RISK INDEXING TOOL TO ASSIST IN PRIORITIZING IMPROVEMENTS

EMBANKMENT DAM INVENTORIES

TO

By Glen R. Andersen,1 Luc E. Chouinard,2 William H. Hover,3 and Chad W. Cox4

ABSTRACT: A risk indexing tool is proposed to assist in the prioritization of maintenance, repair, and evaluation
tasks on embankment dams that are generally less than 33 m (100 ft) high and for which there is little or no
instrumentation, limited or no information concerning as-built conditions, and little or no information on the
performance history. Under such circumstances, there may not be enough information available to perform
anything other than an indexing type of analysis to assist in prioritization. The risk indexing tool is based
upon identifying potential deficiencies in the physical condition of the dam and rating the overall importance
of these deficiencies to the safety of the structure. It is meant as an index of risk (indication) and not as a direct
measure of risk. Checklists are presented for onsite inspections to determine current physical condition. Condition
is defined in terms of a condition function that is based upon a condition indexing scale. Four potential failure
modes are considered: (1) overtopping; (2) external erosion; (3) piping; and (4) mass movement (slope instability). Absolute probabilities are specifically not factored into the analysis. Conditional probabilities are estimated for each failure mode using a Bayesian updating procedure based on dam attributes. A simple failure
criticality analysis is performed wherein specific changes in physical condition of the dam are considered to
contribute to the probability of failure for each mode. From this failure criticality analysis and the conditional
probabilities of failure, the relative importance of the various changes in physical condition is determined. The
physical condition and the relative importance are then combined for each observable deficiency to form a risk
index. These risk indices are used to prioritize expenditures for improvements on the premise that actions to
address the most significant physical deficiencies are preferred.

INTRODUCTION
Decision analysis for the management of an inventory of
aging embankment dams should include a consideration of the
overall risk or probability of a failure within the inventory.
Engineering risk can be defined as the probability of failure
multiplied by the cost of failure and hence is the expected cost
of failure. The price of a failure can include but is not limited
to: replacement cost; loss of service cost; loss of life; damage
to the environment; or other societal costs.
The price of a classical risk analysis and the time required
for its implementation may not be justified for dams on which
there has been no modern engineering analysis and for which
there is little or no information available concerning as-built
conditions and performance history and for which there is little
or no instrumentation. For such dams, current budgets available to state regulators may only enable a rapid walk-through
inspection once every several years. Information necessary to
perform a risk analysis may not be obtainable under current
budgeting constraints and in order to help prioritize maintenance, repair, and evaluation tasks on such dams, a simplified
procedure that can be conducted in real time during a walkthrough inspection at nominal additional cost may be justified.
The indexing system proposed herein is intended for this purpose.
In an effort to develop decision analysis tools that can be
more readily applied to large inventories of civil engineering
1
Sr. Engr., Burns Cooley Dennis Inc., Ridgeland, MS 39157; formerly,
Asst. Prof. of Civ. Engrg., Michigan State Univ., East Lansing, MI 48823.
2
Assoc. Prof. of Civ. Engrg., McGill Univ., Montreal, Quebec, Canada
H3A 2K6.
3
Prin. and Sr. Vice Pres., GZA GeoEnvironmental Technologies, Inc.,
Norwood, MA 02062.
4
Asst. Proj. Mgr., GZA GeoEnvironmental Technologies, Inc., Norwood, MA 02062.
Note. Discussion open until September 1, 2001. Separate discussions
should be submitted for the individual papers in this symposium. To
extend the closing date one month, a written request must be filed with
the ASCE Manager of Journals. The manuscript for this paper was submitted for review and possible publication on September 27, 1999; revised December 8, 2000. This paper is part of the Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 127, No. 4, April, 2001.
ASCE, ISSN 1090-0241/01/0004-03250334/$8.00 $.50 per page.
Paper No. 21939.

facilities in a cost effective manner, the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, under the Repair, Evaluation, Maintenance, and Rehabilitation (REMR) program, has focused on condition or
physical state as determined through on-site inspections rather
than focusing directly on risk. The approach to decision analysis based solely upon physical condition is known as condition indexing. A joint research project by Hydro-Quebec
and the Corps of Engineers developed a decision analysis approach that bridges the gap between decision-making based
solely on condition and decision-making based upon classical
risk analysis while incorporating the most desirable aspects of
each (Andersen et al. 1998). This new approach considers the
current physical state and the impact that such a state may
have upon a potential failure. The theoretical underpinnings
for this new approach, termed function-based condition assessment, were presented by Andersen and Torrey (1995).
This new approach is based upon conditional probabilities of
failure rather than absolute probabilities of failure thus avoiding one of the most controversial aspects of risk analysis applied to embankment dams (i.e., that it might not be possible
to reliably predict an actual probability of failure for an embankment dam).
The purpose of this paper is to present a simplified indexing-type tool that can be used to help prioritize maintenance
and repair tasks for large inventories of dams for safety officials, practicing engineers, and owners/operators of inventories
of dams for which no or limited modern engineering analysis
has been performed, for which there is little or no instrumentation, and for which there is little or no information available
on as-built conditions or performance history. This tool is a
simplified version of the one developed for the Corps of Engineers and Hydro-Quebec. The term indexing is used herein
as providing an indication of a potential problem in much the
same way that Atterberg Limits are routinely used in geotechnical engineering practice to provide an indication of potential
sensitivity problems, expansive soil problems, compressibility
problems, etc.
Risk-indexing is based upon identifying deficiencies in the
physical condition of the dam and rating their overall importance to the safety of the structure in terms of a postulated
failure. On-site inspections are employed to determine current
physical condition, where condition is defined in terms of a

