Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.

-- A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section.
7. (Rules of Court.)

Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where an arrest can be made
either by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his
presence". The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the arrest made by the
constabulary without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was
a subversive was held unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of
the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the
former to be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the
Miranda rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F:
On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the appellant was arrested
while plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of
illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 caliber revolver was
found buried under his house. Subversive documents were also seized from a place
near his house. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had readily
admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. The appellant was found guilty
of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and documents were ordered
confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge that the crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be
committed, in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is no such personal knowledge in
this case. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal.

(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and
the firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the
gun and claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive
documents were hidden. However, as the appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights at that time, his admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec.
12 (1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the
assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of
Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted,
but the gun and the subversive documents must be confiscated.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
F:
Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station
I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was
selling marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and requested
that said person be apprehended. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael
Orbeta, a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the
house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on
board, a driver and 2 passengers, stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St.
They also saw a male person come out of the said house and approach and talk to
the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the male person go back to the
house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff
of a cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give
something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his companions approached
the male person and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police
officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to
bring out the contents of their pockets, which the male person, the driver and the
passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small
plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out
from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal
was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle.
The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge
that he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters
away from the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was not valid as the
requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls
under the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust
operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to
apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police officers

were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were
conducted on them. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led
the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being
committed.

b. Exceptions to strict enforcement

(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court
finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily
deprived of their constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as
amended is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in
the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further
detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
I
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. about a member
of the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who was
listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services
of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTCCaloocan City an info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault
upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned, is now moot
and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an
accused in a crim. case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers.
Nor was he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day
after the shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the
NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,
the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested.

The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed

elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more
an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against govt forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence
imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
II
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also
justified.
In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the
Constantino house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and
on 8/12/88, pursuant to a search warrant , a search of the house was conducted at
5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of the search were found several firearms,
regular power supply, antennae, speaker and subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or
authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS
HQ for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement,
although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive of the NUFC and
a ranking member of the International Dept. of the CPP.
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. When arrested,
he readily submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/
NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong," referring to RC and
other members of the rebel group. Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a
piece of paper containing the jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of Amelia
Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the
place about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military agents conducted a
search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of
the place.
The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP.
They found firearms, subversive documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among
others. Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info.
charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for viol. of the AntiSubversion Act was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf of Roque and
Buenaobra. At the hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
stockade at Camp Crame, Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his behalf is now
moot and academic.
III

Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is
justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was
still under surveillance. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines.
When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to show
their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but they could
not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the
CPP by their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTCPasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. there was no
previous warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. filed against them are
null and void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been
first conducted, is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor
did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed against them in
court.
IV
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal
PC-INP Command, armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house
located at Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head
of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by
Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45
cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to the PC HQ for
investigation, when O. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig.
Rivera was released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2.
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is
justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she
refused to waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7,
ROC.
V
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque claim that the
firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in
their possession, when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by the
military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting

officers that could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners
falsely, has been shown.
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product
of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the petitioners.
VI
Espiritu v. Lim.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at
about 5 AM of 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa,
Mla., he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to
hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed
against him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E.
through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide
strike on 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him,
but he gave the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the
provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a
valid info. filed w/ the competent court, he may not be released on HC.
VII
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group
of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regala who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala
pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. In view
thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police
HQ for questioning.
xxx
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a
resolution denying the petition for HC, it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTCMkti., MM.
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to
Sec. 5 (b), R 113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by his co-accused; and
after investigation by the police.
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably

sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a

crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be
detained participated therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.)

VIII
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of HC will not
be allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/ a view to its
abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n
the court w/c issued the process, judgement or order of commitment, or bef. whom
the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the court itself
stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the court must inquire into
every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;"
and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause
of our Constitution in fact has been satisfied."

Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251

PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE
COURT'S DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a
CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that,
w/in the contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was committing an offense,
when arrested, bec. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed
org., where membership is penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under
Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES
OF ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who, the day before his
arrest, w/o warrant, had shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen, anywhere as

agents or representative of an organized govt. It is in this sense that subversion and

rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the same
acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized govt is attained.
His arrest was based on "probable cause."
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1)
the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person
arresting has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is
the one who committed the offense.
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant
must be based upon probable cause, w/c means on actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an
NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound was based on actual facts and
supported by circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: (1)
the day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo.,
Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a wounded person listed in the
hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said hospital
for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the
hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural.
On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to
regularly perform their official duties.
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him w/ Double murder w/
assault against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He
was placed under judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their
arrests, w/o warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant
issued by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms, explosives and/ or
ammunitions on their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c
justified their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. A few days
after their arrests, informations were filed in court against said petitioners placing
them w/in judicial custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. he
had chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o
warrant was the info. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC
and the other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their
operations, w/ info. as to their exact location and the names of RC and BT as
residents and occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances

surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c
confirmed the belief of the military that the info. they had received was true and the
persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes:
first, the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino
safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person named RC, who admitted
that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communist equipment; third, at the time of their arrests, in
their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions, and/ or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the
CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after their arrests, they were positively identified by
their former comrades as CPP/ NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest
w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met.
This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the
crime, but xxx upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may
reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen."
(US v. Sanchez.)
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for subversive or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa
magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to
sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of
the peace officers to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the words were
uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, w/o obviously becomes difficult at times, the court, has in this case, tilted
the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction.)
Supervening events made this case moot and academic. for E. had bef.
arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Case against E. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled.
NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of Bunye II occured on
12/14/88, while Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14
days later, teh arrest falls under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on 12/28/88 that
the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty
in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even w/o a
warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to prevent
possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.

These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already
guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task
of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper
in a petition for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs

People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784

F:
Accused Linsangan was arrested after a buy-bust operation. The two
marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to sign his name on the
two marked bills. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused
were submitted for examination. After finding these positive for marijuana, a case
was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the charge.
The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of the assertions of
Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen
required him to initial the marked bills, they violated his constitutional right to
counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial
investigation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the
P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against selfincrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana
cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the
marked bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the
policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling
marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more
credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellants denials. That is as
it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their official
duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the
deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to
make it doubly so.

11. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress

Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision
correcional), be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. xxx

B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation

Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense, shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. 17
hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section, as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.

Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

According to Chief Justice Warren, when a defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures,
where compulsion is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated, the
officers must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda
rights" at the outset of the investigation to ensure that the statements made are
truly the product of free choice.
Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be
informed of the following rights:
1. Right to remain silent
a) To make him aware of it.
b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere
c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
privilege should he choose to invoke his right.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says
can and will be used against him.
a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent.
b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system, and that the police
are not acting in his interest.
3. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation
a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the
inherent pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run
unless coupled with the right to counsel.

b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police.

4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel, then one will be provided
for him by the state.
a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one, he
does not have to defend himself alone.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right
to counsel.
(The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person
arrested is a prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he may already know these
rights, the purpose is not so much to inform him, as to assure him that his
interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the pressure of custodial
investigation.)
The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation".
A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
1) "General exploratory investigation" - when the investigation consists
merely of general questions to find out who might be the culprit, but without being
directed at anyone's guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda rule is not yet
applicable; otherwise, people who could otherwise explain their innocence would be
arrested.
2) "Custodial investigation" - when the investigation now focuses on the
guilt of a person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise. It is at this
stage that the Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose of the interrogation is
to evince evidence that can be used to prosecute the person.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running with a stained knife away
from an apparently dead man, he can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him
for an explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. But once
A arrests X and starts interrogating him in the police precinct, then his rights must
now be read, for there can only be one purpose to the questioning, and that is to
elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2
(1988); 61 Phil. LJ 409
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS.
Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal
procedure in the Phils., the rule has been that involuntary confessions are
inadmissible in evidence against the accused.
The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. The early rule
placed the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary and, therefore,
admissible in evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was held that a
confession not shown to have been voluntarily given could be objected to at any
stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal in the SC.

Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the
burden of proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. Under
the new rule, it was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c
accredit prima facie its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. v. de los
Santos that "A confession, to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been
obtained by force and violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects
the confession when, by force or violence or intimidation, the accused is compelled
against his will to tell a falsehood, not even when such force and violence he is
compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated
"the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal
manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission
contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its
admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases
(Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly
overruling its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro,
went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions, regardless of
their truth, are null and void. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure
confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render
inadmissible even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This
is not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law:
that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the def. unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police
interrogators bef. a person in custody may be interrogated, w/c have been adopted
by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege
not to be compelled to incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent pressures of the

interrogation atmosphere, and to assure the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and
wilol be used against him. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of
the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by
his interrogators, it is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel.

THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION

At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The
Consti. does not state at what stage of the interrogation process they must be made.
but in Miranda, the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the
interrogation that its ruling applied. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois,
it is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and
the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy.
He was taken to police precint no. 2 in Mla. The next day, he was included in a
police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion
of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in
front of the complainant, while the latter was interrogated. The accused was then
charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to dismiss the case against him on the
ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. His
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation, when
the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions
or admissions from the accused. As the police line-up in this case was not part of
the custodial inquest, the petitioner was not entitled to counsel xxx.

III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.

It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights and the waiver of
warnings. The first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing
and intelligent" but the second cannot. As the warnings are the means of insuring
that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any subsequent waiver of his rights
can be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no valid
waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be presumed.
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the
suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel does not apply. such confessions, even though presented in
evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti., are admissible, provided
they are voluntary, using the traditional test of voluntariness.

2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17, 1973, but before
March 20, 1985, when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is
that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be
determined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account the circumstances under
w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20, 1985 but before Feb.
2, 1987, when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights
to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be made w/ the
assistance of counsel.
4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti.
requires that the waiver to be valid, must be in writing and w/ the assistance of
counsel.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is
made bet. confession or admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of
confessions only, I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced
uncounselled statements. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it could
... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
guilt by implication."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the
rule excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used
in the exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this mean there can
be instances, where uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in
evidence, albeit, for a limited purpose?
In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession obtained w/o
complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in
chief the confessor's guilt, it may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach
his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what
he had sold to a police officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme to defraud
the purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation w/
prior inconsistent utterance
In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the
Miranda rule. xxx. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda
warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence." It held
that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely
"prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court
noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the giving of
warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in
turn to fewer convictions. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving

of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to
avert an immediate threat to public safety. When answers are not actually coerced,
this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such exigent
circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose bet. giving the warnings
at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at
the risk that probative evidence will be excluded.

People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262

F:
Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The victim, Pagdalian was found dead,
sustaining stab wounds. When the policemen inquired about the circumstances of
the incident, they were informed that the deceased was with two companions, on the
previous night. The accused was apprehended. In the vehicle where the accused
boarded, on his way to the Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he killed
Pagdalian because he was abusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was admissible in evidence.
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial confession of the accused in
evidence, violated his Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to
have a counsel of his choice, while already in police custody. Since the extra-judicial
confession was the only basis for the conviction of the accused, the trial cousts
judgment was reversed. Bam.

People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566

F:
After he and his wife were individually hogtied and their house
ransacked, Atty. Garay was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . For his
death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo,
Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court for robbery with homicide. On the
basis of the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and
Dionanao during their custodial investigation which the court found to "have
all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible
confession, it appearing from the confession that acussed were informed of
their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly
represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded the defenses interposed
by the accused and convicted Bandula. The 3 other accused were acquitted
for "insufficiency of evidence".
Issue:
W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula conformed with the
constitutional requisites for its validity, hence admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused Bandula and
Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel
present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation
with respect to Dionanao, and 2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. And
counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Zerna, the Municipal
Attorney of Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and

who is not an independent counsel. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations
of of Sec. 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the
accused during custodial investigation. Suzette.
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17,
1973

2. Not applicable to res gestae statements

People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an exception to the rule against
Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is based on the belief that because certain statements
are made naturally, spontaneously and without deliberation during the course of an
event, they leave little room for misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing
by someone else( i.e. by the witness who will later repeat the statement to the court)
and thus the courts believe that such statements carry a high degree of credibility.
Evidence which can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three headings:
Words or phrases which either form part of, or explain a physical act,
Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie concoction, and
Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of mind.
3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations
People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of
rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a
verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is
similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, and
2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate
sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been
made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness

against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating

questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly,
or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right,
or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the
first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an
"earthquake in the world of law enforcement."
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right,
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
Miranda rights
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a

police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations,"
or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way."
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his
testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor,
for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of
these rights rejected; and
2)

AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such

refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry.
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
Police Lineups
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest

F:
Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. The following day, he was
included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery
case. He was later charged with robbery and charged. He moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without the assistance of counsel,
was unconstitutional.
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV.

