BRRD Bilingv

12.6.
2014 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 173/190
12.6.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 173/190
DIRECTIVA 2014/59/UE A PARLAMENTULUI

EUROPEAN I A CONSILIULUI
din 15 mai 2014
de instituire a unui cadru pentru redresarea i rezoluia
instituiilor de credit i a firmelor de investiii i de
modificare a Directivei 82/891/CEE a Consiliului i a
Directivelor 2001/24/CE, 2002/47/CE, 2004/25/CE,
2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE, 2012/30/UE i
2013/36/UE ale Parlamentului European i ale
Consiliului, precum i a Regulamentelor (UE) nr.
1093/2010 i (UE) nr. 648/2012 ale Parlamentului
European i ale Consiliului
(Text cu relevan pentru SEE)
PARLAMENTUL EUROPEAN I CONSILIUL UNIUNII
EUROPENE,
avnd n vedere Tratatul privind funcionarea Uniunii
Europene, n special articolul 114,
avnd n vedere propunerea Comisiei Europene,
DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU OF THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 15 May 2014
establishing a framework for the recovery and
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms
and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU
and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010
and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament
and of the Council
dup transmiterea proiectului de act legislativ ctre

parlamentele naionale,
avnd n vedere avizul Bncii Centrale Europene (1),
avnd n vedere avizul Comitetului Economic i Social
European (2),
hotrnd n conformitate cu procedura legislativ ordinar
(3),
ntruct:
(1) | Criza financiar a demonstrat c exist o lips
semnificativ de instrumente adecvate la nivelul Uniunii
pentru a gestiona n mod eficient situaia institu iilor de
credit i a firmelor de investiii neviabile sau n curs de a
intra n dificultate (denumite n continuare instituii).
Aceste instrumente sunt necesare n special pentru a preveni
insolvena sau, n cazul n care aceasta se produce, pentru a
reduce la minimum consecinele negative prin meninerea
funciilor de importan sistemic ale instituiei n cauz. Pe
parcursul crizei, aceste provocri au reprezentat un factor
major care a forat statele membre s salveze instituiile prin
utilizarea banilor contribuabililor. Obiectivul unui cadru de
redresare i rezoluie credibil este acela de a evita pe ct
posibil necesitatea unei astfel de msuri.
(2) | Criza financiar a cunoscut dimensiuni sistemice n
sensul c a afectat accesul la finanare pentru multe institu ii
de credit. Pentru a evita intrarea n dificultate, cu consecin e
pentru ntreaga economie, o astfel de criz necesit msuri
menite s asigure accesul la finanare, n condi ii
asemntoare pentru toate instituiile de credit altfel
solvabile. Msurile respective implic un aport general de
BRRD Directiva 59/2014
(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European
Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the
national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central
Bank (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic
and Social Committee (2),
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure (3),
Whereas:
(1) | The financial crisis has shown that there is a
significant lack of adequate tools at Union level to deal
effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions and
investment firms (institutions). Such tools are needed,
in particular, to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency
occurs, to minimise negative repercussions by preserving
the systemically important functions of the institution
concerned. During the crisis, those challenges were a
major factor that forced Member States to save
institutions using taxpayers money. The objective of a
credible recovery and resolution framework is to obviate
the need for such action to the greatest extent possible.
(2) | The financial crisis was of systemic dimension in

the sense that it affected the access to funding of a large
proportion of credit institutions. To avoid failure, with
consequences for the overall economy, such a crisis
necessitates measures aiming to secure access to funding
under equivalent conditions for all credit institutions that
are otherwise solvent. Such measures involve liquidity
1
lichiditate din partea bncilor centrale i garan ii din partea

statelor membre pentru titlurile de valoare emise de
instituiile de credit solvabile.
(3) | Pieele financiare din Uniune prezint un nivel ridicat de
integrare i de interconectare, multe institu ii desf urndu- i
deseori operaiunile dincolo de graniele na ionale. Intrarea
n dificultate a unei instituii transfrontaliere este susceptibil
de a afecta stabilitatea pieelor financiare din statele membre
n care i desfoar activitatea. Incapacitatea statelor
membre de a prelua controlul instituiilor n curs de a intra n
dificultate i de a proceda la rezoluia acestora astfel nct s
se evite n mod eficient producerea de daune sistemice mai
extinse poate submina ncrederea reciproc a statelor
membre, precum i credibilitatea pieei interne a serviciilor
financiare. Stabilitatea pieelor financiare este, prin urmare,
o condiie esenial pentru instituirea i funcionarea pie ei
interne.
(4) | n prezent, procedurile de rezoluie a institu iilor nu sunt
armonizate la nivelul Uniunii. Unele state membre aplic n
cazul instituiilor aceleai proceduri pe care le aplic altor
societi insolvabile; aceste proceduri sunt uneori adaptate
pentru instituiile. Exist mari diferene de la un stat membru
la altul n ceea ce privete fondul i procedurile prevzute n
actele cu putere de lege i actele administrative care
reglementeaz insolvena instituiilor din statele membre. n
plus, criza financiar a demonstrat faptul c procedurile
generale de insolven nu sunt ntotdeauna adecvate pentru
instituiile, deoarece ele nu asigur ntotdeauna o intervenie
suficient de rapid, meninerea funciilor critice ale institu iei
ori pstrarea stabilitii financiare.
(5) | Este prin urmare necesar instituirea unui regim care s

ofere autoritilor un set credibil de instrumente pentru a
interveni suficient de timpuriu i de rapid n cazul unei
instituii neviabile sau n curs de a intra n dificultate, astfel
nct s garanteze continuitatea funciilor financiare i
economice critice ale acesteia, reducnd n acela i timp la
minimum impactul situaiei de dificultate a instituiei asupra
economiei i a sistemului financiar. Acest regim ar trebui s
garanteze faptul c acionarii sunt cei care suport pierderile
primii, iar creditorii suport pierderi ulterior acionarilor, cu
condiia ca pierderile suferite de fiecare creditor s nu
depeasc pierderile care ar fi fost suferite de acesta dac
instituia ar fi fost lichidat n cadrul unei proceduri
obinuite de insolven, n conformitate cu principiul potrivit
cruia niciun creditor nu trebuie s fie dezavantajat, astfel
cum este specificat n prezenta directiv. Noi competen e ar
trebui s permit autoritilor, de exemplu, s menin un
acces nentrerupt la depozite i la opera iunile de plat, s
vnd dup caz activitile viabile ale instituiei i s
support from central banks and guarantees from Member

States for securities issued by solvent credit institutions.
(3) | Union financial markets are highly integrated and
interconnected with many institutions operating
extensively beyond national borders. The failure of a
cross-border institution is likely to affect the stability of
financial markets in the different Member States in
which it operates. The inability of Member States to
seize control of a failing institution and resolve it in a
way that effectively prevents broader systemic damage
can undermine Member States mutual trust and the
credibility of the internal market in the field of financial
services. The stability of financial markets is, therefore,
an essential condition for the establishment and
functioning of the internal market.
(4) | There is currently no harmonisation of the
procedures for resolving institutions at Union level.
Some Member States apply to institutions the same
procedures that they apply to other insolvent enterprises,
which in certain cases have been adapted for institutions.
There are considerable substantial and procedural
differences between the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions which govern the insolvency of
institutions in the Member States. In addition, the
financial crisis has exposed the fact that general
corporate insolvency procedures may not always be
appropriate for institutions as they may not always
ensure sufficient speed of intervention, the continuation
of the critical functions of institutions and the
preservation of financial stability.
(5) | A regime is therefore needed to provide authorities
with a credible set of tools to intervene sufficiently early
and quickly in an unsound or failing institution so as to
ensure the continuity of the institutions critical financial
and economic functions, while minimising the impact of
an institutions failure on the economy and financial
system. The regime should ensure that shareholders bear
losses first and that creditors bear losses after
shareholders, provided that no creditor incurs greater
losses than it would have incurred if the institution had
been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings in
accordance with the no creditor worse off principle as
specified in this Directive. New powers should enable
authorities, for example, to maintain uninterrupted access
to deposits and payment transactions, sell viable portions
of the institution where appropriate, and apportion losses
in a manner that is fair and predictable. Those objectives
should help avoid destabilising financial markets and
minimise the costs for taxpayers.
2
repartizeze pierderile n mod corect i previzibil. Aceste

obiective ar trebui s contribuie la evitarea destabilizrii
pieelor financiare i s reduc la minimum costurile pentru
contribuabili.
(6) | Revizuirea n curs a cadrului de reglementare, n special
consolidarea rezervelor de capital i de lichidit i, precum i
mbuntirea
instrumentelor
pentru
politicile
macroprudeniale, ar trebui s reduc probabilitatea unor
crize viitoare i s mbunteasc reziliena instituiilor la
situaii de tensiuni economice, cauzate fie de perturbri
sistemice, fie de evenimente specifice fiecrei institu ii. Cu
toate acestea, nu este posibil s se elaborareze un cadru de
reglementare i de supraveghere care s evite ca institu iile
respective s se confrunte vreodat cu situaii dificile. Prin
urmare, statele membre ar trebui s fie pregtite i s dispun
de instrumente adecvate de redresare i rezoluie pentru a
face fa situaiilor care implic att crize sistemice, ct i
intrri n dificultate ale instituiilor individuale. Astfel de
instrumente ar trebui s includ mecanisme care s permit
autoritilor s gestioneze n mod eficient situaia instituiilor
care sunt n curs de a intra n dificultate sau sunt susceptibile
de a intra n dificultate.
(7) | Exercitarea unor astfel de competen e i msurile luate
ar trebui s ia n considerare circumstanele n care se
produce intrarea n dificultate. Dac problema apare ntr-o
anumit instituie, iar restul sistemului financiar nu este
afectat, autoritile ar trebui s-i exercite competen ele de
rezoluie fr a se preocupa de efectele de contagiere. ntr-un
mediu fragil, pe de alt parte, ar trebui s se acorde o mai
mare atenie pentru a evita destabilizarea pie elor financiare.
(8) | Rezoluia unei instituii care i menine activitatea
poate, n ultim instan, s implice instrumente publice de
stabilizare financiar, inclusiv trecerea temporar n
proprietatea public. De aceea, este esenial s se structureze
competenele de rezoluie i facilitile de finan are pentru
rezoluie astfel nct contribuabilii s fie beneficiarii oricrui
surplus care poate rezulta din restructurarea unei institu ii
care este readus pe un curs sigur de ctre autorit i.
Responsabilitatea i asumarea riscurilor ar trebui s fie
recompensate.
(9) | Unele state membre au adoptat deja modificri
legislative care introduc mecanisme de rezolu ie a
instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate; altele i-au
exprimat intenia de a adopta astfel de mecanisme, n cazul
n care ele nu sunt adoptate la nivel european. Absen a
condiiilor, competenelor i procedurilor comune de
rezoluie a instituiilor poate constitui un obstacol n calea
bunei funcionri a pieei interne i poate frna cooperarea
dintre autoritile naioanle n cazul grupurilor de institu ii
transfrontaliere n curs de a intra n dificultate. Acest lucru
(6) | The ongoing review of the regulatory framework, in

particular the strengthening of capital and liquidity
buffers and better tools for macro-prudential policies,
should reduce the likelihood of future crises and enhance
the resilience of institutions to economic stress, whether
caused by systemic disturbances or by events specific to
the individual institution. It is not possible, however, to
devise a regulatory and supervisory framework that can
prevent those institutions from ever getting into
difficulties. Member States should therefore be prepared
and have adequate recovery and resolution tools to
handle situations involving both systemic crises and
failures of individual institutions. Such tools should
include mechanisms that allow authorities to deal
effectively with institutions that are failing or likely to
fail.
(7) | The exercise of such powers and the measures taken

should take into account the circumstances in which the
failure occurs. If the problem arises in an individual
institution and the rest of the financial system is not
affected, authorities should be able to exercise their
resolution powers without much concern for contagion
effects. In a fragile environment, on the other hand,
greater care should be exercised to avoid destabilising
financial markets.
(8) | Resolution of an institution which maintains it as a
going concern may, as a last resort, involve government
financial stabilisation tools, including temporary public
ownership. It is therefore essential to structure the
resolution powers and the financing arrangements for
resolution in such a way that taxpayers are the
beneficiaries of any surplus that may result from the
restructuring of an institution that is put back on a safe
footing by the authorities. Responsibility and assumption
of risk should be accompanied by reward.
(9) | Some Member States have already enacted
legislative changes that introduce mechanisms to resolve
failing institutions; others have indicated their intention
to introduce such mechanisms if they are not adopted at
Union level. The absence of common conditions, powers
and processes for the resolution of institutions is likely to
constitute a barrier to the smooth operation of the
internal market and hinder cooperation between national
authorities when dealing with failing cross-border groups
of institutions. This is particularly true where different
3
este valabil atunci cnd, din cauza unor abordri diferite,

autoritile naioanle nu au acelai nivel de control sau
aceeai capacitate de a proceda la rezoluia institu iilor.
Aceste diferene ntre regimurile de rezolu ie pot afecta
costurile de finanare ale instituiilor de credit, n mod diferit
de la un stat la altul i pot crea denaturri ale concuren ei
ntre instituii. Existena unor regimuri de rezoluie eficiente
n toate statele membre este necesar pentru a garanta c
exercitarea de ctre instituii a drepturilor de stabilire pe care
le confer piaa intern nu poate fi limitat de capacitatea
financiar a statului membru de origine de a gestiona situaia
de dificultate a acestora.
(10) | Aceste obstacole ar trebui eliminate i ar trebui
adoptate norme care s garanteze c dispoziiile pie ei
interne nu sunt compromise. n acest scop, normele care
reglementeaz rezoluia instituiilor de credit ar trebui s
fac obiectul unor dispoziii comune minime de armonizare.
(11) | Pentru a asigura coerena cu legisla ia existent a
Uniunii n domeniul serviciilor financiare i pentru a garanta
tuturor instituiilor un nivel maxim de stabilitate financiar,
regimul de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice institu iilor care
fac obiectul cerinelor prudeniale prevzute n
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 al Parlamentului European
i al Consiliului (4) i n Directiva 2013/36/UE a
Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (5). Totodat,
regimul ar trebui s se aplice holdingurilor financiare,
holdingurilor financiare mixte prevzute n Directiva
2002/87/CE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (6),
holdingurilor cu activitate mixt i instituiilor financiare, n
cazul n care acestea din urm sunt filiale ale unei institu ii
sau a unui holding financiar, a unui holding financiar mixt
sau a unui holding cu activitate mixt i sunt supuse
supravegherii ntreprinderii-mam pe o baz consolidat.
Criza a demonstrat c insolvabilitatea unei entit i afiliate
unui grup poate avea un impact rapid asupra solvabilit ii
ntregului grup, putnd astfel avea chiar implica ii sistemice.
Prin urmare, autoritile ar trebui s dispun de mijloace
eficiente de aciune n ceea ce privete aceste entiti, pentru
a preveni contaminarea i pentru a elabora un plan de
rezoluie coerent pentru ansamblul grupului, deoarece
insolvabilitatea unei entiti afiliate unui grup poate avea un
impact rapid asupra solvabilitii ntregului grup.
(12) | Pentru a asigura coerena cadrului de reglementare,
contraprile centrale definite n Regulamentul (UE) nr.
648/2012 al Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (7) i
depozitarii centrali de titluri de valoare, defini i n
regulamentul care urmeaz s fie adoptat de Parlamentul
European i de Consiliu privind mbuntirea decontrii
titlurilor de valoare n Uniunea European i privind
depozitarii centrali de titluri de valoare (CSD), ar putea s
approaches mean that national authorities do not have the

same level of control or the same ability to resolve
institutions. Those differences in resolution regimes may
affect the funding costs of institutions differently across
Member States and potentially create competitive
distortions between institutions. Effective resolution
regimes in all Member States are necessary to ensure that
institutions cannot be restricted in the exercise of the
internal market rights of establishment by the financial
capacity of their home Member State to manage their
failure.
(10) | Those obstacles should be eliminated and rules
should be adopted in order to ensure that the internal
market provisions are not undermined. To that end, rules
governing the resolution of institutions should be made
subject to common minimum harmonisation rules.
(11) | In order to ensure consistency with existing Union
legislation in the area of financial services as well as the
greatest possible level of financial stability across the
spectrum of institutions, the resolution regime should
apply to institutions subject to the prudential
requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) and
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council (5). The regime should also apply to
financial holding companies, mixed financial holding
companies provided for in Directive 2002/87/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (6), mixedactivity holding companies and financial institutions,
when the latter are subsidiaries of an institution or of a
financial holding company, a mixed financial holding
company or a mixed-activity holding company and are
covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking on a
consolidated basis. The crisis has demonstrated that the
insolvency of an entity affiliated to a group can rapidly
impact the solvency of the whole group and, thus, even
have its own systemic implications. Authorities should
therefore possess effective means of action with respect
to those entities in order to prevent contagion and
produce a consistent resolution scheme for the group as a
whole, as the insolvency of an entity affiliated to a group
could rapidly impact the solvency of the whole group.
(12) | To ensure consistency in the regulatory framework,
central counterparties, as defined in Regulation (EU) No
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(7) and central securities depositories as defined in
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on improving securities settlement in the
European Union and on central securities depositories
(CSDs) and amending Directive 98/26/EC could be
4
fac obiectul unei iniiative legislative separate care s

instituie un cadru de redresare i rezoluie pentru aceste
entiti.
(13) | Utilizarea instrumentelor i a competenelor de
rezoluie prevzute n prezenta directiv poate afecta
drepturile acionarilor i pe cele ale creditorilor. Mai exact,
competena autoritilor de a transfera aciunile sau o parte
ori totalitatea activelor unei instituii ctre un cumprtor
privat, fr acordul acionarilor, afecteaz drepturile de
proprietate ale acionarilor. n plus, competen a de a decide
care datorii ale unei instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate
s fie transferate, n conformitate cu obiectivul de a asigura
continuitatea serviciilor i de a evita efectele negative asupra
stabilitii financiare, ar putea afecta tratamentul egal al
creditorilor. Prin urmare, msurile de rezolu ie ar trebui s
fie luate doar atunci cnd acest lucru este necesar n interes
public, iar orice atingeri aduse drepturilor proprietarilor i
creditorilor ca urmare a msurilor de rezoluie ar trebui s fie
compatibile cu Carta drepturilor fundamentale a Uniunii
Europene (Carta). n special, ar trebui ca, n acele situa ii n
care creditorii din aceeai categorie sunt trata i diferi i n
contextul unei msuri de rezoluie, aceste distinc ii s fie
justificate din perspectiva interesului public i s fie
proporionale cu riscurile abordate i, de asemenea, ele nu ar
trebui s aib un caracter discriminatoriu, direct sau indirect,
pe criterii de naionalitate.
(14) | Autoritile ar trebui s ia n considerare tipul de
activitate a instituiei, structura acionariatului, forma
juridic, profilul de risc, dimensiunea, statutul juridic i
gradul de interconectare cu alte instituii sau cu sistemul
financiar n general, domeniul de aplicare i complexitatea
activitii economice, dac este sau nu membru al unui
mecanism de protecie instituional sau al altor sisteme de
solidaritate reciproc, msura n care exercit servicii sau
activiti de investiii i dac intrarea sa n dificultate i
lichidarea ulterioar prin procedurile de insolven obinuite
ar putea avea un efect negativ semnificativ asupra pie elor
financiare, asupra altor instituii, asupra condiiilor de
finanare sau asupra economiei n ansamblu n contextul
planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie i atunci cnd
utilizeaz diversele competene i instrumente pe care le au
la dispoziie, asigurndu-se c procedura este aplicat n mod
corespunztor i proporional i c exist o sarcin
administrativ minim legat de obligaiile aferente
pregtirii planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie. ntruct
coninutul i informaiile menionate n prezenta directiv i
n anexa la aceasta stabilesc un standard minim pentru
instituii cu relevan sistemic evident, autoritile pot
aplica cerine diferite sau semnificativ mai reduse n materie
de planificare a redresrii sau a rezolu iei i de informare, n
funcie de instituie i cu o frecven a actualizrilor mai rar
de un an. Pentru o instituie mic cu un grad redus de
covered by a separate legislative initiative establishing a

recovery and resolution framework for those entities.
(13) | The use of resolution tools and powers provided
for in this Directive may disrupt the rights of
shareholders and creditors. In particular, the power of the
authorities to transfer the shares or all or part of the
assets of an institution to a private purchaser without the
consent of shareholders affects the property rights of
shareholders. In addition, the power to decide which
liabilities to transfer out of a failing institution based
upon the objectives of ensuring the continuity of services
and avoiding adverse effects on financial stability may
affect the equal treatment of creditors. Accordingly,
resolution action should be taken only where necessary
in the public interest and any interference with rights of
shareholders and creditors which results from resolution
action should be compatible with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the
Charter). In particular, where creditors within the same
class are treated differently in the context of resolution
action, such distinctions should be justified in the public
interest and proportionate to the risks being addressed
and should be neither directly nor indirectly
discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.
(14) | Authorities should take into account the nature of
an institutions business, shareholding structure, legal
form, risk profile, size, legal status and
interconnectedness to other institutions or to the financial
system in general, the scope and complexity of its
activities, whether it is a member of an institutional
protection scheme or other cooperative mutual solidarity
systems, whether it exercises any investment services or
activities and whether its failure and subsequent winding
up under normal insolvency proceedings would be likely
to have a significant negative effect on financial markets,
on other institutions, on funding conditions, or on the
wider economy in the context of recovery and resolution
plans and when using the different powers and tools at
their disposal, making sure that the regime is applied in
an appropriate and proportionate way and that the
administrative burden relating to the recovery and
resolution plan preparation obligations is minimised.
Whereas the contents and information specified in this
Directive and in Annexes A, B and C establish a
minimum standard for institutions with evident systemic
relevance, authorities are permitted to apply different or
significantly reduced recovery and resolution planning
and information requirements on an institution-specific
basis, and at a lower frequency for updates than one year.
For a small institution of little interconnectedness and
5
interconectare i de complexitate, un plan de redresare ar

putea fi redus la unele informaii de baz privind structura
sa, condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de redresare,
precum i aciunile i opiunile de redresare. n cazul n care
s-ar putea permite unei instituii s intre n insolven, atunci
i planul de rezoluie ar putea fi redus. De asemenea, regimul
ar trebui aplicat n aa fel nct s nu pericliteze stabilitatea
pieelor financiare. n special, n situaiile caracterizate de
probleme mai generale sau chiar de ndoieli cu privire la
reziliena multora dintre instituii, este esenial ca autorit ile
s examineze riscul de contagiere provocat de msurile luate
n legtur cu oricare dintre instituii.
(15) | Pentru a garanta rapiditatea de aciune necesar,
independena n raport cu actorii economici i pentru a evita
conflictele de interese, statele membre ar trebui s
desemneze autoriti administrative publice sau autorit i
nvestite cu competene administrative publice care s
ndeplineasc funciile i sarcinile de rezoluie, n temeiul
prezentei directive. Statele membre ar trebui s se asigure c
acestor autoriti de rezoluie le sunt alocate resursele
corespunztoare. Desemnarea de autoriti publice nu ar
trebui s exclud delegarea de funcii, sub responsabilitatea
unei autoriti de rezoluie. Nu este necesar s se prevad
ns tipul de autoritate sau autoriti pe care statele membre
ar trebui s le desemneze drept autoritate de rezolu ie. De i
armonizarea acestui aspect ar veni n sprijinul coordonrii,
ea ar reprezenta un amestec important n sistemele
constituionale i administrative ale statelor membre. Este
ns posibil atingerea unui grad suficient de coordonare, cu
ajutorul unei cerine mai puin intruzive, n virtutea creia
toate autoritile implicate n rezoluia instituiilor ar trebui
s fie reprezentate n colegii de rezolu ie, care ar asigura
coordonarea la nivel transnaional sau la nivelul Uniunii.
Statele membre ar trebui, prin urmare, s aib libertatea de a
alege
autoritile
responsabile
pentru
aplicarea
instrumentelor de rezoluie i exercitarea competenelor
prevzute n prezenta directiv. n cazul n care un stat
membru
desemneaz
autoritatea
responsabil
cu
supravegherea prudenial a instituiilor (autoritate
competent) drept autoritate de rezolu ie, ar trebui instituite
mecanisme structurale adecvate pentru a separa func ia de
supraveghere de cea de rezoluie. Aceast separare nu ar
trebui s mpiedice funcia de rezoluie s aib acces la orice
informaie aflat la dispoziia funciei de supraveghere.
(16) | Avnd n vedere consecinele pe care le-ar putea avea
intrarea n dificultate a unei instituii asupra sistemului
financiar i asupra economiei unui stat membru, precum i
eventuala necesitate de a utiliza fonduri publice pentru
soluionarea unei crize, ministerele de finane sau alte
ministere relevante din statele membre ar trebui s fie strns
implicate, nc din faza de nceput, n procesul de gestionare
a crizelor i de rezoluie.
complexity, a recovery plan could be reduced to some

basic information on its structure, triggers for recovery
actions and recovery options. If an institution could be
permitted to go insolvent, then the resolution plan could
be reduced. Further, the regime should be applied so that
the stability of financial markets is not jeopardised. In
particular, in situations characterised by broader
problems or even doubts about the resilience of many
institutions, it is essential that authorities consider the
risk of contagion from the actions taken in relation to any
individual institution.
(15) | In order to ensure the required speed of action, to
guarantee independence from economic actors and to
avoid conflicts of interest, Member States should appoint
public administrative authorities or authorities entrusted
with public administrative powers to perform the
functions and tasks in relation to resolution pursuant to
this Directive. Member States should ensure that
appropriate resources are allocated to those resolution
authorities. The designation of public authorities should
not exclude delegation under the responsibility of a
resolution authority. However, it is not necessary to
prescribe the type of authority or authorities that Member
States should appoint as a resolution authority. While
harmonisation of that aspect may facilitate coordination,
it would considerably interfere with the constitutional
and administrative systems of Member States. A
sufficient degree of coordination can still be achieved
with a less intrusive requirement: all the national
authorities involved in the resolution of institutions
should be represented in resolution colleges, where
coordination at cross-border or Union level should take
place. Member States should therefore be free to choose
which authorities should be responsible for applying the
resolution tools and exercising the powers laid down in
this Directive. Where a Member State designates the
authority responsible for the prudential supervision of
institutions (competent authority) as a resolution
authority, adequate structural arrangements should be put
in place to separate the supervisory and resolution
functions. That separation should not prevent the
resolution function from having access to any
information available to the supervisory function.
(16) | In light of the consequences that the failure of an
institution may have on the financial system and the
economy of a Member State as well as the possible need
to use public funds to resolve a crisis, the Ministries of
Finance or other relevant ministries in the Member States
should be closely involved, at an early stage, in the
process of crisis management and resolution.
6
(17) | Rezoluia eficient a instituiilor sau a entit ilor dintrun grup active la nivelul Uniunii necesit cooperarea dintre
autoritile competente i autoritile de rezoluie n cadrul
colegiilor de supraveghere i de rezoluie n toate etapele
acoperite de prezenta directiv, de la pregtirea planurilor de
redresare i de rezoluie, pn la rezoluia propriu-zis a unei
instituii. n caz de dezacord ntre autorit ile na ionale cu
privire la deciziile care urmeaz s fie adoptate referitor la
instituii n conformitate cu prezenta directiv, autoritatea
european de supraveghere (Autoritatea Bancar European)
(ABE), instituit prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 al
Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (8) ar trebui s
joace, n cazurile specificate n prezenta directiv i n ultim
instan, un rol de mediere. n anumite cazuri, prezenta
directiv prevede medierea obligatorie realizat de ABE n
conformitate cu articolul 19 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010. O astfel de mediere obligatorie nu constituie un
obstacol pentru utilizarea, n alte situaii, a medierii
facultative, n conformitate cu articolul 31 din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(18) | n cadrul procedurii de rezoluie a institu iilor sau a
grupurilor active la nivelul Uniunii, deciziile luate ar trebui,
de asemenea, s vizeze pstrarea stabilitii financiare i
reducerea la minimum a efectelor economice i sociale n
statele membre n care instituia sau grupul i desf oar
activitatea.
(19) | Pentru a putea aciona n mod eficient n cazul
instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate, autorit ile ar
trebui s aib competena de a impune msuri de pregtire i
prevenire.
(20) | Avnd n vedere extinderea responsabilitilor i a
sarcinilor ABE prevzut de prezenta directiv, Parlamentul
European, Consiliul i Comisia ar trebui s asigure punerea
imediat la dispoziie a unor resurse umane i financiare
adecvate. n acest scop, procedura de stabilire, execu ie i
control al bugetului su, astfel cum sunt men ionate la
articolele 63 i 64 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, ar
trebui s in seama n mod corespunztor de sarcinile
respective. Parlamentul European i Consiliul ar trebui s
garanteze respectarea celor mai nalte standarde de eficien .
(21) | Este esenial ca instituiile se elaboreze planuri de
redresare i s le actualizeze n mod regulat, stabilind
msurile care trebuie luate pentru restabilirea pozi iei lor
financiare n urma unei deteriorri semnificative. Aceste
planuri ar trebui s fie detaliate i s se bazeze pe ipoteze
realiste, aplicabile unei serii de scenarii solide i grave.
Obligaia de a ntocmi planuri de redresare ar trebui aplicat
ns proporional, astfel nct s se in cont de importan a
sistemic a instituiei sau a grupului i a gradului su de
interconectare, inclusiv prin sisteme de garanii reciproce. n
(17) | Effective resolution of institutions or group entities

operating across the Union requires cooperation among
competent authorities and resolution authorities within
supervisory and resolution colleges at all the stages
covered by this Directive, from the preparation of
recovery and resolution plans to the actual resolution of
an institution. In the event of disagreement between
national authorities on decisions to be taken in
accordance with this Directive with regard to institutions,
the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority) (EBA), established by Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council (8) should, where specified in this Directive, as a
last resort, play a mediation role. In certain cases, this
Directive provides for binding mediation by EBA in
accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010. Such binding mediation does not prevent
non-binding mediation in accordance with Article 31 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 in other cases.
(18) | In the resolution of institutions or groups operating
across the Union, the decisions taken should also aim to
preserve financial stability and minimise economic and
social effects in the Member States where the institution
or group operates.
(19) | In order to deal in an efficient manner with failing
institutions, authorities should have the power to impose
preparatory and preventative measures.
(20) | Given the extension of EBAs responsibilities and
tasks as laid down in this Directive, the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission should
ensure that adequate human and financial resources are
made available without delay. For that purpose, the
procedure for the establishment, implementation and
control of its budget as referred to in Articles 63 and 64
of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 should take due
account of those tasks. The European Parliament and the
Council should ensure that the best standards of
efficiency are met.
(21) | It is essential that institutions prepare and regularly
update recovery plans that set out measures to be taken
by those institutions for the restoration of their financial
position following a significant deterioration. Such plans
should be detailed and based on realistic assumptions
applicable in a range of robust and severe scenarios. The
requirement to prepare a recovery plan should, however,
be applied proportionately, reflecting the systemic
importance of the institution or the group and its
interconnectedness, including through mutual guarantee
7
acest sens, coninutul solicitat ar trebui s in cont de natura

surselor de finanare ale instituiei, inclusiv finanarea pe
baz de garanii reciproce sau pasive, i de credibilitatea
perspectivelor de a primi sprijin din partea grupului.
Instituiile ar trebui s aib obligaia de a-i prezenta
planurile autoritilor competente n vederea unei evaluri
complete, care s stabileasc printre altele dac aceste
planuri sunt suficient de cuprinztoare i dac ele ar putea
restabili la timp viabilitatea instituiei, chiar i n perioade de
dificulti financiare grave.
(22) | Planurile de redresare ar trebui s includ posibile
msuri care ar putea fi luate de ctre conducerea institu iei
atunci cnd sunt ntrunite condiiile pentru interven ia
timpurie.
(23) | Pentru a determina dac o aciune a sectorului privat ar
putea mpiedica ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil intrarea n
dificultate a unei instituii, autoritatea relevant ar trebui s
ia n considerare eficacitatea msurilor de interven ie
timpurie ntreprinse n termenul prestabilit de ctre
autoritatea competent. n cazul planurilor de redresare la
nivel de grup, la elaborarea planurilor ar trebui s se in
seama de posibilul impact al msurilor de redresare n toate
statele membre n care grupul i desfoar activitatea.
(24) | n cazul n care o instituie nu prezint un plan de
redresare adecvat, autoritile competente ar trebui s aib
competena de a solicita instituiilor luarea msurilor
necesare pentru remedierea deficienelor majore ale planului.
Aceast cerin ar putea afecta libertatea de a desf ura o
activitate comercial, garantat prin articolul 16 din Cart.
Limitarea acestui drept fundamental este ns necesar
pentru atingerea obiectivelor de stabilitate financiar. Mai
precis, aceast limitare este necesar pentru consolidarea
activitii instituiilor i pentru a evita o cretere excesiv a
instituiilor sau a asumrii unor riscuri excesive de ctre
acestea, fr capacitatea de a dep i eecurile i pierderile i
de a-i restabili baza de capital. Limitarea este propor ional
deoarece permite msuri preventive n msura n care
acestea sunt necesare pentru abordarea deficien elor i, prin
urmare, este conform cu articolul 52 din Cart.
(25) | Planificarea rezoluiei este una dintre condi iile
eseniale ale unei rezoluii eficiente. Autorit ile ar trebui s
dein toate informaiile necesare pentru a identifica funciile
critice i pentru a asigura continuitatea acestora. Con inutul
unui plan de rezoluie ar trebui, totui, s fie propor ional cu
importana sistemic a instituiei sau a grupului.
(26) | Avnd n vedere cunotinele privilegiate deinute de
instituie cu privire la propria funcionare i la orice
problem care poate decurge din aceasta, planurile de
rezoluie ar trebui elaborate de autorit ile de rezolu ie
printre altele pe baza informaiilor furnizate de instituiile
schemes. Accordingly, the required content should take

into account the nature of the institutions sources of
funding, including mutually guaranteed funding or
liabilities, and the degree to which group support would
be credibly available. Institutions should be required to
submit their plans to competent authorities for a
complete assessment, including whether the plans are
comprehensive and could feasibly restore an institutions
viability, in a timely manner, even in periods of severe
financial stress.
(22) | Recovery plans should include possible measures
which could be taken by the management of the
institution where the conditions for early intervention are
met.
(23) | In determining whether a private sector action
could prevent the failure of an institution within a
reasonable timeframe, the relevant authority should take
into account the effectiveness of early intervention
measures
undertaken
within
the
timeframe
predetermined by the competent authority. In the case of
group recovery plans, the potential impact of the
recovery measures on all the Member States where the
group operates should be taken into account while
drawing up the plans.
(24) | Where an institution does not present an adequate
recovery plan, competent authorities should be
empowered to require that institution to take measures
necessary to redress the material deficiencies of the plan.
That requirement may affect the freedom to conduct a
business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter. The
limitation of that fundamental right is however necessary
to meet the objectives of financial stability. More
specifically, such a limitation is necessary in order to
strengthen the business of institutions and avoid
institutions growing excessively or taking excessive risks
without being able to tackle setbacks and losses and to
restore their capital base. The limitation is proportionate
because it permits preventative action to the extent that it
is necessary to address the deficiencies and therefore
complies with Article 52 of the Charter.
(25) | Resolution planning is an essential component of
effective resolution. Authorities should have all the
information necessary in order to identify and ensure the
continuance of critical functions. The content of a
resolution plan should, however, be proportionate to the
systemic importance of the institution or group.
(26) | Because of the institutions privileged knowledge
of its own functioning and any problems arising from it,
resolution plans should be drawn up by resolution
authorities on the basis of, inter alia, the information
provided by the institutions concerned.
8
implicate.
(27) | Pentru a respecta principiul proporionalitii i pentru
a evita impunerea unei sarcini administrative excesive, ar
trebui ca, pentru cazurile limitate prevzute n prezenta
directiv, s se permit autoritilor competente i, dup caz,
autoritilor de rezoluie, s acorde derogri legate de
diversele situaii individuale de la cerinele legate de
ntocmirea planurilor de redresare i de rezoluie. Astfel de
cazuri includ instituiile afiliate unui organism central i
scutite n totalitate sau parial de cerinele pruden iale din
dreptul intern n conformitate cu articolul 21 din Directiva
2013/36/UE, precum i instituiile care aparin unui
mecanism de protecie instituional n conformitate cu
articolul 113 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013. n fiecare caz, acordarea unei derogri ar trebui s
fac obiectul condiiilor specificate n prezenta directiv.
(28) | Avnd n vedere structura capitalului instituiilor
afiliate unui organism central, n sensul prezentei directive,
aceste instituii nu ar trebui s fie obligate s elaboreze
fiecare planuri de redresare sau de rezoluie separate doar din
cauz c organismul central la care sunt afiliate se afl sub
supravegherea direct a Bncii Centrale Europene.
(29) | Autoritile de rezoluie, n baza evalurii
posibilitilor de soluionare de ctre autoritile de rezoluie
relevante, ar trebui s aib competena de a solicita
modificri ale structurii i organizrii institu iilor direct sau
indirect prin intermediul autoritii competente, n vederea
lurii de msuri necesare i proporionale n scopul de a
reduce sau a elimina obstacolele importante din calea
aplicrii instrumentelor de rezoluie i pentru a se asigura c
entitilor n cauz li se pot aplica posibilit ile de
soluionare. Datorit naturii potenial sistemice a tuturor
instituiilor, este esenial ca, pentru a putea men ine
stabilitatea financiar, autoritile s aib posibilitatea de a
aplica oricrei instituii procedura de rezolu ie. Pentru a nu
nclca dreptul de a desfura o activitate comercial
prevzut la articolul 16 din Cart, puterile discre ionare ale
autoritilor ar trebui s se limiteze la ceea ce este necesar
pentru a simplifica structura i funcionarea instituiei,
exclusiv cu scopul de a spori posibilitile de soluionare ale
acesteia. n plus, orice msur instituit n acest scop ar
trebui s fie conform cu dreptul Uniunii. Msurile nu ar
trebui s conin niciun fel de discriminare direct sau
indirect pe criterii de naionalitate i ar trebui s fie
justificate de un motiv imperios, i anume de meninerea
stabilitii financiare n interesul public. n plus, msurile nu
ar trebui s depeasc nivelul minim necesar pentru
atingerea obiectivelor urmrite. Atunci cnd definesc
msurile care trebuie luate, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui
s ia n considerare avertismentele i recomandrile
(27) | In order to comply with the principle of

proportionality and to avoid excessive administrative
burden, the possibility for competent authorities and,
where relevant, resolution authorities, to waive the
requirements relating to the preparation of the recovery
and resolution plans on a case-by-case basis should be
allowed in the limited cases specified in this Directive.
Such cases comprise institutions affiliated to a central
body and wholly or partially exempt from prudential
requirements in national law in accordance with Article
21 of Directive 2013/36/EU and institutions which
belong to an institutional protection scheme in
accordance with Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013. In each case the granting of a waiver should
be subject to the conditions specified in this Directive.
(28) | Having regard to the capital structure of
institutions affiliated to a central body, for the purposes
of this Directive, those institutions should not be obliged
to each draw up separate recovery or resolution plans
solely on the grounds that the central body to which they
are affiliated is under the direct supervision of the
European Central Bank.
(29) | Resolution authorities, on the basis of the
assessment of resolvability by the relevant resolution
authorities, should have the power to require changes to
the structure and organisation of institutions directly or
indirectly through the competent authority, to take
measures which are necessary and proportionate to
reduce or remove material impediments to the
application of resolution tools and ensure the
resolvability of the entities concerned. Due to the
potentially systemic nature of all institutions, it is crucial,
in order to maintain financial stability, that authorities
have the possibility to resolve any institution. In order to
respect the right to conduct business laid down in Article
16 of the Charter, the authorities discretion should be
limited to what is necessary in order to simplify the
structure and operations of the institution solely to
improve its resolvability. In addition, any measure
imposed for such purposes should be consistent with
Union law. Measures should be neither directly nor
indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality,
and should be justified by the overriding reason of being
conducted in the public interest in financial stability.
Furthermore, action should not go beyond the minimum
necessary to attain the objectives sought. When
determining the measures to be taken, resolution
authorities should take into account the warnings and
recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board
established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the
9
Comitetului european pentru risc sistemic, nfiin at n

temeiul Regulamentului (UE) nr. 1092/2010 al Parlamentului
European i Consiliului (9).
(30) | Msurile propuse n vederea abordrii sau eliminrii
obstacolelor din calea posibilitilor de soluionare ale unei
instituii sau a unui grup nu ar trebui s mpiedice instituiile
s i exercite dreptul de stabilire conferit lor de Tratatul
privind funionarea Uniunii Europene (TFUE).
(31) | Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie nu ar trebui s se
bazeze pe accesul la sprijin financiar public extraordinar i
nu ar trebui s expun contribuabilii la riscuri de pierdere.
(32) | Tratamentul grupurilor n cazul planificrii redresrii i
a rezoluiei prevzute n prezenta directiv ar trebui s se
aplice tuturor instituiilor supravegheate pe baz consolidat,
inclusiv grupurilor ale cror ntreprinderi sunt legate printr-o
relaie n sensul articolului 22 alineatul (7) din Directiva
2013/34/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (10).
Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s in seama
de structura financiar, tehnic i economic a grupului
relevant. Dac se ntocmesc planuri de redresare i de
rezoluie individuale pentru instituii care fac parte dintr-un
grup, autoritile relevante ar trebui s ncerce s asigure, n
msura n care este posibil, coerena cu planuri de redresare
i de rezoluie pentru restul grupului.
(33) | Regula general ar trebui s fie ca planurile de
redresare de rezoluie ale grupului s fie elaborate pentru
grup n ansamblul acestuia i identific msuri n raport cu o
instituie-mam, precum i n raport cu toate filialele
individuale care fac parte din grup. Autoritile relevante,
acionnd n cadrul colegiului de rezoluie, ar trebui s fac
toate eforturile necesare pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun
cu privire la evaluarea i adoptarea planurilor respective.
Totui, n cazuri specifice, n care a fost elaborat un plan
individual de redresare sau de rezoluie, domeniul de
aplicare al planului de redresare a grupului evaluat de
supraveghetorul consolidant sau al planului de rezoluie a
grupului decis de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului nu ar
trebui s acopere acele entiti din grup pentru care planurile
individuale au fost evaluate sau elaborate de autorit ile
relevante.
(34) | n cazul planurilor de rezoluie la nivel de grup, la
elaborarea planurilor de rezoluie la nivel de grup ar trebui s
se in seama n mod specific de posibilul impact al
msurilor de rezoluie n toate statele membre n care grupul
i desfoar activitatea. La elaborarea planului ar trebui
implicate autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n care
grupul deine filiale.
(35) | Planurile de redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s
includ proceduri pentru informarea i consultarea
reprezentanilor angajailor pe ntreg procesul de redresare i
European Parliament and of the Council (9).
(30) | Measures proposed to address or remove

impediments to the resolvability of an institution or a
group should not prevent institutions from exercising the
right of establishment conferred on them by the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(31) | Recovery and resolution plans should not assume
access to extraordinary public financial support or
expose taxpayers to the risk of loss.
(32) | The group treatment for recovery and resolution
planning provided for in this Directive should apply to
all groups of institutions supervised on a consolidated
basis, including groups whose undertakings are linked by
a relationship within the meaning of Article 22(7) of
the Council (10). The recovery and resolution plans
should take into account the financial, technical and
business structure of the relevant group. If individual
recovery and resolution plans for institutions that are a
part of a group are prepared, the relevant authorities
should aim to achieve, to the extent possible, consistency
with recovery and resolution plans for the rest of the
group.
(33) | It should be the general rule that the group
recovery and resolution plans are prepared for the group
as a whole and identify measures in relation to a parent
institution as well as all individual subsidiaries that are
part of a group. The relevant authorities, acting within
the resolution college, should make every effort to reach
a joint decision on the assessment and adoption of those
plans. However, in specific cases where an individual
recovery or resolution plan has been drawn up, the scope
of the group recovery plan assessed by the consolidating
supervisor or the group resolution plan decided by the
group-level resolution authority should not cover those
group entities for which the individual plans have been
assessed or prepared by the relevant authorities.
(34) | In the case of group resolution plans, the potential

impact of the resolution measures in all the Member
States where the group operates should be specifically
taken into account in the drawing up of group resolution
plans. The resolution authorities of the Member States
where the group has subsidiaries should be involved in
the drawing up of the plan.
(35) | Recovery and resolution plans should include
procedures for informing and consulting employee
representatives throughout the recovery and resolution
10
de rezoluie, dup caz. Dac este cazul, ar trebui respectate

