Art 12 Section 4 of Philippine Constitution.

The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law,

the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter,
such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The
Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and
watershed areas.

TIPTON VS ANDUEZA
On the 30th day of October, 1899, Vicente Aguirre y Flores, as administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital, leased to
the defendant in this case a tract of land belonging to the hospital. It was stipulated in the contract that the lease
should run for a period of ten years from the 1st day of January, 1899. Aguirre, the administrator, was duly
authorized to execute such contracts, but his power was general in terms and contained no provision specially
authorizing him to make leases with respect to the hospital property for a period of ten years or any other specific
term.
The plaintiff, as the present administrator of the hospital property, claims that the contract made by his predecessor,
Aguirre, was null and void for want of power on his part to make such contract, basing his contention upon the
provisions of article 1548 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The husband with respect to the property of his wife, the father and guardian with regard to that of his children or
minor, and the administrator of property without a special power giving him such authority, can not execute a lease
for a period exceeding six years."cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision plainly shows that Aguirre could not, as administrator, have validly executed a lease of the land in
question for a period of ten years in the absence of special authority to that effect. This, in our opinion, vitiated the
contract. This defect, however, did not affect the contract in its entirety, but only in so far as it exceeded the six-year
limit fixed by law as the maximum period for which an administrator can execute a lease without special power. The
contract in question was perfectly valid in so far as it did not exceed that limit, having been executed by the
administrator, Aguirre, within the scope of the legal authority he had under his general power to lease. That general
power carried with it, under the article above quoted, the authority to lease the property for a period not exceeding
six years. There was no excess of authority and consequently no cause for nullification arising therefrom, as to the
first six years of the lease. As to the last four, the contract was, however, void, the administrator having acted beyond
the scope of his powers.
The trial court construed article 1548 of the Civil Code as applying only to administrators of estates of deceased
persons. This construction is manifestly erroneous. The provisions of that article are general and apply as well to
administrators of property of living as of deceased persons.
It is contended, on the other hand, by the defendant, that article 1548 is not applicable to public lands such as the
property in question, nor to public officials as was Vicente Aguirre, the administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital.
As to the first contention, it is not stated in defendants brief in what sense the words "public lands" are used. It
seems, however, that the defendant refers to lands of the public domain. He testified at the trial that the lands of the
San Lazaro Hospital belonged to the Government of the United States. If such were the case his interpretation of
these words would be erroneous. That property belongs to the public domain which is destined to public use or
which belongs exclusively to the State without being devoted to common use or which is destined to some public
service or to the development of the national resources and of mines until transferred to private persons. (Art. 339 of
the Civil Code.) The land in question does not pertain to any of these classes. The best proof of it is that the
defendant himself had been using it for his own personal and exclusive benefit. So that, assuming without deciding

that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, it would be nevertheless private property
under the provisions of articles 340 and 345 of the Civil Code, and as such, unless provided for by special
legislation, is subject to the provisions of those articles. The defendant has not called our attention to any special law
providing a method different from that contained in the Civil Code for the leasing of the lands belonging to the San
Lazaro Hospital, and we do not know of the existence of any such law.
As to public officials, the only reason given by defendant in support of his contention that article 1548 does not
apply to them is that it would be impossible for the Government to make a lease for a period, exceeding six years,
because it has no legal capacity and must necessarily transact all its business through the medium of officials. This
contention can not be sustained. It is a manifest error to say that the Government has no legal capacity or that if has
no power to grant special authority to one of its officials for the leasing of Government property for a period
exceeding six years, if deemed advisable. This is so apparent that it certainly requires no argument.
It is claimed, however, that Government officials do not act by virtue of any special power but under the law
creating their respective offices, and that for this reason they are no affected by the provisions of article 1548, which
refer to administrators whose acts may be governed by the limitations of a power of attorney. We think that this is a
mere question of words. Power, according to text writers, means the authority granted by one person to another to do
in his behalf the same thing which he would do himself in the premises. This is the sense in which the word power is
used in that article and it refers to the private individual who administers property belonging to another as well as to
the public official who administers patrimonial property or the private property belonging to the State. Such
property, whether owned by the State or by a private citizen, is covered by the provisions of the Civil Code. In either
case the administrator, in so far as he has the management of the property of another, is a mere agent whose acts
must be governed by the limitations of the power which his principal may have conferred upon him. In neither case
can he exceed these limitations, but must discharge his trust in accordance with his instructions. A public official is
not, as such, exempt from the operation of this rule. He can not assume that he has the power to lease to others the
patrimonial property belonging to the State for such time as he may see fit, say, for eighty or ninety years. He can
not do so unless expressly authorized. Whether the administrator derives his powers from a legislative enactment, as
in the case of a public official, or from the terms of a public instrument where private parties only are concerned, is
immaterial. It is a mere question of form which does not affect the provision of the code above cited. What the law
requires in order that the administrator may lease the property for a period exceeding six years is special power
giving him such authority. The grant must be contained in a public document. (Art. 1280 of the Civil Code.) A public
document may be either a public instrument or a legislative enactment, for legislative acts are also public documents
under our code.
Furthermore it is very doubtful whether Aguirre was in fact a public official as the administrator of the San Lazaro
estate. This question, however, was not raised in the court below, no evidence bearing on the subject having been
introduced. We have merely assumed that he was such for the sake of argument.
It is further contended by the defendant that the complaint does not state a cause of action. This is not true. A mere
perusal of the complaint will show the contrary. We hold that the facts therein set forth constitute a sufficient cause
of action.
It is also contended that there is no allegation with respect to the interest of the plaintiff in this action. Without
passing upon the correctness of this allegation which refers to the legal capacity of the plaintiff, it may be said that
as no question was raised as to this point in the court below it can not be urged on appeal.
The court below expressly found that the Government had collected rent for four years and held that it had thereby
ratified the contract. This question was not discussed in the court below and, legally speaking, the court should not
and could not have made any such finding. We hold that this was error on the part of the trial court.

The judgment of the court below is hereby modified so as to declare that the lease in question was valid only for six
years from the 1st day of January, 1899, to the 31st of December, 1904, and void as to the last four years of the
contract term that is to say, the effects of its nullity should date from the 1st day of January, 1905. The defendant
shall return the land in the form and manner provided for in the lease together with the proceeds derived from its
possession since the last-mentioned date. The plaintiff will return to the defendant the rent received during the same
period, provided the rent has in fact been paid to him, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.
No costs will be allowed to either party in either instance. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court below for action in conformity herewith.
So ordered.