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condition function that is based upon a standardized condition

indexing scale. The relative importance of these potential
physical conditions is determined by considering the conditional probability of failure modes and the conditional probability that each physical condition would be associated with a
particular failure mode. Four potential failure modes are considered: (1) overtopping; (2) external erosion; (3) piping; and
(4) mass movement (slope instability). These modes are evaluated in terms of the failure-initiating event (or proximate
cause) or the first event in a sequence of events that could lead
to an uncontrolled release of the reservoir. Conditional probabilities are estimated for each failure mode. A simplified failure criticality analysis is performed wherein specific changes
in physical condition of the dam are considered to contribute
to the probability of failure for each mode. From this failure
criticality analysis, the relative importance of the various
changes in physical condition is determined. Then, an on-site
inspection is performed in order to determine the physical state
or condition of the dam. The physical condition and the relative importance are then combined for each observable deficiency to form a risk index.

guidelines presented by FEMA (1998). The relative importance of various observable physical conditions that could lead
to a failure is then determined through a Bayesian updating
procedure and a simplified failure criticality analysis based
upon conditional probabilities of failure determined by expert
elicitation. An onsite inspection is then performed to determine
the current physical state. Inspection forms that describe various indicators of physical state are provided herein. The relative importance of the physical conditions is combined with
the importance of the dam in the inventory to obtain the overall importance with respect to the entire inventory. The results
of the importance determination are then combined with the
current physical condition (in a simple multiplication) to compute a risk index for each observed deficiency. For a particular
dam, these risk indices are summed to estimate an overall risk
index. Prioritization can be accomplished based on particular
physical deficiencies or upon the overall risk index.

SUMMARY OF RISK INDEXING TOOL

The importance of an embankment dam within an inventory

can be determined through a rough indication of the potential
risk that it poses. The guidelines presented herein for dam
importance have been adapted from those developed by the
Dam Safety Directorate of Hydro-Quebec (Dascal 1991) and
those presented by FEMA (1998). These guidelines and proposed vulnerability and hazard potential measures are presented for illustrative purposes only. Should any organization
wishing to use this risk indexing procedure find other measures
of dam importance rather than the vulnerability and hazard
potential proposed herein that are more relevant to their inventory, or should they wish to adopt a more direct measure
of risk for determining dam importance, they are encouraged
to do so. For example, Hydro-Quebec is currently developing
a direct risk-based measure for dam importance to be used in
conjunction with their condition measurement tool.
An indication of the potential risk that a dam break poses
can be expressed in terms of a vulnerability function (V ) and
a hazard potential function (H ). The vulnerability of the dam
and downstream environment can be defined as the capability
of or susceptibility to being damaged or harmed. In this sense,
a vulnerability measure would involve the susceptibility of the
dam and the susceptibility of the downstream environment to
damage. Conversely, the hazard potential can be defined as a
measure of the specific types of damage such as property loss
or loss of life that may result in the event of a dam breach.
From these two definitions it is possible to imagine a dam and
the associated downstream environment that might be very
susceptible to damage (if it had a high likelihood of failure
and there was a large storage capacity so that a large area
downstream would be susceptible) but with a low hazard potential (if there were very few inhabited structures in the potential flood zone).
According to the dam safety directorate in Hydro-Quebec,
a vulnerability measure for the dam and the downstream environment can depend upon intrinsic and time-invariant characteristics (I ) of the dam (I1 = height; I2 = dam type; I3 =
foundation type; and I4 = storage capacity) and upon external
time-variant factors (E ) associated with the dam (E1 = age;
and E2 = seismicity). Additionally, it can depend upon design
characteristics (Ds) associated with the dam (D1 = spillway
adequacy; and D2 = mass movement factor of safety). Note
that seepage and internal erosion are not included in this measure of design characteristics because for the types of dams
targeted by this methodology there is generally no design information to indicate that internal erosion defense measures or
seepage control measures have been incorporated into the

The tool presented herein is called a risk index because it

provides an indication of potential levels of risk that might be
associated with an embankment dam failure. This tool is not
a measure of risk but provides an indication of potential levels
of risk. These risks are quantified as deficiencies in the current
physical state or condition of the dam and are weighted by
their overall importance to the safety of the dam and by the
vulnerability and hazard potential of the dam. Herein, an embankment dam failure is defined as an uncontrolled release of
the reservoir.
Fig. 1 presents a flowchart for the proposed methodology.
The first step is to determine the overall importance of the
dam through a consideration of the vulnerability of the dam
and the downstream environment and its hazard potential in a
manner similar to that developed by Hydro-Quebec for their
dams, Dascal (1991), but modified according to the general

FIG. 1.

Summary of Risk Indexing Methodology

IMPORTANCE OF EMBANKMENT DAM

IN INVENTORY

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foundation or the embankment and these are generally hidden

from visual observation.
A discussion for the use of each of these surrogate factors
as a measure of vulnerability is as follows: (1) the dam height
is the determinant factor of the hydraulic load magnitude on
the dam and one of the main factors influencing the magnitude
of the area affected downstream in the event of a break (extent
of the break wave); (2) statistical studies have shown various
failure probabilities for different dam types; (3) the resistance
to internal piping of the foundation and the stability of the
foundation to resist a mass movement varies according to the
material of which it is made and hence is related to the probability of a dam breach; (4) the storage capacity is a second
factor that is related to the magnitude of the flooded area
downstream following a dam break; (5) there is a correlation
between the likelihood of failure of an embankment dam and
its age in the sense that a larger percentage of embankment
dams have failed during initial filling or early on in their lives
(deterioration of components with age is considered in the condition assessment portion of this proposed methodology and
as a result is not considered specifically in this vulnerability
measure); (6) seismicity has a strong effect on the likelihood
of a failure; (7) an inadequate spillway capacity will result in
an overtopping; and (8) inadequate factors of safety against
mass movement will result in a failure of the dam. Several of
these justifications can be found in Dascal (1991).
Each of the factors in the vulnerability function are treated
on a scale from 1 to 10 with the overall vulnerability being
expressed as the product of the mean value of the intrinsic
time-invariant characteristics, the mean value of the external
time-variant factors, and the mean value of the design characteristics according to the following equation:
(1)