n acest sens acordurile colective sau alte n elegeri
convenite de partenerii sociali, precum i dreptul intern i
dreptul Uniunii privind implicarea sindicatelor i a
reprezentanilor lucrtorilor n procesele de restructurare a
ntreprinderilor.
(36) | Dat fiind caracterul sensibil al informa iilor cuprinse n
aceste planuri, informaiile confideniale din planurile de
redresare i de rezoluie ar trebui s fac obiectul
dispoziiilor privind confidenialitatea prevzute n prezenta
directiv.
(37) | Autoritile competente ar trebui s transmit planurile
de redresare i orice modificare adus la acestea autorit ilor
de rezoluie relevante, iar acestea din urm ar trebui s
transmit planurile de rezoluie i orice modificare adus la
acestea autoritilor competente, pentru ca fiecare autoritate
de rezoluie relevant s fie informat pe deplin i n
permanen.
(38) | Furnizarea de sprijin financiar din partea uneia dintre
entitile unui grup transnaional ctre o alt entitate din
acelai grup este n prezent limitat de o serie de dispozi ii
stabilite de dreptul intern din anumite state membre. Aceste
dispoziii sunt destinate protejrii creditorilor i a
acionarilor fiecrei entiti. Ele nu iau ns n considerare
interdependena dintre entitile aceluiai grup. Este prin
urmare oportun s se stabileasc condiiile n care sprijinul
financiar poate fi acordat ntre entitile unui grup
transnaional de instituii, cu scopul de a asigura stabilitatea
financiar a grupului n ansamblu fr a pune n pericol
starea de lichiditate sau de solvabilitate a entit ii din grup
care ofer acest sprijin. Sprijinul financiar ntre entit ile
unui grup ar trebui s fie voluntar i ar trebui s fac obiectul
unor mecanisme de siguran corespunztoare. Este oportun
ca statele membre s nu condiioneze, direct sau indirect,
exercitarea dreptului de stabilire de existen a unui acord
privind furnizarea de sprijin financiar. Dispozi iile privind
sprijinul financiar intragrup din prezenta directiv nu
afecteaz obligaiile contractuale sau statutare asumate ntre
instituii i care protejeaz instituiile participante prin
intermediul garantrii ncruciate sau al unor mecanisme
echivalente. Dac o autoritate competent restric ioneaz sau
interzice sprijinul financiar intragrup i dac planul de
redresare a grupului face referire la sprijinul financiar
intragrup, o astfel de interdicie sau restric ie ar trebui s fie
considerat ca fiind o modificare substanial n scopul
revizuirii planului de redresare.
(39) | Pe parcursul fazelor de redresare i interven ie
timpurie prevzute n prezenta directiv, ac ionarii ar trebui
s pstreze responsabilitatea integral i controlul institu iei
cu excepia cazului n care un administrator temporar a fost
processes where appropriate. Where applicable,

collective agreements, or other arrangements provided
for by social partners, as well as national and Union law
on the involvement of trade unions and workers
representatives in company restructuring processes,
should be complied with in that regard.
(36) | Given the sensitivity of the information contained
in them, confidential information in the recovery and
resolution plans should be subject to the confidentiality
provisions as laid down in this Directive.
(37) | The competent authorities should transmit the
recovery plans and any changes thereto to the relevant
resolution authorities, and the latter should transmit the
resolution plans and any changes thereto to the former, in
order to permanently keep every relevant resolution
authority fully informed.
(38) | The provision of financial support from one entity
of a cross-border group to another entity of the same
group is currently restricted by a number of provisions
laid down in national law in some Member States. Those
provisions are designed to protect the creditors and
shareholders of each entity. Those provisions, however,
do not take into account the interdependency of the
entities of the same group. It is, therefore, appropriate to
set out under which conditions financial support may be
transferred among entities of a cross-border group of
institutions with a view to ensuring the financial stability
of the group as a whole without jeopardising the liquidity
or solvency of the group entity providing the support.
Financial support between group entities should be
voluntary and should be subject to appropriate
safeguards. It is appropriate that the exercise of the right
of establishment is not directly or indirectly made
conditional by Member States to the existence of an
agreement to provide financial support. The provisions
regarding intra-group financial support in this Directive
do not affect contractual or statutory liability
arrangements between institutions which protect the
participating institutions through cross-guarantees and
equivalent arrangements. Where a competent authority
restricts or prohibits intragroup financial support and
where the group recovery plan makes reference to
intragroup financial support, such a prohibition or
restriction should be considered to be a material change
for the purpose of reviewing the recovery plan.
(39) | During the recovery and early intervention phases
laid down in this Directive, shareholders should retain
full responsibility and control of the institution except
when a temporary administrator has been appointed by
11
desemnat de autoritatea competent. Acetia nu ar mai trebui

s pstreze o astfel de responsabilitate odat ce institu ia a
intrat n procesul de rezoluie.
(40) | n vederea meninerii stabilitii financiare, este
important ca autoritile competente s fie n msur s
remedieze deteriorarea situaiei financiare i economice a
unei instituii nainte ca aceasta s ajung ntr-un stadiu n
care singura alternativ rmas la dispozi ia autorit ilor s
fie rezoluia. n acest scop, autoritilor competente ar trebui
s li se acorde competene de interven ie timpurie, inclusiv
competena de a numi un administrator temporar, care fie s
nlocuiasc organul de conducere i conducerea superioar
ale unei instituii, fie s coopereze temporar cu acestea.
Sarcina administratorului temporar ar trebui s constea n a
exercita toate competenele de care dispune pentru a
promova soluii n vederea redresrii situa iei financiare a
instituiei. Numirea administratorului temporar nu ar trebui
s aduc atingere n mod excesiv drepturilor acionarilor sau
celor ale proprietarilor, ori obligaiilor procedurale instituite
n temeiul dreptului comercial al Uniunii sau al celui
naional i ar trebui s respecte obligaiile interna ionale ale
Uniunii i ale statelor membre referitoare la protec ia
investiiilor. Competenele de intervenie timpurie ar trebui
s le includ pe cele deja prevzute n temeiul Directivei
2013/36/UE pentru mprejurri, altele dect cele considerate
drept intervenie timpurie, precum i pentru alte situaii
considerate necesare pentru a restabili soliditatea financiar a
unei instituii.
(41) | Cadrul de rezoluie ar trebui s prevad declan area
rapid a procedurii de rezoluie, nainte ca insolvabilitatea
instituiei financiare s se reflecte n bilan i nainte ca toate
titlurile de capital s fi fost terse. Procedura de rezolu ie ar
trebui demarat n momentul n care o autoritate competent,
n urma consultrii unei autoriti de rezoluie, stabilete c o
instituie este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este
susceptibil de a intra n dificultate i c msurile alternative
specificate n prezenta directiv ar putea preveni o astfel de
situaie de dificultate ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil. n
mod excepionale, statele membre pot s prevad faptul c,
pe lng autoritatea competent, i autoritatea de rezolu ie
poate s stabileasc dac instituia este n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, n
urma consultrii autoritii competente. Faptul c o instituie
nu ndeplinete condiiile de autorizare nu ar trebui s
justifice n sine declanarea procedurii de rezoluie, mai ales
dac instituia este sau ar putea fi nc viabil. O instituie ar
trebui considerat n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este
susceptibil de a intra n dificultate atunci cnd nu respect
sau cnd este susceptibil s nu respecte, n viitorul apropiat,
cerinele pentru continuarea autorizrii, atunci cnd activele
instituiei sunt inferioare pasivelor sale sau sunt susceptibile
s devin, n viitorul apropiat, inferioare pasivelor sale,
the competent authority. They should no longer retain

such a responsibility once the institution has been put
under resolution.
(40) | In order to preserve financial stability, it is
important that competent authorities are able to remedy
the deterioration of an institutions financial and
economic situation before that institution reaches a point
at which authorities have no other alternative than to
resolve it. To that end, competent authorities should be
granted early intervention powers, including the power to
appoint a temporary administrator, either to replace or to
temporarily work with the management body and senior
management of an institution. The task of the temporary
administrator should be to exercise any powers conferred
on it with a view to promoting solutions to redress the
financial situation of the institution. The appointment of
the temporary administrator should not unduly interfere
with rights of the shareholders or owners or procedural
obligations established under Union or national company
law and should respect international obligations of the
Union or Member States, relating to investment
protection. The early intervention powers should include
those already provided for in Directive 2013/36/EU for
circumstances other than those considered to be early
intervention as well as other situations considered to be
necessary to restore the financial soundness of an
institution.
(41) | The resolution framework should provide for
timely entry into resolution before a financial institution
is balance-sheet insolvent and before all equity has been
fully wiped out. Resolution should be initiated when a
competent authority, after consulting a resolution
authority, determines that an institution is failing or
likely to fail and alternative measures as specified in this
Directive would prevent such a failure within a
reasonable timeframe. Exceptionally, Member States
may provide that, in addition to the competent authority,
the determination that the institution is failing or likely to
fail can be made also by the resolution authority, after
consulting the competent authority. The fact that an
institution does not meet the requirements for
authorisation should not justify per-se the entry into
resolution, especially if the institution is still or likely to
still be viable. An institution should be considered to be
failing or likely to fail when it infringes or is likely in the
near future to infringe the requirements for continuing
authorisation, when the assets of the institution are or are
likely in the near future to be less than its liabilities,
when the institution is or is likely in the near future to be
unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or when the
institution requires extraordinary public financial support
12
atunci cnd instituia este n imposibilitatea de a- i plti

obligaiile la scaden sau este susceptibil s se afle n
aceast imposibilitate n viitorul apropiat sau atunci cnd
instituia necesit sprijin financiar public extraordinar, cu
excepia circumstanelor specifice prevzute n prezenta
directiv. Necesitatea unei asistene privind lichiditatea n
situaii de urgen din partea unei bnci centrale nu ar trebui
s fie, n sine, o condiie care demonstreaz n mod suficient
faptul c o instituie se afl sau se va afla n viitorul apropiat
n imposibilitatea de a-i achita datoriile la scaden. | n
cazul garantrii de ctre stat a acestei facilit i, o institu ie
care acceseaz o astfel de facilitate ar face obiectul normelor
privind ajutoarele de stat. n vederea men inerii stabilit ii
financiare, n special n cazul unui deficit de lichiditate
sistemic, garaniile acordate de stat pentru facilit ile de
trezorerie oferite de bncile centrale sau garan iile acordate
de stat pentru instrumentele de datorie nou emise, pentru
remedierea unei perturbri grave a economiei unui stat
membru, nu ar trebui s conduc la declanarea procedurii
de rezoluie, dac sunt ndeplinite anumite condiii. n
special, garaniile de stat ar trebui s fie aprobate n
conformitate cu cadrul privind ajutoarele de stat i nu ar
trebui s fac parte dintr-un pachet mai mare de msuri de
ajutor, iar utilizarea msurilor de garantare ar trebui s fie
strict limitat n timp. Ar trebui interzis garantarea de ctre
statele membre a creanelor din titluri de capital. Atunci cnd
furnizeaz o garanie, pentru noile emisiuni e instrumente de
datorie, altele dect titluri de capital, un stat membru ar
trebui s se asigure c garania este remunerat n mod
suficient de instituie. Mai mult, acordarea de sprijin
financiar public extraordinar nu ar trebui s conduc la
declanarea rezoluiei n cazul n care, cu titlu de precau ie,
un stat membru devine participant la capitalul unei institu ii,
inclusiv al unei instituii publice, care i respect cerin ele
de capital. Un exemplu n acest sens ar putea fi situa ia n
care o instituie este obligat s atrag capital nou ca urmare
a rezultatelor unui test de rezisten bazat pe scenarii de criz
sau ale unui exerciiu echivalent desfurat de autoritile
macroprudeniale care include o cerin ce vizeaz
meninerea stabilitii financiare n contextul unei crize
sistemice, instituia neputnd ns atrage capital prin
mecanisme private, pe pieele de profil. Simplul fapt c unei
instituii i s-a acordat sprijin financiar public extraordinar
nainte de intrarea n vigoare a prezentei directive nu ar
trebui s constituie un temei pentru ca instituia s fie
considerat n curs de a intra n dificultate sau susceptibil
de a intra n dificultate. n fine, accesul la facilit ile de
trezorerie, inclusiv la asistena privind lichiditatea n situa ii
de urgen, oferite de bncile centrale poate constitui ajutor
de stat n temeiul normelor privind ajutoarele de stat.
(42) | n cazul rezoluiei unui grup cu activitate
transfrontalier, orice msur de rezolu ie ar trebui s ia n
except in the particular circumstances laid down in this

Directive. The need for emergency liquidity assistance
from a central bank should not, per se, be a condition that
sufficiently demonstrates that an institution is or will be,
in the near future, unable to pay its liabilities as they fall
due. | If that facility were guaranteed by a State, an
institution accessing such a facility would be subject to
the State aid framework. In order to preserve financial
stability, in particular in the case of a systemic liquidity
shortage, State guarantees on liquidity facilities provided
by central banks or State guarantees of newly issued
liabilities to remedy a serious disturbance in the
economy of a Member State should not trigger the
resolution framework provided that a number of
conditions are met. In particular, the State guarantee
measures should be approved under the State aid
framework and should not be part of a larger aid
package, and the use of the guarantee measures should
be strictly limited in time. Member States guarantees for
equity claims should be prohibited. When providing a
guarantee for newly issued liabilities other than equity, a
Member State should ensure that the guarantee is
sufficiently remunerated by the institution. Furthermore,
the provision of extraordinary public financial support
should not trigger resolution where, as a precautionary
measure, a Member State takes an equity stake in an
institution, including an institution which is publicly
owned, which complies with its capital requirements.
This may be the case, for example, where an institution
is required to raise new capital due to the outcome of a
scenario-based stress test or of the equivalent exercise
conducted by macroprudential authorities which includes
a requirement that is set to maintain financial stability in
the context of a systemic crisis, but the institution is
unable to raise capital privately in markets. An institution
should not be considered to be failing or likely to fail
solely on the basis that extraordinary public financial
support was provided before the entry into force of this
Directive. Finally, access to liquidity facilities including
emergency liquidity assistance by central banks may
constitute State aid pursuant to the State aid framework.
(42) | In the event of resolution of a group with crossborder activity, any resolution action should take into
13
considerare impactul potenial al rezoluiei n toate statele

membre n care instituia sau grupul i desfoar
activitatea.
(43) | Competenele autoritilor de rezoluie ar trebui s se
aplice i holdingurilor, n cazurile n care att holdingul, ct
i o instituie-filial a acestuia sunt n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau sunt susceptibile de a intra n dificultate n
Uniune sau ntr-o ar ter. n plus, chiar n cazul n care un
anumit holding nu este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau nu
este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, competenele
autoritilor de rezoluie ar trebui s se aplice holdingului
atunci cnd una sau mai multe instituii filiale ndeplinesc
condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de rezolu ie, sau o
instituie dintr-o ar ter ndeplinete condiiile pentru
rezoluie n acea ar ter, iar aplicarea instrumentelor i a
competenelor de rezoluie n raport cu holdingul este
necesar pentru rezoluia uneia sau mai multora dintre
filialele acestuia, ori pentru rezoluia ntregului grup.
(44) | n cazul n care o instituie este n curs de a intra n
dificultatesau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate,
autoritile naionale de rezoluie ar trebui s aib la
dispoziie un set minim armonizat de instrumente i de
competene n materie de rezoluie. Exercitarea acestora ar
trebui s fie supus unor condiii i obiective comune,
precum i unor principii generale. Odat ce autoritatea de
rezoluie a luat decizia de a declana procedura de rezolu ie
mpotriva unei instituii, procedurile obinuite de insolven
ar trebui s fie excluse, cu excepia situaiei n care este
necesar s fie combinate cu utilizarea instrumenelor de
rezoluie i la iniiativa autoritii de rezoluie. Statele
membre ar trebui s fie n msur s confere autoritilor de
rezoluie competene i instrumente suplimentare, pe lng
cele care le-au fost conferite n temeiul prezentei directive.
Utilizarea acestor instrumente i competene suplimentare ar
trebui s respecte ns principiile i obiectivele rezolu iei,
stabilite prin prezenta directiv. Mai exact, utilizarea unor
astfel de instrumente sau competene nu ar trebui s afecteze
rezoluia eficient a grupurilor transnaionale.
(45) | Pentru a evita hazardul moral, orice institu ie n curs de
a intra n dificultate ar trebui s fie n msur s ias de pe
pia, indiferent de mrimea i de gradul su de
interconectare, fr a provoca perturbri sistemice. n
principiu, o instituie n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui
s fie lichidat prin procedura obi nuit de insolven. Cu
toate acestea, lichidarea prin procedura obinuit de
insolven ar putea s pun n pericol stabilitatea financiar,
s ntrerup derularea funciilor critice i s afecteze
protecia deponenilor. n astfel de cazuri, este foarte
probabil existena unui interes public pentru a declan a
procedura de rezoluie mpotriva unei instituii i pentru a
aplica intrumentele de rezoluie n locul recurgerii la
account the potential impact of the resolution in all the

Member States where the institution or the group
operates.
(43) | The powers of resolution authorities should also
apply to holding companies where both the holding
company is failing or likely to fail and a subsidiary
institution, whether in the Union or in a third country, is
failing or likely to fail. In addition, notwithstanding the
fact that a holding company might not be failing or likely
to fail, the powers of resolution authorities should apply
to the holding company where one or more subsidiary
institutions meet the conditions for resolution, or a thirdcountry institution meets the conditions for resolution in
that third country and the application of the resolution
tools and powers in relation to the holding company is
necessary for the resolution of one or more of its
subsidiaries or for the resolution of the group as a whole.
(44) | Where an institution is failing or likely to fail,
national resolution authorities should have at their
disposal a minimum harmonised set of resolution tools
and powers. Their exercise should be subject to common
conditions, objectives, and general principles. Once the
resolution authority has taken the decision to put the
institution under resolution, normal insolvency
proceedings should be excluded except if they need to be
combined with the use of the resolution tools and at the
initiative of the resolution authority. Member States
should be able to confer on the resolution authorities
powers and tools in addition to those conferred on them
under this Directive. The use of those additional tools
and powers, however, should be consistent with the
resolution principles and objectives as laid down in this
Directive. In particular, the use of such tools or powers
should not impinge on the effective resolution of crossborder groups.
(45) | In order to avoid moral hazard, any failing

institution should be able to exit the market, irrespective
of its size and interconnectedness, without causing
systemic disruption. A failing institution should in
principle be liquidated under normal insolvency
proceedings. However, liquidation under normal
insolvency proceedings might jeopardise financial
stability, interrupt the provision of critical functions, and
affect the protection of depositors. In such a case it is
highly likely that there would be a public interest in
placing the institution under resolution and applying
resolution tools rather than resorting to normal
insolvency proceedings. The objectives of resolution
14
procedura obinuit de insolven. Prin urmare, obiectivele

rezoluiei ar trebui s fie asigurarea continuit ii func iilor
critice, evitarea efectelor negative asupra stabilit ii
financiare, protejarea fondurilor publice prin reducerea la
minimum a dependenei instituiilor n curs de a intra n
dificultate de sprijinul financiar public extraordinar i
protejarea deponenilor care beneficiaz de acoperire, a
investitorilor, precum i a fondurilor i activelor clienilor.
(46) | nainte de aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie, ar
trebui ntotdeauna avut n vedere lichidarea institu iei n
curs de a intra n dificultate prin intermediul procedurii
obinuite de insolven. Atunci cnd se recurge la
instrumente de rezoluie, activitatea unei instituii n curs de
a intra n dificultate ar trebui s fie meninut, n msura
posibilului, prin utilizarea de fonduri private. Acest lucru
poate fi realizat fie prin vnzarea sau fuzionarea cu un
cumprtor din sectorul privat, fie prin reducerea pasivelor
instituiei, fie prin conversia datoriei sale n titluri de capital,
n vederea efecturii unei recapitalizri.
(47) | Atunci cnd aplic instrumente de rezoluie i exercit
competene n materie de rezoluie, autorit ile de rezolu ie
ar trebui s ia toate msurile corespunztoare pentru a
garanta c msura de rezoluie este luat n conformitate cu
anumite principii, inclusiv cel al participrii n mod
corespunztor la pierderi a acionarilor i a creditorilor, cel al
nlocuirii conducerii, n principiu, cel al reducerii la
minimum a costurilor legate de rezoluia instituiei i cel al
tratamentului echitabil al creditorilor apar innd aceleia i
categorii. n special, trebuie ca, n acele situa ii n care
creditorii din aceeai categorie sunt tratai diferi i n
contextul unei msuri de rezoluie, aceste distinc ii ar trebui
s fie justificate din perspectiva interesului public i, de
asemenea, ele nu ar trebui s aib un caracter
discriminatoriu, direct sau indirect, pe criterii de
naionalitate. Atunci cnd utilizarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie implic acordarea de ajutor de stat, interven iile ar
trebui evaluate n conformitate cu dispoziiile relevante
privind ajutoarele de stat. Ajutorul de stat poate intra n joc,
printre altele, atunci cnd fondurile de rezoluie sau fondurile
de garantare a depozitelor intervin n rezoluia unei institu ii
n curs de a intra n dificultate.
(48) | Atunci cnd aplic instrumente de rezoluie i exercit
ar trebui s informeze i s consulte reprezentan ii
angajailor, dac este cazul. Dup caz, contractele colective
sau alte proceduri prevzute de ctre partenerii sociali ar
trebui s fie respectate pe deplin n acest sens.
(49) | Limitrile drepturilor acionarilor i ale creditorilor ar
trebui s fie conforme principiilor enunate la articolul 52 din
Cart. Prin urmare, instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui s se
aplice doar acelor instituii de credit care sunt n curs de a
should therefore be to ensure the continuity of critical

functions, to avoid adverse effects on financial stability,
to protect public funds by minimising reliance on
extraordinary public financial support to failing
institutions and to protect covered depositors, investors,
client funds and client assets.
(46) | The winding up of a failing institution through

normal insolvency proceedings should always be
considered before resolution tools are applied. A failing
institution should be maintained through the use of
resolution tools as a going concern with the use, to the
extent possible, of private funds. That may be achieved
either through sale to or merger with a private sector
purchaser, or after having written down the liabilities of
the institution, or after having converted its debt to
equity, in order to effect a recapitalisation.
(47) | When applying resolutions tools and exercising
resolution powers, resolution authorities should take all
appropriate measures to ensure that resolution action is
taken in accordance with principles including that
shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of
the losses, that the management should in principle be
replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution
are minimised and that creditors of the same class are
treated in an equitable manner. In particular, where
creditors within the same class are treated differently in
the context of resolution action, such distinctions should
be justified in the public interest and should be neither
directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of
nationality. When the use of the resolution tools involves
the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be
assessed in accordance with the relevant State aid
provisions. State aid may be involved, inter alia, where
resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds intervene to
assist in the resolution of failing institutions.
(48) | When applying resolution tools and exercising

resolution powers, resolution authorities should inform
and consult employee representatives where appropriate.
Where applicable, collective agreements, or other
arrangements provided for by social partners, should be
fully taken into account in that regard.
(49) | The limitations on the rights of shareholders and
creditors should be in accordance with Article 52 of the
Charter. The resolution tools should therefore be applied
only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail,
15
intra n dificultatesau sunt susceptibile de a intra n

dificultate, i numai atunci cnd acest lucru este necesar
pentru atingerea obiectivului de stabilitate financiar, n
interesul general. Mai exact, instrumentele de rezoluie ar
trebui aplicate atunci cnd instituia nu poate fi lichidat n
conformitate cu procedura obinuit de insolven, deoarece
acest lucru ar putea destabiliza sistemul financiar, iar aceste
msuri sunt necesare pentru a asigura transferul rapid i
meninerea funciilor de importan sistemic i atunci cnd
nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil de gsire a unei solu ii
alternative provenind din sectorul privat care s fie suficient
pentru redresarea deplin a instituiei, nici chiar majorarea
capitalului de ctre acionarii existeni sau de ctre o ter
parte. n plus, atunci cnd se aplic instrumente de rezolu ie
i se exercit competene n materie de rezoluie, ar trebui s
se in seama de principiul proporionalitii i de
particularitile formei juridice a unei instituii.
(50) | Atingerile aduse drepturilor de proprietate nu ar trebui
s fie disproporionate. Acionarii i creditorii afecta i nu ar
trebui s suporte pierderi mai mari dect cele pe care le-ar fi
suportat n cazul n care instituia ar fi fost lichidat la
momentul lurii deciziei de declanare a procedurii de
rezoluie. n cazul unui transfer parial al activelor unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie ctre un cumprtor privat sau o
banc-punte, partea rezidual a instituiei aflate n rezolu ie
ar trebui lichidat n baza procedurilor obi nuite de
insolven. n scopul protejrii, n cadrul procedurii de
lichidare a instituiei, a acionarilor i a creditorilor rma i,
acetia ar trebui s aib dreptul de a primi drept plat sau
compensare a creanelor n cadrul acestei proceduri, cel pu in
suma pe care, conform estimrilor, ar fi recuperat-o n cazul
n care ntreaga instituie ar fi fost lichidat prin procedura
obinuit de insolven.
(51) | Cu scopul de a proteja dreptul acionarilor i al
creditorilor, ar trebui stabilite obligaii clare n ceea ce
privete evaluarea activelor i a pasivelor instituiei aflate n
rezoluie i, acolo unde se prevede n cadrul prezentei
directive, evaluarea tratamentului pe care acionarii i
creditorii l-ar fi primit n cazul n care institu ia ar fi fost
lichidat n baza procedurii obinuite de insolven.
nceperea evalurii ar trebui s fie posibil deja din faza de
intervenie timpurie. nainte de luarea oricrei msuri de
rezoluie, ar trebui efectuat o evaluare corect i realist a
activelor i pasivelor instituiei. Aceast evaluare ar trebui s
fie supus unei ci de atac numai mpreun cu decizia de
declanare a procedurii de rezoluie. n plus, n cazurile n
care se prevede acest lucru n cadrul prezentei directive, ar
trebui s se efectueze, dup aplicarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie, o comparaie ex post ntre tratamentul acordat
efectiv acionarilor i creditorilor i tratamentul de care
acetia ar fi beneficiat n cadrul procedurii obi nuite de
insolven. n cazul n care se constat c ac ionarii i
and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of

financial stability in the general interest. In particular,
resolution tools should be applied where the institution
cannot be wound up under normal insolvency
proceedings without destabilising the financial system
and the measures are necessary in order to ensure the
rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important
functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for
any alternative private solution, including any increase of
capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party
sufficient to restore the full viability of the institution. In
addition, when applying resolutions tools and exercising
resolution powers, the principle of proportionality and
the particularities of the legal form of an institution
should be taken into account.
(50) | Interference with property rights should not be

disproportionate. Affected shareholders and creditors
should not incur greater losses than those which they
would have incurred if the institution had been wound up
at the time that the resolution decision is taken. In the
event of a partial transfer of assets of an institution under
resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge bank, the
residual part of the institution under resolution should be
wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In order
to protect shareholders and creditors who are left in the
winding up proceedings of the institution, they should be
entitled to receive in payment of, or compensation for,
their claims in the winding up proceedings not less than
what it is estimated they would have recovered if the
whole institution had been wound up under normal
insolvency proceedings.
(51) | For the purpose of protecting the right of
shareholders and creditors, clear obligations should be
laid down concerning the valuation of the assets and
liabilities of the institution under resolution and, where
required under this Directive, valuation of the treatment
that shareholders and creditors would have received if
the institution had been wound up under normal
insolvency proceedings. It should be possible to
commence a valuation already in the early intervention
phase. Before any resolution action is taken, a fair and
realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the
institution should be carried out. Such a valuation should
be subject to a right of appeal only together with the
resolution decision. In addition, where required under
this Directive, an ex-post comparison between the
treatment that shareholders and creditors have actually
been afforded and the treatment they would have
received under normal insolvency proceedings should be
carried out after resolution tools have been applied. If it
16
creditorii au primit ca plat sau compensare a crean elor

echivalentul unei sume inferioar celei pe care ar fi primit-o
n cadrul procedurii obinuite de insolven, ei ar trebui s
aib dreptul la plata diferenei, n cazurile n care prezenta
directiv prevede acest lucru. Spre deosebire de evaluarea
efectuat naintea de luarea msurilor de rezoluie, ar trebui
s existe posibilitatea de a contesta rezultatele compara iei,
separat de decizia de declanare a procedurii de rezolu ie.
Statele membre ar trebui s aib libertatea de a decide
procedura de urmat pentru achitarea ctre ac ionari i
creditori a diferenei de tratament constatate. Aceast
eventual diferen ar trebui pltit din fondurile
mecanismelor financiare instituite n conformitate cu
prezenta directiv.
(52) | Este important contabilizarea pierderilor n cazul
intrrii n dificultate a instituiei. Evaluarea activelor i a
pasivelor instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate ar trebui
s se bazeze pe estimri corecte, prudente i realiste, la
momentul aplicrii instrumentelor de rezoluie. Valoarea
pasivelor nu ar trebui ns s fie afectat n cadrul evalurii
de situaia financiar a instituiei. Din raiuni de urgen,
autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s poat efectua o evaluare
rapid a activelor sau a pasivelor unei instituii n curs de a
intra n dificultate. Aceast evaluare ar trebui s fie
provizorie i aplicabil pn la efectuarea unei evaluri
independente. Standardele tehnice obligatorii ale ABE
referitoare la metoda de evaluare ar trebui s stabileasc un
cadru de principii aplicabile cu ocazia desf urrii acestor
evaluri i ar trebui s permit aplicarea unor diferite
metodologii specifice de ctre autoritile de rezolu ie i
evaluatorii independeni, dup caz.
(53) | Pentru a menine ncrederea pieei i a reduce la
minimum contagiunea, este necesar o ac iune rapid i
coordonat. n momentul n care se stabile te c o institu ie
este n curs de a intra n dificultatesau este susceptibil de a
intra n dificultate i nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil ca
vreo msur alternativ, a sectorului privat sau de
supraveghere, s previn intrarea n dificultate a institu iei
ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil, autoritile de rezolu ie ar
trebui s ia fr ntrziere msuri adecvate i coordonate de
rezoluie n interesul public. innd cont de circumstan ele
intrrii n dificultate a unei instituii i, n special, de
posibilul caracter urgent al situaiei, autorit ile de rezolu ie
ar trebui s aib posibilitatea de a lua msuri de rezolu ie,
fr impunerea obligaiei ca acestea s fac mai nti uz de
competenele de intervenie timpurie.
(54) | Atunci cnd adopt msuri de rezoluie, autoritile de
rezoluie ar trebui s ia n considerare i s urmeze msurile
prevzute n planurile de rezoluie, cu excep ia cazului n
care autoritile de rezoluie consider, avnd n vedere
circumstanele cazului, c obiectivele rezolu iei vor fi
is determined that shareholders and creditors have

received, in payment of, or compensation for, their
claims, the equivalent of less than the amount that they
would have received under normal insolvency
proceedings, they should be entitled to the payment of
the difference where required under this Directive. As
opposed to the valuation prior to the resolution action, it
should be possible to challenge that comparison
separately from the resolution decision. Member States
should be free to decide on the procedure as to how to
pay any difference of treatment that has been determined
to shareholders and creditors. That difference, if any,
should be paid by the financial arrangements established
in accordance with this Directive.
(52) | It is important that losses be recognised upon
failure of the institution. The valuation of assets and
liabilities of failing institutions should be based on fair,
prudent and realistic assumptions at the moment when
the resolution tools are applied. The value of liabilities
should not, however, be affected in the valuation by the
institutions financial state. It should be possible, for
reasons of urgency, that the resolution authorities make a
rapid valuation of the assets or the liabilities of a failing
institution. That valuation should be provisional and
should apply until an independent valuation is carried
out. EBAs binding technical standards relating to
valuation methodology should establish a framework of
principles to be used in conducting such valuations and
should allow different specific methodologies to be
applied by resolution authorities and independent
valuers, as appropriate.
(53) | Rapid and coordinated action is necessary to
sustain market confidence and minimise contagion. Once
an institution is deemed to be failing or likely to fail and
there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative
private sector or supervisory action would prevent the
failure of the institution within a reasonable timeframe,
resolution authorities should not delay in taking
appropriate and coordinated resolution action in the
public interest. The circumstances under which the
failure of an institution may occur, and in particular
taking account of the possible urgency of the situation,
should allow resolution authorities to take resolution
action without imposing an obligation to first use the
early intervention powers.
(54) | When taking resolution actions, resolution
authorities should take into account and follow the
measures provided for in the resolution plans unless
resolution authorities assess, taking into account
circumstances of the case, that resolution objectives will
17
obinute mai eficient prin adoptarea de msuri care nu sunt

prevzute n planurile de rezoluie.
(55) | Cu excepia situaiilor prevzute n mod expres n
prezenta directiv, instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui s fie
aplicate nainte ca instituiile s beneficieze de vreo infuzie
de capital din partea sectorului public sau de acordarea
vreunui sprijin financiar public extraordinar echivalent.
Acest fapt nu trebuie s mpiedice ns utilizarea fondurilor
provenind din schemele de garantare a depozitelor sau a
fondurilor de rezoluie pentru a absorbi pierderi care ar fi
fost altfel suferite de deponenii care beneficiaz de
acoperire sau de creditorii exclui n temeiul competen elor
discreionare. n acest sens, utilizarea sprijinului financiar
public extraordinar, a fondurilor de rezoluie sau a schemelor
de garantare a depozitelor, pentru sprijinirea procesului de
rezoluie a instituiilor n curs de a intra n dificultate ar
trebui s respecte dispoziiile relevante privind ajutoarele de
stat.
(56) | Problemele de pe pieele financiare din Uniune care
sunt determinate de evenimente sistemice ar putea avea
efecte negative asupra economiei i cetenilor Uniunii. Prin
urmare, instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui s fie concepute
astfel nct s poat face fa unei game largi de scenarii n
mare parte imprevizibile, innd seama de faptul c ar putea
exista o diferen ntre situaia unei singure instituii aflate n
criz i o criz bancar sistemic mai ampl.
(57) | Atunci cnd Comisia iniiaz, n temeiul articolului
107 din TFUE, procedura de evaluare a ajutoarelor de stat n
cazul instrumentelor publice de stabilizare men ionate n
prezenta directiv, ea ar trebui s evalueze n mod distinct
dac instrumentele publice de stabilizare notificate nu
ncalc vreuna dintre dispoziiile din dreptul Uniunii legate
intrinsec, inclusiv cele referitoare la cerina minim de 8 %
privind absorbia pierderilor prevzut n prezenta directiv,
precum i dac exist situaia extraordinar a unei crize
sistemice care justific recurgerea la aceste instrumente n
temeiul prezentei directive, garantnd n acela i timp condi ii
de concuren echitabile n cadrul pieei interne. n
conformitate cu articolele 107 i 108 din TFUE, aceast
evaluare ar trebui efectuat nainte de a permite utilizarea
oricrui instrument public de stabilizare.
(58) | Aplicarea instrumentelor publice de stabilizare ar
trebui s fie neutr din punct de vedere fiscal pe termen
mediu.
(59) | Instrumentele de rezoluie ar trebui s includ vnzarea
activitii sau a aciunilor instituiei aflate n rezolu ie,
crearea unei instituii-punte, separarea activelor performante
ale instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate de activele slab
performante sau toxice i recapitalizarea intern a
acionarilor i creditorilor instituiei n curs de a intra n
dificultate.
be achieved more effectively by taking actions which are

not provided for in the resolution plans.
(55) | Save as expressly specified in this Directive, the
resolution tools should be applied before any public
sector injection of capital or equivalent extraordinary
public financial support to an institution. This, however,
should not impede the use of funds from the deposit
guarantee schemes or resolution funds in order to absorb
losses that would have otherwise been suffered by
covered depositors or discretionarily excluded creditors.
In that respect, the use of extraordinary public financial
support, resolution funds or deposit guarantee schemes to
assist in the resolution of failing institutions should
comply with the relevant State aid provisions.
(56) | Problems in financial markets in the Union arising

from system-wide events could have adverse effects on
the Union economy and citizens of the Union. Therefore,
resolution tools should be designed and suitable to
counter a broad set of largely unpredictable scenarios,
taking into account that there could be a difference
between a single institution in a crisis and a broader
systemic banking crisis.
(57) | When the Commission undertakes State aid
assessment under Article 107 TFEU of the government
stabilisation tools referred to in this Directive, it should
separately assess whether the notified government
stabilisation tools do not infringe any intrinsically linked
provisions of Union law, including those relating to the
minimum loss absorption requirement of 8 % contained
in this Directive, as well as whether there is a very
extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis justifying
resorting to those tools under this Directive while
ensuring the level playing field in the internal market. In
accordance with Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, that
assessment should be made before any government
stabilisation tools may be used.
(58) | The application of government stabilisation tools
should be fiscally neutral in the medium term.
(59) | The resolution tools should include the sale of the
business or shares of the institution under resolution, the
setting up of a bridge institution, the separation of the
performing assets from the impaired or under-performing
assets of the failing institution, and the bail-in of the
shareholders and creditors of the failing institution.
18
(60) | n cazul n care pentru a transfera serviciile de

importan sistemic sau activitile viabile ale unei instituii
ctre o entitate solid (cum ar fi un cumprtor din sectorul
privat sau o instituie-punte) au fost utilizate instrumentele
de rezoluie, partea rezidual a instituiei ar trebui lichidat
ntr-un termen adecvat, inndu-se cont de necesitatea
instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate de a furniza
eventuale servicii sau sprijin, astfel nct s permit
cumprtorului sau instituiei-punte s-i desf oare
activitile sau serviciile achiziionate prin transferul
respectiv.
(61) | Instrumentul de vnzare a activit ii ar trebui s
permit autoritilor s efectueze vnzarea institu iei sau a
unor pri ale activitii acesteia ctre unul sau mai mul i
cumprtori, fr acordul acionarilor. Atunci cnd aplic
instrumentul de vnzare a activitii, autoritile ar trebui s
ia msurile necesare pentru scoaterea pe pia a institu iei
sau a unei pri a activitii acesteia n cadrul unui proces
deschis, transparent i nediscriminatoriu, ncercnd n acela i
timp s obin preul maxim de vnzare. n cazul n care, din
motive de urgen, un astfel de proces este imposibil,
autoritile ar trebui s ia msuri pentru a remedia efectele
negative asupra concurenei i a pieei interne.
(62) | Orice venituri nete din transferul activelor sau
pasivelor instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n cazul aplicrii
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii, ar trebui s revin
instituiei rmase n procedur de lichidare. Orice venituri
nete din transferul aciunilor sau al altor instrumente de
proprietate emise de instituia aflat n rezoluie, n cazul
aplicrii instrumentului de vnzare a activitii, ar trebui s
revin deintorilor respectivelor aciuni sau alte instrumente
de proprietate. ncasrile ar trebui s fie calculate prin
deducerea costurilor ocazionate de intrarea n dificultate a
instituiei i de procesul de rezoluie.
(63) | Pentru a efectua vnzarea activit ii n timp util i
pentru a proteja stabilitatea financiar, evaluarea
cumprtorului unei deineri calificate trebuie efectuat n
mod prompt, n aa fel nct s nu se ntrzie aplicarea
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii n conformitate cu
prezenta directiv, prin derogare de la termenele i
procedurile prevzute n Directiva 2013/36/UE i Directiva
(64) | Informaiile referitoare la scoaterea pe pia a unei
instituii n curs de a intra n dificultate i la negocierile cu
potenialii cumprtori anterioare aplicrii instrumentului de
vnzare a activitii sunt susceptibile de avea o importan
sistemic. n scopul asigurrii stabilitii financiare este
important ca publicarea acestor informa ii impus de
i al Consiliului (12) s poat fi amnat pentru perioada de
(60) | Where the resolution tools have been used to

transfer the systemically important services or viable
business of an institution to a sound entity such as a
private sector purchaser or bridge institution, the residual
part of the institution should be liquidated within an
appropriate time frame having regard to any need for the
failing institution to provide services or support to enable
the purchaser or bridge institution to carry out the
activities or services acquired by virtue of that transfer.
(61) | The sale of business tool should enable authorities

to effect a sale of the institution or parts of its business to
one or more purchasers without the consent of
shareholders. When applying the sale of business tool,
authorities should make arrangements for the marketing
of that institution or part of its business in an open,
transparent and non-discriminatory process, while
aiming to maximise, as far as possible, the sale price.
Where, for reasons of urgency, such a process is
impossible, authorities should take steps to redress
detrimental effects on competition and on the internal
market.
(62) | Any net proceeds from the transfer of assets or
liabilities of the institution under resolution when
applying the sale of business tool should benefit the
institution left in the winding up proceedings. Any net
proceeds from the transfer of shares or other instruments
of ownership issued by the institution under resolution
when applying the sale of business tool should benefit
the owners of those shares or other instruments of
ownership. Proceeds should be calculated net of the costs
arisen from the failure of the institution and from the
resolution process.
(63) | In order to perform the sale of business in a timely
manner and protect financial stability, the assessment of
the buyer of a qualifying holding should be carried out in
a timely manner that does not delay the application of the
sale of business tool in accordance with this Directive by
way of derogation from the time-limits and procedures
laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council (11).
(64) | Information concerning the marketing of a failing
institution and the negotiations with potential acquirers
prior to the application of the sale-of-business tool is
likely to be of systemic importance. In order to ensure
financial stability, it is important that the disclosure to
the public of such information required by Regulation
(EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council (12) may be delayed for the time necessary to
19
timp necesar planificrii i structurrii procesului de

rezoluie a instituiei, n conformitate cu ntrzierile permise
n cadrul regimului abuzului de pia.
(65) | Ca instituie aflat integral sau par ial n proprietatea
uneia sau mai multor autoriti publice sau controlat de
autoritatea de rezoluie, rolul principal al institu iei-punte ar
fi asigurarea continuitii n furnizarea de servicii financiare
eseniale ctre clienii instituiei n curs de a intra n
dificultate i a continuitii n desfurarea activitilor
financiare eseniale. Instituia-punte ar trebui s func ioneze
ca entitate viabil i s fie introdus napoi pe pia n
momentul n care exist circumstanele corespunztoare i n
termenul prevzut n prezenta directiv ori s fie lichidat n
cazul n care ea nu este viabil.
(66) | Instrumentul de separare a activelor ar trebui s
permit autoritilor transferarea ctre un vehicul separat a
activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor unei instituii aflate n
rezoluie. Acest instrument ar trebui utilizat numai n
combinaie cu alte instrumente, pentru a preveni apari ia
unui avantaj concurenial nejustificat pentru instituia n curs
de a intra n dificultate.
(67) | Un regim de rezoluie eficient ar trebui s reduc la
minimum acele costuri ale rezoluiei unei instituii n curs de
a intra n dificultate care sunt suportate de contribuabili.
Acesta ar trebui s garanteze o rezoluie a instituiilor de
importan sistemic care s nu pun n pericol stabilitatea
financiar. Instrumentul de recapitalizare intern atinge
aceste obiective prin garantarea faptului c ac ionarii i
creditorii instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate particip
la pierderi i suport aceste costuri ocazionate de intrarea n
dificultate a instituiei n mod corespunztor. Instrumentul de
recapitalizare intern i va ncuraja mai mult pe ac ionarii i
creditorii instituiilor s monitorizeze soliditatea unei
instituii n condiii normale i corespunde recomandrii
Consiliului pentru stabilitate financiar referitoare la
includerea de competene statutare privind reducerea valorii
contabile a datoriilor i de conversie ntr-un cadru pentru
rezoluie, ca o opiune suplimentar n coroborare cu alte
instrumente de rezoluie.
(68) | Pentru a se asigura c autoritile de rezolu ie au
flexibilitatea necesar, n diferite circumstan e, de a aloca
pierderile ctre creditori, este adecvat ca respectivele
autoriti s fie n msur s aplice instrumentul de
recapitalizare intern att atunci cnd obiectivul este acela de
a aplica instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate procedura
de rezoluie n condiiile meninerii activitii acesteia, dac
exist perspective reale de restabilire a viabilit ii instituiei,
ct i atunci cnd serviciile de importan sistemic sunt
transferate unei instituii-punte, iar partea rezidual a
instituiei i nceteaz activitatea i este lichidat.
(69) | Atunci cnd instrumentul de recapitalizare intern este
plan and structure the resolution of the institution in

accordance with delays permitted under the market abuse
regime.
(65) | As an institution which is wholly or partially
owned by one or more public authorities or controlled by
the resolution authority, a bridge institution would have
as its main purpose ensuring that essential financial
services continue to be provided to the clients of the
failing institution and that essential financial activities
continue to be performed. The bridge institution should
be operated as a viable going concern and be put back on
the market when conditions are appropriate and within
the period laid down in this Directive or wound up if not
viable.
(66) | The asset separation tool should enable authorities
to transfer assets, rights or liabilities of an institution
under resolution to a separate vehicle. That tool should
be used only in conjunction with other tools to prevent
an undue competitive advantage for the failing
institution.
(67) | An effective resolution regime should minimise the
costs of the resolution of a failing institution borne by the
taxpayers. It should ensure that systemic institutions can
be resolved without jeopardising financial stability. The
bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that
shareholders and creditors of the failing institution suffer
appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of the
costs arising from the failure of the institution. The bailin tool will therefore give shareholders and creditors of
institutions a stronger incentive to monitor the health of
an institution during normal circumstances and meets the
Financial Stability Board recommendation that statutory
debt-write down and conversion powers be included in a
framework for resolution, as an additional option in
conjunction with other resolution tools.
(68) | In order to ensure that resolution authorities have

the necessary flexibility to allocate losses to creditors in
a range of circumstances, it is appropriate that those
authorities be able to apply the bail-in tool both where
the objective is to resolve the failing institution as a
going concern if there is a realistic prospect that the
institutions viability may be restored, and where
systemically important services are transferred to a
bridge institution and the residual part of the institution
ceases to operate and is wound up.
(69) | Where the bail-in tool is applied with the objective
20
aplicat cu scopul de a reface fondurile proprii ale institu iei

