Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
AT SEATTLE
11
)
FLOW SCIENCES INC., Individually and on )
12 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
)
)
13
Plaintiff,
)
)
14
vs.
)
)
15 DUN & BRADSTREET CREDIBILITY
)
CORPORATION, et al.,
)
16
)
Defendants.
)
17
)
No. 2:14-cv-01404-TSZ
CLASS ACTION
FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1009929_1
Now comes plaintiff Flow Sciences Inc. (Plaintiff or FSI), individually and on behalf of
2 all others similarly situated, through counsel, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B), for its
3 amended complaint against defendants Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corporation (DBCC), and
4 Dun & Bradstreet Corporation and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (collectively, D&B), states and alleges
5 as follows:
6
7
INTRODUCTION
1.
Small businesses are the heart of this nations economy. Access to credit is the
8 lifeblood of small businesses. D&B is the most powerful and prominent reporter on small business
9
10
credit. Thus, the truthfulness and accuracy of a small businesss D&B credit profile, ratings, and
scores are of critical concern to the continued health of the small business. And small businesses are
11
12
13
sensitive to inquiries by others (e.g., potential customers) into their D&B credit profiles. DBCC is a
telesales company that markets and sells expensive internet-based credit-on-self products under the
14 brand CreditBuilder.
15
2.
D&B and DBCC are separate companies, but both profit from the sale of
16 CreditBuilder, which they cloak in the Dun & Bradstreet name, brand, and tradition. And DBCC
17
represents CreditBuilder as a D&B solution to credit report problems. And small business are led
18
to believe that they are working with Dun & Bradstreet the company who reports on credit, has
19
20
databases, investigates trade experiences, and so on when in fact they are speaking with a DBCC
21 telesales agent.
22
3.
D&B defames small businesses by placing false and inaccurate information on small
23 business credit reports. D&B conducts no due diligence to determine whether information reported
24 to it is accurate, and removes false information when challenged by an aggrieved small business
25
without ascertaining the accuracy of that information in the first instance, despite advising
26
complaining businesses that it is conducting an actual investigation of the false information.
1009929_1
-1-
4.
D&B sends to DBCC a list of false and inaccurate negative entries and score changes
2 on small business credit reports, which DBCC uses to leverage sales of CreditBuilder.
3
4
5.
D&B also manipulates credit scores without any regard for the actual financial
condition of a given small business, oftentimes publicizing that a business is high risk or at risk of
5
6
7
financial collapse when, in reality, the business is healthy and financially sound.
6.
D&B also inflates the number of inquiries made about small businesses by generating
8 inquiries itself and by not de-duplicating multiple requests for information from the same subscriber
9 on the same day. Not only do these inflated inquiries have a negative effect on certain D&B credit
10 scores publicized to the world, but D&B sends the inflated inquiries to DBCC (without disclosing
11
that they are inflated), which DBCC uses to solicit small businesses to purchase CreditBuilder.
12
7.
DBCC markets and solicits sales for CreditBuilder through deceptive and misleading
13
14
statements which confuse reasonable persons regarding the affiliation of D&B to DBCC and to
15 CreditBuilder.
16
8.
DBCC also makes promises about what CreditBuilder can do for a small business
9.
DBCC also inflates the number of inquiries made about a small business, claiming
that there have been more unique companies making inquiries than there really have been. This
20
inflation is in addition to D&Bs inflation.
21
PARTIES & JURISDICTION
22
23
10.
Plaintiff FSI is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business at
11.
Defendant DBCC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of
26 business at 22761 Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu, California 90265. At all relevant times, DBCC
1009929_1
-2-
1 marketed, solicited, and sold CreditBuilder products in the stream of interstate commerce throughout
2 the state of North Carolina.
3
4
12.
places of business at 103 John F. Kennedy Parkway in Short Hills, New Jersey 07078. At all
5
6
7
8
relevant times, D&B licensed, distributed, sold, and published small business credit reports
throughout the state of North Carolina.
13.
This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2),
9 because the matter in controversy (exclusive of interest and costs) exceeds the sum of $5,000,000,
10 and this case is a class action in which the members of the class of plaintiffs are citizens of a state
11
12
14.
