed the principle that
land registration court has limited jurisdiction except where there was then
unanimity among the parties or none of them raised any adverse claim or
serious objection.314
In Omandan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 315 the Supreme Court resolved the
issue on the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action to the
order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision
of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent. It is said that Sections
3 and 4 of the Public Land Act, gives primarily to the Director of Lands and
ultimately to Secretary of Agriculture (now Secretary of DENR) the authority
to dispose and manage public lands. In this regard, courts have no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by
the Director of Lands. Only the DENR Secretary can review on appeal such
decree. The DENR under the Public Land Act had prior jurisdiction over the
patent on the contested homestead area.

311

312
313
314
315

196

Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. First Baptist Church, 152
SCRA 393.
146 SCRA 459.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 124.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 124-125.
G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001.

DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the
courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand
in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public
claimants. But once the DENR has decided, particularly with grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision
prevails.
DELEGATED JURISDICTION TO THE MTC
Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 allows inferior courts,
by way of delegated jurisdiction in certain cases, to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases. The provision states:
Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of
the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their
decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner
as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
Pursuant to the said law, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular
No. 6-93-A dated November 15, 1995 authorizing the inferior courts to hear
and decided the cadastral or land registration cases mentioned in the
aforequoted law.316
JURISDICTION CONFERRED UPON THE RTC ACTING AS A
LAND REGISTRATION COURT WHAT IT INCLUDES
When acting as a land registration court, the Regional Trial Court, has a
limited and special jurisdiction. It cannot however be denied that when the
law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 317
If the question of whether or not the title claimed by a particular party is
registrable depends upon whether the instrument upon which he bases said
claim of title is a true deed of sale or a mere equitable mortgage, it is obvious
that the court has jurisdiction and legal authority to determine said question,
for otherwise, it cannot properly exercise its jurisdiction to determine whether
said party has a registrable title or not. Such question is not foreign but
intimately related to the subject matter placed by law under its jurisdiction.
To hold that such question must be submitted for adjudication in a separate
and independent action would be clearly contrary to the general that
316
317

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 126.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 127.

197

multiplicity of suits must be avoided, and is, furthermore, expensive, dilatory

and impracticable.318
Consistent with the same trend, it was held that where the issue of the
genuineness of a document is presented in a land registration case, the
Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court should not in any
manner hesitate to determine the conflicting claims of the parties; otherwise,
that would practically reduce said court to impotence to determine questions
of fact, since claims on such a dispute land, more often than not, are based
on documents of title, and it is only natural that the issue of genuineness
would be raised against said documents. 319
It is true that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) acting as a
land registration court has limited and special jurisdiction. It cannot be
denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction to make it effective. The purpose of the applicant is to prove that
he has an absolute or a fee simple title over the property sought to be
registered, otherwise his application will be denied. An absolute oppositor
claims a dominical right totally adverse to that of the applicant. If successful,
registration will be decreed in favor of the oppositor, as to whether or not
private respondents have absolute or fee simple title over the property
sought to be registered necessarily requires a resolution of the question as to
whether or not the oppositor had a dominical right totally adverse to that of
the applicants. Hence, the relevancy of the issue of the validity of the
conveyances in question.320
In Franco, et al. v. Monte de Piedad,321 the Supreme Court stated that
although the general rules is that a land registration court has no power to
decide cases involving issues properly litigated in ordinary action, yet
inasmuch s in this jurisdiction it is the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) that also functions as courts of land registration, our
jurisprudence recognizes exceptions to said rule; where the parties have
acquiesced in submitting the issues for determination in the registration
proceedings, and they are given full opportunity to present their respective
sides and submit their evidence. From the cases, it may be gathered that,
from the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of al and registration court
being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in
nature, does not extend to issues properly litigable in ordinary civil actions,
deviations have been sanctioned under the following conditions: (1) The
parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid
issues for determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) the
parties have been given full opportunity in the presentation of their
respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereof; and (3)
the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that
318

319

320
321

198

Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388 (1940); Director of Lands v. Estrellado, et al.,

510 O.G. 12; Alcala v. Bundale, 530 O.G. 20.
Padera v. Ruiz, 61. O.G. 6.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 128.
117 Phil. 672 (1963).

the same is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issues.
The latter condition is a matter that largely lies within the sound discretion of
the trial judge.322
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION
COURT SIMILAR TO THAT OF PROBATE COURTS
In Director of Lands v. Estrellado, et al.,323 the Court of Appeals held that:
The power and jurisdiction of a Court of Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) acting as a court of land registration is, we believe,
similar to that enjoyed by the same court acting as a probate
court. The main duty of a probate court is to settle the estate of
the deceased testator or intestate. Included in its jurisdiction to
make such settlement and distribution, is the power to
determine whether or not a person is an acknowledged natural
child of the decedent, and to decide who of two women is the
lawful surviving spouses of the deceased. These matters are not
foregoing to the subject matter placed by law under its
jurisdiction but are incidental thereto, their adjudication being
necessary to enable the probate court to proceed to the
settlement and distribution of the estate.
REGISTRATION COVERING TWO OR MORE PARCELS OF LAND
A petition for registration may cover two or more lands. Section 18 of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides that:
Sec. 18. Application covering two or more parcels An
application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to
the applicant/s provided they are situated within the same
province or city. The court may at any time order an application
to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a
severance of the application.
Hence, if the two parcels of land are within the same territorial jurisdiction
they may be registered under one petition as provided in Section 18 of P.D.
1529. In case several parcels of land are situated in different provinces and
belongs to one owner, the application for registration shall be made in each
of the corresponding Regional Trial Courts of the province where the different
parcels of land are located.324
When the land lies partly in one province and partly in another and the
boundary between the two provinces has not yet been definitely established
by means of survey, and the land has been declared for taxation purposes by
the owner in one province, the surveyor necessarily makes it appear in the
plan of the property that the land is located in the province where it is
322
323
324

Aglipay v. delos Reyes, 107 Phil. 331 (1960).

510 O.G. 12.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 95.

199

recorded for taxation purposes. Under such circumstances, the application

shall be filed in that province. If the boundary between the two provinces is
already definitely established by survey, the surveyor has to make a plan for
the portion of the land lying in one province and another plan for the other
portion lying in the other province, in which case an application should be
filed for each lot in the province where it lies. 325
GENERAL PROCEDURE AND REQUIREMENTS
In original registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree
(P.D. 1529) as well as in the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, the following
requisites should all be satisfied:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)

Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;
Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by
the Court;
Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing with
all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the
Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission (now Land
Registration authority);
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date
and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those
known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
Hearing of the case by the Court;
Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final
and instructing the Land Registration Authority to issue a decree
of confirmation and registration;
Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Authority;
Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds; and
Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
book and issuance of the owners duplicate original certificate of
title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of
the prescribed fees.

A certificate of title issued without fully complying with the above requisites
are thus illegal and invalid and may be cancelled by the courts. 326
WHO CAN APPLY?
325
326

200

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 95.

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 14-15.

Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree,

enumerates the persons who may apply for registration:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of Fist Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1)

Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2)

Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by

prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

(3)

Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or

abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.

(4)

Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other

manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor
a retro may file an application for the original registration of the
land, provided, however that should the period for redemption
expired during the pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro,
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by
the instrument creating the trust.
SECTION 14 (1) INTERPRETED
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005
FACTS: Naguit filed with the MCTC of Aklan, a petition for registration
of title of a parcel of land situated in Aklan. The application seeks
judicial confirmation of Naguits imperfect title over the aforesaid
land. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose
Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the
petition.

201

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of a certain
Urbano in 1945. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of a certain Maming, wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. Naguit
and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and
in the concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
The MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. The RTC and CA
affirmed the MCTC decision.
ISSUE: WON it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
HELD: No. Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
There are three requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b)
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Section 14(1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is

202

still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
There are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public
domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be
noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Clearly, the
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type. The
land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been
planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable,
hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the
existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the
property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia

203

of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Considering that
the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be
traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced
since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is without doubt that she
has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of
the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and
without any opposition from any private person and the government
itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
THOSE WHO HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE LANDS BY PRESCRIPTION
Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. It must be
noted that while Article 1137 of the Civil Code speaks of ownership and
other real rights over immovables, the above-mentioned Section 14(2) of
P.D. 1529 relates to the acquisition of ownership of private lands by
prescription under existing laws. Therefore, it is not ownership of any kind of
immovable acquired by prescription that may be registered under said
Decree, but only the ownership of private lands. An example would be those
lands registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law which are not yet covered
by a certificate of title by the time of the issuance of P.D. 1529 on June 11,
1978 and considered as unregistered land. Those lands may be deemed as
falling under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code, when acquired by a person by prescription by adverse possession
against the original grantee.327
In the computation of the 30-year period, Article 1138 of the Civil Code also
provides the following rules:
(a)

The present possessor may complete the period by tacking his

possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-interest;

(b)

The present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous

time, is presumed to have continued to be in possession during
the intervening time in the absence of proof to the contrary; and

(c)

The first day shall be excluded and the last day included.

Alba v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120066, September 9, 1999
327

204

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra note 37, at 17-18.

FACTS: Lachica filed an application for title to land with the claim that
the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, from one
Eulalio Raz. The land applied for is residential and is situated in Aklan
with an area of 4,845 square meters. Lachica alleged that he acquired
the land in question from three (3) sources, namely: 1.) A Deed of
Sale dated allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840
square meters; 2.) 300 square meters allegedly purchased from
Lachicas father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and 3.) 3,725 square meters
private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eufrocino Alba.
In this applicaton for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four
oppositions were filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
The oppositions of Rago and the Braulios were dismissed for not
having presented evidence to show that by the time this application
was filed, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous possession of the land claimed,
in concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire title
thereto. The court rendered judgment in favor of Lachica. In
dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors, the trial court said
that the oppositors have never offered any explanation as to the nonpayment of realty taxes for the disputed portions of the subject
property from 1941 to 1958 while Lachica continuously paid taxes.
ISSUE: WON Lachica is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in
fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.
HELD: No. Among other things, the lower courts reliance on
prescription should not be given weight. The controlling statute when
Lachica filed his application for registration is Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act 141. In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the
CA relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 in relation to the
Civil Codes provisions on prescription on the assumption that the
subject land is private land. The application for registration of Lachica
is for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that
the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the
public domain.
Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration of
private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple
which refer to:
(1.) Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government
during the Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown
namely the: a.) royal grant; b.) special grant; c.) adjustment title; d.)

205

title by purchase and; e.) possessory information title, which could

become a gratuitous title;
(2.) Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion,
avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for
in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code; and
(3.) Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by
law.
The land sought to be registered by Lachica does not fall under the
classifications under Act 496. Given the foregoing facts, prescription
in the manner invoked by both courts cannot be pleaded to bolster
Lachicas claim because no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the government;
it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state. The
possession of public agricultural land, however, long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor.
Furthermore, even assuming that prescription can be applied in the
manner invoked by the trial and the appellate courts, it must be
pointed out that while Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,
this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 which
requires possession in good faith and with just title. The good faith of
the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or
other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
It cannot be said that Lachicas possession was with color of title and
good faith. Lachicas act of appropriating for himself the entire area of
4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have been
occupying portions of the disputed land constituted acts of
deprivation of the latters right which is tantamount to bad
faith. Failure and intentional omission of Lachica to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession by another person constitutes fraud.
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership
over the property upon Lachica because Article 1137 states that
ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of good faith. Lachicas possession of 13 years falls
way below the 30 year requirement.
ACCESSION OR ACCRETION

206

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the currents of the waters.
For accretion or alluvion to be registrable, the following requisites of Article
457 must be all present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. 328 A
sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process
contemplated under Article 457. It is the slow and hardly perceptible
accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian owner. 329
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature, not caused by human
intervention.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or
alluvion deposited by rivers is to compensate him for the danger of loss that
he suffers because of the location of his land. Thus, the ownership of such
accretions or alluvions by the riparian owner is not lost even after they are
separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the
river.330
An accretion from river to registered land does not automatically become
registered land. As such it must be placed under the operations of the Torrens
system.331 A petition then for registration of the accretion is in effect a
request for confirmation of title already vested in the riparian owner by the
law.332 However, it must also be noted that an accretion from the sea is part
of the public domain and generally outside the commerce of man. 333
Article 461 of the Civil Code states that river beds which are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
THE PERSON OR PERSONS CLAIMING, SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY,
TO OWN THE LEGAL ESTATE IN FEE SIMPLE

Ownership of a particular parcel of land may rest singly in one person or

collectively in two or more persons. If singly, there may not be any problem;
but if collectively, the difficulty may arise when joining them together for the
purpose of filing a joint application. A parcel of land jointly owned by two or
more individuals cannot be object of partial registration with respect to one
co-owner, to the exclusion of the others. So then, if the co-owners cannot
328
329
330
331
332
333

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514.

Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374.
Supra note 18.
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 313.
Fernandez v. Tanada, 39 SCRA 662.
De Buyser v. Director of Lands 121 SCRA 13.

207

come together for one reason or another, the remedy is to split the land by
subdivision, assigning to each of them his corresponding share. This done,
anyone of them may file a separate application for registration. Thus, where
applicants own merely an undivided share less than fee simple in the land
described in the application, the application should be dismissed without
prejudice to the right of the various owners of the undivided interests in the
land jointly to present a new application for registration. 334
By legal estate in fee simple, means an interest in real estates in the form
of absolute ownership, subject only to legal limitations. 335
The word persons includes both natural and juridical persons. Thus, it was
held in San Juan de Dios Hospital v. Government of the Philippines 336 that the
San Juan de Dios Hospital, which is a foundation of public interest, is a
juridical person in accordance with Article 44 of the Civil Code, and had rights
and personality of its own to apply for registration and obtain a decree and
title. The Government itself recognized the legal personality of the said
Hospital when it promulgated Act No. 1724 approving and ratifying the
agreement entered into by the Secretary of War of the United States, as
representative of the Government of the Philippines, and the Archbishop of
Manila, as representative of the Roman Catholic Church.
THE PERSON OR PERSONS CLAIMING, SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY, TO HAVE
THE POWER OF DISPOSING OF THE LEGAL ESTATE IN FEE SIMPLE

This class refers to persons who are authorized to act jointly or severally for
and in behalf of a principal. In this case, the appointment of the agent or his
power of attorney need be attached to the application.
While this is liable to be abused, it is borne in mind that the relations of an
agent to his principal are fiduciary and in regard to the property forming the
subject matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or asserting a
title of adverse to that or his principal. Action in personam will lie against an
agent to compel him to return or retransfer to his principal the real property
committed to his custody as such agent and also to execute the necessary
documents of conveyance to effect such retransfer. The principals right of
action to compel a reconveyance is not extinguished through the registration
of the land in favor of the agent; expiration of one year from the date of its
entry, there appears to be no reason why the agent should not be compelled
through a suit in equity to make such reparation as may lie within his power
for the breach of trust committed by him, and, as long as the land stands
registered in his name, such reparation may take the form of a conveyance or
transfer of title cestui que trust, i.e., the principal. The reason for this is that
the title obtained under this Act by an overseer in his own name over a parcel
of land without the knowledge and consent of the owner does not affect the
right of ownership and title of the latter. 337
334
335
336
337

208

Santiago v. Cruz, et al., 19 Phil. 145.

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 34.
67 Phil. 150 and 158.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 35.

MINORS OR OTHER PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY, THROUGH THEIR LEGALLY

APPOINTED GUARDIANS, BUT THE PERSON IN WHOSE BEHALF THE
APPLICATION IS MADE SHALL BE NAMED AS APPLICANT BY THE GUARDIAN.
The guardian referred to above is the one appointed by the court for the
estate of the minor or incompetent pursuant to the provisions of Rule 93 of
the Rules of Court. It is to be noted, however, that under the provisions of
Articles 320 and 326 of the new Civil Code the father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority, and considered also as the guardian of the childs
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court. In view of such legal innovation, it is submitted that an
administrator designated by law for the property of a minor child may,
without being judicially appointed as a guardian, apply for registration in
behalf of his ward.338
CORPORATION, THROUGH AN OFFICER DULY AUTHORIZED
BY VOTE OF ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The mere fact that one holds the position of president of a corporation does
not confer upon him the power to represent the corporation in an act of strict
ownership. Thus, it was held that the powers of the president of a corporation
are such only as are conferred upon him by the board of directors or vested in
him by the by-laws. If there is nothing in the by-laws conferring any particular
authority upon him, he has, from his office alone, no more power over the
corporate property and business than has any other director. The president
has no implied authority as such, to act as the agent for the corporation, but
like other agents he must derive his power from the board of directors of the
corporation.339
When a corporation is not shown to possess a board of directors, a petition in
the Court may be presented in its behalf by a duly authorized person. 340
Under the Constitution of the Philippines, no private lands may be owned by a
corporation or association by transfer or assignment, unless at least sixty
percent of its capital belongs to Filipinos. Neither may a corporation be
permitted to hold or own real estate except such as may be reasonably
necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it is created; and, if
authorized to engage in agriculture, such corporation is restricted to the
ownership and control of not to exceed 1,0234 hectares of land.
It is to be noted, in this connection, that under the 1987 Constitution, Art. XII,
Sec. 3, private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease for a period not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed
1,000 hectares in area. It can thus be inferred that such private
338
339
340

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 36-37.

Wait v. Nashua Armory Assn., 66. N.H. 581; 14 L.R.A. 356.
Capellania del Convento de Tambobong v. Cruz, et al., 9 Phil. 145.

209

corporations, or associations, even if 100% of its capital belongs to Filipinos,

are disqualified to apply for original registration of its title to alienable lands
of the public domain. 341
CORPORATION SOLE MAY PURCHASE AND HOLD REAL ESTATE
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him. A corporation sole is organized and composed of a
single individual, the head of any religious society or church, for the
administration of the temporalities of its incorporation, is vested with the
right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not
therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or
not it be so treated such, the Constitutional provision prohibiting private
corporations from acquiring public agricultural lands will not apply. 342
A corporation sole or ordinary is not the owner of the properties that he
may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in trust
for the faithful or members of the society or church for which the corporation
is organized. Properties acquired by the incumbent pass, by operation of law,
upon his death not to his personal heirs but to his successor in office. 343
Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome
G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982
FACTS: The Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) applied for the
confirmation of its two parcels of land located in Rizal. The Republic of
the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the
applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable
public lands and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
The lower court dismissed MERALCOs application. It held that
MERALCO is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land
since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens
or natural person can apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles to public land. MERLACO is a juridical person.
ISSUE: WON MERALCO can apply for judicial confirmation of the two
parcels of land.
HELD: No. The subject land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
341
342

343

210

Ayog v. Cusi, Jr., et al., G.R. No L-46729, November 19, 1982.

