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1. Prezena militar O.N.

U n lume(hart)
2. Cheltuieli cu aprarea a rilor(pt Europa cauti Eurostat pe
google, pt Orientul mijlociu cauti tot pe google ca nu stiu acuma
3. Personalul military desfasurat n operaiuni onu si non onu
(Annual review of global peace operations)
4. Desfasurarea personalului military onu si non onu in operaiuni
de pace, pe regiuni (idem 3)
5. Contributia principalelor organizatii international de securitate,
exceptand onu, in operaiuni de pace non onu(idem 3.4.)
Si alea 2 cu refugiatii (cati sunt in lume azi vs 90), si nu mai stiu ce ai
zis acoloas vrea si ceva legat de Siria ca e situatie actuala si cred ca
d bineceva gen personalul military onu in siria in 2012 si in 2015
sau ce gasesti legat de onu si siria

Fig. X. Harta misiunilor active de meninere a pcii ale ONU la mijlocul anului 2014

Fig XX. Desfurarea trupelor militare i poliieneti ale ONU pe regiuni n 20121


Potrivit datelor prezentate de ONU pe site-ul oficial2, actualizate n 31 martie

2015, organizaia are un numr de 71 de misiuni de meninere a pcii din 1948 pn
astzi, din care 16 sunt misiuni nc n derulare.
Conform aceluiai site, trupele de meninere a pcii ale ONU nsumeaz peste 106
mii de persoane, din care aproape 92 de mii de militari, peste 13 mii de poli i ti i circa
1.800 de obervatori militari. n ultimii 15 ani, numrul acestora a fluctuat, cu o tendin
de cretere graduat anual. Aceast cretere este semnificativ n ultimii doi ani, din
2013 n prezent.
Fig 1. Grafic al fluctuaiei pe ani a numrului de personal ONU angrenat n meninerea pcii

medie lunar


rile europene i non-europene membre ONU care au contribuit semnificativ la

meninerea pcii pot fi consultate n tabelul de mai jos3. Datele prezentate din perioada
2000 2014 reprezint contribuia medie lunar a unei ri pe an.

Contribuia rilor non-UE la

trupele ONU de meninere a pcii



Contribuia rilor UE la trupele

ONU de meninere a pcii

Marea Britanie


Fig 2. Primele 10 ri ale lumii ce contribuie cu personal militar la operaiunile

de meninere a pcii ale ONU4(n stnga) i topul rilor member UE ce contribuie cu
personal militar la operaiunile de meninere a pcii ale ONU5 (n dreapta)

Bugetul aprobat pentru operaiuni de meninere a pcii ale ONU

pentru anul fiscal 1 iulie 2014 30 iunie 2015 este de aproximativ 7,06
miliarde de dolari, potrivit notei nr. A/C.5/69/17 a secretarului general al
ONU din ianuarie a.c. Prin comparaie cu bugetul militar nsumat al
rilor lumii (estimat la 1.747 miliarde de dolari n 2013), aceast sum
reprezint doar 0,5% din cheltuielile militare mondiale cumulate.
n ceea ce privete contribuia financiar pentru ONU din partea rilor lumii, pe
primul loc se situeaz SUA, cu 28,38% din total, urmat, la mare distan, de Japonia, cu
Datele prezentate din 2000 - 2015 reprezint contribuia medie lunar a unei ri
pe an, media fiind cea a anului 2014.

Fig X. Primele 10 ri ce contribuie major din punct de vedere financiar la bugetul destinat meninerii
pcii cifre exprimate n procente6

Agenia de Refugiai a ONU (UNHCR), n raportul Mid-Year Trends 20147,

analizeaz situaia refugiailor pn n anul 2014. Astfel, Afganistan a fost cea mai mare
ar-surs de refugiai pentru mai mult de treizeci de ani, culminnd n 1990-1991.
Numrul refugiailor afgani trece de ase milioane, cea mai mare parte dintre aceste
persoane au ajuns n Pakistan i n Iran. Pn la mijlocul anului 2014, la mai mult de trei
milioane de refugiai nregistrai, numrul sirienilor refugiai l-a depit pe cel al
afganilor, Siria ajungnd s fie ara cu cei mai muli refugiai.
De altfel, situaia ultimilor ani din Siria a dus la prezena trupelor ONU de
meninere a pcii pe teritoriul rii arabe n numr mare, de aproape 800 de militari i 156
de reprezentani civili ai ONU.
De vazut:


Fig. XXX (:D) Proveniena i numrul refugiailor, exprimat n milioane pn la mijlocului anului 2014

Fig XXX. Populaia de refugiai sub mandatul UNHC, n perioada 1990 2014 (sfritul anului)