13
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
14
15
16
The Dun & Bradstreet name has been synonymous with small business credit for
17 over 150 years. Dun & Bradstreet occupies a unique institutional role in American and international
18 business and D&B has a virtual monopoly over small business credit reporting. Dun & Bradstreet
19 carries the imprimatur of the federal government, which requires a small business to have a D&B20 assigned Data Universal Number System (DUNS) number in order to apply to do work on a
21
22
required by global corporations, governments, industry and trade associations. They are similar to
23
24
federal tax ID numbers, but only D&B distributes DUNS numbers. When applying for credit, loans,
25 or government bids, small businesses must submit a DUNS number, which vendors or others use to
26 pull financial and credit information.)
1009929_1
-3-
16.
Given the age, size, reputation, and unique importance attached to Dun &
2 Bradstreet and D&Bs profiles, reports, scores, and ratings, small businesses are understandably
3
4
sensitive to negative information on their reports or profiles, reductions in their scores and ratings,
and email alerts regarding their D&B information.
5
6
7
8
Some years ago, D&B sought to capitalize on the importance given to its reports and
small businesses concerns about monitoring and improving their credit profile. It developed an
9 internet-based credit-on-self product called Self Awareness Solutions (SAS), which was supposed
10 to provide customers with an opportunity to monitor their reports, dispute inaccurate information in
11 their reports, and submit positive information to help improve their scores and ratings.
12
18.
Although the SAS line of business was profitable, by April 2009, customer criticism
13
had become so vocal that D&B planned killing off the products because customer complaints were
14
15
driving down its internal Voice of the Customer score, and dissatisfaction with the products was
16 resulting in high rates of customer attrition. Customers complained that D&B was using high17 pressure, bait-and-switch tactics to sell SAS products, and that the products did not perform as
18 promised.
19
20
19.
In order to avoid further scrutiny and litigation over the SAS products but while
continuing to reap profits from the credit-on-self line of business D&B transferred the rights to sell
21
the product line (which was re-named CreditBuilder) to a new company, DBCC, in August 2010,
22
23
for $10 million in cash and annual royalties; a deal estimated at $100 million.
24
25
26
1009929_1
-4-
20.
D&B granted to DBCC a unique license to use the Dun & Bradstreet name, brand,
3 logo, and trade dress. DBCC employs these elements, as well as email and website addresses that
4
are similar to D&B email and website addresses: http://www.dandb.com and http://www.dnb.com
5
6
7
8
9
10
21.
When small businesses call D&B directly about a problem on their credit report, they
11
12
13
14
are uniformly and seamlessly routed to a DBCC sales representative who tries to sell them
CreditBuilder, rather than attempt to fix the problem itself.
22.
Although DBCC was created in August 2010, it represents to potential customers that
15 it help[s] businesses establish their credit with a D&B DUNS number, and that it offers D&B
16 solutions. It describes its sales force (which it calls credit advisors) as modern day Credit
17
Reporters.
18
23.
DBCC describes itself as a component of D&Bs legacy and another chapter in its
19
20
long and storied history. DBCC represents to potential customers that its roots can be traced back
21 to the beginning of the credit industry. DBCC further represents: For over 170 years, millions of
22 businesses have relied on these credit services to pave their path to business success. By 2010, Dun
23 & Bradstreet Credibility Corp. launched a new chapter in this storied history as the company began
24 to offer products to help businesses monitor, manage and build their credit and credibility. In that
25
respect, we consider Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp. a 175 year-old startup.
26
1009929_1
-5-
24.
DBCC represents to potential customers that they should Protect Your Business
2 Credit with Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Search Our Database of Over 29 Million Businesses
3
4
Now. The database referred to is the D&B database, which DBCC has no ownership or control
over.
5
6
7
8
25.
DBCC uses marketing materials which bear both a DBCC logo and a D&B logo and
DBCC represents to potential customers that [a]t D&B Credibility Corp., we make
9 over 1.5 million updates to our database on a daily basis. It could be major transactions like paying
10 vendors or making lease or mortgage payments, but it could also be seemingly smaller transactions
11
like equipment leasing, advertising, shipping packages or underwriting insurance. . . . With all this
12
information flooding into D&B, its critical that you keep on top of your profile and credit score to
13
14
help ensure you keep your reputation solid . . . . D&B makes these updates to its databases, not
15 DBCC. DBCC does not play a single role, direct or indirect, in the updating of D&Bs database.
16
27.