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988,
168 SCRA 165.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration
Commission, G.R. No. L-8451, December 20, 1957, 102. Phil. 596.

land and MERALCO, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for

its registration under section 48(b), MERLACOs application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
The constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has
an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has in imperfect tile subject to
judicial confirmation. Since Section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as two which a Torrens
title may be secured under Section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) presupposes that the land is public.
AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR DULY APPOINTED UNDER THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
While the administrator of an estate is the one designated by law to file an
application for registration in behalf of the estate of the deceased, it does not
necessarily follow that the heirs will be entirely powerless to intervene when
circumstances so warrant. Thus, it was held that, notwithstanding the
appointment of a judicial administrator, the heirs have a right to intervene
when they believe the administrators acts are prejudicial to their interests:
and it cannot be said that the administrator answers with his bond for any
damage he may cause to the interests of the estate, since such bond might
not be sufficient to cover said damages.344
TENANT, MORTGAGOR, SELLER IN PACTO DE RETRO, AND
MARRIED WOMAN, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
A tenant is one who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of
title, either in fee, for life, for years, or at will. In a popular sense, he is one
who has the temporary use and occupation of lands or tenements which
belong to another, the duration and other terms of whose occupation are
usually defined by an agreement called lease, while the parties thereto are
placed in the relation of landlord and tenant.
When one or more tenants for a term of years file an application, the legal
requirement is that they must be joined by those claiming reversionary
interest in the property which makes up the fee simple at common law, and,
if such tenants own undivided shares less than a fee simple in the whole land,
they cannot apply without joining the other tenants owning the rest of the
undivided shares so that the whole fee shall be represented in the
proceeding.
In case of an owner who had previously mortgaged his property, he cannot
apply for registration of his title without the written consent of the
mortgagee. In case the mortgagee refuses to give his consent, the
344

Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil. 396.

211

application may be allowed provided that the title be made subject to such
mortgage, which shall be specified in the decree of registration. 345
With respect to the right of the vendor in a sale under pacto de retro to apply
for registration, it was held that he may apply for the registration of his right
over the property sold; but, for this purpose, he must previously obtain the
written consent of the purchaser, and if the latter refuses to give it, he must
set forth in his application the sale with right of repurchase, in order that the
same may likewise be recorded in the decree of registration. 346 In such a
case, what would happen if the period for redemption reserved for the
vendor-applicant has elapsed and ownership consolidated by operation of law
and said vendor lost all his rights in the property? In that case, the new and
lawful owner is entitled to be subrogated in place of the applicant or previous
owner pending registration, and he may continue the proceedings in the case
and finally obtain title as owner.
VENDEE A RETRO MAY FILE APPLICATION IN HIS NAME
It is to be noted that a sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the
vendee and the vendee is subrogated to all the rights and actions of the
vendor, subject to the latters right of redemption. Having the legal title to
the land, the vendee a retro has therefore a registrable title thereto which
may be the subject of initial registration. The right to redeem the property
retained by the vendor a retro should only be noted in the decree and
certificate of title that may be issued.347
CO-OWNERS SHALL FILE THE APPLICATION JOINTLY
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly (Par.5 Sec. 14, P.D. 1529). A co-owner of a parcel of land
cannot apply for and obtain the registration of his undivided share to the
exclusion of the other owners under the provision of P.D. 1529. The law does
not allow or permit land held or owned jointly by two or more persons to be
separately registered with respect to the share of one co-owner only. 348
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of this part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. Since a co-owner cannot be considered
a true owner of a specific portion until division or partition is effected, he
cannot file an application for registration of the whole are without joining the
co-owners as applicants.349
345
346
347
348
349

212

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 39.

Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 497.
Id.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 95.
JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 100 (1997).

It is elemental that until a partition is made among co-owners, no one of

them can claim any particular portion of an undivided property as exclusively
his own. That portion cannot be ascertained until such time as the coownership shall have ceased. Since a co-owner cannot be considered as the
true and exclusive owner of a designated portion until partition is made upon
the termination of the co-ownership, he cannot alone apply for the
registration of the title to the whole land held in co-ownership without joining
the other co-owners as applicants. 350
PERSONS OR ENTITIES ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF LAND BY
OTHER MODES MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE THERETO

A land reserved, by presidential proclamation, for medical center site

purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital is not subject to
entry by any other person or entity and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. The proclamation legally effected a land grant, validly sufficient for
initial registration by the grantee under the Property Registration Decree
(formerly under Act 496). Such land grant is constitutive of a fee simple
title or absolute title in favor of said grantee.351 It can be said then that any
other person or entity to whom a land grant has been granted by a similar
proclamation issued by the President of the Philippines may apply for
registration of title thereto.
In the case of International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v.
University of the Philippines,352 the Supreme Court held,
Pursuant to R.A. No. 3990, which establishes a central
experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its
research and extension functions, particularly by the College of
Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts
and Sciences, the above reserved area was ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines
subject to any existing concessions, if any.
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic
of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain
and removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested
itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and
conveyed the same to UP; and made the latter the absolute
owner thereof.
UP may validly apply for registration of its title to the land ceded to it by the
law. Other persons or entities to whom a land might have been similarly
350
351

352

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 95-96.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146, 152-153 (1976); see also Section 103
of P.D. No. 1529.
200 SCRA 554, 572 (1991).

213

ceded by the Republic of the Philippines by law may thus also properly apply
for registration of title thereto.
APPLICATION BY NON-RESIDENTS
A non-resident of the Philippines may also apply for the registration of land.
Section 16 of P.D. 1529 provides that:
Sec. 16. Non-resident applicant. If the applicant is not a
resident of the Philippines, he shall file with his application an
instrument in due form appointing an agent or representative
residing in the Philippines, giving his full name and postal
address, and shall therein agree that the service of any legal
process in the proceedings under or growing out of the
application made upon his agent or representative shall be of
the same legal effect as if made upon the applicant within the
Philippines. If the agent or representative dies, or leaves the
Philippines, the applicant shall forthwith make another
appointment for the substitute, and, if he fails to do so the court
may dismiss the application.
WHAT ACCOMPANIES THE APPLICATION?
The following should accompany the application, which should be presented
in duplicate:353
(a)

Tracing-cloth plan duly approved by the Director of Lands,

together with two blueprint or photographic copies thereof;

(b)

Three copies of the corresponding technical descriptions;

(c)

Three copies of the surveyors certificate;

(d)

All original muniments of title in the possession of the applicant

which prove his rights, to the title he prays for or the land he
claims;

(e)

And certificate in quadruplicate of the city or provincial treasurer

of the assessed value of the land, at its last assessment for
taxation, or, in the absence thereof, that of the next preceding
year. However, in case the land has not been assessed, the
application may be accompanied with an affidavit in
quadruplicate of the fair market value of the land, signed by
three disinterested persons.

ON SURVEY PLANS

353

214

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 43-44, citing regulations in Ordinary

Land registration cases.

The submission of the original Tracing-cloth plan is a mandatory statutory

requirement and therefore must be submitted in evidence. 354 The survey
plans may be made either by the Bureau of Lands itself, after charging
reasonable fees, a government surveyor, or a duly licensed private land
surveyor authorized by the Bureau of Lands. In order for the plan and
technical description of the property prepared by a private surveyor to be
admissible in land registration proceedings, it will have to be approved by the
Director of Lands.355
The failure to submit the original tracing-cloth plan is detrimental to the
application.356 The reason behind the rule is to ensure that it does not overlap
a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by
subsequent registration of any adjoining land. 357 Therefore, the failure of the
applicant to submit the survey plans by reason that such plan is in the Land
Registration Authority for the purpose of having them checked or verified is
inexcusable for it is not the function of the Authority to check the original
survey plan for lack of authority to approve such survey plans, and if there is
any reason the original tracing cloth is needed to be forwarded there, the
applicant has the duty to retrieve it there. 358 Because the submission of the
original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement, the advance survey
plan, which was attached to petitioners application and marked in evidence,
does not suffice to comply with the requirement of the law, although in
Republic v. Court of Appeals,359 it ruled that mere blueprint copy of the cloth
plan, together with the lots technical description, was sufficient to identify
the land applied for registration, as long as they are certified by the Director
of Lands.360 Therefore, the failure of the persons contesting the application to
the presentation of certified copy of the original tracing cloth plan cannot be
considered as a waiver.361 Besides the rules of court specifically says that the
rule that failure to object to presentation of evidence is considered a waiver
to the objection does not apply to land registration cases:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral
and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.362
On the other hand, mere approval of the survey plans by the Bureau of Lands
is not proof of ownership of land covered by the said plan. 363 Consequently,
354
355
356
357
358

359
360
361
362
363

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 46.

Administrative Code, 1858
Del Rosario v. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 568.
Director of Lands v. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA
177, and February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 415.
167 SCRA 150
Noblejas 120
Director Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339 (1992).
Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3.
Gimeno v. Ct. of App., G.R. No. L-22747, December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 623.

215

where an applicant sought to register a part of a municipal street, even if his

survey plan, which includes the said part of the street, is approved by the
Bureau of Lands, his claim over the said part cannot be accepted. First, the
approval of the survey plans is no proof that he owns the property covered by
such plan. And second, there is no positive act from the government
classifying such land as patrimonial, therefore it is still public property and
cannot be appropriated.
Furthermore, the clerk of court will not accept the application applicant has
shown that he has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the
application and the above-mentioned annexes. 364
ON MUNIMENTS
Although the submission Original Tracing-Cloth plan is mandatory, the
submission of orginal muniments is not. Muniments are instruments or
written evidences which the applicant holds or possesses to enable him to
substantiate and prove title to his estate. Considering, however, the danger
of losing the original of such valuable evidence of title, the filing of such
documents together is not mandatory so long as they can be presented to
the court during the hearing of the case whenever required or necessary. 365
FORM OF APPLICATION366
The application for land registration shall be in writing and:
(a) Signed by the application or the person duly authorized in his
behalf,
(b) Sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths for the
province or city where the application was actually signed. If
there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed
and sworn to by and in behalf of each.
The application shall contain the following

364
365
366

216

(a)

A description of the land.

(b)

Shall state the citizenship and civil status of the applicant,

whether single or married, and, if married, the name of
the wife or husband, and, if the marriage has been legally
dissolved, when and how the marriage relation
terminated.

(c)

It shall also state the full names and addresses of all

occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners,

P.D. 1529, Sec. 17 (1978).

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 47.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 15.

if known, and, if not known, it shall state the extent of the

search made to find them.
The application for registration must be as follows:
Republic
of
the
Philippines
Regional Trial Court of _________________
The
undersigned,
____________________________________________________________hereby applies (or
apply) to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of
the Property Registration Decree, and to have the title thereto registered and
confirmed:
AND DECLARE . . . . .
1. That the applicants/s is/are the owners of the land (by virtue of inheritance
or deed of sale or conveyance and/or possession in accordance with Section
14 of said Decree), together with the building and improvements thereon,
with
the
exception
of
the
following:____________________________________________________________________
______ which is/are the property of _________________________ residing at
_________________________ The said land, consisting of ____________________
parcel/s is/are situated, bounded and described as shown on the plan and
technical descriptions attached hereto and made a part hereof, with the
following
exception:___________________________________________________________________
2. That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at P ____,
Philippine currency, and the buildings and other improvements at P
___________, Philippine currency.
3. That to the best of my/our knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other
person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or in possession, other
than
as
follows:
______________________________________________________________________________
__________
4. That the applicant/s has/have acquired said land in the following manner:
________________________________
(Note: Refer to Sec. 14 of said Decree. State also whether the property is
conjugal, paraphernal or exclusive property of the applicant/s)
5.
That
said
land
is
occupied
by
the
following
person:
_____________________________ ______________________________________________
6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned,
of the owners of all adjoining properties, of the persons mentioned in
paragraphs 3 and 5, and of the persons shown on the plan as claimants, are
as
follows:
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________
7. That the applicant/s is/are single or married to ____________________ (Note: if
marriage has been legally dissolved, state when and how the marriage
relation

217

terminated.)_________________________________________________________________
_____________________
8. That the applicant's/s' full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal
address/es
is/are
as
follows:
___________________________________________________________________
9. That (Note: If the land included in the application is bounded by a public or
private way or road, there should be stated in this paragraph whether or not
the applicant claims any and what land within the limits of the way or road
and whether the applicant desires to have the line of the way or road
determined.)
________________________________________
___________________________
10. That the following documents are attached hereto and made a part
hereof: ___________________________________ ________________________________
Signed
at
___________________
this
_____________________
day
of
____________________, in the year nineteen hundred and ______________________.
_________________________
(Post Office Address)
Republic
Of
The
Philippines
Province (Or City) Of _______________
On this _______________ day of _________________________,19 ________ personally
appeared
before
me
the
abovenamed
__________________________________________________ known to me to be the
person/s who executed the foregoing application and made oath that the
statements therein are true of his/their knowledge, information and belief.
The Residence Certificate/s ______________________ of the applicant/s
______________ was/were exhibited to me being No. _________________ issued at
___________________ dated ____________, 19 __________.
An application may include two or more parcels of land belonging to the
applicant/s provided the said lands are situated within the same province or
city. The court may at any time order an application to be amended by
striking out one or more of the parcels or by a severance of the application. 367
WHEN THE LAND BORDERS ON ROAD
If the application describes the land as bounded by a public or private way or
road, it shall state whether or not the applicant claims any and what portion
of the land within the limits of the way or road, and whether the applicant
desires to have the line of the way or road determined. 368
REQUIREMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS AND PAPERS, AND OCCULAR INSPECTIONS
The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to
those prescribed by P.D. 1529, provided that they are not inconsistent with
the said decree. The court may also require the filing of any additional
papers. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessary. 369
367
368
369

218

P.D. 1529, Sec. 18.

P.D. 1529, Sec. 20.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 21.

When the land applied for is subject to any mortgage or lease, the court may
require the applicant to furnish a copy of such mortgage or lease. It shall
cause the original, or upon its discretion, the certified true copy to be
presented for registration before the decree of registration is entered. 370
AMENDMENTS TO THE APPLICATION
Amendments to the application, including joinder, substitution, or
discontinuance as to parties, can be done in any stage of the proceedings
subject to just and reasonable terms the court may impose. 371 However, when
the amendment involves substantial increase in the area covered by the
application, it cannot be effected unless there be publication and notification
as if it is another original application for registration. 372 Such substantial
increase includes:
(a)
(b)
(c)

A substantial change in the boundaries;

An increase in the area of the land applied for; or
The inclusion of an additional land.

This is required in order to afford persons who may have interests in the said
additional areas opportunity to present their claims. An order of the court, in
a land registration proceeding, amending an official plan so as to include land
not previously included therein is a nullity as against a person who is not a
party and who has no notice of the proceeding, unless publication is effected
anew.373 Without publication of the amendments for the inclusion lands not
covered by original application, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction of over
the said parts.374 Thus, any judgment made regarding such parcels of land
shall be null and void for having been made without jurisdiction. However,
when the amendment involves the decrease of the area covered by the
application no publication and notification is needed. 375 To summarize, the
primary purpose and effects of publication of the notice of application are 1)
to confer jurisdiction over the land applied for upon the court, and 2) to
charge the whole world with knowledge of the application of the land
involved, and invite them to take part in the case and assert and prove their
rights over the property subject thereof.376
The most common amendment is the substitution of the name of the new
and legal owner for the original applicant. 377 The new and legal owner has the
right to be subrogated in the place of the original applicant, and he may
continue the proceedings until he obtains the title thereof. 378 This can be done

370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378

Act 496, Sec. 27

P.D. 1529, Sec. 19 par. 1.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 19 par. 2.
Juan v. Luis, G.R. No. 24701, August 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 252.
Benin v. Tuazon, 57 SCRA 531 (1974).
Id. at 552.
Noblejas 138
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 44.
Ortiz, et al. v. Ortiz, 26 Phil. 280.

219

by filing a motion to the court, with the deed attached, pleading that the
application be considered in accordance with the said deed. 379.
However, such failure to publicize cannot be blamed to the applicant for that
duty rests upon the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). 380
The certification of the Administrator that there has been publication and
notification is conclusive proof of such publication and notification. 381 The
court cannot rule upon the issue of publication if there is such certificate. It is
only when there is the absence of such certificate, can the court rule
otherwise. Therefore, if such certificate is put on record such decision is valid
for it is conclusively presumed that the amendments were published and that
the court has jurisdiction over the said parcels of land because of such
publication.
However, even without such certification being attached to the record of the
court, the application can still be valid because there is that legal
presumption that a public officer has regularly performed his duties, provided
the case has been terminated for a long period of time.
to permit such a legal presumption to be rebutted after a
good many years since the termination of the case will not only
endanger judicial stability but also violate the underlying
principle of the Torrens system. 382
DEALINGS WITH LAND BEFORE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE
The law expressly allows the land, subject matter of an application for
registration, to be dealt with, i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during
the interval of time between the filing of the application and the issuance of
the decree title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or
encumbrance presented to the registration court by the interested party for
the court to either order such land registered subject to the encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the
name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed
by said instruments.383 Section 22 of P.D. 1529 provides that:
After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of registration, the land therein described may still be
the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the
interested party shall present to the court the pertinent
instruments together with a subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof and the
court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in
379
380
381
382
383

220

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 45.