TDC VS MANILA (, MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS,
INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, andTARLAC
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTS
These two cases are petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated June 30, 1975 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 51590-R entitled "Tarlac Development Corporation vs. City of Manila, and Manila Lodge No. 761,
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.," affirming the trial court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the
property subject of the decision a quo is a "public park or plaza."
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a
portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the
reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set
aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred
feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to
a responsible person or corporation for a term not exceed ninety-nine years."
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to
authorize the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.
The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the
reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The title
described the registered land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta Extension, situato en el distrito de la
Ermita x x x." The registration was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of said
law (Land Registration Act) as may be subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones impuestas en la Ley
No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de venta, celebrados y otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del
Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, fechados
respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909." 1
On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07 square meters
of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE,
for short) on the basis of which TCT No. 2195 2 was issued to the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de
la Luneta Extension, Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back of this title vas annotated document 4608/T1635, which in part reads as follows: "que la citada Ciusdad de Manila tendra derecho a su opcion, de recomparar la

expresada propiedad para fines publicos solamete in cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 le Julio
le 1911, precio de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que entonces tengan las mejoras."
For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge
No. 761, PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No. 2196 3 was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to which
was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court oder to
"Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."
In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the
right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.
On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements
thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700.000 as down payment and
mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly
installments.5 At the time of the sale,, there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On
December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE
TERRENO, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."
In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its
right to repurchase; the court, after haering, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarind the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the
property after fifty years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in
G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring
another action for the clarification of its rights.
As a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, containing
three causes of action and praying a) On the first cause of action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have purchased the parcel of land now in
question with the buildings and improvements thereon from the defendant BPOE for value and in good faith, and
accordingly ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the
name of the Plaintiff;
b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant City of Manila to pay the plaintiff TDC damages in the sum
of note less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
c) On the third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to recover from the defendant BPOE the
amounts mentioned in par. XVI of the complaint in accordance with Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in the remote event
that the final judgment in this case should be that the parcel of land now in question is a public park; and
d) For costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 6
Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971, admitted all the facts alleged in the first cause
of action except the allegation that TDC purchased said property "for value and in good faith," but denied for lack of
knowledge or information the allegations in the second and third causes of action. As, special and affirmative

defense, the City of Manila claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it had actual notice of the City's
right to repurchase which was annotated at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and that,
assumingarguendo that TDC had no notice of the right to repurchase, it was, nevertheless, under obligation to
investigate inasmuch as its title recites that the property is a part of the Luneta extension. 7
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971, admitted having sold the land together with the
improvements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in good faith, but denied for lack of knowledge as to
their veracity the allegations under the second cause of action. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paid the
quarterly installments until October l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the
subsequent installments. It also asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without having misrepresented or
concealed tacts relative to the title on the property. As counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to
recover the balance of the purchase price plus interest and costs. 8
On June 15, 1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its refusal to make further payments was
fully justified. 9
After due trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public
park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject
land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser
thereof in g faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to
recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter. 'The dispositive part of the decision
reads: +.wph!1
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel of land formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos 2195 and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 73444 in the name of Tarlac Development Corporation is a public' park or plaza, and,
consequently, instant complaint is dimissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
In view of the reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation to recover from
defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI of the complaint in accordance with
Article 1555 of the Civil Code, the Court makes no pronouncement on this point. 10
From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, avers that the trial court
committed the following errors, namely:
1. In holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial property of the City of Manila; and
2. In holding that the Tarlac Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right against the defendant
BPOE. 11
The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the other hand, asserts that the trial court erred:
(1) In finding that the property in question is or was a public park and in consequently nullifying the sale thereof by
the City of Manila to BPOE;

(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, and Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil.
112, to the case at bar; and
(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to ,recover damages from the defendant City of Manila. 12
Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second assignment of error raised by BPOE, maintained that it can
recover and enforce its rigth against BPOE in the event that the land in question is declared a public park or part
thereof. 13
In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals concur ed in the findings and conclusions of the
lower court upon the ground that they are supported by he evidence and are in accordance with law, and accordingly
affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari.
G.R. No. L-41001
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41001,
that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the very enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the
subject property was, and still is, patrimonial property of the City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or
disposed of like any other private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings when it simply made a general affirmance of the court a quo's findings and conclusions without
bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed by the BPOE in its assigned errrors. 14
G.R. No. L-41012
The Tarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41012, relies on
the following grounds for the allowance of its petition:
1. that the Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, of the Philippine
Commission; and
2. that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not
make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court. 15
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
FIRST ISSUE
Upon the first issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act
No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza.
Arguments of Petitioners
In G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be some logic in the
conclusion" of the Court of Appeals that "neither Act No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to supply the
City of Manila the authority to sell the subject property which is located at the south end not the north of the
reclaimed area." 16 It argues, however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the City of Manila to