n curs de a intra n dificultate, pentru a permite men inerea
activitii acesteia, rezoluia prin recapitalizare intern ar
trebui s fie nsoit de nlocuirea cadrelor de conducere, cu
excepia situaiilor n care pstrarea acestora este adecvat i
necesar pentru ndeplinirea obiectivelor rezolu iei, i de
restructurarea ulterioar a instituiei i a activit ilor acesteia,
ntr-un mod care s in cont de motivele care au condus la
intrarea ei n dificultate. Aceast restructurare ar trebui s fie
realizat prin punerea n aplicare a unui plan de reorganizare
a activitii. Dup caz, aceste planuri trebuie s fie
compatibile cu planul de restructurare pe care institu ia
trebuie s l prezinte Comisiei conform cadrului privind
ajutoarele de stat. Mai exact, pe lng msurile care vizeaz
restabilirea viabilitii pe termen lung a instituiei, planul ar
trebui s includ msuri de limitare a ajutorului astfel nct
s se reduc la minimum partajarea sarcinii suportate,
precum i msuri de limitare a denaturrii concuren ei.
(70) | Aplicarea instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n
cazul datoriilor nu este oportun, dac acestea sunt garantate
prin garanii mobiliare, garanii reale sau prin alte mijloace.
Cu toate acestea, pentru a se asigura c instrumentul de
recapitalizare intern este eficace i i atinge obiectivele,
este de dorit ca aceasta s poat fi aplicat unui numr ct mai
mare de obligaii negarantate ale unei instituii n curs de a
intra n dificultate. Cu toate acestea, este adecvat
excluderea anumitor tipuri de obligaii negarantate din
domeniul de aplicare al instrumentului de recapitalizare
intern. Pentru a proteja deintorii de depozite acoperite,
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern nu ar trebui s se
aplice depozitelor protejate n conformitate cu Directiva
Pentru a asigura continuitatea funciilor critice, instrumentul
de recapitalizare intern nu ar trebui s se aplice anumitor
datorii fa de angajaii instituiei n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau creanelor comerciale care se refer la mrfuri
i servicii eseniale pentru funcionarea de zi cu zi a
instituiei. Pentru a onora drepturile la pensie i sumele
aferente pensiilor datorate societilor de administrare a
fondurilor de pensii i administratorilor fondurilor de pensii,
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern nu ar trebui s se
aplice datoriilor instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate fa
de un sistem de pensii. Cu toate acestea, instrumentul de
recapitalizare intern s-ar aplica datoriilor pentru presta iile
de pensie care pot fi atribuite unei remuneraii variabile
nedecurgnd din contractele colective de munc, precum i
componentei variabile a remuneraiei entitilor care i
asum riscuri substaniale. Pentru a reduce riscul de
contagiune sistemic, instrumentul de recapitalizare intern
nu ar trebui s se aplice pasivelor care rezult din
participarea la sisteme de plat i care au o scaden
rezidual sub apte zile i nici datoriilor fa de instituii,
of restoring the capital of the failing institution to enable

it to continue to operate as a going concern, the
resolution through bail-in should be accompanied by
replacement of management, except where retention of
management is appropriate and necessary for the
achievement of the resolution objectives, and a
subsequent restructuring of the institution and its
activities in a way that addresses the reasons for its
failure. That restructuring should be achieved through the
implementation of a business reorganisation plan. Where
applicable, such plans should be compatible with the
restructuring plan that the institution is required to
submit to the Commission under the State aid
framework. In particular, in addition to measures aiming
to restore the long-term viability of the institution, the
plan should include measures limiting the aid to the
minimum burden sharing, and measures limiting
distortions of competition.
(70) | It is not appropriate to apply the bail-in tool to
claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or
otherwise guaranteed. However, in order to ensure that
the bail-in tool is effective and achieves its objectives, it
is desirable that it can be applied to as wide a range of
the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as
possible. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude
certain kinds of unsecured liability from the scope of
application of the bail-in tool. In order to protect holders
of covered deposits, the bail-in tool should not apply to
those deposits that are protected under Directive
Council (13). In order to ensure continuity of critical
functions, the bail-in tool should not apply to certain
liabilities to employees of the failing institution or to
commercial claims that relate to goods and services
critical to the daily functioning of the institution. In order
to honour pension entitlements and pension amounts
owed or owing to pension trusts and pension trustees, the
bail-in tool should not apply to the failing institutions
liabilities to a pension scheme. However, the bail-in tool
would apply to liabilities for pension benefits attributable
to variable remuneration which do not arise from
collective bargaining agreements, as well as to the
variable component of the remuneration of material risk
takers. To reduce risk of systemic contagion, the bail-in
tool should not apply to liabilities arising from a
participation in payment systems which have a remaining
maturity of less than seven days, or liabilities to
institutions, excluding entities that are part of the same
group, with an original maturity of less than seven days.
21
excluznd entitile care fac parte din acela i grup, cu o

scaden iniial sub apte zile.
(71) | Din moment ce protecia deponenilor care beneficiaz
de acoperire constituie unul dintre cele mai importante
obiective ale rezoluiei, depozitele acoperite nu ar trebui s
fac obiectul exercitrii instrumentului de recapitalizare
intern. Schema de garantare a depozitelor ar trebui s
contribuie ns la finanarea procesului de rezoluie
absorbind pierderi pe msura pierderilor nete pe care ar fi
trebuit s le nregistreze dup compensarea deponenilor n
cadrul unei proceduri obinuite de insolven. Exercitarea
competenelor de recapitalizare intern ar garanta faptul c
deponenii continu s aib acces la propriile depozite pn
cel puin la nivelul de acoperire, acesta fiind principalul
motiv pentru care au fost instituite schemele de garantare a
depozitelor. Lipsa prevederii implicrii acestor scheme n
astfel de cazuri ar constitui un avantaj necuvenit fa de
restul creditorilor care ar fi condiionai de exercitarea
competenelor autoritii de rezoluie.
(72) | Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s fie n msur s
exclud pasive, integral sau parial, ntr-o serie de
circumstane, inclusiv n cazurile n care recapitalizarea
intern a pasivelor respective nu este posibil ntr-un termen
rezonabil, excluderea este strict necesar i este
proporional pentru a obine continuitatea funciilor critice
i a liniilor de activitate eseniale sau n care aplicarea
instrumentului de recapitalizare intern pentru pasivele n
cauz ar conduce la o deteriorare a valorii, astfel nct
pierderile suferite de ali creditori ar fi superioare cazului n
care pasivele respective nu ar fi excluse de la recapitalizare.
Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s fie n msur s exclud
pasive, integral sau parial, atunci cnd acest lucru este
necesar pentru a evita rspndirea contaminrii sau a
instabilitii financiare care ar putea determina o perturbare
grav a economiei unui stat membru. Atunci cnd efectueaz
aceste evaluri, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s ia n
considerare consecinele unei poteniale recapitalizri interne
a pasivelor care rezult din depozitele eligibile de inute de
persoane fizice i de microntreprinderi, ntreprinderi mici i
mijlocii peste nivelul de acoperire prevzut n Directiva
2014/49/UE.
(73) | n cazul n care se aplic excluderile men ionate,
nivelul reducerii valorii contabile sau al conversiei altor
pasive eligibile poate fi majorat pentru a ine seama de astfel
de excluderi, sub rezerva respectrii principiului niciun
creditor nu trebuie s fie dezavantajat n raport cu
procedurile normale de insolven. n cazul n care
pierderile nu pot fi transferate altor creditori, mecanismul de
finanare a rezoluiei poate face o contribuie n beneficiul
instituiei aflate n rezoluie, sub rezerva unei serii de
condiii stricte, inclusiv cerina ca pierderile n valoare total
(71) | As the protection of covered depositors is one of

the most important objectives of resolution, covered
deposits should not be subject to the exercise of the bailin tool. The deposit guarantee scheme should, however,
contribute to funding the resolution process by absorbing
losses to the extent of the net losses that it would have
had to suffer after compensating depositors in normal
insolvency proceedings. The exercise of the bail-in
powers would ensure that depositors continue to have
access to their deposits up to at least the coverage level
which is the main reason why the deposit guarantee
schemes have been established. Not providing for the
involvement of those schemes in such cases would
constitute an unfair advantage with respect to the rest of
creditors which would be subject to the exercise of the
powers by the resolution authority.
(72) | Resolution authorities should be able to exclude or
partially exclude liabilities in a number of circumstances
including where it is not possible to bail-in such
liabilities within a reasonable timeframe, the exclusion is
strictly necessary and is proportionate to achieving the
continuity of critical functions and core business lines or
the application of the bail-in tool to liabilities would
cause a destruction in value such that losses borne by
other creditors would be higher than if those liabilities
were not excluded from bail-in. Resolution authorities
should be able to exclude or partially exclude liabilities
where necessary to avoid the spreading of contagion and
financial instability which may cause serious disturbance
to the economy of a Member State. When carrying out
those assessments, resolution authorities should give
consideration to the consequences of a potential bail-in
of liabilities stemming from eligible deposits held by
natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises above the coverage level provided for in
Directive 2014/49/EU.
(73) | Where those exclusions are applied, the level of

write down or conversion of other eligible liabilities may
be increased to take account of such exclusions subject to
the no creditor worse off than under normal insolvency
proceedings principle being respected. Where the losses
cannot be passed to other creditors, the resolution
financing arrangement may make a contribution to the
institution under resolution subject to a number of strict
conditions including the requirement that losses totalling
not less than 8 % of total liabilities including own funds
22
de cel puin 8 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile

proprii, s fi fost deja absorbite i ca finanarea furnizat din
fondul de rezoluie s fie limitat la oricare valoare este mai
mic dintre 5 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile
proprii sau mijloacele disponibile fondului de rezolu ie, i
suma care poate fi perceput prin contribuii ex post n
termen de trei ani.
(74) | n circumstane extraordinare, atunci cnd pasivele au
fost excluse i fondul de rezoluie a fost utilizat pentru a
contribui la recapitalizarea intern n locul pasivelor
respective n msura plafonului permis, autoritatea de
rezoluie ar trebui s poat solicita finanare din surse de
finanare alternative.
(75) | Cuantumul minim al contribuiei la absorbia
pierderilor i recapitalizrii interne, de 8 % din totalul
pasivelor inclusiv fondurile proprii sau, dup caz, de 20 %
din activele ponderate n funcie de risc ar trebui s se
calculeze pe baza evalurii efectuate n scopul rezolu iei n
conformitate cu prezenta directiv. Pierderile istorice care au
fost deja absorbite de acionari printr-o reducere a fondurilor
proprii anterioar respectivei evaluri nu ar trebui incluse n
procentele respective.
(76) | Niciun element din cadrul prezentei directive nu ar
trebui s solicite statelor membre s finaneze mecanisme de
finanare a rezoluiei prin mijloace de la bugetul general al
acestora.
(77) | Cu excepia situaiilor pentru care dispoziiile prezentei
directive specific altfel, autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s
aplice instrumentul de recapitalizare intern astfel nct s
respecte tratamentul egal al creditorilor i rangul statutar al
creanelor, conform legislaiei aplicabile n materie de
insolven. Pierderile ar trebui s fie absorbite n primul rnd
de instrumentele de capital reglementare i ar trebui s fie
alocate acionarilor fie prin anularea sau transferul ac iunilor,
fie prin diluarea semnificativ a acestora. n cazul n care
aceste instrumente nu sunt suficiente, datoriile subordonate
ar trebui convertite sau reduse. Atunci cnd clasele
subordonate au fost convertite sau reduse integral, datoriile
principale ar trebui convertite sau reduse.
(78) | n cazul n care exist scutiri aplicabile pasivelor, de
exemplu pentru sisteme de plat i de decontare, pentru
angajai sau creditori comerciali, sau o ordine preferen ial,
de exemplu pentru depozitele persoanelor fizice, ale
microntreprinderilor i ale ntreprinderilor mici i mijlocii,
acestea ar trebui s se aplice n rile tere, precum i n
Uniune. Pentru a asigura capacitatea de a reduce valoarea
contabil a pasivelor sau de a le converti, dac este cazul, n
ri tere, recunoaterea acestei posibiliti ar trebui s fie
inclus n prevederile contractuale crora li se aplic dreptul
rii tere, n special n ceea ce privete datoriile de rang
inferiordin cadrul ierarhiei creditorilor. Astfel de clauze
have already been absorbed, and the funding provided by

the resolution fund is limited to the lower of 5 % of total
liabilities including own funds or the means available to
the resolution fund and the amount that can be raised
through ex-post contributions within three years.
(74) | In extraordinary circumstances, where liabilities

have been excluded and the resolution fund has been
used to contribute to bail-in in lieu of those liabilities to
the extent of the permissible cap, the resolution authority
should be able to seek funding from alternative financing
sources.
(75) | The minimum amount of contribution to loss
absorption and recapitalisation of 8 % of total liabilities
including own funds or, where applicable, of 20 % of
risk-weighted assets should be calculated based on the
valuation for the purposes of resolution in accordance
with this Directive. Historical losses which have already
been absorbed by shareholders through a reduction in
own funds prior to such a valuation should not be
included in those percentages.
(76) | Nothing in this Directive should require Member
States to finance resolution financing arrangements by
means from their general budget.
(77) | Except where otherwise specified in this Directive,
resolution authorities should apply the bail-in tool in a
way that respects the pari passu treatment of creditors
and the statutory ranking of claims under the applicable
insolvency law. Losses should first be absorbed by
regulatory capital instruments and should be allocated to
shareholders either through the cancellation or transfer of
shares or through severe dilution. Where those
instruments are not sufficient, subordinated debt should
be converted or written down. Senior liabilities should be
converted or written down if the subordinate classes have
been converted or written down entirely.
(78) | Where there are exemptions of liabilities such as
for payment and settlement systems, employee or trade
creditors, or preferential ranking such as for deposits of
natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises, they should apply in third countries as well
as in the Union. To ensure the ability to write down or
convert liabilities when appropriate in third countries,
recognition of that possibility should be included in the
contractual provisions governed by the law of the third
countries, especially for those liabilities ranking at a
lower level within the hierarchy of creditors. Such
contractual terms should not be required for liabilities
23
contractuale nu ar trebui cerute pentru pasivele scutite de

procedura de recapitalizare intern pentru depozitele
persoanelor fizice, ale microntreprinderilor i ale
ntreprinderilor mici i mijlocii sau n cazul n care legisla ia
rii tere sau un acord obligatoriu ncheiat cu ara ter
respectiv permite autoritii de rezoluie a statului membru
s i exercite competenele de reducere a valorii contabile
sau de conversie.
(79) | Pentru a evita structurarea de ctre instituii a
propriilor pasive ntr-un mod care s mpiedice func ionarea
eficient a instrumentului de recapitalizare intern, este
oportun s se stabileasc ca instituiile s ndeplineasc, n
orice moment, o cerin minim de fonduri proprii i de
pasive eligibile, exprimat ca procent din pasivele totale i
fondurile proprii ale instituiei. Autoritile de rezoluie ar
trebui s aib posibilitatea de a solicita, de la caz la caz, ca
acest procent s fie format, integral sau par ial, din fonduri
proprii sau dintr-o anumit categorie de pasive.
(80) | Prezenta directiv abordeaz de sus n jos modul de
stabilire a cerinei minime de fonduri proprii i de pasive
eligibile n cadrul unui grup. Abordarea respectiv
recunoate, n continuare, faptul c aciunea de rezolu ie se
aplic la nivelul fiecrei persoane juridice n parte i c este
neaprat necesar ca la nivelul entitii din cadrul grupului n
care se produc pierderile s fie localizat capacitatea de
absorbie a pierderilor sau acestei persoane juridice s i fie
creat accesul la acea capacitate. n acest scop, autorit ile de
rezoluie ar trebui s garanteze distribuia n ntregul grup a
capacitii de absorbie a pierderilor dintr-un grup, n
conformitate cu nivelul de risc al persoanelor juridice care l
constituie. Cerina minim necesar pentru fiecare filial n
parte ar trebui evaluat separat. Mai mult, autorit ile de
rezoluie ar trebui s se asigure c ntregul capital i pasivele
contabilizate n contul cerinei minime consolidate sunt
localizate la nivelul entitilor susceptibile s nregistreze
pierderi sau sunt n alt mod puse la dispoziie pentru a
absorbi pierderi. Prezenta directiv ar trebui s permit o
procedur de rezoluie cu mai multe puncte de intrare sau cu
un singur punct de intrare. Cerinele minime pentru fondurile
proprii i pasivele eligibile ar trebui s reflecte strategia de
rezoluie adecvat pentru un grup n conformitate cu planul
de rezoluie. n special, cerinele minime pentru fondurile
proprii i pasivele eligibile ar trebui impuse la nivelul
adecvat n cadrul grupului, astfel nct s reflecte o abordare
cu mai multe puncte de intrare sau o abordare cu un singur
punct de intrare, cuprins n planul de rezolu ie, innd
seama de faptul c ar putea exista situaii n care o abordare
diferit de cea menionat n planul respectiv este utilizat,
deoarece aceasta ar permite, de exemplu, atingerea
obiectivelor rezoluiei ntr-un mod mai eficient. n acest
context, indiferent dac un grup a ales abordarea cu un
singur punct de intrare sau abordarea cu mai multe puncte de
exempted from bail-in for deposits of natural persons and

micro, small and medium-sized enterprises or where the
law of the third country or a binding agreement
concluded with that third country allow the resolution
authority of the Member State to exercise its write down
or conversion powers.
(79) | To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a

manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail-in tool
it is appropriate to establish that the institutions meet at
all times a minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total
liabilities and own funds of the institution. Resolution
authorities should be able to require, on a case-by-case
basis, that that percentage is wholly or partially
composed of own funds or of a specific type of
liabilities.
(80) | This Directive adopts a top down approach to the
determination of the minimum requirement for own
funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) within a group. The
approach further recognises that resolution action is
applied at the level of the individual legal person, and
that it is imperative that loss-absorbing capacity is
located in, or accessible to, the legal person within the
group in which losses occur. To that end, resolution
authorities should ensure that loss-absorbing capacity
within a group is distributed across the group in
accordance with the level of risk in its constituent legal
persons. The minimum requirement necessary for each
individual subsidiary should be separately assessed.
Furthermore, resolution authorities should ensure that all
capital and liabilities which are counted towards the
consolidated minimum requirement are located in
entities where losses are liable to occur, or are otherwise
available to absorb losses. This Directive should allow
for a multiple-point-of-entry or a single-point-of-entry
resolution. The MREL should reflect the resolution
strategy which is appropriate to a group in accordance
with the resolution plan. In particular, the MREL should
be required at the appropriate level in the group in order
to reflect a multiple-point-of-entry approach or singlepoint-of-entry-approach contained in the resolution plan
while keeping in mind that there could be circumstances
where an approach different from that contained in the
plan is used as it would allow, for instance, reaching the
resolution objectives more efficiently. Against that
background, regardless of whether a group has chosen
the single-point- of-entry or the multiple-point-of entry
approach, all institutions and other legal persons in the
group where required by the resolution authorities
should, at all times, have a robust MREL so as to avoid
24
intrare, toate instituiile i persoanele juridice din grup ar

trebui s fie obligate de autoritile de rezoluie s dispun n
permanen de cerine minime solide pentru fondurile proprii
i pasivele eligibile, astfel nct s evite riscul de contagiere
sau de panic bancar.
(81) | Statele membre ar trebui s se asigure c fondurile
proprii de nivel 1 suplimentar sau de nivel 2 absorb integral
pierderile n momentul n care instituia emitent atinge
punctul de neviabilitate. n consecin, ar trebui s se solicite
autoritilor de rezoluie reducerea valorii contabile a
respectivelor instrumente n ntregime sau conversia lor n
instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz, n
momentul n care instituia atinge punctul de neviabilitate i
nainte de luarea alte msuri de rezoluie. n acest scop,
punctul de neviabilitate al instituiei ar trebui neles drept
momentul n care autoritatea relevant stabile te c instituia
ndeplinete condiiile de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie
sau momentul n care autoritatea decide c institu ia ar nceta
s mai fie viabil, dac instrumentele de capital respective
nu ar fi reduse sau convertite. Faptul c instrumentele vor fi
reduse sau convertite de ctre autoriti, n circumstan ele
prevzute de prezenta directiv, ar trebui s fie men ionat n
condiiile care reglementeaz instrumentul i n orice
prospect sau document de ofert publicat sau furnizat n
legtur cu instrumentele respective.
(82) | Pentru a permite obinerea de rezultate efective n
urma procedurii de rezoluie ar trebui s existe posibilitatea
aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern nainte de 1
ianuarie 2016.
(83) | Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s poat aplica doar
parial instrumentul de recapitalizare intern, n cazul n care
o evaluare a posibilului impact asupra stabilit ii sistemului
financiar din statele membre vizate i din restul Uniunii
Europene demonstreaz c aplicarea sa n totalitate ar fi
contrar intereselor publice generale ale statelor membre sau
ale Uniunii n ansamblul su.
(84) | Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s dispun de toate
competenele juridice necesare, care pot fi exercitate, n
diferite combinaii, n aplicarea instrumentelor de rezolu ie.
Acestea ar trebui s includ competena de a transfera ac iuni
sau active, drepturi sau pasive ale unei instituii n curs de a
intra n dificultate ctre o alt entitate, cum ar fi o alt
instituie sau o instituie-punte, competena de a reduce
valoarea contabil a aciunilor sau de a le anula, ori de a
reduce valoarea contabil a pasivelor unei institu ii n curs de
a intra n dificultate sau a le converti, competen a de a
nlocui cadrele de conducere i competena de a impune un
moratoriu temporar privind plata creanelor. Sunt necesare
competene suplimentare, inclusiv cea de a solicita altor pri
ale grupului asigurarea continuitii serviciilor esen iale.
(85) | Nu este necesar s se impun autorit ilor de rezolu ie
the risk of contagion or a bank run.
(81) | Member States should ensure that Additional Tier 1

and Tier 2 capital instruments fully absorb losses at the
point of non-viability of the issuing institution.
Accordingly, resolution authorities should be required to
write down those instruments in full, or to convert them
to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, at the point of
non-viability and before any resolution action is taken.
For that purpose, the point of non-viability should be
understood as the point at which the relevant authority
determines that the institution meets the conditions for
resolution or the point at which the authority decides that
the institution would cease to be viable if those capital
instruments were not written down or converted. The fact
that the instruments are to be written down or converted
by authorities in the circumstances required by this
Directive should be recognised in the terms governing
the instrument, and in any prospectus or offering
documents published or provided in connection with the
instruments.
(82) | In order to allow for effective resolution outcomes,
it should be possible to apply the bail-in tool before 1
January 2016.
(83) | Resolution authorities should be able to apply the
bail-in tool only partially where an assessment of the
potential impact on the stability of the financial system in
the Member States concerned and in the rest of the
Union demonstrates that its full application would be
contrary to the overall public interests of the Member
State or the Union as a whole.
(84) | Resolution authorities should have all the
necessary legal powers that, in different combinations,
may be exercised when applying the resolution tools.
They should include the power to transfer shares in, or
assets, rights or liabilities of, a failing institution to
another entity such as another institution or a bridge
institution, the power to write down or cancel shares, or
write down or convert liabilities of a failing institution,
the power to replace the management and the power to
impose a temporary moratorium on the payment of
claims. Supplementary powers are needed, including the
power to require continuity of essential services from
other parts of a group.
(85) | It is not necessary to prescribe the exact means
25
mijloacele exacte de intervenie n cazul instituiilor n curs

de a intra n dificultate. Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s
aib posibilitatea de a alege ntre preluarea controlului printro intervenie direct asupra instituiei sau prin ordin executiv.
Ele ar trebui s decid n funcie de circumstan ele fiecrui
caz n parte. Impunerea unui sistem unic pentru asigurarea
unei cooperri eficiente ntre statele membre nu pare a fi
necesar la acest moment.
(86) | Cadrul de rezoluie ar trebui s cuprind cerin e
procedurale prin care s se garanteze faptul c msurile de
rezoluie sunt notificate i fcute publice n mod corect, sub
rezerva excepiilor limitate prevzute n prezenta directiv.
innd ns cont de faptul c informaiile obinute de
autoritile de rezoluie i de consilierii lor profesionali pe
parcursul procesului de rezoluie vor fi probabil sensibile,
aceste informaii ar trebui s fac obiectul unui regim de
confidenialitate eficient. Ar trebui s se in seama de faptul
c informaiile privind coninutul i detaliile planurilor de
redresare i de rezoluie, precum i rezultatele eventualelor
evaluri ale acestor planuri pot avea un impact major, n
special asupra ntreprinderilor n cauz. Toate informa iile
furnizate n ceea ce privete o decizie nainte de a fi luat,
indiferent dac privesc ndeplinirea condiiilor pentru
declanarea procedurii de rezoluie, ori utilizarea unui
instrument specific sau a unei eventuale msuri n cursul
procedurii, trebuie considerate ca avnd efecte asupra
intereselor publice i private vizate de msur. Cu toate
acestea, informaia conform creia autoritatea de rezolu ie
examineaz o anumit instituie ar putea fi de ajuns s
produc efecte negative asupra instituiei respective. Prin
urmare, este necesar s se asigure c exist mecanisme
adecvate pentru pstrarea confidenialitii acestor
informaii, cum ar fi coninutul i detaliile privind planurile
de redresare i de rezoluie, precum i rezultatele
eventualelor evaluri efectuate n acest context.
(87) | Autoritile de rezoluie ar trebui s dispun de
competene auxiliare privind asigurarea eficacitii
transferului de aciuni, instrumente de datorie i active,
drepturi i pasive. Sub rezerva mecasnismelor de siguran
prevzute n prezenta directiv, aceste competen e ar trebui
s includ competena de a ridica drepturile deinute de teri
asupra instrumentelor sau activelor transferate, competen a
de a asigura respectarea contractelor i continuitatea
acordurilor n beneficiul destinatarului activelor i ac iunilor
transferate. Cu toate acestea, drepturile angaja ilor de a
rezilia contractul de munc nu ar trebui s fie afectate. De
asemenea, nu ar trebui s fie afectat nici dreptul unei pr i de
a rezilia un contract cu o instituie aflat n rezolu ie sau, cu
o entitate din grup, pentru alte motive dect rezolu ia
instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate. Autorit ile de
rezoluie ar trebui s aib competena auxiliar de a solicita
instituiei reziduale care se afl n curs de lichidare n
through which the resolution authorities should intervene

in the failing institution. Resolution authorities should
have the choice between taking control through a direct
intervention in the institution or through executive order.
They should decide according to the circumstances of the
case. It does not appear necessary for efficient
cooperation between Member States to impose a single
model at this stage.
(86) | The resolution framework should include
procedural requirements to ensure that resolution actions
are properly notified and, subject to the limited
exceptions laid down in this Directive, made public.
However, as information obtained by resolution
authorities and their professional advisers during the
resolution process is likely to be sensitive, before the
resolution decision is made public, that information
should be subject to an effective confidentiality regime.
The fact that information on the contents and details of
recovery and resolution plans and the result of any
assessment of those plans may have far-reaching effects,
in particular on the undertakings concerned, must be
taken into account. Any information provided in respect
of a decision before it is taken, be it on whether the
conditions for resolution are satisfied, on the use of a
specific tool or of any action during the proceedings,
must be presumed to have effects on the public and
private interests concerned by the action. However,
information that the resolution authority is examining a
specific institution could be enough for there to be
negative effects on that institution. It is therefore
necessary to ensure that there are appropriate
mechanisms for maintaining the confidentiality of such
information, such as the content and details of recovery
and resolution plans and the result of any assessment
carried out in that context.
(87) | Resolution authorities should have ancillary
powers to ensure the effectiveness of the transfer of
shares or debt instruments and assets, rights and
liabilities. Subject to the safeguards specified in this
Directive, those powers should include the power to
remove third parties rights from the transferred
instruments or assets and the power to enforce contracts
and to provide for the continuity of arrangements vis-vis the recipient of the transferred assets and shares.
However, the rights of employees to terminate a contract
of employment should not be affected. The right of a
party to terminate a contract with an institution under
resolution, or a group entity thereof, for reasons other
than the resolution of the failing institution should not be
affected either. Resolution authorities should have the
ancillary power to require the residual institution that is
being wound up under normal insolvency proceedings to
26
temeiul procedurii obinuite de insolven prestarea acelor

servicii care sunt necesare pentru a permite institu iei ctre
care au fost transferate active sau aciuni n virtutea aplicrii
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii sau a instrumentului
instituiei-punte s i desfoare activitatea.
(88) | n conformitate cu articolul 47 din Cart, pr ile n
cauz au dreptul la un proces echitabil i la o cale de atac
eficient mpotriva msurilor care le afecteaz. n
consecin, deciziile luate de autoritile de rezoluie ar
trebui s fac obiectul dreptului la o cale de atac.
(89) | Msurile de gestionare a crizelor luate de autorit ile
naionale de rezoluie pot necesita evaluri economice
complexe i o marj larg de apreciere. Autorit ile na ionale
de rezoluie sunt special nzestrate cu capacitatea de
expertiz necesar pentru a realiza aceste evaluri i pentru a
stabili utilizarea adecvat a marjei de apreciere. Prin urmare,
este important s se asigure c evalurile economice
complexe efectuate de autoritile naionale de rezolu ie n
acest context sunt utilizate ca baz de ctre instan ele
naionale cu ocazia examinrii msurilor de gestionare a
crizelor n cauz. Cu toate acestea, natura complex a acestor
evaluri nu ar trebui s mpiedice instanele naionale s
analizeze dac elementele de prob invocate de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie sunt exacte din punct de vedere
material, fiabile i coerente, dac elementele de prob con in
toate informaiile relevante care ar trebui s fie luate n
considerare pentru a evalua o situaie complex i dac ele
sunt de natur s susin concluziile deduse pe baza lor.
(90) | innd cont de faptul c prezenta directiv are drept
obiectiv tratarea unor situaii de extrem urgen i c
suspendarea oricrei decizii a autoritilor de rezolu ie ar
putea afecta continuitatea funciilor critice, este necesar s se
prevad faptul c nitroducerea unei ci de atac nu ar trebui s
aib drept rezultat suspendarea automat a efectelor deciziei
contestate, iar decizia autoritii de rezoluie ar trebui s aib
imediat titlu executoriu, cu prezumia c suspendarea ar fi
contrar interesului public.
(91) | n plus, acolo unde este necesar, pentru a proteja
prile tere care au achiziionat cu bun-credin active,
drepturi i obligaii ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n
temeiul exercitrii de ctre autoriti a competen elor de
rezoluie i pentru a asigura stabilitatea pie elor financiare,
nicio cale de atac nu ar trebui s afecteze actele
administrative sau tranzaciile ncheiate ulterior pe baza unei
decizii anulate. n astfel de cazuri, repara iile n cazul unei
decizii abuzive ar trebui s se limiteze prin urmare la
acordarea de despgubiri pentru daunele suferite de
persoanele afectate.
(92) | Avnd n vedere c este posibil s se impun luarea
urgent a unor msuri de gestionare a crizelor din cauza
riscurilor majore la adresa stabilitii financiare a statului
provide services that are necessary to enable the

institution to which assets or shares have been
transferred by virtue of the application of the sale of
business tool or the bridge institution tool to operate its
business.
(88) | In accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, the
parties concerned have a right to due process and to an
effective remedy against the measures affecting them.
Therefore, the decisions taken by the resolution
authorities should be subject to a right of appeal.
(89) | Crisis management measures taken by national
resolution authorities may require complex economic
assessments and a large margin of discretion. The
national resolution authorities are specifically equipped
with the expertise needed for making those assessments
and for determining the appropriate use of the margin of
discretion. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the
complex economic assessments made by national
resolution authorities in that context are used as a basis
by national courts when reviewing the crisis management
measures concerned. However, the complex nature of
those assessments should not prevent national courts
from examining whether the evidence relied on by the
resolution authority is factually accurate, reliable and
consistent, whether that evidence contains all relevant
information which should be taken into account in order
to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn therefrom.
(90) | Since this Directive aims to cover situations of
extreme urgency, and since the suspension of any
decision of the resolution authorities might impede the
continuity of critical functions, it is necessary to provide
that the lodging of any appeal should not result in
automatic suspension of the effects of the challenged
decision and that the decision of the resolution authority
should be immediately enforceable with a presumption
that its suspension would be against the public interest.
(91) | In addition, where necessary in order to protect
third parties who have acquired assets, rights and
liabilities of the institution under resolution in good faith
by virtue of the exercise of the resolution powers by the
authorities and to ensure the stability of the financial
markets, a right of appeal should not affect any
subsequent administrative act or transaction concluded
on the basis of an annulled decision. In such cases,
remedies for a wrongful decision should therefore be
limited to the award of compensation for the damages
suffered by the affected persons.
(92) | Given that crisis management measures may be
required to be taken urgently due to serious financial
stability risks in the Member State and the Union, any
27
membru respectiv i a Uniunii, orice procedur n temeiul

dreptului intern referitoare la cererea de aprobare judiciar
ex ante a unei astfel de msuri, precum i examinarea de
ctre instan a cererii respective ar trebui s fie realizate
rapid. Dat fiind cerina ca o msur de gestionare a crizelor
s fie luat de urgen, instana ar trebui s adopte o decizie
n termen de 24 de ore, iar statele membre ar trebui s se
asigure c autoritatea relevant poate lua o decizie imediat
dup ce instana i-a dat acordul. Acest lucru nu ar trebui s
aduc atingere posibilului drept al prilor interesate de a
depune o cerere n faa instanei n vederea anulrii deciziei
pentru o perioad de timp limitat dup ce autoritatea de
rezoluie a luat msura de gestionare a crizelor.
(93) | Pentru ca procedura de rezoluie s produc efectele
dorite i pentru a evita conflictele de competen, pe
parcursul perioadei n care autoritatea de rezoluie i
exercit competenele de rezoluie sau aplic instrumentele
de rezoluie, procedura obinuit de insolven pentru
instituia n curs de a intra n dificultate nu ar trebui deschis
sau, dup caz, continuat dect la ini iativa sau cu
consimmntul autoritii de rezoluie. Este util i necesar
ca anumite obligaii contractuale s fie suspendate pentru o
perioad limitat, astfel nct autoritatea de rezolu ie s aib
timpul necesar punerii n practic a acestor instrumente.
Totui, acest lucru nu ar trebui s se aplice obliga iilor n
legtur cu sistemele desemnate n temeiul Directivei
98/26/CE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (14),
contrapartidele centrale i bncile centrale. Directiva
98/26/CE reduce riscul ce decurge din participarea la
sistemele de plat i de decontare a titlurilor de valoare, n
special prin reducerea perturbrilor n cazul insolven ei unui
participant la un astfel de sistem. Pentru a se asigura c
aceste protecii se aplic n mod corespunztor n situa ii de
criz, meninnd, n acelai timp, un nivel adecvat de
certitudine pentru operatorii sistemelor de plat i de titluri
de valoare, precum i pentru ali participan i pe pia,
prezenta directiv prevede c o msur de prevenire sau de
gestionare a crizelor nu ar trebui, de una singur, s fie
recunoscut ca o procedur de insolven n sensul Directivei
98/26/CE, cu condiia ca obligaiile contractuale substaniale
s fie ndeplinite n continuare. Cu toate acestea, nicio
dispoziie din prezenta directiv nu aduce atingere
funcionrii unui sistem desemnat n temeiul Directivei
98/26/CE sau dreptului la garanii suplimentare garantat prin
articolul 9 din Directiva 98/26/CE.
(94) | Pentru a se asigura c, atunci cnd efectueaz
transferul de active i pasive ctre un cumprtor din
sectorul privat sau o instituie-punte, autoritile de rezolu ie
au la dispoziie o perioad corespunztoare de timp pentru a
identifica acele contracte care trebuie transferate, ar putea fi
oportun impunerea de restricii proporionale asupra
drepturilor contrapartidelor de a rezilia, de a anticipa
procedure under national law relating to the application

for ex-ante judicial approval of a crisis management
measure and the courts consideration of such an
application should be swift. Given the requirement for a
crisis management measure to be taken urgently, the
court should give its decision within 24 hours and
Member States should ensure that the relevant authority
can take its decision immediately after the court has
given its approval. This is without prejudice to the right
that interested parties might have in making an
application to the court to set aside the decision for a
limited period after the resolution authority has taken the
crisis management measure.
(93) | It is in the interest of an efficient resolution, and in
order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, that no normal
insolvency proceedings for the failing institution be
opened or continued whilst the resolution authority is
exercising its resolution powers or applying the
resolution tools, except at the initiative of, or with the
consent of, the resolution authority. It is useful and
necessary to suspend, for a limited period, certain
contractual obligations so that the resolution authority
has time to put into practice the resolution tools. This
should not, however, apply to obligations in relation to
systems designated under Directive 98/26/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (14), central
counterparties and central banks. Directive 98/26/EC
reduces the risk associated with participation in payment
and securities settlement systems, in particular by
reducing disruption in the event of the insolvency of a
participant in such a system. To ensure that those
protections apply appropriately in crisis situations, whilst
maintaining appropriate certainty for operators of
payment and securities systems and other market
participants, this Directive provides that a crisis
prevention measure or a crisis management measure
should not, per se, be deemed to be insolvency
proceedings within the meaning of Directive 98/26/EC,
provided that the substantive obligations under the
contract continue to be performed. However, nothing in
this Directive prejudices the operation of a system
designated under Directive 98/26/EC or the right to
collateral security guaranteed by Article 9 of Directive
98/26/EC.
(94) | In order to ensure that resolution authorities, when
transferring assets and liabilities to a private sector
purchaser or bridge institution, have an adequate period
to identify contracts that need to be transferred, it might
be appropriate to impose proportionate restrictions on
counterparties rights to close out, accelerate or otherwise
terminate financial contracts before the transfer is made.
28
scadena sau de a pune capt n orice alt fel contractelor

financiare, nainte de efectuarea transferului. O astfel de
restricie ar fi necesar pentru a permite autorit ilor s
obin o imagine fidel a bilanului unei instituii n curs de a
intra n dificultate, fr modificrile pe care exercitarea pe
scar larg a drepturilor de reziliere le-ar aduce valorii i
sferei de activitate ale instituiei. Pentru a afecta ntr-o
msur ct mai mic posibil drepturile contractuale ale
contrapartidelor, restriciile privind drepturile de reziliere ar
trebui s se aplice doar n legtur cu msura de prevenire a
crizelor sau cu msura de gestionare a crizelor, inclusiv cu
producerea unui eveniment direct legat de aplicarea unei
astfel de msuri, iar drepturile de reziliere care decurg din
orice alt tip de nerespectare a obligaiilor, inclusiv din
nerespectarea obligaiilor de plat sau a obliga iilor de a da
curs apelului n marj, ar trebui s fie meninute.
(95) | Pentru ca acordurile legitime ncheiate pe pie ele de
capital s nu fie afectate n eventualitatea transferrii unei
pri, dar nu a totalitii activelor, drepturilor i obliga iilor
instituiei n curs de a intra n dificultate, este oportun
includerea de mecasisme de siguran care s previn
divizarea pasivelor, drepturilor i a contractelor conexate,
dup caz. Aceast restricie privind anumite practici legate
de contractele conexate ar trebui extins la contractele
ncheiate cu aceeai contraparte i acoperite prin acorduri de
garanie, contracte de garanie financiar cu transfer de
proprietate, acorduri de compensare reciproc i acorduri de
compensare cu exigibilitate imediat (set-off i close out
netting), precum i prin mecanisme de finanare structurate.
Atunci cnd se aplic mecasnisme de siguran , autorit ile
de rezoluie ar trebui s fie obligate ori s transfere toate
contractele conexate, n cadrul unui acord protejat, ori s le
menin pe toate la instituia n curs de a intra n dificultate.
Aceste mecasnisme de siguran ar trebui s garanteze faptul
c tratamentul reglementar al cerinelor de capital n ceea ce
privete expunerile care fac obiectul unui acord de
compensare n sensul Directivei 2013/36/UE nu este
compromis.
(96) | Garantarea faptului c autorit ile de rezolu ie au la
dispoziie aceleai instrumente i competene va facilita o
aciune coordonat n eventualitatea intrrii n dificultate a
unui grup transnaional, ns pentru promovarea cooperrii i
prevenirea fragmentrii abordrilor na ionale par a fi
necesare eforturi suplimentare. n ceea ce prive te
procedurile de rezoluie declanate mpotriva entitilor din
grup, ar trebui s se prevad obligaia autoritilor de
rezoluie de a se consulta reciproc i de a coopera n cadrul
colegiilor de rezoluie, pentru a conveni asupra unei scheme
de rezoluie a grupului. Aceste colegii ar trebui create
pornind de la colegiile de supraveghere existente, prin
includerea autoritilor de rezoluie i prin implicarea
ministerelor competente, a bncilor centrale, a ABE i, dup
Such a restriction would be necessary to allow

authorities to obtain a true picture of the balance sheet of
the failing institution, without the changes in value and
scope that extensive exercise of termination rights would
entail. In order to interfere with the contractual rights of
counterparties to the minimum extent necessary, the
restriction on termination rights should apply only in
relation to the crisis prevention measure or crisis
management measure, including the occurrence of any
event directly linked to the application of such a
measure, and rights to terminate arising from any other
default, including failure to pay or deliver margin, should
remain.
(95) | In order to preserve legitimate capital market

arrangements in the event of a transfer of some, but not
all, of the assets, rights and liabilities of a failing
institution, it is appropriate to include safeguards to
prevent the splitting of linked liabilities, rights and
contracts, as appropriate. Such a restriction on selected
practices in relation to linked contracts should extend to
contracts with the same counterparty covered by security
arrangements, title transfer financial collateral
arrangements, set-off arrangements, close out netting
agreements, and structured finance arrangements. Where
the safeguard applies, resolution authorities should be
bound to transfer all linked contracts within a protected
arrangement, or leave them all with the residual failing
institution. Those safeguards should ensure that the
regulatory capital treatment of exposures covered by a
netting agreement for the purposes of Directive
2013/36/EU is not affected.
(96) | While ensuring that resolution authorities have the

same tools and powers at their disposal will facilitate
coordinated action in the event of a failure of a crossborder group, further action appears necessary to
promote cooperation and prevent fragmented national
responses. Resolution authorities should be required to
consult each other and cooperate in resolution colleges
when resolving group entities with a view to agreeing a
group resolution scheme. Resolution colleges should be
established around the core of the existing supervisory
colleges through the inclusion of resolution authorities
and the involvement of competent ministries, central
banks, EBA and, where appropriate, authorities
responsible for the deposit guarantee schemes. In the
29
caz, a autoritilor responsabile de schemele de garantare a

depozitelor. n caz de criz, colegiul de rezolu ie va juca
rolul de forum pentru schimbul de informa ii i pentru
coordonarea msurilor de rezoluie.
(97) | Rezoluia grupurilor transnaionale ar trebui s in
cont de dou imperative majore: pe de o parte, necesitatea
unor proceduri care s ia n considerare caracterul urgent al
situaiei i care s permit gsirea de soluii eficiente, corecte
i tempestive pentru ntregul grup, iar pe de alt parte,
necesitatea de a proteja stabilitatea financiar n toate statele
membre n care grupul i desfoar activitatea. Autorit ile
de rezoluie ar trebui s-i mprteasc opiniile n cadrul
colegiilor de rezoluie. Msurile de rezoluie propuse de
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului ar trebui s fie pregtite i
discutate de diferitele autoriti de rezoluie n contextul
planurilor de rezoluie a grupului. Colegiile de rezoluie ar
trebui s includ punctele de vedere ale autorit ilor de
rezoluie din toate statele membre n care grupul desf oar
activitate, n scopul de a facilita, ori de cte ori este posibil,
luarea unor decizii comune i rapide. Msurile de rezolu ie
luate de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului ar trebui s in
ntotdeauna cont de impactul lor eventual asupra stabilit ii
financiare n statele membre n care grupul i desf oar
activitatea. Acest aspect ar trebui garantat prin posibilitatea
autoritilor de rezoluie din statul membru de stabilire al
filialei de a se opune deciziilor autoritii de rezoluie la
nivel de grup, nu doar din raiuni legate de caracterul
oportun sau inoportun al msurilor de rezoluie, ci i
invocnd necesitatea protejrii stabilit ii financiare a
respectivului stat membru.
(98) | Colegiul de rezoluie nu ar trebui s fie un organism
decizional, ci o platform care faciliteaz procesul decizional
al autoritilor naionale. Deciziile comune ar trebui luate de
autoritile naionale vizate.
(99) | Crearea unei scheme de rezoluie a grupului ar trebui
s faciliteze o rezoluie coordonat, ceea ce va conduce
probabil la obinerea celor mai bune rezultate pentru toate
instituiile din grup. Schema de rezoluie a grupului ar trebui
s fie propus de autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup i
s fie prezentat colegiului de rezoluie. Autoritile
naionale de rezoluie care nu sunt de acord cu schema
respectiv sau decid s ia msuri de rezolu ie n mod
independent ar trebui s explice care sunt motivele
dezacordului lor i s comunice motivele respective, precum
i detaliile eventualelor msuri de rezoluie pe care
intenioneaz s le ia n mod independent, autorit ii de
rezoluie a grupului, precum i altor autorit i de rezolu ie
vizate de schema de rezoluie la nivel de grup. Orice
autoritate naional care decide s se abat de la schema de
rezoluie a grupului ar trebui s in seama n mod
corespunztor de impactul potenial asupra stabilitii
event of a crisis, the resolution college should provide a

forum for the exchange of information and the
coordination of resolution actions.
(97) | Resolution of cross-border groups should strike the
balance between the need, on the one hand, for
procedures that take into account the urgency of the
situation and allow for efficient, fair and timely solutions
for the group as a whole and, on the other, the necessity
to protect financial stability in all the Member States
where the group operates. The different resolution
authorities should share their views in the resolution
college. Resolution actions proposed by the group-level
resolution authority should be prepared and discussed
amongst different resolution authorities in the context of
the group resolution plans. Resolution colleges should
incorporate the views of the resolution authorities of all
the Member States in which the group is active, in order
to facilitate swift and joint decisions wherever possible.
Resolution actions by the group-level resolution
authority should always take into account their impact on
the financial stability in the Member States where the
group operates. This should be ensured by the possibility
for the resolution authorities of the Member State in
which a subsidiary is established to object to the
decisions of the group-level resolution authority, not only
on appropriateness of resolution actions and measures
but also on ground of the need to protect financial
stability in that Member State.
(98) | The resolution college should not be a decisionmaking body, but a platform facilitating decision-making
by national authorities. The joint decisions should be
taken by the national authorities concerned.
(99) | The production of a group resolution scheme
should facilitate coordinated resolution that is more
likely to deliver the best result for all institutions of a
group. The group-level resolution authority should
propose the group resolution scheme and submit it to the
resolution college. National resolution authorities that
disagree with the scheme or decide to take independent
resolution action should explain the reasons for their
disagreement and notify those reasons, together with
details of any independent resolution action they intend
to take, to the group-level resolution authority and other
resolution authorities covered by the group resolution
scheme. Any national authority that decides to depart
from the group resolution scheme should duly consider
the potential impact on financial stability in the Member
States where the other resolution authorities are located
and the potential effects on other parts of the group.
30
financiare din statele membre n care sunt situate celelalte