P.D. 1529, Sec. 23.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 24.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 46.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 84 SCRA 67 (1978).

the name of the person to whom the property has been

conveyed by said instruments.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
84 SCRA 67
FACTS: Mendoza tried to register their land. After due notice an order
of general default was issued. Before the issuance of the title they
sold the land to Gole. The court issued the title in favor of Gole. Later,
Mendoza asked that the title be granted him because Gole failed to
fully pay the purchase price and Gole was not a party in the
application. The RTC approved the motion while CA reversed and
issued the title to Gole.
ISSUE: WON the title should be issued to Gole.
HELD: Yes. It should be issued to Gole. The law permits that before
the title be decreed the subject property can be dealt with as long as
the interested party presents evidence of the dealing and those
affected be notified. In this case, it is Mendoza himself who presented
the instrument of the dealing. He satisfied the first element. The
notice requisite was also satisfied because there was an order of
general default issued by the court, therefore the only party entitled
to notice is Mendoza. Besides, breach of contract is not a ground to
assail the validity of title. The only ground to assail it is on the ground
of fraud in obtaining the same. If there is breach of contract he should
have resolved the contract by filing a case in court.
B. PUBLICATION, ANSWER & DEFAULT
PURPOSE AND EFFECTS OF PUBLICATION
As was what mentioned earlier, there are several purposes and effects of
publication of the notice of application. First is to confer jurisdiction over the
land applied for upon the court. Another is to charge the whole world with
knowledge of the application of the land involved, and invite them to take
part in the case and assert and prove their rights over the property subject.
By the description in the notice, To all whom it may concern, all the world
are made parties defendant. To require personal notice as a prerequisite to
the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of
unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to
unknown claimants. The great difficulty in land title arises from the
existence of possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt
with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of title.
Courts have held that in action in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is
not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the
res. Neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree
or title issued in a registration proceeding. For the state, as sovereign over
the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a

221

proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be

binding upon all persons, known or unknown. 384
Thus, notice of application and initial hearing by publication is sufficient and
the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the
property did not receive personal notice is not a sufficient ground to
invalidate the proceedings although he may ask for the review of the
judgment or the reopening of the decree of registration, if he was made the
victim of actual fraud. However, lack of actual notice or knowledge of the
pendency of the proceedings does not of itself constitute fraud. 385
This is clearly explained in the case of Benin v. Tuazon,386
The settle rule, further, is that once the registration court had
acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in
the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the
application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands
mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown
that the decree of registration had included land or lands not
included in the original application as published, then the
registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be
declared null and void-but only insofar- as the land not included
in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the
publication- the publication being the basis of the jurisdiction of
the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration,
relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are
valid. Thus, if it shown that a certificate of title had been issued
covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction,
the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the
land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction.
In addition, it is a rule that a land registration court cannot be deprived of
said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance
by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of
land. This is especially true if the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over
a parcel of land for registration of title thereto by the publication of the
application.
Furthermore, failure of people to assert rights to the land involved cannot
operate to exclude them from the binding effects of the judgment that may
be rendered therein.

384
385

386

222

Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661.

Republic v. Abadilla, CA-G.R. No. 6902-R, Oct. 6, 1951; Derayunan v. Derayunan,
56 O.G.22, p. 3863, May 30, 1960, CA.
57 SCRA 531, 558, citing Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122;
Juan and Chongco vs. Ortiz, 49 Phil. 252; Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 60
Phil. 211.

The rights and interests of a person who is not made a party to an action
affecting the ownership or possession thereof, are not thereby prejudiced. 387
Thus, the purpose of the notice and publication thereof is to invite all persons
concerned who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for to
come to the court and show cause why the application should not be granted.
In other words, everybody is welcome to become party to the case if he has
any rights to enforce or interests to protect.
To deprive him of that
opportunity will be to deprive him of his right or property without due process
of law.
Incidentally, it may be well to understand what due process of law is. This
phrase was defined by Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as the
law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. 388
Due process of law is not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all
the inhabitants of the state, but simply: (1) There shall be a law prescribed in
harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) That this law shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) That it
shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and (4) That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a
class.
When a person is deprived of his life or liberty or property, therefore, under a
law prescribed by the proper lawmaking body of the state and such law is
within the power of said department to make, and is reasonable, and is then
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed, and is
applicable alike to all citizens of a particular class within the state, such
persons is not deprived of his property or of his life or of his liberty without
due process of law.389
NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING
Under Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), after the
filing of the application for registration of title to land, the next step is for the
proper Regional Trial Court, within five (5) days from said filing, to issue an
order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. In
turn, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application
for land registration by means of: (1) Publication; (2) Mailing; (3) Posting.
The Administrator of Land Registration Authority shall cause a notice of the
hearing to be published in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. This notice shall be directed towards all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved, including
adjoining owners so far as known, and in general to all whom it may concern.
This obliges all persons concerned to appear in court on the date and time
387
388
389

Albano, 10 Phil. 410.

U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104.
See Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., Secs. 1943-1946; Principles of
Constitutional Law, Cooley, 434.

223

indicated to show proof on why the application for registration should not be
granted. The publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.
The publication in the Official Gazette binds the whole world, inclusive of
those who may be adversely affected and those who factually have been
innocent of such publication. This is the only way to give meaning to the
finality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be issued, as against the
argument that such rule could result to actual injustice. 390
FORM OF NOTICE
The aforementioned Section 23 requires that copy of the notice of initial
hearing duly attested by the Administrator of Land Registration Authority be
posted by the Sheriff of the province or city in a conspicuous place on each
parcel of land as well as on the bulletin board of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the date
set for the hearing. The notice shall be substantially in the form prescribed in
said Section 23. Said Section never meant to dispense with the requirement
of notice by mailing and by posting.391
Republic v. Marasigan,392 explains the meaning of the proviso of Section 23 of
P.D. No. 1529:
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement
of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is
that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette,
although the law mandates that it be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines. However, publication in the latter alone would
not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication.
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other
modes of giving notice, which remain mandatory and
jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of
the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notice to all persons named
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners
of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
Moreover, in the case of Director of Lands vs. CA, 393 it was held that
publication of the notice of the initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory and imperative. Without such, the land registration
court cannot validly confirm the title of the applicant for registration.
390

391
392
393

224

Francisco v. Ct. of App., Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-35787, Apr. 11, 1980; 97 SCRA
22.
Republic v. Marasigan, 198 SCRA 219.
198 SCRA 219, 228 (1991), stress supplied.
276 SCRA 276, 285 (1997).

The date of mailing of the motion, pleading, or any other papers, which may
include instruments as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing
as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt. 394
MAILING AND PROOF OF PUBLICATION AND NOTICE
The two other modes of giving notice are by mailing and by posting.
Compliance with these requirements is mandatory and jurisdictional. 395
PERSONS AND OFFICIALS TO WHOM NOTICE IS GIVEN BY MAILING
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that the Commissioner of Land
Registration Commission (now Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority) shall cause a copy of the notice of initial hearing of the application
to be mailed to the following:
(a)

To every person named in the notice whose address is knownwithin seven days after publication of said notice in the Official
Gazette.

(b)

To the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, to the Provincial

Governor, and to the Mayor of the municipality or city, as the
case may be, in which the land lies- if the applicant requests to
have the line of a public way or road determined.

(c)

To the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the

Director of Land Management, the Director of Mines and/ or the
Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, as may be
appropriate- if the land borders on a river, navigable stream or
shore, or on an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has
been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from
the application or the proceedings that a tenant-farmer or the
national government may have a claim adverse to that of the
applicant.

(d)

To such other persons as the court may deem proper.

NOTICE BY POSTING
The same Section 23 of P.D. 1529 also provides that the Administrator of the
Land Registration AuthorityShall also cause a duly attested copy of the notice of initial
hearing to be posted by the Sheriff of the province or city, as the
case may be, or by his deputy, in a conspicuous place on each
parcel of land included in the application and also in a
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal
394
395

Mingoa v. Land Registration Administrator, 200 SCRA 782.

Republic vs. Marasigan, supra.

225

building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion

thereof is situated, fourteen days at least before the date of
initial hearing.
PROOF OF PUBLICATION AND NOTICE
Section 24 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that the certification of the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority and of the Sheriff concerned to the effect
that the notice of initial hearing, as required by law, has been complied with
shall be filed in the case before the date of initial hearing, and shall be
conclusive proof of such fact.
Such certification cannot, however, be conclusive proof of the fact of
publication and/ or posting, if the certification is made even prior to the
actual publication of the notice or release for circulation of the Official
Gazette, or prior to the completion of the 14-day period of actual posting of
such notice. A party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with
the business of such official in the performance of his duties. 396
DEFECTIVE PUBLICATION AND EFFECTS
A defective publication of the notice of initial hearing deprives the court of
jurisdiction.397 When the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
case, it lacks the authority over the whole case and all its aspects. 398 This is
so because it is the proper publication of said notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and confers the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decree it.399 The publication is defective in the following instances:
(a)

Where what was published in the Official Gazette is the

description of a bigger lot which included the lands subject of
registration. The registration did not acquire jurisdiction over
subject lands because:
1.
Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 (as also Sec. 21 of Act 496)
specifies that the application for registration should
contain the description of the land subject of registration
and this is the description to be published;
2.

396
397
398
399

226

It is the publication of specific boundaries of lands to be

registered that would actually put the interested parties
on notice of the registration proceedings and enable
them, if they have rights or interest in the property, to
show why the application for registration should not be
granted;

Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921.

Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37 (1971).
Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224 (1968).
Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC, Malabon, M.M. Branch 170, 181 SCRA 788
(1990).

3.

(b)

The adjoining owners of the bigger lot would not be the

same as the owners of the smaller lots subject of
registration. Hence, notice to adjoining owners of the
bigger lot is not notice to those of the smaller lots. 400

Where the actual publication of the notice of initial hearing

was after the hearing itself. The publication is also defective
where the Official Gazette containing said notice, although for
the month prior the scheduled hearing, was released for
publication only after said hearing.401

Accordingly, in the case of Register of Deeds of Malabon vs. RTC Malabon, the
court order set the hearing of petition for reconstitution of title on August 17,
1988. Said order was included in the May 22 and 30, 1988 issues of the
Official Gazette, but released for circulation on October 3, 1988. The Supreme
Court held that the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition for
tardiness of publication. This principle equally applies to a belated publication
of an application for registration of title.
MINORS AND PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY GIVEN DUE REPRESENTATION
Upon the return day of notice, and proof of service of all orders of notice
issued, the court may appoint a disinterested person to act as guardian ad
litem for minors and persons not in being, unascertained, unknown, or out of
the Philippines, who may have an interest. The Compensation of the
guardian or the agent shall be determined by the court and paid as part of
the expenses of the court. 402 Ordinarily, a guardian ad litem has no authority
to act or bind a minor in any transaction with respect to his estate, his
authority being restricted only to matters connected with the litigation at
hand; but he can however do so with the approval of the court. 403
OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION IN ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS
Section 25 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice
or not, may appear and file an opposition on or before the date
of initial hearing, or within such further time as may be allowed
by the court. The opposition shall state all the objections to the
application and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party
filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some other duly authorized
person.
If the opposition or the adverse claim of any person covers only
a portion of the lot and said portion is not properly delimited on
400
401
402
403

Fewkes vs. Vasques, 39 SCRA 514, 516-518 (1971).

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442, 449 (1994).
Act 496, Sec. 33.
Sto. Domingo, etc. v. Sto. Domingo, et al., 103 Phil. 373.

227

the plan attached to the application, or in case of undivided coownership, conflicting claims of ownership or possession, or
overlapping of boundaries, the court may require the parties to
submit a subdivision plan duly approved by the Director of
Lands.
It will be noted that under Section 34 of the land Registration Act (Act 496), a
person alleging his interest in the land is required to file an answer to the
application for registration. But even before P.D. No. 1529, the Supreme
Court had said that a verified opposition is the answer referred to in said
Section 34 of Act 496.404
WHO ARE ENTITLED?
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may
appear and file an opposition or answer on or before the return day, or within
such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all
the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by
the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be
signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf. 405
All that is required to give him a standing in court is that he has some kind of
an interest in the property. It is immaterial whether this interest is in the
character of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is a
beneficiary of a trust. 406 Under these criteria, the following may be proper
oppositors:
(a)

A homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who
had fulfilled all the conditions required by law to entitle him to a
patent;

(b)

A purchaser of friar land before the issuance of the patent to

him; and

(c)

Persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land

and have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase. 407

Failure to file an answer or opposition within the period granted by the court
or within a reasonable time thereafter constitutes abandonment of the
opposition.408 But once an opposition has been formally filed, it is improper
for the court taking cognizance of such registration case to order the

404
405
406

407

408

228

Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186 (1988).

Sec. 34 of Act 496, as amended by Sec. 1 of Act 3621.
De Castro vs. Marcos, 26 SCRA 644, 653 (1969), citing Archbishop of Manila vs.
Barrio of Sto. Cristo, 39 Phil. 1, 7 and Cuoto vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459, 461.
De Castro vs. Marcos, supra; also Heirs of Pelagia Zara vs. Director of Lands, 20
SCRA 641 (1967).
Omandam v. Director of Lands, 95 Phil. 450.

dismissal thereof on the ground that the opposition failed to appear on the
day set for the hearing.409
Where one who may justly oppose an application for registration should find
him out of time, the proper procedure should be to ask for the lifting of the
order of general or special default, and then, once lifted, to file an opposition
to the application.410 This is because proceedings in land registration are in
rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for
and not the determination of any right not connected with the registration. 411
REQUISITES OF AN OPPOSITION
An opposition has two requisites, namely: (1) It shall set forth all the
objections to the application and (2) It shall state the interest claimed by
the party filing the same. The real purpose of the provision was to require
the answer to disclose the objections to the application, the requirement that
the opponent show his interest being merely for purpose of making plain, full,
and clear the objections to the application. 412
IS AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF OBTAINABLE IN ANSWER?
In the case of City of Manila v. Lack,413 this question was answered in the
negative adhering to the theory that the respondent is merely an objector,
one who prevents but cannot obtain. This ruling, however, has been
rendered obsolete with the subsequent passage of an amendatory measures,
Act No. 3621, providing that where there is an adverse claim, the court shall
determine the conflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant
or oppositor, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither
of them succeeds in showing that he has title proper for registration, or shall
enter a decree awarding the land applied for, or any part thereof, to the
person entitled thereto, and such decree, when final, shall entitle such person
to the issuance of an original certificate of title. 414
The new rule seems to be in keeping with the procedure under the Public
Land Act, permitting any number of persons (Section 50) to seek judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to land by presenting their
respective applications, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and determined accordingly;
so also in cadastral
proceedings, where an answer or claim may be filed with the same effect as
an application for registration.
DEFAULT
Section 26 of P.D. No. 1529 states:
409
410
411
412
413
414

Vda. De Barbin v. Jordas, et al., 55 O.G. 1, Jan. 5, 1959, CA

Serrano v. Palacio, 52 O.G. 1, Jan. 1956, CA.
Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 467.
City of Manila v. Lack, 19 Phil. 324.
Ibid.
Nicolas v. Pre, et al., 97 Phil. 766.

229

If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the

court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require
the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the
notice To all Whom It May Concern, the entire world are made
parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a
default order shall be entered against persons who did not
appear and answer.
EFFECTS OF DEFAULT
A default order in land registration proceedings is entered against the whole
world, so that all persons, except the parties who had appeared and filed
pleadings in the case, are bound by said order. 415 Where there is no
opposition, all the allegations in the application are deemed confessed on the
part of the opponent. As a result, it has also been held that a person who has
not challenged the application is deemed confessed on the part of the
opponent. Moreover, a claimant having failed to present his answer or
objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens system or to
question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the
certificate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land,
even granting that he had any right therein. 416
A defaulted interested person may however gain standing in court by filing a
motion to set aside the order of default in accordance with Section 3, Rule 18
of the Rules of Court,417 which reads:
Sec. 3: Relief from order of default- A party declared in default
may at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment file
a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer (or file an opposition as
in ordinary land registration case) was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious
defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
WHEN DEFAULT ORDER IS IMPROPER?
Where an oppositor has already filed with the court an opposition based on
substantial grounds, it is improper, even illegal, to declare him in default
simply because he failed to appear at the initial hearing of the application for

415
416
417

230

Cachero vs. Marzan, 196 SCRA 601, 610 (1991).

De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420.
Sec. 34. of P.D. No. 1529 allows application of the Rules of Court in a suppletory
character when not inconsistent with said Decree.

registration. This was explained further by the Supreme Court in Director of

Lands v. Santiago,418
The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person
appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at
once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded 419 cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer
(now opposition) before it, which has long been filed, for such
interpretation would nothing less than illogical, unwarranted and
unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to
appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for
default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been so
stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious
consequences of default.
In the same case, the Supreme Court also held that the appropriate remedy
to contest an illegal declaration or order of default is a petition for certiorari.
It pointed out that in Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos,420
the Court held that the remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e.,
Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly, though not exclusively, available to a defendant
who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and
efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by
default set aside as a nullity.
GENERAL DEFAULT NOT A GUARANTEE TO SUCCESS OF APPLICATION
That no person is entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is
no opposition presented against such registration by third persons, has been
affirmed by the courts many times.
One of the fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens
system is to secure to the owner an absolute indefeasible title, free from all
encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the
certificate of title issued, and, so far as it is possible, to make the certificate
issued to the owner by the court absolute proof of such title. In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same
registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally
issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner
of the land he is applying for. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to
have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one
appeared to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He
must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the
court, that he owns the legal estate in fee simple. Courts are not justified in
registering property under the Torrens system simply because there is no
opposition interposed. Courts may, even, in the absence of any opposition,
deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground
418
419
420

160 SCRA 186, 191-192 (1988).

Section 26, P.D. No. 1529.
63 SCRA, 300 (1975), citing Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768 (1969).

231

that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner in fee
simple, of the land which he is attempting to register. 421
The applicant must prove that he has just title to the property inasmuch as
just title is never presumed. He cannot merely rely on the absence or
weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. By express provision of Article
1129 of the New Civil Code, there is just title when the claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. 422
ORDER OF DEFAULT MAY BE SET ASIDE
The power of the court to set aside an interlocutory default order and permit
a person to come in and make defense for any good cause shown cannot be
questioned. This is a power inherent in courts of general jurisdiction, and
may, so it has been declared, be exercised without the grant of statutory
authority.423 Moreover, an interlocutory judgment or order remains under the
control of the court, in the absence of a legal provision to the contrary, until
the final decision of the case, and may be modified and rescinded, on
sufficient grounds shown, at any time before the entry of final judgment. 424
Accordingly, while it may be an error of procedure to file a petition to reopen
and/ or review on the ground of fraud pending the promulgation of the
judgment, the interests of substantial justice and the speedy determination of
the controversy should have impelled the trial court to lift its order of general
default and once lifted to allow the petitioners to file his opposition to the
application.425
ISSUANCE OF ORDER OF GENERAL DEFAULT PRESUMED
Where the record in a land registration case does not affirmatively show an
order of general default, it is deemed that such order was issued. For, in the
absence of showing to the contrary, a judicial proceeding is presumed to be
regular, and all steps required by law to be taken before the court may validly
render judgment, have been so taken. 426
Under Sec. 26 of P.D. No. 1529, a general default may be ordered by the court
if no person appears and answers within the time prescribed. As a rule, this
is done upon motion of the applicant when the case is called at the initial
hearing, but may also be ordered by the court motu proprio. If the applicant
himself fails to appear, the court may dismiss his application without
prejudice.
421

422
423
424

425

426

232

Maloles and Malvar v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548; De los Reyes v. Paterno,
34 Phil. 420; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367;
Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil.277.
Reyes v. Sierra, et al., G.R. No. L-28658, Oct. 18, 1979; 93 SCRA 472.
23 Cyc. 389.
Larrobis v. Wislezenus and Smith, Bell & Co., 42 Phil. 401; De Vela v. Naawa, 62
O.G. 44, Oct. 31, 1966, CA.
Yabut Lee and Liscano v. Punzalan, G.R. No. L-50236, Aug. 29, 1980; 99 SCRA
567.
Pascual, et al., v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12, Mar. 19, 1962, CA.

