Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co.

L-24670
(December 14, 1979)
Posted on October 23, 2012
G.R. No. L-24670
94 SCRA 533
December 14, 1979
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees
transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon
payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale
thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the
deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The
restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the
said lots issued in the name of Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building
restrictions also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly
from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6 was acquired
through a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone,
per ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff
completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing
EDSA and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or
more than 2 years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial
zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building
devoted to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for
residential purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded in writing that the
construction of the commercial building be stopped but the defendant refused to
comply contending that the construction was in accordance with the zoning
regulations.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was
impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not
dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiffappellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said
resolution, the posture is unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly
is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word regulation under the
provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a
municipality should be liberally construed in its favor and that any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of
the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to the general
welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will
conflict with vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does not apply to
the case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers and
the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of police
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard
to the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote the
health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. EDSA supports an endless stream of traffic and
the resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was
reasonably justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution.

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected
to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental aim of the Government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated.
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Land, Titles and Deeds, Local
Police Power, Public Corporation | Tagged 1979, 94 SCRA 533, Augusto
Padilla, Banking, Case Digest, Certificate of
Title,Constitutional, construction, contractual obligations, December
14, Deed of Exchange, deeds of sale,Digest, EDSA, Emma Chavez, G.R. No.
L-24670, general welfare, General Welfare Clause, general welfare
powers, Highway Hills Subdivision, LGC, Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank
and Trust Co., Local Autonomy Act, Mandaluyong, No. L-24670, nonimpairment of contracts, o, Ortigas, Ortigas & Co.,Ortigas vs Feati, Ortigas
vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., Pasig River, police power, PubCorp, Public
Corporation, R.A. No. 2644, RA 2644, regulation, Resolution No.
27, Resolution No.27 s-1960, Rizal, Sed. 16, Shaw Boulevard, TCT, Transfer
Certificate of Title, zoning ordinances, zoning regulations | Leave a reply
Magtajas vs Pryce
Posted on October 19, 2012
G.R. No. 111097
July 20, 1994

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped
the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the
operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the
Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.

Held:
No.
CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC.
However,ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are
merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated
powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a
statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Public Corporation

| Tagged 111097, 1994, Cagayan de Oro City, Case, Case Digest, casino, G.R.
No. 111097, Inc., July 20, LGC, Local Government Code, Magtajas,Magtajas
vs Pryce, Ordinance No. 3353, Ordinance No. 3375-93, PAGCOR, PD
1869, PD No. 1869, police power, Presidential Decree No.
1869, Pryce, Pryce Properties Corporations | Leave a reply
De La Paz Masikip vs City of Pasig GR 136349 (Jan 23, 2006)
Posted on October 15, 2012
Lourdes De La Paz Masikip v City of Pasig
G.R. No. 136349
January 23, 2006
FACTS
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro
Manila. The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified
petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her
property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of the
residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of
1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was
allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Petitioner sent a reply to

respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is

unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.
Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and petitioner
filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff has no cause of action
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain considering that: (1) there is no
genuine necessity for the taking of the property sought to be expropriated; and (2)
plaintiff has arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the property sought to be
expropriated. The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on the
ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports
and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the taking of the property of
petitioner.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. The records show
that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that
the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, nonprofit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that
the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private
playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area,
which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those
of Caniogan. Therefore, the petition for review was Granted.
Posted in Constitutional Law, Local Eminent Domain, Public Corporation
| Tagged 136349, 2006,Caniogan, Constitution, Constitutional Law, eminent
domain, Expropriation, G.R. No. 136349, genuine necessity, GR 136349, GR
No. 136349, January 23, LGC, Local government, Lourdes Dela Paz
Masikip,Masikip vs City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Pasig, Pasig
City, Petitioner, PubCorp, Public Corporation,Respondent, Sangguniang
Bayan, Sec. 19 | Leave a reply
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July
20, 1998)

Posted on October 4, 2012

G.R. No. 127820
292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty
Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant
to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an
offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which
the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the
subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to
15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a)
the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as
the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an
ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body,
the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the
previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160
prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Land, Titles and Deeds, Local
Eminent Domain, Public Corporation | Tagged 127820, 1998, 292 SCRA
676, BP 337, Case, Case Digest, Digest, eminent domain,G.R. No.
127820, July 20, LGC, LGU, Local Government Code, Local Government
Units, Paraaque,PubCorp, Public Corporation, RA 7160, Sangguniang
Bayan, V.M. Realty Corp. | Leave a reply
Bunye vs Escareal