undertake the construction of the Luneta extension by reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and declared that the
reclaimed land shall be the "property of the City of Manila," the State expressly granted the ownership thereof to the
City of Manila which. consequently. could enter into transactions involving it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No.
1909, there could he no doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City was its patrimonial property;" that the south
end of the reclaimed area could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC a street, park or promenade can be
property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the Spanish Civil Code only when it has already been so
constructed or laid out, and the subject land, at the time it was sold to the Elk's Club, was neither actually
constructed as a street, park or promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;" that even assuming that the
subject property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was subsequently converted into patrimonial
property pursuant to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had never been used, red or utilized since it was
reclaimed in 1905 for purpose other than this of an ordinary real estate for sale or lease; that the subject property had
never been intended for public use, is further shown by the fact that it was neither included as a part of the Luneta
Park under Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park
(now Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of President Ramon Magsaysay or by
Proclamation Order No. 274 dated October 4, 1967 of President Ferdinand E. Marcos;" 19 that, such being the case,
there is no reason why the subject property should -not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial
property, pursuant to the ruling in Municipality vs. Roa 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of Manila has considered it
as its patrimonial property not only bringing it under the operation of the Land Registration Act but also by
disposing of it; 20 and that to consider now the subject property as a public plaza or park would not only impair the
obligations of the parties to the contract of sale (rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property
without due process of law. 21
G.R. No. L-410112
In L-41012, the petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the interpretation of Act No. 1360, as amended by.
Act No. 1657 of the Philippine Commission, 22 and avers that inasmuch as Section 6 of Act No. 1360, as amended
by Act 1657, provided that the reclamation of the Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the City of
Manila which was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended in the construction of Luneta Extension," the
reclaimed area became "public land" belonging to the City of Manila that spent for the reclamation, conformably to
the holding in Cabangis,23 and consequently, said land was subject to sale and other disposition; that the Insular
Government itself considered the reclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to disposition as
evidenced by the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360 declared that "the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property of the
City of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for according to Article 344 of the Civil Code,
the character of property for public use can only attach to roads and squares that have already been constructed or at
least laid out as such, which conditions did not obtain regarding the subject land, that Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized
the City of Manila to lease the northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel purposes; that Act No. 1657 furthermore
authorized the City of Manila to sell the same; 24 that the express statutory authority to lease or sell the northern part
of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean that the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the
purpose of the statute was not merely to confer authority to sell the northern portion but rather to limit the city's
power of disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent disposition of the northern portion for any purpose other than for a
hotel site that the northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be considered as extension of the Luneta
for they lie beyond the sides of the original Luneta when extended in the direction of the sea, and that is the reason
why the law authorized the sale of the northern portion for hotel purposes, and, for the same reason, it is implied that
the southern portion could likewise be disposed of. 26
TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids
in construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit:
(1) Exhibits "J" and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity,
do not include the subject property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which is the plan of the subject

property covered by TCT No. 67488 of BPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is not a
public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copy of Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is
President Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U" which is Proclamation Order No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President
Marcos, do not include the subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4) Exhibit "W", which is the location plan of the
Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms that the subject property is not a
public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 in the name of the United States of America
covering the land now occupied by the America covering the land now occupied by the American Embassy, the
boundaries of which were delineated by the Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is bounded on the
northwest by properties of the Army and Navy Club (Block No. 321) and the Elks Club (Block No. 321), and this
circumstance shows that even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject property as private property of the
Elks Club. 27
TDC furthermore contends that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale of the subject
property that it executed on July 13, 1911 to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1) the
City's petition for the reannotation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when
the property was bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park as testified to by both Pedro
Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the surveyor, Manuel Aoneuvo, according to whom the subject property was from
all appearances private property as it was enclosed by fences; (3) the property in question was cadastrally surveyed
and registered as property of the Elks Club, according to Manuel Anonuevo; (4) the property was never used as a
public park, for, since the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO. 761,
the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16, 1909 the City of Manila had already executed a deed
of sale over the property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761; and (5) the City of Manila has not presented any
evidence to show that the subject property has ever been proclaimed or used as a public park. 28
TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply to the subject land, for Com. Act No. 141
took effect on December 1, 1936 and at that time the subject land was no longer part of the part of the public
domain. 29
TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be disregarded, for the mere mention in the
certificate of title that the lot it purchased was "part of the Luneta extension" was not a sufficient warning that tile
title to the City of Manila was invalid; and that although the trial court, in its decision affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, found the TDC -to has been an innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded the petitioner's rights as
such purchaser that relied on Torrens certificate of title. 30
The Court, continues the petitioner TDC erred in not holding that the latter is entitled to recover from the City of
Manila damages in the amount of P100,000 caused by the City's petition for- reannotation of its right to repurchase.
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUE
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be
discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent, the whole
statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered. 32 It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all
the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.
Act No. 1360 which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as amended by Act No. 1657
enacted on May 18, 1907, authorized the "construction of such rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be
necessary for the making of an extension to the Luneta" (Sec. 1 [a]), and the placing of the material dredged from
the harbor of Manila "inside the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta extension above referred to" (Sec. 1

[a]). It likewise provided that the plan of Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for the extension and
improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila" be adopted; that "the reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the
land included in said projected Luneta extension... is hereby authorized and the land thereby reclaimed shall be the
property of the City of Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension authorized by this Act at the worth end of said tract, not to exceed
five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same with the approval of the
Governor General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years; that "should the Municipal Board ... deem it
advisable it is hereby authorized to advertise for sale to sell said tract of land ... ;" "that said tract shall be used for
hotel purposes as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should
the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold,
conveyed, and transferred, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the
grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed,
and transferred to the grantee shall revert to the City of Manila, and said City of Manila shall thereupon become
entitled to immediate possession of said tract of land" (Sec. 5); that the construction of the rock and timber
bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said
proposed Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila
Bay at the expense of the Insular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to borrow
from the Insular Government ... the sum of three hundred thousand pesos, to be expended in the construction of
Luneta extension provided for by paragraph (a) of section one hereof" (Sec.7).
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same
having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the
grantee. 33 One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a
gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that
reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public. 34 This reason for strict interpretation obtains
relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and
timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed
would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material
dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included
would defeat the policy of the legislation.
The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of Manila. Property, however,
is either of public ownership or of private ownership. 35 What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is
it of public ownership (dominion) or of private ownership?
We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.
Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue
of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization to do so from the lawmaking
body. Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing without further limitations than those established by law." 36 The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's
property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that
the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without being authorized by the lawmaking body. Thus
the statute provides that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract ... at the north end, for a hotel
site, and to lease the same ... should the municipal board ... deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized ...to sell said
tract of land ... " (Sec. 5). If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it
without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside ... lease ... or sell ... given
by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute s to render the term "authorize," which is

repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must
be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part
thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous. 37 To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. 38 Act No. 1360
furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or
section," Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell
even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area
was granted to the City of Manila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a
hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and
the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.
TDC however, contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in Act No. 1360 to lease or sell was really to
limit the City's power of disposition. To sustain such contention is to beg the question. If the purpose of the law was
to limit the City's power of disposition then it is necessarily assumed that the City had already the power to dispose,
for if such power did not exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gave the City the power to
dispose for it was hereby authorized by lease of sale. Hence, the City of Manila had no power to dispose of the
reclaimed land had such power not been granted by Act No. 1360, and the purpose of the authorization was to
empower the city to sell or lease the northern part and not, as TDC claims, to limit only the power to dispose.
Moreover, it is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and
existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto. 39 If by
another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do if such area
were given to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a superfluity for Act No. 1360 to authorize the City
to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do
so, nor have we come across any. What we do know is that if the reclaimed land were patrimonial property, there
would be no need of giving special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said authorization was given because
the reclaimed land was not intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and without the express
authorization to dispose of the northern portion, the City could not dispose of even that part.
Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." 40 If the reclaimed area is an
extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been
said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. 41 It
is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila. 42 Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for
public use.
TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is
outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the term
"extension," for an "extension," it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction in length, breadth, or
circumstance." 43
Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea.
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the
national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to
Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain.
When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use,
according to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis. 44 The predecessor of the claimants in this case was
the owner of a big tract of land including the lots in question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due to the
action of the waters of Manila Bay. In 1901 the lots in question became completely submerged in water in ordinary

tides. It remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of the Vitas estuary and
dumped the Sand and - silt from estuary on the low lands completely Submerged in water thereby gradually forming
the lots in question. Tomas Cabangis took possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed hence, the claimants,
his successors in interest, claimed that the lots belonged to them. The trial court found for the claimants and the
Government appealed. This Court held that when the lots became a part of the shore. As they remained in that
condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government, they belonged to the public domain. for public use .
4' Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose a part of the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use
after it was reclaimed.
Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel
sites. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the
southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not
authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more
imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila
be, as above stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal
corporation, as happens in this case where the city is author ized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta
extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the
objectives of the corporation.
Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in provinces and in towns,
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the promenades, and public
works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta,
is undoubtedly comprised in said article.
The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that the character of property for public
use may be so attached to a plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the
subject property was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it
could not be property for public use. It should be noted, however, that properties of provinces and towns for public
use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain. 46 In
order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient. 47 The, petitioners'
contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in his comments", on Article 344, that: +.wph!1
Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos correspondent sin duda aiguna aldominio publico municipal ),
porque se hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y estan destinadas al uso de todos Laurent
presenta tratando de las plazas, una question relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de dominio
publico los lugares vacios libres, que se encuenttan en los Municipios rurales ... Laurent opina
contra Pioudhon que toda vez que estan al servicio de todos pesos lugares, deben considerable
publicos y de dominion publico. Realmente, pala decidir el punto, bastara siempre fijarse en el
destino real y efectivo de los citados lugares, y si este destino entraa un uso comun de todos, no
hay duda que son de dominio publico municipal si no patrimoniales.
It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered
property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been shown that the
intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of
patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.
We have demonstrated ad satietatem that the Luneta extension as intended to be property of the City of Manila for
public use. But, could not said property-later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It

could be. But this Court has already said, in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, 49 the executive and possibly the
legislation department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property, is no longer
required for public use, and until such declaration i made the property must continue to form paint of the public
domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration It should be noted,
furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are undoubted v not. primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to
determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters . 50
Having disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the main issue, we now pass to the items of
circumstantial evidence which TDC claims may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent in the enactment of
Act No. 1360, as amended. It is noteworthy that all these items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far
removed in time from the date of the enactment of Act No.1360 such that they cannot be considered
contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not farfetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might
have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, to wit: the City's having obtained over the reclaimed
area OCT No. 1909 on January 20,1911; the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761;
and the issuance to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It cannot gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the
circumstantial evidence have been base on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles
S they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in enacting Act No. 1360 and its amendatory act.
TDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the subject property is not a park.
Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and vicinity showing proposed development" dated May 14, 1949, were prepared
by the National Urban Planning Commission of the Office of the President. It cannot be reasonably expected that
this plan for development of the Luneta should show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public
park, for it was made 38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been issued to Elks. It is to be
assumed that the Office of the President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE. That the subject property was
not included as a part of the Luneta only indicated that the National Urban Planning Commission that made the plan
knew that the subject property was occupied by Elks and that Elks had a Torrens title thereto. But this in no way
proves that the subject property was originally intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or that the
sale to Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.
Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for Tarlac Development Company." It was
made on November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz, private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for
TDC. 51 This plan cannot be expected to show that the subject property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was
made to show the lot that "was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have also assumed the existence of a valid
title to the land in favor of Elks.
Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations No. 234 issued on November 15, 1955 and No. 273
issued on October 4, 1967, respectively. The purpose of the said Proclamations was to reserve certain parcels of land
situated in the District of Ermita, City of Manila, for park site purposes. Assuming that the subject property is not
within the boundaries of the reservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the subject property was not
originally intended to be for public use or that it has ceased to be such. Conversely, had the subject property been
included in the reservation, it would mean, if it really were private property, that the rights of the owners thereof
would be extinguished, for the reservations was "subject to private rights, if any there be." That the subject property
was not included in the reservation only indicates that the President knew of the existence of the Torrens titles
mentioned above. The failure of the Proclamations to include the subject property in the reservation for park site
could not change the character of the subject property as originally for public use and to form part of the Luneta
Park. What has been said here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also refer to the area and
location of the reservation for the Luneta Park.

Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935, covering the lot where now stands the
American Embassy [Chancery]. It states that the property is "bounded ... on the Northwest by properties of Army
and Navy Club (Block No.321) and Elks Club (Block No. 321)." Inasmuch as the said bounderies delineated by the
Philippine Legislature in Act No. 4269, the petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized and conceded the
existence of the Elks Club property as a primate property (the property in question) and not as a public park or plaza.
This argument is non sequitur plain and simple Said Original Certificate of Title cannot be considered as an
incontrovertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention
as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void.
TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale it executed on July
13,'1911 conconveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE. This contention cannot be
seriously defended in the light of the doctrine repeatedly enunciated by this Court that the Government is never
estopped by mistakes or errors on the pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to
validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against Republic policy, and the sale of July 13, 1911 executed by
the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged
even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had
performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case
would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 52
The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and
inexistent for lack of subject matter. 53 It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse
of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale.
Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No.
761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract at all.
The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first
vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its suceessors, including the TDC which are not
protected the doctrine of bona fide ii purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC does not apply where
there is a total absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none
exists. 55
The so-called sale of the subject property having been executed, the restoration or restitution of what has been given
is order 56
SECOND ISSUE
The second ground alleged in support of the instant petitions for review on certiorari is that the Court of Appeals has
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the power of
supervision. TDC in L-41012, argues that the respondent Court did not make its own findings but simply recited
those of the lower court and made a general affirmance, contrary to the requirements of the Constitution; that the
respondent Court made glaring and patent mistakes in recounting even the copied findings, palpably showing lack of
deliberate consideration of the matters involved, as, for example, when said court said that Act No. 1657 authorized
the City of Manila to set aside a portion of the reclaimed land "formed by the Luneta Extension of- to lease or sell
the same for park purposes;" and that respondent Court. further more, did not resolve or dispose of any of the
assigned errors contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act.. 57
The Manila Lodge No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the reasons warranting review, that the Court of
Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedings by simply making a general affirmance