Special default is when a party appears at the initial hearing without having
filed an answer or opposition and asks the court for time within which to file
the same, and this has accordingly been granted, in case of failure of such
party to file his answer or opposition within the period allowed. This operates
only against specific person or persons.
ORDER OF DEFAULT, WHEN APPEALABLE
As a rule in ordinary civil cases, a party who has been declared in default
loses his standing in court and, consequently, cannot appear later on, adduce
evidence and be heard, and for that reason he is not entitled even to notice.
Neither can he appeal from the judgment rendered, and the only exception is
when the party in default files a motion to set aside the order of default on
the ground or grounds stated in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, in which event
he is entitled to notice of all proceedings. 427
However, in registration proceedings, where a party appeared and presented
an answer in opposition and later amended it, although rejected by the court,
he did not lose thereby his standing in court, and the order excluding his
answer, which is equivalent to declaring him in default, is appealable as soon
as the decision ordering the issuance of the decree in favor of the adverse
party shall have been rendered. 428
MOTION TO DISMISS APPLICATION; MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION
In a land registration case, a motion to dismiss the application, or a motion to
dismiss the opposition to such application, is allowed. In Valisno v. Plan,429
the Supreme Court held that while the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does
not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court however allows the application of the rules in a
suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Similarly, the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) does not provide for a motion to
dismiss, but it specifically provides in its Section 34 that the Rules of Court
shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practical and convenient. Thus, in an
earlier case,430 the High Court sustained the dismissal of the application for
registration upon a motion to dismiss grounded on the courts lack of
jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered had been
previously registered in the names of the oppositors.
On the other hand, in the Valisno case, the applicants motion to dismiss the
opposition to the application for registration on ground of res judicata was
sustained by the Court, holding that the former judgment (in a case of
recovery of possession) was a final judgment rendered by a court (Court of
427
428
429
430

Garcia Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166; Manidian v. Leong, 103 Phil. 431.
See Malagum and Ornopia v. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19.
143 SCRA 502 (1986).
Duran vs. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154 (1961), cited in Valisno vs. Plan, supra.

233

Appeals) having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parities, and that
there was between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
This is the reasoning of the Court:
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery
of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein
raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an
accion reivindicatoria. The second case is for registration of
title. Consequently, between the two casers there is identity
causes of action because in accion reivindicatoria possession is
sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in
registration cases. Registration of title in ones name is based
on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek
to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question.
The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is
directed against particular persons, while in the latter
proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world.
Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same.
It does not matter that the first cause was decided by a court of
general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one
of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough
that the court which decided the first case on the merits had
validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a
requisite of res judicata.
C. EVIDENCE
BURDEN OF APPLICANT
The burden of the applicant is to show that he is the real and absolute owner,
in fee simple.431 Applicants of a claim over the land must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain, through competent, clear and persuasive evidence of private
ownership or of acquisition from the government, which applies also in cases
of confirmation of imperfect title.432 As stated in Laragan v. Court of Appeals,
433
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, the presumption always is that
the land pertains to the State, and the occupants and possessors claim and
interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership for the required number of years. The basic rule then is that the
applicant must stand on the strength of his own evidence. He must submit
the evidence to the court although no one appears to oppose his title and to
431
432
433

234

Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13.

Amado D. Aquino, Land Registration and Related Proceedings 62 (4 th ed., 2007).
Laragan v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 172.

oppose the registration of the land. He should not also rely on the absence or
weakness of the evidence of the oppositors.
WHAT APPLICANT MUST PROVE?
First, the applicant must prove that the land applied for has been declassified
from the forest or timber zone and is a public agricultural land, is alienable
and disposable, or otherwise capable of registration. When the property
sought to be registered is agricultural land, it only need be classified as
alienable and disposable only at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.434
He must also prove the identity of the land, his possession and occupation
thereof for the length of time and in the manner required by law. 435 If,
however, the claim is not based on his own possession, he must prove the
basis of such claim by submitting his muniments of title or whatever evidence
to support the same436, whether documentary or oral. 437 He must also prove
the genuineness of the title he presents. 438
The Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), the Property Registration Decree (PD
No. 1529), or the Public Land Act (specifically, Section 48[b], CA No. 141,
require that every applicant show a proper title for registration. Indeed, even
in the absence of any adverse claim, the applicant is not assured of a
favorable decree by the land registration court if he fails to establish a proper
title for official recognition.439
PROOFS THAT LAND HAS BEEN DECLASSIFIED FROM
THE FOREST ZONE, IS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE, AND IS REGISTRABLE.
According to Agcaoili, such proofs are:

434
435

436
437
438
439

(a)

Presidential Proclamations;

(b)

Executive Orders also issued by the President, withdrawing from

a reservation a specific area and declaring the same open for
entry, sale or other mode of disposition;

(c)

Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of Environment

and Natural Resources;

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, 448 SCRA 442.

Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legalization (Free
Patent) and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable
and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, for eleven (11) years commencing
January 1, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 4, amending subsections 48[b] and 48[c] of the
Public Land Act (1977).
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 63.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 156.
Republic Cement Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 734.
Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 171.

235

(d)

Bureau of Forest Development Land Classification Map, that the

land lies within the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain;

(e)

Certification by the Director of Forestry, that the land has been

released as alienable and disposable; and reports of district
Forester, that the subject land was found inside and agricultural
zone and is suitable for rice cultivation is binding on the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government to classify public lands;

(f)

Investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigator (binding

upon the courts), and

(g)

Legislative act/statute, reserving a portion of the public domain

for public or quasi-public use, which amounts to a transfer of
ownership to the grantee.440

A mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of Forestry (or by a

District Forester) is not controlling in all cases, as in a case where the land
involved is within a forested zone covered by a land classification map
showing the timberland zone and testimony which merely identified and
described the condition of the area and verified the location of the land as
stated in the survey plan, absent any authentic document evidencing the
classification of the land applied for as a forest zone. 441 However, there was a
case where the court held that reports and testimonies of a district forester
and a land inspector that the area applied for is forest land within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve deserve great weight. At the same time, in Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals,442 the Court gave weight to the mere
certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land applied for became
disposable and alienable only on a later date prior to application. However, a
private corporation may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without
need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessor-in-interest
first.443
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
106 SCRA 426
DOCTRINE: A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does
not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Sec. 48 of C.A. 141, as
amended and as long as said public land remains alienable and
disposable.

440
441
442
443

236

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 247-248.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 77.
133 SCRA 701.
Republic v. Manna Properties, inc., G.R. No. 144692, January 31, 2005.

FACTS: The respondents filed a lease application with the Bureau of

Lands, but were denied as the land has been classified as within U.S.
Military Reserve. A few years later, the land was deemed reverted to
public domain as it was excluded from the U.S. Philippine Military
Bases Agreement. Respondents contend that they had been in open,
continuous, and exclusive ownership of the land. The Director of
Lands, herein petitioner, opposed, alleging that petitioners had not
been in the concept of such ownership thirty (30) years prior to the
application, and that the petition was an attempt to reopen a
cadastral case which was held res judicata. The lower court ruled in
favor of herein respondents. The appellate court reversed, stating
that the said declaration is binding upon the applicants even if they
did not take part in the proceedings, and therefore the trial court had
no further jurisdiction to entertain the case at bar.
ISSUES:
(1)
WON the CA erred in ruling that the prior decision in the
cadastral proceedings declaring the disputed lot as public
land does not constitute res judicata.
(2)
WON the CA erred in ruling that the applicants had
registrable title over the disputed land
HELD:
(1)

(2)

The Supreme Court grants the petition, setting aside the

decision of the CA. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land
is public does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to
the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Sec. 48 of C.A. 141, as amended and as long as
said public land remains alienable and disposable. When the
cadastral proceedings was instituted in 1927 and terminated
in 1930, the land in question was still classified as within the
U. S. Military Reservation and was deemed reverted to the
public domain only in 1953. On this basis, the Court finds
that the decision in the aforesaid cadastral case does not
constitute res judicata upon a subsequent action for land
registration considering the futility of filing any claim then
over the land in question since the same would nevertheless
have been denied due to the fact that during the pendency
of the cadastral case, said land was not alienable nor
disposable and this was shown by the denial of the lease
application filed then by private respondents' predecessorin-interest
But while the cadastral proceedings in 1927 cannot be
considered a bar to the registration proceedings instituted
by private respondents in 1965, the chronology of events in
the case at bar clearly negates compliance by private
respondents-applicants with the thirty-year possession
requirement. The intervening period commencing from the

237

promulgation of Proclamation No. 10 of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines in 1925 declaring the land in
question as part of the U.S. Military Reservation until 1953
when the land was deemed reverted back to the public
domain
disturbed
private
respondentsapplicants,
possession over the land in question because during this
interregnum, no amount of time in whatever nature of
possession could have ripen such possession into private
ownership, the land having been segregate as part of a
military reservation.
Private respondents' claim of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession over the land in question should
then be counted only from 1953. Considering that the
application for registration was filed in 1965, obviously, the
thirty-year requirement had not been met at the time the
action for registration was filed and therefore it was error on
the part of the appellate court to rule that the applicants
already possessed a registrable title over the land in
question.
PROOFS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DECLASSIFICATION:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(e)
(f)

Survey plans, even if approved by the Bureau of Lands;

Conversion of land into fishpond and the tilting of properties
around it;
Mere fact that the area in which the land involved is located has
become highly developed residential or commercial land and
actually no longer forest land;
Period during which land was under pasture lease permits
granted to petitioner (as it lends credence to the fact that said
land was within the Forest Zone as only lands of the category of
public forest land subject to such permits);
Evidence that only establishes that the land is public grazing
land within a forest reserve, and
Certification by the Director of Forestry that the land sought to
be registered is within the public forest, based on land
classification map, sufficing to show such fact. 444 The mere
initiation of an application for registration of land under the
Torrens system is not proof that the land is of private
ownership.445

POSSESSION OR OCCUPATION (IF PRESCRIPTION IS BASIS)

The general rule is open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without need
of judicial or other sanctions, ceases to be public land and becomes private
444
445

238

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 66, 67.

Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.

property.446 The possessor deemed to have acquired by operation of law a

right to a grant, a government grant, does not need to acquire a certificate of
title.447 The confirmation proceedings would then simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such conversion already effected by
operation of law form the moment the required period of possession became
complete.448
However, a declaration of possession is a mere conclusion of law rather than
a factual evidence of possession. The applicant must then present specific
facts that would show such nature of possession. 449 Possessory information
titles or titulo possessorio are not sufficient to confer title susceptible of
registration, as such are only prima facie evidence that the possessor of the
land is the owner thereof. There must have been actual possession for the
period required by law.450
If the land was formerly within forest zone, it is only from the date it was
released as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act that
the period of occupancy for purpose of confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title may be counted.451 However, where the applicants
possession of the lands for 30 years or more antedated the classification as
forest land, then such prior possession may ripen into private ownership and
such lands could not be retroactively legislated or classified as forest lands
because it would violate previously acquired property rights protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution.452
When tacking the possession of the predecessor-in-interest, privity between
the successive possessors is necessary. 453 If a part of the claimed land was
not included in the technical description, the claimants possession may only
begin upon actual possession of the same, not counting that of its former
possessors.454
IDENTITY OF LAND; SURVEY PLAN, IN GENERAL
In land registration proceedings, the land applied for must be identified. A
sufficient survey plan which can stand alone shows the propertys boundaries
and total area, clearly identifying and delineating the extent of the land.
However, such plan must be approved by the Director of Lands, as required
by the Revised Administrative Code and P.D. No. 239, to be considered as
evidence.455 Errors in the plans and reproduced in the certificate of title do
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 79.

Director of Lands v. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369.
Rumarate v. Hernandez, 487 SCRA 317.
Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 17 (1194 revised ed.).
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480.
Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998.
Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 79 SCRA 535.
South City Homes, Inc. v. Republic, 185 SCRA 693.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 68.

239

not annul the decree of registration since it is not the plan but the land itself
which is registered.456
TRACING CLOTH PLAN AND BLUE PRINT COPIES OF PLAN
Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 26 of
Act 496 require the presentation of the tracing cloth plan. This is a statutory
requirement which cannot be waived. Its purpose is to fix the exact or
definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions. 457
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the blue print copy of the plan
suffices for the purpose where the original tracing cloth plan was attached to
the application for registration, as well as the true certified copy of the white
paper plan for purposes of identifying the land. It is necessary that such
contain all the details and information required for a proper and definite
identification of the land sought to be registered, thereby serving the
purposes for which the original tracing cloth plain is required, the fact
therefore that the original survey plan was recorded on paper instead of a
tracing cloth plan though not detract from the probative value thereof. 458
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR, DULY SIGNED BY A GEODETIC ENGINEER
It has been held that what defines a piece of titled property is not the
numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but the boundaries or
metes and bounds of the property specified in its technical description as
enclosing it and showing its limits.459
TAX DECLARATIONS
Differences between the description of the land boundaries as well as in the
land area stated in tax declarations after the survey, if logically explained, do
not adversely affect the probative value of these tax declarations as evidence
of identity of the land.460
CLAIMS OWNERSHIP OTHER THAN BY POSSESSION, PROVE BASIS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
(TITLE IS GENUINE, ETC.)
The usual proof to establish a registrable title is by means of document. One
who relies on a document evidencing his title thereto must prove not only the
identity of the land but also the genuineness of the title. 461
SPANISH TITLES

456
457
458
459
460
461

240

University of the Philippines v. Rosario, G.R. No. 136965, March 28, 2001.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 68.
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 705.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 72.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 74.

Although Spanish titles or the like are now inadmissible and ineffective as
proof of ownership in land registration proceedings filed after August 16,
1976, as stated under Presidential decree No. 892, there are still pending
cases in court which particularly involve possessory information titles, having
probative value and the possibility of ripening into ownership. 462 For example,
although an inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria
under the Spanish Mortgage Law merely furnishes a prima facie evidence of
the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in
possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his application,
such information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 10
years, upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage law.463
Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage law required that the registered
possessory information proceedings do not ripen into ownership except for
certain conditions such as: (a) the applicant has been in open possession of
the land; (b) the application to this effect has been filed after the expiration
of 10 years from the date of such registration; (c) such conversion be
announced by means of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; (d) there
is a court order for the conversion of the registration of possession into a
record of ownership; and (e) the Register of Deeds make the proper record
thereof in the Registry.464
The Court has also held that a titulo de informacion posesoria may provide a
prima facie evidence of the fact that at the time of its execution, the
predecessors-in-interest of claimants were in possession of the property
covered, which may possibly be converted into ownership by uninterrupted
possession for the statutory period. 465 In another case, the SC held that
possessory information has to be confirmed in a land registration proceeding,
as required in Section 10 of Act 496. Moreover, the holder must show actual,
public and adverse possession of the land, under claim of ownership, for such
possessory information to be effective as a mode of acquiring title under Act
496 (now P.D. No. 1529).
It is also the rule that where the applicant alleges a Spanish title such as a
composition title as basis of his application, he must produce that title or
prove the contents thereof by secondary evidence. Otherwise, the precise
boundaries and location of the land applied for cannot be established. 466
However, when such titles are not intended to prove ownership but only to
show that the land covered by a Spanish title is no longer public land but
private property, all that may be needed is to establish the validity of the
possessory information and produce its effect as title of ownership by
showing the fact that such was duly registered within its non-extendible
462
463
464
465
466

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 74.

Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424.
Querol v. Querol, 48 Phil. 90
Baltazar v. Insular Government, 40 Phil. 267.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 91.

241

period. Only in default of such timely registration may the land revert to the
State as part of the public domain.467
Santiago v. SBMA
G.R. No. 156888, November 20, 2006
DOCTRINE: The holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership
of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same
for the required prescriptive period. Taking the law as a whole, it has
clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of
ALL Spanish titles under the Torrens system, after which, the Spanish
titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. Spanish titles
can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land
ownership.
FACTS: The petitioner filed for recovery of possession of property
against Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. In the original case, the late
Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of parcels of land
registered under a Spanish Title. Victoria M. Rodriguez was the sole
heir and administrator of said estate, and in her capacity as heir and
administrator, she leased the estate to Pedro R. Santiago and
Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land of
Hermogenes Rodriguez. Later on, Victoria Rodriguez claimed
possessory rights over the parcels of land.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, on the basis that since the alleged
right of Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, it cannot be
considered a right in esse, with the application of Presidential Decree
No. 892, which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply
for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six months from effectivity
of the decree, or until 16 August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles
or grants could no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in
any registration proceedings under the Torrens System.
ISSUES: WON Spanish titles are still admissible evidence of ownership
of land.
HELD: In the case at bar, Spanish titles could not be admissible as
evidence of Rodriguez ownership. Consequently, the petition fails to
state a cause of action. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly
the enabling clauses of PD 892, Spanish titles can no longer be
utilized as evidence of ownership. As such, the complaint indeed
failed to state a cause of action simply because the court can take
judicial notice of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court to the case at bench.
In the absence of an allegation in petitioners Complaint that
petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then
467

242

Balbin, et al. v. Medalla, et al., 108 SCRA 666.

it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to

comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as
proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as the
same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of
the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same
for the required prescriptive period. Because of this inherent
weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his
Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he
is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the
possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same
property by virtue of prescription.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the
Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on
29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No.
892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration
proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
TAX DECLARATIONS AND REALTY TAX PAYMENTS
Such are not conclusive evidence of ownership, but are at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property, also at best indicia of
possession.468 They become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property469 or supported by other effective proof. 470
However, such may lose their probative value when such taxes were paid
only a few months prior to the filing of the application. It then does not
constitute sufficient proof that the applicant has a bona fide claim or
ownership during the time period prior to the filing of the application. 471
Irregular payment of realty taxes as well as discrepancies in the names of
adjoining owners in tax declarations or in the size of the lands produce the
same effect of doubt.472 However, the mere failure of the owner to pay the
realty tax does not warrant a conclusion that there was abandonment of his
right to the property.473
PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES

468
469
470
471
472
473

Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532.
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49903 1983.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 140.
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 98.
Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.