autoriti de rezoluie, precum i de efectele poten iale
asupra altor pri ale grupului.
(100) | Ca parte a schemei de rezoluie a grupului,
autoritile ar trebui invitate s aplice acela i instrument
persoanelor juridice care ndeplinesc condiiile de declan are
a procedurii de rezoluie. Autoritile de rezolu ie ale
grupurilor ar trebui s aib competena de a recurge la un
instrument de instituie-punte la nivel de grup (ceea ce poate
include, dup caz, acorduri de partajare a sarcinii) pentru a
stabiliza un grup n ansamblul su. Proprietatea filialelor ar
putea fi transferat ctre banca-punte n vederea vnzrii
ulterioare, fie sub forma unui pachet, fie individual, atunci
cnd condiiile de pia sunt adecvate. n plus, autoritatea de
rezoluie a grupului ar trebui s aib competena de a aplica
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern la nivelul entit iimam.
(101) | Rezoluia eficace a instituiilor i grupurilor care i
desfoar activitatea la nivel internaional necesit
cooperarea ntre Uniune, statele membre i autoritile de
rezoluie din ri tere. Aceast cooperare va fi facilitat n
cazul n care regimurile de rezoluie din rile ter e se
bazeaz pe principiile i abordrile comune elaborate n
prezent de Consiliul pentru Stabilitate Financiar i de G20.
n acest scop, ABE ar trebui s fie abilitat s ncheie
acorduri-cadru de cooperare facultativ cu autorit ile rilor
tere, n conformitate cu articolul 33 din Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 1093/2010, iar autoritilor naionale ar trebui s li se
permit s ncheie acorduri bilaterale conforme cu aceste
acorduri-cadru ale ABE. Elaborarea respectivelor acorduri
dintre autoritile naionale responsabile cu gestionarea
situaiei de dificultate a firmelor transna ionale ar trebui s
reprezinte un mijloc de a asigura o planificare, un proces
decizional i o coordonare eficiente n ceea ce prive te
grupurile internaionale. n general, n cadrul acestor
acorduri ar trebui s existe reciprocitate. Autorit ile
naionale de rezoluie, ca parte a colegiului de rezolu ie
european ar trebui, dup caz, s recunoasc i s execute
procedurile de rezoluie ale rilor ter e n situa iile prevzute
n prezenta directiv.
(102) | Ar trebui s se coopereze att n ceea ce prive te
filialele grupurilor din Uniune sau din ri tere, ct i n ceea
ce privete sucursalele instituiilor din Uniune sau din ri
tere. Filialele grupurilor din ri tere sunt ntreprinderi
stabilite n Uniune i, prin urmare, se supun n totalitate
dreptului Uniunii, inclusiv instrumentelor de rezoluie
prevzute n prezenta directiv. Este totui necesar ca statele
membre s i pstreze dreptul de a aciona n raport cu
sucursalele instituiilor care i au sediul n ri ter e, atunci
cnd recunoaterea i aplicarea, n cazul unei sucursale, a
(100) | As part of a group resolution scheme, authorities

should be invited to apply the same tool to legal persons
meeting the conditions for resolution. The group-level
resolution authorities should have the power to apply the
bridge institution tool at group level (which may involve,
where appropriate, burden sharing arrangements) to
stabilise a group as a whole. Ownership of subsidiaries
could be transferred to the bridge bank with a view to
onward sale, either as a package or individually, when
market conditions are appropriate. In addition, the grouplevel resolution authority should have the power to apply
the bail-in tool at parent level.
(101) | Effective resolution of internationally active

institutions and groups requires cooperation between the
Union, Member States and third-country resolution
authorities. Cooperation will be facilitated if the
resolution regimes of third countries are based on
common principles and approaches that are being
developed by the Financial Stability Board and the G20.
For that purpose EBA should be empowered to develop
and enter into non-binding framework cooperation
arrangements with authorities of third countries in
1093/2010 and national authorities should be permitted
to conclude bilateral arrangements in line with EBA
framework arrangements. The development of those
arrangements between national authorities responsible
for managing the failure of global firms should be a
means to ensure effective planning, decision-making and
coordination in respect of international groups. In
general, there should be reciprocity in those
arrangements. National resolution authorities, as part of
the European resolution college, where applicable,
should recognise and enforce third-country resolution
proceedings in the circumstances laid down in this
Directive.
(102) | Cooperation should take place both with regard to
subsidiaries of Union or third-country groups and with
regard to branches of Union or third-country institutions.
Subsidiaries of third-country groups are enterprises
established in the Union and therefore are fully subject to
Union law, including the resolution tools laid down in
this Directive. It is necessary, however, that Member
States retain the right to act in relation to branches of
institutions having their head office in third countries,
when the recognition and application of third-country
31
procedurilor de rezoluie din ara ter ar pune n pericol

stabilitatea financiar din Uniune ori atunci cnd deponen ii
din Uniune nu ar beneficia de tratament egal fa de
deponenii din ara ter. n astfel de situa ii, precum i n
celelalte situaii prevzute de prezenta directiv, statele
membre ar trebui s aib dreptul ca, n urma consultrii
autoritilor de rezoluie naionale, s refuze recunoa terea
procedurilor de rezoluie din rile tere cu privire la
sucursale din Uniune de ctre instituii avnd sediul n ra
ter.
(103) | Exist situaii n care eficacitatea instrumentelor de
rezoluie aplicate poate depinde de posibilitile de finan are
pe termen scurt ale instituiei sau ale instituiei-punte, de
furnizarea de garanii cumprtorilor poteniali sau de
furnizarea de capital instituiei-punte. Fr a aduce atingere
rolului deinut de bncile centrale n furnizarea de lichidit i
pentru sistemul financiar chiar i n perioade de criz, este
important ca statele membre s instituie mecanisme de
finanare, pentru a evita situaia n care fondurile necesare n
aceste scopuri provin de la bugetele naionale. Stabilizarea
sistemului financiar ar trebui finanat de ansamblul
sectorului financiar.
(104) | Ca regul general, statele membre ar trebui s- i
creeze mecanismele de finanare naionale prin fonduri
controlate de autoriti de rezoluie, menit s fie utilizat n
scopurile prevzute n prezenta directiv. Cu toate acestea, ar
trebui s se prevad o excepie strict limitat pentru a
permite statelor membre s i creeze mecanismele de
finanare naionale prin contribuii obligatorii din partea
instituiilor care sunt autorizate pe teritoriile loe i care nu
sunt deinute printr fonduri controlat de autoritile lor de
rezoluie, cu condiia ndeplinirii anumitor condiii.
(105) | n principiu, contribuiile ar trebui colectate din
sectorul financiar naintea oricrei opera iuni de rezolu ie i
independent de aceasta. Atunci cnd finanarea prealabil
este insuficient pentru acoperirea pierderilor sau a costurilor
suportate prin recurgerea la mecanisme de finan are, ar
trebui colectate contribuii suplimentare pentru acoperirea
costurilor sau a pierderilor suplimentare.
(106) | Pentru a atinge o mas critic i pentru a evita
efectele prociclice care ar putea aprea n caz de criz
sistemic, dac mecanismele de finanare ar fi alimentate
exclusiv prin contribuii ex post, este indispensabil ca
mijloacele financiare ex ante disponibile ale mecanismelor
de finanare naionale s se cifreze cel puin la un anumit
nivel-int minim.
(107) | Pentru a asigura un calcul corect al contribu iilor i a
oferi stimulente pentru funcionarea n conformitate cu un
model mai puin riscant, contribuiile la mecanismele de
finanare naionale ar trebui s in seama de gradul de risc
resolution proceedings relating to a branch would

endanger financial stability in the Union or when Union
depositors would not receive equal treatment with thirdcountry depositors. In those circumstances, and in the
other circumstances as laid down in this Directive,
Member States should have the right, after consulting the
national resolution authorities, to refuse recognition of
third-country resolution proceedings with regard to
Union branches of third-country institutions.
(103) | There are circumstances when the effectiveness of
the resolution tools applied may depend on the
availability of short-term funding for an institution or a
bridge institution, the provision of guarantees to potential
purchasers, or the provision of capital to the bridge
institution. Notwithstanding the role of central banks in
providing liquidity to the financial system even in times
of stress, it is important that Member States set up
financing arrangements to avoid that the funds needed
for such purposes come from the national budgets. It
should be the financial industry, as a whole, that finances
the stabilisation of the financial system.
(104) | As a general rule, Member States should establish
their national financing arrangements through funds
controlled by resolution authorities to be used for the
purposes as laid down in this Directive. However, a
strictly framed exception should be provided to allow
Member States to establish their national financing
arrangements through mandatory contributions from
institutions which are authorised in their territories and
which are not held through funds controlled by their
resolution authorities provided that certain conditions are
met.
(105) | As a principle, contributions should be collected
from the industry prior to and independently of any
operation of resolution. When prior funding is
insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the
use of the financing arrangements, additional
contributions should be collected to bear the additional
cost or loss.
(106) | In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid procyclical effects which would arise if financing
arrangements had to rely solely on ex-post contributions
in a systemic crisis, it is indispensable that the ex-ante
available financial means of the national financing
arrangements amount at least to a certain minimum target
level.
(107) | In order to ensure a fair calculation of
contributions and provide incentives to operate under a
less risky model, contributions to national financing
arrangements should take account of the degree of credit,
32
pentru credite, lichiditi i pia la care sunt expuse

instituiile.
(108) | Garantarea unei rezoluii eficace a instituiilor n curs
de a intra n dificultate pe ntreg cuprinsul Uniunii este un
element esenial al finalizrii pieei interne. Intrarea n
dificultate a acestor instituii are un efect negativ nu doar
asupra stabilitii financiare a pieelor pe care acestea
opereaz n mod direct, ci i asupra ntregii pie e financiare a
Uniunii. Odat cu realizarea pieei interne a serviciilor
financiare, se consolideaz interac iunea diferitelor sisteme
financiare naionale. Instituiile funcioneaz n afara statului
membru de stabilire i sunt interconectate prin intermediul
pieei interbancare i al altor piee care au, n esen , un
caracter paneuropean. Asigurarea finan rii eficiente a
rezoluiei acestor instituii n toate statele membre este nu
numai n interesul statelor membre n care ele i desf oar
activitatea, ct i n interesul tuturor statelor membre n
general, ca mijloc de a asigura condiii egale de concuren
i de a mbunti funcionarea pieei financiare interne.
nfiinarea unui sistem european al mecanismelor de
finanare ar trebui s garanteze faptul c toate institu iile care
opereaz n Uniune fac obiectul unor mecanisme de
finanare a rezoluiei la fel de performante i s contribuie la
stabilitatea pieei interne.
(109) | n scopul mbuntirii rezilienei sistemului european
respectiv al mecanismelor de finanare i n conformitate cu
obiectivul potrivit cruia ar trebui ca finanarea s provin n
principal de la acionarii i creditorii instituiei aflate n
rezoluie i apoi de la sectorul financiar, mai degrab dect
de la bugetele publice, mecanismele de finanare pot cere
mprumut de la alte mecanisme de finanare, n caz de
necesitate. n mod asemntor, ele ar trebui s aib
competena de a acorda mprumuturi altor mecanisme care
au nevoie de creditare. Acordarea de mprumuturi n cauz ar
trebui s fie strict pe baz de voluntariat. Decizia de a acorda
un mprumut unui alt mecanism ar trebui s fie luat de
mecanismul de finanare creditor, ns, avnd n vedere
implicaiile fiscale poteniale, ar trebui ca statele membre s
aib posibilitatea de a solicita o consultare sau un
consimmnt din partea ministerului competent.
(110) | Dei mecanismele de finanare sunt instituite la nivel
naional, ele ar trebui s devin reciproce n contextul
rezoluiei grupurilor, cu condiia s se ajung la un acord al
autoritilor naionale n ceea ce privete rezoluia instituiei.
Nu ar trebui ca depozitele acoperite de schemele de
garantare a depozitelor s suporte vreo pierdere n procesul
de rezoluie. Atunci cnd o aciune de rezolu ie garanteaz
faptul c deponenii continu s aib acces la propriile
depozite, ar trebui ca schemelor de garantare a depozitelor la
care este afiliat o instituie aflat n rezolu ie s li se cear
s fac o contribuie care s nu depeasc valoarea
liquidity and market risk incurred by the institutions.

(108) | Ensuring effective resolution of failing
institutions within the Union is an essential element in
the completion of the internal market. The failure of such
institutions has an effect not only on the financial
stability of the markets where it directly operates but also
on the whole Union financial market. With the
completion of the internal market in financial services,
the interplay between the different national financial
systems is reinforced. Institutions operate outside their
Member State of establishment and are interrelated
through the interbank and other markets which, in
essence, are pan-European. Ensuring effective financing
of the resolution of those institutions across Member
States is not only in the best interests of the Member
States in which they operate but also of all the Member
States in general as a means of ensuring a level
competitive playing field and improving the functioning
of the internal financial market. Setting up a European
system of financing arrangements should ensure that all
institutions that operate in the Union are subject to
equally effective resolution financing arrangements and
contribute to the stability of the internal market.
(109) | In order to build up the resilience of that
European system of financing arrangements, and in
accordance with the objective requiring that financing
should come primarily from the shareholders and
creditors of the institution under resolution and then from
industry rather than from public budgets, financing
arrangements may make a request to borrow from other
financing arrangements in the case of need. Likewise
they should have the power to grant loans to other
arrangements that are in need. Such lending should be
strictly voluntary. The decision to lend to other
arrangements should be made by the lending financing
arrangement, but due to potential fiscal implications,
Member States should be able to require consultation or
the consent of the competent ministry.
(110) | While financing arrangements are set up at
national level, they should be mutualised in the context
of group resolution, provided that an agreement is found
between national authorities on the resolution of the
institution. Deposits covered by deposit guarantee
schemes should not bear any losses in the resolution
process. When a resolution action ensures that depositors
continue to have access to their deposits, deposit
guarantee schemes to which an institution under
resolution is affiliated should be required to make a
contribution not greater than the amount of losses that
33
pierderilor pe care aceste scheme ar fi trebuit s o suporte n

cazul n care instituia ar fi fost lichidat n conformitate cu
procedura obinuit de insolven.
(111) | Dei depozitele acoperite sunt protejate n caz de
pierdere n procesul de rezoluie, alte depozite eligibile sunt
potenial disponibile n scopul absorbiei pierderilor. Pentru a
oferi un anumit nivel de protecie persoanelor fizice,
microntreprinderilor i ntreprinderilor mici i mijlocii care
dein depozite eligibile care depesc nivelul depozitelor
acoperite, astfel de depozite ar trebui s aib un rang mai
nalt de prioritate fa de creanele deinute de creditorii
chirografari neprivilegiai obinuii n temeiul dreptului
intern care reglementeaz procedurile obi nuite de
insolven. n temeiul aceluiai drept intern, crean a schemei
de garantare a depozitelor ar trebui s aib un rang i mai
nalt dect categoriile de depozite eligibile menionate
anterior. Armonizarea legislaiei naionale referitoare la
insolven n acest domeniu este necesar pentru a reduce la
minim expunerea fondurilor de rezoluie ale statelor membre
n temeiul principiului potrivit cruia niciun creditor nu
trebuie s fie dezavantajat, dup cum se prevede n prezenta
directiv.
(112) | Atunci cnd sunt transferate depozite ctre o alt
instituie n contextul rezoluiei unei instituii, deponen ii nu
ar trebui s fie asigurai dincolo de nivelul de acoperire
prevzut de Directiva 2014/49/UE. Prin urmare, crean ele
asociate depozitelor rmase n instituia aflat n rezoluie ar
trebui s fie limitate la diferena dintre fondurile transferate
i nivelul de acoperire prevzut de Directiva 2014/49/UE. n
cazurile n care valoarea depozitelor transferate este
superioar nivelului de acoperire, deponentul ar trebui s nu
poat invoca schema de garantare a depozitelor n ceea ce
privete depozitele meninute n instituia aflat n rezoluie.
(113) | Stabilirea mecanismelor de finanare care instituie
sistemul european al mecanismelor de finanare prevzut de
prezenta directiv ar trebui s asigure coordonarea utilizrii
fondurilor disponibile la nivel naional pentru procedurile de
rezoluie.
(114) | Competena de a adopta acte n conformitate cu
articolul 290 din TFUE ar trebui delegat Comisiei n ceea
ce privete specificarea criteriilor pentru definirea func iilor
critice i a liniilor de activitate esen iale n temeiul
prezentei directive; a circumstanelor cnd este necesar
excluderea pasivelor de la cerinele privind reducerea valorii
contabile sau conversia, n temeiul prezentei directive; a
categoriilor de acorduri pentru care statele membre ar trebui
s asigure o protecie adecvat n cazul transferului; a
modului n care ar trebui s fie ajustate contribuiile
instituiilor la mecanismele de finanare a rezoluiei,
proporional cu profilul de risc al acestora; nregistrarea,
they would have had to bear if the institution had been

wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
(111) | While covered deposits are protected from losses
in resolution, other eligible deposits are potentially
available for loss absorbency purposes. In order to
provide a certain level of protection for natural persons
and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises holding
eligible deposits above the level of covered deposits,
such deposits should have a higher priority ranking over
the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors
under the national law governing normal insolvency
proceedings. The claim of the deposit guarantee scheme
should have an even higher ranking under such national
law than the aforementioned categories of eligible
deposits. Harmonisation of national insolvency law in
that area is necessary in order to minimise exposure of
the resolution funds of Member States under the no
creditor worse off principle as specified in this Directive.
(112) | Where deposits are transferred to another

institution in the context of the resolution of a institution,
depositors should not be insured beyond the coverage
level provided for in Directive 2014/49/EU. Therefore,
claims with regard to deposits remaining in the
institution under resolution should be limited to the
difference between the funds transferred and the
coverage level provided for in Directive 2014/49/EU.
Where transferred deposits are superior to the coverage
level, the depositor should have no claim against the
deposit guarantee scheme with regard to deposits
remaining in the institution under resolution.
(113) | The setting up of financing arrangements
establishing the European system of financing
arrangements laid down in this Directive should ensure
coordination of the use of funds available at national
level for resolution.
(114) | The power to adopt acts in accordance with
Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the
Commission in order to specify the criteria for defining
critical functions and core business lines for the
purposes of this Directive; the circumstances when
exclusion of liabilities from the write down or
conversion requirements under this Directive is
necessary; the classes of arrangement for which Member
States should ensure appropriate protection in partial
transfers; the manner in which institutions contributions
to resolution financing arrangements should be adjusted
in proportion to their risk profile; the registration,
34
contabilitatea, obligaiile de raportare i alte obligaii menite

s asigure faptul c contribuiile ex ante sunt pltite n mod
efectiv; i a circumstanelor i condiiilor n care o institu ie
poate s fie temporar scutit de la plata contribu iilor ex post.
Este deosebit de important ca, n timpul lucrrilor sale
pregtitoare, Comisia s organizeze consultri adecvate,
inclusiv la nivel de experi. Atunci cnd pregtete i
elaboreaz acte delegate, Comisia ar trebui s asigure o
transmitere simultan, n timp util i adecvat a
documentelor relevante ctre Parlamentul European i
Consiliu.
(115) | Este oportun ca, n cazurile prevzute de prezenta
directiv, ABE s promoveze convergena practicilor
autoritilor naionale prin intermediul unor orientri n
1093/2010. n domeniile care nu fac obiectul unor standarde
tehnice de reglementare sau de punere n aplicare, ABE
poate emite din proprie iniiativ orientri i recomandri cu
privire la aplicarea dreptului Uniunii.
(116) | Parlamentul European i Consiliul ar trebui s aib la
dispoziie trei luni de la data notificrii pentru a formula
obieciuni la un act delegat. De asemenea, ar trebui ca
Parlamentul European i Consiliul s poat informa celelalte
instituii n legtur cu intenia lor de a nu formula
obieciuni.
(117) | Standardele tehnice n materie de servicii financiare
ar trebui s faciliteze o armonizare coerent i o protec ie
adecvat a deponenilor, investitorilor i consumatorilor din
ntreaga Uniune. Ar fi eficient i oportun ca, n cazurile
precizate n prezenta directiv, s se ncredineze ABE, ca
organism cu nalt specializare, sarcina de a elabora proiecte
de standarde tehnice de reglementare i proiecte de standarde
tehnice de punere n aplicare care nu implic alegeri
strategice, urmnd ca acestea s fie naintate Comisiei.
(118) | n cazurile prevzute de prezenta directiv, Comisia
ar trebui s adopte proiectele de standarde tehnice de
reglementare elaborate de ABE prin intermediul actelor
delegate, n temeiul articolului 290 din TFUE i n
conformitate cu articolele 10-14 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010. n cazurile prevzute de prezenta directiv,
Comisia ar trebui s adopte proiecte de standarde tehnice de
punere n aplicare elaborate de ABE prin intermediul actelor
de punere n aplicare n temeiul articolului 291 din TFUE i
n conformitate cu articolul 15 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010.
(119) | Directiva 2001/24/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (15) prevede recunoaterea i executarea
reciproc n toate statele membre a deciziilor privind
reorganizarea i lichidarea instituiilor avnd sucursale n
state membre, altele dect cele n care i au sediul social.
accounting, reporting obligations and other obligations

intended to ensure that the ex-ante contributions are
effectively paid; and the circumstances in which and
conditions subject to which an institution may be
temporarily exempted from paying ex-post contributions.
It is of particular importance that the Commission carry
out appropriate consultations during its preparatory
work, including at expert level. The Commission, when
preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a
simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of
relevant documents to the European Parliament and to
the Council.
(115) | Where provided for in this Directive, it is
appropriate that EBA promote convergence of the
practices of national authorities through guidelines in
1093/2010. In areas not covered by regulatory or
implementing technical standards, EBA is able to issue
guidelines and recommendations on the application of
Union law under its own initiative.
(116) | The European Parliament and the Council should
have three months from the date of notification to object
to a delegated act. It should be possible for the European
Parliament and the Council to inform the other
institutions of their intention not to raise objections.
(117) | Technical standards in financial services should
facilitate consistent harmonisation and adequate
protection of depositors, investors and consumers across
the Union. As a body with highly specialised expertise, it
would be efficient and appropriate, where provided for in
this Directive, to entrust EBA with the development of
draft regulatory and implementing technical standards
which do not involve policy choices, for submission to
the Commission.
(118) | The Commission should, where provided for in
this Directive, adopt draft regulatory technical standards
developed by EBA by means of delegated acts pursuant
to Article 290 TFEU, in accordance with Articles 10 to
14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The Commission
should, where provided for in this Directive, adopt draft
implementing technical standards developed by EBA by
means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291
TFEU, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU)
No 1093/2010.
(119) | Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council (15) provides for the mutual
recognition and enforcement in all Member States of
decisions concerning the reorganisation or winding up of
institutions having branches in Member States other than
35
Directiva garanteaz faptul c toate activele i pasivele

instituiei, indiferent de ara n care se afl, sunt tratate n
cadrul unui proces unic, n statul membru de origine, iar
creditorii din statele membre-gazd sunt trata i n acela i
mod ca i creditorii din statul membru de origine. Pentru ca
procedura de rezoluie s fie eficace, Directiva 2001/24/CE
ar trebui s se aplice n cazul utilizrii instrumentelor de
rezoluie, att n cazurile n care aceste instrumente li se
aplic instituiilor, ct i n cele n care li se aplic altor
entiti care fac obiectul regimului de rezolu ie. Prin urmare,
Directiva 2001/24/CE ar trebui modificat n consecin .
(120) | Directivele Uniunii n materie de drept al societilor

comerciale conin norme obligatorii privind protec ia
acionarilor i a creditorilor instituiilor care se ncadreaz n
domeniul de aplicare al acestor directive. Atunci cnd este
necesar o aciune rapid a autoritilor de rezoluie, aceste
norme pot reduce att eficacitatea ac iunilor ntreprinse de
autoritile de rezoluie, ct i utilizarea instrumentelor i
competenelor de rezoluie, astfel c ar trebui incluse
derogri corespunztoare n prezenta directiv. n scopul de
a garanta prilor interesate maxima certitudine juridic,
derogrile ar trebui definite n mod clar i strict i ar trebui
s fie utilizate exclusiv n interes public i doar atunci cnd
sunt ndeplinite condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de
rezoluie. Recurgerea la instrumentele de rezoluie presupune
ndeplinirea obiectivelor rezoluiei i a condi iilor de
rezoluie prevzute de prezenta directiv.
(121) | Directiva 2012/30/UE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (16) conine norme privind drepturile acionarilor
de a decide n legtur cu majorrile sau reducerile
capitalului, dreptul de a participa, prin aport n numerar, la
orice nou emisiune de aciuni, protecia creditorilor n cazul
reducerii capitalului i convocarea adunrii acionarilor, n
cazul unor grave pierderi de capital. Aceste norme pot
mpiedica aciunea rapid a autoritilor de rezoluie i ar
trebui prevzute derogri corespunztoare de la aceste
norme.
(122) | Directiva 2011/35/UE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (17) stabilete, printre altele, norme privind
aprobarea fuziunilor de ctre adunrile generale ale fiecreia
dintre societile care fuzioneaz, privind cerin ele
referitoare la proiectul de fuziune, raportul de gestionare i
raportul de expertiz, precum i privind protec ia creditorilor.
Directiva 82/891/CEE a Consiliului (18) conine prevederi
similare referitoare la societile comerciale publice pe
aciuni. Directiva 2005/56/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (19) prevede normele corespunztoare fuziunilor
transfrontaliere ale societilor comerciale pe ac iuni. Pentru
a le permite autoritilor de rezoluie s ac ioneze rapid, ar
those in which they have their head offices. That

directive ensures that all assets and liabilities of the
institution, regardless of the country in which they are
situated, are dealt with in a single process in the home
Member State and that creditors in the host Member
States are treated in the same way as creditors in the
home Member State. In order to achieve an effective
resolution, Directive 2001/24/EC should apply in the
event of use of the resolution tools both when those
instruments are applied to institutions and when they are
applied to other entities covered by the resolution
regime. Directive 2001/24/EC should therefore be
amended accordingly.
(120) | Union company law directives contain mandatory
rules for the protection of shareholders and creditors of
institutions which fall within the scope of those
directives. In a situation where resolution authorities
need to act rapidly, those rules may hinder effective
action and use of resolution tools and powers by
resolution authorities and appropriate derogations should
be included in this Directive. In order to guarantee the
maximum degree of legal certainty for stakeholders, the
derogations should be clearly and narrowly defined, and
they should only be used in the public interest and when
resolution triggers are met. The use of resolution tools
presupposes that the resolution objectives and the
conditions for resolution laid down in this Directive are
met.
(121) | Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council (16) contains rules on shareholders
rights to decide on capital increases and reductions, on
their right to participate in any new share issue for cash
consideration, on creditor protection in the event of
capital reduction and the convening of shareholders
meeting in the event of serious loss of capital. Those
rules may hinder the rapid action by resolution
authorities and appropriate derogations from them should
be provided for.
(122) | Directive 2011/35/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council (17) lays down rules, inter alia, on the
approval of mergers by the general meeting of each of
the merging companies, on the requirements concerning
the draft terms of merger, management report and expert
report, and on creditor protection. Council Directive
82/891/EEC (18) contains similar rules on the division of
public limited liability companies. Directive 2005/56/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (19)
provides for corresponding rules concerning cross-border
mergers of limited liability companies. Appropriate
derogations from those directives should be provided in
36
trebui prevzute derogri corespunztoare de la aceste

directive.
Consiliului (20) prevede obligaia de a lansa o ofert public
de cumprare privind toate aciunile societ ii, la un pre
echitabil n sensul directivei respective, n cazul n care un
acionar preia, n mod direct sau indirect, singur sau
mpreun cu alii, un anumit procent din ac iunile unei
societi, stabilit de dreptul intern, care i asigur controlul
asupra respectivei societi. Scopul acestei norme privind
oferta obligatorie este protejarea acionarilor minoritari n
caz de schimbare a controlului. Cu toate acestea, perspectiva
unei astfel de obligaii costisitoare ar putea descuraja
investiiile n instituia afectat, fcnd astfel dificil
exercitarea de ctre autoritile de rezolu ie a tuturor
competenelor n materie. Ar trebui prevzute derogri
corespunztoare de la norma privind oferta obligatorie, n
msura necesar utilizrii competenelor de rezolu ie, n timp
ce, dup ncheierea perioadei de rezoluie, norma privind
oferta obligatorie ar trebui s se aplice oricrui acionar care
dobndete controlul asupra instituiei afectate.
Consiliului (21) prevede drepturile procedurale ale
acionarilor n ceea ce privete adunrile generale. Directiva
2007/36/CE prevede, printre altele, termenul minim de
convocare a adunrilor generale i coninutul convocrii unei
adunri generale. Normele respective pot mpiedica ac iunea
rapid a autoritilor de rezoluie i, prin urmare, ar trebui
prevzute derogri corespunztoare de la aceast directiv.
nainte de declanarea procedurii de rezolu ie ar putea fi
necesar o cretere rapid a capitalului, n cazul n care
instituia nu ndeplinete sau este susceptibil s nu
ndeplineasc cerinele prevzute de Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013 i Directiva 2013/36/UE, iar o cretere a
capitalului ar restabili probabil situaia financiar i ar evita
atingerea pragului de declanare a procedurii de rezolu ie. n
astfel de situaii, ar trebui permis convocarea adunrii
generale n termen scurt. Cu toate acestea, acionarii ar trebui
s-i pstreze competena decizional n ceea ce prive te
prelungirea sau scurtarea termenului de convocare a
adunrilor generale. Ar trebui prevzute derogri
corespunztoare de la Directiva 2007/36/CE pentru
instituirea acestui mecanism.
(125) | Pentru a se asigura c autorit ile de rezolu ie sunt
reprezentate n sistemul european de supraveghere financiar
instituit prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1092/2010,
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1094/2010 al Parlamentului European i al Consiliului (22)
i Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1095/2010 al Parlamentului
European i al Consiliului (23) i c ABE are expertiza
necesar pentru a ndeplini sarcinile prevzute n prezenta
order to allow a rapid action by resolution authorities.

and of the Council (20) sets out an obligation to launch a
mandatory takeover bid on all shares of the company for
the equitable price, as defined in that directive, if a
shareholder acquires, directly or indirectly and alone or
in concert with others, a certain percentage of shares of
that company, which gives it control of that company and
is defined by national law. The purpose of the mandatory
bid rule is to protect minority shareholders in the case of
change of control. However, the prospect of such a costly
obligation might deter possible investors in the affected
institution, thereby making it difficult for resolution
authorities to make use of all their resolution powers.
Appropriate derogations should be provided from the
mandatory bid rule, to the extent necessary for the use of
the resolution powers, while after the resolution period
the mandatory bid rule should be applied to any
shareholder acquiring control in the affected institution.
and of the Council (21), provides for procedural
shareholders rights relating to general meetings.
Directive 2007/36/EC provides, inter alia, for a minimum
notice period for general meetings and the contents of the
notice of general meeting. Those rules may hinder rapid
action by resolution authorities and appropriate
derogations from the directive should be provided for.
Prior to resolution there may be a need for a rapid
increase of capital when the institution does not meet or
is likely not to fulfil the requirements of Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU and an increase
of capital is likely to restore the financial situation and
avoid a situation where the threshold conditions for
resolution are met. In such situations a possibility for
convening a general meeting at short notice should be
permitted. However, the shareholders should retain the
decision making power on the increase and on the
shortening of the notice period for the general meetings.
Appropriate derogations from Directive 2007/36/EC
should be provided for the establishment of that
mechanism.
(125) | In order to ensure that resolution authorities are
represented in the European System of Financial
Supervision established by Regulation (EU) No
1092/2010, Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Regulation
(EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of
the Council (22) and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of
the European Parliament and of the Council (23), and to
ensure that EBA has the expertise necessary to carry out
37
directiv, Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 ar trebui

modificat, pentru a include autoritile naionale de rezolu ie,
astfel cum sunt definite n prezenta directiv, n conceptul de
autoriti competente definit n regulamentul respectiv.
Aceast asimilare a autoritilor de rezolu ie la autorit ile
competente n conformitate cu Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010 este n concordan cu funciile atribuite ABE n
conformitate cu articolul 25 din respectivul regulament, i
anume de a contribui i a participa activ la elaborarea i
coordonarea planurilor de redresare i de rezolu ie i de a
face eforturi n vederea facilitrii rezoluiei institu iilor n
curs de a intra n dificultate, n special a grupurilor
transnaionale.
(126) | n scopul garantrii respectrii obliga iilor ce decurg
din prezenta directiv de ctre instituii, de ctre persoanele
care controleaz efectiv activitatea acestora i de ctre
organele de conducere ale acestora, i pentru a se asigura c
acetia fac obiectul unui tratament similar pe ntreg teritoriul
Uniunii, statele membre ar trebui s fie obligate s prevad
sanciuni administrative i alte msuri administrative care s
fie eficiente, proporionale i disuasive. Prin urmare,
sanciunile administrative i alte msuri administrative
instituite de statele membre ar trebui s respecte anumite
cerine eseniale privind destinatarii, criteriile care trebuie
avute n vedere la aplicarea sanciunilor sau a unei alte
msuri administrative, publicarea sanciunilor sau a altor
msuri administrative, competenele-cheie n materie de
sancionare i nivelurile amenzilor administrative. Sub
rezerva respectrii unor cerine stricte de pstrare a
secretului profesional, ABE ar trebui s pstreze o baz de
date central cu toate sanciunile administrative i
informaiile referitoare la recursuri care i-au fost aduse la
cunotin de ctre autoritile competente i autorit ile de
rezoluie.
(127) | Prezenta directiv face referire att la sanc iuni
administrative ct i la alte msuri administrative, n scopul
de a include toate dispoziiile aplicate dup comiterea unei
infraciuni i de a preveni comiterea unor noi infrac iuni,
indiferent dac aceste dispoziii sunt ncadrate n dreptul
intern cu titlul de sanciuni sau de alte msuri administrative.
(128) | Chiar dac nimic nu mpiedic statele membre s
stabileasc norme pentru sanciuni administrative, precum i
sanciuni penale pentru aceleai nclcri, nu ar trebui ca
statelor membre s li se impun s stabileasc norme pentru
sanciuni administrative aplicate nclcrilor prezentei
directive care fac obiectul dreptului penal intern. n
conformitate cu dreptul intern, statele membre nu au
obligaia de a impune att sanciuni administrative ct i
penale pentru aceeai nclcare, dar pot face acest lucru dac
dreptul intern le-o permite. Cu toate acestea, men inerea
the tasks laid down in this Directive, Regulation (EU) No

1093/2010 should be amended in order to include
national resolution authorities as defined in this Directive
in the concept of competent authorities established by
that Regulation. Such assimilation between resolution
authorities and competent authorities pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 is consistent with the
functions attributed to EBA pursuant to Article 25 of
Regulation (EC) No 1093/2010 to contribute and
participate actively in the development and coordination
of recovery and resolution plans and to aim at the
facilitation of the resolution of failing institutions and in
particular cross-border groups.
(126) | In order to ensure compliance by institutions,
those who effectively control their business and their
management body with the obligations deriving from this
Directive and to ensure that they are subject to similar
treatment across the Union, Member States should be
required to provide for administrative sanctions and other
administrative
measures
which
are
effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. Therefore, administrative
sanctions and other administrative measures laid down
by Member States should satisfy certain essential
requirements in relation to addressees, criteria to be
taken into account when applying a sanction or other
administrative measure, publication of sanctions or other
administrative measures, key penalising powers and
levels of administrative fines. Subject to strict
professional secrecy, EBA should maintain a central
database of all administrative sanctions and information
on the appeals reported to it by competent authorities and
resolution authorities.
(127) | This Directive refers to both administrative

sanctions and other administrative measures in order to
cover all actions applied after an infringement is
committed, and which are intended to prevent further
infringements, irrespective of their qualification as a
sanction or another administrative measure under
national law.
(128) | Even though nothing prevents Member States
from laying down rules for administrative sanctions as
well as criminal sanctions for the same infringements,
Member States should not be required to lay down rules
for administrative sanctions for infringements of this
Directive which are subject to national criminal law. In
accordance with national law, Member States are not
obliged to impose both administrative and criminal
sanctions for the same offence, but they can do so if their
national law so permits. However, the maintenance of
38
sanciunilor penale mai degrab dect a sanciunilor

administrative sau a altor msuri administrative pentru
nclcri ale prezentei directive nu ar trebui s reduc sau s
afecteze n alt mod capacitatea autoritilor de rezolu ie i a
autoritilor competente de a coopera, a accesa i a face
schimb de informaii n timp util cu autoritile de rezolu ie
i cu autoritile competente din alte state membre n sensul
prezentei directive, inclusiv dup eventuala trimitere a
cazurilor de nclcare relevante ctre autoritile judiciare
competente n vederea urmririi penale.
(129) | n conformitate cu Declaraia politic comun din 28
septembrie 2011 a statelor membre i a Comisiei privind
documentele explicative (24), statele membre s-au angajat s
nsoeasc, n cazurile justificate, notificarea msurilor de
transpunere cu unul sau mai multe documente care s explice
relaia dintre componentele unei directive i pr ile
corespunztoare din instrumentele naionale de transpunere.
n ceea ce privete prezenta directiv, organul legislativ
consider c transmiterea unor astfel de documente este
justificat.
(130) | Prezenta directiv respect att drepturile
fundamentale, ct i drepturile, libertile i principiile
recunoscute n particular de Cart, n special dreptul la
proprietate, dreptul la o cale de atac eficient i la un proces
echitabil i dreptul la aprare.
(131) | Deoarece obiectivul prezentei directive, i anume
armonizarea normelor i a procedurilor aplicabile rezolu iei
instituiilor, nu poate fi realizat n mod satisfctor de ctre
statele membre dar, avnd n vedere efectele intrrii n
dificultate a oricrei instituii la nivelul ntregii Uniuni, poate
fi realizat mai bine la nivelul Uniunii, aceasta poate adopta
msuri, n conformitate cu principiul subsidiaritii, astfel
cum este definit la articolul 5 din Tratatul privind Uniunea
European. n conformitate cu principiul propor ionalit ii,
astfel cum este definit la articolul menionat, prezenta
directiv nu depete ceea ce este necesar pentru realizarea
obiectivului menionat.
(132) | Atunci cnd iau decizii sau msuri n temeiul
prezentei directive, autoritile competente i autorit ile de
rezoluie ar trebui s acorde ntotdeauna atenia cuvenit
impactului deciziilor i msurilor lor asupra stabilit ii
financiare din alte state membre i asupra situaiei
economice din alte state membre i ar trebui s aib n
vedere nsemntatea oricrei filiale sau sucursale pentru
sectorul financiar i pentru economia statului membru n
care este stabilit sau situat filiala sau sucursala respectiv,
chiar i n cazurile n care filiala sau sucursala n cauz are o
importan mai mic pentru grupul consolidat.
(133) | Comisia va examina aplicarea general a prezentei
directive i n special, va lua n considerare n lumina
criminal sanctions rather than administrative sanctions or

other administrative measures for infringements of this
Directive should not reduce or otherwise affect the
ability of resolution authorities and competent authorities
to cooperate, access and exchange information in a
timely way with resolution authorities and competent
authorities in other Member States for the purposes of
this Directive, including after any referral of the relevant
infringements to the competent judicial authorities for
prosecution.
(129) | In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration
of Member States and the Commission of 28 September
2011 on explanatory documents (24), Member States
have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the
notification of their transposition measures with one or
more documents explaining the relationship between the
components of a directive and the corresponding parts of
national transposition instruments. With regard to this
Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of
such documents to be justified.
(130) | This Directive respects the fundamental rights and
observes the rights, freedoms and principles recognised
in particular by the Charter, and, in particular, the right to
property, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair
trial and the right of defence.
(131) | Since the objective of this Directive, namely the
harmonisation of the rules and processes for the
resolution of institutions, cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of the
effects of a failure of any institution in the whole Union,
be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt
measures, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on
European Union. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve
that objective.
(132) | When taking decisions or actions under this
Directive, competent authorities and resolution
authorities should always have due regard to the impact
of their decisions and actions on financial stability in
other Member States and on the economic situation in
other Member States and should give consideration to
the significance of any subsidiary or branch for the
financial sector and the economy of the Member State
where such a subsidiary or branch is established or
located, even in cases where the subsidiary or branch
concerned is of lesser importance for the consolidated
group.
(133) | The Commission will review the general
application of this Directive and, in particular, consider,
39
acordurilor ncheiate n temeiul oricrui act de drept al

Uniunii care instituie un mecanism de rezoluie care vizeaz
mai mult de un stat membru, exercitarea competenelor ABE
n temeiul prezentei directive de a media ntre o autoritate de
rezoluie dintr-un stat membru care particip la mecanismul
n cauz i o autoritate de rezoluie dintr-un stat membru care
nu particip la acesta,
ADOPT PREZENTA DIRECTIV:
TITLUL I
DOMENIU DE APLICARE, DEFINIII I AUTORITI
Articolul 1
Obiect i domeniu de aplicare
(1) Prezenta directiv stabilete normele i procedurile de
redresare i de rezoluie pentru urmtoarele entit i:
(a) | instituii stabilite n Uniune;
(b) | instituiile financiare stabilite n Uniune, care sunt filiale
ale unei instituii de credit, ale unei firme de investi ii ori ale
uneia dintre societile menionate la litera (c) sau (d) i care
fac obiectul supravegherii consolidate a ntreprinderii-mam
n conformitate cu articolele 6-17 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013;
(c) | holdingurile financiare, holdingurile financiare mixte i
holdingurile cu activitate mixt stabilite n Uniune;
(d) | holdingurile financiare-mam dintr-un stat membru,
holdingurile financiare-mam din Uniune, holdingurile
financiare mixte-mam dintr-un stat membru, holdingurile
financiare mixte-mam din Uniune;
(e) | sucursalele instituiilor stabilite sau situate n afara
Uniunii, conform condiiilor specifice stipulate n prezenta
directiv.
n stabilirea i aplicarea cerinelor prezentei directive i n
utilizarea diferitelor instrumente de care dispun relativ la una
dintre entitile prevzute la primul paragraf, i n
conformitate cu dispoziii specifice aplicabile, autoritile de
rezoluie i autoritile competente in cont de tipul de
activitate, structura acionariatului, forma juridic, profilul
de risc, dimensiunea, statutul juridic i gradul de
interconectare al unei instituii cu alte institu ii sau cu
sistemul financiar n general, domeniul de aplicare i
complexitatea activitii economice, calitatea de membru al
unui sistem instituional de protecie (SIP) ce respect
cerinele prevzute la articolul 113 alineatul (7) din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 sau al altor sisteme de
solidaritate reciproc prevzute la articolul 113 alineatul (6)
din respectivul regulament, precum i msura n care
exercit servicii sau activiti de investi ii astfel sunt definite
la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 2 din Directiva
2014/65/UE.
in light of the arrangements taken under any act of Union

law establishing a resolution mechanism covering more
than one Member State, the exercise of EBAs powers
under this Directive to mediate between a resolution
authority in a Member State participating in the
mechanism and a resolution authority in a Member State
not participating therein,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
TITLE I
SCOPE, DEFINITIONS AND AUTHORITIES
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
1. This Directive lays down rules and procedures relating
to the recovery and resolution of the following entities:
(a) | institutions that are established in the Union;
(b) | financial institutions that are established in the
Union when the financial institution is a subsidiary of a
credit institution or investment firm, or of a company
referred to in point (c) or (d), and is covered by the
supervision of the parent undertaking on a consolidated
basis in accordance with Articles 6 to 17 of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013;
(c) | financial holding companies, mixed financial
holding companies and mixed-activity holding
companies that are established in the Union;
(d) | parent financial holding companies in a Member
State, Union parent financial holding companies, parent
mixed financial holding companies in a Member State,
Union parent mixed financial holding companies;
(e) | branches of institutions that are established outside
the Union in accordance with the specific conditions laid
down in this Directive.
When establishing and applying the requirements under
this Directive and when using the different tools at their
disposal in relation to an entity referred to in the first
subparagraph, and subject to specific provisions,
resolution authorities and competent authorities shall
take account of the nature of its business, its
shareholding structure, its legal form, its risk profile, size
and legal status, its interconnectedness to other
institutions or to the financial system in general, the
scope and the complexity of its activities, its membership
of an institutional protection scheme (IPS) that meets the
requirements of Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 or other cooperative mutual solidarity systems
as referred to in Article 113(6) of that Regulation and
whether it exercises any investment services or activities
as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of Directive
2014/65/EU.
40
(2) Statele membre pot adopta sau menine dispozi ii care

sunt mai stringente sau suplimentare fa de cele din
prezenta directiv i n actele delegate i de punere n
aplicare adoptate pe baza prezentei directive, cu condi ia ca
acestea s aib o aplicabilitate general i s nu contravin
prezentei directive i actelor delegate i de punere n aplicare
adoptate pe baza prezentei directive.
Articolul 2
Definiii
(1) n sensul prezentei directive, se aplic urmtoarele
definiii:
1. | rezoluie nseamn aplicarea unui instrument de
rezoluie sau a unui instrument prevzut la articolul 37
alineatul (9) n vederea atingerii unuia sau mai multor
obiective de rezoluie menionate la articolul 31 alineatul (2);
2. | instituie de credit nseamn o instituie de credit astfel
cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 1 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, cu excepia entit ilor
menionate la articolul 2 alineatul (5) din Directiva
2013/36/UE;
3. | firm de investiii nseamn o firm de investiii astfel
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 care face obiectul cerinei
privind capitalul iniial prevzute la articolul 28 alineatul (2)
din Directiva 2013/36/UE;
4. | instituie financiar nseamn o instituie financiar
astfel cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 26
din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
5. | filial nseamn o filial, astfel cum este definit la
articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 16 din Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 575/2013;
6. | ntreprindere-mam nseamn o ntreprindere-mam
litera (a) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
7. | baz consolidat nseamn baza situaiei consolidate
8. | sistem instituional de protecie sau SIP nseamn un
mecanism ce respect cerinele prevzute la articolul 113
alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
9. | societate financiar holding nseamn un holding
financiar astfel cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1)
punctul 20 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
10. | societate financiar holding mixt nseamn o
societate financiar holding mixt astfel cum este definit la
nr. 575/2013;
11. | societate holding cu activitate mixt nseamn o
societate holding cu activitate mixt astfel cum este definit la
2. Member States may adopt or maintain rules that are

stricter or additional to those laid down in this Directive
and in the delegated and implementing acts adopted on
the basis of this Directive, provided that they are of
general application and do not conflict with this
Directive and with the delegated and implementing acts
adopted on its basis.
Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Directive the following
definitions apply:
(1) | resolution means the application of a resolution
tool or a tool referred to in Article 37(9) in order to
achieve one or more of the resolution objectives referred
to in Article 31(2);
(2) | credit institution means a credit institution as
defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013, not including the entities referred to in
Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU;
(3) | investment firm means an investment firm as
No 575/2013 that is subject to the initial capital
requirement laid down in Article 28(2) of Directive
2013/36/EU;
(4) | financial institution means a financial institution as
No 575/2013;
(5) | subsidiary means a subsidiary as defined in point
(16) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(6) | parent undertaking means a parent undertaking as
defined in point (15)(a) of Article 4(1) of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013;
(7) | consolidated basis means the basis of the
consolidated situation as defined in point (47) of Article
4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(8) | institutional protection scheme or IPS means an
arrangement that meets the requirements laid down in
Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(9) | financial holding company means a financial
holding company as defined in point (20) of Article 4(1)
of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(10) | mixed financial holding company means a mixed
financial holding company as defined in point (21) of
(11) | mixed-activity holding company means a mixedactivity holding company as defined in point (22) of
41
nr. 575/2013;
12. | societate financiar holding -mam dintr-un stat
membru nseamn o societate financiar holding-mam
dintr-un stat membru astfel cum este definit la articolul 4
alineatul (1) punctul 30 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013;
13. | societate financiar holding-mam din Uniune
nseamn societate financiar holding-mam din UE astfel
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
14. | societate financiar holding mixt-mam dintr-un stat
membru nseamn societate financiar holding mixt-mam
dintr-un stat membru astfel cum este definit la articolul 4
alineatul (1) punctul 32 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013;
15. | societate financiar holding mixt-mam din Uniune
nseamn o societate financiar holding mixt-mam din UE
16. | obiectivele rezoluiei sunt obiectivele rezoluiei
menionate la articolul 31 alineatul (2);
17. | sucursal nseamn o sucursal, astfel cum este
definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 17 din
18. | autoritate de rezoluie nseamn autoritatea desemnat
de un stat membru n conformitate cu articolul 3;
19. | instrument de rezoluie nseamn un instrument de
rezoluie menionat la articolul 37 alineatul (3);
20. | competen de rezoluie nseamn o competen n
sensul articolelor 63-72;
21. | autoritate competent nseamn o autoritate
competent astfel cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1)
punctul 40 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, inclusiv
Banca Central European, referitor la anumite competen e
conferite prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1024/2013 al
Consiliului (25);
22. | ministere competente nseamn ministerele de finan e
sau alte ministere ale statelor membre responsabile pentru
deciziile economice, financiare i bugetare la nivel naional,
conform competenelor naionale, care au fost desemnate n
conformitate cu articolul 3 alineatul (5);
23. | instituie nseamn o instituie de credit sau o firm de
investiii;
24. | organ de conducere nseamn un organ de conducere
din Directiva 2013/36/UE;
25. | conducere superioar nseamn conducerea
superioar astfel cum este definit la articolul 3 alineatul (1)
(12) | parent financial holding company in a Member