where all terms have been previously defined. Note that the
maximum vulnerability score is 1,000 in accordance with (1).
Thus, a three-order-of-magnitude range is available for classifying dams within the same inventory according to vulnerability. This three-order-of-magnitude range might be similar
to that from a probability of failure analysis to dams in similar
inventories. Tables 18 present each of the vulnerability factors, the suggested criteria, and the suggested scores that are
used in the calculation. Note that the relationship between the
criteria and the scores proposed is approximately linear.
These criteria are in general conformance with similar criteria
Intrinsic Characteristics (I1 = Height of Dam)

Height of dam
[m (ft)]
(1)

Score
(2)

<2.7 (<9)
2.712.2 (940)
12.230.5 (40100)
>30.5 (>100)

1
3
6
10

TABLE 3.

Intrinsic Characteristics (I3 = Type of Foundation)

Type of foundation
(1)

Score
(2)

Rock
Moraine
Alluvium

1
5
10

TABLE 4.

Intrinsic Characteristics (I4 = Storage Capacity)

Storage capacity
[ha m (acre-ft)]
(1)

Score
(2)

<6.17 (<50)
6.17123 (50999)
1236,170 (1,00050,000)
>6,170 (>50,000)

1
3
6
10

Note: Ranges are in accordance with summarized ranges published by

FEMA (1998). Actual ranges could be modified to reflect particular inventory within state or jurisdiction.

TABLE 5.

(I1 I2 I3 I4) (E1 E2) (D1 D2)

V=

4
2
2

TABLE 1.

developed by several states as summarized by FEMA (1998).

For any particular state or jurisdiction, these criteria, the corresponding scores, and the relationship between them (linear
versus nonlinear) can be modified to be representative of the
applicable regulations or in accordance with the users personal preferences, experience, or judgment. Additionally, other
vulnerability factors can be employed that might be more representative of the particular dams in that jurisdiction.
The hazard potential of the dam is determined in accordance
with specific types of damage that could occur downstream as

External Factors (E1 = Age of Dam)

Age of dam
(years)
(1)

Score
(2)

09
1029
3059
6099
>100

10
8
5
2
1

TABLE 6.

External Factors (E2 = Seismicity)

Modified Mercalli intensity

(1)

Score
(2)

V or lower
VI
VII
VIII
IX

1
2
6
8
10

Note: Uniform Building Code seismic zones or other relevant seismic

criteria could be used in place of modified Mercalli Intensity scale.

TABLE 7.

Note: Ranges and scores can be modified for specific owner requirements.

Spillway Adequacy (D1)

Conditions
(1)

Score
(2)

(a) Known conditions

TABLE 2.
Type of
dam
(1)
Rockfill
Earthfill

Intrinsic Characteristics (I2 = Type of Dam)

Description
(2)

Score
(3)

Composed primarily of cobble or larger sized particles

Composed primarily of gravel, sand, and/or silt and
clay sized particles

4
10

Spillway capacity is less than half the required capacity

Spillway capacity is greater than half the required capacity
Spillway capacity is greater than required

10
5
1

(b) Suspected conditions

Spillway capacity is less than required
Spillway capacity is greater than required

5
2

Note: Only select known conditions if a hydrologic and hydraulic analysis has been performed.

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TABLE 8.

Mass Movement Factor of Safety (D2)

Conditions
(1)

Score
(2)

(a) Known conditions

Factor of safety against mass movement is less than required
Factor of safety against mass movement is greater than required

10
1

(b) Suspected conditions

Factor of safety against mass movement is less than required
Factor of safety against mass movement is greater than required

7
2

Note: Select known conditions only if slope stability analyses have

been conducted. Select factor of safety suspected to be less than required
only if there is visible evidence of potential slope instabilities.

a result of a dam breach following the recommendations by

FEMA (1998) and is quantified in terms of a number (H ) on
a scale from 1 to 10. Three hazard potential ranges, high, medium, and low, are proposed. High hazard dams (score of 10)
are classified uniquely in terms of the potential for loss of life
(i.e., if there is the potential for loss of life then it is a high
hazard dam). Medium hazard dams (score of 5) are those for
which there is no potential for loss of life but for which there
are significant possible economic losses, environmental damage, and/or disruption of life-line facilities. These dams are
often located in rural or agricultural areas with population and
significant infrastructure. Low hazard dams (score of 1) are
those for which there is no potential loss of life and for which
there are minor economic and/or environmental losses. Often
these losses would be limited to the owners property. These
hazard potential ranges are suggested. For any particular state
or jurisdiction, they may be modified to reflect applicable regulations or varying conditions.
The importance of a dam (IDam) in an inventory is determined as its overall dam vulnerability score multiplied by its
hazard potential score in accordance with the following equation:
IDam = V H

(2)

where all terms have been previously defined.