Posted on October 1, 2012

R No. 110216
September 10, 1993
Facts:
The above-named accused, all public officers of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, were charged of enacting Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 in order
to allegedly take possession and take over its operation and management of the
New Public Market inAlabang, Muntinlupa starting August 19, 1988 despite the
valid and subsisting lease contract for a term o0f 25 years between the Municipality
of Muntinlupa and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.(Kilusang Magtitinda). COA Chairman Domingo
and MMC Governor Cruz also warned that appropriate legal steps be taken by the
MMC toward the rescission of the contractto protect the interests of the
Government, and to evaluate thoroughly and study further the case to preclude
possible damages of financial liabilities which the Court may adjudge against that
municipality as an offshoot of the case.
The forcible take-over allegedly caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative
members, and gave the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official
functions.
On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
suspending them pendent lite from public office pursuant to Sec.13 of RA 3019.
Petitioners Municipal Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors question the resolution
suspending them from office for 90 days pending their trial for violation of Sec.3(3)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue:
WON the preventive suspension is unjustified or unnecessary and its
implementation will sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality
of Muntinlupa, to the shattering of the peace and order thereat?
Held:
Sec.13 of RA No. 3019 as amended, provides that the accused public officials
shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.
In Gonzaga vs Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, the SC ruled that such
preventive suspension is mandatory. Preventive suspension n is not a penalty. In
fact, suspension under Sec.13 of RA 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the
information is determined (People vs CA, 135 SCRA 372).

The Sandiganbayan clearly did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the
preventive suspension of the petitioners.
The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that
their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its
case against them. The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and
prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non-intervention and
non-interference for 90 straight days from petitioners camp (p.13, Solicitor
Generals comment).
The petitioners fear that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed
for 90 days when they are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain
8 councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter
ego, the Secretary of the Interior Local Government, will surely know how to deal
with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor,
and 6 councilors in accordance with the provisions of the LGC, RA 7160 (Samad
vs COMELEC, et al., GR No. 107854; Samad vs Executive Secretary, et al., GR No.
108642, July 16, 1993).
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Public Corporation
| Tagged 110216, 1993, Bunye,Corporation, Councillor, Escareal, Governmen
t, GR No. 110216, LGC, Local government, Local Government
Code, Mayor, Metro Manila, Muntinlupa, PubCorp, Public, Public
Corporation, RA 3019,Sandiganbayan, Sangguniang Bayan, September 10
| Leave a reply
Mercado vs Manzano GR 135083 (May 26, 1999)
Posted on October 1, 2012
GR No. 135083
307 SCRA 630
May 26, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent received the highest
votes from the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition fordisqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent
was not a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and acquired US citizenship by
operation of the US Constitution & laws under the principle of jus soli. However, he
was also a natural born Filipino citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time

of his birth. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent is
both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.
Under Sec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
ISSUE
Whether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the position for which he
filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from holding the office for which he has been
elected.
HELD
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2)
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are citizens of the latters country; (3) Those
who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854, Sec.20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, mere dual citizenship
does not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their CoC,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Disqualifications, Election
Law, Public Corporation | Tagged1999, 307 SCRA
630, Citizenship, Constitution, Constitutional Law, disqualifications, dual
allegiance,dual citizenship, election, Election Law, Filipino, GR 135083, jus
soli, Law, LGC, Local Government Code,Mamaril, Manzano, May
26, Mercado, Multiple citizenship, Philippine, Philippine nationality
law,qualifications, RA 7160, RA 7854, San Francisco, United States | Leave
a reply

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr.

Posted on September 11, 2012
G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino,
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion
of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto,
based on the technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of
Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77
dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of
Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between
the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied
the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province
of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the
Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive
Secretary.
Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which should be
used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a
municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation
of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore
the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of

Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive

order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity,
its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporationwhere its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced
publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was
done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the validity of
E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40
years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to
an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and even the
Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate existence.
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in
1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the
country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis
Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be
deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban since it states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances/executive orders and
which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities
created for the first time under the Constitution it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now
barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those
barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes
and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly
ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the
municipality & consequently to which municipality the barangays in question
belong.

Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the
carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a provincial
Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary
to the technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding. If
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated
to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the
RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in
accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing law when the action was brought
by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA
7160).
Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the
start of the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day
period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the validity
of the decision rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period prescribed by
law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge
thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.
Posted in Case Digests, Constitutional Law, Public Corporation | Tagged 1987
Constitution, 1996, Baz,Case, Case Digest, Commission on
Audit, Constitution, Constitutional Law, De Facto, De Jure, December
2, Delegation of Power, Digest, Elpidio Quirino, GR
105746, Jimenez, Jimenez vs Baz, Jr., Jurisdiction,LGC, LGC 1983, LGC
1991, Local Government Code, Misamis Occidental, Municipal
Corporations, Order 258, Oroquieta, Plebiscites, Provincial board of
Misamis Occidental, Quo Warranto, Separation of
Powers, Sinacaban, Sinacaban Misamis Occidental, Vicente Baz | Leave a
reply
Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC
Posted on September 10, 2012
G.R. No. 177597
July 16, 2008
Facts:
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district
ofMaguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held

on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City
in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10,
2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407
by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province
with Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the
canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of
the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
Held:
1.Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary
to Sec. 5 ofArt.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of
an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority
in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies
the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In
fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in
the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is
complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x
an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at
least 1 representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation
of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of
the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress.
Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively
in Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones.Congress exercises these powers through a law the
Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative
bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power

(of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any
changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the
ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national
office because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial
jurisdiction. (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail
over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative
power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative
district whose representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.