of the court a quo findings without bothering to resolve several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned
errors. 58
COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUE
We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law.
To follows that when such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the affirmance was likewise in
accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be served in further discussing the second issue.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

1.

WHAT LANDS CAPABLE TO REGISTER?

___________________________________
2.

HOW LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN OPENS FOR OWNERSHIP?

ACT No. 2874

As amended by Acts Nos. 3164, 3219, 3346, and 3517TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE
LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 7. For the purpose of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the GovernorGeneral, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this, Act.
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited
and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands
of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or
may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature.
Section 9. For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural

(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.

(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes.
(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses.
The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time make the classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner,
transfer lands from one class to another.
Section 10. The words "alienation,'' "disposition," or "Concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the
methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than
timber or mineral lands.

Section 3 Article 13 of Constitution.

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential
use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share
in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and
growth

Section 8 COMMONWEALTH ACT.141

Section8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited
and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the
public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may,
for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly.

DELIMITED AND CLASSIFIED?

BAGUNU VS AGGABAO
The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit
(respondents) against the petitioners free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan,
Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista
(Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent3 over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now
Lands Management Bureau).4 On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner,5 who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land
sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application. 6
The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey,7 and the free patent
applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also
uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.8
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The
respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June
23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.9
The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal
investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in
dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]."10
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent
application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included
in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical
description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.11
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in determining
the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling. Since the boundaries
indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner
acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322. 12

On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed13 the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in
the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed
by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on
the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the
petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
COURT OF APPEALS RULING
The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that
since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the
findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if
not finality.15 The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.
Civil Case No. 751
In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a
complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the
civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds
evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds,
nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.16
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of the
land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss. 17
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil
case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned the
respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages. 18 The respondents alleged
that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also
alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully
acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them
from Lot 322 after transferring his possession from Lot 258.19 The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as
owners of Lot 322.
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents asked
the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.20 In their prayer, the
respondents asked the RTC to:
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx
for reformation of contracts be granted;
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot
322 xxx.
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]
THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties
conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By
ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the
respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership over a real property
matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine.
The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right
over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves
interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions,
which are matters within the competence of the courts.
The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the evidence.
The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the
same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a
survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has
been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of
Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation.
The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322,
based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the
respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322
from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware
of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only
in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents
inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents
presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.
In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration,
confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.
THE RULING
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA in identifying the
parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the
subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009
Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the
CAs application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45
petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the

identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the parties
respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the
general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls
within the recognized exceptions.21 On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of
Lands22 on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,23and
even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine
our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to manage and
dispose of lands of the public domain
The petitioner insists that under the law24 actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation
of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his
authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for
a free patent over the same lot.
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their
true intention.25 In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third
sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the
plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his
ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.26
While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve
controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party
has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by
mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting
their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the
Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land27 whose
management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4,
Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 29228 reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and,
in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy
and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve
as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,29 the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty,
among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No.

141)30 by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the
petitioners free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve
the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and
management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free
patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of
a free patent31 in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.)
Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public
lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary
and the Director of Lands,32 unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its
jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, 33 such as the distinct cause of action
for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property,
identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain
to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to
the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does
not sanction a split of jurisdiction34
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out
of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them
as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular
expertise.35
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of
who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. He posits
that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent
Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact 36
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However,
if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be

obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view."37
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It
need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are
threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily
served.38 (Emphases added.)
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence
and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively
resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to
Executive Order No. 192,39 the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.40
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not
divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their
respective possessions and occupations),41 the respondents complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue
of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover
possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.1avvphi1 Ineluctably, the
RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the
DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents entitlement to a free patent, following the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and his
consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of
sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42 which involves the
decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale
underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since
this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial
determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL VS LAO

This petition for review assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the
judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.
On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18,
an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she
acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited
it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same
from Edilberto Perido by transfer.
In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open, public, actual,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for
more than thirty (30) years.
At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on
the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of
the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her
application for registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 3 dated April 19,
1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property, and
the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest.
On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:
x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and Ma.
Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land
for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the
realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land
patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as
technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural
and not within any forest zone or public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession
to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years. 4
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land
described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349)
square meters as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON
O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of
Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.6 Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:

THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE

OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.7
A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF
POSSESSION.8
B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER
CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.9
C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.10
In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of
evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession,
in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the
land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the
required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became
effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession remained the same.
RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940
amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set
forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the

classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court
of Appeals,11 we held that:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo
since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained.
However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later
enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the
President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,12 thus:
This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This
was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Petitioner argues that respondent failed to prove by incontrovertible evidence that she had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, in the concept of an owner, since June 12,
1945 or earlier. According to petitioner, respondents witnesses did not state the exact period when respondents
predecessors-in-interest started occupying the subject land. They only made sweeping statements to the effect that
respondent had been in possession of the property for more than thirty years. Hence, it can not be conclusively
determined whether respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have truly been in possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Furthermore, respondent failed to show how the property was transferred from Generosa
Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. No extrajudicial settlement of property was
established. Consequently, respondent can not tack her possession with those of Generosa Medina and her
predecessors-in-interest.
There is merit in the petition.
Candido Amoroso, respondents first witness, testified that he first knew of the property in 1932 and that it was
owned by a certain Edilberto Perido. However, no evidence was presented to support his claim. Respondent
submitted the tax declarations in the name of her predecessors-in-interest, including that of Edilberto. However, the
earliest of these documents pertained to the year 1948 only, three years short of the required period. Respondents
other witness, Vicente Laudato, claimed that he had known about the property since he was ten years old, which was