17 databases. DBCC sales representatives uniformly advise small businesses that companies are
18 coming to us for credit reports. DBCC sales representatives uniformly describe credit reporting
19
functions (e.g., checking for liens) as something we do. In truth, DBCC does not have databases,
20
D&B does; DBCC does not have companies coming to it for reports, D&B does; and DBCC does
21
22
23
24 misrepresent the affiliation of DBCC to D&B and the affiliation of CreditBuilder to D&B. DBCC
25 fails to disclose the nature of the relationship between DBCC and D&B and the relationship between
26
1009929_1
-6-
1 misrepresentations or omissions which conflate DBCC with D&B or Dun & Bradstreet and
2 position CreditBuilder as bearing the sponsorship or approval of D&B or Dun & Bradstreet.
3
4
29.
On February 20, 2014, DBCC sued D&B in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York. Although DBCCs complaint is heavily redacted, the unredacted portions allege how
5
6
7
critically important the confusion caused by the shared name, logo, trade dress, and conflated
websites is to DBCC[s business model. DBCC says these elements are essential to DBCCs
8 business. For example, as part of the falling out between the two companies, D&B made
9 significant changes to its [website] links including . . . a pop-up box . . . which ha[s] steered
10 customers away from DBCC, by telling them that they are Now Leaving D&B. Previously, there
11
was no such notification, allowing DBCC to profit off potential customers believing that they were
12
still on D&Bs website or on a D&B-affiliated website. As another example, DBCC alleges that
13
14
D&B changed its websites search functions. Previously, when a business name was typed into the
15 D&B search box, the inquiring party was taken directly to DBCCs website and presented options
16 for learning more information regarding purchasing D&B COS [credit-on-self] Products.
17 (CreditBuilder is a COS product.) Now, a pop-up directly interferes with the search flow,
18 according to DBCC.
19
30.
20
telling them that there have been inquiries on their profiles, when no such inquiries have been
21
22
made, and that there is negative information on their reports, when such information either does not
1009929_1
-7-
10
32.
D&B artificially raises the SER Ratings of a swath of small businesses, assigning
11
12
them a rating of 7-9, which indicates high risk of financial stress, despite the fact that D&B has no
13 basis whatsoever to identify a small business as being so close to financial collapse. D&B then
14 submits through a batch communication computer program these artificial changes in the SER
15 Rating to DBCC.
16
17
CreditBuilder as the solution to the change in SER Rating, DBCC solicits the swath of small
businesses to purchase the product to enable them to improve their SER Rating.
18
19
20
33.
Another one of D&Bs scores is called the PAYDEX Score, which purports to
reflect the payment history of a small business and its current re-payment capabilities, as reported by
21 its business associates. D&B claims it must have at least three reports of trade experiences by a
22 subject small businesss associates to prepare a PAYDEX Score.
23
24
34.
D&B issues inaccurate PAYDEX Scores because it fails to keep accurate and
current records of the current re-payment capabilities of swaths of small businesses. Also, for
25
swaths of small businesses about whom D&B only had two reports of trade experiences, D&B
26
manufactures a third fictitious trade experience so that it can give the subject small business a
1009929_1
-8-
1 PAYDEX Score. In both cases, D&B transmits via batch computer communication these
2 inaccurate changes to the PAYDEX Scores to DBCC. Then, as part of a marketing and sales
3
4
campaign designed to position CreditBuilder as the solution to a low or inaccurate PAYDEX Score,
DBCC solicits the swath of small businesses to purchase the product to enable them to improve their
5
6
7
PAYDEX Score.
35.
Another one of D&Bs scores is called the Commercial Credit Score, which purports
8 to represent the likelihood of a small business falling delinquent in its payments to its business
9 associates within the next 12 months.
10
11
36.
D&B issues inaccurate Commercial Credit Scores because it fails to keep current
records of the current financial outlook of swaths of small businesses. D&B submits the inaccurate
12
Commercial Credit Scores to DBCC. Then, as part of a marketing and sales campaign designed to
13
14
position CreditBuilder as the solution to a low or inaccurate Commercial Credit Score, DBCC
15 solicits the swath of small businesses to purchase the product to enable them to improve their
16 Commercial Credit Score.
17
37.