US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)

People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
F:
Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions
including Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant, describing the latter as a
"mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect in
a police line- up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton alleges that
at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted by
counsel. Hence, his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification,
technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation. Thus, the right to counsel
does not yet apply.
However, there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of
the suspect by the witness. During the proceedings in the police station, Ongue
identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant
but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed by
the police as the suspect. This cannot be considered as positive identification of the
accused by the witness.
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights

No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent
F:
Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The
prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who
identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged
waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. When Roca was questioned on
the incriminating answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending that
Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. Respondent Judge
sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided
the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its

consequences. In this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening

question, after informing the suspect that he was under investigation, that he had a
right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or against him and
after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes." The
statement was in Tagalog which the defendant, a native of Samar, had not been
shown to be fully acquainted with. The date of execution of the statement before the
municipal court was not indicated. The separate statement signed by the defendant
stating he was made to read the opening statement containing the Miranda
warnings and that they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to
whether the defendant was properly informed of his right.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
F:
Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary
in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado,
another prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying
"surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they gave extrajudicial
confessions admitting the killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty.
They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced
to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On
review, it was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to
counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the
place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of
the trial there. Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In another case
where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that, for security reasons, Avila's
trial be held in the National Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that
he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was willing to
answer questions of the police. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily
made. The truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their
guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without interrogation, was part of the res
gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that
statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, the
two waived their right to remain silent and to counsel.
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence
F:
Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to
death. His conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he
disowned in court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed before the
clerk of court and contains a waiver.
HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite
waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to
be sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the
moment." As worded, the question suggested a tentativeness that belied the

suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was
any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one
could be provided for him for free. VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession
showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the
fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.

b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987)

It is not enough that the confession is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
The waiver must be made in the presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel
must be made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from March 20,
1985 to February 2, 1987.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, reiterating a dictum in
Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that although the right to
counsel may be waived, the waiver should not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an
obiter. The confession in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did
not need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession.
Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with
homicide on the basis of his confession, which was obtained through torture. The
NBI investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl
full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that he signed the
confession and posed for pictures for re-enactment as directed by the investigators.

People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)

F:
Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal
Court. The principal prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and
his wife, who was the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the
crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because he and his
companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the
extrajudicial confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained
through torture. The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and
then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had
broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and posed for pictures for
reenactment as directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there
is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two weeks after he executed the
salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement does not
contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not

assisted by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case
of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest
by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v.
Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one
who took no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against
Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted
through a leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was
wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the
confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without
the assistance of counsel.

People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)

F:
Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as
evidence an extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession,
she admitted, through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. The
trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the waiver of Miranda rights
was made without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that the
ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with
the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum.
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in
by all Justices except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding
the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.

People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)

In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted
of robbery with homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions
taken in 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom the
confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given, but these were
not made in the presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that
the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially since in this case the
trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.

People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)

F:
Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and
circumstantial evidence which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt.
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the
assistance of a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit
and People v. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement
obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence. VV.
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing,
and (2) in the presence of counsel.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning
devolves upon the one seeking to present the confession, that is, on the
prosecution. This rule applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted that the stereotype
"advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators automatically type
it together with "opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in
their handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
accused.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that
protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution
must prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly and deliberately manifested
that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
confession.

People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)

F:
Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and
robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa
Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of
parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made
extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were
taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and
after two weeks of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal
form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the
taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not
the right to be given "Miranda warnings"
The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the
Miranda rights, can be waived.
What cannot be waived are:
1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For how can one waive
what one does not know?)
2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent
or to counsel.

8. Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the
credibility of the accused. Two, public safety.
Impeach the credibility

The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally without use. While

it is not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to
impeach his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled the U.S.
Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover
police agent. He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation, but the
confession was uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. But
when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that what he sold was baking
powder in order to defraud the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to
introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying.
In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice Burger said that it is
one thing to say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of the
evidence unlawfully obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can turn
the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession of the government was
obtained to his own advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury and
the contradiction of his untruths.
The reason, continued the Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda
rights cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
Public Safety
Public Safety may justify the police in taking confessions without prior
warning. Thus ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
2626 (1984).

New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).

In the case, the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because
the public safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used
by the accused against those in the supermarket.
The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be
justified in forcing the assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is not
justified to present this in evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution.

C. Right to bail
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired

even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
1. When right may be invoked
The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be
before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by
final judgement (which means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is
under arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
The case was unique in that after the war, the People's Court Act amended
Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the
impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary period due to the number of
indictees.
Bail and Habeas Corpus
In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and
detention, are valid, or that even if they were initially illegal, such illegality was
cured by the subsequent filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that
one be released temporarily from such valid detention, and this can be made
anytime after arrest.
In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention
are illegal, so that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal
detention. When the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention
remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not available. Under
the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has been considerably
lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise
the detainee is to be released.
The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the
right to bail. Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail refers to legal
detention, or even detention that started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a
case in court.
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of discretion
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua.
It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong. In such a
case, according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to
grant bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by
the prosecution. Thus, the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong.

The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong.
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and the automatic
commutation of a death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is contended that when
the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those crimes which were once punishable by
death. For if it includeds even those crimes which before and now are really
punishable by reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the
Constitution.
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
3. Bail in courts-martial
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- The judge who issed
the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to the following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory be

requiring a sum that is excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the ear to be
broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will"
(Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against Mayor Camara for
charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found excessive.
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ability of the accused to give the bail.

Nature of the offense.
Penalty for the offense charged.
Character and reputation of the accused

5. Health of the accused.

6. Character and strength of the evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested.
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied
bail. the remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v.
Amparo).
5.

Right to bail and right to travel abroad

Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1986), the SC disallowed a

person released on bail to travel abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2
reasons why bail operates only within the country.
One, the accused may be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court if he
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of
the conditions in the grant of bail, namely to have the accused available whenever
the court requires his presence.
Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between the State and the surety
that the State will do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest the
defendant upon order of the court. If the court thus allows his to leave, then the
State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself has breached
its obligation to the surety.
The case leaves the question of allowing an accused under bail to go abroad
for humanitarian reasons open-ended. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court,
which hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient
reason". What the Court found insufficient was the business trip.

Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)

F:
Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two corporations, in one of which he
was the president. The firms were placed under a management committee by the
SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of Immigration.
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He later asked for permission to leave the
country for business reasons, but his request was denied by the courts. He filed a
petition for certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. He
appealed to the SC.

HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the accused to make
himself available whenever the court requires his presence, operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. The constitutional right to travel is not absolute,
but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.

6. Waiver of the Right to Bail

People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
D. Rights during trial
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

1. Presumption of innocence
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC noted that the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right
to be presumed innocent.

In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law disqualifying candidates

charged with national security offences was struck down as unconstitutional, for
violating the presumption against innocence.

In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a judge who allowed the accused
to present his evidence ahead of the prosecution, over the objection of the
prosecution, after the acused admitted the killing but invoked self-defense, was
reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order of trial violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence which places the burden proof on the
prosecution.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits
the act but invokes a justifying or exempting circumstance.

People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739

F:
De Guzman, Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the
killing of an unidentified person on Nov. 16, 1994. Only De Guzman and
Castro were arrested and both pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by the
court mainly on the basis of the testimony of Adelia Angeles. She positively
identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who maltreated
an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing
her, she testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the
direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away. This was further
strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Police
Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the victim and
that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs.
Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has
been overcome.
HELD: YES
Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing
of the unknown victim, the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec.
4, Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is
no evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. While it
is true that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel,
hence inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the
accused established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover
in Peo v Alvarez, the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible
against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime committed.
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty (Art. III, Sec. 11.) No matter how educated one may be, he may not know
how to establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules
of evidence said the SC in People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952).

People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952)

F:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of
Romblon with slight illegal detention because he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel, pleaded guilty and said that he was
instructed by Mr. Ocampo to do so.
Accused was convicted of a capital offense.

Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to

have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital
offense from the facts pleaded in the information.
Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the
accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the
trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of
prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is
expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6),
that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the
court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned., and must be asked
if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that
"no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel."
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the evidence of the

prosecution (on the ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case) and this
motion is denied -- could the defense still present its own evidence?
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC ruled in the affirmative,
contending that the right of the accused to present his evidence is a constitutional
right which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119,
Sec. 15.)
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)

F:
Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was accused of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After
hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal, the court held the
proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon counsel for the
defense offered to present evidence for the accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the
presentation of evidence by the defense, contending that the present procedural
practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any
evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation
and after said motion had been denied, and citing as authority the case of United
States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the
opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present
evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner
to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial
of their motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution
Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present
proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error
which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section
1 (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor "procedural
practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before
being sentenced.
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the
case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied, the court should
proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of
whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event its
motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course
if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it,
the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by
the prosecution alone.
2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a
case like the present.
We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be
invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence
in his defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right.
Such constitutional right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive
his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough,

and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it
has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the
sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons
hereinabove stated, he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained
or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The
process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may stand should be resumed from
the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right
to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the proceedings were valid
and should be resumed from there.

People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973)

Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal
F:
After prosecution presented its witnesses, the defense moved for dismissal of
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion.
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the accused?
Ruling: YES
A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to
prove the guilt of the accused, the case must be dismissed, and it will be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court
upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way
as a judgment of acquittal.
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the prosecution has rested
its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with proper
leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Rules of Court.)
3. Right to free legal assistance
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.

People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)

F:
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters
dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma
and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to
withdraw the appeal due to his poverty.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the
accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the
right to a preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first a part of the
Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important
to the person accused of crime."
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an
accused by a trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such that the duty of the
court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to
appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his
intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in
this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason.
After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law." Justice should never be
limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to
favor one party over another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts
to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122
of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if
possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor
the guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for
the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their
respective briefs, upon submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused- appellant
was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant
Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of
the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the Municipality of

Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned Wilma Phua against her will.
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by
Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense charged.
xxx
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. The
accused claimed that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he
was in Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the accused's brother, Amado Rio.
However, this claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of
the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31
March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense.
The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was
stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that,
allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. This allegation as
well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only
have been due to the fact that there was consent. The charge was filed, according to
defense counsel de oficio, only because the complainant's mother caught them.
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the
complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an
incredulous situation indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to
the ways of the world, would permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship
with an uncle, a brother of her very own mother. The Court notes the sudden swift
in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident in question, by
way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the
complainant. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that
counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. Although the
Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted, the Court
deems it more likely that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of
the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. If the
appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, had read the records and transcripts
of the case thoroughly, he would not have changed the theory of the defense for such
a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense. Moreover, the rule in
civil procedure, which applies equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not shift
his theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious, he would
have known that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned procedural
rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of
their duties as advocates of their clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio,
for "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or defense of his client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the
whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs

that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar and to the public.
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he is expected to take
such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his
professional guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a
transgressor of its precepts.
The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he
was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
responsibility owed to his client. The ethics of the profession require that counsel
display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to
pay him his fees. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation
distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar.
4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply
with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process requires
that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he
must meet.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
F:
Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu.
After one postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset.
Again, petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman. The court then
allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the fact that petitioner had not
been arraigned. After the offended party had testified and presented documentary
evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the decision. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is
void. Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal proceeding.
5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
(1) Speedy Trial
The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and
oppressive delays. Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and
expense of a court litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time, compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose.

While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined on a case to case

basis, an unreasonable delay on the part of the prosecution to present its case,
thereby causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the
accused for an extended period of time, violates the right of the accused to a speedy
trial.
The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas corpus if he has been
restrained of his liberty, or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus for the final
dismissal of the case; and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial
amounts to an acquittal.
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case
involving the prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence
which had been pending for 6 years, the last step taken being the start of the crossexamination of the complaining witness, who did not appear thereafter. The SC
ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, thus acquitting the accused.
(2) Public Trial
A public trial does not require that the entire public can witness the trial. It
is enough if it is conducted at a place where one's relatives and friends can be
accommodated and the public may know what is going on.
The right is not absolute. The court can order the public out of the trial
room in the interest of morality and order.
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the SC dismissed the contention
of one party that the trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the
ground that the objection came too late (the party only complained after the 14th
hearing) and that the place was agreed upon by the parties for their mutual
convenience (the judge's room was air conditioned).

Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)

The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far
has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to
public trial.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge violative of the right to a
public trial?
Ruling: NO
The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be held in the
chambers. On fourteen separate occasions this was the case and there was no
objection on their part. There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that any
other person was excluded from the chambers. It is thus evident that what took
place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional
secrecy.
The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested
in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do

so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is
of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies
behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted
with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse
summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem
arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are
free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
decency or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers
that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of
this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public
was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though
is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black
in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter with what offense he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of respondent policemen. xxx
(3) Impartial trial
One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate who exercises cold
impartiality.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held that a town mayor who
was paid on the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the
drinking laws, could not be an impartial judge. Under such a situation, he would be
interested in convicting those he tries so he would earn more.
Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the
Bill of Rights and the strict rules of evidence and procedure.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), the SC held that a
civilian cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire
Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and operating, even during Martial
Law.
6. Right to confront witness
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of
the witness. The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination.