in 1945, and that Edilberto Perido owned the property. On cross-examination, however, he testified that he based his
information on Edilbertos ownership of the land on the fact that the latter used to greet him and his family
whenever he passed by their house. Vicente later on admitted that he did not know with certainty whether Edilberto
was indeed the owner and possessor of the property.13
Finally, respondent failed to present the extrajudicial settlement or other document evidencing the transfer of the
land from Generosa Medina to Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela. She likewise did not show the
relationship between these parties. She only presented the deed of sale between her and the latter, where it was
stated that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria inherited the property from Generosa. Hence, respondent can not tack her
possession with those of Generosa and her predecessors-in-interest. At most, respondents possession can only be
reckoned from the time that Raymundo and Ma. Victoria claimed possession of the property.
Respondent having thus failed to show by incontrovertible evidence that her possession of the land commenced on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, she failed to meet the first requisite under the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and CA 141.
Petitioner further submits that respondent failed to show that the land subject of her application is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our
Constitution,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land.15 All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.16 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.17 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 18
In De Ocampo v. Arlos,19 it was held that:
x x x a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to
alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and
technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.
Respondent argues that she was not required to present any certification stating that the land is open for disposition
because no opposition to her application was ever made by the appropriate government agencies. She claims that in
the absence of any proof to the contrary, lands of the public domain are agricultural in nature and thus susceptible to
private ownership.
As an applicant for registration of a parcel of land, respondent had the initial obligation to show that the property
involved is agricultural. Being the interested party, it was incumbent upon her to prove that the land being registered
is indeed alienable or disposable. She cannot rely on the mere presumption that it was agricultural and, therefore,
alienable part of the public domain.20 Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtilar,21 we held:

It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for
registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified
forest zone. The ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications
for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Moreover, the absence of opposition from the government agencies is of no moment because the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.22
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and positive act from the government. 23 It cannot be presumed;
but must be established by convincing proof.24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 56230 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for original registration of title over Lot No.
3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, which was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TG-719
before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL VS LAO (DIGESTED VERSION)

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the
land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa
Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto
Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land
Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented
witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax
declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by
the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this
petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance
of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law
and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the qualifications required by law on
the manner of possession (continuous, adverse, notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a
bonafide claim of ownership under C.A. 141?
Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable
land of the public domain?
Ruling:

The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the
applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land subject of the
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent
did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law.
She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the property. No
extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship
between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any certification from
appropriate government agency to show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the
public domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible evidences to
support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition
was granted and her application was denied.

DCD vs Republic of the Philippines

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated June 25,
2007 and Resolution2 dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868. The CA
reversed the Decision3 dated August 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch 25 in LRC
No. 147 (LRA Rec. No. N-73333).
On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D. Dira, Jr., filed a
verified application for registration4 of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Danao City with an area of 4,493 square
meters designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, CAD 681-D. It was alleged that applicant which acquired the
property by purchase, together with its predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse, public,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property for more than thirty (30) years.
Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially confirmed.
After compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, the trial court through its clerk of court conducted hearings
for the reception of petitioners evidence. Based on petitioners documentary and testimonial evidence, it appears
that although designated as Cadastral Lot No. 5331-part, the approved technical description indicated the lot number
as Lot 30186, CAD 681-D which is allegedly identical to Lot 21225-A, Csd-07-006621 consisting of 3,781 square
meters. Lot 5331-part (4,493 sq. ms.) was subdivided into two (Lots 21225-A and 21225-B) so that the 712 square
meters (Lot 21225-B) can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 97-05.5
Andrea Batucan Enriquez, one of the six (6) children of Vivencio and Paulina Batucan, testified that her parents
originally owned the subject land which was bought by her father after the Second World War. Vivencio and Paulina
died on April 2, 1967 and November 11, 1980, respectively. Upon the death of their parents, she and her siblings
inherited the land which they possessed and declared for tax purposes. On December 22, 1993, they executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With Absolute Sale whereby they sold the property to Danilo C. Dira, Sr.,
petitioners father.6
Danilo D. Dira, Jr. testified that the subject land declared under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 0400583 in the name of
Danilo C. Dira, Sr. was among those properties which they inherited from his father, as shown in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate With Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 1996 and Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate dated February 27, 1997. On June 26, 2000, his mother, brothers and sisters executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale whereby the subject land was sold to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner declared the property for tax purposes and
also paid realty taxes. His father had possessed the land beginning 1992 or 1994, and presently petitioner is in

possession thereof. Petitioner also assumed the P3.8 million mortgage obligation with Land Bank of the Philippines
as evidenced by the Deed of Undertaking/Agreement dated March 30, 2000.7
On August 22, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all of the foregoing undisputed facts, this Court finds and so holds that the applicant DCD
CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to Lot No. 5331-A with an area of 3,781 square meters as part of
Lot 5331, CAD-681-D, under Csd-072223-003891 which is identical to Lot No. 21225-A as part of Lot No. 21225,
CAD-681-D, under Csd-07-006621, and is covered by Tax Declaration No. 0-0400469 situated in Taytay, Danao
City, hereby confirming the same and ordering its registration under Act 496, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1529, strictly in line with the Technical Description of Lot 30186, Danao, CAD-681-D, identical to Lot 21225A, Csd-07-006621, upon finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal by respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA ruled that the evidence
failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and disposable considering that only a notation in the survey
plan was presented to show the status of the property. The CA also found that petitioners evidence was insufficient
to establish the requisite possession as the land was bought by Vivencio Batucan only after the Second World War or
in 1946, further noting that the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued only in 1988. As to the testimony of
witness Andrea Batucan Enriquez, the CA held that it did not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court raising the following
arguments:
I
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE LAND APPLIED FOR IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
WHICH WARRANTS A REVIEW BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULING IN MEGAWORLD AND HOLDINGS, INC. VS. HON. JUDGE BENEDICTO G. COBARDE, ET AL.
AND SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, ET AL.
(A) THE BUREAU OF LANDS VERIFIED AND CERTIFIED THE SUBJECT LOT AS "ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE".
(B) THE DENR CERTIFIED THAT ITS OWN LAND CLASSIFICATION MAP SHOWS THAT
SUBJECT LOT IS "WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA".
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SETTLED
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
PROVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW HAS
BEEN COMPLIED WITH, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:

(A) WITNESS ANDREA ENRIQUEZS TESTIMONY SHOWS THAT PETITIONERS

PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST ACQUIRED AND POSSESSED SUBJECT LOT IN 1942.
(B) IN REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. SPOUSES ENRIQUEZ, THE SUPREME COURT
CATEGORICALLY RULED THAT POSSESSION FOR 34 YEARS IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR REGISTRATION.9
We deny the petition.
In Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v. Cobarde,10 the Court held that as an exception to the binding effect of
the trial courts factual findings which were affirmed by the CA, a review of such factual findings may be made
when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain relevant facts
that would lead to a completely different conclusion. In the same vein, we declared in Superlines Transportation
Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company,11 that while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of
facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties, a number of
exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the Court, such as when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Petitioner invokes the foregoing exceptions
urging this Court to pass upon anew the CAs findings regarding the status of the subject land and compliance with
the required character and duration of possession by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.
After a thorough review, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that petitioner failed to establish
a registrable title on the subject land.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945.12
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.13 All lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.14 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable and disposable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.15 Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.16
In support of its contention that Lot 5331-A, CAD-681-D under Csd-072223-003891 is alienable and disposable,
petitioner presented the following notation appearing in the survey plan which reads:
CONFORMED PER LC MAP NOTATION
LC Map No. 1321, Project No. 26-A certified on June 07, 1938, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area
(SGD.) CYNTHIA L. IBAEZ
Chief, Map Projection Section17
Petitioner assailed the CA in refusing to give weight to the above certification, stressing that the DENR-Lands
Management Services (LMS) approved the survey plan in its entirety, "without any reservation as to the inaccuracy

or incorrectness of Cynthia L. Ibaez[s] annotation found therein."18 Petitioner relies on the statement of Rafaela
A. Belleza, Chief, Surveys Assistance Section, DENR-LMS, who testified (direct examination) as follows:
Atty. Paylado continues:
Q Before this is given to the surveyor, did these two (2) documents pass your office?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you said it passed your office, it passed your office as you have to verify all the entries in these documents
whether they are correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to have a personal look and verification on these Exhibits "P" and "Q" and will you confirm that all
the entries here are true and correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Based on the records in your office?
A As a whole.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner contends that the foregoing declaration of Belleza conclusively proves that the LMS itself had approved
and adopted the notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan as its own. Such approval amounts to a positive act of
the government indicating that the land applied for is indeed alienable and disposable.
We do not agree.
First, it must be clarified that the survey plan (Exhibit "Q") was not offered by petitioner as evidence of the lands
classification as alienable and disposable. The formal offer of exhibits stated that said document and entries therein
were offered for the purpose of proving the identity of the land, its metes and bounds, boundaries and adjacent lots;
and that the survey has passed and was approved by the DENR-LMS. And while it was also stated therein that the
evidence is also being offered as part of the testimony of Belleza, nowhere in her testimony do we find a
confirmation of the notation concerning the lands classification as correct. In fact, said witness denied having any
participation in the actual approval of the survey plan. This can be gleaned from her testimony on cross-examination
which immediately followed the afore-quoted portion of her testimony that the survey plan "passed" their office,
thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION: (FISCAL KYAMKO TO THE WITNESS)
Q Madam Witness, you said that Exhibits "P" and "Q" passed before your office, now, the question is, could you
possibly inform the Court whether you have some sort of an initial on the two (2) documents or the two (2) exhibits?

A Actually, sir, I am not a part of this approval because this will undergo in the isolated survey and my section is I
am the Chief, Surveys Assistant Section, which concerns of the LRA, issuance of Certified Sketch Plans, issuance of
certified Technical Descriptions of Untitled Lots to correct the titles for judicial purpose.
Q In other words, since Exhibits "P" and "Q" are originals, they did not actually pass your office, is it not?
A Our office, yes, but not in my section, sir.
Q So it passed your office but it did not pass your section?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, you had [no] hand in re-naming or renumbering of the subject lots, is it not?
A It is in the Isolated Survey Section, sir.
Q In other words, you cannot possibly testify with authority as to the manner by which the numbering of the subject
lot was renumbered, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to the veracity of the
notation made by Ibaez on the survey plan regarding the status of the subject land. Hence, no error was committed
by the CA in finding that the certification made by DENR-LMS pertained only to the technical correctness of the
survey plotted in the survey plan and not to the nature and character of the property surveyed.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; and administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.22 A certification issued by a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that the lots involved
were found to be within the alienable and disposable area was deemed sufficient to show the real character of the
land.23
As to notations appearing in the subdivision plan of the lot stating that it is within the alienable and disposable area,
the consistent holding is that these do not constitute proof required by the law.24 In Menguito v. Republic,25the Court
declared:
x x x petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation x x x indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification
of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying
solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable.26
The above ruling equally applies in this case where the notation on the survey plan is supposedly made by the Chief
of Map Projection Unit of the DENR-LMS. Such certification coming from an officer of the DENR-LMS is still

insufficient to establish the classification of the property surveyed. It is not shown that the notation was the result of
an investigation specifically conducted by the DENR-LMS to verify the status of the subject land. The certifying
officer, Cynthia L. Ibaez, did not testify on her findings regarding the classification of the lot as reflected in her
notation on the survey plan. As to the testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, the CA noted that Engr.
Norvic Abella who prepared the survey plan had no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain, while Rafaela
A. Belleza who is the Chief of the Surveys Assistance Section, admitted on cross-examination that she had no part in
the approval of the subdivision plan, and hence incompetent to testify as to the correctness of Ibaezs notation.
More important, petitioner failed to establish the authority of Cynthia L. Ibaez to issue certifications on land
classification status for purpose of land registration proceedings.
Our pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.27 is instructive:
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(CENRO), Batangas City, certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925."
The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical
Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an
alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO
No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the
authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this
case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares
(564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square
meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and
disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of
land classification. x x x
xxxx
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to
the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for
land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is

alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated
therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value
in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have
attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications
are not even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and
thus have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls
within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do
not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima
facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
x x x x28 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the notation inserted in the survey plan (Exhibit "Q") hardly satisfies the
incontrovertible proof required by law on the classification of land applied for registration.
The CA likewise correctly held that there was no compliance with the required possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner," are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the applicant to prove by clear, positive
and convincing evidence that the alleged possession was of the nature and duration required by law.29The bare
statement of petitioners witness, Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of the subject
land from the time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice.

Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of petitioners father, TD No. 0400583 was issued only in 1994, while TD
No. 0-0400469 in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners predecessors-in-interest were able to submit a tax
declaration only for the year 1988, which was long after both spouses Vivencio and Paulina Batucan have died.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.30 And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez claimed
knowledge of their familys possession since she was just ten (10) years old although she said she was born in
1932 -- there was no clear and convincing evidence of such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never mentioned any act of occupation, development, cultivation or
maintenance over the property throughout the alleged length of possession.31 There was no account of the
circumstances regarding their fathers acquisition of the land, whether their father introduced any improvements or
farmed the land, and if they established residence or built any house thereon.
We have held that the bare claim of the applicant that the land applied for had been in the possession of her
predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence
required in land registration.32 1avvphi1
As the Court declared in Republic v. Alconaba:33
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the allencompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must
not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.34 (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated June 25, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77868 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PROCLAMATION NO. 1801

Declaring Certain Islands, Coves and Peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist Zones and Marine Reserve Under the
administration and Control of the Philippine Tourism authority
WHEREAS, the Philippines abound with natural beauty and potentials for aquatic sports, tourism and marine life
conservation;
WHEREAS, these natural marine resources offer great potential and tremendous advantage in the growing
worldwide interest in aquatic sports;
WHEREAS, lack of proper government control resulted in ecological imbalance to the marine environment;

WHEREAS, said islands require the concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in the
development of their tourism potential;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the following islands, coves and peninsulas as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of
PD-564: cdtai
I. Whole of Batangas Coastline and the Offshore Islands of:
Fortune Island
Maricaban Island
Gaban Island
Sombrero Island
Ligpo Island
Malahibong Manok
Verde Island
II. Fuga Island, Cagayan Province
III. Oriental Mindoro
Puerto Galera
a. Port Galera
b. Balatero Cove
c. Medio Island
Bulalakao
a. Buyayao Island
b. Aslom Island
c. Bating Peninsula
d. Maasim Island
e. Balatasan Cove

f. Pocanol Island
g. Opao Island
h. Buyallao Peninsula
i. Suguicay Island
j. Libago Island
k. Sibalat Island
l. Pambaron Island
m. Apo Reef and Islands
IV. Boracay Islands, Aklan casia
V. Dumaguete
Apo Island
Siquijor Island
Selinog Island (between Negros & Cebu)
Aligway Island
VI. Cebu
Gaubian Island and vicinity (SE of Mactan Island)
Olango Island, Sulpa Island, Hilutungan Island, Lasuan Island, Caohangan Island, Pangan (SE of Mactan)
Buyong Beach (Maribago, Mactan Island)
Sogod (North of Cebu City)
VII. Tagbilaran (Bohol)
Panglao Island
Cabilao Island
Balicasag Island
VIII. Tacloban

Guian, Eastern Samar

Gigantangan Island, NW tip of Leyte
IX. Palawan
Busuangan Island
Coron Island
Puerto Princesa & Surrounding areas
Malampaya Sound and Islands
Canaron Island
Solitario Island
Bacuit Bay Island
Balabac Island
Fort Bunton
Busuangga Island
X. Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental
Al-Sulnuan Point (West of Cagayan de Oro City)
Camiguin Island
XI. Zamboanga
Big and small Sta. Cruz Island
Sangali Cove
Sacol Island
Ayala/San Ramon
Malanipa Island
XII. Davao cd
Maliputo Island - Talicud Island

Ligid Island 3. Eastern side of Samal Island

No development projects or construction for any purposes shall be introduced within the zones without prior
approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
The PTA shall delineate well defined geographic areas within the zones with potential tourism value, promulgate
rules and regulations subject to the approval of the President, and coordinate the integrated development of these
areas for the optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities.
All proclamations, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
casia
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be
affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

Republic Act No. 9323

AN ACT RECLASSIFYING A PARCEL OF TIMBERLAND LOCATED IN BARANGAY ATABAY,
MUNICIPALITY OF HILONGOS, PROVINCE OF LEYTE, AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE LAND
FOR RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER PRODUCTIVE PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The parcel of timberland located in Barangay Atabay, Municipality of Hilongos, Province of Leyte,
identified under Hilongos Cadastre, CAD. 566-, Case 1, CM 10 22N 124 44 E Sections 1 and 2 per Land
Classification Map No. 2994, Block D, Timberland Leyte Project No. 18, certified on February 22, 1982 per LC
Map No. 829 dated September 25, 1929 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby
declared as alienable or disposable land for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes.
With a total area of twenty-one (21) hectares and six thousand eight hundred ninety (6,890) square meters, more or
less, said parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
Tie Line: From BLLM No. 1, 566-D, Hilongos, Leyte Cadastre to corner 1 is S. 80-18 W., 448.51 meters.

1-2

S. 26 16 E.

218.91 m.

2-3

S. 50 13 W.

177.96 m.

3-4

N. 45 03 W.

248.07 m.

4-5

N. 52 50 W.

250.91 m.

56

N. 57 30 W.

306.34 m.

67

N. 48 49 W.

160.18 m.

78

N. 55 20 E.

81.21 m.

89

N. 80 42 E.

157.33 m.

9 10

S. 53 59 E.

224.66 m.

10 11

N. 81 50 E.

163.38 m.

11 1

N. 42 31 E.

339.51 m.

Section 2. Within six (6) months following the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of
this Act.chan robles virtual law library
Section 3. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.