State means a parent financial holding company in a
Member State as defined in point (30) of Article 4(1) of
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(13) | Union parent financial holding company means
an EU parent financial holding company as defined in
point (31) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013;
(14) | parent mixed financial holding company in a
Member State means a parent mixed financial holding
company in a Member State as defined in point (32) of
Article 4(1)of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(15) | Union parent mixed financial holding company
means an EU parent mixed financial holding company as
No 575/2013;
(16) | resolution objectives means the resolution
objectives referred to in Article 31(2);
(17) | branch means a branch as defined in point (17) of
(18) | resolution authority means an authority
designated by a Member State in accordance with Article
3;
(19) | resolution tool means a resolution tool referred to
in Article 37(3);
(20) | resolution power means a power referred to in
Articles 63 to 72;
(21) | competent authority means a competent authority
as defined in point (40) of Article 4(1) of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 including the European Central Bank
with regard to specific tasks conferred on it by Council
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (25);
(22) | competent ministries means finance ministries or
other ministries of the Member States which are
responsible for economic, financial and budgetary
decisions at the national level according to national
competencies and which have been designated in
accordance with Article 3(5);
(23) | institution means a credit institution or an
investment firm;
(24) | management body means a management body as
defined in point (7) of Article 3(1) of Directive
2013/36/EU;
(25) | senior management means senior management as
42
punctul 9 din Directiva 2013/36/UE;

26. | grup nseamn o ntreprindere-mam i filialele sale;
27. | grup transfrontalier nseamn un grup ale crui
entiti sunt stabilite n cel puin dou state membre;
28. | sprijin financiar public extraordinar nseamn ajutor
de stat n sensul articolului 107 alineatul (1) din Tratatul
privind funcionarea Uniunii Europene sau orice alt sprijin
financiar public la nivel supranaional, care, dac ar fi
furnizat la nivel naional ar constitui un ajutor de stat i care
este furnizat pentru a menine sau restabili viabilitatea,
lichiditatea sau solvabilitatea unei instituii sau entiti
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) sau (d)
sau a unui grup din care face parte o astfel de entitate sau
grup;
29. | asisten privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen
nseamn furnizarea de bani ai bncii centrale sau orice alt
form de asisten ce poate conduce la cre terea volumului
de bani ai bncii centrale, ctre o instituie financiar
solvabil sau un grup de instituii financiare solvabile, care
se confrunt temporar cu probleme de lichidit i, fr ca o
astfel de operaiune s fie parte a politicii monetare;
30. | criz sistemic nseamn o perturbare a sistemului
financiar care poate genera consecine negative grave pentru
piaa intern i economia real; toate tipurile de entiti
financiare intermediare, piee i infrastructuri financiare pot
fi importante din punct de vedere sistemic ntr-o anumit
msur;
31. | entitate din grup nseamn o persoan juridic care
face parte dintr-un grup;
32. | plan de redresare nseamn un plan de redresare
elaborat i actualizat de o instituie n conformitate cu
articolul 5;
33. | plan de redresare a grupului nseamn un plan de
redresare a grupului elaborat i pstrat la zi n conformitate
cu articolul 7;
34. | sucursal semnificativ nseamn o sucursal care ar
fi considerat drept semnificativ ntr-un stat membru-gazd
n conformitate cu articolul 51 alineatul (1) din Directiva
2013/36/UE;
35. | funcii critice nseamn activiti, servicii sau
operaiuni a cror ntrerupere ar putea conduce, ntr-unul sau
mai multe state membre, la perturbarea serviciilor esen iale
pentru economia real sau la perturbarea stabilit ii
financiare din cauza dimensiunii, cotei de pia , a
interconexiunilor externe i interne, a complexitii sau
activitilor transfrontaliere ale unei instituii sau grup, mai
ales avnd n vedere caracterul substituibil al respectivelor
activiti, servicii sau operaiuni;
36. | linii de activitate eseniale nseamn liniile de
2013/36/EU;
(26) | group means a parent undertaking and its
subsidiaries;
(27) | cross-border group means a group having group
entities established in more than one Member State;
(28) | extraordinary public financial support means
State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, or
any other public financial support at supra-national level,
which, if provided for at national level, would constitute
State aid, that is provided in order to preserve or restore
the viability, liquidity or solvency of an institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) or
of a group of which such an institution or entity forms
part;
(29) | emergency liquidity assistance means the
provision by a central bank of central bank money, or
any other assistance that may lead to an increase in
central bank money, to a solvent financial institution, or
group of solvent financial institutions, that is facing
temporary liquidity problems, without such an operation
being part of monetary policy;
(30) | systemic crisis means a disruption in the financial
system with the potential to have serious negative
consequences for the internal market and the real
economy. All types of financial intermediaries, markets
and infrastructure may be potentially systemically
important to some degree;
(31) | group entity means a legal person that is part of a
group;
(32) | recovery plan means a recovery plan drawn up
and maintained by an institution in accordance with
Article 5;
(33) | group recovery plan means a group recovery plan
drawn up and maintained in accordance with Article 7;
(34) | significant branch means a branch that would be
considered to be significant in a host Member State in
accordance with Article 51(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU;
(35) | critical functions means activities, services or
operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or
more Member States, to lead to the disruption of services
that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt
financial stability due to the size, market share, external
and internal interconnectedness, complexity or crossborder activities of an institution or group, with
particular regard to the substitutability of those activities,
services or operations;
(36) | core business lines means business lines and
43
activitate i serviciile asociate care reprezint importante

surse de venit, de profit sau de valoare a francizei pentru o
instituie sau pentru un grup din care face parte institu ia;
37. | supraveghetor consolidant nseamn un
supraveghetor consolidant, astfel cum este definit la articolul
4 alineatul (1) punctul 41 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013;
38. | fonduri proprii nseamn fonduri proprii n sensul
articolului 4 alineatul (1) punctul 118 din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 575/2013;
39. | condiii de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie
nseamn condiiile menionate la articolul 32 alineatul (1);
40. | msur de rezoluie nseamn decizia de a supune o
instituie sau entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
literele (b), (c) sau (d) unei proceduri de rezoluie n
conformitate cu articolul 32 sau 33, precum i aplicarea unui
instrument de rezoluie sau exercitarea uneia sau mai multor
competene de rezoluie;
41. | plan de rezoluie nseamn un plan de rezolu ie
ntocmit pentru o instituie n conformitate cu articolul 10;
42. | rezoluia grupului nseamn oricare dintre
urmtoarele msuri: | (a) | adoptarea unei msuri de rezolu ie
la nivelul unei ntreprinderi-mam sau al unei institu iei care
face obiectul supravegherii consolidate; sau | (b) |
coordonarea aplicrii instrumentelor de rezoluie i a
exercitrii competenelor de rezoluie de ctre autorit ile de
rezoluie n raport cu entitile din grup care ndeplinesc
condiiile de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie;
43. | plan de rezoluie a grupului nseamn un plan de
rezoluie ntocmit pentru un grup n conformitate cu
articolele 12 i 13;
44. | autoritate de rezoluie a grupului nseamn autoritatea
de rezoluie din statul membru n care se afl sediul
supraveghetorului consolidant;
45. | schem de rezoluie a grupului nseamn un plan
ntocmit n conformitate cu articolul 91 n scopul rezolu iei
unui grup;
46. | colegiu de rezoluie nseamn un colegiu instituit n
conformitate cu articolul 88 n vederea ndeplinirii sarcinilor
menionate la articolul 88 alineatul (1);
47. | procedur obinuit de insolven nseamn
procedura de insolven colectiv care implic dezinvestirea
parial sau integral a dreptului de administrare a unui
debitor i numirea unui lichidator sau a unui administrator,
aplicabil n mod normal instituiilor n temeiul dreptului
intern i care este fie specific institu iilor n cauz, fie
aplicabil n general oricrei persoane fizice ori juridice;
48. | instrumente de datorie n sensul articolului 63
alineatul (1) literele (g) i (j) nseamn obligaiuni i alte
forme de datorii transferabile, instrumente care creeaz sau
associated services which represent material sources of

revenue, profit or franchise value for an institution or for
a group of which an institution forms part;
(37) | consolidating supervisor means consolidating
supervisor as defined in point (41) of Article 4(1) of
(38) | own funds means own funds as defined in point
(39) | conditions for resolution means the conditions
referred to in Article 32(1);
(40) | resolution action means the decision to place an
institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of
Article 1(1) under resolution pursuant to Article 32 or 33,
the application of a resolution tool, or the exercise of one
or more resolution powers;
(41) | resolution plan means a resolution plan for an
institution drawn up in accordance with Article 10;
(42) | group resolution means either of the following: |
(a) | the taking of resolution action at the level of a parent
undertaking or of an institution subject to consolidated
supervision, or | (b) | the coordination of the application
of resolution tools and the exercise of resolution powers
by resolution authorities in relation to group entities that
meet the conditions for resolution;
(43) | group resolution plan means a plan for group
resolution drawn up in accordance with Articles 12 and
13;
(44) | group-level resolution authority means the
resolution authority in the Member State in which the
consolidating supervisor is situated;
(45) | group resolution scheme means a plan drawn up
for the purposes of group resolution in accordance with
Article 91;
(46) | resolution college means a college established in
accordance with Article 88 to carry out the tasks referred
to in Article 88(1);
(47) | normal insolvency proceedings means collective
insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total
divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a
liquidator or an administrator normally applicable to
institutions under national law and either specific to
those institutions or generally applicable to any natural
or legal person;
(48) | debt instruments referred to in points (g) and (j)
of Article 63(1) means bonds and other forms of
transferable debt, instruments creating or acknowledging
44
recunosc o datorie i instrumente care dau dreptul de a

achiziiona instrumente de datorie;
49. | instituie-mam dintr-un stat membru nseamn o
instituie mam dintr-un stat membru astfel cum este definit
la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 28 din Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 575/2013;
50. | instituie-mam din Uniune nseamn o instituiemam din UE astfel cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul
(1) punctul 29 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013;
51. | cerine de fonduri proprii nseamn cerin ele
prevzute la articolele 92-98 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013;
52. | colegiu de supraveghere nseamn un colegiu de
supraveghere instituit n conformitate cu articolul 116 din
Directiva 2013/36/UE;
53. | cadrul Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat nseamn
cadrul instituit prin articolele 107, 108 i 109 din TFUE i
prin reglementrile i toate actele Uniunii, inclusiv orientri,
comunicri i avize stabilite sau adoptate n temeiul
articolului 108 alineatul (4) sau al articolului 109 din TFUE;
54. | lichidare nseamn valorificarea activelor unei
instituii sau entiti menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
literele (b), (c) sau (d);
55. | instrument de separare a activelor nseamn
mecanismul prin care o autoritate de rezolu ie efectueaz, n
conformitate cu articolul 42, un transfer al activelor,
drepturilor sau pasivelor unei instituii supuse procedurii de
rezoluie ctre un vehicul de gestionare a activelor;
56. | vehicul de gestionare a activelor nseamn o persoan
juridic ce ndeplinete cerinele prevzute la articolul 42
alineatul (2);
57. | instrument de recapitalizare intern nseamn
mecanismul prin care o autoritate de rezolu ie exercit, n
conformitate cu articolul 43, competenele de reducere a
valorii contabile i conversie referitoare la pasivele unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie;
58. | instrumentul de vnzare a activitii nseamn
mecanismul prin care o autoritate de rezolu ie efectueaz, n
conformitate cu articolul 38, un transfer al ac iunilor sau al
altor instrumente de proprietate emise de o instituie aflat n
rezoluie sau al activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie, ctre un cumprtor care nu este
o instituie-punte;
59. | instituie punte nseamn o persoan juridic ce
ndeplinete cerinele prevzute la articolul 40 alineatul (2);
60. | instrumentul instituiei-punte nseamn mecanismul
de transfer ctre o instituie-punte, n conformitate cu
articolul 40, al aciunilor ori al altor instrumente de
proprietate care au fost emise de o instituie aflat n
rezoluie sau al activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor unei
a debt, and instruments giving rights to acquire debt

instruments;
(49) | parent institution in a Member State means a
parent institution in a Member State as defined in point
(50) | Union parent institution means an EU parent
institution as defined in point (29) of Article 4(1) of
(51) | own funds requirements means the requirements
laid down in Articles 92 to 98 of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013;
(52) | supervisory college means a college of
supervisors established in accordance with Article 116 of
Directive 2013/36/EU;
(53) | Union State aid framework means the framework
established by Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU and
regulations and all Union acts, including guidelines,
communications and notices, made or adopted pursuant
to Article 108(4) or Article 109 TFEU;
(54) | winding up means the realisation of assets of an
Article 1(1);
(55) | asset separation tool means the mechanism for
effecting a transfer by a resolution authority of assets,
rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an
asset management vehicle in accordance with Article 42;
(56) | asset management vehicle means a legal person
that meets the requirements laid down in Article 42(2);
(57) | bail-in tool means the mechanism for effecting
the exercise by a resolution authority of the write-down
and conversion powers in relation to liabilities of an
institution under resolution in accordance with Article
43;
(58) | sale of business tool means the mechanism for
effecting a transfer by a resolution authority of shares or
other instruments of ownership issued by an institution
under resolution, or assets, rights or liabilities, of an
institution under resolution to a purchaser that is not a
bridge institution, in accordance with Article 38;
(59) | bridge institution means a legal person that meets
the requirements laid down in Article 40(2);
(60) | bridge institution tool means the mechanism for
transferring shares or other instruments of ownership
issued by an institution under resolution or assets, rights
or liabilities of an institution under resolution to a bridge
institution, in accordance with Article 40;
45
instituii aflate n rezoluie;

61. | instrumente de proprietate nseamn ac iuni, alte
instrumente care confer dreptul de proprietate, instrumente
care dau dreptul de a achiziiona aciuni sau alte instrumente
de proprietate sau care pot fi convertite n acestea i
instrumente reprezentnd participaii n aciuni sau n alte
instrumente de proprietate;
62. | acionari nseamn acionari sau deintori ai altor
instrumente de proprietate;
63. | competene de transfer nseamn competenele
menionate la articolul 63 alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d)
privind transferarea aciunilor, a altor instrumente de
proprietate, a instrumentelor de datorie, a activelor, a
drepturilor ori pasivelor sau a oricrei combina ii a acestor
elemente, de la o instituie aflat n rezolu ie ctre un
destinatar;
64. | contraparte central nseamn o CPC, astfel cum este
definit la articolul 2 punctul 1 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
648/2012;
65. | instrument financiar derivat nseamn un instrument
financiar derivat, astfel cum este definit la articolul 2 punctul
5 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 648/2012;
66. | competene de reducere a valorii contabile i de
conversie nseamn competenele menionate la articolul 59
alineatul (2) i la articolul 63 alineatul (1) literele (e)-(i);
67. | obligaie garantat nseamn o datorie pentru care
dreptul creditorului la plat sau la alt form de executare
este asigurat printr-un privilegiu, o, un gaj sau drept de
retenie, sau prin contracte de garanie real, inclusiv datorii
care rezult din tranzacii de rscumprare sau din alte
contracte de garanie cu transfer de proprietate;
68. | instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz
nseamn instrumente de capital ce ntrunesc cerin ele
prevzute la articolul 28 alineatele (1)-(4), articolul 29
alineatele (1)-(5) sau articolul 31 alineatul (1) din
69. | instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivelul 1
suplimentar nseamn instrumente de capital ce ntrunesc
cerinele prevzute la articolul 52 alineatul (1) din
70. | cuantum agregat nseamn cuantumul agregat cu care
trebuie reduse sau convertite pasivele eligibile, rezultat n
urma evalurii efectuate de autoritatea de rezolu ie n
71. | pasive eligibile nseamn acele pasive i instrumente
de capital care nu se nu ndplinesc condiiile pentru a fi
considerate instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz, instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivelul 1 suplimentar
sau instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 2, apar innd
unei instituii sau entiti menionate la articolul 1 alineatul
(61) | instruments of ownership means shares, other

instruments that confer ownership, instruments that are
convertible into or give the right to acquire shares or
other instruments of ownership, and instruments
representing interests in shares or other instruments of
ownership;
(62) | shareholders means shareholders or holders of
other instruments of ownership;
(63) | transfer powers means the powers specified in
point (c) or (d) of Article 63(1) to transfer shares, other
instruments of ownership, debt instruments, assets, rights
or liabilities, or any combination of those items from an
institution under resolution to a recipient;
(64) | central counterparty means a CCP as defined in

point (1) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012;
(65) | derivative, means a derivative as defined in point
(5) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012;
(66) | write-down and conversion powers means the
powers referred to in Article 59(2) and in points (e) to (i)
of Article 63(1);
(67) | secured liability means a liability where the right
of the creditor to payment or other form of performance
is secured by a charge, pledge or lien, or collateral
arrangements including liabilities arising from
repurchase transactions and other title transfer collateral
arrangements;
(68) | Common Equity Tier 1 instruments means capital
instruments that meet the conditions laid down in Article
28(1) to (4), Article 29(1) to (5) or Article 31(1) of
(69) | Additional Tier 1 instruments means capital
instruments that meet the conditions laid down in Article
52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(70) | aggregate amount means the aggregate amount by
which the resolution authority has assessed that eligible
liabilities are to be written down or converted, in
accordance with Article 46(1);
(71) | eligible liabilities means the liabilities and capital
instruments that do not qualify as Common Equity Tier
1, Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments of an institution
or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
that are not excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool by
virtue of Article 44(2);
46
(1) literele (b), (c) sau (d) care nu sunt excluse din domeniul
de aplicare al instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n
temeiul articolului 44 alineatul (2);
72. | schem de garantare a depozitelor nseamn o schem
de garantare a depozitelor introdus i recunoscut n mod
oficial de un stat membru n temeiul articolului 4 din
73. | instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 2 nseamn
instrumente de capital sau mprumuturi subordonate ce
ntrunesc cerinele prevzute la articolul 63 din
74. | instrumente de capital relevante n sensul dispozi iilor
titlului IV capitolul IV seciunea 5 i ale titlului IV capitolul
V nseamn instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1
suplimentar i instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 2;
75. | rat de conversie nseamn factorul care determin
numrul de aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate n care
poate fi convertit o datorie aparinnd unei anumite
categorii, exprimat fie n raport cu un singur instrument din
categoria respectiv, fie n raport cu o unitate de valoare dat
a unui titlu de crean;
76. | creditor afectat nseamn creditorul a crui crean
este legat de un element de pasiv redus sau convertit n
aciuni sau n alte instrumente de proprietate prin exercitarea
competenei de reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie,
n urma utilizrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern;
77. | deintor afectat nseamn un deintor de
instrumente de proprietate ale crui instrumente sunt anulate
prin exercitarea competenei menionate la articolul 63
alineatul (1) litera (h);
78. | autoritate corespunztoare nseamn autoritatea dintrun stat membru, desemnat conform articolului 61, care,
conform dreptului intern din statul membru respectiv, este
responsabil cu stabilirea elementelor menionate la articolul
59 alineatul (3);
79. | instituie-mam relevant nseamn o instituie-mam
dintr-un stat membru, o instituie-mam din Uniune, o
societate financiar holding, o societate financiar holding
mixt, o societate financiar holding cu activitate mixt, o
societate financiar holding-mam dintr-un stat membru, o
societate financiar holding-mam din Uniune, societate
financiar holding mixt-mam dintr-un stat membru sau o
societate financiar holding mixt-mam din Uniune cruia i
se aplic instrumentul de recapitalizare intern;
80. | destinatar nseamn entitatea creia i sunt transferate
aciuni, alte instrumente de proprietate, instrumente de
datorie, active, drepturi ori pasive sau orice combina ie a
acestor elemente, aparinnd unei instituii aflate n rezolu ie;
81. | zi lucrtoare nseamn orice alt zi dect smbta,
duminica sau zilele de srbtoare legal din statul membru n
cauz;
(72) | deposit guarantee scheme means a deposit

guarantee scheme introduced and officially recognised
by a Member State pursuant to Article 4 of Directive
2014/49/EU;
(73) | Tier 2 instruments means capital instruments or
subordinated loans that meet the conditions laid down in
Article 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(74) | relevant capital instruments for the purposes of
Section 5 of Chapter IV of Title IV and Chapter V of
Title IV, means Additional Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2
instruments;
(75) | conversion rate means the factor that determines
the number of shares or other instruments of ownership
into which a liability of a specific class will be
converted, by reference either to a single instrument of
the class in question or to a specified unit of value of a
debt claim;
(76) | affected creditor means a creditor whose claim
relates to a liability that is reduced or converted to shares
or other instruments of ownership by the exercise of the
write down or conversion power pursuant to the use of
the bail-in tool;
(77) | affected holder means a holder of instruments of
ownership whose instruments of ownership are cancelled
by means of the power referred to in point (h) of Article
63(1);
(78) | appropriate authority means authority of the
Member State identified in accordance with Article 61
that is responsible under the national law of that State for
making the determinations referred to in Article 59(3);
(79) | relevant parent institution means a parent
institution in a Member State, a Union parent institution,
a financial holding company, a mixed financial holding
company, a mixed-activity holding company, a parent
financial holding company in a Member State, a Union
parent financial holding company, a parent mixed
financial holding company in a Member State, or a
Union parent mixed financial holding company, in
relation to which the bail-in tool is applied;
(80) | recipient means the entity to which shares, other
instruments of ownership, debt instruments, assets, rights
or liabilities, or any combination of those items are
transferred from an institution under resolution;
(81) | business day means a day other than a Saturday, a
Sunday or a public holiday in the Member State
concerned;
47
82. | drept de ncetare nseamn dreptul de a nceta un

contract, dreptul de a accelera, lichida ori compensa obliga ii
sau orice clauz similar care suspend, modific sau stinge
o obligaie a uneia dintre prile la contract sau o clauz care
mpiedic naterea unei obligaii n temeiul contractului,
obligaie care ar s-ar fi nscut n absena acesteia;
83. | instituie aflat n rezoluie nseamn o institu ie, o
instituie financiar, societate financiar holding, societate
financiar holding mixt, o societate holding cu activitate
mixt, societate financiar holding-mam dintr-un stat
membru, o societate financiar holding-mam din Uniune,
societate financiar holding mixt-mam dintr-un stat
membru sau societate financiar holding mixt-mam din
Uniune care face obiectul unei msuri de rezolu ie;
84. | filial din Uniune nseamn o instituie stabilit ntrun stat membru i care este filial a unei instituii dintr-o ar
ter sau a unei ntreprinderi-mam dintr-o ar ter;
85. | ntreprindere-mam din Uniune nseamn o instituiemam din Uniune, o societate financiar holding-mam din
Uniune sau o societate financiar holding mixt-mam din
Uniune;
86. | instituie dintr-o ar ter nseamn o entitate care are
sediul central stabilit ntr-o ar ter i care ar face obiectul
definiiei unei instituii, dac ar fi stabilit n Uniune;
87. | ntreprindere-mam dintr-o ar ter nseamn o
instituie-mam, o societate financiar holding-mam sau o
societate financiar holding mixt-mam, stabilit ntr-o ar
ter;
88. | procedur de rezoluie dintr-o ar ter nseamn o
msur prevzut de legislaia unei ri tere pentru a
gestiona intrarea n dificultate a unei instituii sau a unei
ntreprinderi-mam din ara ter respectiv care este
comparabil, din punctul de vedere al obiectivelor i al
rezultatelor anticipate, cu msurile de rezolu ie ntreprinse n
temeiul prezentei directive;
89. | sucursal din Uniune nseamn o sucursal a unei
instituii dintr-o ar ter, situat ntr-un stat membru;
90. | autoritate relevant dintr-o ar ter nseamn o
autoritate dintr-o ar ter care ndeplinete func ii
comparabile cu cele ale autoritilor de rezolu ie sau ale
autoritilor competente prevzute n prezenta directiv;
91. | mecanism de finanare a grupului nseamn
mecanismul sau mecanismele de finanare ale statului
membru al autoritii de rezoluie a grupului;
92. | tranzacie back-to-back nseamn o tranzac ie
ncheiat ntre dou entiti din grup cu scopul de a transfera,
n totalitate sau n parte, riscul generat de o alt tranzac ie
ncheiat ntre una dintre aceste entiti din grup i o ter
parte;
(82) | termination right means a right to terminate a

contract, a right to accelerate, close out, set-off or net
obligations or any similar provision that suspends,
modifies or extinguishes an obligation of a party to the
contract or a provision that prevents an obligation under
the contract from arising that would otherwise arise;
(83) | institution under resolution means an institution, a
financial institution, a financial holding company, a
mixed financial holding company, a mixed-activity
holding company, a parent financial holding company in
a Member State, a Union parent financial holding
company, a parent mixed financial holding company in a
Member State, or a Union parent mixed financial holding
company, in respect of which a resolution action is taken;
(84) | Union subsidiary means an institution which is
established in a Member State and which is a subsidiary
of a third-country institution or a third-country parent
undertaking;
(85) | Union parent undertaking means a Union parent
institution, a Union parent financial holding company or
a Union parent mixed financial holding company;
(86) | third-country institution means an entity, the head
office of which is established in a third country, that
would, if it were established within the Union, be
covered by the definition of an institution;
(87) | third-country parent undertaking means a parent
undertaking, a parent financial holding company or a
parent mixed financial holding company, established in a
third country;
(88) | third-country resolution proceedings means an
action under the law of a third country to manage the
failure of a third-country institution or a third-country
parent undertaking that is comparable, in terms of
objectives and anticipated results, to resolution actions
under this Directive;
(89) | Union branch means a branch located in a
Member State of a third-country institution;
(90) | relevant third-country authority means a thirdcountry authority responsible for carrying out functions
comparable to those of resolution authorities or
competent authorities pursuant to this Directive;
(91) | group financing arrangement means the financing
arrangement or arrangements of the Member State of the
group-level resolution authority;
(92) | back-to-back transaction means a transaction
entered into between two group entities for the purpose
of transferring, in whole or in part, the risk generated by
another transaction entered into between one of those
group entities and a third party;
48
93. | garanie intragrup nseamn un contract prin care o

entitate din grup garanteaz obligaiile unei alte entit i din
grup fa de o ter parte;
94. | depozite acoperite nseamn depozite acoperite astfel
cum sunt definite la articolul 2 alineatul (1) punctul 5 din
95. | depozite eligibile nseamn depozite eligibile astfel
cum sunt definite la articolul 2 alineatul (1) punctul 4 din
96. | obligaiune garantat nseamn un instrument astfel
cum este menionat la articolul 52 alineatul (4) din Directiva
2009/65/CE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (26);
97. | contract de garanie financiar cu transfer de
proprietate nseamn un contract de garanie financiar cu
transfer de proprietate astfel cum este definit la articolul 2
alineatul (1) litera (b) din Directiva 2002/47/CE a
Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (27);
98. | acord de compensare nseamn un acord prin care
mai multe creane sau obligaii pot fi convertite ntr-o
singur crean net, inclusiv acordurile de compensare cu
exigibilitate imediat n temeiul crora, n cazul producerii
unui eveniment determinat (oricum i oriunde ar fi definit
acesta), scadena obligaiilor prilor este accelerat, astfel
nct ele fie devin imediat exigibile, fie sunt stinse i, n
orice caz, sunt convertite ntr-o singur crean net sau
nlocuite cu aceasta, inclusiv clauza de compensare cu
exigibilitate imediat astfel cum este definit la articolul 2
alineatul (1) litera (n) punctul (i) din Directiva 2002/47/CE i
compensarea astfel cum este definit la articolul 2 litera
(k) din Directiva 98/26/CE;
99. | acord de compensare reciproc nseamn un acord
prin care dou sau mai multe creane sau obligaii datorate
ntre instituie aflat n rezoluie i o contrapartid pot face
obiectul unei compensri reciproce;
100. | contracte financiare nseamn urmtoarele contracte
i acorduri: | (a) | contracte de titluri de valoare, inclusiv: | (i)
| contracte de cumprare, vnzare sau mprumut de titluri de
valoare, grupuri sau indici de titluri de valoare; | (ii) | opiuni
pe un titlu de valoare, grup sau indice de titluri de valoare; |
(iii) | tranzacii de rscumprare sau tranzac ii de
rscumprare reversibile implicnd orice astfel de titluri de
valoare, grupuri sau indici de titluri de valoare; | (b) |
contracte pe mrfuri, inclusiv: | (i) | contracte de cumprare,
vnzare sau mprumut de mrfuri, grupuri sau indici de
mrfuri pentru livrri viitoare; | (ii) | op iuni pe o marf, un
grup sau un indice de mrfuri; | (iii) | tranzac ii de
rscumprare sau tranzacii de rscumprare reversibile
implicnd orice astfel de mrfuri, grupuri sau indici de
mrfuri; | (c) | contractele futures i forward, inclusiv
contractele (altele dect cele pe mrfuri) privind cumprarea,
vnzarea sau transferul de mrfuri sau bunuri de orice
(93) | intra-group guarantee means a contract by which

one group entity guarantees the obligations of another
group entity to a third party;
(94) | covered deposits means covered deposits as
2014/49/EU;
(95) | eligible deposits means eligible deposits as
2014/49/EU;
(96) | covered bond means an instrument as referred to
in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council (26);
(97) | title transfer financial collateral arrangement
means a title transfer financial collateral arrangement as
defined in point (b) of Article 2(1) of Directive
2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council (27);
(98) | netting arrangement means an arrangement under
which a number of claims or obligations can be
converted into a single net claim, including close-out
netting arrangements under which, on the occurrence of
an enforcement event (however or wherever defined) the
obligations of the parties are accelerated so as to become
immediately due or are terminated, and in either case are
converted into or replaced by a single net claim,
including close-out netting provisions as defined in
point (n)(i) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2002/47/EC and
netting as defined in point (k) of Article 2 of Directive
98/26/EC;
(99) | set-off arrangement means an arrangement under
which two or more claims or obligations owed between
the institution under resolution and a counterparty can be
set off against each other;
(100) | financial contracts includes the following
contracts and agreements: | (a) | securities contracts,
including: | (i) | contracts for the purchase, sale or loan of
a security, a group or index of securities; | (ii) | options
on a security or group or index of securities; | (iii) |
repurchase or reverse repurchase transactions on any
such security, group or index; | (b) | commodities
contracts, including: | (i) | contracts for the purchase, sale
or loan of a commodity or group or index of
commodities for future delivery; | (ii) | options on a
commodity or group or index of commodities; | (iii) |
repurchase or reverse repurchase transactions on any
such commodity, group or index; | (c) | futures and
forwards contracts, including contracts (other than a
commodities contract) for the purchase, sale or transfer
of a commodity or property of any other description,
service, right or interest for a specified price at a future
49
natur, de servicii, drepturi sau interese contra unui anumit

pre, la un anumit moment n viitor; | (d) | contracte swap,
inclusiv: | (i) | swapuri i opiuni pe rata dobnzii; acorduri
pe cursul valutar la vedere sau de alt tip pe pia a valutar;
swapuri pe valut, pe indici ai titlurilor de capital sau pe
titluri de capital, pe indici ai datoriei sau pe datorii, pe indici
ai mrfurilor sau pe mrfuri, condi ii meteorologice; emisii
sau inflaie; | (ii) | swapuri pe randamentul total, pe marja de
credit sau swapuri pe riscul de credit; | (iii) | orice acord sau
tranzacie similar cu unul dintre acordurile men ionate la
punctele (i) sau (ii) de la prezenta liter i care face obiectul
unor tranzacionri repetate pe pieele swapurilor sau ale
instrumentelor financiare derivate; | (e) | acorduri de
mprumut interbancar n cazul crora mprumutul se acord
pe o perioad de maxim trei luni; | (f) | acorduri-cadru
referitoare la toate tipurile de contracte sau acorduri
menionate la literele (a)-(e);
101. | msur de prevenire a crizelor nseamn exercitarea
competenelor privind eliminarea direct a deficienelor sau
a obstacolelor din calea posibilitii de redresare n temeiul
articolului 6 alineatul (6), exercitarea competenelor de
abordare sau de eliminare a obstacolelor din calea
posibilitii de soluionare n temeiul articolului 17 sau al
articolului 18, aplicarea unei msuri de interven ie timpurie
n temeiul articolului 27, numirea unui administrator
temporar n temeiul articolului 29 sau exercitarea
competenelor de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie n temeiul articolului 59;
102. | msur de gestionare a crizelor nseamn o msur
de rezoluie sau numirea unui administrator special n
temeiul articolului 35 sau a unei persoane n temeiul
articolului 51 alineatul (2) sau al articolului 72 alineatul (1);
103. | capacitate de redresare nseamn capacitatea unei
instituii de a-i restabili poziia financiar n urma unei
deteriorri semnificative;
104. | deponent nseamn un deponent astfel cum este
definit la articolul 2 alineatul (1) punctul 6 din Directiva
2014/49/UE;
105. | investitor nseamn un investitor n sensul
articolului 1 punctul 4 din Directiva 97/9/CE a Parlamentului
European i a Consiliului (28);
106. | autoritate naional macroprudenial desemnat
nseamn autoritatea nsrcinat cu realizarea politicii
macroprudeniale, menionat n recomandarea B1 din
Recomandarea Comitetului european pentru risc sistemic din
22 decembrie 2011 privind mandatul autoritilor naionale
pentru chestiuni macroprudeniale (CERS/2011/3);
107. | microntreprinderi i ntreprinderi mici i mijlocii
nseamn microntreprinderi i ntreprinderi mici i mijlocii
astfel cum sunt definite n funcie de criteriul cifrei anuale de
afaceri la articolul 2 alineatul (1) din anexa la Recomandarea
date; | (d) | swap agreements, including: | (i) | swaps and

options relating to interest rates; spot or other foreign
exchange agreements; currency; an equity index or
equity; a debt index or debt; commodity indexes or
commodities; weather; emissions or inflation; | (ii) | total
return, credit spread or credit swaps; | (iii) | any
agreements or transactions that are similar to an
agreement referred to in point (i) or (ii) which is the
subject of recurrent dealing in the swaps or derivatives
markets; | (e) | inter-bank borrowing agreements where
the term of the borrowing is three months or less; | (f) |
master agreements for any of the contracts or agreements
referred to in points (a) to (e);
(101) | crisis prevention measure means the exercise of

powers to direct removal of deficiencies or impediments
to recoverability under Article 6(6), the exercise of
powers to address or remove impediments to
resolvability under Article 17 or 18, the application of an
early intervention measure under Article 27, the
appointment of a temporary administrator under Article
29 or the exercise of the write down or conversion
powers under Article 59;
(102) | crisis management measure means a resolution

action or the appointment of a special manager under
Article 35 or a person under Article 51(2) or under
Article 72(1);
(103) | recovery capacity means the capability of an
institution to restore its financial position following a
significant deterioration;
(104) | depositor means a depositor as defined in point
(6) of Article 2(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU;
(105) | investor means an investor within the meaning
of point (4) of Article 1 of Directive 97/9/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (28);
(106) | designated national macroprudential authority
means the authority entrusted with the conduct of
macroprudential policy referred to in Recommendation
B1 of the Recommendation of the European Systemic
Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macroprudential
mandate of national authorities (ESRB/2011/3);
(107) | micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
means micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as
defined with regard to the annual turnover criterion
referred to in Article 2(1) of the Annex to Commission
50
Comisiei 2003/361/CE (29);

108. | pia reglementat nseamn o pia reglementat
astfel cum e definit n articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 21
din Directiva 2014/65/UE.
(2) Comisia este mputernicit s adopte acte delegate n
conformitate cu articolul 115 pentru a preciza criteriile
pentru stabilirea activitilor, serviciilor i operaiunilor
menionate la punctul 35 din primul paragraf, n ceea ce
privete definiia funciilor critice, precum i criteriile
pentru stabilirea liniilor de activitate i a serviciilor asociate
menionate la punctul 36 din primul paragraf, n ceea ce
privete definiia liniilor de activitate eseniale.
Articolul 3
Desemnarea autoritilor responsabile cu rezolu ia
(1) Fiecare stat membru desemneaz una sau, n mod
excepional, mai multe autoriti de rezoluie care sunt
abilitate s aplice instrumentele de rezolu ie i s exercite
competenele de rezoluie.
(2) Autoritatea de rezoluie este o autoritate public
administrativ sau autoriti nvestite cu competen e
administrative publice.
(3) Autoritile de rezoluie pot fi bncile centrale,
ministerele competente sau alte autoriti publice
administrative sau alte autoriti nvestite cu competen e
administrative publice. Statele membre pot prevedea, n mod
excepional, ca autoritatea de rezoluie s fie autorit ile
competente pentru supraveghere n sensul Regulamentului
(UE) nr. 575/2013 i Directiva 2013/36/UE. Se instituie
mecanisme structurale corespunztoare pentru a se asigura
independena operaional i pentru a evita conflictele de
interese ntre funciile de supraveghere prevzute n
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 i Directiva 2013/36/UE
sau alte funcii ale autoritii relevante i func iile
autoritilor de rezoluie prevzute n prezenta directiv, fr
a aduce atingere schimburilor de informaii i cerin elor de
cooperare prevzute la alineatul (4). Mai exact, statele
membre se asigur c, n cadrul autoritilor competente, al
bncilor centrale naionale, al ministerelor competente sau al
altor autoriti, exist independen operaional ntre funcia
de rezoluie i funciile de supraveghere sau de alt natur
ale autoritii relevante.
Personalul implicat n exercitarea func iilor autoritii de
rezoluie n temeiul prezentei directive este supus unor linii
distincte de subordonare i este separat structural fa de
personalul ce exercit sarcini n temeiul Regulamentului
(UE) nr. 575/2013 i al Directivei 2013/36/UE sau fa de
alte funcii ale autoritii relevante.
n sensul prezentului alineat, statul membru sau autoritatea
Recommendation 2003/361/EC (29);