7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in

his behalf)
There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or
defense of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum:
depositions and other modes of discovery; perpetuation of testimonies.
8. Trial in Absentia
Although the right to be present is not explicit in the provision, it is
inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused"
This right to be present may, however, be waived by the accused. Rule 115,
sec, 1(c), talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express waiver
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification; (b) implied waiver
when the accused without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular
date of which he had notice; and (c) implied waiver when the accused under custody
who had been notified of the date of trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right to be present,
whether expressed or implied, the trial may be held "in absentia". The requisites of a
valid trial in absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he was duly
notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is unjustified.
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the accused has been
arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a
charge for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the trial
court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence even if the accused has not yet
been arraigned. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the accued of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Conviction without arraignment violates
due process and ousts the court of its jurisdiction.
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of his right to be heard
by himself and counsel. The indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it
should come after arraignment. VV.

Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present
evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment),
without any justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of
the evidence, and thereupon, the court may consider the case submitted for
decision. The court will decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
evidence. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because
it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), which further
ruled that trial in absentia applies even to capital cases.

People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)

Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
F:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but
before he could be arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on motion of the
prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but
while it was in progress, the prisoner took advantage of the first information filed
and succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
ordering his release. The respondent Judge, learning of the trickery, cancelled the
illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional
provision authorizing trial in absentia. The respondent Judge denied the motion and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. Hence, this petition.
HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avancea has been modified by Art. IV,
sec. 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in
absentia. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution
and possible eventual conviction provided only that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he
has been duly notified of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The
right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. The
defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing
with his trial. VV.

Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to remedy a

situation in which criminal prosecution could not move because the accused has
either escaped or jumped bail.
In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC ruled that trial in absentia
does not justify the accused to jump bail. Just because th Constitution allows trial
in absentia does not mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be
present during the trial. If he does, he runds the risk of having his bail bond
forfeited.
Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail
F:
For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to appear, respondent
Judge declared the bail bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to produce the
accused within thirty days and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against them. However, on motion of defense counsel, who invoked the last sentence
of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge
reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the accused
has been arraigned and identified, the conclusion is inescapable that issuing an
order of forfeiture of the bail bond is premature." The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari.

HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than
to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under
the conditions therein specified. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail.
VV.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront
witnesses
F:
Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five others, was charged with murder.
After arraignment, during which he pleaded not guilty, the case was set for hearing
on Sept. 18, 1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held in abeyance the
proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the
witnesses against him and present evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the
law and failed to appear during the trial? No. As we have consistently ruled,
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues
until the case is terminated. The lower court was correct in proceeding with the
reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to
appear. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on
trial in absentia.
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that (a) the accused has the
right to be present during trial; (b) if he is in the custody of the law, presence in all
stage is likewise a duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, and (iii)
promulgation of judgment. This rule however has been modified.
As things stand, the following are the rules:
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial
(from arraignment to rendition of judgment).
2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, his presence during the trial is
a duty only if the court orders his presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to
identify him. (People v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military Commiission,
infra. modifying People v. Avancena, infra.)
3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he
is in the custody of the law), his presence is required in the following cases:
a) Arraignment, regardless of the offense;
b) Entering a plea, regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not
guilty.

c) Promulgation of judgment, except that when the judgment is for a

light offense, he may be represented by his counsel or a personal emissary.

a. Arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt

Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-xxx
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record,
but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

b. During trial, for identification

People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at
that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify
the accused.
c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case accused
may appear by counsel, or a representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.)
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)]
1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination
The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily. It
refers therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties,
and not to a merely physical activity. If the act is physical or mechanical, the
accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act, and the result can be used in
evidence against him.
Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken
from his body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)).
F:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. He was found guilty of
the charge. He appeals the decision on the ground that the lower court erred in
admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance
from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the
chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of
the accused with reference to a venereal disease. It was discovered that the rape

victim was infected by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the
accused was material to his conviction.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the
defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took
a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it
over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of
the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering
from gonorrhea.
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used
against him
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer
any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined:
seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence
of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by
Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his
person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been
taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the
clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished
evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection
to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of
even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken
from the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person
and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not
considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for
when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far,
the evidence if material, is competent.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question
before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
control] in whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to
shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the
authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by
forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential
articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion
that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec.
2263.)

The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit

compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose
of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking
at the fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an
application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted.
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not
violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.

The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v.
Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused
was compelled to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the
result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. To force a
prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring
him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his
guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person
accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in
order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)

The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be
photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)).

A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for

physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
(1920)). Viewed against present standards, however, it is possible that this method
of determining pregnancy would violate due process as being too barbaric.
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
F:
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria
Villaflor, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to
determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional
provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of

court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the
medical examination required by the court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill
of Rights
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that
torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with
its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to
the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the
scene of the crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v. Sara).
However, making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her
handwriting is not allowed, for this involves the use of the mental process.
[Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937).]
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
F:
In connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, six letters
which, for purposes of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37.
He contends that said six letters are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while
she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal.
Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own
handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, refused invoking
her right not to incriminate herself. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did
not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the respondent's
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in
her own handwriting
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self- incrimination.
The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the
complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth
before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said
oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were
she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later
that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to
evade prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is
positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly

inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to

furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose,
then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence
in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute
immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to
furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion
that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a
real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as it is hereby held, that
the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's
petition is denied.
Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not allowed, for this also
involves the mental process.

People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525

F:
Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder
for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted.
The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions
executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle
appellants' case, and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances
surrounding the killing.
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. They were made in the
presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He
cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent
his presence at the confession proceedings.
But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when
they were forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and
coerced confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. This
constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in
nature acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to
avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
F:
After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by the police. Upon the
presentation of a search warrant, the house of the accused was searched, and
several prohibited drugs were seized. They were charged with and convicted of
violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended that they had not been
shown a search warrant. In concluding that a search warrant had been presented
to the accused prior to the search, the trial court relied on a document entitiled
Certificate of Re-conduct of Search, signed by the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in evidence.

RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission
that shabu, the marked money, and shabu papaphernalia had been found by the
police authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore, subject to the
control and custody of the accused (the spouses) and necessarily in their
possession. To this extent, the Certification is a declaration against the interest
and tacit admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph of the Certification
is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time when the spouses were not assisted
by counsel and under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the
search of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render intelligent
waiver of their right against self-incrimination open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent admission of the
Certification to substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by a judge had
been brought to the attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust
operation carried out at their residence and that in the course thereof, no force or
intimidation had been exercised upon the spouses.
Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of the crime charged
against them.
2. In what proceedings available
The privilege is available in any proceedings, even outside the court, for they
may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held
that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings
which possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held that a doctor
who was being investigated by a medical board for alleged malpractice and would
lose his license if found guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand
without his consent.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)
F:
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondentappellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case
for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present
as his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the respondent in such
malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record
his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a
plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12,
1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in
the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the
claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board
"from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in
said investigation without his consent and against himself."

HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner,
for some an even greater deprivation.
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional
guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light
of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be
legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold
that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding
investigation by an adhoc body.

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)

A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with
the privilege against self- incrimination
F:
The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major General Prospero
Olivas testified before the Agrava Board looking into the killing of former Senator
Benigno Aquino. They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for the
killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando Galman. They were charged as accessories in
both. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the
Agrava Board, but on the latter's objections, the Sandiganbayan excluded the
testimony. The private and public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari.
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava Board were "under
investigation for the commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. III, sec.
12. It is to be noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the Miranda
reference to "custodial investigation." The subject matter dealt with and the
questioning before the Agrava Board indubitably evinced purposes other than
merely determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination.
The respondents were called to determine their probable involvement in the crime.
Yet they were not informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain silent
and that any statement given by them may be used against them. The first portion
of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent, and gave power to the
Board to punish refusal to testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that when they
testified they waived their constitutional right not be compelled to be a witness

against themselves, much less their right to remain silent. The SC also said it
cannot be contended that the privilege against self- incrimination applies only to
criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself."

IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
xxx
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
Free Market Place of Ideas
1. For the discovery of political truth
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-- that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.
(1919)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a
democratic society, and so the only way to rule ultimately is by, means of public
opinion, which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and
compete in the free market place of ideas.
2. For self government
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), supra

HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such
closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom
of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patenly

anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press
is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality, giving the government a
heavy burden to show justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New York v.
United States (1971); also in New York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v.
Publication of Pentagon Papers).

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)

Subsequent Punishment
And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of
promoting free public opinion. The most significant expression is the law on libel.
We consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to debate on public issues being uninhibited, robust and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. The falsity of some of the factual
statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role. And just as factual error
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free, the same is
true of injury to official reputation. (New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of
public affairs. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper
comment. Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731 (1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any defamatory statement is presumed
to be malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense proves that the communication is
privileged, such a presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater public
interest involved.
If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of
speech), the prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact.
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the
2 instances: fair and true reporting of an official proceeding; legal moral or social
duty), the burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, which the
defense can overcome by proving the truth of the defamatory statement (which in

the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to
the conduct of his office) and good motive.
C. Content-Based Restrictions
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation, the Philippine
Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined
generally, in the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve
such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether
any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to
bring the substantive evils, is not open to consideration. In such cases, the general
provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its
natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the legislature has decided
that one who advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot
intrude. As it evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute, in
contrast to the clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not
prohibited by statute.
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. [Schenck
v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).]
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is
uttered. The speech itself may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded
movie house.
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by
its improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger. [Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned
Hand.]
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. They both
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but this latter test consider the
weighing of values.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation, except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action.

[Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA
438 (1985).]
The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter?
(b) What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present
danger test for being top dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may, when
tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and
difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.
[American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty
crimes compete. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v.
Comelec)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a question of balancing the
freedom of expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger
test is over- simplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other
factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of
the occasion for speech or political activity, (2) the availability of more moderate
controls than those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with
which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).

2. Applications of tests in various contexts

a. Freedom of expression and national security
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984)
F:
Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On different dates in July 1980,
they were summoned by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work,
feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private lives. In addition, one of
them was charged with libel by a General who sought to recover P10 million in
damages. They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning
them and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by
the NIB.
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle
to note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some
questions is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of
ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp.

b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of "Actual

Malice"
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361-362
Freedom of expression and libel
Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel is the most common
form of subsequent punishment. Although one cannot be prevented from saying
something before he actually says it, one can be held liable for what one has said if it
causes damage to the rights of others.

Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)

F:
The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the
petitioners, who were the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on
the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Nervous
Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall, during the August 29 coup
attempt, the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the
first Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and
instead, moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this
petition for certiorari.
HELD: xxx
(3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held
liable for libel bec. of the privileged character of the publication, the Court reiterates
that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to
appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim
that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV.
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in
bad faith
F:
Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center
denouncing abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients.
Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace
and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were exonerated
so petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. Later, the
Bulletin Today published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. This
became the basis of an action for libel brought against petitioner and his clients.
Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied.
HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law, the charge is
defective. The letter constitutes privileged communication. It was sent by petitioner
in his capacity as lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He could

also invke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public
service. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them
and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of good faith, the letter
was sent privately, directly to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for
the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen
without known ties to newspaper, could have by himself caused the publication. It
does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. At any
rate, the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or remarks. VV.

Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)

F:
Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the publication in the Feb.
23, 1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar
planters of Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed them as exploiters of
sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
article was not libelous since it did not single any particular individual. The trial
court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the IAC which
was dismissed. Thus, this appeal to the SC.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it
is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual
in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to
him, so that he can bring the action separately if need be. The disputed portion
which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. The news report merely stated
that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into
the area by Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it does to an official act is
within the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and press. VV.
Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not
specify any individual, it cannot be libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific
or at least sweeping as to apply to all members of a group, in order to be deemed
libelous.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently published and mistaken
for another man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the authorities about the
Babuyan Islands, claiming of murders there, so they could go and he could be
rescued. An erratum was published by the This Week magazine. The SC, quoting
Quisumbing v. Lopez, however, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, since
the error in in this case could have been checked consideringing that this was a
weekly magazine and not a daily.
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955)
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the

preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race to their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be
held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words.
.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)
F:
Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to
the Secretary of Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of
the Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
his communication was privileged, but his motion was denied. He filed another
motion which was also denied. Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition in the SC.
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar
decision of the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive
the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free
speech and free press. However, Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos was careful to
point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by proof of
malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct, vis--vis
private respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of
conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be
entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance
to prove malice.
c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
F:
Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by
Rodriguez. xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie
on the ground that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life,
including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a certain
"Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister
and mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and develope the life story of
Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the pictures," in consideration of P20,000.
Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay the balance agreed upon, he was
sued. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by
the CA. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into
the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the
movie and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M.
Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a public figure does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a
person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how a public figure he or she may
be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the

true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little

romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, w/o limitations. In the particular
circumstances presented and considering the obligations assumed by petitioner
under the agreement, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particular bec. the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression
touches upon matters of private concern. [In the agreement signed by him,
petitioner admitted that in the picture produced, he had "exploited the life story of
Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, and (had) encroached
upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact included, in
the PICTURE's case, persons portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988