243

A Presidential Proclamation reserving a land for a specific purpose in favor of

an entity is constitutive of a fee simple title or absolute title in favor of the
grantee.474 A law of statute which cedes or transfers in full ownership a
reserve area in favor of a government institution thereby effectively transfers
such ownership to the transferee. 475 Official, authentic or duly certified copies
of such proclamation and/or statute, or similar conveyances, are perforce
proofs of private ownership covered thereby. 476
D. HEARING AND JUDGMENT
PERIOD OF HEARING
In conformity with the right to speedy disposition of cases, section 27 of P.D.
1529 states that the trial court must dispose of all registration proceedings
within ninety (90) days from the date of its submission for decision. 477
The court has the prerogative to refer the case to a referee, also regarded as
commissioner,478 who shall make a report based on the testimonies of the
parties and the evidence presented before him. It is imperative that notice be
sent to the parties regarding the schedule and venue of the hearing before
the referee. Subsequently, the referee should submit his report to the Court
within fifteen (15) days after the termination of the hearing. The court may
rely on the said report in rendering its decision, set it aside in whole or in part
or may remand the case for further proceedings. 479 Trial by commissioner
shall be subject to Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. 480
PARTIAL JUDGMENT
The court may render partial judgment in cases where only a fraction of land
subject of registration is contested. However, the applicant must have
submitted beforehand to the court a subdivision plan of the entire land
approved by the Director of Lands. 481 Partial Judgment may also be rendered
in a case involving an uncontested portion of land, however, the applicant
must substantiate his claim over such portion or else the court shall declare it
a public land. In all cases, the applicant must substantiate his claim as the
court will not confirm title over a portion of land to which the parties did not
claim ownership. 482
With regard to portions of land covered by titles based on public land patents,
the courts cannot just set these aside despite the evidence presented by the
474
475

476
477
478
479

480
481
482

244

Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146.

International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phils. v. University of the
Philippines, 200 SCRA 554.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 78.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 27.
NARCISO PEA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (1997).
P.D. 1529, Sec. 27.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 199, at 64.
P.D. 1529 Sec. 28.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 149.

applicant establishing private ownership over them. This must be settled in a

separate litigation. 483
JUDGMENT CONFIRMING TITLE
The court shall decide on all conflicting claims of ownership and interests
over the land subject of registration based on the evidence and reports
submitted by the Administrator of the of Land Registration Authority (LRA)
and Director of Lands. 484 These reports may be submitted even after the
courts decision becomes final but not beyond the end of one year from the
entry of the decree. 485
The Court shall confirm title to the entire land or its portions in favor of the
party who has sufficient title proper for registration. 486 This means that the
judgment shall merely confirm the ownership of the party entitled to the land
subject of the application. 487
It may also order the registration of the land in the name of the buyer or of
the person to whom the land has been conveyed even if he was not a party in
the registration case.488 However, such new owner must manifest his interest
over the land as the judgment in the registration proceedings determines the
status of the land and serves as a bar on any subsequent claim on the basis
of the principle of res judicata.489
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
The new rule is that judgment becomes final upon the lapse of fifteen (15)
days to be counted from the time the notice of judgment is received 490
without any motion or appeal having been filed. 491 If an appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court, counting shall begin from the date of the
receipt of notice from the decision of the appellate court. 492
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF REGISTRATION
A judgment in a land registration proceeding constitutes the decision of the
court regarding the application for the registration of land based on the
evidence presented to it. Such becomes final after fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of notice of judgment. Judicial action consists of confirming title in
favor of one of the parties and declaring that such decree is final thereby

483
484
485
486

487
488
489
490
491
492

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 450.

P.D. 1529, Sec. 29.
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 29.,
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 98.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra note 37, at 89.
Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356.
Section 39, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 4-8.
Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.

245

subsequently ordering the Administrator of the LRA to issue a decree of

registration.493
On the other hand, a decree of registration refers to the one issued by the
Administrator of the LRA by order of the court, after the decision has become
final. The decree contains the technical description of the land, details about
the owner494 and a list of encumbrances affecting the land. 495 The purpose of
which is to bind the land and quiet the title subject to exceptions or liens
provided by law. Therefore, it shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Government. 496
The decree becomes final only after the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of its issuance and entry. It may be reviewed only on the ground of
actual fraud before the decree becomes final and as long as no transfer has
been made to an innocent purchaser for value. 497
UPON FINALITY
After the decision has attained finality, the clerk of court shall, within fifteen
(15) days from the time the decision has been entered in the book of
judgments, send certified copies of the decision, the order of the court
directing the Administrator of the LRA to issue a decree of registration, the
certificate of title and a certificate stating that the decision has become final.
The decree of registration shall be signed by the Administrator and shall be
entered and filed in the LRA. The Original Certificate of Title shall likewise
bear the signature of the Commissioner and shall be sent together with the
duplicate to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property
is situated. 498
WRIT OF POSSESSION
The writ of possession is an order by the court commanding the sheriff to
enter the subject land and transfer its possession to party entitled to it. 499
Generally, it may only be issued to the winning party once the judgment
confirming title has become final. However, in special cases, the court may
issue the writ of possession even before the decision has become final. 500
The right to ask the court to issue a writ of possession does not prescribe as
the writ delivers the possession of the land to its rightful owner and
possession is an inherent element of the right of ownership. 501

493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501

246

PEA, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 1, at 88.

P.D. 1529, Sec 31.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 194.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 31, par. 2.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 194-195.
P.D. 1529 Sec. 39.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 108.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 176.
Romansanta, et al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76

The writ is issued against the oppositor in the land registration proceedings or
anyone adversely occupying the land at the time of the trial up until a
decision has been rendered. Nonetheless, the writ may not issue against
actual possessors under claim of ownership 502 and to those who occupy the
land after the decree has been issued, especially if they were not part of the
proceedings. They cannot be evicted from the land even if they have no
proper title thereto, for they have not been given due process. 503
In case the losing party does not effectuate the writ despite the efforts of the
sheriff in enforcing it such that they refuse to be ejected from the property or
forcefully enter and commit acts to disturb the ownership of the party
entitled to such property may be charged with and punished by contempt. 504
Bernas v. Nuevo
G.R. No. L-58438, January 31, 1984
DOCTRINE: It is a settled ruled that when parties against whom a writ
of possession is sought have been in possession of the land for at
least ten years, and they entered into possession apparently after the
issuance of the final decree, and none of them had been a party in
the registration proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A
person who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the
same in registration proceedings cannot be summarily ousted
through a writ of possession secured by a mere motion and that
regardless of any title or lack of title of persons to hold possession of
the land in question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their
day in court in proper independent proceedings.
FACTS: The Heirs of Bellosillo filed a complaint against Bernas for
recovery of possession of a 33 1/3 hectare parcel of land located in
Panay and for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restore
the plaintiffs to the possession of the land in dispute. Such motion
was denied. Petitioner heirs subsequently filed another motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that the same is
paramount for the prevention of the subject lot to dissipate and leave
them with nothing to inherit. Furthermore, Bernas have not shown
any definite title or right over the estate with confusing claims. They
had previously claimed that they were lessees then later, tenants,
which are two incompatible and divergent sources of right. Judge
Nuevo granted the writ of possession applied for by petitioner heirs
after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for the issuance of said writ.
Meanwhile, the sala vacated by Judge Nuevo was filled through the
appointment of Judge Leviste. While the petition assailing the order
granting the writ of possession was pending before this Court, Judge
Leviste, acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by Bernas and
issued an order declaring null and void the writ of possession issued
by former Judge Nuevo. In a subsequent order, the same Judge also
502
503
504

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 178.

Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.
Marcelo v Mencias, 107 Phil. 1071.

247

ordered Bernas to be placed in possession of the property in question.

Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed, this time by the petitioner
heirs.
ISSUES: WON Judge Leviste acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion in issuing both orders
HELD: The questioned orders of respondent Judge Leviste were issued
without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the writ of
possession was not in order. It was presumptuous on his part to grant
the motion for reconsideration when he knew very well that the
subject-matter of said motion was still pending with this Court in a
petition for certiorari. The act of issuing the orders constituted
disrespect and disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of this Court.
The respondent judge should have waited for this Court's decision
before acting on said motion for reconsideration and issuing the said
orders. The order of Judge Nuevo is reversed and set aside. The
orders of Judge Oscar Leviste are also reversed and set aside. As
matter of right, Bernas should remain in possession of the lot pending
final adjudication of the respective rights of both Bernas and Heirs
Bellosillo in their civil case.
WRIT OF DEMOLITION
As a complement to the writ of possession, the court has the authority to
issue the demolition of improvements introduced by the defeated party to
restore the possession of the subject land to its rightful owner who was
deprived of his ownership over said premises. 505
Marcelo v. Mencias
G.R. No. L-15609, April 29, 1960
DOCTRINE: The Court has the inherent power to issue the writ of
demolition. Its issuance is reasonably necessary to do justice to
petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in
question, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent to remove
his house thereon and restore possession of the premises to
petitioner. If the writ of Possession issued in a land registration
proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the
successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue,
especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the
former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective.
FACTS: Marcelo applied for registration in his name, 3 parcels of land
located at Taguig. His application was opposed by the father
respondent Pagsisihan. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court, declared petitioner Marcelo to be the owner of
only 1 of the 3 lots applied for; denying the opposition of the then
505

248

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 178.

oppositor Pagsisihan; and declaring the 2 other lots to be public

lands. Petitioner Marcelo appealed to the CA and it held that
Petitioner Marcelo is also the owner of the 2 other lots which were
declared public lands. Later on, Judge Mencias issued an order for the
issuance of a decree in favor of Petitioner Marcelo and forthwith a
certificate of title was issued for all said lots in petitioners name.
Since respondent Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession of the 2
lots (lots 2 and 3) which were occupied by him, petitioner Macelo filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession which was granted.
In spite of the issuance of the writ of possession, respondent
Pagsisihan refused to surrender the possession of lots 2 and 3 and to
remove his house standing thereon. Petitioner Marcelo, therefore,
filed a petition for demolition but respondent Judge Mencias denied
the same for the reason that his court did not have jurisdiction to
issue such a writ. Petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the court has jurisdiction to issue an order of
demolition which is simply the coercive process or remedy to render
effective the writ of possession already issued by it. Said motion was
still denied by the court.
ISSUE: WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction to order the demolition of
improvements, as a consequence of a writ of possession it has issued.
HELD: It is contended that respondent Judge erred in denying the
petition for demolition. Provisions of the Rules of Court are applicable
to land registration cases in a suppletory character. Respondent Judge
has the power to issue all auxiliary writs, including the writ of
demolition sought by petitioner, processes and other means
necessary to carry into effect the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law
in land registration cases to issue a writ of possession to the
successful litigant, the petitioner herein.
Respondent judge, in the instant case, has the inherent power to
issue the writ of demolition demanded by petitioner. Needless to say,
its issuance is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is
being deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of
the continued refusal of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan to remove
his house thereon and restore possession of the premises to
petitioner. The orders of Judge Mencias were set aside, and the case
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings on petitioner's
petition for an order of demolition, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court.
E. CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
TORRENS TITLE

249

As discussed earlier, a Torrens Title is a system for registration of land under

which, upon the landowners application, the court may direct the issuance of
a certificate of title. With exceptions, this certificate is conclusive as to
applicants estate is land. The originator of the system was Lord Richard
Torrens, reformer of Australian Land Laws. 506
It is the certificate of ownership issued under the Torrens system of
registration by the government, thru the Register of Deeds naming and
declaring the owner in fee simple of the real property described therein, free
from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted
thereon or otherwise reserved by law. It is regarded as conclusive with
respect to all matters contained therein, and when the owners duplicate
thereof is presented with any voluntary instrument filed for registration it
serves as a conclusive authority granted for the Register of Deeds to enter a
new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with
what may be purported in such instrument. 507
DECREE OF REGISTRATION
Section 31. Decree of registration. Every decree of registration
issued by the Commissioner shall bear the date, hour and
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by him. It shall state
whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married, the
name of the husband or wife: Provided, however, that if the land
adjudicated by the court is conjugal property, the decree shall
be issued in the name of both spouses. If the owner is under
disability, it shall state the nature of disability, and if a minor, his
age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally
determined by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the
owner, and also, in such manner as to show their relative
priorities, all particular estates, mortgages, easements, liens,
attachments, and other encumbrances, including rights of
tenant-farmers, if any, to which the land or owner's estate is
subject, as well as any other matters properly to be determined
in pursuance of this Decree.
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title
thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be
provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the National Government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or
notice, the same being included in the general description "To all
whom it may concern".508
The duty of the land registration officials to issue the decree of registration is
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with court judgment and with the date found in
the record. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
506
507
508

250

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY

PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 139.
P.D. 1529, Sec. 31.

preparation and issuance of the decree, they are duty bound to refer the
matter to the court.509
As soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the Register
of Deeds, the property included in said decree shall become registered land,
and the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the
decree. The certificate of title is a true copy of the decree of registration. The
original certificate of title must contain the full transcription of the decree of
registration. Any defect in the manner of transcribing the technical
description should be considered as formal, and not a substantial defect. 510
Section 39. Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title. After
the judgment directing the registration of title to land has
become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue
the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title.
The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of
the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate
stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,
nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the
Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of
registration as well as the original and duplicate of the
corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate
of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The
decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner,
entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The
original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by
the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner's
duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.511
Upon the finality of the court decision adjudicating the land as private
property, the court shall, within 15 days from the entry thereof, issue an
order directing the LRA Administrator to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title. The Administrator shall then prepare the
decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the
corresponding certificate of title. The original certificate of title, signed by
him, shall be a true copy of the decree of registration, and shall be sent,
together with the owners duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of
the city or province where the land lies.
The certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by
the Register of Deeds in the registry. It accumulates in one document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title which
509
510
511

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 109.

Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531
P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 39.

251

an owner possesses. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title
which the owner has. What appears on the face of the title is controlling on
questions of ownership since the certificate of title is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. But mere possession of title is not conclusive
as to the holders true ownership of all property described therein. 512
ENTRY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by
the Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate copies of the
original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his record
book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the
Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The Register
of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by mail to the registered
owner that his owner's duplicate is ready for delivery to him
upon payment of legal fees.513
The certificate of title issued for the first time after initial registration
proceedings is known as the Original Certificate of Title. This is the true
copy of the decree of registration. It shall set forth the pertinent information
regarding the persons whose interest makes up the ownership of the land.
Any subsequent title issued pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary
instrument affecting the property covered by the original certificate of title is
known as the Transfer Certificate of Title. It shall show the number of the
next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was
originally registered.514
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATE 515
As to issuance:
An original certificate of title is issued for the first time after the land has
been adjudicated and decreed in the name of its owner in original or initial
registration proceedings by the Register Deeds; whereas a transfer certificate
of title is issued after the cancellation of the original when the land is
transferred by the registered owner.
As to legal effect:
Every person receiving an original certificate of title holds the land free from
all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate; whereas a purchaser
of registered land who takes a transfer certificate of title may hold the same
subject to more encumbrances, such as prior interests.
512
513
514
515

252

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 386-387.

P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 40.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 392
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 271-272.

Section 41. Owner's duplicate certificate of title. The owner's

duplicate certificate of title shall be delivered to the registered
owner or to his duly authorized representative. If two or more
persons are registered owners, one owner's duplicate certificate
may be issued for the whole land, or if the co-owners so desire,
a separate duplicate may be issued to each of them in like form,
but all outstanding certificates of title so issued shall be
surrendered whenever the Register of Deeds shall register any
subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or
part thereof or any interest therein. The Register of Deeds shall
note on each certificate of title a statement as to whom a copy
thereof was issued.516
If two or more persons are registered owners, one owners duplicate may be
issued for the whole land, or, if the co-owners so desire, a separate duplicate
may be issued to each of them in the like form, but all outstanding
certificates of title so issued shall be surrendered whenever the Register of
Deeds shall register any voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or
part thereof. The Register of Deeds shall note on each certificate of title a
state as to whom a copy thereof was issued.517
WHAT MUST BE INDICATED IN A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE?
Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said
certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws
and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required
to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two
years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over
the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to
the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.
Third. Any public highway or private way established or
recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral
thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof
have been determined.
516
517

P.D. 1529, Sec. 41.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 272

253

Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use

thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or
any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.
A lien is a charge on property usually for the payment of some debt or
obligation. It is a qualified right or a proprietary interest, which may be
exercised over the property of another. An encumbrance is a burden upon
land, depreciative of its value, such as a lien, easement, or servitude, which,
though adverse to the interest of the landowner, does not conflict with his
conveyance of the land in fee.518
LIENS AFFECTING THE TITLE
The first group of lien is concerned about the prohibitions that are provided
by law or by the Constitution. It need not be annotated at the title because of
the Civil Code provision regarding the presumption that everyone knows the
law. An example of a prohibition proscribed by the Constitution is the
prohibition against aliens owning public agricultural lands and that private
corporations can only lease land of the public domain.
The second is concerned with uncollected real estate taxes. Even if the land
has passed to an innocent purchaser for value, it does not preclude the
government from collecting the unpaid tax. This has foundation in the
Constitution because the power to tax, like police power, cant be bargained
away. Also, it is one of the inherent powers of the State.
The third is a guard against oversight or mistake in case a person acquires
land which is described by the said lien. The inclusion of public highway and
the like does not give the holder of such certificate ownership over the said
land. Further, prescription does not apply to a land that is registered under
the Torrens system.
The final statutory lien is concerned with agrarian reform. This is to ensure
that the goal of the agrarian reform will be met. That is to distribute land to
qualified tenant farmers.
Section 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the
certificate. Every certificate of title shall set forth the full names
of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the
whole land, including their civil status, and the names of their
respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship,
residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to
the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both
spouses.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
A certificate of title serves as an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein, and is conclusive to the identity of
518

254

AGCAOILI,, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 398

the land and its location. The title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible
one year from its final decree. It is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong presumption exists that
the title was validly and regularly issued. The validity of the certificate of title
can be threshed out only in a direct proceeding filed for the purpose and not
by a collateral attack.
GENERAL INCIDENTS OF REGISTERED LANDS
Section 46. General incidents of registered land. Registered land
shall be subject to such burdens and incidents as may arise by
operation of law. Nothing contained in this decree shall in any
way be construed to relieve registered land or the owners
thereof from any rights incident to the relation of husband and
wife, landlord and tenant, or from liability to attachment or levy
on execution, or from liability to any lien of any description
established by law on the land and the buildings thereon, or on
the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, or to change
the laws of descent, or the rights of partition between coowners, or the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to
relieve such land from liability to be recovered by an assignee in
insolvency or trustee in bankcruptcy under the laws relative to
preferences, or to change or affect in any way other rights or
liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land,
except as otherwise provided in this Decree. 519
Land registered under the Torrens system is not subject to any burden except
those noted in the certificate of title. In fact, every registered owner and
subsequent purchaser taking a certificate of title in good faith shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted thereon and except any
of the encumbrances mentioned in Sec.44. Whatever is written or annotated
in the title is generally binding and the party interested need not go to the RD
to check its validity except for particular circumstances.
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title
to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
According to jurisprudence cited by Aquino, it is by law that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not
only against the registered owner but also equally against his hereditary
successors. Thus, even adverse, notorious, and continuous possession under
a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a
Torrens title520.
But even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches. Under PD 1529, no title registered
519
520

P.D. 1529, Sec. 46.