(108) | regulated market means a regulated market as
2014/65/EU.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt
delegated acts in accordance with Article 115 in order to
specify the criteria for the determination of the activities,
services and operations referred to in point (35) of the
first subparagraph as regards the definition of critical
functions and the criteria for the determination of the
business lines and associated services referred to in point
(36) of the first subparagraph as regards the definition of
core business lines.
Article 3
Designation of authorities responsible for resolution
1. Each Member State shall designate one or,
exceptionally, more resolution authorities that are
empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise the
resolution powers.
2. The resolution authority shall be a public
administrative authority or authorities entrusted with
public administrative powers.
3. Resolution authorities may be national central banks,
competent ministries or other public administrative
authorities or authorities entrusted with public
administrative powers. Member States may exceptionally
provide for the resolution authority to be the competent
authorities for supervision for the purposes of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU. Adequate
structural arrangements shall be in place to ensure
operational independence and avoid conflicts of interest
between the functions of supervision pursuant to
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU
or the other functions of the relevant authority and the
functions of resolution authorities pursuant to this
Directive, without prejudice to the exchange of
information and cooperation obligations as required by
paragraph 4. In particular, Member States shall ensure
that, within the competent authorities, national central
banks, competent ministries or other authorities there is
operational independence between the resolution
function and the supervisory or other functions of the
relevant authority.
The staff involved in carrying out the functions of the
resolution authority pursuant to this Directive shall be
structurally separated from, and subject to, separate
reporting lines from the staff involved in carrying out the
tasks pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and
Directive 2013/36/EU or with regard to the other
functions of the relevant authority.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the Member States or
51
de rezoluie adopt i public orice reguli interne necesare,

inclusiv dispoziii privind secretul profesional i schimburile
de informaii ntre diferitele domenii de rspundere.
(4) Statele membre impun ca autoritile care exercit funcii
de supraveghere i de rezoluie i persoanele care exercit
aceste funcii n numele autoritilor respective s coopereze
ndeaproape la pregtirea, planificarea i aplicarea deciziilor
de rezoluie, att n cazul n care autoritatea de rezolu ie i
autoritatea competent sunt entiti separate, ct i n cazul
n care funciile sunt exercitate n cadrul aceleia i entit i.
(5) Fiecare stat membru desemneaz un singur minister care
este responsabil de exercitarea funciilor ministerului
competent n temeiul prezentei directive.
(6) n cazul n care autoritatea de rezoluie dintr-un stat
membru nu este ministerul competent, aceasta informeaz
ministerul competent cu privire la deciziile luate n temeiul
prezentei directive i, n cazul n care dreptul intern nu
prevede altfel, obine aprobarea acestuia anterior aplicrii
deciziilor ce au un impact fiscal direct sau implica ii
sistemice.
(7) Deciziile luate de autoritile competente, de autorit ile
de rezoluie i de ABE n conformitate cu prezenta directiv
in seama de posibilul impact al deciziei n toate statele
membre n care instituia sau grupul i desfoar activitatea
i reduc la minimum efectele negative asupra stabilit ii
financiare i efectele socioeconomice negative n statele
membre respective. Deciziile ABE respect prevederile
articolului 38 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(8) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie
dispun de experiena, resursele i capacitatea operaional
pentru a aplica msurile de rezoluie i c sunt n msur s
i exercite competenele cu rapiditatea i flexibilitatea
necesare n vederea atingerii obiectivelor rezolu iei.
(9) ABE, n cooperare cu autoritile competente i cu
autoritile de rezoluie, se asigur c dispune de expertiz,
de resursele i de capacitile operaionale i necesare i
monitorizeaz punerea n aplicare a alineatului (8) prin
evaluri inter pares periodice.
(10) n cazul n care, n conformitate cu alineatul (1), un stat
membru desemneaz mai multe autoriti pentru a aplica
instrumentele de rezoluie i a exercita competenele de
rezoluie, el transmite ABE i Comisiei o notificare de
justificare i repartizeaz cu claritate func iile i
responsabilitile ntre aceste autoriti, asigur coordonarea
corespunztoare dintre acestea i desemneaz o singur
autoritate drept autoritate de contact n sensul cooperrii i
coordonrii cu autoritile elevante din alte state membre.
(11) Statele membre informeaz ABE n legtur cu
autoritatea naional sau autoritile desemnate drept
the resolution authority shall adopt and make public any

necessary relevant internal rules including rules
regarding professional secrecy and information
exchanges between the different functional areas.
4. Member States shall require that authorities exercising
supervision and resolution functions and persons
exercising those functions on their behalf cooperate
closely in the preparation, planning and application of
resolution decisions, both where the resolution authority
and the competent authority are separate entities and
where the functions are carried out in the same entity.
5. Each Member State shall designate a single ministry
which is responsible for exercising the functions of the
competent ministry under this Directive.
6. Where the resolution authority in a Member State is
not the competent ministry it shall inform the competent
ministry of the decisions pursuant to this Directive and,
unless otherwise laid down in national law, have its
approval before implementing decisions that have a
direct fiscal impact or systemic implications.
7. Decisions taken by competent authorities, resolution
authorities and EBA in accordance with this Directive
shall take into account the potential impact of the
decision in all the Member States where the institution or
the group operate and minimise the negative effects on
financial stability and negative economic and social
effects in those Member States. Decisions of EBA are
subject to Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
8. Member States shall ensure that each resolution
authority has the expertise, resources and operational
capacity to apply resolution actions, and is able to
exercise their powers with the speed and flexibility that
are necessary to achieve the resolution objectives.
9. EBA, in cooperation with competent authorities and
resolution authorities, shall develop the required
expertise, resources and operational capacity and shall
monitor the implementation of paragraph 8, including
through periodical peer reviews.
10. Where, in accordance with paragraph 1, a Member
State designates more than one authority to apply the
resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers, it
shall provide a fully reasoned notification to EBA and
the Commission for doing so and shall allocate functions
and responsibilities clearly between those authorities,
ensure adequate coordination between them and
designate a single authority as a contact authority for the
purposes of cooperation and coordination with the
relevant authorities of other Member States.
11. Member States shall inform EBA of the national
authority or authorities designated as resolution
52
autoriti de rezoluie i autoritate de contact i, dup caz, n

legtur cu funciile i responsabilitile lor specifice. ABE
public lista acestor autoriti de rezoluie i autorit i de
contact.
(12) Fr a aduce atingere articolului 85, statele membre pot
limita rspunderea autoritii de rezoluie, a autorit ii
competente i a personalului respectiv al acestora n
conformitate cu dreptul intern n ceea ce prive te ac iunile i
omisiunile n cursul exercitrii funciilor lor n temeiul
prezentei directive.
TITLUL II
PREGTIREA
CAPITOLUL I
Planificarea redresrii i a rezoluiei
Seciunea 1
Dispoziii generale
Articolul 4
Obligaii simplificate pentru anumite instituii
(1) Avnd n vedere impactul pe care intrarea n dificultate a
unei instituii l-ar putea avea asupra pieelor financiare,
asupra altor instituii, asupra condiiilor de finanare i
asupra economiei n general, ca urmare a naturii activit ii
sale, a structurii acionariatului, a formei juridice, a profilului
de risc, a dimensiunii i a statutului juridic sau a
interconectrii sale cu alte instituii sau cu sistemul financiar
n general, a domeniului i complexitii de activitate, a
statutului de membru al unui SIP sau al altor sisteme de
solidaritate reciproc prevzute la articolul 113 alineatul (7)
din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, precum i exercitarea
de servicii sau activiti de investiii astfel cum se prevede la
articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 2 din Directiva 2014/65/UE,
precum i avnd n vedere potenialele efecte pe care situaia
de dificultate i lichidarea sa ulterioar prin procedurile
normale de insolven le-ar avea, statele membre se asigur
c autoritile competente i autoritile de rezoluie
stabilesc:
(a) | coninutul i detaliile planurilor de redresare i de
rezoluie prevzute la articolele 5-12;
(b) | data pn la care primele planuri de redresare i
rezoluie sunt elaborate i frecvena pentru actualizarea
acestor planuri, care poate fi inferioar celei prevzute la
articolul 5 alineatul (2), articolul 7 alineatul (5), articolul 10
alineatul (6) i articolul 13 alineatul (3);
(c) | coninutul i detaliile informaiilor solicitate din partea
instituiilor n conformitate cu articolul 5 alineatul (5),
articolul 11 alineatul (1) i articolul 12 alineatul (2) i n
seciunile A i B din anex;
(d) | nivelul de detaliere pentru evaluarea posibilit ii de
soluionare prevzut la articolele 15 i 16 i n sec iunea C
din anex;
authorities and the contact authority and, where relevant,

their specific functions and responsibilities. EBA shall
publish the list of those resolution authorities and contact
authorities.
12. Without prejudice to Article 85, Member States may
limit the liability of the resolution authority, the
competent authority and their respective staff in
accordance with national law for acts and omissions in
the course of discharging their functions under this
Directive.
TITLE II
PREPARATION
CHAPTER I
Recovery and resolution planning
Section 1
General provisions
Article 4
Simplified obligations for certain institutions
1. Having regard to the impact that the failure of the
institution could have, due to the nature of its business,
its shareholding structure, its legal form, its risk profile,
size and legal status, its interconnectedness to other
institutions or to the financial system in general, the
scope and the complexity of its activities, its membership
of an IPS or other cooperative mutual solidarity systems
as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 and any exercise of investment services or
activities as defined in point (2) of Article 4(1) of
Directive 2014/65/EU, and whether its failure and
subsequent winding up under normal insolvency
proceedings would be likely to have a significant
negative effect on financial markets, on other
institutions, on funding conditions, or on the wider
economy, Member States shall ensure that competent and
resolution authorities determine:
(a) | the contents and details of recovery and resolution
plans provided for in Articles 5 to 12;
(b) | the date by which the first recovery and resolution
plans are to be drawn up and the frequency for updating
recovery and resolution plans which may be lower than
that provided for in Article 5(2), Article 7(5), Article
10(6) and Article 13(3);
(c) | the contents and details of the information required
from institutions as provided for in Article 5(5), Article
11(1) and Article 12(2) and in Sections A and B of the
Annex;
(d) | the level of detail for the assessment of resolvability
provided for in Articles 15 and 16, and Section C of the
Annex.
53
(2) Autoritile competente i, dup caz, autoritile de

rezoluie efectueaz evaluarea menionat la alineatul (1) n
urma consultrii, dup caz, cu autoritatea na ional
macroprudenial.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazurile n care sunt
prevzute cerine simplificate, autorit ile competente i,
dup caz, autoritile de rezoluie pot impune n orice
moment cerine standard.
(4) Statele membre se asigur c aplicarea unor obliga ii
simplificate nu afecteaz, n sine, competenele autorit ii
competente i, dup caz, ale autoritii de rezoluie de a lua
msuri de prevenire a crizelor sau msuri de gestionare a
crizelor.
(5) Pn la 3 iulie 2015, ABE elaboreaz orientri, n
1093/2010, pentru a preciza criteriile menionate la alineatul
(1), pentru a evalua, n conformitate cu respectivul alineat,
impactul intrrii n dificultate a unei instituii asupra pie elor
financiare, asupra altor instituii i asupra condi iile de
finanare.
(6) Lund n considerare, dup caz, experien a dobndit n
punerea n aplicare a orientrilor menionate la alineatul (5),
ABE este abilitat s elaboreze proiecte de standarde tehnice
de reglementare cu scopul de a preciza criteriile men ionate
la alineatul (1), pentru a evalua, n conformitate cu alineatul
(1), impactul intrrii n dificultate a unei instituii asupra
pieelor financiare, asupra altor instituii i asupra condi iilor
de finanare.
ABE nainteaz Comisiei aceste proiecte de standarde
tehnice de reglementare pn la 3 iulie 2017.
Se confer Comisiei competena de a adopta standardele
tehnice de reglementare menionate la primul paragraf n
1093/2010.
(7) Autoritile competente i autoritile de rezoluie
informeaz ABE n legtur cu modul n care au aplicat
dispoziiile de la alineatele (1), (8), (9) i (10) institu iilor
aflate n propria jurisdicie. ABE transmite un raport
Parlamentului European, Consiliului i Comisiei pn la 31
decembrie 2017 n legtur cu punerea n aplicare a
alineatelor (1), (8), (9) i (10). n special, raportul respectiv
identific orice divergen existent cu privire la punerea n
aplicare la nivel naional a alineatelor (1), (8), (9) i (10).
(8) n conformitate cu alineatele (9) i (10), statele membre
se asigur c autoritile competente i, dup caz, autoritile
de rezoluie pot deroga de la aplicarea:
(a) | cerinelor prevzute la seciunile 2 i 3 institu iilor
afiliate unui organism central i complet sau parial exceptate
de la aplicarea cerinelor prudeniale n dreptul intern n
575/2013;
2. Competent authorities and, where relevant, resolution

authorities shall make the assessment referred to in
paragraph 1 after consulting, where appropriate, the
national macroprudential authority.
3. Member States shall ensure that where simplified
obligations are applied the competent authorities and,
where relevant, resolution authorities can impose full,
unsimplified obligations at any time.
4. Member States shall ensure that the application of
simplified obligations shall not, per se, affect the
competent authoritys and, where relevant, the resolution
authoritys powers to take a crisis prevention measure or
a crisis management measure.
5. EBA shall, by 3 July 2015, issue guidelines in
1093/2010 to specify the criteria referred to in paragraph
1, for assessing, in accordance with that paragraph, the
impact of an institutions failure on financial markets, on
other institutions and on funding conditions.
6. Taking into account, where appropriate, experience
acquired in the application of the guidelines referred to in
paragraph 5, EBA shall develop draft regulatory
technical standards to specify the criteria referred to in
paragraph 1, for assessing, in accordance with that
paragraph, the impact of an institutions failure on
financial markets, on other institutions and on funding
conditions.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical
standards to the Commission by 3 July 2017.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the
regulatory technical standards referred to in the first
subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
7. Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall
inform EBA of the way they have applied paragraphs 1,
8, 9 and 10 to institutions in their jurisdiction. EBA shall
submit a report to the European Parliament, to the
Council and to the Commission by 31 December 2017 on
the implementation of paragraphs 1, 8, 9 and 10. In
particular, that report shall identify any divergences
regarding the implementation at national level of
paragraphs 1, 8,9 and 10.
8. Subject to paragraphs 9 and 10, Member States shall
ensure that competent authorities and, where relevant,
resolution authorities may waive the application of:
(a) | the requirements of Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter
to institutions affiliated to a central body and wholly or
partially exempted from prudential requirements in
national law in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013;
54
(b) | cerinelor prevzute la seciunea 2 instituiilor care sunt

membre ale unui SIP.
(9) n cazul acordrii unei derogri n conformitate cu
alineatul (8), statele membre:
(a) | aplic cerinele de la seciunile 2 i 3 din prezentul
capitol pe baz consolidat organismului central i
instituiilor afiliate la acesta n sensul articolului 10 din
(b) | impun SIP respectarea cerinelor din sec iunea 2 n
cooperare cu fiecare dintre membrii ce se bucur de o
derogare.
n acest scop, n cadrul prezentului capitol sec iunile 2 i 3,
orice trimitere la un grup include un organism central i
instituiile afiliate acestuia n nelesul articolului 10 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, precum i filialele
acestora, iar orice trimitere la ntreprinderi-mam sau la
instituii care fac obiectul supravegherii consolidate n
conformitate cu articolul 111 din Directiva 2013/36/UE
include organismul central.
(10) Instituiile supuse supravegherii directe a Bncii
Centrale Europene n temeiul articolului 6 alineatul (4) din
Regulamentului (UE) nr. 1024/2013 sau ce constituie o
pondere important n sistemul financiar al unui stat membru
i elaboreaz propriile planuri de redresare n conformitate
cu seciunea 2 din prezentul capitol i fac obiectul unor
planuri de rezoluie individualizate n conformitate cu
seciunea 3.
n sensul prezentului alineat, se consider c activitatea unei
instituii are o pondere important n cadrul sistemului
financiar al respectivului stat membru n cazul n care se
ntrunete oricare dintre condiiile urmtoare:
(a) | valoarea total a activelor sale dep e te 30 000 000 000
EUR; sau
(b) | ponderea totalului activelor n PIB-ul statului membru
n care este stabilit depete 20 %, cu excepia cazului n
care totalul activelor este sub 5 000 000 000 EUR;
(11) ABE elaboreaz proiecte de standarde tehnice de punere
n aplicare pentru a specifica formate, modele i defini ii
uniforme pentru identificarea i transmiterea de informa ii de
ctre autoritile competente i autoritile de rezoluie ctre
ABE n sensul alineatului (7), cu respectarea deplin a
principiului proporionalitii.
tehnice de punere n aplicare menionate la primul paragraf,
1093/2010.
Seciunea 2
Planificarea redresrii
(b) | the requirements of Section 2 to institutions which

are members of an IPS.
9. Where a waiver pursuant to paragraph 8 is granted,
Member States shall:
(a) | apply the requirements of Sections 2 and 3 of this
Chapter on a consolidated basis to the central body and
institutions affiliated to it within the meaning of Article
10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(b) | require the IPS to fulfil the requirements of Section
2 in cooperation with each of its waived members.
For that purpose, any reference in Sections 2 and 3 of
this Chapter to a group shall include a central body and
institutions affiliated to it within the meaning of Article
10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and their
subsidiaries, and any reference to parent undertakings or
institutions that are subject to consolidated supervision
pursuant to Article 111 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall
include the central body.
10. Institutions subject to direct supervision by the
European Central Bank pursuant to Article 6(4) of
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 or constituting a
significant share in the financial system of a Member
State shall draw up their own recovery plans in
accordance with Section 2 of this Chapter and shall be
the subject of individual resolution plans in accordance
with Section 3.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the operations of an
institution shall be considered to constitute a significant
share of that Member States financial system if any of
the following conditions are met:
(a) | the total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 000 000
000; or
(b) | the ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the
Member State of establishment exceeds 20 %, unless the
total value of its assets is below EUR 5 000 000 000.
11. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical
standards to specify uniform formats, templates and
definitions for the identification and transmission of
information by competent authorities and resolution
authorities to EBA for the purposes of paragraph 7,
subject to the principle of proportionality.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical
implementing technical standards referred to in the first
subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of
Section 2
Recovery planning
55
Articolul 5
Planuri de redresare
(1) Statele membre se asigur c fiecare institu ie care nu
este parte a unui grup supus supravegherii consolidate n
temeiul articolelor 111 i 112 din Directiva 2013/36/UE
elaboreaz i menin un plan de redresare care s prevad
msuri ce trebuie luate de instituie pentru restabilirea
poziiei financiare a acesteia n cazul deteriorrii sale
semnificative. Planurile de redresare sunt considerate a fi
principii de guvernan n sensul articolului 74 din Directiva
2013/36/UE.
(2) Autoritile competente se asigur c institu iile i
actualizeaz planurile de redresare cel puin o dat pe an sau
dup orice modificare a structurii lor organizaionale sau
juridice, a activitii sau a situaiei lor financiare care ar
putea avea un efect important asupra planurilor lor de
redresare sau ar putea impune modificarea acestora.
Autoritile competente pot solicita instituiilor s i
actualizeze planurile de redresare mai frecvent.
(3) Planurile de redresare nu trebuie s se bazeze n niciun
fel pe accesul sau acordarea de sprijin financiar public
extraordinar.
(4) Planurile de redresare prevd, dup caz, o analiz a
modului i a momentului n care instituia poate solicita, n
condiiile prevzute n plan, accesul la facilitile oferite de
banca central i identific acele active ce pot fi folosite
drept garanii.
(5) Fr a aduce atingere articolului 4, statele membre se
asigur c planurile de redresare includ informa iile stipulate
n seciunea A din anex. Statele membre pot impune
includerea unor informaii suplimentare n planurile de
redresare.
De asemenea, planurile de redresare includ posibile msuri
care ar putea fi luate de ctre instituie atunci cnd sunt
ntrunite condiiile de la articolul 27 pentru interven ia
timpurie.
(6) Statele membre solicit ca planurile de redresare s
includ condiii i proceduri adecvate pentru a garanta
punerea n aplicare n timp util a msurilor de redresare,
precum i o gam larg de opiuni de redresare. Statele
membre solicit ca planurile de redresare s aib n vedere o
serie de scenarii de criz financiar i macroeconomic
grav, relevante pentru condiiile specifice institu iei, care s
includ evenimente de amploare sistemic i crize specifice
la nivelul persoanelor juridice individuale i la nivelul
grupurilor.
(7) n strns consultare cu Comitetul european pentru riscul
sistemic (CERS), pn la 3 iulie 2015 ABE elaboreaz
orientri n conformitate cu articolul 16 din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1093/2010 care s spcifice evantaiul de scenarii
Article 5
Recovery plans
1. Member States shall ensure that each institution, that
is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision
pursuant to Articles 111 and 112 of Directive
2013/36/EU, draws up and maintains a recovery plan
providing for measures to be taken by the institution to
restore its financial position following a significant
deterioration of its financial situation. Recovery plans
shall be considered to be a governance arrangement
within the meaning of Article 74 of Directive
2013/36/EU.
2. Competent authorities shall ensure that the institutions
update their recovery plans at least annually or after a
change to the legal or organisational structure of the
institution, its business or its financial situation, which
could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change
to, the recovery plan. Competent authorities may require
institutions to update their recovery plans more
frequently.
3. Recovery plans shall not assume any access to or
receipt of extraordinary public financial support.
4. Recovery plans shall include, where applicable, an
analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the
conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central
bank facilities and identify those assets which would be
expected to qualify as collateral.
5. Without prejudice to Article 4, Member States shall
ensure that the recovery plans include the information
listed in Section A of the Annex. Member States may
require that additional information is included in the
recovery plans.
Recovery plans shall also include possible measures
which could be taken by the institution where the
conditions for early intervention under Article 27 are
met.
6. Member States shall require that recovery plans
include appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure
the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as
a wide range of recovery options. Member States shall
require that recovery plans contemplate a range of
scenarios of severe macroeconomic and financial stress
relevant to the institutions specific conditions including
system-wide events and stress specific to individual legal
persons and to groups.
7. EBA, in close cooperation with the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall, by 3 July 2015,
issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to specify further the
56
care trebuie utilizate n sensul alineatului (6) din prezentul

articol.
(8) Statele membre pot prevedea ca autoritile competente
s aib competena de a solicita unei instituii s pstreze
evidene detaliate ale contractelor financiare la care este
parte.
(9) Conducerea instituiei menionate la alineatul (1)
evalueaz i aprob planul de redresare nainte de
transmiterea acestuia ctre autoritatea competent.
(10) ABE elaboreaz proiecte de standarde tehnice de
reglementare care specific, fr a aduce atingere articolului
4, informaiile pe care trebuie s le conin planul de
redresare menionat la alineatul (5) din prezentul articol.
Se deleag Comisiei competena de a adopta standardele
1093/2010.
Articolul 6
Evaluarea planurilor de redresare
(1) Statele membre solicit instituiilor care au obliga ia de a
elabora planuri de redresare n temeiul articolului 5 alineatul
(1) i al articolului 7 alineatul (1) s le transmit autorit ii
competente spre examinare. Statele membre solicit
instituiilor s demonstreze, spre satisfacia autoritii
competente, c planurile de redresare respective ndeplinesc
criteriile de la alineatul (2).
(2) Autoritile competente, n termen de ase luni de la
prezentarea fiecrui plan i dup consultarea autorit ilor
competente ale statelor membre n care sunt situate sucursale
semnificative, n msura n care acest lucru este relevant
pentru sucursala respectiv, examineaz planurile de
redresare i evalueaz msura n care fiecare plan
ndeplinete att cerinele prevzute la articolul 5, ct i
urmtoarele criterii:
(a) | n mod rezonabil, este probabil ca punerea n aplicare a
msurilor propuse n aceste planuri s pstreze sau s
restabileasc viabilitatea i poziia financiar a institu iei sau
a grupului, innd seama de msurile pregtitoare pe care
instituia le-a luat sau a planificat s le ia;
(b) | n mod rezonabil, este probabil ca planul i op iunile
specifice din cadrul acestuia s fie puse n aplicare n mod
rapid i eficient n situaii de criz financiar, evitnd pe ct
posibil vreun efect negativ semnificativ asupra sistemului
financiar, inclusiv n scenariile care ar determina i alte
instituii s pun n aplicare planuri de redresare n aceea i
perioad.
(3) La evaluarea caracterului adecvat al planurilor de
redresare, autoritatea competent ine seama de caracterul
range of scenarios to be used for the purposes of

paragraph 6 of this Article.
8. Member States may provide that competent authorities
have the power to require an institution to maintain
detailed records of financial contracts to which the
institution concerned is a party.
9. The management body of the institution referred to in
paragraph 1 shall assess and approve the recovery plan
before submitting it to the competent authority.
10. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical
standards further specifying, without prejudice to Article
4, the information to be contained in the recovery plan
referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the
Article 6
Assessment of recovery plans
1. Member States shall require institutions that are
required to draw up recovery plans under Article 5(1)
and Article 7(1) to submit those recovery plans to the
competent authority for review. Member States shall
require institutions to demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the competent authority that those plans meet the criteria
of paragraph 2.
2. The competent authorities shall, within six months of
the submission of each plan, and after consulting the
competent authorities of the Member States where
significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to
that branch, review it and assess the extent to which it
satisfies the requirements laid down in Article 5 and the
following criteria:
(a) | the implementation of the arrangements proposed in
the plan is reasonably likely to maintain or restore the
viability and financial position of the institution or of the
group, taking into account the preparatory measures that
the institution has taken or has planned to take;
(b) | the plan and specific options within the plan are
reasonably likely to be implemented quickly and
effectively in situations of financial stress and avoiding
to the maximum extent possible any significant adverse
effect on the financial system, including in scenarios
which would lead other institutions to implement
recovery plans within the same period.
3. When assessing the appropriateness of the recovery
plans, the competent authority shall take into
57
adecvat al structurii de capital i de finanare a instituiei

pentru nivelul de complexitate a structurii organizatorice i
profilul de risc ale instituiei.
(4) Autoritatea competent transmite planul de redresare
autoritii de rezoluie. Autoritatea de rezolu ie poate
examina planul de redresare pentru a identifica dac acesta
conine msuri care ar putea avea un impact negativ asupra
posibilitii de soluionare a instituiei i poate face
recomandri autoritii competente cu privire la aceste
aspecte.
(5) n cazul n care autoritatea competent apreciaz c
planul de redresare prezint deficien e majore sau c exist
obstacole majore n calea punerii sale n aplicare, aceasta
informeaz instituia sau ntreprinderea-mam a grupului n
legtur cu rezultatul evalurii sale i i solicit instituiei s
prezinte, n termen de dou luni, ce poate fi prelungit cu o
lun cu acordul autoritii, un plan revizuit, indicnd modul
n care aceste deficiene sau obstacole au fost abordate.
nainte de a solicita unei instituii s depun din nou un plan
de redresare, autoritatea competent ofer institu iei
posibilitatea prezentrii opiniei sale cu privire la respectiva
cerin.
n cazul n care autoritatea competent nu consider c
deficienele i obstacolele au fost abordate n mod
corespunztor n planul revizuit, aceasta poate impune
instituiei s aduc planului anumite modificri.
(6) n cazul n care instituia nu prezint un plan de redresare
revizuit sau autoritatea competent stabilete c planul de
redresare revizuit nu soluioneaz n mod adecvat
deficienele sau obstacolele poteniale identificate n cadrul
evalurii iniiale i c nu este posibil s se soluioneze n
mod adecvat deficienele sau obstacolele prin impunerea
unor modificri punctuale ale planului, autoritatea
competent solicit instituiei s identifice ntr-un orizont de
timp rezonabil modificrile pe care le poate aduce activit ii
sale economice pentru a soluiona respectivele deficien e sau
obstacole din calea punerii n aplicare a planului de
redresare.
n cazul n care instituia nu identific astfel de modificri n
orizontul de timp stabilit de autoritatea competent sau n
cazul n care autoritatea competent estimeaz c ac iunile
propuse de instituie nu ar soluiona n mod adecvat
deficienele sau obstacolele, autoritatea competent poate
impune instituiei s ia orice msuri pe care le consider
necesare i proporionale, innd seama de gravitatea
deficienelor sau obstacolelor i de efectul msurilor
respective asupra activitii economice a institu iei.
Autoritatea competent poate solicita instituiei, fr a aduce
atingere articolului 104 din Directiva 2013/36/UE,
consideration the appropriateness of the institutions

capital and funding structure to the level of complexity
of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the
institution.
4. The competent authority shall provide the recovery
plan to the resolution authority. The resolution authority
may examine the recovery plan with a view to
identifying any actions in the recovery plan which may
adversely impact the resolvability of the institution and
make recommendations to the competent authority with
regard to those matters.
5. Where the competent authority assesses that there are
material deficiencies in the recovery plan, or material
impediments to its implementation, it shall notify the
institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its
assessment and require the institution to submit, within
two months, extendable with the authorities approval by
one month, a revised plan demonstrating how those
deficiencies or impediments are addressed.
Before requiring an institution to resubmit a recovery
plan the competent authority shall give the institution the
opportunity to state its opinion on that requirement.
Where the competent authority does not consider the
deficiencies and impediments to have been adequately
addressed by the revised plan, it may direct the
institution to make specific changes to the plan.
6. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery
plan, or if the competent authority determines that the
revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the
deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its
original assessment, and it is not possible to adequately
remedy the deficiencies or impediments through a
direction to make specific changes to the plan, the
competent authority shall require the institution to
identify within a reasonable timeframe changes it can
make to its business in order to address the deficiencies
in or impediments to the implementation of the recovery
plan.
If the institution fails to identify such changes within the
timeframe set by the competent authority, or if the
competent authority assesses that the actions proposed by
the institution would not adequately address the
deficiencies or impediments, the competent authority
may direct the institution to take any measures it
considers to be necessary and proportionate, taking into
account the seriousness of the deficiencies and
impediments and the effect of the measures on the
institutions business.
The competent authority may, without prejudice to
Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU, direct the
58
urmtoarele:
(a) | reducerea profilului de risc al instituiei, inclusiv al
riscului de lichiditate;
(b) | aplicarea de msuri de recapitalizare n timp util;
(c) | revizuirea strategiei i structurii instituiei;
(d) | efectuarea de modificri n strategia de finan are, pentru
mbuntirea rezilienei liniilor de activitate eseniale i a
funciilor critice;
(e) | efectuarea de modificri n structura de guvernan a
instituiei.
Lista de msuri menionat n prezentul alineat nu mpiedic
statele membre s autorizeze autoritile competente s ia
msuri suplimentare n temeiul dreptului intern.
(7) Atunci cnd o autoritate competent solicit unei
instituii s ia msuri n conformitate cu alineatul (6), decizia
sa cu privire la aceste msuri este justificat i propor ional.
Decizia se notific n scris instituiei i se supune dreptului la
recurs.
reglementare, preciznd criteriile minime pe care autoritatea
competent trebuie s le examineze n vederea evalurii
menionate la alineatul (2) din prezentul articol i la articolul
8 alineatul (1).
1093/2010.
Articolul 7
Planuri de redresare a grupului
(1) Statele membre se asigur c ntreprinderile-mam din
Uniune elaboreaz i nainteaz supraveghetorului
consolidant un plan de redresare a grupului. Planurile de
redresare a grupului constau ntr-un plan de redresare
destinat grupului n ansamblul su, n frunte cu
ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune. Planul de redresare a
grupului identific msuri a cror implementare poate fi
necesar la nivelul ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune i la
nivelul fiecrei filiale n parte.
(2) n conformitate cu articolul 8, autoritile competente pot
solicita filialelor s elaboreze i s nainteze planuri de
redresare pe baz individual.
(3) Supraveghetorul consolidant, cu condiia instituirii
cerinelor de confidenialitate prevzute n prezenta
directiv, transmite planurile de redresare a grupului:
(a) | autoritilor competente elevante menionate la
articolele 115 i 116 din Directiva 2013/36/UE;
(b) | autoritilor competente ale statelor membre n care sunt
institution to:
(a) | reduce the risk profile of the institution, including
liquidity risk;
(b) | enable timely recapitalisation measures;
(c) | review the institutions strategy and structure;
(d) | make changes to the funding strategy so as to
improve the resilience of the core business lines and
critical functions;
(e) | make changes to the governance structure of the
institution.
The list of measures referred to in this paragraph does
not preclude Member States from authorising competent
authorities to take additional measures under national
law.
7. When the competent authority requires an institution
to take measures according to paragraph 6, its decision
on the measures shall be reasoned and proportionate.
The decision shall be notified in writing to the institution
and subject to a right of appeal.
8. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards
specifying the minimum criteria that the competent
authority is to assess for the purposes of the assessment
of paragraph 2 of this Article and of Article 8(1).
Article 7
Group recovery plans
1. Member States shall ensure that Union parent
undertakings draw up and submit to the consolidating
supervisor a group recovery plan. Group recovery plans
shall consist of a recovery plan for the group headed by
the Union parent undertaking as a whole. The group
recovery plan shall identify measures that may be
required to be implemented at the level of the Union
parent undertaking and each individual subsidiary.
2. In accordance with Article 8, competent authorities
may require subsidiaries to draw up and submit recovery
plans on an individual basis.
3. The consolidating supervisor shall, provided that the
confidentiality requirements laid down in this Directive
are in place, transmit the group recovery plans to:
(a) | the relevant competent authorities referred to in
Articles 115 and 116 of Directive 2013/36/EU;
(b) | the competent authorities of the Member States
59
situate sucursale semnificative, n msura n care acest lucru

este relevant pentru sucursala respectiv;
(c) | autoritii de rezoluie a grupului; i
(d) | autoritilor de rezoluie ale filialelor.
(4) Planul de redresare a grupului urmre te stabilizarea
grupului n ansamblu sau stabilizarea unei instituii din grup,
atunci cnd aceasta se afl n criz, astfel nct s solu ioneze
sau s elimine cauzele dificultii i s restabileasc pozi ia
financiar a grupului sau a instituiei n cauz, innd seama
n acelai timp de poziia financiar a altor entit i ale
grupului.
Planul de redresare a grupului include dispoziii menite s
asigure coordonarea i consecvena msurilor care se iau la
nivelul ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune, la nivelul entit ilor
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) i (d),
precum i a msurilor care se iau la nivelul filialelor i, dup
caz, n conformitate cu Directiva 2013/36/UE la nivelul
sucursalelor semnificative.
(5) Planul de redresare a grupului i orice plan elaborat
pentru o filial individual include elementele menionate la
articolul 5. Planurile respective includ, dup caz, dispozi ii
privind un sprijin financiar intragrup, adoptat n conformitate
cu un acord privind sprijinul financiar intragrup ncheiat n
temeiul prevederilor capitolului III.
(6) Planurile de redresare a grupului includ o serie de op iuni
de redresare, stabilind msuri viznd soluionarea scenariilor
menionate la articolul 5 alineatul (6).
n cazul fiecrui scenariu, planul de redresare a grupului
identific eventualele obstacole aflate n calea punerii n
aplicare a msurilor de redresare n cadrul grupului, inclusiv
la nivelul entitilor individuale prevzute n plan, i
eventualele obstacole majore de natur juridic sau practic
aflate n calea transferului prompt de fonduri proprii sau a
rambursrii rapide a datoriilor ori activelor n cadrul
grupului.
(7) Organul de conducere al entitii ce elaboreaz planul de
redresare al grupului n temeiul alineatului (1) evalueaz i
aprob planul de redresare a grupului nainte de prezentarea
acestuia ctre supraveghetorul consolidant.
Articolul 8
Evaluarea planurilor de redresare a grupurilor
(1) Supraveghetorul consolidant, mpreun cu autorit ile
competente ale filialelor, n urma unei consultri cu
autoritile competente menionate la articolul 116 din
Directiva 2013/36/UE i cu autoritile competente ale
sucursalelor semnificative n msura n care este relevant
pentru sucursala semnificativ, examineaz planul de
redresare a grupului i evalueaz msura n care acesta
where significant branches are located insofar as is

relevant to that branch;
(c) | the group- level resolution authority; and
(d) | the resolution authorities of subsidiaries.
4. The group recovery plan shall aim to achieve the
stabilisation of the group as a whole, or any institution of
the group, when it is in a situation of stress so as to
address or remove the causes of the distress and restore
the financial position of the group or the institution in
question, at the same time taking into account the
financial position of other group entities.
The group recovery plan shall include arrangements to
ensure the coordination and consistency of measures to
be taken at the level of the Union parent undertaking, at
the level of the entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of
Article 1(1) as well as measures to be taken at the level
of subsidiaries and, where applicable, in accordance with
Directive 2013/36/EU at the level of significant
branches.
5. The group recovery plan, and any plan drawn up for
an individual subsidiary, shall include the elements
specified in Article 5. Those plans shall include, where
applicable, arrangements for intra-group financial
support adopted pursuant to an agreement for intra-group
financial support that has been concluded in accordance
with Chapter III.
6. Group recovery plans shall include a range of recovery
options setting out actions to address those scenarios
provided for in Article 5(6).
For each of the scenarios, the group recovery plan shall
identify whether there are obstacles to the
implementation of recovery measures within the group,
including at the level of individual entities covered by
the plan, and whether there are substantial practical or
legal impediments to the prompt transfer of own funds or
the repayment of liabilities or assets within the group.
7. The management body of the entity drawing up the
group recovery plan pursuant to paragraph 1 shall assess
and approve the group recovery plan before submitting it
to the consolidating supervisor.
Article 8
Assessment of group recovery plans
1. The consolidating supervisor shall, together with the
competent authorities of subsidiaries, after consulting the
competent authorities referred to in Article 116 of
Directive 2013/36/EU and with the competent authorities
of significant branches insofar as is relevant to the
significant branch, review the group recovery plan and
assess the extent to which it satisfies the requirements
60
ndeplinete cerinele i criteriile prevzute la articolele 6 i

7. Aceast evaluare se efectueaz n conformitate cu
procedurile stabilite la articolul 6 i cu prezentul articol i
ine seama de impactul potenial al msurilor de redresare
asupra stabilitii financiare n toate statele membre n care
grupul opereaz.
(2) Supraveghetorul consolidant i autoritile competente
ale filialelor depun toate eforturile s ajung la o decizie
comun cu privire la:
(a) | examinarea i evaluarea planului de redresare a
grupului;
(b) | elaborarea sau nu a unui plan de redresare pe baz
individual pentru instituiile care fac parte din grup; i
(c) | aplicarea msurilor menionate la articolul 6 alineatele
(5) i (6).
Prile depun toate eforturile pentru a ajunge la o decizie
comun n termen de patru luni de la data transmiterii de
ctre supraveghetorul consolidant a planului de redresare a
grupului, n conformitate cu articolul 7 alineatul (3).
ABE poate, la cererea unei autoriti competente, s acorde
asisten autoritilor competente, pentru obinerea unei
decizii comune n conformitate cu articolul 31 litera (c) din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(3) n absena unei decizii comune luate de autorit ile
competente, n termen de patru luni de la data transmiterii,
cu privire la examinarea i evaluarea planului de redresare a
grupului sau la orice msuri pe care ntreprinderea-mam din
Uniune are obligaia s le ia n conformitate cu articolul 6
alineatele (5) i (6), supraveghetorul consolidant ia propria
decizie n ceea ce privete aceste chestiuni. Supraveghetorul
consolidant adopt decizia innd cont de opiniile i
rezervele celorlalte autoriti competente, exprimate n
termenul de patru luni. Supraveghetorul consolidant notific
decizia ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune i celorlalte
autoriti competente.
Dac, pn la finalul respectivei perioade de patru luni,
oricare dintre autoritile competente menionate la alineatul
(2) a adus n atenia ABE o problem menionat la alineatul
(7), n conformitate cu articolul 19 din Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 1093/2010, supraveghetorul consolidant i amn decizia
i ateapt decizia luat de ABE n conformitate cu articolul
19 alineatul (3) din regulamentul menionat, adoptnd
ulterior propria sa decizie n conformitate cu decizia ABE.
Perioada de patru luni este considerat a fi perioada de
conciliere n nelesul regulamentului menionat. ABE adopt
propria decizie n termen de o lun. Problema nu poate fi
adus n atenia ABE dup expirarea perioadei de patru luni
sau dup ce s-a ajuns la o decizie comun. n absena unei
decizii a ABE n termen de o lun, se aplic decizia
and criteria laid down in Articles 6 and 7. That

assessment shall be made in accordance with the
procedure established in Article 6 and with this Article
and shall take into account the potential impact of the
recovery measures on financial stability in all the
Member States where the group operates.
2. The consolidating supervisor and the competent
authorities of subsidiaries shall endeavour to reach a
joint decision on:
(a) | the review and assessment of the group recovery
plan;
(b) | whether a recovery plan on an individual basis shall
be drawn up for institutions that are part of the group;
and
(c) | the application of the measures referred to in Article
6(5) and (6).
The parties shall endeavour to reach a joint decision
within four months of the date of the transmission by the
consolidating supervisor of the group recovery plan in
accordance with Article 7(3).
EBA may, at the request of a competent authority, assist
the competent authorities in reaching a joint decision in
accordance with Article 31(c) of Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010.
3. In the absence of a joint decision between the
competent authorities, within four months of the date of
transmission, on the review and assessment of the group
recovery plan or on any measures the Union parent
undertaking is required to take in accordance with Article
6(5) and (6), the consolidating supervisor shall make its
own decision with regard to those matters. The
consolidating supervisor shall make its decision having
taken into account the views and reservations of the other
competent authorities expressed during the four-month
period. The consolidating supervisor shall notify the
decision to the Union parent undertaking and to the other
competent authorities.
If, at the end of that four-month period, any of the
competent authorities referred to in paragraph 2 has
referred a matter mentioned in paragraph 7 to EBA in
1093/2010, the consolidating supervisor shall defer its
decision and await any decision that EBA may take in
accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation, and
shall take its decision in accordance with the decision of
EBA. The four-month period shall be deemed to be the
conciliation period within the meaning of the Regulation.
EBA shall take its decision within one month. The matter
shall not be referred to EBA after the end of the fourmonth period or after a joint decision has been reached.
In the absence of an EBA decision within one month, the
61
supraveghetorului consolidant.
(4) n absena unei decizii comune ntre autorit ile
competente n termen de patru luni de la data transmiterii, cu
privire la:
(a) | elaborarea sau nu a unui plan de redresare pe baz
individual pentru instituiile aflate sub jurisdicia sa; sau
(b) | aplicarea la nivel de filial a msurilor men ionate la
articolul 6 alineatele (5) i (6);
fiecare autoritate competent ia propria sa decizie cu privire
la acest aspect.
Dac, pn la finalul perioadei de patru luni, oricare dintre
autoritile competente implicate a adus n atenia ABE o
problem menionat la alineatul (7), n conformitate cu
articolul 19 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010,
autoritatea competent a filialei i amn decizia i ateapt
decizia luat de ABE n conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul
(3) din regulamentul menionat, adoptnd ulterior propria sa
decizie n conformitate cu decizia ABE. Perioada de patru
luni este considerat a fi perioada de conciliere n n elesul
regulamentului menionat. ABE adopt propria decizie n
termen de o lun. Problema nu poate fi adus n atenia ABE
dup expirarea perioadei de patru luni sau dup ce s-a ajuns
la o decizie comun. n absena unei decizii a ABE n termen
de o lun, se aplic decizia autoritii competente
responsabile pentru filial la nivel individual.
(5) Celelalte autoriti competente ntre care nu exist un

dezacord n conformitate cu alineatul (4) pot ajunge la o
decizie comun privind planul de redresare a grupului care
acoper entitile din grup aflate sub jurisdiciile lor.
(6) Decizia comun menionat la alineatul (2) sau (5),
precum i deciziile adoptate de autoritile competente n
absena deciziei comune menionate la alineatele (3) i (4)
sunt recunoscute ca fiind definitive i sunt aplicate de ctre
autoritile competente din statele membre n cauz.
(7) La solicitarea unei autoriti competente n conformitate
cu alineatul (3) sau (4), ABE poate doar s acorde asisten
autoritilor competente pentru ajungerea la un acord n
conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1093/2010 referitor la evaluarea planurilor de
redresare i la punerea n aplicare a msurilor prevzute la
articolul 6 alineatul (6) literele (a), (b) i (d).
Articolul 9
Indicatorii planului de redresare
(1) n sensul articolelor 5-8, autoritile competente solicit
ca fiecare plan de redresare s includ un cadru de indicatori,
stabilit de instituie, care identific etapele n care pot fi luate
msurile corespunztoare menionate n plan. Aceti
decision of the consolidating supervisor shall apply.

competent authorities within four months of the date of
transmission on:
(a) | whether a recovery plan on an individual basis is to
be drawn up for the institutions under its jurisdiction; or
(b) | the application at subsidiary level of the measures
referred to in Article 6(5) and (6);
each competent authority shall make its own decision on
that matter.
If, at the end of the four-month period, any of the
competent authorities concerned has referred a matter
mentioned in paragraph 7 to EBA in accordance with
Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the
competent authority of the subsidiary shall defer its
decision and await any decision that EBA may take in
conciliation period within the meaning of that
Regulation. EBA shall take its decision within one
month. The matter shall not be referred to EBA after the
end of the four-month period or after a joint decision has
been reached. In the absence of an EBA decision within
one month, the decision of the competent authority
responsible for the subsidiary at an individual level shall
apply.
5. The other competent authorities which do not disagree
under paragraph 4 may reach a joint decision on a group
recovery plan covering group entities under their
jurisdictions.
6. The joint decision referred to in paragraph 2 or 5 and
the decisions taken by the competent authorities in the
absence of a joint decision referred to in paragraphs 3
and 4 shall be recognised as conclusive and applied by
the competent authorities in the Member States
concerned.
7. Upon request of a competent authority in accordance
with paragraph 3 or 4, EBA may only assist the
competent authorities in reaching an agreement in
1093/2010 in relation to the assessment of recovery plans
and implementation of the measures of point (a), (b) and
(d) of Article 6(6).
Article 9
Recovery Plan Indicators
1. For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent
authorities shall require that each recovery plan includes
a framework of indicators established by the institution
which identifies the points at which appropriate actions
62
indicatori sunt agreai de ctre autoritile competente atunci

cnd evalueaz planurile de redresare n conformitate cu
articolele 6 i 8. Indicatorii pot fi calitativi sau cantitativi n
ceea ce privete poziia financiar a institu iei, i pot fi
monitorizai cu uurin. Autoritile competente se asigur
c instituiile pun n aplicare dispozi ii adecvate pentru
monitorizarea periodic a indicatorilor.
Fr a aduce atingere primului paragraf, o institu ie poate:

(a) | s ia msuri pe baza planului su de redresare n cazul n
care indicatorul relevant nu a fost respectat, ns numai
atunci cnd conducerea instituiei consider c acest lucru
este adecvat n condiiile date; sau
(b) | s nu ia o astfel de msur n cazul n care conducerea
instituiei consider c acest lucru nu este adecvat n
condiiile date.
Decizia de a lua o msur prevzut n planul de redresare
sau decizia de a nu lua o astfel de msur este notificat fr
ntrziere autoritii competente.
(2) Pn la 3 iulie 2015, ABE elaboreaz orientri n
1093/2010 prin care specific lista minim a indicatorilor
calitativi i cantitativi menionai la alineatul (1).
Seciunea 3
Planificarea rezoluiei
Articolul 10
Planuri de rezoluie
(1) Autoritatea de rezoluie, dup consultarea autorit ii
competente, precum i dup consultarea cu autoritile de
rezoluie din jurisdiciile n care sunt situate sucursale
semnificative n msura n care este relevant pentru
sucursala semnificativ, elaboreaz un plan de rezolu ie
pentru fiecare instituie care nu face parte dintr-un grup
supus supravegherii consolidate n conformitate cu articolele
111 i 112 din Directiva 2013/36/UE. Planul de rezoluie
prevede msurile de rezoluie pe care autoritatea de rezolu ie
ar putea s le ntreprind atunci cnd instituia ndepline te
condiiile de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie.
Informaiile prevzute la alineatul (7) litera (a) se comunic
instituiei n cauz.
(2) n elaborarea planului de rezoluie, autoritatea de
rezoluie identific obstacolele majore n calea posibilit ii
de soluionare i, dac este necesar i proporionat, prevede
msuri relevante pentru soluionarea respectivelor obstacole
n conformitate cu capitolul II din prezentul titlu.
(3) Planul de rezoluie ia n considerare scenarii relevante,
prevznd inclusiv posibilitatea ca intrarea n dificultate s
referred to in the plan may be taken. Such indicators

shall be agreed by competent authorities when making
the assessment of recovery plans in accordance with
Articles 6 and 8. The indicators may be of a qualitative
or quantitative nature relating to the institutions
financial position and shall be capable of being
monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that
institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the
regular monitoring of the indicators.
Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, an institution
may:
(a) | take action under its recovery plan where the
relevant indicator has not been met, but where the
management body of the institution considers it to be
appropriate in the circumstances; or
(b) | refrain from taking such an action where the
management body of the institution does not consider it
to be appropriate in the circumstances of the situation.
A decision to take an action referred to in the recovery
plan or a decision to refrain from taking such an action
shall be notified to the competent authority without
delay.
1093/2010 to specify the minimum list of qualitative and
quantitative indicators as referred to in paragraph 1.
Section 3
Resolution planning
Article 10
Resolution plans
1. The resolution authority, after consulting the
competent authority and after consulting the resolution
authorities of the jurisdictions in which any significant
branches are located insofar as is relevant to the
significant branch shall draw up a resolution plan for
each institution that is not part of a group subject to
consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 111 and
112 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The resolution plan shall
provide for the resolution actions which the resolution
authority may take where the institution meets the
conditions for resolution. Information referred to
paragraph 7(a) shall be disclosed to the institution
concerned.
2. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution
authority shall identify any material impediments to
resolvability and, where necessary and proportionate,
outline relevant actions for how those impediments could
be addressed, according to Chapter II of this Title.
3. The resolution plan shall take into consideration
relevant scenarios including that the event of failure may
63
se datoreze unor circumstane particulare i individuale sau

s survin pe fondul unei instabiliti financiare extinse sau
al unor evenimente sistemice. Planul de rezolu ie nu trebuie
s se bazeze pe niciuna dintre urmtoarele:
(a) | orice sprijin financiar public extraordinar pe lng
utilizarea mecanismelor de finanare instituite n
conformitate cu articolul 100;
(b) | orice asisten privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen
din partea bncii centrale; sau
(c) | orice asisten privind lichiditatea din partea bncii
centrale furnizat cu garanii, rate ale dobnzilor sau durate
non-standard.
(4) Planul de rezoluie include o analiz a modului i a
momentului n care instituia poate solicita, n condi iile
prevzute n plan, accesul la facilit ile oferite de banca
central i identific acele active ce pot fi folosite drept
garanii.
(5) Autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita instituiilor s le
ofere asisten la elaborarea i actualizarea planurilor.
(6) Planul de rezoluie al instituiei este reexaminat i, dup
caz, actualizat cel puin o dat pe an i dup orice modificare
important a structurii organizaionale sau juridice, a
activitii economice sau a poziiei financiare a institu iei
care ar putea avea un efect semnificativ asupra eficacit ii
respectivului plan sau care ar impune o modificare a planului
de rezoluie.
n scopul examinrii sau actualizrii planurilor de rezolu ie
n conformitate cu primul paragraf, institu iile i autorit ile
competente comunic prompt autoritilor de rezolu ie orice
modificare care impune o astfel de examinare sau actualizare
a planului.
(7) Fr a aduce atingere articolului 4, planul de rezolu ie
stabilete opiuni de aplicare asupra instituiei a
instrumentelor i competenelor de rezoluie men ionate n
titlul IV. Acesta cuprinde, cuantificat de cte ori este necesar
i posibil:
(a) | un rezumat al elementelor-cheie ale planului;
(b) | un rezumat al modificrilor importante survenite n
cadrul instituiei ulterior transmiterii ultimelor informa ii
referitoare la rezoluie;
(c) | o demonstraie a modului n care funciile critice i
liniile de activitate eseniale ar putea fi separate de alte
funcii, din punct de vedere juridic i economic, n msura
necesar asigurrii continuitii acestora n cazul intrrii n
dificultate a instituiei;
(d) | o estimare a calendarului punerii n aplicare a fiecrui
aspect important al planului;
(e) | o descriere detaliat a evalurii posibilitilor de
soluionare, efectuat n conformitate cu alineatul (2) din
prezentul articol i articolul 15;
be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader

financial instability or system wide events. The
resolution plan shall not assume any of the following:
(a) | any extraordinary public financial support besides
the use of the financing arrangements established in
accordance with Article 100;
(b) | any central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or
(c) | any central bank liquidity assistance provided under
non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate
terms.
4. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how
and when an institution may apply, in the conditions
addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank
facilities and shall identify those assets which would be
expected to qualify as collateral.
5. Resolution authorities may require institutions to assist
them in the drawing up and updating of the plans.
6. Resolution plans shall be reviewed, and where
appropriate updated, at least annually and after any
material changes to the legal or organisational structure
of the institution or to its business or its financial
position that could have a material effect on the
effectiveness of the plan or otherwise necessitates a
revision of the resolution plan.
For the purpose of the revision or update of the
resolution plans referred to in the first subparagraph, the
institutions and the competent authorities shall promptly
communicate to the resolution authorities any change
that necessitates such a revision or update.
7. Without prejudice to Article 4, the resolution plan shall
set out options for applying the resolution tools and
resolution powers referred to in Title IV to the institution.
It shall include, quantified whenever appropriate and
possible:
(a) | a summary of the key elements of the plan;
(b) | a summary of the material changes to the institution
that have occurred after the latest resolution information
was filed;
(c) | a demonstration of how critical functions and core
business lines could be legally and economically
separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions
so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the
institution;
(d) | an estimation of the timeframe for executing each
material aspect of the plan;
(e) | a detailed description of the assessment of
resolvability carried out in accordance with paragraph 2
of this Article and with Article 15;
64
(f) | o descriere a tuturor msurilor necesare conform

articolului 17 pentru a aborda sau nltura obstacolele din
calea posibilitilor de soluionare, identificate n urma
evalurii efectuate n conformitate cu articolul 15;
(g) | o descriere a proceselor de stabilire a valorii i
tranzacionabilitii funciilor critice, a liniilor de activitate
eseniale i a activelor instituiei;
(h) | o descriere detaliat a msurilor destinate garantrii
faptului c informaiile solicitate n conformitate cu articolul
11 sunt actualizate i puse la dispoziia autoritilor de
rezoluie n orice moment;
(i) | explicarea, de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie, a modului n
care pot fi finanate opiunile de rezoluie fr recurgerea la
oricare dintre urmtoarele: | (i) | niciun fel de sprijin
financiar public extraordinar, n afara utilizrii mecanismelor
de finanare instituite n conformitate cu articolul 100; | (ii) |
asisten privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen din partea
bncii centrale; sau | (iii) | asisten privind lichiditatea din
partea bncii centrale furnizat cu garanii, rate ale
dobnzilor sau durate non-standard;
(j) | o descriere detaliat a diferitelor strategii de rezolu ie
care ar putea fi aplicate, n funcie de diferitele scenarii
posibile i termenele aplicabile;
(k) | o descriere a interdependenelor critice;
(l) | o descriere a opiunilor care ar permite men inerea
accesului la serviciile de pli i de compensare i o evaluare
a portabilitii poziiilor clientului;
(m) | o analiz a impactului planului asupra angaja ilor
instituiei, inclusiv o evaluare a oricror costuri asociate i o
descriere a procedurilor vizate pentru consultarea
personalului n cursul procesului de rezolu ie, innd seama
de sistemele naionale de dialog cu partenerii sociali, dup
caz;
(n) | un plan de comunicare cu mass-media i cu publicul;
(o) | cerina minim de fonduri proprii i pasive eligibile
necesare n temeiul articolului 45 alineatul (1) i, dup caz,
termenul n care trebuie s se ajung la acest nivel;
(p) | acolo unde este cazul, cerina minim de fonduri proprii
i instrumente contractuale de recapitalizare intern, n
temeiul articolului 45 alineatul (1) i, dup caz, termenul n
care trebuie s se ajung la acest nivel;
(q) | o descriere a operaiunilor i a sistemelor esen iale
pentru a menine funcionarea continu a proceselor
operaionale ale instituiei;
(r) | dup caz, orice opinie exprimat de instituie cu privire
la planul de rezoluie.
(8) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie au
competena de a solicita unei instituii i unei entiti
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) sau (d)
(f) | a description of any measures required pursuant to

Article 17 to address or remove impediments to
resolvability identified as a result of the assessment
carried out in accordance with Article 15;
(g) | a description of the processes for determining the
value and marketability of the critical functions, core
business lines and assets of the institution;
(h) | a detailed description of the arrangements for
ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article
11 is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution
authorities at all times;
(i) | an explanation by the resolution authority as to how
the resolution options could be financed without the
assumption of any of the following: | (i) | any
extraordinary public financial support besides the use of
the financing arrangements established in accordance
with Article 100; | (ii) | any central bank emergency
liquidity assistance; or | (iii) | any central bank liquidity
assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation,
tenor and interest rate terms;
(j) | a detailed description of the different resolution
strategies that could be applied according to the different
possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;
(k) | a description of critical interdependencies;
(l) | a description of options for preserving access to
payments and clearing services and other infrastructures
and, an assessment of the portability of client positions;
(m) | an analysis of the impact of the plan on the
employees of the institution, including an assessment of
any associated costs, and a description of envisaged
procedures to consult staff during the resolution process,
taking into account national systems for dialogue with
social partners where applicable;
(n) | a plan for communicating with the media and the
public;
(o) | the minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 45(1) and
a deadline to reach that level, where applicable;
(p) | where applicable, the minimum requirement for own
funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to
Article 45(1), and a deadline to reach that level, where
applicable;
(q) | a description of essential operations and systems for
maintaining the continuous functioning of the
institutions operational processes;
(r) | where applicable, any opinion expressed by the
institution in relation to the resolution plan.
8. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities
have the power to require an institution and an entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to
65
s pstreze o eviden detaliat a contractelor financiare la

care aceasta este parte. Autoritatea de rezolu ie poate
specifica un termen n care instituia sau entitatea men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) sau (d) trebuie s
furnizeze respectivele evidene. Acela i termen se aplic
tuturor instituiilor i tuturor entitilor menionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d) aflate sub
jurisdicia sa. Autoritatea de rezoluie poate decide s
stabileasc termene diferite pentru diferitele tipuri de
contracte financiare menionate la articolul 2 punctul 100.
Prezentul alineat nu aduce atingere competen elor de
colectare a informaiilor ale autoritii competente.
(9) ABE, dup consultarea cu CERS, elaboreaz proiecte de
standarde tehnice de reglementare detaliate, specificnd
coninutul planului de redresare.
tehnice de reglementare menionate la primul paragraf, n
1093/2010.
Articolul 11
Informaii de furnizat pentru planurile de rezolu ie i
cooperarea din partea instituiei
competena de a solicita instituiilor:
(a) | s coopereze att ct este necesar la elaborarea
planurilor de rezoluie;
(b) | s furnizeze, fie direct, fie prin intermediul autorit ii
competente, toate informaiile necesare elaborrii i punerii
n aplicare a planurilor de rezoluie.
Mai exact, autoritile de rezoluie au competen a de a
solicita, printre altele, informaiile i analiza men ionate n
seciunea B din anex.
(2) Autoritile competente din statele membre relevante
coopereaz cu autoritile de rezoluie pentru a verifica n ce
msur informaiile menionate la alineatul (1) sunt deja
disponibile, n ntregime sau n parte. n cazul n care ele
sunt disponibile, autoritile competente furnizeaz aceste
informaii autoritilor de rezoluie.
(3) ABE elaboreaz proiectele de standarde tehnice pentru a
specifica procedurile de punere n aplicare referitoare la
proceduri i un set minim de formulare i modele tip pentru
furnizarea informaiilor n temeiul prezentului articol.
maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which

it is a party. The resolution authority may specify a timelimit within which the institution or entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is to be capable of
producing those records. The same time-limit shall apply
to all institutions and all entities referred to in point (b),
(c) and (d) of Article 1(1) under its jurisdiction. The
resolution authority may decide to set different timelimits for different types of financial contracts as referred
to in Article 2(100). This paragraph shall not affect the
information gathering powers of the competent authority.
9. EBA, after consulting the ESRB, shall develop draft
regulatory technical standards further specifying the
contents of the resolution plan.
Article 11
Information for the purpose of resolution plans and
cooperation from the institution
have the power to require institutions to:
(a) | cooperate as much as necessary in the drawing up of
resolution plans;
(b) | provide them, either directly or through the
competent authority, with all of the information
necessary to draw up and implement resolution plans.
In particular the resolution authorities shall have the
power to require, among other information, the
information and analysis specified in Section B of the
Annex.
2. Competent authorities in the relevant Member States
shall cooperate with resolution authorities in order to
verify whether some or all of the information referred to
in paragraph 1 is already available. Where such
information is available, competent authorities shall
provide that information to the resolution authorities.
standards to specify procedures and a minimum set of
standard forms and templates for the provision of
information under this Article.
66
1093/2010.
Articolul 12
Planuri de rezoluie a grupului
(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezolu ie a
grupului, mpreun cu autoritile de rezoluie ale filialelor i
n urma consultrii cu autoritile de rezoluie ale
sucursalelor semnificative n msura n care acest lucru este
relevant pentru sucursala semnificativ, elaboreaz planuri
de rezoluie a grupului. Planurile de rezoluie a grupului
includ un plan de rezoluie a grupului condus de
ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune per ansamblu, fie prin
rezoluie la nivelul ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune, fir prin
separare i rezoluie la nivelul filialelor. Acest plan de
rezoluie a grupului identific msurile necesare pentru
rezoluia:
(a) | ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune;
(b) | filialelor ce fac parte din grup i sunt situate n Uniune;
(c) | entitilor menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele
(c) i (d); i
(d) | conform titlului VI, a filialelor ce fac parte din grup i
sunt situate n afara Uniunii.
(2) Planul de rezoluie a grupului trebuie s fie elaborat pe
baza informaiilor furnizate n conformitate cu articolul 11.
(3) Planul de rezoluie a grupului:
(a) | stabilete msurile de rezoluie care urmeaz a fi luate n
cadrul scenariilor prevzute la articolul 10 alineatul (3),
pentru toate entitile din grup, att prin intermediul
msurilor de rezoluie luate cu privire la entitile men ionate
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d), la
ntreprinderea-mam i la instituiile-filiale, ct i prin
intermediul unor msuri de rezoluie coordonate referitoare
la instituiile-filiale;
(b) | examineaz msura n care instrumentele i
competenele de rezoluie ar putea fi aplicate i exercitate n
mod coordonat n cazul entitilor din grup stabilite n
Uniune, inclusiv msurile viznd facilitarea achizi ionrii de
ctre o ter parte a grupului n ansamblu, a unor linii de
activitate separate sau a unor activit i realizate fie de mai
multe entiti din grup, fie doar de unele dintre acestea, i s
identifice eventualele obstacole din calea unei rezolu ii
coordonate;
(c) | n cazul grupurilor care conin entit i constituite n ri
tere, identific modalitile adecvate de cooperare i de
coordonare cu autoritile relevante ale respectivelor ri
tere i implicaiile pentru rezoluia n cadrul Uniunii.
(d) | identific msurile necesare, inclusiv separarea din
punct de vedere juridic i economic a anumitor funcii sau
liniile de activitate, pentru a facilita rezolu ia grupului,

Article 12
Group resolution plans
1. Member States shall ensure that group-level resolution
authorities, together with the resolution authorities of
subsidiaries and after consulting the resolution
authorities of significant branches insofar as is relevant
to the significant branch, draw up group resolution plans.
Group resolution plans shall include a plan for resolution
of the group headed by the Union parent undertaking as a
whole, either through resolution at the level of the Union
parent undertaking or through break up and resolution of
the subsidiaries. The group resolution plan shall identify
measures for the resolution of:
(a) | the Union parent undertaking;
(b) | the subsidiaries that are part of the group and that
are located in the Union;
(c) | the entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article
1(1); and
(d) | subject to Title VI, the subsidiaries that are part of
the group and that are located outside the Union.
2. The group resolution plan shall be drawn up on the
basis of the information provided pursuant to Article 11.
3. The group resolution plan shall:
(a) | set out the resolution actions to be taken in relation
to group entities, both through resolution actions in
respect of the entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d)
of Article 1(1), the parent undertaking and subsidiary
institutions and through coordinated resolution actions in
respect of subsidiary institutions, in the scenarios
provided for in Article 10(3);
(b) | examine the extent to which the resolution tools and
powers could be applied and exercised in a coordinated
way to group entities established in the Union, including
measures to facilitate the purchase by a third party of the
group as a whole, or separate business lines or activities
that are delivered by a number of group entities, or
particular group entities, and identify any potential
impediments to a coordinated resolution;
(c) | where a group includes entities incorporated in third
countries, identify appropriate arrangements for
cooperation and coordination with the relevant
authorities of those third countries and the implications
for resolution within the Union;
(d) | identify measures, including the legal and economic
separation of particular functions or business lines, that
are necessary to facilitate group resolution when the
67
atunci cnd sunt ndeplinite condiiile de declanare a

procedurii de rezoluie;
(e) | stabilete msuri suplimentare, care nu sunt prevzute n
prezenta directiv i pe care autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel
de grup intenioneaz s le aplice pentru rezoluia grupului;
(f) | identific modul n care ar putea fi finan ate msurile de
rezoluie a grupului i n cazul n care ar fi necesare
mecanisme de finanare, definete principii de partajare a
responsabilitii pentru respectiva finanare ntre surse de
finanare din diferite state membre. Planul nu trebuie s se
bazeze pe niciuna dintre urmtoarele: | (i) | orice fel de
sprijin financiar public extraordinar, n afara utilizrii
mecanismelor de finanare instituite n conformitate cu
articolul 100; | (ii) | orice asisten privind lichiditatea n
situaii de urgen din partea bncii centrale; sau | (iii) | orice
asisten privind lichiditatea din partea bncii centrale
funizat cu garanii, rate ale dobnzilor sau durate nonstandard.
Principiile respective sunt definite pe baza unor criterii
echitabile i echilibrate i iau n considerare n special
articolul 107 alineatul (5) i impactul asupra stabilitii
financiare n toate statele membre vizate.
(4) Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare a grupului n
temeiul articolului 16 se realizeaz concomitent cu
elaborarea i actualizarea planului de rezoluie a grupului n
conformitate cu prezentul articol. n planul de rezoluie a
grupului se include o descriere detaliat a evalurii
posibilitilor de soluionare, efectuat n conformitate cu
articolul 16.
(5) Planul de rezoluie a grupului nu are un impact
disproporionat asupra niciunui stat membru.
(6) ABE, dup consultarea cu CERS, elaboreaz proiecte de
standarde tehnice de reglementare, specificnd con inutul
planului de redresare, innd cont de diversitatea modelelor
de afaceri ale grupurilor de pe piaa intern.
ABE nainteaz aceste proiecte de standarde tehnice de
reglementare Comisiei pn la 3 iulie 2015.
1093/2010.
Articolul 13
Cerine i proceduri pentru planurile de rezoluie a grupurilor
(1) ntreprinderile-mam din Uniune transmit informa iile
care pot fi solicitate n conformitate cu articolul 11 ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului. Aceste informa ii se
refer la ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune, i, conform
solicitrii, la fiecare dintre entitile care fac parte din grup,
inclusiv cele menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c)
conditions for resolution are met;

(e) | set out any additional actions, not referred to in this
Directive, which the group-level resolution authority
intends to take in relation to the resolution of the group;
(f) | identify how the group resolution actions could be
financed and, where the financing arrangement would be
required, set out principles for sharing responsibility for
that financing between sources of funding in different
Member States. The plan shall not assume any of the
following: | (i) | any extraordinary public financial
support besides the use of the financing arrangements
established in accordance with Article 100; | (ii) | any
central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or | (iii) |
any central bank liquidity assistance provided under nonstandard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms.
Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable

and balanced criteria and shall take into account, in
particular Article 107(5) and the impact on financial
stability in all Member States concerned.
4. The assessment of the resolvability of the group under
Article 16 shall be carried out at the same time as the
drawing up and updating of the group resolution plan in
accordance with this Article. A detailed description of the
assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance
with Article 16 shall be included in the group resolution
plan.
5. The group resolution plan shall not have a
disproportionate impact on any Member State.
6. EBA shall, after consulting the ESRB, develop draft
regulatory technical standards specifying the contents of
group resolution plans, by taking into account the
diversity of business models of groups in the internal
market.
Article 13
Requirement and procedure for group resolution plans
1. Union parent undertakings shall submit the
information that may be required in accordance with
Article 11 to the group-level resolution authority. That
information shall concern the Union parent undertaking
and to the extent required each of the group entities
including entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of
68
i (d).
Cu condiia instituirii cerinelor de confidenialitate
prevzute de prezenta directiv, autoritatea de rezoluie a
grupului transmite informaiile menionate n prezentul
alineat ctre:
(a) | ABE;
(b) | autoritile de rezoluie ale filialelor;
(c) | autoritile de rezoluie ale jurisdiciilor n care sunt
situate sucursale semnificative, n msura n care acest lucru
este relevant pentru sucursala semnificativ;
(d) | autoritilor competente relevante men ionate la
articolele 115 i 116 din Directiva 2013/36/UE; i
(e) | autoritile de rezoluie ale statelor membre n care sunt
stabilite entitile menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
literele (c) i (d).
Informaiile furnizate de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului
autoritilor de rezoluie i autoritilor competente ale
filialelor, autoritilor de rezoluie din jurisdic iile n care
sunt situate sucursale semnificative i autorit ilor
competente relevante menionate la articolele 115 i 116 din
Directiva 2013/36/UE, includ cel puin toate informa iile
relevante pentru filial sau pentru sucursala semnificativ.
Informaiile furnizate ABE cuprind toate informaiile
relevante pentru rolul ABE referitor la planurile de rezolu ie
a grupului. n cazul informaiilor referitoare la filiale din ri
tere, autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup nu are obligaia
de a le transmite fr consimmntul autoritii de
supraveghere sau al autoritii de rezoluie relevante din ara
ter respectiv.
grupurilor, acionnd mpreun cu autoritile de rezoluie
menionate la alineatul (1) al doilea paragraf din prezentul
articol, elaboreaz i actualizeaz planurile de rezoluie a
grupurilor, n cadrul colegiilor de rezoluie i dup
consultarea cu autoritile competente relevante, inclusiv cu
autoritile competente din jurisdiciile statelor membre n
care sunt situate sucursale de importan semnificativ.
Autoritile de rezoluie a grupului pot, cu condi ia s
ndeplineasc cerinele de confidenialitate stabilite la
articolul 98 din prezenta directiv, s ia ini iativa de a
implica n elaborarea i actualizarea planurilor de rezoluie a
grupului autoriti de rezoluie din ri tere n ale cror
jurisdicii grupul a nfiinat filiale, holdinguri financiare sau
sucursale semnificative n sensul articolului 51 din Directiva
2013/36/UE.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c planurile de rezolu ie a
grupului sunt reexaminate i, dup caz, actualizate, cel puin
o dat pe an, precum i dup orice modificare a structurii
juridice sau organizaionale, a activitii economice sau a
poziiei financiare a grupului, inclusiv a oricrei entit i din
Article 1(1).
The group-level resolution authority shall, provided that
the confidentiality requirements laid down in this
Directive are in place, transmit the information provided
in accordance with this paragraph to:
(a) | EBA;
(b) | the resolution authorities of subsidiaries;
(c) | the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in
which significant branches are located insofar as is
relevant to the significant branch;
(d) | the relevant competent authorities referred to in
Articles 115 and 116 of Directive 2013/36/EU; and
(e) | the resolution authorities of the Member States
where the entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of
Article 1(1) are established.
The information provided by the group-level resolution
authority to the resolution authorities and competent
authorities of subsidiaries, resolution authorities of the
jurisdiction in which any significant branches are
located, and to the relevant competent authorities
referred to in Articles 115 and 116 of Directive
2013/36/EU, shall include at a minimum all information
that is relevant to the subsidiary or significant branch.
The information provided to EBA shall include all
information that is relevant to the role of EBA in relation
the group resolution plans. In the case of information
relating to third-country subsidiaries, the group-level
resolution authority shall not be obliged to transmit that
information without the consent of the relevant thirdcountry supervisory authority or resolution authority.
authorities, acting jointly with the resolution authorities
referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of
this Article, in resolution colleges and after consulting
the relevant competent authorities, including the
competent authorities of the jurisdictions of Member
States in which any significant branches are located,
draw up and maintain group resolution plans. Grouplevel resolution authorities may, at their discretion, and
subject to them meeting the confidentiality requirements
laid down in Article 98 of this Directive, involve in the
drawing up and maintenance of group resolution plans
third-country resolution authorities of jurisdictions in
which the group has established subsidiaries or financial
holding companies or significant branches as referred to
in Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
3. Member States shall ensure that group resolution plans
are reviewed, and where appropriate updated, at least
annually, and after any change to the legal or
organisational structure, to the business or to the
financial position of the group including any group
69
grup, care ar putea avea un efect major asupra planului sau

ar necesita modificarea sa.
(4) Adoptarea planului de rezoluie a grupului ia forma unei
decizii comune a autoritii de rezoluie a grupului i a
autoritilor de rezoluie ale filialelor.
Aceste autoriti de rezoluie iau o decizie comun n termen
de patru luni de la data transmiterii de ctre autoritatea de
rezoluie a grupului a informaiilor menionate la alineatul
(1) al doilea paragraf.
ABE poate, la cererea unei autoriti competente, acorda
asisten autoritilor de rezoluie, n vederea ajungerii la o
decizie comun n conformitate cu articolul 31 litera (c) din
(5) n absena unei decizii comune a autorit ilor de rezolu ie
n termen de patru luni, autoritatea de rezolu ie a grupului ia
propria decizie cu privire la planul de rezoluie a grupului.
Decizia este temeinic motivat i ia n considerare avizele i
rezervele altor autoriti de rezoluie. Decizia se transmite
ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune de ctre autoritate de
rezoluie a grupului.
Sub rezerva alineatului (9) din prezentul articol, dac pn la
finalul perioadei de patru luni, oricare dintre autorit ile de
rezoluie aduce problema n atenia ABE n conformitate cu
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului i amn decizia i
ateapt orice decizie care poate fi luat de ABE n
conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din regulamentul
menionat, adoptnd ulterior propria sa decizie n
conformitate cu decizia ABE. Perioada de patru luni este
considerat a fi perioada de conciliere n n elesul
la o decizie comun. n absena unei decizii a ABE n termen
de o lun, se aplic decizia autoritii de rezolu ie a grupului.
(6) n absena unei decizii comune a autorit ilor de rezolu ie
n termen de patru luni, fiecare autoritate de rezolu ie
responsabil pentru o filial ia propria sa decizie i
elaboreaz i pstreaz la zi un plan de rezolu ie pentru
entitile aflate n jurisdicia sa. Fiecare dintre deciziile
individuale este temeinic motivat, prezint motivele
dezacordului cu planul de rezoluie a grupului propus i ia n
considerare avizele i rezervele celorlalte autorit i
competente i ale celorlalte autoriti de rezolu ie. Fiecare
autoritate de rezoluie notific decizia sa celorlali membri ai
colegiului de rezoluie.
Sub rezerva alineatului (9) din prezentul articol, dac pn la
finalul perioadei de patru luni, oricare dintre autorit ile de
rezoluie aduce problema n atenia ABE n conformitate cu
entity, that could have a material effect on or require a

change to the plan.
4. The adoption of the group resolution plan shall take
the form of a joint decision of the group-level resolution
authority and the resolution authorities of subsidiaries.
Those resolution authorities shall make a joint decision
within four months of the date of the transmission by the
group-level resolution authority of the information
referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
EBA may, at the request of a resolution authority, assist
the resolution authorities in reaching a joint decision in
1093/2010.
resolution authorities within four months, the group-level
resolution authority shall make its own decision on the
group resolution plan. The decision shall be fully
reasoned and shall take into account the views and
reservations of other resolution authorities. The decision
shall be provided to the Union parent undertaking by the
group-level resolution authority.
Subject to paragraph 9 of this Article, if, at the end of the
four-month period, any resolution authority has referred
the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the group-level
resolution authority shall defer its decision and await any
decision that EBA may take in accordance with Article
19(3) of that Regulation, and shall take its decision in
accordance with the decision of EBA. The four-month
period shall be deemed to be the conciliation period
within the meaning of that Regulation. EBA shall take its
decision within one month. The matter shall not be
referred to EBA after the end of the four-month period or
after a joint decision has been reached. In the absence of
an EBA decision within one month, the decision of the
group-level resolution authority shall apply.
resolution authorities within four months, each resolution
authority responsible for a subsidiary shall make its own
decision and shall draw up and maintain a resolution plan
for the entities under its jurisdiction. Each of the
individual decisions shall be fully reasoned, shall set out
the reasons disagreement with the proposed group
resolution plan and shall take into account the views and
reservations of the other competent authorities and
resolution authorities. Each resolution authority shall
notify its decision to the other members of the resolution
college.
Subject to paragraph 9 of this Article, if, at the end of the
four-month period, any resolution authority has referred
the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of
70

autoritatea de rezoluie n cauz i amn decizia i a teapt
orice decizie care poate fi luat de ABE n conformitate cu
articolul 19 alineatul (3) din regulamentul menionat,
adoptnd ulterior propria sa decizie n conformitate cu
decizia ABE. Perioada de patru luni este considerat a fi
perioada de conciliere n nelesul regulamentului menionat.
ABE adopt propria decizie n termen de o lun. Problema
nu poate fi adus n atenia ABE dup expirarea perioadei de
patru luni sau dup ce s-a ajuns la o decizie comun. n
absena unei decizii a ABE n termen de o lun, se aplic
decizia autoritii de rezoluie a filialei.
(7) Celelalte autoriti de rezoluie ntre care nu exist un
dezacord n conformitate cu alineatul (6) pot ajunge la o
decizie comun privind planul de rezoluie a grupului care
acoper entitile din grup aflate sub jurisdiciile lor.
(8) Deciziile comune menionate la alineatele (4) i (7),
precum i deciziile adoptate de autoritile de rezoluie n
absena deciziei comune menionate la alineatele (5) i (6)
sunt recunoscute ca fiind definitive i sunt aplicate de ctre
celelalte autoriti de rezoluie vizate.
(9) n conformitate cu alineatele (5) i (6) din prezentul
articol, la cererea unei autoriti de rezolu ie, ABE poate
acorda asisten autoritilor de rezoluie n vederea ajungerii
la un acord n conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, cu excepia cazului n
care oricare dintre autoritile de rezolu ie vizate evalueaz
c aspectul care face obiectul dezacordului poate afecta n
orice mod responsabilitile fiscale ale statului su membru.
(10) n cazul n care sunt luate decizii comune n temeiul
alineatelor (4) i (7) i n cazul n care o autoritate de
rezoluie consider, n temeiul alineatului (9), c motivul
dezacordului privind planurile de rezoluie a grupului aduce
atingere responsabilitilor fiscale ale statului su membru,
aceasta procedeaz la o reevaluare a planului de rezolu ie a
grupului, inclusiv cerina minim privind fondurile proprii i
pasivele eligibile.
Articolul 14
Transmiterea planurilor de rezoluie ctre autorit ile
competente
(1) Autoritatea de rezoluie transmite autorit ilor
competente relevante planurile de rezoluie i orice
modificri aduse acestora.
(2) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului transmite autoritilor
competente relevante planurile de rezolu ie a grupurilor i
orice modificri aduse acestora.
CAPITOLUL II
Posibilitile de soluionare
Articolul 15
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the resolution authority

concerned shall defer its decision and await any decision
that EBA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of
that Regulation, and shall take its decision in accordance
with the decision of EBA. The four-month period shall
be deemed to be the conciliation period within the
meaning of that Regulation. EBA shall take its decision
within one month. The matter shall not be referred to
EBA after the end of the four-month period or after a
joint decision has been reached. In the absence of an
EBA decision within one month, the decision of the
resolution authority of the subsidiary shall apply.
7. The other resolution authorities which do not disagree
resolution plan covering group entities under their
jurisdictions.
8. The joint decisions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 7
and the decisions taken by the resolution authorities in
the absence of a joint decision referred to in paragraphs 5
and 6 shall be recognised as conclusive and applied by
the other resolution authorities concerned.
9. In accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article,
upon request of a resolution authority, EBA may assist
the resolution authorities in reaching an agreement in
1093/2010 unless any resolution authority concerned
assesses that the subject matter under disagreement may
in any way impinge on its Member States fiscal
responsibilities.
10. Where joint decisions are taken pursuant to
paragraphs 4 and 7 and where a resolution authority
assesses under paragraph 9 that the subject matter of a
disagreement regarding group resolution plans impinges
on the fiscal responsibilities of its Member State, the
group-level resolution authority shall initiate a
reassessment of the group resolution plan, including the
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities.
Article 14
Transmission of resolution plans to the competent
authorities
1. The resolution authority shall transmit the resolution
plans and any changes thereto to the relevant competent
authorities.
2. The group-level resolution authority shall transmit
group resolution plans and any changes thereto to the
relevant competent authorities.
CHAPTER II
Resolvability
Article 15
71
Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare n cazul instituiilor

(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritatea de rezoluie,
dup consultarea cu autoritatea competent i cu autorit ile
de rezoluie din jurisdiciile n care sunt situate sucursale
semnificative, n msura n care acest lucru este relevant
pentru sucursalele semnificative, evalueaz msura n care o
instituie ce nu face parte din grup poate face obiectul unei
rezoluii, fr s se bazeze pe niciuna din urmtoarele:
(a) | orice fel de sprijin financiar public extraordinar, n afara
utilizrii mecanismelor de finanare instituite n conformitate
cu articolul 100;
din partea bncii centrale;
centrale oferit cu garanii, dobnzi sau durate non-standard.
Se consider c rezoluia unei instituii este posibil dac
autoritatea de consider fezabil i credibil, fie s lichideze
instituia prin procedura obinuit de insolven, fie s
declaneze procedura de rezoluie, aplicnd institu iei
diferitele instrumente i competene de rezoluie evitnd pe
ct posibil orice efect negativ semnificativ asupra sistemului
financiar al statului membru n care este stabilit instituia, al
altor state membre sau al Uniunii, inclusiv n caz de
instabilitate financiar mai extins sau de evenimente la
scara ntregului sistem, cu scopul de a asigura continuitatea
funciilor critice desfurate de instituie. Autoritile de
rezoluie notific ABE n timp util ori de cte ori se
consider c rezoluia unei instituii nu este posibil.
(2) Pentru a evalua posibilitile de soluionare menionate la
alineatul (1), autoritatea de rezoluie examineaz cel pu in
elementele menionate n seciunea C din anex.
(3) Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare n temeiul
prezentului articol este efectuat de autoritatea de rezolu ie
concomitent cu elaborarea i actualizarea planului de
rezoluie n conformitate cu articolul 10, i totodat n scopul
elaborrii i actualizrii planului.
(4) ABE, dup consultarea CERS, elaboreaz proiecte de
standarde tehnice de reglementare, specificnd criteriile i
procesele care trebuie examinate n vederea evalurii
posibilitilor de soluionare a instituiilor sau a grupurilor
menionate la alineatul (2) din prezentul articol i la articolul
16.
1093/2010.
Assessment of resolvability for institutions

1. Member States shall ensure that, after the resolution
authority has consulted the competent authority and the
resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which
the significant branch, it assesses the extent to which an
institution which is not part of a group is resolvable
without the assumption of any of the following:
(b) | any central bank emergency liquidity assistance;
terms.
An institution shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is
feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either
liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to
resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and
powers to the institution while avoiding to the maximum
extent possible any significant adverse effect on the
financial system, including in circumstances of broader
financial instability or system-wide events, of the
Member State in which the institution is established, or
other Member States or the Union and with a view to
ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out
by the institution. The resolution authorities shall notify
EBA in a timely manner whenever an institution is
deemed not to be resolvable.
2. For the purposes of the assessment of resolvability
referred to in paragraph 1, the resolution authority shall,
as a minimum, examine the matters specified in Section
C of the Annex.
3. The resolvability assessment under this Article shall be
made by the resolution authority at the same time as and
for the purposes of the drawing up and updating of the
resolution plan in accordance with Article 10.
4. EBA, after consulting the ESRB, shall develop draft
regulatory technical standards to specify the matters and
criteria for the assessment of the resolvability of
institutions or groups provided for in paragraph 2 of this
Article and in Article 16.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the draft
72
Articolul 16
Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare n cazul grupurilor
grupului, mpreun cu autoritile de rezoluie a filialelor,
dup consultarea cu supraveghetorul consolidant i cu
autoritile competente ale filialelor respective, precum i
autoritile de rezoluie din jurisdiciile n care sunt situate
sucursale semnificative, n msura n care acest lucru este
relevant pentru sucursalele semnificative, evalueaz msura
n care un grup poate face obiectul unei proceduri de
rezoluie, fr s se bazeze pe niciuna din urmtoarele:
(a) | orice sprijin financiar public extraordinar, n afara
utilizrii mecanismelor de finanare instituite n conformitate
cu articolul 100;
din partea bncii centrale;
centrale furnizat cu garanii, dobnzi sau durate nonstandard.
Se consider c rezoluia unui grup este posibil dac
autoritile de consider c este fezabil i credibil, fie s
lichideze entitile din grup prin procedura obi nuit de
insolven, fie s declaneze procedura de rezoluie aplicnd
entitilor din grup instrumente i competene de rezolu ie,
evitnd totodat, pe ct posibil, orice efect negativ
semnificativ asupra sistemelor financiare ale statelor
membre n care sunt stabilite entitile din grup, ale altor
state membre sau al Uniunii, inclusiv n caz de instabilitate
financiar mai extins sau de evenimente la scara ntregului
sistem, cu scopul de a asigura continuitatea funciilor critice
ndeplinite de entitile din grup, atunci cnd acestea pot fi
separate cu uurin n timp util sau prin alte mijloace.
Autoritile de rezoluie la nivel de grup notific ABE n
timp util ori de cte ori se consider c rezolu ia unui grup
nu este posibil.
Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare a unui grup este luat
n considerare n cadrul colegiilor de rezoluie men ionate la
articolul 88.
(2) Pentru a evalua posibilitile de soluionare a grupului,
autoritile de rezoluie examineaz cel puin elementele
menionate n seciunea C din anex.
(3) Evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare a grupului n
temeiul prezentului articol se realizeaz concomitent cu i n
scopul elaborrii i actualizrii planurilor de rezolu ie a
grupului n conformitate cu articolul 12. Evaluarea se
realizeaz n cadrul procedurilor de luare a deciziilor
prevzute la articolul 13.
Articolul 17
Competena de a aborda sau de a nltura obstacolele din
calea posibilitilor de soluionare
Article 16
Assessment of resolvability for groups
authorities, together with the resolution authorities of
subsidiaries, after consulting the consolidating supervisor
and the competent authorities of such subsidiaries, and
the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which
the significant branch, assess the extent to which groups
are resolvable without the assumption of any of the
following:
(b) | any central bank emergency liquidity assistance;
terms.
A group shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible
and credible for the resolution authorities to either wind
up group entities under normal insolvency proceedings
or to resolve group entities by applying resolution tools
and powers to group entities while avoiding to the
maximum extent possible any significant adverse effect
on the financial system, including in circumstances of
broader financial instability or system wide events, of the
Member States in which group entities are established, or
other Member States or the Union and with a view to
ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out
by the group entities, where they can be easily separated
in a timely manner or by other means. Group-level
resolution authorities shall notify EBA in a timely
manner whenever a group is deemed not to be
resolvable.
The assessment of group resolvability shall be taken into
consideration by the resolution colleges referred to in
Article 88.
2. For the purposes of the assessment of group
resolvability, resolution authorities shall, as a minimum,
examine the matters specified in Section C of the Annex.
3. The assessment of group resolvability under this
Article shall be made at the same time as, and for the
purposes of drawing up and updating of the group
resolution plans in accordance with Article 12. The
assessment shall be made under the decision-making
procedure laid down in Article 13.
Article 17
Powers to address or remove impediments to
resolvability
73
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd, n urma

evalurii posibilitilor de soluionare a unei instituii,
efectuat n conformitate cu articolele 15 i 16, autoritatea de
rezoluie, dup consultri cu autoritatea competent, constat
existena unor obstacole semnificative n calea posibilit ilor
de soluionare a instituiei respective, autoritatea de rezoluie
notific aceste constatri n scris instituiei n cauz,
autoritii competente i autoritilor de rezoluie din
jurisdiciile n care sunt situate sucursale semnificative.
(2) Cerina aplicabil autoritilor de rezoluie de a elabora
planuri de rezoluie i autoritilor de rezoluie relevante de a
ajunge la o decizie comun cu privire la planurile de
rezoluie a grupurilor de la articolul 10 alineatul (1) i,
respectiv, articolul 13 alineatul (4) este suspendat ca urmare
a notificrii menionate la alineatul (1) din prezentul articol,
pn ce msurile de ndeprtare a obstacolelor semnificative
din calea posibilitilor de soluionare au fost acceptate de
autoritatea de rezoluie n temeiul alineatului (3) din
prezentul articol sau au fost decise n temeiul alineatului (4)
din prezentul articol.
(3) n termen de patru luni de la data primirii unei notificri
n conformitate cu alineatul (1), instituia propune autorit ii
de rezoluie msuri posibile avnd ca scop abordarea sau
nlturarea obstacolelor semnificative identificate n
notificare. Autoritatea de rezoluie, dup consultarea cu
autoritatea competent, evalueaz eficiena msurilor
propuse n abordarea sau nlturarea obstacolelor
semnificative n cauz.
(4) Dac estimeaz c msurile propuse de o institu ie n
conformitate cu alineatul (3) nu reduc sau nu nltur n mod
eficient obstacolele n cauz, autoritatea de rezoluie, fie
direct, fie indirect prin intermediul autoritii competente,
solicit instituiei s ia msuri alternative care pot conduce la
atingerea acestui obiectiv i notific msurile respective n
scris instituiei, care n termen de o lun propune un plan
viznd intrarea n conformitate cu acestea.
n identificarea msurilor alternative, autoritatea de rezolu ie
demonstreaz c msurile propuse de instituie nu ar reu i s
ndeprteze obstacolele din calea posibilit ii de solu ionare
i n ce mod msurile alternative propuse sunt potrivite
pentru ndeprtarea acestora. Autoritatea de rezolu ie ine
seama de ameninarea pentru stabilitatea financiar pe care o
reprezint aceste obstacole din calea posibilit ii de
soluionare i de efectul msurilor asupra activitii
economice a instituiei, asupra stabilitii acesteia i a
capacitii sale de a contribui la economie.
(5) n sensul alineatului (4), autoritile de rezolu ie au
competena de a lua oricare dintre urmtoarele msuri:
1. Member States shall ensure that when, pursuant to an

assessment of resolvability for an institution carried out
in accordance with Articles 15 and 16, a resolution
authority after consulting the competent authority
determines that there are substantive impediments to the
resolvability of that institution, the resolution authority
shall notify in writing that determination to the
institution concerned, to the competent authority and to
the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which
significant branches are located.
2. The requirement for resolution authorities to draw up
resolution plans and for the relevant resolution
authorities to reach a joint decision on group resolution
plans in Article 10(1) and Article 13(4) respectively shall
be suspended following the notification referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article until the measures to remove
the substantive impediments to resolvability have been
accepted by the resolution authority pursuant to
paragraph 3 of this Article or decided pursuant to
3. Within four months of the date of receipt of a
notification made in accordance with paragraph 1, the
institution shall propose to the resolution authority
possible measures to address or remove the substantive
impediments identified in the notification. The resolution
authority, after consulting the competent authority, shall
assess whether those measures effectively address or
remove the substantive impediments in question.
4. Where the resolution authority assesses that the
measures proposed by an institution in accordance with
paragraph 3 do not effectively reduce or remove the
impediments in question, it shall, either directly or
indirectly through the competent authority, require the
institution to take alternative measures that may achieve
that objective, and notify in writing those measures to the
institution, which shall propose within one month a plan
to comply with them.
In identifying alternative measures, the resolution
authority shall demonstrate how the measures proposed
by the institution would not be able to remove the
impediments to resolvability and how the alternative
measures proposed are proportionate in removing them.
The resolution authority shall take into account the threat
to financial stability of those impediments to
resolvability and the effect of the measures on the
business of the institution, its stability and its ability to
contribute to the economy.
5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, resolution authorities
shall have the power to take any of the following
measures:
74
(a) | s solicite instituiei revizuirea oricror acorduri de

finanare intragrup sau examinarea motivelor pentru absena
acestora, sau ncheierea unor acorduri de servicii, fie
intragrup, fie cu pri tere, pentru a asigura furnizarea de
funcii critice;
(b) | s solicite instituiei limitarea expunerilor sale
individuale i agregate maxime;
(c) | s impun cerine suplimentare de informare punctual
sau periodic, relevante pentru procedura de rezoluie;
(d) | s solicite instituiei renunarea la anumite active;
(e) | s solicite instituiei limitarea sau ncetarea anumitor
activiti aflate n curs de desfurare sau propuse;
(f) | s limiteze sau s mpiedice crearea de noi linii de
activitate economic, dezvoltarea celor existente, vnzarea
de produse noi sau vnzarea produselor existente;
(g) | s solicite modificarea structurilor juridice sau
operaionale ale instituiei sau ale oricrei entit i din grup,
fie n mod direct, fie n mod indirect sub controlul lor, pentru
a reduce complexitatea i a garanta astfel posibilitatea
separrii, din punct de vedere juridic i operaional, a
funciilor critice de alte funcii, prin aplicarea instrumentelor
de rezoluie;
(h) | s solicite unei instituii sau unei ntreprinderi-mam
nfiinarea unei societi financiare holding-mam ntr-un
stat membru sau a unei societi financiare holding-mam
din Uniune;
(i) | s solicite unei instituii sau entit i men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s emit pasive
eligibile pentru a ndeplini cerinele de la articolele 45;
(j) | s solicite unei instituii sau entit i men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s adopte alte
msuri pentru a ndeplini cerina minim pentru fondurile
proprii i pentru pasivele eligibile n temeiul articolului 45,
inclusiv, ndeosebi, s ncerce s renegocieze orice pasiv
eligibil i orice instrument de fonduri proprii de nivel 1
suplimentar sau instrument de fonduri proprii de nivel 2 pe
care l-a emis, pentru a se asigura c orice decizie a autorit ii
de rezoluie de a reduce valoarea contabil a pasivului sau
instrumentului n cauz sau de a-l converti ar fi aplicat n
temeiul legislaiei jurisdiciei care l reglementeaz; i
(k) | n cazul n care o instituie este filial a unei societ i
holding cu activitate mixt, poate solicita societ ii holding
cu activitate mixt nfiinarea unei societi financiare
holding separate pentru a controla instituia, dac este
necesar pentru a facilita rezoluia instituiei i pentru a evita
eventualele efecte negative ale aplicrii instrumentelor i
competenelor de rezoluie menionate n titlul IV asupra
prii nefinanciare a grupului.
(6) O decizie luat n conformitate cu alineatul (1) sau
alineatul (4) ndeplinete urmtoarele cerine:
(a) | require the institution to revise any intragroup

financing agreements or review the absence thereof, or
draw up service agreements, whether intra-group or with
third parties, to cover the provision of critical functions;
(b) | require the institution to limit its maximum
individual and aggregate exposures;
(c) | impose specific or regular additional information
requirements relevant for resolution purposes;
(d) | require the institution to divest specific assets;
(e) | require the institution to limit or cease specific
existing or proposed activities;
(f) | restrict or prevent the development of new or
existing business lines or sale of new or existing
products;
(g) | require changes to legal or operational structures of
the institution or any group entity, either directly or
indirectly under its control, so as to reduce complexity in
order to ensure that critical functions may be legally and
operationally separated from other functions through the
application of the resolution tools;
(h) | require an institution or a parent undertaking to set
up a parent financial holding company in a Member State
or a Union parent financial holding company;
(i) | require an institution or entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to issue eligible liabilities to
meet the requirements of Article 45;
(j) | require an institution or entity referred to in point(b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1), to take other steps to meet the
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities under Article 45, including in particular to
attempt to renegotiate any eligible liability, additional
Tier 1 instrument or Tier 2 instrument it has issued, with
a view to ensuring that any decision of the resolution
authority to write down or convert that liability or
instrument would be effected under the law of the
jurisdiction governing that liability or instrument; and
(k) | where an institution is the subsidiary of a mixedactivity holding company, requiring that the mixedactivity holding company set up a separate financial
holding company to control the institution, if necessary
in order to facilitate the resolution of the institution and
to avoid the application of the resolution tools and
powers referred to in Title IV having an adverse effect on
the non-financial part of the group.
6. A decision made pursuant to paragraph 1 or 4 shall
meet the following requirements:
75
(a) | s fie susinute de o expunere a motivelor care au stat la

baza evalurii sau a constatrii n cauz;
(b) | s indice modul n care respectiva evaluare sau
constatare respect cerina privind aplicarea propor ional
prevzut la alineatul (4); i
(c) | s se supun dreptului la recurs.
(7) nainte de identificarea oricreia dintre msurile
menionate la alineatul (4), autoritatea de rezolu ie, n urma
consultrii autoritii competente i, dup caz, a autorit ii
macroprudeniale naionale desemnate, iau n considerare, n
mod corespunztor, efectul potenial al msurilor respective
asupra instituiei respective, asupra pieei interne de servicii
financiare, asupra stabilitii financiare din alte state membre
i asupra Uniunii n ansamblu.
1093/2010 prin care specific detalii suplimentare prevzute
la alineatul (5) i a circumstanelor n care fiecare dintre
acestea pot fi aplicate.
Articolul 18
Competena de a aborda sau de a nltura obstacolele din
calea posibilitilor de soluionare: tratamentul grupurilor
(1) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului, mpreun cu
autoritile de rezoluie ale filialelor, n urma consultrii cu
colegiul de supraveghere i cu autoritile de rezoluie ale
jurisdiciilor n care sunt situate sucursalele semnificative, n
msura n care este relevant pentru sucursala semnificativ,
iau n considerare evaluarea prevzut la articolul 16 n
cadrul colegiului de rezoluie i iau toate msurile rezonabile
pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun cu privire la aplicarea
msurilor identificate n conformitate cu articolul 17
alineatul (4) n ceea ce privete toate instituiile care fac
parte din grup.
(2) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului, n cooperare cu
supraveghetorul consolidant i cu ABE, conform articolului
25 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010,
ntocmete i prezint un raport ntreprinderii-mam din
Uniune, autoritilor de rezoluie ale filialelor, care l vor
transmite filialelor care fac obiectul supravegherii i
autoritilor de rezoluie din jurisdiciile n care sunt situate
sucursale semnificative. Raportul, ntocmit dup consultarea
cu autoritile competente, conine o analiz a obstacolelor
de fond aflate n calea aplicrii eficiente a instrumentelor de
rezoluie i a exercitrii competenelor de rezolu ie n raport
cu grupul. Raportul ia n considerare impactul asupra
modelului economic al instituiei i recomand orice msuri
proporionale i specifice care, n opinia autoritii, sunt
necesare sau adecvate pentru a ndeprta aceste obstacole.
(3) n termen de patru luni de la data primirii raportului,