Fig. X. Misiunile ONU i non-ONU de meninere a pcii n perioada 2010-2012



i (Miliarde $)
% din PIB







Arabia Saudit 80.8





Marea Britanie 61.8














Korea de Sud


















Fig XX. Lista rilor cu cele mai mari bugete ale aprrii8


The United Nations (UN) has made no secret of its desire to see greater numbers of
European troops in its peacekeeping operations, especially those in Africa. It also desires
European Union (EU) cooperation to bridge key capability gaps, like rapid deployment.
Despite the need for European armies to stay operationally engaged after leaving
Afghanistan, however, their rapid integration into UN operations or rapid deployment in
support of UN operations will not happen automatically or without effort on all sides.
This paper assesses progress on several areas of recent European military cooperation
with the UN and offers recommendations for consideration by the EU, the UN and
European governments in discussing the opportunities for collaboration in the coming
The EUs Plan of Action
For a number of reasons, the implementation of the Plan of Action has been uneven to
date. In general, technical areas have progressed, such as the development of modalities
for cooperation in the planning of EU and UN missions in the same theater. But areas
which required further member state action at a political level have seen less progress,
such as identifying EU member state capabilities for possible use in UN missions.
Despite limited progress on the related provisions of the Action Plan, however, the UN
has recently seen important contributions of enabling capacities from European states to
its mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the EU deployed an autonomous peacekeeping
force to the Central African Republic (CAR) to assist the African Union (AU) and the
French forces there until the UN could deploy. Importantly, as well, European member
states, led by Italy, France, and Spain, have remained steadfast contributors to the UN
peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Such events were not necessarily facilitated,
however, by the institutional cooperation processes envisioned in the Plan of Action,
since EU member states have expressed a strong preference in favor of dealing with the
UN directly when it comes to their own contributions to UN missions, rather than using
the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a go-between. Despite the EU member
states agreement to the Plan of Action in 2012, it did not reflect a genuine high-level
political consensus to move towards a more reliable and joined-up mechanism for EU
(military) crisis response or an interlocking peacekeeping mechanism with the United
Nations. Increasing European Participation in UN Peacekeeping The EU does not
currently provide capabilities directly as a component to a UN mission (the so-called
modular approach), but as of 1 September, 2014, European countries individually were
contributing 5,667 troops to UN peacekeeping operations, led by Italys contribution of
over 1,100 troops. European contributions constitute 6.7 percent of the total number of
UN troops deployed, up from 6.0 percent at the end of 2013, but down from its most
recent high of 13.8 percent in 2007. Focus on Africa and the Middle East Currently, 1,254
European troops are deployed to the UNs missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The largest
concentration of blue-helmeted European troops in Africa serves in MINUSMA (684)
where the Netherlands has deployed 370 military personnel supported by four Apache

attack helicopters and three Chinook helicopters. The Dutch are leading an All Sources
Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) jointly with a contingent soon to be deployed from
Sweden. European forces are present in large numbers in three other UN operations
outside Africa: UNIFIL (Lebanon, 3,716 troops), UNDOF (Golan Heights, 136 troops)
and UNFICYP (Cyprus, 561 troops). In Lebanon, Italy provides over 1,000 troops,
Command and Control assets for other national units, critical enablers and four
helicopters search and rescue and medical evacuation in support to the UNIFIL HQ.
Collectively, European states are deployed in four EU military operations in Africa
working alongside UN and AU operations: EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Horn of Africa);
EUTM Somalia; EUTM Mali, and EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic).
Of course, in looking toward the future of European contributions to UN peacekeeping or
to the deployment of new EU military missions, one must also consider how continued
instability in the Middle East and Ukraine will affect the picture. Two recent events are of
note in this regard. First, some have blamed the lackluster force generation of EUFOR
RCA on European preoccupation with the Ukraine crisis. Certainly continued
interference of Russia in that region would drop sub-Saharan Africa conflicts down the
list of EU member state security priorities. Second, in terms of the Middle East, and
specifically the spillover of the Syrian conflict, the UN is likely to need more highcapacity European armed forces participating in its missions in the region. In UNDOF,
the deterrent capability of the UN has been compromised by the capture of the missions
Filipino and then Fijian troops. It was the Irish contingent that successfully assisted in the
escape of a Filipino contingent from their besieged compound. It may be that the
missions reinforcement with more high-capacity European troops is the only thing that
can save UNDOF.

Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) - $2.93 B UN

peacekeeping constitutes the largest deployed military force in the world, with more than
120,000 personnel deployed on 17 peacekeeping missions in hotspots around the world.
These operations help promote our nations national security goals and core values
without requiring the commitment of U.S. troops. They are also extremely cost-effective,
as UN missions overall are eight times cheaper than U.S. forces acting alone. UN
peacekeeping missions are currently facing a number of critical and increasingly weighty
demands, and it is therefore essential that they receive full funding through the CIPA
account. For example, robust CIPA funding is necessary to help peacekeepers protect
more than 100,000 South Sudanese civilians who have sought shelter at UN bases to
escape the fighting; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to hundreds of
thousands more who have been forced to flee their homes; and monitor and document
human rights violations. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is also working
alongside the UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF) and others to help end the recruitment of
child soldiers in South Sudan. In late January, the UN helped negotiate the release of

3,000 child soldiers from a rebel militia in South Sudan, one of the largest
demobilizations of children ever. Full funding for CIPA will also be vital to ensuring that
the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), is able to continue to help stabilize key population
centers in northern Mali that, up until early 2013, were under the control of several
radical Islamist groups, including an affiliate of al-Qaeda. This mission has proven to be
particularly dangerous, as 32 peacekeepers have been killed since the mission deployed
in July 2015, making continued support all the more critical. In the Central African
Republic, full funding is also critical to the UNs new peacekeeping mission there, which
is currently working to restore order in the country and protect civilians after nearly two
years of political strife and sectarian conflict between Christians and Muslims. In
addition to fully funding FY16 peacekeeping needs, BWC also requests that Congress
include language in the FY16 SFOPS appropriations bill allowing the U.S. to pay its
peacekeeping dues at the full assessed rate of 28.36%. Similar language lifting
reimbursement to countries like Bangladesh, Ghana, and Jordan who contribute troops to
peacekeeping operations; and potentially deny critical resources to missions that are
squarely in our nations security interests. Requested language is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made
available under the heading Department of StateInternational Organizations
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities in this and prior acts shall be
available for United States assessed contributions up to the amount specified in the
Annex accompanying United Nations General Assembly document A/67/224/ Add.1.
The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is a United
Nations peacekeeping mission in Syria, set up in 2012 as a result ofUnited Nations
Security Council Resolution 2043 in response to the Syrian Civil War.[1] It was
commanded by Norwegian major general Robert Mood[2] until 20 July 2012 followed
by Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye from Senegal. Although observers remain in the
country, Mood suspended their mission on June 16, 2012 citing "escalating
violence."[3] Observers will conduct no further patrols and stay in their current positions
until the suspension is lifted. On 20 July 2012, the Security Council extended UNSMIS
for a final period of 30 days. According to resolution 2059, the Council would only
consider more extensions in the event that the Secretary-General reports and the Security
Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level
of violence sufficient by all sides to allow UNSMIS to implement its mandate.[4]
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2043 was unanimously adopted on 21
April 2012.[1]
The resolution resulted in the setting up of the United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria to observe the implementation of the Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria on the Syrian
Civil War. The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria was frozen in early June
2012, following an increasingly unstable and violent situation in Syria.

As 2012 came to a close, violence in Syria continued unabated despite efforts by joint
UNAU Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to mediate between the conflict parties
and to reconcile differences between member states over the approach to the crisis. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo, national forces cautiously returned to Goma after M23
rebels withdrew, but the situation remained volatile. In Mali, amid preparations for an
African-led international intervention force to expel Islamist groups affiliated with alQaeda, insurgents advanced farther toward government-held territory. The growing threat
prompted the launch of a French military operation in early January 2013, at the
transitional governments request, to halt the Islamists and accelerate the deployment of
African troops. Events in 2012 demonstrated the critical role that peace operations can
play as a tool for crisis management, but also brought their limits into sharp relief.
Political and security advances in a number of countries allowed for reductions in
deployments. However, across the Middle East and much of Africa, peace operations
came under severe strain as they struggled to respond to deteriorating security conditions,
as in eastern Congo, and to unraveling political agreements, as in Guinea-Bissau and the
Central African Republic. The confluence of the two in Syria resulted in the resignation
of Kofi Annan from his post as Special Envoy and the withdrawal of the short-lived
observer mission. The international community continues to struggle to develop a
roadmap for the way forward, with divisions in the Security Council hampering progress
in finding a resolution to the crisis. In addition to the authorizations in Syria, in 2012 the
Security Council upgraded the UNs political presence in Yemen to assist with the
transition process and established the post of Special Envoy for the Sahel. In December
the Council authorized an African-led military force in Mali and asked the
SecretaryGeneral to submit detailed proposals for a multidisciplinary UN presence in
Mali to support the political and security process. These events took place against an
evolving debate on the financing and support of both peacekeeping and political missions
at the UN. At UN headquarters, the divide between troop- and financial-contributing
member states continued, but the senior advisory group on troop costs presented a series
of recommendations to be deliberated by member states in 2013 that have the potential to
break the stalemate on this issue. Proposals to strengthen the funding and backstopping
arrangements for political missions failed to move forward. However, there are some
promising signs that agreements may be reached on some aspects of financing in 2013.
While political missions still lack a dedicated forum at the UN, where all member states
can express their views on these operations, a request by member states for the SecretaryGeneral to provide a comprehensive report on the UNs political missions in mid-2013
may provide a venue for further discussion. Commitments by the Security Council and
General Assembly to strengthen the UNs conflict prevention and mediation capacities
may be a harbinger of new momentum