The maximum importance of a dam is 10,000 in accordance
with (2). Thus, the hazard potential consideration permits an
additional order-of-magnitude variation in the importance of
dams within an inventory. A dam possessing the highest scores
in each category and having a high hazard potential will have
an importance score of 10,000, while a dam with the lowest
scores in each category will have an importance of 1 thus
providing a four-order-of-magnitude range.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
There are various physical conditions (physical states) that
can lead to failure of an embankment dam. These include: (1)
loss of the spillway capacity; (2) erosion of the spillway: (3)
loss of function of the low-level outlet works; (4) loss of crest
elevation; (5) loss of the embankment surface protection material; (6) piping in the embankment or along the low-level
outlet; (7) piping in the foundation; (8) a slide in the embankment; and (9) a slide in the foundation and embankment. For
a particular dam, the relative importance of these physical conditions will vary. This relative importance is defined as the
relative likelihood that each would be associated with a failure
event. For the purposes of this analysis, the association between changes in physical state and failure is defined in terms
of the Failure Initiating Event. In other words, the relative
importance of physical conditions is assessed in terms of their
likelihood of being the initiating event in a sequence of events
that could lead to a failure. The analysis depicted in Fig. 2
presents a simplified failure criticality analysis that is used to

FIG. 2. Simplified Failure Criticality Analysis for Determination of Relative

estimate the relative importance of each physical condition in

terms of conditional probabilities of the four potential failure
modes (overtopping, external erosion, piping, and mass movement).
The relative importance is defined as the probability that
each physical condition (or physical state) would be the initiating event in a sequence of events that could lead to a failure
of the dam. These conditional probabilities are determined in
a two-step process. First, the evaluator must consider all of
the construction, performance, and behavioral information that
is available for the dam (generally after an on-site inspection)
and then determine the relative (conditional) probabilities of
the four potential failure modes, P[Mi F ], interpreted as the
probability of mode i given a failure. Remember that the failure modes are considered to be the failure-initiating events. In
assigning these conditional probabilities, the evaluator can use
the following question:
Considering a failure of the dam, what is the relative likelihood that each of the four failure modes will be the initiating event?

and assign these probabilities directly using subjective judgment. In this case, it is suggested that a precision no greater
than 10% be used and that any failure mode with a conditional
probability of less than 10% be given zero conditional probability. If actual probabilities of failure have been determined
for each of the failure modes in a risk or reliability analysis,
these can be used in place of the direct elicitation. Note that
the consequence of assigning a zero conditional probability to
a failure mode at this stage is to cause all physical deficiencies
associated with it to have a zero risk index in the final analysis.
General guidance can be provided for the selection of these
conditional probabilities from the reported dam incidents summarized by the United States Committee on Large Dams Subcommittee of Dam Incidents and Accidents (USCOLD 1988).
For those incidents involving a failure of the dam (failure type
1 or failure type 2 as outlined in the report), 81 were associated

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with embankment dams. A type 1 failure is defined as A

major failure of an operating dam, which has involved complete abandonment of the dam. A type 2 failure is defined as
A failure of an operating dam, which at the time may have
been severe, but was of a nature, and extent which permitted
the damage to be successfully repaired and the dam again
placed in operation. Of the reported failures, 49% were attributed to overtopping, 32% were attributed to piping, 10%
were attributed to erosion, and 9% were attributed to mass
movement. In the absence of additional information, the engineer may consider using these percentages as a starting
point. Clearly, the actual conditional probabilities for a particular dam are a function of site specific and dam specific factors
and can vary dramatically from the national averages reported
by USCOLD (Table 9). Note that the probabilities in Table 9
assume that the dam has failed but do not say anything about
the likelihood of failure, just the mode of failure.
An objective procedure has been developed to assist in estimating the conditional probabilities of failure for the four
major failure modes should the evaluator not wish to rely
wholly upon subjective opinion. The probabilities of failure
obtained from the 1998 USCOLD data base can be used as
prior probabilities and represent the best estimates of the relative probabilities of failure in the absence of information relative to a given dam, P[Mi F ]. These prior conditional probabilities can be updated using Bayes Theorem (Benjamin and
Cornell, 1970) with information available on dam attributes in
accordance with the following equation:
TABLE 9. Prior Conditional Probabilities for Failure Modes
(USCOLD)
Failure mode
(1)

Prior conditional probability

(2)

Overtopping
Piping
Mass movement
Surface erosion

0.49
0.32
0.09
0.10

FIG. 3.

P [Mi Xi F] =

P[Xi Mi F] P[Mi F ]

(3)

P[Xi Mi F] P[Mi F ]

i=1

where Xi = an observation of the presence of an attribute relative to failure mode i, and P[Mi Xi F ] is the updated
conditional probability of failure mode i in the presence of
attribute Xi and failure. In the above equation, the denominator
is a summation over the four possible failure modes. The equation is applied recursively for all the attributes Xi that are present at the dam using the latest posterior probabilities as the
new prior probabilities. Eq. (3) assumes that each attribute has
a first-order effect and that there is no synergy between attributes (in order to simplify the analysis). The conditional probabilities relating the attributes to the failure modes, P[Xi Mi
F ] in (3), must be determined and placed in Fig. 3. The writers
propose the use of expert elicitation for this purpose relying
upon engineering judgment and where appropriate upon an
analysis of existing data bases on dam performance. Note that
the probabilities of the complementary events can be obtained
by subtraction.
A conditional probability of 0.5 indicates that an attribute
has no effect on the updated conditional probability of the
failure mode while a conditional probability larger/smaller
than 0.5 indicate that the presence of the attribute increases/
decreases the likelihood of the failure mode, respectively. In
other words, if the likelihood of an attribute being present
given a failure mode and failure is 0.5, then its converse (likelihood that the attribute is absent) is (10.5) or 0.5 and the
attribute is a neutral indicator for that particular failure mode
given failure. These updating conditional probabilities are defined for four cases: (1) when the attributes are known to be
present (A in Fig. 3); (2) when they are suspected to be present
(B in Fig. 3); (3) when they are suspected to be absent (C in
Fig. 3); and (4) when they are known to be absent (D in Fig.
3). In other words, for each attribute that is applicable to a
particular dam, the evaluator answers whether or not the at-

Conditional Probabilities of Attributes Given at Failure Mode and Failure

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TABLE 10.