D&B also enters false negative payment experiences on the credit reports of swaths of
18 small businesses. These entries include slow pay entries (that a small business did not pay its bills
19
or service its debts within industry time-frames), delinquency entries (that a small business was
20
delinquent in a payment), and cash account entries (that a small business was on a cash-basis with
21
22
a certain vendor). D&B submits the entries of these false negative payment experiences to DBCC.
23 Then, as part of a marketing and sales campaign designed to position CreditBuilder as the solution to
24 a negative payment experience, DBCC solicits the swath of small businesses and offers
25 CreditBuilder as the way to repair the small businesses credit report.
26
1009929_1
-9-
38.
2 inquiry means an entity has pulled D&Bs report about a small business. D&B inflates the number
3
4
of inquiries by generating its own inquiries, and by failing to de-duplicate multiple inquiries by the
same subscriber. D&B then submits the internal inquiries and the duplicate inquiries to DBCC
5
6
7
without disclosing that they were internal or duplicates. Then, as part of a marketing and sales
campaign designed to position CreditBuilder as the solution to a negative payment experience,
8 DBCC solicits small businesses by telling them there have been a high number of inquiries into their
9 D&B credit report.
10
11
39.
product, D&B manipulates the customers credit profile in one or more of the foregoing ways to
12
enable DBCC to solicit the customer for renewal.
13
14
40.
41.
FSI produces containment systems for pharmaceutical laboratory, pilot plant, and
17 manufacturing areas. Its products are designed to protect operators from exposure to hazardous
18 particulates and vapors while performing delicate operations. Ruth Ryan is an officer of FSI. FSI
19 purchased a CreditBuilder product on November 14, 2012.
20
42.
Prior to purchase, D&B artificially changed one or more of FSIs credit scores
21
without taking into account any actual change in the creditworthiness or financial stress of the
22
23
business. The manipulation of the score(s) was intended to make FSI susceptible to a CreditBuilder
24 solicitation.
25
43.
For example, D&B artificially harmed FSIs Financial Stress Score by including in its
1009929_1
- 10 -
44.
Prior to purchase, D&B placed false negative payment experiences on FSIs credit
2 report without exercising any due diligence to determine whether the experiences were true; D&B
3
4
did not have any documentation supporting the experiences and it did not request any information
from FSI to confirm or dispute the experiences. The placement of false negative payment
5
6
7
For example, in November 2012, D&B published approximately seven separate false
8 entries that FSI was past due on amounts of $1000, $750, $250, or $50, when, in truth, FSI had not
9 failed to timely pay bills and had no out-standing debts. These false entries remained on FSIs report
10 for an extended period of time despite FSIs disputing their truth and D&B continued to publish
11
12
46.
For another example, D&B published reports that FSI was between 30 and 90 days
13
14
late in making payment to vendors when, in truth, FSI had not been slow in making payments and
15 had not had any vendors take issue with its payment habits. These false entries remained on FSIs
16 report for an extended period of time despite FSIs disputing their truth and D&B continued to
17 publish them in subsequent reports to its subscribers.
18
19
47.
For another example, D&B published reports that there were 43 UCC filings against
FSI when, in truth, there were 10 or fewer filings. In fact, Ms. Ryan confirmed with the Secretary of
20
States website that D&Bs information was false. These false entries remained on FSIs report for
21
22
an extended period of time despite FSIs disputing their truth and D&B continued to publish
48.
For another example, D&B published reports that the highest credit available to FSI
1009929_1
- 11 -
49.
2 logistics company, Expeditors. The publication said, Currently, there is a record of open
3
4
5
6
7
proceeding was closed in 1998. As a result of the false publication, FSI was denied credit.
50.
In August 2013, D&B published reports that FSI had slow pays and was past due
8 on amounts, including (but not limited to) a slow pay entry reported in May 2012 for $100 for a
9 Lease Agreement. This false entry continued to appear on FSIs published D&B report.
10
11
51.
Prior to purchase, D&B included in its inquiry rate calculation inquiries D&B itself
had made under one or more of its subscriber numbers, which wrongfully inflated the rate; since the
12
rate is used to calculate certain credit scores, it wrongfully harmed one or more of FSIs scores. The
13
14
15
inclusion of D&B inquiries was intended to make FSI susceptible to a CreditBuilder solicitation.
52.
For example, D&B included internal inquiries in its calculation of FSIs Financial
53.