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 115

255

under derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by

prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with laches. 521
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
As an indefeasible evidence of ownership, the certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The integrity of the Torrens title must be protected at all
times.
LAND REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF TWO PERSONS
Where two transfer certificates of title happen to be issued on different dates
to two different persons covering the same parcel of land, even if both
owners be presumed to be title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily
follow that the one who holds the earlier title should prevail. On the
assumption that there was regularity in the process of registration leading to
the eventual issuance of such transfer certificates, it would be a better
procedure to trace back their original certificates from which they were
derived. Now, if there is only one common original certificate of title from
which the two transfer certificates came from, it would be safe to conclude
that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date along the line should
prevail, barring anomaly in the process of registration. But if there are two
original certificates of title, then whichever of the two transfer certificates
traceable to the earlier original certificate should prevail. The efficacy of the
transfer certificate issued at a later date cannot be any better than its
original source.522
Legarda v. Saleeby
31 Phil. 595
FACTS: The land that the parties occupy is separated by a stone wall
which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On May 2, 1906, plaintiffs
petitioned the court for the registration of the lot which was granted
on October 25. On March 25, 1912, the defendants sought to register
their land and their petition was granted. Several months later, the
plaintiff discovered the incident. Therefore, the separating wall was
registered to both parties.
ISSUE: WON the first party who registered the land has a better right.
HELD: Yes. When two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
with all the requirements of the law should be protected. Once the
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, to avoid the possibility of losing the
521
522

256

AGCAOILI,, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 413

PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES supra note 1, at 144

land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens
system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action.
SPLITTING, CONSOLIDATION OF TITLES
Section 49. Splitting, or consolidation of titles. A registered
owner of several distinct parcels of land embraced in and
covered by a certificate of title desiring in lieu thereof separate
certificates, each containing one or more parcels, may file a
written request for that purpose with the Register of Deeds
concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender of the owner's
duplicate, shall cancel it together with its original and issue in
lieu thereof separate certificates as desired. A registered owner
of several distincta parcels of land covered by separate
certificates of title desiring to have in lieu thereof a single
certificate for the whole land, or several certificates for the
different parcels thereof, may also file a written request with the
Register of Deeds concerned, and the latter, upon the surrender
of the owner's duplicates, shall cancel them together with their
originals, and issue in lieu thereof one or separate certificates as
desired.523
A land owner can either split or consolidate his land upon petition to the
Register of Deeds. He must also surrender his original title which will be
replaced with a new one (the consolidated title or split title). The motive in
splitting or consolidating the titles of land depends upon the intent of the
owner as to how he would use it.
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or more shall
file with the LRA a consolidation plan showing the lots affected, with their
technical descriptions, and upon surrender of the owners duplicate
certificates and receipt of the plan duly approve by the LRA, the RD shall
cancel said certificated and issue a new one. 524
SUBDIVISION
Section 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner
subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not
constitute a subdivision project has defined and provided for
under P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land
Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of
such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and
waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by
the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands
together with the approved technical descriptions and the
523
524

P.D. 1529, Sec. 49.

AGCAOILI,, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at425

257

corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title is presented

for registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring
further court approval of said plan, register the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as
amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall
annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street,
passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that
except by way of donation in favor of the national government,
province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan
shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner
without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which the land is situated.
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one
or more, requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with the
Land Registration Commission, a consolidation plan on which
shall be shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and
as they will appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender
of the owner's duplicate certificates and the receipt of
consolidation plan duty approved by the Commission, the
Register of Deeds concerned shall cancel the corresponding
certificates of title and issue a new one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change,
modification, or amendment in the contents of any certificate of
title, or of any decree or plan, including the technical description
therein, covering any real property registered under the Torrens
system, nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title
and the issuance of a new one which would result in the
enlargement of the area covered by the certificate of title. 525
Any owner desiring to subdivide a tract of registered land into lots shall
submit to the LRA a subdivision plan of the land duly approved by the Land
Management Bureau, together with the approved technical descriptions and
the corresponding owners duplicate certificate of title. The plan shall
distinctly accurately delineate all boundaries, streets, passageways and
waterways, if any. The RD shall thereupon register the subdivision plan with
need of prior court approval and issue a new certificate of title for the land as
subdivided.526
ILLEGAL ENLARGEMENT OF AREA
The last paragraph of this section zealously guards against this incident. This
is a safeguard in order to maintain the integrity of the Torrens system. It is a
censurable practice which has spawned numerous land claims and

525
526

258

P.D. 1529, Sec. 50.

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 425.

conflicts.527 Any enlarged area could not be considered as registered land and
the certificate of title covering the same may be cancelled. 528
F. REMEDIES
In the Torrens system, the title to land becomes indefeasible at a certain point
in time. This is to strengthen the registration system and to avoid tortuous
litigation over the same property. But this doesnt mean that a person who is
unlawfully deprived of his legally acquired property is without redress. He can
avail of the following remedies provided he avails of it within the prescribed
period. It must be remembered that the law does not shield those who
commit a wrong by mere technicality of law or those who slumber in their
rights, but it protects those who are vigilant in protecting their rights.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A motion for New Trial is a remedy preparatory to an appeal. 529 Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to
set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of
the causes of materially affecting the substantial rights of said party. 530 If the
motion for new trial is granted, the judgment is set aside; if the motion for
reconsideration is granted, the judgment is merely amended. 531
GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL532
(a)

Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary

prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of
which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or

(b)

Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable

diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which
if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also
move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the
damages awarded are excessive, that evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order or that
decision or final order is contrary to law.

MEANING OF FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE AND EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE

(a)

527
528
529
530
531
532

Fraud an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose

of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 426

Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, 71 SCRA 57.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 203.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 288.
OSCAR M. HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW 300 (Vol.. II, 1197 Ed.)
Rules of Court, Sec. 1, Rule 37.

259

valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal

right. It can be an extrinsic fraud which is collateral to the
issues tried in the case where the judgment is rendered or
it can be intrinsic fraud which pertains to the issue
involved in original action or where acts constituting fraud
were, or could have been litigated therein. 533
(b)

Accident an unusual or unexpected result attending the

operation or performance of a usual or necessary act or
event.534

(c)

Mistake is some unintentional act, omission, or error

arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced
confidence. It may arise from unconsciousness, ignorance,
forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence. 535

(d)

Excusable neglect a failure to take the proper steps at

the proper time, not in consequence of the partys own
carelessness, intention, or willful disregard of the process
of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or
unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care
and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the
adverse party.536

CONTENTS537
The motion shall be made in writing stating the grounds therefore, a written
notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. A motion
for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. A
motion for new trial shall be supported by affidavits of merit setting forth the
facts and circumstances alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. It can be rebutted by counter-affidavits setting forth
the particular facts claimed as a defense.
A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by
evidence or which are contrary to law.
EFFECTS OF FILING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The filing of a motion for new trial suspends the running of the period of
appeal and the time employed by the court in deciding the motion for new
trial of a party desiring to appeal from an adverse judgment should not be
counted against him.538
533
534
535
536
537
538

260

Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 660-661

Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 15
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1001
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 566
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 288-289.
Taromo v. Judge Cruz, 68 Phil. 281.

A motion for a new trial shall include all grounds then available and those not
included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a
ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be
filed within the time herein provided excluding the time during which the first
motion had been pending.539
EFFECTS OF GRANTING A NEW TRIAL
(a)

the original judgment is vacated;

(b)

the action shall stand for trial de nuvo;

(c)

the recorded evidence taken upon the former trial so far as the
same is material and competent to establish the issues, shall be
used at the new trial without retaking the same. 540

If the grounds for the motion appear to the court to the effect the issues as to
only a part or less than all of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less
than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial as to such, issued
if severable without interfering with the judgment upon the rest. 541
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A motion for reconsideration is filed and based on the ground that the
judgment is against the law or that it is not supported by the facts, it has the
character of a motion for a new trial, thus suspending the running of the
period to appeal. When such is resolved by the Court against the movant and
the party filed another motion and called it a motion for new trial but based
on the same ground, this motion shall not suspend the running of the period
of appeal.542
RELIEF FROM JUGMENT
Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. 543
Sec. 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment
or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party
thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
539
540
541
542
543

Rules of Court, Sec. 3, Rule 37.

Rules of Court, Sec. 5, Rule 37.
Rules of Court, Sec. 6, Rule 37.
Levett v. Quia, 61 Phil. 847.
Rules of Court, Sec. 1, Rule 38.

261

has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition

in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be
given due course.544
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. 545
The remedy of relief from judgment is applicable to land registration cases, if
the petition is filed within the time provided for filing said petition and the
decree of registration has not yet been issued. Even if an order of the decree
has been issued but no decree was actually issued, the remedy is still
available. The relief is no longer available if the decree of registration has
already been issued.546
APPEALS
Section 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. The judgment and orders
of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to
the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same
manner as in ordinary actions.547
An appeal may be taken form a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or a particular matter therein when declared by the
Rules of Court.548 There are four modes of appeal that is provided by the
Rules of Court:
(a) Ordinary Appeal under Rule 41
(b) Petition for review under Rule 42
(c) Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
(d) Appeal by certiorari regarding GADLEJ under Rule 65

544
545
546

547
548

262

Rules of Court, Sec. 2, Rule 38.

Rules of Court, Sec. 3, Rule 38.
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 215
P.D. 1529, Sec. 33.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 364

In land registration cases, it is necessary that the appellant must show that
his rights or interest have been prejudiced by the decisions appealed from,
before his appeal may be properly entertained. 549
Cabanas v. Director of Lands
10 Phil. 393
FACTS: Cabanas filed an application with the land registration court to
register his property at Leyte. During the trial, the Director of Lands
never mad an opposition for the request of registration. The court
therefore approved the registration under the name of Cabanas. The
Director of Lands then asked for a new trial on the ground that the
evidence of Cabanas was insufficient. His motion for new trial was
denied.
ISSUE: WON the Director of Lands can still file an appeal.
HELD: A person who has not challenged an application for registration
of land, even if the appeal afterwards interposed based on the right of
dominion over the same land, can not allege damage or error against
the judgment ordering the registration, inasmusch as he did not
allege or pretend to have any right to such land, and no right has
been infringed by error which should be corrected by the court.
Roxas v. Cuervas
8 Phil. 469
FACTS: The land in question (Hacienda of Calauang) were originally
owned by the Crown of Spain and was conveyed to Francisco Salgado
through a Royal Grant. After his death, the administration of the land
was taken by the Auditoria de Guerra. The hacienda was then sold to
Benito Machado who used the funds of one Domingo Roxas. The court
of land registration approved the decree of registration to their name.
Various parties (private individuals & the government) opposed the
registration of the land and filed an appeal.
ISSUE: WON the land belongs to the Government or to the private
individuals who appealed the registration.
HELD: If it is the opinion of the appellants that the land awarded to
the petitioners does not belong to the private individuals but to the
government, it follows that they can have no interest in such land
since they do not represent the government, being private citizens
only. Since the property belongs to the government, the right to
appeal rests with the government, not with any other private
individual to whom the representation of the state has not been
entrusted.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
549

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 212

263

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser

for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to
file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening
and review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by
the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer
for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud.550
The Torrens Title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year form the
issuance of the final decree and generally conclusive evidence of ownership.
The courts may review the issuance of the title (land registration) filed by the
aggrieved party within one year from its issuance. Sec. 32 is also applicable
to titles acquired through homestead patents or free patents. If the title to
the land would be subject to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been
given by the government thru the process of proceedings, there would arise
uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the governments system of
distributing public agricultural land.551
PETITION FOR REVIEW
REQUISITES FOR A PETITION FOR REVIEW552
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of
registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year form the issuance of the
decree by the Land Registration Authority;
550
551
552

264

P.D. 1529, Sec. 32.

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 296-297
Walstrom v. Mapa, 181 SCRA 527

(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW553
(a) That a land belonging to a person has been registered in the name
of another, or that an interest has been omitted in the
application;
(b) That the registration has been procured through actual fraud, or
that the omission in the application of the interest of the third
person in the property is intentional;
(c) That the petitioner is the owner of said property or interest therein;
(d) That the actual fraud must be perpetrated or utilized in the
procurement of the decree and not thereafter.
WHEN RELIEF MAY NOT BE GRANTED554
(a) Where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic
and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided;
(b) Where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the
trial of a supposed forged judgment or a false perjured
testimony; or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent
compromise agreement; or in the alleged fraudulent acts or
omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from
properly presenting the case.
INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH
The case of Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. CA
defines a purchaser for value and in good faith as one who buys property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. 555 According the Dean Villanueva, the definition
actually includes as an element of good faith that there must be full payment
on the part of the buyer before he can be considered to be in good faith. 556
The phrase includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer
for value.557
A person dealing with registered land has the right to rely upon the face of
the Torrens title and dispense with the trouble of inquiring further except
553
554
555
556
557

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 220-221

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 305
213 SCRA 563
CESAR L. VILLANUEVA, LAW ON SALES 284 (2004)
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 833

265

when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonable cautious man to make inquiry. 558
Where the original certificate of registration was valid and the land in
question was properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system, the
concept of innocent purchaser for value comes into play. But where the land
in question was never brought under the operation of the Torrens system
because the original certificate of title is null and void, the concept of
innocent purchaser for value cannot come into play.
De Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court
157 SCRA 297
FACTS: The land in question was originally registered to Sps. Aton &
Casiban, Eustaquia Arong & Teodora Aton. The title was was lost
during WWII. On May 3, 1962, Sps. Aton & Arong sold their share to
Elueteria Pino who in turn petitioned the reconstitution of the lost
title. On November 30, 1966, Sps. Cabisan & Teodora Aton soled their
undivided share to Sps. Bunagan & Felicidad de los Angeles & he also
filed a motion for reconstitution. On December 31, 1977, the
Bunagans sold their land to Alicia de Santos but she occupied the
wrong portion of the land. It should be bourn in mind that the
respective parties has executed their partition agreements with each
other. On April 25, 1978, the atty-in-fact of Elueteria Pino cuased the
annotation of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Alicia de Santos then
filed an Action for Quieting of Title and Damages. After the trial, the
court ruled in favor of Elueteria Pino.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be considered a purchaser in good faith.
HELD: No. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys
property of another, without notice that some other person has a
right or interest in such property and pays a full price for the same, at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims of
some other person in the property.
Director of Lands v. Basilio
73 Phil. 606
FACTS: In a cadastral land proceeding, the land owned by Lina Vda.
Imperial and Santiago Imperial was awarded in favor of the Adornado
family who subsequently mortgaged the land to Luis Meneses.
Santiago Imperial filed a motion to declare the title as null and void
which was granted.
ISSUE: WON the court can order the outright nullification of the title.
HELD: The court cannot disregard such right and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such would be to impair
558

266

Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587

public confidence in the certificate of title. Every person dealing with

registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
RECONVEYANCE
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or
reconvey the land to him. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open
the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only
to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned
property is not the real owner thereof.
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the
name of the registered owner, he can still be compelled under law to
reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property is deemed
to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one
who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad
faith.
Reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly
registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third
party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for
value. Only the value of the property can be demanded from the person who
procured the wrongful registration in his name.
Beyond the one year period, the decree of registration is no longer open to
review or attack although its issuance is attended with actual fraud. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated
on the certificate of title immediately upon the institutionof the action in
court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person
for value.559 If the property is passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the
only remedy left is an action for damages.
NATURE OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is
not an action in rem or an action against the whole world. It is an action in
personam, so much so that the judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard.560
WHEN AND WHO MAY FILE AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE?
559
560

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 327

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 245

267

As a general rule, an action for reconveyance may be filed when the decree
of registration and title has become final and incontrovertible, provided the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. 561 The person
who was deprived of his property by fraud, whether actual or constructive,
and who was not at fault, may file such personal action for reconveyance. 562
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER SEC. 32 AND RECONVEYANCE
A Petition for Review under Sec. 32 directly attacks the issuance of the
certificate of title. It aims to cancel the erroneously issued title and to issue a
new one in favor of the true owner. This petition must be filed within the one
year prescriptive period otherwise, the title will become indefeasible. An
action for reconveyance on the other hand, is a remedy that is available once
the title has become indefeasible. Reconveyance is available only if the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
Balbin v. Medalla
666 SCRA 108
FACTS: Respondent purchased a parcel of land from the heirs of Juan
Ladao on June 19, 1962. They then filed an application for registration
on June 14, 1963 & utilized as ground of ownership, the Informacion
Posesoria issued under the name of Juan Ladao. The application was
opposed by the petitioners on the ground that they were issued an
Original Certificate of Title over the said land. The trial court ruled in
favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: WON the cause of action has prescribed.
HELD: An action for reconveyance of property resulting from fraud
may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the
action shall be filed within four years from the discorvery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when the petitioners
herein were issued original certificate of title through either
homestead or free patent grants, for the registration of said patents
constitute constructive notice.
DAMAGES
Sec. 32 Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree
of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud.563
561
562
563

268

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 247

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 250
P.D. 1529, Sec. 32, par. 2.

An action for damages is a subsidiary remedy. This is true when the action to
file for reconveyance has already lapsed or if the property has passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. The action can be filed simultaneously with the
petition for reconveyance in the event that the property sought to be
recovered has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The person so
prejudiced can file the action for damages against the person responsible for
depriving him of his right or interest in the property. 564
ASSURANCE FUND565
Section 93. Contribution to Assurance Fund. Upon the entry of a
certificate of title in the name of the registered owner, and also
upon the original registration on the certificate of title of a
building or other improvements on the land covered by said
certificate, as well as upon the entry of a certificate pursuant to
any subsequent transfer of registered land, there shall be paid to
the Register of Deeds one-fourth of one per cent of the assessed
value of the real estate on the basis of the last assessment for
taxation purposes, as contribution to the Assurance Fund. Where
the land involved has not yet been assessed for taxation, its
value for purposes of this decree shall be determined by the
sworn declaration of two disinterested persons to the effect that
the value fixed by them is to their knowledge, a fair valuation.
Nothing in this section shall in any way preclude the court from
increasing the valuation of the property should it appear during
the hearing that the value stated is too small.
Section 94. Custody and investment of fund. All money received
by the Register of Deeds under the preceding section shall be
paid to the National Treasurer. He shall keep this money in an
Assurance Fund which may be invested in the manner and form
authorized by law, and shall report annually to the
Commissioner of the Budget the condition and income thereof.
The income of the Assurance Fund shall be added to the
principal until said fund amounts to five hundred thousand
pesos, in which event the excess income from investments as
well as from the collections of such fund shall be paid into the
National Treasury to the account of the Assurance Fund.
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who,
without negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence
of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens
system of arising after original registration of land, through fraud
or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or
564
565

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 351.