Hypothetical Calculation for Relative Importance of Physical Conditions (from Direct Elicitation)

Conditional probabilities
for failure modes
(1)
Overtopping (60%)
Overtopping (60%)
Overtopping (60%)
External Erosion (0%)
Piping (30%)
Piping (30%)
Mass movement (10%)
Mass movement (10%)
a

Relative importance
of observable physical
conditions to dam
(3)

Conditional probabilities for

physical conditions
(2)

30% 60% =
10% 60% =
60% 60% =
a
70% 30% =
30% 30% =
50% 10% =
50% 10% =

Loss of or inadequacy in spillway capacity 30%

Loss of crest elevation 10%
Loss of function of outlet works 60%
a
Piping in embankment 70%
Piping in foundation 30%
Slide in embankment 50%
Slide in foundation and embankment 50%

18%
6%
36%
21%
9%
5%
5%

Relative importance
of observable physical
conditions to inventory
IDam = 1,000
(4)
0.18 1,000 =
0.06 1,000 =
0.36 1,000 =
a
0.21 1,000 =
0.09 1,000 =
0.05 1,000 =
0.05 1,000 =

180
60
360
210
90
50
50

No further calculations are necessary because the initial conditional probability was assessed to be less than 10%.

tribute is present and whether or not she/he suspects or knows

that it is.
Next, the evaluator considers each failure mode and assigns
conditional probabilities to each of the physical conditions that
are associated with it P[Cj Mi], interpreted as the probability
of physical condition j being associated with failure mode i.
In assigning these probabilities, the evaluator can use the following question:
Considering the particular failure mode, what is the relative
likelihood that each of the associated physical conditions
would have precipitated it?

Again, the evaluator should not use a conditional probability

less than 10% and any physical condition that is assessed to
have a conditional probability of less than 10% should be
given a zero. If the actual probabilities of failure have been
determined for each of these physical conditions, as may be
the case in a risk or reliability analysis, these can be used to
determine the conditional probabilities in place of expert elicitation.
After assigning the second level of conditional probabilities,
the relative importance of each physical condition (RIj) is computed by simply forming the product of the conditional probabilities from the two analysis levels depicted in Fig. 2, with
the importance of the dam in accordance with the following
equation:
RIj = P[Cj Mi] P[Mi F ] IDam

(4)

where all terms have been previously defined. Under this definition, the relative importance of the jth physical condition
on a dam is the conditional probability that it would lead to a
failure of the dam multiplied by the importance of the dam in
the inventory. Table 10 presents a hypothetical relative importance determination for the physical conditions on a fictitious
embankment dam. In this example the importance of the embankment dam in the inventory is assumed to be 1,000. According to the hypothetical calculation presented in Table 10,
the most significant changes in physical conditions at this particular dam would be the loss of function in the outflow works,
piping in the embankment, and the loss of the spillway capacity.
Note that this analysis for relative importance of physical
conditions is generally conducted after an onsite inspection or
after an analysis of existing dam safety inspection reports,
when the engineer would have more information about the
current physical condition of the dam and the most likely
modes of failure. In other words, the current physical state can
and should have an impact on the perceived importance of the
physical conditions.

ON-SITE INSPECTION AND CHECKLISTS

An on-site visual inspection is performed to determine the
current physical state of the dam in terms of the nine physical
conditions listed in Fig. 2. Each of the nine physical conditions
is quantified in terms of a condition function (CFj). The condition function (CFj) is a number ranging from 0 (failed) to
10 (ideal). The task of the inspector is to observe indicators
of each of the nine physical conditions and to quantify them
in terms of the appropriate condition function (CFj). The proposed condition function scale is a modification of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers REMR condition index scale. Table
11 presents this modified scale consisting of general condition
definitions and the corresponding numerical scores. The condition categories range form excellent with a numerical
score of 10 to failed with a numerical score of 0. Each
condition category is provided with a brief description. The
task of the inspector is to match her/his observations of the
nine physical conditions to the brief descriptions and then to
assign an appropriate condition score.
The inspector may not be able to directly determine the
physical condition for some of the inspection items but must
infer it through various indicators or clues. For example, piping in the embankment can be inferred from sinkholes or
depressions on the dam, seepage containing soil fines or evidence of the buildup of pore pressures. Nine inspection checklists are presented in Tables 1220 containing the suggested
indicators to assist the inspector in quantifying each of the
physical conditions. Each of the indicators is given with suggested ranges in condition. For a physical condition that has
multiple indicators, the one resulting in the lowest condition
function is used in the subsequent risk index computation.
Note that in the absence of any indicator, the inspector should
assign a condition function of 10.
TABLE 11.

Objective Based Condition Function Scale

Condition
function
(C)
(1)
10
98
76
54
32
1
0

General condition description

(2)
Excellent: Fully functional. Some aging or wear may be visible.
Good: Only slight loss of function or slight deterioration.
Fair: Some loss of function or some deterioration, but performancce is not significantly affected.
Marginal: Moderate loss of function or moderate deterioration but performance is still adequate.
Poor: Serious loss of function or serious deterioration and
performance is inadequate.
Very Poor: Extensive loss of function or extensive deterioration. Barely barely able to perform.
Failed: No longer functions. Cannot perform role.