Prior to purchase, D&B sent to DBCC a list of inquiries, which included D&Bs own
18 inquiries, without disclosing to DBCC that D&Bs own inquiries were included. The inclusion of
19
the D&B inquiries but without identifying and disclosing them was intended to provide DBCC
20
leverage to sell FSI a CreditBuilder product.
21
22
54.
For example, D&B generated its own inquiries about FSI on April 27, 2011, February
23 11, 2011, March 27, 2012, April 17, 2012, April 20, 2012, July 6, 2012, September 4, 2012,
24 September 19, 2012, September 20, 2012, and November 12, 2012. D&Bs generation of its own
25 inquiries was a consistent and uniform practice. For example, on November 12, 2012, D&B made
26
1009929_1
- 12 -
1 an inquiry itself; and it sent that inquiry to DBCC, who sent FSI an email alert on November 14,
2 2012, that a new inquiry had been made.
3
4
55.
Prior to purchase, D&B sent to DBCC a list of inquiries, which included duplicate
inquiries, without disclosing to DBCC that they were nothing more than multiple types of requests
5
6
7
by the same subscriber on the same day. The inclusion of the duplicate inquiries but without
identifying them as such was intended to provide DBCC leverage to sell FSI a CreditBuilder
56.
For example, D&B did not de-duplicate inquiries by the same subscriber on the same
10 day on November 12, 2012; and it sent those duplicates to DBCC, who sent FSI an email alert that
11
12
57.
As a result of D&B generating its own inquiries and failing to de-duplicate other
13
14
inquiries, both D&B and DBCC told FSI that there had been a high number of inquiries to D&B
15 over the last 12 months, and that high number was a factor for why FSI had a negative Financial
16 Stress Score. Both D&B and DBCC advised FSI that its Financial Stress Score indicated that it was
17 a moderate to high risk of severe financial stress, such as bankruptcy, over the next 12 months.
18
19
58.
Prior to purchase, DBCC held itself out as D&B and CreditBuilder as a D&B-
affiliated product. FSI was confused by DBCCs representations. This confusion was designed to
20
leverage the power of Dun & Bradstreet to sell a CreditBuilder product.
21
22
59.
For example, DBCC sent FSI form marketing materials that bore the Dun &
60.
For another example, in an early November 2012 phone call, a sales representative,
25 Sandy Gilliam, led Ms. Ryan to believe she was communicating with Dun & Bradstreet. In truth,
26
1009929_1
- 13 -
61.
For another example, FSI received a November 13, 2012 email from a DBCC Expert
2 Credit Advisor, which referred to FSIs profile with Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp. There is
3
4
no such profile; there is only the D&B profile. The email also said, we get your companys profile
updates and that it is us completing the necessary background checks on your company. Only
5
6
7
During the early November 13, 2012 sales call, Ms. Gilliam told Ms. Ryan there had
8 been over 100 inquiries by separate companies. The November 13 email contained the same
9 statement. These representations were false; there had only been 24 companies who had made
10 inquiries. Ms. Gilliam told Ms. Ryan the high number of inquiries was driving FSIs scores
11
negatively, and it was urgent the FSI address this and improve its credibility and that CreditBuilder
12
was the only solution.
13
14
63.
During the early November 13, 2012 sales call, Ms. Gilliam also told Ms. Ryan there
64.
By November 14, 2012, FSI believed it had no choice but to enroll in one of the
17 credit building solutions offered in the letters in order to repair its credit and the false information
18 reported on its D&B profile. So it purchased a CreditBuilder product for $1,599.00 and a $149.00
19
activation fee.
20
65.
Had D&B not seeded FSIs credit report with false information, FSI would not have
21
22
23
Had D&B not given DBCC the internal and duplicate inquiries for use in the
1009929_1
67.
Had DBCC not held itself out as D&B and CreditBuilder out as a D&B solution, FSI
- 14 -
68.
Had DBCC not represented that CreditBuilder was the solution to false entries
2 appearing on FSIs report, FSI would not have purchased the product. In truth, there was a free
3
4
5
6
7
On February 1, 2013, FSI again received an email alert which indicated that there
8 were new inquiries into FSIs record with D&B. In truth, there had been only one. The other was
9 manufactured by D&B in one of two ways: it sent DBCC its own inquiry; or it sent DBCC a
10 duplicate inquiry.
11
71.