P.D. 1529, Chapter VII.

269

memorandum in the registration book, and who by the

provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under
the provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery
of such land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of
damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
If the land sought to be recovered has passed to an innocent purchaser for
value or if the person who caused prejudice is insolvent, the remedy provided
in this chapter is the last available remedy. Public policy dictates that those
unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by reason of the operation
of law of our registration laws must be afforded of other remedies. 566 The
assurance fund has been created for the purpose of compensating persons
who suffered losses by erroneous registration due to mistake, omission, or
misfeasance of the Clerk of Court or the Register of Deeds or any of the
respective employees with or without intervention of other persons. 567 To
reiterate, this law is created not to shield those who commit wrong but to
protect the vigilant.
REQUISITES
(a) That a person sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of any estate
in the land
(b) On account of the bringing of the bringing of the land under the
operation of the Torrens system arising after original registration
(c) Through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or
memorandum in the registration book
(d) Without negligence on his part
(e) Is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law
from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the
estate or interest therein
Section 96. Against whom action filed. If such action is brought
to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any
estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court
personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of
the Registry in the performance of their respective duties, the
action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land is situated and the National
Treasurer as defendants. But if such action is brought to recover
for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any interest
therein arising through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or
566
567

270

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 360

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 255

misfeasance of person other than court personnel, the Register

of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry, such
action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds, the
National Treasurer and other person or persons, as codefendants. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor General in person
or by representative to appear and to defend all such suits with
the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where the land lies:
Provided, however, that nothing in this Decree shall be
construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right of action which he
may have against any person for such loss or damage or
deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party
defendant. In every action filed against the Assurance Fund, the
court shall consider the report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
Section 97. Judgment, how satisfied. If there are defendants
other than the National Treasurer and the Register of Deeds and
judgment is entered for the plaintiff and against the National
Treasury, the Register of Deeds and any of the other defendants,
execution shall first issue against such defendants other than
the National and the Register of Deeds. If the execution is
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and the officer returning
the same certificates that the amount due cannot be collected
from the land or personal property of such other defendants,
only then shall the court, upon proper showing, order the
amount of the execution and costs, or so much thereof as
remains unpaid, to be paid by the National treasurer out of the
Assurance Fund. In an action under this Decree, the plaintiff
cannot recover as compensation more than the fair market
value of the land at the time he suffered the loss, damage, or
deprivation thereof.
Section 98. General Fund when liable. If at any time the
Assurance Fund is not sufficient to satisfy such judgment, the
National Treasurer shall make up for the deficiency from any
funds available in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.
CASES WHERE THE ASSURANCE FUND IS NOT LIABLE568
(a) In case the land may be recovered or reconveyed
(b) In case the party who caused the loss can pay the damages on the
property to the person deprived thereof
(c) In case the loss is due to the owners negligence
(d) In case the loss is caused by a breach of trust whether expressed,
implied or constructive committed by any registered owner who
is a trustee
568

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 262

271

(e) When the loss is caused by the improper exercise of any sale in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings
(f) In case the action has prescribed
(g) That the loss was caused by mistake in the resurvey or subdivision
of registered land resulting in the expansion of the area in the
certificate of title.
Section 99. Subrogation of government to plaintiff's rights. In
every case where payment has been made by the National
Treasurer in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against any other parties
or securities. The National Treasurer shall enforce said rights and
the amount recovered shall be paid to the account of the
Assurance Fund.
Section 100. Register of Deeds as party in interest. When it
appears that the Assurance Fund may be liable for damages that
may be incurred due to the unlawful or erroneous issuance of a
certificate of title, the Register of Deeds concerned shall be
deemed a proper party in interest who shall, upon authority of
the Commissioner of Land Registration, file the necessary action
in court to annul or amend the title.
The court may order the Register of Deeds to amend or cancel a
certificate of title or to do any other act as may be just and
equitable.
Section 101. Losses not recoverable. The Assurance Fund shall
not be liable for any loss, damage or deprivation caused or
occasioned by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or
constructive or by any mistake in the resurveyed or subdivision
of registered land resulting in the expansion of area in the
certificate of title.
Section 102. Limitation of Action. Any action for compensation
against the Assurance Fund by reason of any loss, damage or
deprivation of land or any interest therein shall be instituted
within a period of six years from the time the right to bring such
action first occurred: Provided, That the right of action herein
provided shall survive to the legal representative of the person
sustaining loss or damage, unless barred in his lifetime; and
Provided, further, That if at the time such right of action first
accrued the person entitled to bring such action was a minor or
insane or imprisoned, or otherwise under legal disability, such
person or anyone claiming from, by or under him may bring the
proper action at any time within two years after such disability

272

has been removed, notwithstanding the expiration of the original

period of six years first above provided.
REVERSION SUITS
Section101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines.569
A reversion suit is instituted by the Government (through the Solicitor
General) in cases where public land is fraudulently awarded or disposed of to
the public and may be again subject to disposition provided by law. But when
what is involved is private land, the proper remedy is cancellation of title.
The Director of Lands has a continuing authority to conduct investigation to
determine whether or not public land has been fraudulently awarded or titled
to the end that the corresponding certificate of title be cancelled and the land
reverted to the public domain. And the fact that the title sought to be
cancelled has become indefeasible is not a hindrance because government is
never estopped nor barred by prescription. 570
IV. RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR DESTROYED TITLES
JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens
Title. Original copies of certificates of title lost or destroyed in
the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be
reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with
this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said
Act is hereby abrogated.
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution
shall be given to the Register of Deeds of the place where the
land is situated and to the Commissioner of Land Registration.
No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate
of title shall become final until the lapse of thirty days from
receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of
Land Registration of a notice of such order or judgment without
any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
MEANING, PURPOSE AND NATURE OF RECONSTITUTION
569

570

An Act To Amend And Compile The Laws Relative To Lands Of The Public Domain,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, Sec. 101.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 352

273

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration of the

instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document
is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same from
they were when the loss or destruction occurred. 571 The applicant must prove
not only the los or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted but also
that at the time the said title was lost or destroyed he was the registered
owner thereof.572
According to Aquino, if the court goes beyond such purpose, it acts without or
in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, if the petition for reconstitution showed that
one of the registered co-owners was Pedro Pinote, the court cold not receive
evidence proving that Petra Pinote, not Pedro Pinote, is a registered owner. 573
It has also been held that if the certificate of title was decreed in the names
of Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, the reconstituted title could not be in
the names of spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong for this was a
material change.574 If there is no original certificate of title that exists, the
reconstituted title is a nullity. This same rule applies if there is an earlier valid
certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another person. 575
A judicially reconstituted title has the same validity and legal effect as the
original thereof, and is not subject to the reservation that it shall be without
prejudice to any party whose right or interest in the property was duly noted
in the original at the time of loss or destruction but which entry or notation
has not been made on the reconstituted title. The limitation that
reconstitution of titles should be limited to the certificate as it stood at the
time of its loss or destruction has reference only to changes which alter or
affect title of the registered owner and not to mere liens and other
encumbrances.576
For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements must be
present: (1) that the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed; (2) that the
petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and (3) that the
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed. 577
Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding and is
a proceeding in rem. The proceeding is governed by Republic Act No. 26
entitled An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of
Torrents Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed in relation to Section 110 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Administrative reconstitution of title is also
governed by Republic Act No. 26, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732. 578
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578

274

Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12.

Republic v. Holazo, 437 SCRA 352.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra note 37, at 164.
Bunagan, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 97 SCRA 72.
Serra v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482.
Philippine National Bank v. Dela Via, G.R. No. L-14601, August 31, 1960.
Chinest Nationalist Party v. Bermudo, CA-44100-R, Decemeber 11, 1972.
AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra note 37, at 165.

R.A. No. 26 confers jurisdiction or authority upon the Regional Trial Court to
hear and decided petitions for judicial reconstitution. As mentioned, it is a
proceeding in rem. This means it is an action directed not only against
particular persons, but against the thing itself. Its object is to bar indifferently
all who might be minded to make any objection against the right sought to be
enforced; hence, the judgment therein is binding theoretically upon the whole
world.579
Unlike an extrajudicially reconstituted title where there is statutory
reservation that the new title shall be without prejudice to any party whose
right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it
was lost or destroyed as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 26, a judicially
reconstituted title, by express provision of Section 10, shall not be subject to
the encumbrance referred to in the Section 7 of the Act. 580
WHO MAY APPLY?
According to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26, the registered owner, his
assigns, or any person having an interest in the property may resort to
judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title. In Register of Deeds of Malabon
v. Malabon Regional Trial Court,581 the Register of Deeds for Malabon filed the
petition for reconstitution of an original certificate of title. The Supreme Court
held that it is not a proper party to file said petition. Section 6 of R.A. No. 26,
which allowed the Register of Deeds to motu propio reconstitute a lost or
destroyed certificate of title from its corresponding owners duplicate
certificate, was expressly repealed or declared to be inoperative by Section
6 of R.A. No. 6732. A petition for reconstitution may now be filed only by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the
property.
SOURCES OF JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26 governs reconstitution of original certificates
of title while Section 3 governs petitions for reconstitution of transfer
certificates of title. Pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. No. 26, lost or destroyed
original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from the sources hereunder
enumerated in the following order:

579
580
581

(a)

The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b)

The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of said

certificate;

(c)

A certified copy of such certificate, previously issued by

the Register of Deeds concerned or by a legal custodian
thereof;

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101690, August 23, 1995.

Ibid.
181 SCRA 788.

275

(d)

An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or

patent as the case may be, which was the basis of the
certificate of title;

(e)

A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the

property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and

(f)

Any other document which, in the judgment of the court,

is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.

On the other hand, Section 3 states that lost or destroyed transfer

certificates of title shall be reconstituted from the sources hereunder
enumerated in the following order:
(a)

The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b)

The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of said

certificate;

(c)

A certified copy of such certificate, previously issued by

the Register of Deeds concerned or by a legal custodian
thereof;

(d)

The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the

registry of deeds, containing the description of the
property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that
its original had been registered, and pursuant to which
the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;

(e)

A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the

property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its
original had been registered; and

(f)

Any other document which, in the judgment of the court,

is sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution.

It should be noted that Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 26 are similar except for
Section 2(d) and Section 3(d). According to Agcaoili, Section 2 differs from
Section as follows:582

582

276

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 37, at 759.

(a)

As to applicability Section 2 applies to original certificates of

title while Section 3 applies to transfer certificates of title.

(b)

As to (d) of both sections While Section 2(d) requires an

authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent,
Section 3(d) requires the deed of transfer or other document in
the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property,
or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that is original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
certificate of tile was issued.

With respect to liens and encumbrances affecting lost or destroyed

certificates of title, Section 4 provides that they shall be reconstituted from
the sources enumerated hereunder, in the following order:
(a)

Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owners, coowners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate;

(b)

Registered documents on file in the registry of deeds, or

authenticated copies thereof showing that the originals
thereof had been registered; and

(c)

Any other document which, in the judgment of the court,

is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the liens or
encumbrances affecting the property covered by the lost
or destroyed certificate of title.

RULE ON AVAILMENT OF ANY OTHER DOCUMENT

In Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Kiram,583 it was held that
when Republic Act No. 26 speaks of any other document that the court may
deem proper and sufficient for reconstitution of title, it must refer to similar
documents previously enumerated therein. In another case, the Supreme
Court considered a certification from the Bureau of Lands that the lot
involved was decreed in the names of the oppositor, and a decision in a civil
case for recovery of possession concerning the same lot and showing who
were the registered owners of the lot falls under the scope of any other
document.584 Paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 reads in part:
5. In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from
sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) and 3(f) of Republic Act No.
26 in relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of
the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be
accompanied by the following:
(a)

583
584

A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth,

with two (2) print copies thereof, prepared by the
government agency which issued the certified technical

157 SCRA 62.

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 422.

277

description, or by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer who

shall certify thereon that he prepared the same on the
basis of a duly certified technical description. Where the
plan as submitted is certified by the government agency
which issued the same, it is sufficient that the technical
description be prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic
Engineer on the basis of said certified plan.
(b)

The original, two (2) duplicate copies, and a Xerox copy of

the original of the technical description of the parcel of
land covered by the certificate of title, duly certified by
the authorized officer of the Bureau of Lands or the Land
Registration Commission who issued the technical
description.

(c)

A signed copy of the certification of the Register of Deeds

concerned that the original of the certificate of title on file
in the Registry was either lost or destroyed, indicating the
name of the registered owner, if known from the other
record on file in said office.

In Dizon v. Discaya,585 it was held that sub paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
paragraph 5 of LRC Circular No. 35 are merely additional document that must
accompany the petition to be forwarded to the Land Registration Authority.
When Section 2(f) of R.A. No. 26 speaks of any other document, it must
refer to similar documents previously enumerated in Sections 2(a), (b), (c),
and (d).
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Susukan
G.R. No. 71835, April 30, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner presented the owners duplicate of the certificate of
title in support of his petition for reconstitution. However, oppositors
claimed that said title does not contain the name of the third
registered owners. Oppositors presented two documents, namely a
certificate from the Bureau of Lands and a copy of the decision of the
lower court to prove not only the ownership of the third registered
owners but all the registered owners.
HELD: These documents fall under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 26 and are
sufficient and proper bases for reconstituting the burned or destroyed
original certificate of title.
REQUIREMENT AND PROCEDURES IN PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL RECONSTITUTION
If the sources for judicial reconstitution are those enumerated in Sections
2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b) and 4(a) of R.A. No. 26, 586 the requirements are set forth
585
586

G.R. No. 133502, February 15, 1999.

2(a) and 3(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
2(b) and 3(b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of said certificate;

278

in Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of the Act. 587 Sections 9 and 10 require

that 30 days before the date of hearing:
(a)

A notice be published in two successive issues of the Official

Gazette at the expense of the petitioner.

(b)

That such notice be posted at the main entrances of the

provincial building and of the municipal hall of the municipality
or city where the property lies.

The notice under Section of the Act, shall state the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The number of the certificate of title;

The number of the registered owner/ owners;
The name of the interested parties appearing in the
reconstituted certificate of title;
The location of the property; and
The date on which all persons having an interest in the
property, must appear and file such claims as they may
have.

Unlike the requirement set forth in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26, there is
nothing in Sections 9 and 10 of the same act that requires the notices to be
sent to owners of adjoining lots.
The proceedings under Sections 9 and 10 being in rem, the court acquires
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for reconstitution of the owners
certificate of title upon compliance with the required posting of notices and
publication in the Official Gazette. Non-compliance with such mandatory
requirements renders the proceeding therein void, and the reconstituted title
decreed and issued thereby is likewise void. 588
On the other hand, if the sources for judicial reconstitution are those
enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d) and 3(f) of R.A. No.

587

588

4(a) Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owners, co-owners,

mortgagees or lessees duplicate;
Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., G.R. No. 139518, March 6,
2001.
Villegas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129977, February 1, 2001.

279

26,589 the requirements are set forth in Section 12 and 13 of the same Act. 590
According to Section 12, the petition for reconstitution shall state or contain,
among other things, the following:

589

(a)

That the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had

been lost or destroyed;

(b)

That no co-owners, mortgagors or lessees duplicate had

been issued;

(c)

The location, area and boundaries of the property;

(d)

The nature and description of the buildings or

improvement if any, which do not belong to the owner of
the land and the names and addresses of the owners of
such buildings or improvements;

(e)

The names and addresses of the (a) occupants or persons

in possession of the property; (b) of the owners of the
adjoining properties; and (c) of all persons who may have
any interest in the property;

(f)

A detailed description of the encumbrance, if any,

affecting the property; and

(g)

A statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting

the property have been presented for registration, or if
there be nay, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet.

2(c) and 3(c) A certified copy of such certificate, previously issued by the
Register of Deeds concerned or by a legal
custodian thereof;
2(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent as the case may
be, which was the basis of the
certificate of title;
2(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that
its original had been registered; and
2(f) and 3(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient
and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
3(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and
pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
transfer certificate of title was issued;
590
Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., G.R. No. 139518, March 6,
2001.

280

This provision of the Act also requires that all documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition, shall
be attached thereto and filed with the same. If the source for reconstitution is
any other document which may be sufficient and proper for reconstitution,
as enumerated in Sections 2(f) and 3(f) of the Act, the petition shall also be
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, or with a
certified copy of the description from a prior certificate of title covering the
same property.591
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 mandates the court to issue a notice of the petition
for reconstitution, which shall state, among other things, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and date on which
all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or
objections to the petition.
The Court shall cause the said notice:
(a)

To be published in two successive issues of the Official

Gazette at the expense of the petitioner.

(b)

To be posted at the main entrances of the provincial

building and of the municipal building of the municipality
or city in which the land is situated; and

(c)

To be sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense

of the petitioner, to every person named in said notice.

The above publication, posting and sending by mail of the notice should be
done at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing. Under Section 13 of the
Act, the publication of the notice of petition in a local newspaper is not
required.592
The requirements in Section 12 (on the contents of a petition for
reconstitution of title) and in Section 13 (on the publication, posting, and
sending by mail thereof) found both in R.A. No. 26 where the basis or sources
for reconstitution are those enumerate in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d) and 3(f) of R.A. No. 26, are mandatory and jurisdictional, non-observance
of which fatally affects the whole proceedings in all its aspects. 593
Manila Railroad Company v. Moya
G.R. No. L-17913, June 22, 1985
FACTS: The Manila Railroad Company filed a petition to reconstitute
two Transfer Certificate of Titles covering three parcels of land in
591
592
593

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra note 37, at 168.

Zuiga v. Vivencio, 153 SCRA 720.
Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, 234 SCRA 455.