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TABLE 12.
pacity

Condition Inspection Checklist for Spillway CaSuggested

condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Part of the spillway cross section if obstructed
010% obstructed
1025% obstructed
>25% obstructed

710
47
04

Note: In the absence of any obstruction assign a condition of 10.

TABLE 13.

Condition Inspection Checklist for Crest Elevation

Suggested
condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Deviations from original crest elevation in terms of
loss of designed or estimated freeboard
010% loss
1025% loss
>25% loss
Trees on or near crest

Suggested
condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Obstructions in cross section of outlet pipes
010% obstructed
1025% obstructed
>25% obstructed
Suspected but unverified obstruction
Valves and gates for outlet works
Functioning properly or recently repaired
Not operated recently
Owner not willing to exercise valves and gates
Valves and gates cannot be opened

710
47
04
710
610
05
01
0

Note: In absence of any indicator assign a condition of 10. If there is

no low-level outlet then do not consider.
Condition Inspection Checklist for Spillway EroSuggested
condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Observed erosion/deterioration of spillway channel
None to minor
Some to moderate
Serious to extensive
Critical with sill lost

Loss of upstream slope protection

None to isolated and moderate loss or degradation
Serious to extensive loss or degradation
Critical loss or degradation (esposure of bedding
material)
Loss of embankment surface material
Slight [00.3 m (01 ft)]
Moderate [0.30.6 m (12 ft)]
Extreme >0.6 m (>2 ft)

710
47
14
0

Note: In absence of any erosion or deterioration assign a condition of

10.

COMBINATION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE WITH

ACTUAL CONDITION
The final step in the methodology is to combine the results
of the on-site inspection with the results of the relative importance determination to generate a set of risk indices, or
weighted deficiencies in the current physical condition. For
each condition that has been observed on the dam and that has
been assigned a nonzero relative importance, the risk index for

410
14
0
710
57
05

Note: In event of no loss of surface protection material assign a condition of 10.

710
47
04
05

TABLE 14. Condition Inspection Checklist for Loss of Function of Low-Level Outlet Works

Suggested
condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)

TABLE 17.
bankment

Note: In the absence of either indicator assign a condition of 10.

TABLE 15.
sion

TABLE 16. Condition Inspection Checklist for Loss of Embankment Surface Protection Material

Condition Inspection Checklist for Piping in EmSuggested

condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Turbid flows
Evidence of prior occurrence that has gone uncorrected
Actively occurring
Sinkholes or depressions on the surface of dam
Build-up of pore water pressure in embankment as inferred by uncontrolled seepage areas
Changes in surface vegetation
Soft/wet areas on the surface
Constant surface flow
Increasing surface flow
Stumps and root systems left in place on embankment
or small animal burrows present

27
02
05
510
48
27
04
05

Note: In absence of any indicator, assign a condition of 10.

TABLE 18.
dation

Condition Inspection Checklist for Piping in FounSuggested

condition
range
(2)

Indicator
(1)
Turbid flows
Evidence of prior occurrence
Actively occurring
Sinkholes or depressions on dam, toe, or abutments
Buildup of pore water pressure in foundation as inferred by uncontrolled seepage areas in toe and
abutment areas
Changes in surface vegetation
Soft/wet areas on surface
Constant surface flow
Increasing surface flow

27
02
05

510
48
27
04

Note: In the absence of any indicator assign a condition of 10.

the jth condition can be computed according to the following

equation:
Risk Index for jth Condition = RIj

(10 CFj)
10

(5)

where all terms have been previously defined. Note that a

physical condition with a relative importance of 0 and/or a
condition function of 10 will have a zero risk index. A zero
risk index does not imply that a deficiency is insignificant but
that compared with other deficiencies it is of lessor impor-

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TABLE 19.
bankment

Condition Inspection Checklist for Slide in Em-

Indicator
(1)
Buildup of pore water pressure in embankment as inferred by uncontrolled seepage areas
Changes in surface vegetation
Soft/wet areas on the surface
Constant surface flow
Increasing surface flow
Surface evidence of impending mass movement such
as cracking, shallow slides, and differential
movement in the embankment or between the
embankment and foundation
Minor and localized
Major and extensive

Suggested
condition
range
(2)

510
48
27
04

28
02

Note: In the absence of any indicator assign a condition of 10.

TABLE 20. Condition Inspection Checklist for Slide in Embankment and Foundation

Indicator
(1)
Buildup of pore water pressure in embankment and
foundation as inferred by uncontrolled seepage
areas
Changes in surface vegetation
Soft/wet areas on the surface
Constant surface flow
Increasing surface flow
Surface evidence of impending mass movement such
as cracking, shallow slides, and bulging
Minor and localized
Major and extensive

Suggested
condition
range
(2)

510
48
27
04
28
02

Note: In the absence of any indicator assign a condition of 10.