In June 2014, D&B published a false report that FSI had slow pays and was past
12
due on amounts, including (but not limited to) the May 2012 slow pay of $100.
13
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
14
15
72.
This action is brought on behalf of the named plaintiff as well as on behalf of the
16 following class members (Class Members or the Class), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
17 Procedure 23(b)(2)-(3): All purchasers of a CreditBuilder product in the State of North Carolina.
18
73.
The number of Class Members is so numerous and geographically diverse that their
19 joinder is impracticable. There are thousands of small businesses within the state of North Carolina
20
21
74.
The questions of law and fact arising from the named plaintiffs claims are questions
22
23
common to each member of the Class, and these common questions predominate over any individual
(a)
1009929_1
- 15 -
(b)
2 CreditBuilder misleading to potential customers, and, if so, was it objectively reasonable to rely on
3
4
5
(c)
6
7
Did D&B institute a process by which false information was placed on small
(d)
(e)
Did D&B breach a duty to report accurate, current, and truthful information
(f)
12
access to credit?
13
14
75.
The named plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the Class Members. And the
15 named plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained
16 experienced counsel to do so.
17
76.
This case can easily be managed as a class action because the defendants keep
18 electronic databases containing data about each Class Member, which are readily searchable. Notice
19
20
77.
Given that the damage to individual Class Members would likely be dwarfed by the
21
22
expense of litigating a claim on an individual basis, a class action is the most efficient way to
78.
In addition, a Class may be certified because: (a) the prosecution of separate actions
25 by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect
26
1009929_1
to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendants;
FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
(2:14-cv-01404-TSZ)
- 16 -
1 (b) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of
2 adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of
3
4
other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; and/or (c) defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally
5
6
7
applicable to the Class thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with
respect to the members of the Class as a whole.
COUNT I
10
79.
This cause of action incorporates all of the allegations in the other parts of this
11
12
complaint. This cause of action is brought against DBCC only. This cause of action is brought
13 under North Carolinas Unfair Trade Practice Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75.1.1, et seq. (the Act).
80.
14
15 and CreditBuilder constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce and
16 which have injured FSI and the Class. The unfair or deceptive acts are set forth in this complaint
17
and include (but are not limited to): (a) passing off goods or services as those of another; (b) causing
18
a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or
19
20
21 affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by another; and (d) representing that
22 goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, uses, or benefits that they do not have
23 or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not
24
25
have.
81.
26
deception.
1009929_1
- 17 -
82.
DBCC engaged in unfair or deceptive acts willfully, and has refused to take
83.
Pursuant to 75-16 of the Act, judgment shall be for treble the amount fixed by the
verdict. And pursuant to 75-16.1 of the Act, a reasonable attorney fee should be allowed as part of
5
6
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIM AGAINST DBCC
8
9
84.
This cause of action incorporates all of the allegations in the other parts of this
10
complaint. This cause of action is brought against DBCC only.
11
12
85.
86.
DBCC breached this duty by making representations, as set forth in this complaint,
15 that it knew, or should have known, were likely to mislead members of the Class. Those
16 representations include, but are not limited to:
17
(a)
That DBCC was D&B or a part of D&B in a way that it was not;
(b)
(c)
That DBCC had credit reporting databases, had companies coming to it to pull
18
19
20
21 information, or that DBCC conducted credit reporting activities (e.g., checking public records for
22 liens), which it did not;
23
24
25
(d)
26
inquiries, when in fact inquiries were duplicates or were D&Bs inquiries;
1009929_1
- 18 -
(f)
That a potential customers credit profile was incomplete, when it was not;
(g)
That a potential customers SER rating indicated high risk when it did not;
(h)
3
4
5
(i)
6
7
information on its credit profile after purchasing CreditBuilder, or that the product would improve
(j)
That a potential customers DS Status exposed them to risk, when it did not;
10
(k)
11
12
(l)
13
14
CreditBuilder, when, in fact, there were restrictions on the references that could be submitted;
(m)
15
(n)
18 experiences, when, in fact, no investigation takes place, and negative items re-appear after a month.
19
87.
20
transaction at hand (i.e., the purchase of a CreditBuilder product), and were related to the sale of the
21
22
23
1009929_1
89.
to purchase CreditBuilder.
FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
(2:14-cv-01404-TSZ)
- 19 -
90.