281

Camarines Sur. They submitted plans and technical descriptions of

the properties as the basis for the requested reconstitution. An order
was entered granting the reconstitution of the titles. Mrs. Prieto filed a
motion to set aside the order granting the reconstitution stating that
she was never served with notice of the petition filed by the Manila
RIALROAD Company, otherwise, she would have appeared to oppose
the same.
The Manila Railroad Company argued that Mrs. Prieto cannot claim
that she was not served with notice of hearing of the petition to
reconstitute as said notice was duly published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: WON the publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient notice
of hearing.
HELD: No. Section 13 of R.A No. 26 that notice by publication is not
sufficient under the circumstances. Notice must be actually sent or
delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution. The
order of reconstitution, therefore, having been issued without
compliance with the said requirement, has never become final as it
was null and void.
Tahanan Development Corp v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-55771, November 15, 1982
FACTS: The Pascuals claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial
filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of a lost certificate of title
under R.A. No. 26 of two lots both located in Paraaque. The original
certificate of title, original and owners duplicate copies have been
lost or destroyed in World War II. The trial court granted the petition
for reconstitution. Alabang Development Corporation and Bagatsing
filed a petition to Set Aside The Decision claiming that the court has
no jurisdiction to grant the petition for reconstitution since they have
not been personally notified of the pendency of the reconstitution
case to which they are entitled under R.A. No. 26 not only as
adjoining owners but as actual possessors of the land.
ISSUE: WON the court has acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings
and the petitioner in light of the requirements of R.A. No. 26.
HELD: No. The requirements and procedure of R.A. No. 26 are
mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific
jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the
Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or
notified to specified persons. Tahanan development has not been
named, cited or indicated as the owner, occupant or possessor of the
property adjacent to the lots which is sought to be reconstituted in
the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing. The Pascuals
are charged with the obligation to inquire who their neighbors are in
actual possession and occupancy not only portions of their own

282

property but also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation

cannot be ignored where the location or the properties involved is a
prime site for land development, expansion, suitable for residential,
commercial and industrial purposes and where ever square inch of
real estate becomes a valuable and profitable investment.
The Notice of Hearing was also posted only in the bulletin board of
the CFI of Pasay. R.A. No 26 specifically requires that the notice of the
petitions shall be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or
city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the
municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing.
The failure to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of
property adjacent to one of the lots as well as the failure to post
copies of the Notice of Hearing in the required locations is fatal to the
acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial courts.
FEES
Section 23 of R.A. No. 26 provides:
Sec. 23. No fees shall be charged for the filing of any petition
under this Act, nor for any service rendered, in connection
therewith or in compliance with any provision of this Act, by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, clerks of Court of
First Instance, sheriffs, and/or register of deeds. Any certified
copy of document or paper that may be necessary in the
reconstitution of a certificate of title under this Act shall, upon
request of the court, register of deeds, or Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, be furnished free of charge, by any
office or branch of the Government, including Government
controlled corporations, institutions or instrumentalities.
LRC Circular No. 17 also states that No fees shall be charged for the filing of
any petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title, under the provisions of
R.A. No. 26 and these regulations, nor for any service rendered, in connection
therewith or in compliance with any provision of said Act or regulations, by
the Administrator of the NALTDRA, clerks of Regional Trial Courts, sheriffs,
and/or Registrar of Deeds. No certified copy of any document or paper
needed for reconstitution purposes shall, however, be furnished free of
charge, unless the same is made upon specific request of the Court, or the
Registrar of Deeds concerned.
When the Registrar of Deeds demands payment of fees for the reconstitution
of an original certificate of title from an applicant, he should file a motion for
reconsideration of such with the court. 594
DUTY OF COURTS
594

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 312.

283

In Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay,595 the Supreme Court held and warned the
lower courts that reconstitution proceedings have many times been misused
as a means of divesting a property owner of title to his property, so the
courts should proceed with extreme caution in these proceedings, requiring
not only strict compliance with the provisions of R.A. No. 26 but also
ascertaining the identity and authority of every person who files a petition for
reconstitution of title. The courts must exercise the greatest caution in
entertaining such petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of
title, making sure that the parties are duly served with actual and personal
notice of the petition.
The duty of the court to issue the order of reconstitution is mandatory, and
gives it no discretion to deny the same, if all the basic requirements of the
law have been complied with, as when: (1) the petitioner is the registered
owner; (2) the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and (3) the evidence presented is sufficient and proper to warrant
the reconstitution of such title.596 Even if the government does not oppose the
reconstitution, the court must still find that the petitioners evidence is
substantial enough to warrant reconstitution. 597 According to Sec. 110 Par. 2
of P.D. 1529 the order or judgment directing the reconstitution of title shall
become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt by the Register of Deeds
concerned and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a
notice of such order or judgment without an appeal having been file by such
officials.
In Astorga v. Court of Appeals,598 it was held that a reconstitution proceeding
is absolutely unnecessary when the original of the certificate of title to be
reconstituted was never lost, and the existing certificate is on file and
available in the registry of deeds. In such case, it is also the duty of the court
to deny the petition for reconstitution. Needless to state, a wrongly
reconstituted
certificate
of
title,
secured
through
fraud
and
misrepresentation, cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits. 599
ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION
Administrative reconstitution is the putting together again or restoration of
the Original and Transfer Certificates of Title that were lost or destroyed due
to fire, flood or other natural calamities without the necessity of Court
proceedings. The procedure for administrative reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificate of title was originally prescribed in Section 5 of R.A. No.
26.
Under Sec. 110 of P.D. 1529, this procedure was abrogated. However,
R.A. 6732 revived the administrative procedure in a limited scale. Section 1 of
the said act reads in part as follows:

595
596
597
598
599

284

187 SCRA 12.

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 422.
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 62.
133 SCRA 748.
Jose v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 735.

The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost

or destroyed certificate prescribe in Act No. 26 may be availed of
only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due
to fire, flood, or other force majeure as determined by the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority; Provided, That
the number of certificates of titles lost or damage should be at
least 10% of the total number in the possession of the Office of
the Register of Deeds; Provided, further, that in no case shall the
number of certificates of title lost or damaged be less than 500.
Certificates of Title lost or destroyed due to fire, flood or other force majeure
within 15 years before the approval of R.A. No. 6732 on July 20, 1989 may
also be administratively reconstituted. 600
WHO MAY APPLY?
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that the petition may be filled with the
Register of Deeds concerned by the registered owner, his assigns, or other
persons, both natural and juridical, having an interest in the property.
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTIUTION
Section 2 of the same act provides that administrative reconstitution of title
may be based only on the following:
(a)

The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b)

The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of said

certificate;

REQUIREMENT AND PROCEDURES IN PETITIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTIUTION

The petition shall state, among other things, the petitioners full name,
address and other personal circumstances, the nature of his interest in the
property, and the title number of the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted. It must be verified, accompanied by the source or sources for
reconstitution and an affidavit of the registered owner stating the following: 601
(1)

(2)

600
601

That no deed or other instrument affecting the property

had been presented for registration, or, if there be any,
the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as
the names of the parties, and whether the registration of
such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
That the owners duplicate certificate or co-owners
duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional
alterations or erasures;

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 2, at 337.

Reviving and Amending Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 26, Republic Act No. 6732, Sec.
2.

285

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or

investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its
genuineness or due execution or issuance;
That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at
the time it was lost or destroyed;
That the certificate of title is covered by a declaration
regularly issued by the Assessors Office;
That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least 2
years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution.

If the reconstitution is to be made from any of the sources enumerated in

Section 2(b) or 3(b), the affidavit should further state that the owners
duplicate has been lost or destroyed and the circumstances under which it
was lost or destroyed. Thereupon, the register of deeds shall, no valid reason
to the contrary existing, reconstitute the certificate of title as provided in this
act.
REMEDY OF AGGRIEVED PARTY
Republic Act No. 6732 provides for a mechanism for review of the decision of
the Register of Deeds or reconstituting officer as well as the remedy of an
aggrieved party. Section 9 and 10 provides:
Sec. 9. The Land Registration Authority Administrator may
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the
reconstituting officer or Register of Deeds any appeal shall be
filed with 15 days from the receipt of the judgment or order by
the aggrieved party.
Sec. 10. Any interested party who by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence has been unjustly deprived or prevented
from taking part in the proceedings may file a petition in the
proper court to set aside the decision and to reopen the
proceedings. The petition shall be verified and must be filed
within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the decision but not
more than 6 months from the promulgation thereof.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 6732 provides for the review by the Land Registration
Authority Administrator of any decision of the reconstituting officer or
Register of Deeds. On the other hand, Section 10 provides for the remedy of a
petition filed in the proper court to set aside a decision granting
reconstitution where the interested party was unjustly deprived or prevented
from taking part in the proceedings through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. Thus insofar, as the administrative reconstitution of
original copies of certificates of title is concerned, R.A. No. 6732 provides two
remedies to an aggrieved party, namely:
(a)

286

Appeal from the order or decision of reconstitution issued by the

Reconstituting Officer or Register of Deeds to the LRA

Administrator who may review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm

it under the first sentence of Section 9; and
(b)

Petition for review on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or

excusable negligence filed with the proper court under Section
10.

It should be noted that the proper court mentioned in Section 10 could only
mean the Regional Trial Court, a court of general jurisdiction, which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition to set aside the decision of the
reconstituting officer on ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.602
The LRA Administrator, pursuant to his power under Section 9 of R.A. No.
6732 may even nullify the subject reconstituted certificate of title. In Manotok
v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,603 the Supreme Court held that:
The LRA has jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative
reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting
officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature it can properly
deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for
reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or
spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such
declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to
grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA,
when supported by substantial evidence, as in the case, shall be
binding on the Court of Appeals.
In a reconstitution proceeding, the LRA is bound to determine
from evidence submitted from the evidence submitted which
between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it
to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such
authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only
with mechanical powers.
V. CADASTRAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
The cadastral system is an offspring of the system of registration under the
Land Registration Act which was enacted primarily to hasten the system of
registering lands, when the ordinary land registration proves to be inefficient
and slow for lack of initiative on the part of landowners.
The most defining characteristic of the cadastral system, perhaps, is the fact
that upon initiative of the government, titles for all the lands within a stated
area are adjudicated, whether or not the people living within the district
desire to have the titles issued. 604 The purpose of the cadastral proceedings is
602
603
604

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 787.

477 SCRA 339
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND supra note 1, at 487.

287

to settle and adjudicate titles to lands when public interest so requires and
concomitantly, to expedite such adjudication and settlement.
The law governing cadastral registration proceedings is Act No. 2259,
otherwise known as The Cadastral Act. This, however, was updated by PD
1529 which codified all laws, decrees and other issuance relative to land
registration.
NATURE OF CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
The idea behind a cadastral proceeding is to register all private lands in a
town in one single collective proceeding, compelling all claimants in such
municipality to litigate against one another over their respective claims of
ownership. The principal aim is to settle as much as possible all disputes over
the land and to remove all clouds over land titles, as far as practicable, in a
community.605
Like in the ordinary registration proceedings, cadastral registration
proceeding are in rem. In cadastral cases, the government who initiates the
proceedings may well be considered as the plaintiff and all the persons
having claims over lands subject of registration, the defendants. 606 However,
unlike in ordinary registration proceedings, institution of the proceedings in
cadastral system is involuntary as the initiative lies with the government.
GENERAL PROCEDURE IN CADASTRAL CASES
CADASTRAL SURVEY
The cadastral registration proceeding starts with the President, upon finding
that public interest so requires that title to any unregistered lands be settled
and adjudicated, ordering the Director of Lands to conduct a cadastral survey
of the lands in issue.607
The Director of Lands shall ensure that notices have been sent out to all
persons claiming interest over the land as well as the general public. He
should also cause the notice to be published in the Official Gazette and
posted in conspicuous places where the land is situated. Such notice shall
contain the description of the lands to be surveyed and the date of the
survey.
FILING OF PETITION
After the lands have been surveyed or plotted, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Solicitor General shall institute original registration
proceedings by filing the necessary petition in the Regional Trial Court in the
place where the land is situated.608 The petition shall be against all the
605
606
607
608

288

AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 370.

Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120.
PD 1529, Sec. 35.
PD 1529, Sec. 35.

holders, claimants, possessors, or occupants of such lands or any part

thereof, and shall state that public interest requires that titles to such lands
be settled and adjudicated. It shall likewise contain a description of the lands
and shall be accompanied by a plan thereof, and all other data as may to
furnish the occupants of the land full notice of the institution of the
proceedings.
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING
The LRA Administrator, upon receipt of the petition, shall cause: the
publication of the notice of the initial hearing of the application for
registration once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; the mailing of such notice to persons named in
the petition and whose address is known; the posting of copies of such notice
in conspicuous places designated by law.
Such notice is indispensable since the cadastral registration proceeding is in
rem. Like in ordinary registration proceedings, publication in cadastral
proceedings is one of the essential basis of jurisdiction of cadastral courts.
Additional territory cannot be included in the new survey plan unless
publication of the same was made.609
FILING OF ANSWER
Any person having any claim over the lands in issue, whether named in the
notice or not, shall appear before the court and file an answer, which should
contain the information provided for in Section 37 of PD 1529. The filing of
the answer is equivalent to an application for registration under the Land
Registration Act and just like the institution of the proceedings, it is an action
in rem.610 It also suspends the running of the period of prescription.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR PERJURY
Pursuant to Section 116 of the Land Registration Act, those who, in filing their
answers, make any false assertions and swear by it, may be prosecuted
criminally for perjury. Such prosecution, however, is a proceeding in
personam or personally against the accused claimant. It shall not have any
effect upon the land titles.611
HEARING OF THE CASE
A hearing shall then be conducted to determine who has better claims over
the land. Like in an ordinary registration proceeding, parties to a cadastral
case are heard and their evidence considered. However, if no one can prove
title to the property, such property shall be declared part of the public
domain and that judgment shall be res judicata.612
609
610
611
612

AQUINO, LAND REGISTRATION supra note 37, at 102.

Director of Lands v. Aba, et al., 68 Phil. 85.
People v. Cainglet, 16 SCRA 748.
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 1, at 490.

289

DECISION
The cadastral clerk of court notifies all the claimants of the courts decision.
He shall have the benefit of the presumption of regularity in the performance
of such duty. Three actions are taken after trial by the cadastral court:
(a) Judgment or decision which adjudicates ownership of the land
involved in favor of one or more of the claimants. This is the
decree of the court.
(b) Declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificate of title by the Land Registration
Authority. This is issued if no appeal is taken within the
reglementary period.
(c) Registration of the decree by the LRA and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.613
ISSUANCE OF DECREE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
The adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become
final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of
the final decree.614 Within such period, the case may still be reopened and the
decision be set aside on the ground of actual fraud. The title obtained in a
cadastral proceeding shall have the same force and effect as that applied for
in an ordinary land registration proceeding.
In the absence of fraud, title is vested upon expiration of the period to appeal
from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such appeal
being perfected; and form that time the land becomes registered property
which cannot be lost by adverse possession. 615
UNREGISTERED LANDS, OBJECT OF CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to the Act 2259 or the Cadastral Act, both public and private lands
are impliedly made subject of cadastral proceedings. However, the wordings
of CA 141 of the Public Land Act, which provides that the petition for
cadastral proceeding shall be filed against all holders of any land who shall
not have voluntarily come in under the provisions on judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, imply that those land that have been titled
under the provisions mentioned are excluded from the cadastral survey. 616
Furthermore, it is expressly provided in PD 1529 that cadastral proceedings
for unregistered lands may be instituted when public interest so requires.
613
614
615
616

290

Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240.

NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION supra note 2, at 480.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 373-374.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 373-374.

LIMITATION ON THE JURISDICTION OF CADASTRAL COURTS

ON PREVIOUSLY DECREED LANDS

In cadastral proceedings, the courts have no jurisdiction to decree

registration to lands already decreed in an earlier land registration case.
Neither do they have the power to decree title to a lot already covered by
homestead patent, to a person other than the patentee, and they cannot
decree a lot to one who has put no claim to it. 617 Their jurisdiction is limited to
those unregistered lands, or as regards registered lands, to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands. 618
The reason for this limitation on the jurisdiction of the courts in cadastral
proceedings goes back to the intention of the law, The Cadastral Act. The
intention of the law is for titles to be settled and adjudicated. To construe this
provision as allowing the settlement or adjudication of titles already decreed
is to render the law absurd and superfluous. Furthermore, since the title
obtained in a cadastral proceeding has the same force and effect as that
obtained in an ordinary registration proceeding, such construction defeats or
goes against the guarantee of a final, imprescriptible and indefeasible title.
ON AMENDING PLAN TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY
Private lands, by the nature of cadastral proceedings, may inevitably be
included in cadastral surveys. In such cases, those private lands shall retain
their non-alienable lands of public domain. The cadastral courts shall issue
new certificate of titles, but such titles shall not modify or alter the limits of
the lands in the original plan.619
Any modification made by the cadastral court as to the original plan, i.e.,
inclusion of land not originally in the plan, shall be a nullity unless new
publication is made as to such step. However, in proper cases and upon
proper application or the consent of the registered owner , or of the person in
whose name the decree is issued, the Court may make the necessary
changes insofar as such changes do not impair any substantial rights, i.e.,
divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor. 620 This
means that if the cadastral survey extends to those lands which have been
registered under ordinary registration proceedings, the cadastral court may
validly change the title issued, corresponding to the new survey. Such change
of title must not, however, modify the previous extent of the land.
ON DECLARING LOT AS PUBLIC LAND
Moreover, it has been held that the declaration by the cadastral court that a
land is part of public domain is not the final decree contemplated in Sections
38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. Even if the land has been declared by
617

618
619
620

Manalo v. Lucban, 48 Phil. 973; El Hogar Filipino v. Oviga, 60 Phil. 17 ;

Government of the Philippine Island v. Trio, 50 Phil. 708.
Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558.
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 17, at 380.
Sideco v. Aznar, 92 Phil. 952.

291

the cadastral court as a public land, such declaration does not preclude the
occupant from seeking judicial confirmation of his title to the same land. 621
ON AWARDING DAMAGES
The cadastral courts also does not possess authority to award damages as
they restricted to determining whether the claimants are the rightful owners
of the lands subject of registration and if they are, to issue a decree of
registration.
It has been clarified in Timbol vs. Diaz622 however, that these limitations on
the jurisdiction of cadastral courts do not exclude the power to determine the
priority of overlapping registered titles. This power is necessary for a
complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings. In short, cadastral court may also (1) order the
correction of technical description of the land; and (2) resolve as well the
priority of overlapping titles.
REOPENING OF CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS
Under Republic Act No. 931, approved June 20, 1953, persons claiming title to
lands subject of cadastral proceedings, who were in possession thereof at the
time of survey, but for some justifiable reason, failed to file such claims and
by reason of such failure, the lands have been or are about to be declared
part of public domain, may file for the reopening of cadastral cases within
five years, or any time before June 20, 1958. This period has been extended
to ten years or up to December 31, 1968 by Republic Act 2061. Such
reopening, however, shall be limited those lands which have not yet been
permanently disposed of by the government. Failure to file such claims must
be grounded on justifiable reasons like poverty, sickness and the like.
This law, however, is no longer in force. Thus, courts no longer have the
authority to reopen cadastral proceedings since December 31, 1968. 623
Moreover, except when otherwise provided by the laws governing cadastral
registration proceedings, all the provisions of the Land Registration Act are
applicable to cadastral proceedings as well as to titles granted under the
Cadastral Act.

621
622
623

292

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 426.

44 Phil. 589.
Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282.