tance. The overall risk index of the dam is obtained by summing risk index over all potential failure modes.
DISCUSSION
Relationship of Current Approach to Classical
Risk Analysis
The proposed methodology to calculate risk indices is compatible with a classical risk analysis in that: (1) the importance
of the dam (IDam) is estimated through a consideration of surrogate factors that are related to the likelihood of failure and
consequences of failure; and (2) the relative importance of
potential changes in physical state are determined in a failure
criticality analysis based upon their relative likelihood of causing a failure. It is possible to directly incorporate the results
of a classical risk or reliability analysis into this methodology
by using estimated probabilities of failure to determine the
conditional probabilities of failure for each failure mode. Additionally, the dam importance determination can be taken directly from a risk analysis by using the estimated risk instead
of the vulnerability and hazard considerations proposed herein.
The dam with the highest risk would be deemed the most
important. Thus, information determined during a detailed risk
or reliability analysis could supplant the information developed herein.
The proposed methodology provides no measure of the actual probability of failure. This is by design. In the writers
opinion, the determination of probability of failure for a small
embankment dam carries a considerable amount of uncertainty

and is currently the subject of much controversy. There is disagreement within the dam safety profession as to whether or
not it is possible to reliably determine the probability of failure
of a dam and whether or not the probability of failure is of
value for the prioritization of maintenance, repair, and evaluation tasks in an inventory of dams. At the onset of this development, the writers decided to table this controversial issue
until the profession could agree on the ability and usefulness
of determining absolute probabilities of failure. They decided
instead to base the analysis on the use of conditional probabilities. The expert panel members during the development of
the initial condition assessment methodology (senior dam
safety engineers from the Corp of Engineers and Hydro-Quebec) were much more comfortable answering questions dealing with conditional probabilities than with absolute probabilities.
The prioritizations accomplished by this methodology rely
solely on observational factors coupled with engineering judgment. This can be potentially misleading when dealing with
actual dam failures. However, in the absence of engineering
analysis, with the lack of knowledge of a performance history,
with the lack of knowledge of as-built conditions, and with
severely restricted budgets, the writers feel that expert elicitation based on observational factors (as developed herein) is
an appropriate manner in which to develop a tool that can be
used to help prioritize improvements to such inventories of
embankment dams.
A fully developed methodology for condition indexing of
embankment dams (from which this approach has been extracted) has been field tested in one of the management regions
of Hydro-Quebec using approximately 30 dams. The results
were so encouraging that their upper management gave their
authorization to implement the condition indexing methodology across their entire inventory of 300 plus embankment
dams and to use the results for the prioritization of maintenance and repair tasks. Additionally, Hydro-Quebec, the Corps
of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation are currently
working together in a joint research project to develop a condition indexing methodology for spillways and flood water discharge facilities based upon the same principles used in the
methodology for embankment dams. Hence, the indexing
approach is being accepted by owners of large inventories of
dams as a viable alternative to risk analysis for the management of maintenance and repair tasks. The use of this tool
does not rule out the use of good judgment.
Broad Context for Decision-Making on Improvement
to Dams
In a broader context, having the ability to accurately assess
the current condition of an embankment dam and to prioritize
the observed deficiencies in terms of safety-related concerns
if of little value unless such information can be used to generate scope-of-work statements for proposed further investigations and improvements and to generate cost estimates. Improved decision-making must also consider the following
issues that are not directly addressed by the methodology:
1. Does the current physical state represent an emergency
situation that must be immediately remedied?
2. Is it necessary to completely remedy the observed deficiencies to achieve optimal performance or is there some
level of performance that is acceptable but less expensive?
3. What is the cost variance between various improvement
options, and how confident can we be in the cost estimates?
4. Is the physical condition changing at such a rate that if
the repairs are not effected today, there may be unac-

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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

ceptable condition levels prior to the next budgetary cycle?

What is the rate of deterioration across the entire inventory of dams?
How will deferment of improvements affect the cost in
the short term? Long term?
How does the cost of the improvements change over
time?
Does deferment limit the number of improvement options in the future?
How can expenditures be optimized in terms of performance?

Answering questions such as these requires that the risk indexing methodology described herein be linked to a structured
methodology for scope-of-work definition and cost estimation.
These tools can be used at the network level to prioritize limited funds. A well-conceived management system for improvements to embankment dams must be capable of evaluating
alternatives ranging from an initial do nothing and defer
scenario through all available repair options. The ultimate
choice between improvement alternatives must be a balanced
evaluation of impacts to both embankment dam performance
and cost. A quantitatively derived risk indexing tool (such as
the one presented herein) can be used to more accurately define performance levels (benefits) as well as scope of
work(cost) thus enabling an improved benefit/cost analysis
over the entire service life of an inventory of embankment
dams.
Precision of Risk Indices
In order to interpret the results of this risk indexing procedure, it is necessary to consider the precision with which these
risk indices can be determined. The precision of any derived
quantity can be approximated by using a propagation of errors
technique known as first-order second moment method, Benjamin and Cornell (1970). The risk index defined by (4) is the
product of four terms: (1) the importance of the dam; (2) the
conditional probability of failure for a failure mode; (3) the
conditional probability that each of the nine physical conditions leading to a particular failure mode; and (4) a condition
function. Assume that: (1) the importance of the dam is deterministic; (2) the conditional probabilities of failure for the
four failure modes from expert elicitation will be normally
distributed with a standard deviation (cp) of 10%; (3) the conditional probabilities of the nine physical conditions will be
normally distributed with a standard deviation (cp) of 10%;
and (4) the condition functions would be normally distributed
with a standard deviation (cf) of 10%. The standard deviation
for each risk index (RI) will depend upon the importance of
the dam (IDam), upon the conditional probabilities for the physical conditions (P[Mi F ], P[Cj Mi]), and upon the condition
function (CFj). Under the assumption that the conditional
probabilities for the failure modes and physical conditions and
the condition functions are independent, the standard deviation
of the risk index (RI) for any condition j can be expressed by
the following equation:

RI = IDam

P[Mi F ]