2 and Class Members sustained damages, including money spent purchasing CreditBuilder.
3
COUNT III
5
6
91.
This cause of action incorporates all of the allegations in the other parts of this
7 complaint. This cause of action is brought against D&B only. This cause of action is brought under
8 the Act.
9
92.
The following practices by D&B are unfair and deceptive under the Act:
10
(a)
Generating inquiries itself and sending them to DBCC for use in solicitations,
11
12
13
Generating duplicate inquiries for requests by the same subscriber on the same
14 day for information about the same subject company, and sending them to DBCC for use in
15 solicitations, but without disclosing that the inquiries were duplicates;
16
17
(c)
Failing to conduct real investigations of trade disputes that require the supplier
18
(d)
19
20
21
after one month, forcing the subject to dispute the item again.
93.
22
COUNT IV
23
DEFAMATION
CLAIM AGAINST D&B
24
94.
This cause of action incorporates all of the allegations in the other parts of this
25
26
1009929_1
- 20 -
95.
D&B published to third persons false and defamatory matters about the Plaintiff and
(a)
(b)
(c)
5
6
7
8
96.
These publications were unprivileged, and they were made with actual malice.
97.
9 information about the Plaintiffs and Class Members businesses and creditworthiness.
10
11
98.
As a direct and proximate result of D&Bs defamation, the Plaintiff and Class
Members suffered damages, including general (presumed) damages and actual damages (e.g., loss of
12
credit opportunities). As for FSI, its lender refused to refinance its line of credit due, in whole or in
13
14
part, to the false and inaccurate information and faulty scores and ratings D&B had placed on its
15 credit report.
16
99.
As a further direct and proximate result of D&Bs defamation, the Plaintiff and each
17 Class Member purchased CreditBuilder in order to address the false and defamatory information on
18 their credit reports; therefore, each member of the Class incurred the same special damage: the cost
19
of CreditBuilder.
20
100.
21
COUNT V
22
NEGLIGENCE
CLAIM AGAINST D&B
23
24
25
101.
This cause of action incorporates all of the allegations in the other parts of this
26
1009929_1
- 21 -
102.
D&B owes a duty to those small businesses about whom it has information to make
2 sure that the information is accurate when it transmits that information to DBCC. D&B breaches
3
(a)
Sending internal inquiries to DBCC without disclosing that they are internal;
(b)
5
6
and
7
8 duplicates.
9
103.
D&B also owes a duty to those small businesses about whom it formulates scores to
10 make sure that the scoring is commercially reasonable. D&B breaches this duty by:
11
(a)
Changing small businesses scores and rating without taking into account the
12
actual financial condition of the individual business.
13
14
104.
D&B also owed a duty to those small businesses who dispute items on their credit
15 reports to engage in a reasonable and meaningful dispute resolution process. D&B breaches this
16 duty by:
17
(a)
(b)
(c)
20
21
22
23
have them return again, forcing the subject to dispute them again.
105.
As a direct and proximate result of D&Bs negligence, Plaintiff and Class members
24 have sustained damages, including money spent purchasing CreditBuilder to attempt to remedy the
25 inaccurate and untimely information.
26
1009929_1
- 22 -
A.
B.
An injunction ordering DBCC to fully disclose the nature of its relationship to D&B
7
8
9
C.
An injunction ordering D&B to fully disclose to each Class Member the identities of
each person or entity that purportedly made an inquiry or report to D&B regarding that Class
10 Member and upon which D&B relied in publishing its credit reports and ratings;
11
D.
12
E.
F.
G.
13
14
15
JURY DEMAND
16
17
18
19
By: s/Christopher Collins
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1009929_1
- 23 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Attorneys for Plaintiff Flow Sciences Inc.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1009929_1
- 24 -
1
2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 13, 2015, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing
3 with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to
4 the e-mail addresses denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List, and I hereby certify that I
5 caused to be mailed the foregoing document or paper via the United States Postal Service to the non6 CM/ECF participants indicated on the attached Manual Notice List.
7
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
s/ CHRISTOPHER COLLINS
CHRISTOPHER COLLINS
10
13
14
E-mail: ChrisC@rgrdlaw.com
11
12
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1009699_1
https://ecf.wawd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/MailList.pl?171068100751469-L_1_0-1
3/13/2015