F:
Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to
enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a
documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right
to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not
that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference whatsoever to
Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion
pictures and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon
the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred
character of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates
measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that
the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present
danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce
Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific
context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts.
There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who
had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused
the offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and
his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the
ground that it amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the
courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of
history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as
only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was
also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of
Moises Padilla.
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of court)

In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who sent a letter to the
Presidential Action Committee complaining about the delay in the disposition of the
agrarian case, was lifted by the SC. It held that although such a letter should have
been sent to the SC and not the PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech
which did not significantly destroy, the orderly administration of justice.
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
A person can be held liable for making comments on a pending case (sub
judice) which have the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly administration of
justistice. But if the case is not pending, such comment is a valid exercise of the
freedom of expression.
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case
Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected speech.
F:
Respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration where he
burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or
threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the
flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation
of a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of, among other things, a
state or national flag, and (2) defined desecration as the physical mistreatment of
such objects in a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover the act. A state court of appeals affirmed. The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that the desecration statute as
applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because the statute (1) was too broad for First
Amendment purposes as it related to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not
adequately supported by the state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of
unity.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is unconstitutional
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First Amendment under the
particular circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication to implicate the First Amendment, given that this
flag burning was the culmination of a political demonstration and that the state
conceded that the protester's conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest in
preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the record in this case, since
(a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of
the flag burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes serious
offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace, and (c)

the flag burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace;
and (3) the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction
on expression is content-based, and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny,
given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical
integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against impairments that would
cause serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being
offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b) although the state
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag, it may not
foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by
criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest.
f. Movies Censorship
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in the movies is
tolerated because by the nature of the medium, it has a greater impact on the
audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers
which are read by people separated by walls.

Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)

F:
Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain
deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an
action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of
ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to
the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed
an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the
movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. However there is not
enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there
were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing
naked and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians. VV.

Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the
censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that
movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case
whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other
public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.

But a different standard must be followed in television because of the

pervasive and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs
without having to pay anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily
obscenity, the test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the
dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this
score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked
the votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
Tests of obscenity:
(1) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest.
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.)
g. Radio Broadcast
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the SC held that radio
broadcast also enjoys the protection of the freedom of expression. If closed down,
the owners enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang
Tibay v. CIR.
But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers because it could
invade the privacy of everyone for no fee, and it is such that one is likely to listen to
what is being said.

Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 (1985)

F:
The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly
having been used to incite the people to sedition. The petitioner contended that it
was denied due process because no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to
establish a factual basis for the closure. However, before the Court could promulgate
its decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it
had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National
Telecommunications Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the
requisite license.
HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the
inferior courts and administrative bodies, the following guidelines must be observed:
1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in
Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed; 2) All
forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print

media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4)
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
h. Freedom of Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look
into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the
municipality) is guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
custodian of the records.

Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)

D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [US v. O'brien, 391
US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)]
1. Regulation of political campaign
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
F:
Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented
from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA
6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the
operation f media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of
such power are to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media

facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among

candidates."
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that
the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial
difference.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
F:
Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution
No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places,
public or private, and limits their location or publication to authorized posting
areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of
free speech. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places
does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. Under the clear
and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedoom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,
to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but
once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle, the expression
becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's
private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of
this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is
violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
proocess of law.
2. Freedom of Assembly
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least,
five working days before the day of the rally.
But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held
in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner),
and (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities)
The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the
organizers and leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the

use of the street, (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a
statement of the duties of the rallyists.
The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor.
Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. If he does not act,
it is deemed granted.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public
peace, order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he should not deny the
application right away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be
heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he can
deny the application.
The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for
the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on
the petition. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the
applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment becomes final and executory
immediately, and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore.
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant, then he has 48 hours
from receipt to appeal to the SC.
During the rally, the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order
and so must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. They must be in full
uniform, with their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except a
nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the attention of the leader of
the rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd
right away but first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a second
warning. If still violence continues, only then can they fight back.
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can disperse the crowd, but they
cannot use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers.
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty
under the law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities
in maintaining peace and order.

Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best

expressed thus: "Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of time have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought betwee citizens, and
discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts. Hague v. CIO)
Although under a "permit system", before one can use a public place, one
must first obtain prior permit from the proper authorities, the principle has always
been that one has the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable regulation. The

validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is
concered only with the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on
the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use
the public place and discriminate others.
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of
Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be
construed to be limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades socially to
secure public order, convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party
a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by
the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies
could only exacerbate the matter, was overturned by the court.

Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71

F:
This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of
Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza
Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The
Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to the
recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of
the peace and disruption of public order.
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted
by the Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative
Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places, can be construed only
to mean the power to regulate, which means and includes the power to control,
govern, and to restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or
"prohibit."
The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v.
State of New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a
parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities
is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of
speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a
view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license..."

But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730
(1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a
finding that everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and business was
gravely affected because of violent incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to
allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable.

Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)

F:
The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines
(MDP), an association of students, workers and peasants, applied for a permit from
the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent Mayor denied the
application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of
the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended
in the destruction of public and private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
score of other persons and the closing down of schools, offices and many stores.
The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for
its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so
that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same
constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended
that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a
permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the
corresponding right to use public places for that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation
of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.
HELD: NO.
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit
sought by petitioner. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the
peaceful assembly during certain days and time, and at a place when they would not
disrupt the normal activities of the community.
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure
convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of
respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally.
Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown
that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies,
which, petitioner has manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.

In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority upheld the mayor's denial
of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within
the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman
Catholic Church, whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose
church is very near the klosk.

Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)

F:
The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to
use the kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the
ground that the permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance of the religious

ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within
hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident
with members of the rival denomination.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), the SC found no basis
for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to
the street fronting the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that the use of
streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the
rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the
NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police.
The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting
any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with
the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and
personnel of the embassy.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any
group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have
time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the applicant can
question the denial in the lower court, which can try questions of fact and law, and
(iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure.
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
F:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983
starting 2 p.m. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed this petition
because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally.
HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits,
prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." There can
be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither can there be
objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring
persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not
unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration
of the time, place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse a permit.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC upheld the power of
the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as
a form of "area restriction", in order to protect the President and his family, based on
the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. The
rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from the mayor is
required. However, the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.

German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)

F:
On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen, students and
employees, met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing
mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds. They wore
yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists, marched on the street and shouted antigovernment invectives. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the
Presidential Security Command. They brought an action for mandamus.
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their fists clenched and
chants of anti-government investives support the government's claim that the
petitioners purpose was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an antigovernment demonstration close to the residence of the President. The restricted use
of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to secure the safety of heads of states
cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt throughout
the world. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but only in
the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13
SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally
in a private university. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place
other than the one allowed by the administration, their suspension was condoned.
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
F:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to
protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the
students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a
different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement
language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was
disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they
were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were
suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the
TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to pass
squarely on the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights of
peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of
suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the
vigorous presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, the
propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be
taken into consideration.

Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)

F:
Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally
on Sept. 28, 1982.

HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration,

with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at
times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. They would be
ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of
the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full
credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx"
The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate
penalty.
Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of
publication, it is allowed in the case of assembly. In publication, censorship is
presumptively unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or justification for the
regulation of news. The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent
punishment.
But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very
nature of the expression, when people use streets, they may deprive other groups
which want to use the streets too. So as long as only the incidents of speech are
regulated, the measure is constitutionally acceptable.

Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)

F:
While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor unions involved
intensified the pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of
the Court and set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and egress from
the Court's premises. When required to show cause why they should not be held in
contempt of court, their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident
would not be repeated.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force
of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances must be
ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. through appropriate petitions or pleadings in
keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice.
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried fairly in court
by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts
of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a
violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because
while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right, the right to association in
general is a civil- political right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in
collective bargaining and strike.

SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)

F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel
inj. against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the officers and members of the latter
staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventing
non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting
business w/ SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the
strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on
strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's demands.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
w/c motion was denied. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was
converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the
case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees,
they are not allowed to strike.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure
the Govt. to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to SelfOrganization which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and
conditions of employment in the Govt, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose
of securing changes thereof.
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor
and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for
distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the
right to strike?
Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law,
govt. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. Relations bet.
private employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is
the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's
E. Academic Freedom
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975)
F:
The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to readmit petitioner,
Garcia, in its M.A. program because they felt that "her frequent questions and

difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work
with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given therefor were invalid for
nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's
regulations and grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by mandamus to readmit
petitioner.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher
learning of the right to academic freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the
students.
The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as
the freedom of the individual members within it. In considering the problems of
academic freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the university, as a
corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher.
The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university
teacher to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic
work and in his capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual teacher is
as important as the status of the institution to which he belongs and through which
he disseminates learning.
On other hand, the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university
are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions:
(a) admission and examination of students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c)
appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of income
among the different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a university to
proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university
prevail - to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not available for the petitioner. There is
no duty on the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has
the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space,
facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations.
There are standards to meet and policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a
privilege rather than a right.
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
F:
In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to
serve, among others, "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective
teachers - provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." However, the Dept of
Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR decided to phase
out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS
Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher
learning such as the UP?

RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom. Private respondent

invokes the right to quality education and to free secondary education.
The rights invoked by private respondent may be asserted only as against
the Government through the DECS. UP was created under its charter to provide
advanced tertiary education. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to
provide for secondary education.
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys
academic freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities.
Failing on such conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic grounds. Charo.

UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993

F:
Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the Tasaday representative
filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome
Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and
made a proposition in various conferences attended by them that Elizalde merely
fabricated the discovery of the Tasadays.
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the respondents as faculty
members for acts and utterances made in the exercise of academic freedom. The
lower court denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Hence this petition.
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring the
Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower court is cautioned that the
same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may
not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to
vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on
matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for
damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within
the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and
function is the determination of legal issues.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
A. Non-Establishment Clause
The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement
or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny
County v. Greater Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).]

The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. In assessing the
validity of the law, the questions to be asked are:
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it secular?
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the
State and religious matters in religion?
The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest
support to any one religion, even if nothing is done against the individual.
It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions, for there may be atheists
who are not so favored.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
While the ownership, creation and management of educational institutions
must be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian
schools and those run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from
these requirements, provided the administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who
could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]

2. Religious instruction in public schools

Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents and it is at no cost to

the State (although this is not entirely possible, because the use of classrooms and
electricity are costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary and
secondary schools during class hours, by one approved by the authorities of the
religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be
integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
3. Anti-evolution laws
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC held that the teaching
of the Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools by
parents whose religions finds the theory offensive.
4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC disallowed the conducting of
an interdenominational prayer before the start of classes in public schools as,
violative of the Non- Establishment clause.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
F:
The respondent Board of Education upon the recommendation of the State
Board of Regents, directed the School's District principal to cause the recitation in
public schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its observance on the
part of the students was voluntary.

RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by using its public school
system to encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice
wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was composed by
govt officials as part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs. The
constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion
means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to compose
official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by
the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an
establishment of religion and abridging the free exercise thereof, although
overlapping in certain instances, forbids two diff kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the free
exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing
individuals. It rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to destroy
govt and to degrade religion, and upon an awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand in hand.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise
disallowed the reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public
schools as contrary to the Non- Establishment clause.
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania
Statute or a rule of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to
statutory authority requiring the reading without comment, at the opening of each
school day, of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by the
students in unison. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the
school exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities
of students who are required by law to attend school and held in school buildings
under the supervision and participation of teachers employed in those schools.
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated.
The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support
behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees
the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference to religious
training, teaching and observance, free from any compulsion from the State.
The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the
Establishment clause which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious
belief or the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the
enactment. If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. To
withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid. This
is particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character
of the exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of
the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a recent amendment
permitting non-attendance at the exercises, none of those factors being consistent

with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for non-religious
moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.