(10 CFj)
10

2cp

should reflect this uncertainty and dams whose risk indices

that fall within 25% of each other should be given identical
priority. Note that the terms in (6) are not independent as assumed in this analysis and hence the actual standard deviation
of a risk index may be distinct from that presented herein and
the actual variation in overall risk indices between inspectors
will need to be established by multiple results of inspections
with different inspectors. The reader is encouraged to look at
the companion paper (Andersen et al. 2001) where two engineers worked independently on the same inventory of 10 dams
and their overall risk indices (sum of individual risk indices
for a particular dam) fell within a range of variation of 25%
for most of the dams rated. Clearly, more specific statements
about uncertainty must be based on consideration of dependency between the variables in (5) and must be calibrated with
more exhaustive field experience.
CONCLUSIONS
Ratings of embankment dams that are developed according
to the risk indexing methodology reflect the opinion of the
engineer/inspector in terms of the most likely modes of failure
and the observable physical deficiencies of the dams in the
inventory. Vulnerability and hazard potential estimates are directly incorporated to permit comparisons across an inventory.
This simplified methodology captures the most significant aspects of a classical risk analysis and hence can be considered
as an index of risk.
The methodology leads the dam safety engineer/inspector
through a consideration of the physical deficiencies on a dam
in terms of the likelihood that these would be associated with
a failure.
This methodology stands as a bridge between classical risk
analysis and condition indexing and is a cost-effective alternative to enable the prioritization of improvements over large
inventories of dams. Engineers and managers attempting to tie
risk analysis to periodic inspections can use this tool to provide a valuable support for such an effort.
APPENDIX I.

Condition: Current physical state of embankment dam as determined from observational data during walk-through inspection.
Condition function: Numerical score ranging from 0 (poor) to
10 (excellent) that rates current physical state of portion of
embankment dam in terms of its function in preventing one
or more failure modes, CF for jth condition.
Condition indexing: Process of quantifying current physical
state of facility in terms of set of predetermined rules.
Conditional probability: Probability of particular event under
premise that another event has occurred.
Failure criticality analysis: Systematic assessment of events
that can lead to failure and determination of their corresponding importance.
Hazard potential: Measure of specific types of damage such
as property loss or loss of life that may result in event of
dam breach.

P[Cj Mi]

where all terms have been previously defined. For dams indexed according to this methodology, the writers have found
that the standard deviation of a risk index [from (6)] has a
coefficient of variation that is approximately 25% under the
uncertainty assumptions given previously. Thus, the interpretation of the risk index for prioritization of improvements

GLOSSARY

(10 CFj)
10

2cp

P[Mi F ] P[Cj Mi]

10

2cf

(6)

Risk: Probability of failure of dam multiplied by cost of such

failure, in other words, expected cost for failure.
Risk index: Measure of importance of embankment dam (vulnerability of dam and environment and hazard potential of dam
break) and current physical condition that provides indication
of potential levels of risk.

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Vulnerability: Referring to dam and downstream environment

it is capability of or susceptibility to be damaged or harmed.
Vulnerability function: Function defined by (1) to develop
measure of vulnerability in terms of surrogate factors.
Vulnerability score: Numerical score given to each surrogate
factor as defined in Tables 18 and subsequently used
in (1).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The ideas for this simplified risk indexing tool were developed by the
writers while working on an embankment dam prioritization pilot project
funded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management, under the general supervision of R. David Clark,
Chief of Dam Safety. The writers greatly acknowledge their support. The
authors also acknowledge the support of professor W. Edward Back of
Clemson University who has helped to place this contribution in the
broader context of decision-making strategies for civil engineering facilities.

APPENDIX II.

REFERENCES

Andersen, G. R., Chouinard, L. E., Bouvier, C. Y., and Abdo, F. (1998).

Condition Assessment Methodology for Embankment Dams. Final
Rep. prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Hydro-Quebec,
Texas A&M University, College Station, Tex.
Andersen, G. R., Chouinard, L. E., Bouvier, C., and Back, W. E. (1999).
Ranking procedure on maintenance tasks for monitoring of embankment dams. J. Geotech. and Geoenvir. Engrg., ASCE, 125(4), 247
259.
Andersen, G. R., Cox, C. W., Chouinard, L. E., and Hover, W. H. (2001).
Prioritization of ten embankment dams according to physical deficiencies. J. Geotech. and Geoenvir. Engrg., ASCE, 127(4), 335345.
Andersen, G. R., and Torrey, V. H., III. (1995). Function-based condition

indexing for embankment dams. J. Geotech. Engrg., ASCE, 121(8),

579588.
Benjamin, J. R., and Cornell, C. A. (1970). Probability, statistics, and
decision for civil engineers, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Chouinard, L. E., Robichaud, J. G., Blanchette, G., and Gervais, R.
(1998). Priority ranking for maintenance activities on embankment
dams. Conf. Can. Dam Safety Assn., Canadian Dam Safety Association, Halifax, Canada, 252265.
Dascal, O. (1991). Risk of failure and hazard potential classification of
Hydro-Quebec dams. Dam Safety 91, Canadian Dam Safety Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 287299.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1998). Federal Guidelines for
Dam Safety: Hazard Potential Classification Systems for Dams, National Dam Safety Program, Interagency Committee Dam Safety, Washington, D.C.
USCOLD Subcommittee of Dam Incidents and Accidents. (1988). Lessons from dam incidents. USA-II, ASCE, New York.

APPENDIX III.

NOTATION

The following symbols are used in this paper:

IDam = Importance of dam as defined by (2) or other
suitable measure proposed by regulating
agency;
P[Mi F ] = conditional probability of failure mode i given
that failure has occurred;
P[Xi Mi F ] = conditional probability of attribute Xi in presence of failure mode i and failure;
P[Mi Xi F ] = conditional probability of failure mode i in
presence of attribute Xi and failure;
P[Cj Mi] = conditional probability of physical condition j
being associated with failure mode i; and
RIj = relative importance of physical condition j as
defined by (4).

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