(a) | it shall be supported by reasons for the assessment

or determination in question;
(b) | it shall indicate how that assessment or
determination complies with the requirement for
proportionate application laid down in paragraph 4; and
(c) | it shall be subject to a right of appeal.
7. Before identifying any measure referred to in
paragraph 4, the resolution authority, after consulting the
competent authority and, if appropriate, the designated
national macroprudential authority, shall duly consider
the potential effect of those measures on the particular
institution, on the internal market for financial services,
on the financial stability in other Member States and
Union as a whole.
1093/2010 to specify further details on the measures
provided for in paragraph 5 and the circumstances in
which each measure may be applied.
Article 18
Powers to address or remove impediments to
resolvability: group treatment
1. The group-level resolution authority together with the
resolution authorities of subsidiaries, after consulting the
supervisory college and the resolution authorities of the
jurisdictions in which significant branches are located
insofar as is relevant to the significant branch, shall
consider the assessment required by Article 16 within the
resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to
reach a joint decision on the application of measures
identified in accordance with Article 17(4) in relation to
all institutions that are part of the group.
2. The group-level resolution authority, in cooperation
with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance
with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010,
shall prepare and submit a report to the Union parent
undertaking, to the resolution authorities of subsidiaries,
which will provide it to the subsidiaries under their
supervision, and to the resolution authorities of
jurisdictions in which significant branches are located.
The report shall be prepared after consulting the
competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive
impediments to the effective application of the resolution
tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in
relation to the group. The report shall consider the impact
on the institutions business model and recommend any
proportionate and targeted measures that, in the
authoritys view, are necessary or appropriate to remove
those impediments.
3. Within four months of the date of receipt of the report,
76
ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune poate prezenta observa ii i

poate propune autoritii de rezoluie a grupului msuri
alternative de eliminare a obstacolelor identificate n raport.
(4) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului comunic
supraveghetorului consolidant, ABE, autoritilor de
rezoluie ale filialelor i autoritilor de rezolu ie din
jurisdiciile n care sunt situate sucursale semnificative, n
msura n care este relevant pentru sucursala semnificativ,
oirce msuri propuse de ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune.
Autoritile de rezoluie a grupurilor i autoritile de
rezoluie ale filialelor, n urma consultrii cu autorit ile
competente i cu autoritile de rezoluie din jurisdiciile n
care sunt situate sucursale semnificative, fac tot posibilul
pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun n cadrul colegiului de
rezoluie referitor la identificarea obstacolelor majore i,
dup caz, la evaluarea msurilor propuse de ctre
ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune i a msurilor impuse de
autoriti n vederea abordrii sau eliminrii obstacolelor
care in seama de impactul potenial al msurilor n toate
statele membre n care grupul opereaz.
(5) Decizia comun se ia n termen de patru luni de la data

prezentrii oricror observaii de ctre ntreprinderea-mam
din Uniune sau la data expirrii perioadei de patru luni
menionate la alineatul (3), n funcie de care survine mai
nti. Decizia comun trebuie s fie motivat i prezentat
sub forma unui document, care trebuie transmis de
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului ntreprinderii-mam din
Uniune.
ABE poate, la cererea unei autoriti de rezoluie, acorda
asisten autoritilor de rezoluie, n vederea ajungerii la o
decizie comun n conformitate cu articolul 31 litera (c) din
(6) n absena unei decizii comune n termenul men ionat la
alineatul (5), autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului ia propria
decizie privind msurile adecvate care trebuie luate n
conformitate cu articolul 17 alineatul (4) la nivelul grupului.
Decizia este temeinic motivat i ine seama de opiniile i
rezervele celorlalte autoriti de rezoluie. Decizia este
transmis de ctre autoritatea de rezolu ie a grupului
ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune.
autoritile de rezoluie a adus o problem menionat la
alineatul (9) din prezentul articol n aten ia ABE n
1093/2010, autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului i amn
the Union parent undertaking may submit observations

and propose to the group-level resolution authority
alternative measures to remedy the impediments
identified in the report.
4. The group-level resolution authority shall
communicate any measure proposed by the Union parent
undertaking to the consolidating supervisor, EBA, the
resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and the
resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which
the significant branch. The group-level resolution
authorities and the resolution authorities of the
subsidiaries, after consulting the competent authorities
and the resolution authorities of jurisdictions in which
significant branches are located, shall do everything
within their power to reach a joint decision within the
resolution college regarding the identification of the
material impediments, and if necessary, the assessment
of the measures proposed by the Union parent
undertaking and the measures required by the authorities
in order to address or remove the impediments, which
shall take into account the potential impact of the
measures in all the Member States where the group
operates.
5. The joint decision shall be reached within four months
of submission of any observations by the Union parent
undertaking or at the expiry of the four-month period
referred to in paragraph 3, whichever the earlier. It shall
be reasoned and set out in a document which shall be
provided by the group-level resolution authority to the
Union parent undertaking.
1093/2010.
6. In the absence of a joint decision within the period
referred to in paragraph 5, the group-level resolution
authority shall make its own decision on the appropriate
measures to be taken in accordance with Article 17(4) at
the group level.
The decision shall be fully reasoned and shall take into
account the views and reservations of other resolution
authorities. The decision shall be provided to the Union
parent undertaking by the group-level resolution
authority.
If, at the end of the four-month period, any resolution
authority has referred a matter mentioned in paragraph 9
of this Article to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the group-level
77
decizia i ateapt decizia luat de ABE n conformitate cu

adoptnd propria sa decizie n conformitate cu decizia ABE.
Perioada de patru luni este considerat a fi peioad de
conciliere n nelesul regulamentului menionat. ABE ia
autoritii de rezoluie a grupului.
(7) n absena unei decizii comune, autoritile de rezolu ie
ale filialelor iau propriile decizii privind msurile adecvate
care urmeaz s fie luate de filiale la nivel individual n
conformitate cu articolul 17 alineatul (4). Decizia este
temeinic motivat i ine seama de avizele i rezervele
celorlalte autoriti de rezoluie. Decizia se transmite filialei
vizate i autoritii de rezoluie a grupului.

autoritile de rezoluie a adus o problem menionat la
alineatul (9) din prezentul articol n aten ia ABE n
1093/2010, autoritatea de rezoluie a filialei i amn
decizia i ateapt decizia luat de ABE n conformitate cu
adoptnd propria sa decizie n conformitate cu decizia ABE.
Perioada de patru luni este considerat a fi perioad de
conciliere n nelesul regulamentului menionat. ABE ia
autoritii de rezoluie a filialei.
(8) Decizia comun menionat la alineatul (5), precum i
deciziile adoptate de autoritile de rezoluie n absen a
deciziei comune menionate la alineatul (6) sunt recunoscute
ca fiind definitive i sunt aplicate de ctre celelalte autorit i
de rezoluie vizate.
(9) n absena unei decizii comune privind luarea oricror
msuri menionate la articolul 17 alineatul (5) litera (g), (h)
sau (k), ABE poate, la cererea unei autorit i de rezolu ie n
conformitate cu alineatul (6) sau (7) din prezentul articol, s
acorde asisten autoritilor de rezoluie n vederea ob inerii
unui acord n conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din
CAPITOLUL III
Sprijin financiar intragrup
Articolul 19
Acord de sprijin financiar intragrup
(1) Statele membre se asigur c o instituie-mam dintr-un

7. In the absence of a joint decision, the resolution
authorities of subsidiaries shall make their own decisions
on the appropriate measures to be taken by subsidiaries
at individual level in accordance with Article 17(4). The
decision shall be fully reasoned and shall take into
account the views and reservations of the other
resolution authorities. The decision shall be provided to
the subsidiary concerned and to the group-level
resolution authority.
If, at the end of the four-month period, any resolution
authority has referred a matter mentioned in paragraph 9
of this Article to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the resolution authority
of the subsidiary shall defer its decision and await any
resolution authority of the subsidiary shall apply.
8. The joint decision referred to in paragraph 5 and the
decisions taken by the resolution authorities in the
absence of a joint decision referred to in paragraph 6
shall be recognised as conclusive and applied by the
other resolution authorities concerned.
9. In the absence of a joint decision on the taking of any
measures referred to in point (g), (h) or (k) of Article
17(5), EBA may, upon the request of a resolution
authority in accordance with paragraph 6 or 7 of this
Article, assist the resolution authorities in reaching an
agreement in accordance with Article 19(3) of
CHAPTER III
Intra group financial support
Article 19
Group financial support agreement
1. Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in
78
stat membru, o instituie-mam din Uniune sau o entitate

menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d) i
filialele sale din alte state membre sau din ri ter e, care sunt
instituii sau instituii financiare care fac obiectul
supravegherii consolidate a ntreprinderii-mam, pot ncheia
un acord privind acordarea de sprijin financiar oricrei alte
pri la acord care ndeplinete condiiile de interven ie
timpurie n conformitate cu articolul 27, dac sunt respectate
condiiile prevzute n prezentul capitol.
(2) Prezentul capitol nu se aplic acordurilor financiare
intragrup, inclusiv acordurilor de finanare i derulrii
acordurilor de finanare centralizate, cu condi ia ca niciuna
dintre prile la respectivele acorduri s nu ndeplineasc
condiiile de intervenie timpurie.
(3) Un acord de sprijin financiar intragrup nu constituie o
condiie prealabil:
(a) | pentru acordarea de sprijin financiar intragrup oricrei
entiti din grup care ntmpin dificulti financiare, dac
instituia decide acest lucru, pentru fiecare situa ie n mod
individual i conform politicilor grupului, n cazul n care
aceasta nu reprezint un risc pentru ntreg grupul; sau
(b) | pentru a funciona ntr-un stat membru.
(4) Statele membre elimin din dreptul intern orice obstacole
de natur juridic din calea tranzaciilor de sprijin financiar
intragrup desfurate n conformitate cu prezentul capitol, cu
condiia ca nicio dispoziie din prezentul capitol s nu
mpiedice statele membre s impun limite tranzac iilor
intragrup n temeiul dreptului intern de punere n aplicare a
opiunilor prevzute n Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 sau
de transpunere a Directivei 2013/36/UE, sau care impune
separarea, din motive de stabilitate financiar, a unor pr i
dintr-un grup sau a activitilor desf urate n cadrul unui
grup.
(5) Acordul de sprijin financiar intragrup poate:
(a) | s acopere una sau mai multe filiale ale grupului i poate
prevedea sprijin financiar din partea ntreprinderii-mam
ctre filiale, din partea filialelor ctre ntreprinderea-mam,
ntre filialele din grup care sunt parte la acord sau orice
combinaie a acestor entiti;
(b) | s prevad sprijin financiar sub forma unui mprumut, a
acordrii de garanii, a furnizrii de active pentru a fi
utilizate drept garanie real sau a oricrei combina ii ntre
aceste forme de sprijin financiar, n cadrul uneia sau mai
multor tranzacii, inclusiv ntre beneficiarul sprijinului i o
ter parte.
(6) n cazul n care, n conformitate cu termenii acordului de
sprijin financiar intragrup, o entitate din grup se angajeaz s
acorde sprijin financiar unei alte entiti din grup, acest
acord poate include un altul, reciproc, prin care entitatea din
a Member State, a Union parent institution, or an entity

referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) and its
subsidiaries in other Member States or third countries
that are institutions or financial institutions covered by
the consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking,
may enter into an agreement to provide financial support
to any other party to the agreement that meets the
conditions for early intervention pursuant to Article 27,
provided that the conditions laid down in this Chapter are
also met.
2. This Chapter does not apply to intra-group financial
arrangements including funding arrangements and the
operation of centralised funding arrangements provided
that none of the parties to such arrangements meets the
conditions for early intervention.
3. A group financial support agreement shall not
constitute a prerequisite:
(a) | to provide group financial support to any group
entity that experiences financial difficulties if the
institution decides to do so, on a case-by-case basis and
according to the group policies if it does not represent a
risk for the whole group; or
(b) | to operate in a Member State.
4. Member States shall remove any legal impediment in
national law to intra-group financial support transactions
that are undertaken in accordance with this Chapter,
provided that nothing in this Chapter shall prevent
Member States from imposing limitations on intra-group
transactions in connection with national laws exercising
the options provided for in Regulation (EU) No
575/2013, transposing Directive 2013/36/EU or requiring
the separation of parts of a group or activities carried on
within a group for reasons of financial stability.
5. The group financial support agreement may:
(a) | cover one or more subsidiaries of the group, and
may provide for financial support from the parent
undertaking to subsidiaries, from subsidiaries to the
parent undertaking, between subsidiaries of the group
that are party to the agreement, or any combination of
those entities;
(b) | provide for financial support in the form of a loan,
the provision of guarantees, the provision of assets for
use as collateral, or any combination of those forms of
financial support, in one or more transactions, including
between the beneficiary of the support and a third party.
6. Where, in accordance with the terms of the group
financial support agreement, a group entity agrees to
provide financial support to another group entity, the
agreement may include a reciprocal agreement by the
79
grup care primete sprijinul se angajeaz, s acorde sprijin

financiar entitii din grup care acord sprijinul.
(7) Acordul de sprijin financiar intragrup specific principiile
pentru calcularea contraprestaiei datorat pentru orice
tranzacie efectuat n temeiul acordului. Aceste principii
includ cerina de a stabili contraprestaia n momentul
furnizrii sprijinului financiar. Acordul, inclusiv principiile
pentru calcularea contraprestaiei aferente furnizrii
sprijinului financiar, precum i ceilal i termeni ai acordului,
respect urmtoarele principii:
(a) | fiecare parte trebuie s decid n mod liber cu privire la
ncheierea acordului;
(b) | la ncheierea acordului i la calcularea contrapresta iei
aferente furnizrii sprijinului financiar, fiecare parte trebuie
s acioneze potrivit propriilor interese, care pot ine seama
de eventualele beneficii directe sau indirecte pe care le poate
obine partea n urma furnizrii sprijinului financiar;
(c) | fiecare parte care acord sprijin financiar trebuie s
primeasc toate informaiile relevante de la pr ile care
primesc sprijin financiar, nainte de stabilirea contrapresta iei
aferente furnizrii acestuia i nainte de luarea oricrei
decizii privind furnizarea acestuia;
(d) | contraprestaia aferent furnizrii sprijinului financiar
poate ine seama de informaiile pe care partea furnizoare de
sprijin financiar le deine n virtutea faptului c apar ine
aceluiai grup ca i partea beneficiar a sprijinului financiar
i care nu sunt disponibile pentru pia; i
(e) | n ceea ce privete principiile de calcul al
contraprestaiei aferente furnizrii sprijinului financiar, nu
exist obligaia de a se ine seama de eventualele efecte
temporare anticipate asupra preurilor de pe pia ca urmare
a unor evenimente externe grupului.
(8) Acordul de sprijin financiar intragrup poate fi ncheiat
numai dac, la momentul elaborrii proiectului de acord,
autoritile lor competente respective estimeaz c niciuna
dintre pri nu ndeplinete condiiile de intervenie timpurie.
(9) Statele membre se asigur c toate drepturile, crean ele
sau aciunile decurgnd din acordul de sprijin financiar
intragrup pot fi exercitate numai de ctre pr ile la acord, cu
excluderea prilor tere.
Articolul 20
Examinarea de ctre autoritile competente a proiectului de
acord i medierea
(1) Instituia-mam din Uniune depune pe lng
supraveghetorul consolidant o cerere de autorizare pentru
orice proiect de acord de sprijin financiar intragrup propus n
group entity receiving the support to provide financial

support to the group entity providing the support.
7. The group financial support agreement shall specify
the principles for the calculation of the consideration, for
any transaction made under it. Those principles shall
include a requirement that the consideration shall be set
at the time of the provision of financial support. The
agreement, including the principles for calculation of the
consideration for the provision of financial support and
the other terms of the agreement, shall comply with the
following principles:
(a) | each party must be acting freely in entering into the
agreement;
(b) | in entering into the agreement and in determining
the consideration for the provision of financial support,
each party must be acting in its own best interests which
may take account of any direct or any indirect benefit
that may accrue to a party as a result of provision of the
financial support;
(c) | each party providing financial support must have
full disclosure of relevant information from any party
receiving financial support prior to determination of the
consideration for the provision of financial support and
prior to any decision to provide financial support;
(d) | the consideration for the provision of financial
support may take account of information in the
possession of the party providing financial support based
on it being in the same group as the party receiving
financial support and which is not available to the
market; and
(e) | the principles for the calculation of the consideration
for the provision of financial support are not obliged to
take account of any anticipated temporary impact on
market prices arising from events external to the group.
8. The group financial support agreement may only be
concluded if, at the time the proposed agreement is
made, in the opinion of their respective competent
authorities, none of the parties meets the conditions for
early intervention.
9. Member States shall ensure that any right, claim or
action arising from the group financial support
agreement may be exercised only by the parties to the
agreement, with the exclusion of third parties.
Article 20
Review of proposed agreement by competent authorities
and mediation
1. The Union parent institution shall submit to the
consolidating supervisor an application for authorisation
of any proposed group financial support agreement
80
temeiul articolului 19. Cererea trebuie s con in textul

proiectului de acord i s indice entitile din grup care
intenioneaz s fie parte la acord.
(2) Supraveghetorul consolidant transmite fr ntrziere
cererea autoritilor competente ale fiecrei filiale care
intenioneaz s fie parte la acord, pentru a se ajunge la o
decizie comun.
(3) n conformitate cu procedura prevzut la alineatele (5)
i (6) din prezentul articol, supraveghetorul consolidant
acord autorizaia n cazul n care termenii acordului propus
respect condiiile de acordare a sprijinului financiar
(4) Supraveghetorul consolidant poate, n conformitate cu
procedura prevzut la alineatele (5) i (6) din prezentul
articol, s interzic ncheierea acordului propus n cazul n
care se consider c acesta nu respect condi iile de acordare
a sprijinului financiar prevzute la articolul 23.
(5) Autoritile competente trebuie s fac tot posibilul
pentru ca, n termen de patru luni de la data primirii cererii
de ctre supraveghetorul consolidant, s ajung la o decizie
comun, lund n considerare impactul potenial, inclusiv
orice consecine de ordin fiscal, al executrii acordului n
toate statele membre n care funcioneaz grupul, cu privire
la msura n care termenii acordului propus respect
condiiile de acordare a sprijinului financiar prevzute la
articolul 23. Decizia comun se redacteaz ntr-un document
coninnd decizia motivat temeinic, care va fi transmis
solicitantului de ctre supraveghetorul consolidant.
ABE poate acorda asisten autoritilor competente, la
cererea uneia dintre acestea, pentru a ajunge la un acord n
1093/2010.
(6) n cazul n care autoritile competente nu ajung la o
decizie comun n termen de patru luni, supraveghetorul
consolidant adopt propria decizie n legtur cu cererea
respectiv. Decizia este prezentat ntr-un document
coninnd decizia temeinic motivat i ine seama de avizele
i rezervele celorlalte autoriti competente, exprimate pe
parcursul perioadei de patru luni. Supraveghetorul
consolidant notific decizia sa solicitantului i celorlalte
autoriti competente.
(7) Dac pn la finalul perioadei de patru luni, oricare
dintre autoritile competente implicate aduce problema n
atenia ABE n conformitate cu articolul 19 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, supraveghetorul
consolidant i amn decizia i ateapt decizia luat de
ABE n conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din
regulamentul menionat, adoptnd ulterior propria decizie n
conformitate cu decizia ABE. Perioada de patru luni se
proposed pursuant to Article 19. The application shall

contain the text of the proposed agreement and identify
the group entities that propose to be parties.
2. The consolidating supervisor shall forward without
delay the application to the competent authorities of each
subsidiary that proposes to be a party to the agreement,
with a view to reaching a joint decision.
3. The consolidating supervisor shall, in accordance with
the procedure set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this
Article, grant the authorisation if the terms of the
proposed agreement are consistent with the conditions
for financial support set out in Article 23.
4. The consolidating supervisor may, in accordance with
the procedure set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this
Article, prohibit the conclusion of the proposed
agreement if it is considered to be inconsistent with the
conditions for financial support set out in Article 23.
5. The competent authorities shall do everything within
their power to reach a joint decision, taking into account
the potential impact, including any fiscal consequences,
of the execution of the agreement in all the Member
States where the group operates, on whether the terms of
the proposed agreement are consistent with the
conditions for financial support laid down in Article 23
within four months of the date of receipt of the
application by the consolidating supervisor. The joint
decision shall be set out in a document containing the
fully reasoned decision, which shall be provided to the
applicant by the consolidating supervisor.
EBA may at the request of a competent authority assist
the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in
1093/2010.
competent authorities within four months, the
consolidating supervisor shall make its own decision on
the application. The decision shall be set out in a
document containing the full reasoning and shall take
into account the views and reservations of the other
competent authorities expressed during the four-month
period. The consolidating supervisor shall notify its
decision to the applicant and the other competent
authorities.
7. If, at the end of the four-month period, any of the
competent authorities concerned has referred the matter
to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU)
No 1093/2010, the consolidating supervisor shall defer
its decision and await any decision that EBA may take in
81
consider a fi perioada de conciliere n nelesul

la o decizie comun.
Articolul 21
Aprobarea de ctre acionari a proiectului de acord
(1) Statele membre solicit ca orice proiect de acord care a
fost autorizat de autoritile competente s fie prezentat
pentru aprobare acionarilor fiecrei entiti din grup care
intenioneaz s fie parte la acord. n acest caz, acordul nu
este valabil dect pentru acele pri ai cror acionari au
aprobat acordul n conformitate cu alineatul (2).
(2) Un acord de sprijin financiar la nivelul grupului este
valabil pentru o entitate din grup numai dac ac ionarii
acesteia au aprobat organul de conducere al respectivei
entiti din grup s ia o decizie stipulnd faptul c entitatea
din grup acord sau primete sprijin financiar n
conformitate cu termenii acordului i cu condi iile stabilite n
prezentul capitol i numai dac aceast autorizare din partea
acionarilor nu a fost revocat.
(3) Organul de conducere al fiecrei entiti parte la un acord
prezint acionarilor n fiecare an un raport privind
executarea acordului i punerea n aplicare a oricrei decizii
luate n temeiul acestuia.
Articolul 22
Transmiterea acordurilor de sprijin financiar la nivel de grup
ctre autoritile de rezoluie
Autoritile competente transmit autoritilor de rezolu ie
relevante acordurile de sprijin financiar la nivel de grup pe
care le-au autorizat i orice modificri la acestea.
Articolul 23
Condiii de acordare a sprijinului financiar la nivel de grup
(1) Sprijinul financiar poate fi acordat de o entitate din grup
n conformitate cu articolul 19 doar dac sunt ndeplinite
toate urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | exist o perspectiv rezonabil conform creia sprijinul
acordat va contribui n mod semnificativ la solu ionarea
dificultilor financiare ale entitii din grup beneficiare;
(b) | furnizarea de sprijin financiar are ca obiectiv men inerea
sau refacerea stabilitii financiare a grupului n ansamblul
su sau a oricrei entiti din grup i este n interesul entit ii
din grup care furnizeaz sprijinul;
(c) | sprijinul financiar este oferit n termenii prevzu i la
articolul 19 alineatul (7), inclusiv n ceea ce prive te
contraprestaia;
(d) | pe baza informaiilor aflate la dispozi ia organului de
conducere al entitii din grup furnizoare de sprijin financiar
conciliation period within the meaning of that

been reached.
Article 21
Approval of proposed agreement by shareholders
1. Member States shall require that any proposed
agreement that has been authorised by the competent
authorities be submitted for approval to the shareholders
of every group entity that proposes to enter into the
agreement. In such a case, the agreement shall be valid
only in respect of those parties whose shareholders have
approved the agreement in accordance with paragraph 2.
2. A group financial support agreement shall be valid in
respect of a group entity only if its shareholders have
authorised the management body of that group entity to
make a decision that the group entity shall provide or
receive financial support in accordance with the terms of
the agreement and in accordance with the conditions laid
down in this Chapter and that shareholder authorisation
has not been revoked.
3. The management body of each entity that is party to an
agreement shall report each year to the shareholders on
the performance of the agreement, and on the
implementation of any decision taken pursuant to the
agreement.
Article 22
Transmission of the group financial support agreements
to resolution authorities
Competent authorities shall transmit to the relevant
resolution authorities the group financial support
agreements they authorised and any changes thereto.
Article 23
Conditions for group financial support
1. Financial support by a group entity in accordance with
Article 19 may only be provided if all the following
conditions are met:
(a) | there is a reasonable prospect that the support
provided significantly redresses the financial difficulties
of the group entity receiving the support;
(b) | the provision of financial support has the objective
of preserving or restoring the financial stability of the
group as a whole or any of the entities of the group and is
in the interests of the group entity providing the support;
(c) | the financial support is provided on terms, including
consideration in accordance with Article 19(7);
(d) | there is a reasonable prospect, on the basis of the
information available to the management body of the
82
la momentul lurii deciziei de acordare a sprijinului

financiar, exist o perspectiv rezonabil ca entitatea din
grup beneficiar s achite contraprestaia sprijinului acordat,
iar dac sprijinul este acordat sub form de mprumut, ca
entitatea din grup beneficiar s l ramburseze. Dac
sprijinul este acordat sub forma unei garanii sau a unui titlu
de valoare de orice fel, se aplic aceea i condi ie datoriei
rezultate pentru beneficiar n cazul executrii garan iei sau
titlului de valoare respective;
(e) | furnizarea sprijinului financiar nu ar compromite
lichiditatea sau solvabilitatea entitii din grup care
furnizeaz sprijinul;
(f) | furnizarea sprijinului financiar nu ar reprezenta o
ameninare la adresa stabilitii financiare n statul membru
al entitii din grup care furnizeaz sprijinul;
(g) | entitatea din grup care furnizeaz sprijinul se
conformeaz la momentul acordrii cerinelor Directivei
2013/36/UE referitoare la capital sau la lichiditi, precum i
oricror cerine impuse n temeiul articolului 104 alineatul
(2) din Directiva 2013/36/UE, iar furnizarea sprijinului
financiar nu cauzeaz nclcarea de ctre entitate a acestor
cerine, cu excepia cazului n care este autorizat de
autoritatea competent responsabil cu supravegherea la
nivel individual a entitii care furnizeaz sprijinul;
(h) | entitatea din grup care furnizeaz sprijinul se
conformeaz la momentul acordrii acestuia cerinelor
Directivei 2013/36/UE i a Regulamentului (UE) nr.
575/2013 referitoare la expunerile mari, inclusiv legislaia
naional privind exercitarea opiunilor prevzute n aceasta,
iar acordarea sprijinului financiar nu cauzeaz nclcarea, de
ctre entitatea din grup, a acestor cerine, cu excep ia cazului
n care este autorizat de autoritatea competent responsabil
cu supravegherea la nivel individual a entitii din grup care
acord sprijinul;
(i) | furnizarea sprijinului financiar nu ar submina
posibilitile de soluionare a entitii din grup care
furnizeaz sprijinul.
reglementare, preciznd condiiile prevzute la alineatul (1)
literele (a), (c), (e) i (i).
1093/2010.
(3) Pn la 3 ianuarie 2016, ABE emite orientri, n
1093/2010, care s promoveze convergena diferitelor
practici i s specifice condiiile prevzute la alineatul (1)
group entity providing financial support at the time when

the decision to grant financial support is taken, that the
consideration for the support will be paid and, if the
support is given in the form of a loan, that the loan will
be reimbursed, by the group entity receiving the support.
If the support is given in the form of a guarantee or any
form of security, the same condition shall apply to the
liability arising for the recipient if the guarantee or the
security is enforced;
(e) | the provision of the financial support would not
jeopardise the liquidity or solvency of the group entity
providing the support;
(f) | the provision of the financial support would not
create a threat to financial stability, in particular in the
Member State of the group entity providing support;
(g) | the group entity providing the support complies at
the time the support is provided with the requirements of
Directive 2013/36/EU relating to capital or liquidity and
any requirements imposed pursuant to Article 104(2) of
Directive 2013/36/EU and the provision of the financial
support shall not cause the group entity to infringe those
requirements, unless authorised by the competent
authority responsible for the supervision on an individual
basis of the entity providing the support;
(h) | the group entity providing the support complies, at
the time when the support is provided, with the
requirements relating to large exposures laid down in
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Directive
2013/36/EU including any national legislation exercising
the options provided therein, and the provision of the
financial support shall not cause the group entity to
infringe those requirements, unless authorised by the
competent authority responsible for the supervision on an
individual basis of the group entity providing the
support;
(i) | the provision of the financial support would not
undermine the resolvability of the group entity providing
the support.
to specify the conditions laid down in points (a), (c), (e)
and (i) of paragraph 1.
3. EBA shall, by 3 January 2016, issue guidelines in
1093/2010 to promote convergence in practices to
specify the conditions laid down in points (b), (d), (f), (g)
83
literele (b), (d), (f), (g) i (h) din prezentul articol.

Articolul 24
Decizia de a furniza sprijin financiar
Decizia de a furniza sprijin financiar intragrup n
conformitate cu acordul este luat de organul de conducere
al entitii din grup care furnizeaz sprijinul financiar.
Aceast decizie trebuie s fie motivat i s indice scopul
sprijinului financiar propus. Mai exact, decizia precizeaz
modul n care furnizarea sprijinului financiar este conform
cu condiiile prevzute la articolul 23 alineatul (1). Decizia
de a accepta sprijinul financiar la nivel de grup n
conformitate cu acordul este luat de organul de conducere
al entitii din grup care primete sprijin financiar.
Articolul 25
Dreptul de opoziie al autoritilor competente
(1) nainte de a acorda sprijin conform unui acord de sprijin
financiar intragrup, organul de conducere al unei entit i din
grup care intenioneaz s acorde sprijinul financiar trebuie
s notifice:
(a) | propria autoritate competent;
(b) | dac este vorba de o autoritate distinct de autorit ile
menionate la literele (a) i (c), dup caz, supraveghetorul
consolidant;
(c) | dac este vorba de o autoritate distinct de autorit ile
menionate la literele (a) i (b), autoritatea competent a
entitii din grup care primete sprijinul financiar; i
(d) | ABE.
Notificarea trebuie s conin decizia motivat a organului
de conducere, n conformitate cu articolul 24, precum i
detalii cu privire la sprijinul financiar propus, inclusiv o
copie a acordului de sprijin financiar la nivel de grup.
(2) n termen de cinci zile lucrtoare de la data primirii unei
notificri complete, autoritatea competent a entit ii din
grup care furnizeaz sprijin financiar poate aproba acordarea
de sprijin financiar, poate interzice sau limita acest lucru n
cazul n care evalueaz c nu au fost ndeplinite condi iile
pentru acordarea de sprijin financiar intragrup prevzute la
articolul 23. Orice decizie a autorit ii competente privind
interzicerea sau limitarea sprijinului financiar trebuie s fie
motivat.
(3) Decizia autoritii competente privind aprobarea,
interzicerea sau limitarea sprijinului financiar este notificat
imediat ctre:
(a) | supraveghetorul consolidant;
(b) | autoritatea competent a entitii din grup care prime te
sprijinul financiar; i
(c) | ABE.
Supraveghetorul consolidant informeaz imediat pe ceilal i
membri ai colegiului de supraveghere i pe membrii
and (h) of paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 24
Decision to provide financial support
The decision to provide group financial support in
accordance with the agreement shall be taken by the
management body of the group entity providing financial
support. That decision shall be reasoned and shall
indicate the objective of the proposed financial support.
In particular, the decision shall indicate how the
provision of the financial support complies with the
conditions laid down in Article 23(1). The decision to
accept group financial support in accordance with the
agreement shall be taken by the management body of the
group entity receiving financial support.
Article 25
Right of opposition of competent authorities
1. Before providing support in accordance with a group
financial support agreement, the management body of a
group entity that intends to provide financial support
shall notify:
(a) | its competent authority;
(b) | where different from authorities in points (a) and (c),
where applicable, the consolidating supervisor;
(c) | where different from points (a) and (b), the
competent authority of the group entity receiving the
financial support; and
(d) | EBA.
The notification shall include the reasoned decision of
the management body in accordance with Article 24 and
details of the proposed financial support including a copy
of the group financial support agreement.
2. Within five business days from the date of receipt of a
complete notification, the competent authority of the
group entity providing financial support may agree with
the provision of financial support, or may prohibit or
restrict it if it assesses that the conditions for group
financial support laid down in Article 23 have not been
met. A decision of the competent authority to prohibit or
restrict the financial support shall be reasoned.
3. The decision of the competent authority to agree,
prohibit or restrict the financial support shall be
immediately notified to:
(a) | the consolidating supervisor;
(b) | the competent authority of the group entity receiving
the support; and
(c) | EBA.
The consolidating supervisor shall immediately inform
other members of the supervisory college and the
84
(4) Dac supraveghetorul consolidant sau autoritatea
competent care rspunde de entitatea din grup beneficiar a
sprijinului au obiecii privind decizia de interzicere sau de
limitare a sprijinului financiar, ele pot sesiza ABE n termen
de dou zile i pot solicita asistena acesteia n conformitate
cu articolul 31 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(5) n cazul n care autoritatea competent nu interzice sau
nu limiteaz sprijinul financiar n termenul prevzut la
alineatul (2), sau a fost de acord cu acel sprijin nainte de
sfritul acelei perioade, acesta poate fi acordat n
conformitate cu condiiile prezentate autorit ii competente.
(6) Decizia organului de conducere al instituiei de a furniza
sprijin financiar se transmite ctre:
(a) | autoritatea competent;
(b) | dac este vorba de o autoritate distinct de autorit ile
menionate la literele (a) i (c), dup caz, supraveghetorul
consolidant;
(c) | dac este vorba de o autoritate distinct de autorit ile
menionate la literele (a) i (b), autoritatea competent a
entitii din grup care primete sprijinul financiar; i
(d) | ABE.
Supraveghetorul consolidant informeaz imediat pe ceilal i
membri ai colegiului de supraveghere i pe membrii
(7) Dac autoritatea competent limiteaz sau interzice
sprijinul financiar la nivel de grup n temeiul alineatului (2)
din prezentul articol i dac planul de redresare la nivel de
grup n conformitate cu articolul 7 alineatul (5) face referire
la sprijinul financiar intragrup, autoritatea competent a
entitii din grup pentru care sprijinul este refuzat sau
interzis poate solicita supraveghetorului consolidant s
lanseze o reevaluare a planului de redresare la nivel de grup
n temeiul articolului 8 sau, dac planul de redresare este
ntocmit cu titlu individual, s solicite entitii din grup s
prezinte un plan de redresare revizuit.
Articolul 26
Prezentarea informaiilor
(1) Statele membre se asigur c entitile din grup fac
public faptul c au ncheiat sau nu un acord de sprijin
financiar intragrup n conformitate cu articolul 19 i public
o descriere a condiiilor generale ale acordului i denumirile
entitilor din grup care sunt parte la acesta i actualizeaz
aceste informaii cel puin o dat pe an.
Se aplic articolele 431-434 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013.
members of the resolution college.

4. Where the consolidating supervisor or the competent
authority responsible for the group entity receiving
support has objections regarding the decision to prohibit
or restrict the financial support, they may within two
days refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in
1093/2010.
5. If the competent authority does not prohibit or restrict
the financial support within the period indicated in
paragraph 2, or has agreed before the end of that period
to that support, financial support may be provided in
accordance with the terms submitted to the competent
authority.
6. The decision of the management body of the
institution to provide financial support shall be
transmitted to:
(a) | the competent authority;
(b) | where different from authorities in points (a) and (c),
and where applicable, the consolidating supervisor;
(c) | where different from points (a) and (b), the
competent authority of the group entity receiving the
financial support; and
(d) | EBA.
The consolidating supervisor shall immediately inform
the other members of the supervisory college and the
7. If the competent authority restricts or prohibits group
financing support pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article
and where the group recovery plan in accordance with
Article 7(5) makes reference to intra-group financial
support, the competent authority of the group entity in
relation to whom the support is restricted or prohibited
may request the consolidating supervisor to initiate a
reassessment of the group recovery plan pursuant to
Article 8 or, where a recovery plan is drawn up on an
individual basis, request the group entity to submit a
revised recovery plan.
Article 26
Disclosure
1. Member States shall ensure that group entities make
public whether or not they have entered into a group
financial support agreement pursuant to Article 19 and
make public a description of the general terms of any
such agreement and the names of the group entities that
are party to it and update that information at least
annually.
Articles 431 to 434 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
shall apply.
85

n aplicare pentru a specifica forma i con inutul descrierii
menionate la alineatul (1).
tehnice de punere n aplicare pn la 3 iulie 2015.
Se confer Comisiei competena de a adopta proiectele de
standarde tehnice de punere n aplicare menionate la primul
paragraf, n conformitate cu articolul 15 din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1093/2010.
TITLUL III
INTERVENIE TIMPURIE
Articolul 27
Msuri de intervenie timpurie
(1) n cazul n care o instituie ncalc sau, datorit, printre
altele, unei stri de deteriorare rapid a situaiei financiare ce
include o situaie de deteriorare rapid a lichiditilor, de
cretere rapid a nivelului de ndatorare, a creditelor
neperformante sau a concentrrii expunerilor, evaluat pe
baza unui serii de indicatori de declanare, care poate
include cerin de fonduri prorpii a instituiei plus 1,5 puncte
procentuale, sau este susceptibil de a nclca, n viitorul
apropiat, cerinele pentru autorizare prevzute n
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, n Directiva 2013/36/UE,
n titlul II din Directiva 2014/65/UE sau n oricare dintre
articolele 3-7, articolele 14-17, articolul 24, articolul 25 i
articolul 26 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 600/2014, statele
membre se asigur c, fr a aduce atingere msurilor
menionate la articolul 104 din Directiva 2013/36/UE,
autoritile competente au la dispoziie, dup caz, cel pu in
urmtoarele msuri:
(a) | s solicite organului de conducere al institu iei punerea
n aplicare a unuia sau a mai multora dintre acordurile sau
msurile stabilite n planul de redresare sau n conformitate
cu articolul 5 alineatul (2) s actualizeze acest plan de
redresare atunci cnd circumstanele care au condus la
intervenia timpurie difer de prezumiile prevzute n planul
iniial de redresare i s pun n aplicare unul sau mai multe
dintre acordurile sau msurile stabilite n planul actualizat
ntr-un anumit interval de timp, pentru a garanta faptul c
condiiile menionate n fraza introductiv nu se mai aplic;
(b) | s solicite organului de conducere al institu iei
examinarea situaiei, identificarea de msuri viznd
depirea oricror probleme constatate, precum i ntocmirea
unui program de aciune pentru depirea aceste probleme i
a unui calendar de punere n aplicare a acestuia;
(c) | s solicite organului de conducere al institu iei
convocarea unei adunri a acionarilor instituiei sau, n
cazul n care organul de conducere nu respect aceast
cerin, s convoace adunarea respectiv n mod direct, i n
ambele cazuri s stabileasc ordinea de zi i s solicite ca

standards to specify the form and content of the
description referred to in paragraph 1.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the draft
TITLE III
EARLY INTERVENTION
Article 27
Early intervention measures
1. Where an institution infringes or, due, inter alia, to a
rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including
deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of
leverage, non-performing loans or concentration of
exposures, as assessed on the basis of a set of triggers,
which may include the institutions own funds
requirement plus 1,5 percentage points, is likely in the
near future to infringe the requirements of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013, Directive 2013/36/EU, Title II of
Directive 2014/65/EU or any of Articles 3 to 7, 14 to 17,
and 24, 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014,
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities
have at their disposal, without prejudice to the measures
referred to in Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU where
applicable, at least the following measures:
(a) | require the management body of the institution to

implement one or more of the arrangements or measures
set out in the recovery plan or in accordance with Article
5(2) to update such a recovery plan when the
circumstances that led to the early intervention are
different from the assumptions set out in the initial
recovery plan and implement one or more of the
arrangements or measures set out in the updated plan
within a specific timeframe and in order to ensure that
the conditions referred to in the introductory phrase no
longer apply;
(b) | require the management body of the institution to
examine the situation, identify measures to overcome
any problems identified and draw up an action
programme to overcome those problems and a timetable
for its implementation;
(c) | require the management body of the institution to
convene, or if the management body fails to comply with
that requirement convene directly, a meeting of
shareholders of the institution, and in both cases set the
agenda and require certain decisions to be considered for
86
acionarii s analizeze posibilitatea adoptrii anumitor

decizii;
(d) | s solicite destituirea sau nlocuirea unuia sau a mai
multor membri ai organului de conducere sau ai conducerii
superioare, n cazul n care aceste persoane se dovedesc
necorespunztoare pentru exercitarea atribuiilor lor n
sensul articolului 13 din Directiva 2013/36/UE sau
articolului 9 din Directiva 2014/65/UE;
(e) | s solicite organului de conducere ale instituiei
elaborarea unui plan de negociere a restructurrii datoriilor
cu o parte sau cu totalitatea creditorilor institu iei, n
conformitate cu planul de redresare, dup caz;
(f) | s solicite efectuarea de modificri n strategia de afaceri
a instituiei;
(g) | s solicite efectuarea de modificri n structurile juridice
sau operaionale ale instituiei; i
(h) | s dobndeasc, inclusiv prin inspecii la fa a locului, i
s prezinte autoritii de rezoluie, toate informa iile necesare
pentru actualizarea planului de rezoluie i pentru a pregti
rezoluia eventual a instituiei, precum i pentru a efectua o
evaluare a activelor i pasivelor instituiei n conformitate cu
articolul 36;
(2) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile competente
notific autoritile de rezoluie, fr ntrziere, cu privire la
ndeplinirea condiiilor prevzute la alineatul (1) n legtur
cu o instituie i c printre competenele autorit ilor de
rezoluie se numr i competena de a solicita instituiei s
contacteze cumprtori poteniali pentru a pregti rezolu ia
instituiei, sub rezerva condiiilor prevzute la articolul 39
alineatul (2) i a dispoziiilor privind confidenialitatea
prevzute la articolul 84;
(3) Pentru fiecare din msurile menionate la alineatul (1),
autoritile competente stabilesc un termen adecvat pentru
finalizare pentru a permite autoritii competente s evalueze
eficacitatea msurii;
1093/2010, pentru promovarea unei aplicri consecvente a
factorului declanator al utilizrii msurilor men ionate la
alineatul (1) din prezentul articol;
(5) Lund n considerare, dup caz, experien a dobndit n
aplicarea orientrilor menionate la alineattul (4), ABE poate
elabora proiecte de standarde tehnice de reglementare pentru
a stabili un set minim de factori declanatori pentru utilizarea
msurilor menionate la alineatul (1).
Se deleg Comisiei competena de a adopta standardele
1093/2010.
adoption by the shareholders;

(d) | require one or more members of the management
body or senior management to be removed or replaced if
those persons are found unfit to perform their duties
pursuant to Article 13 of Directive 2013/36/EU or Article
9 of Directive 2014/65/EU;
(e) | require the management body of the institution to
draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt
with some or all of its creditors according to the recovery
plan, where applicable;
(f) | require changes to the institutions business strategy;
(g) | require changes to the legal or operational structures
of the institution; and
(h) | acquire, including through on-site inspections and
provide to the resolution authority, all the information
necessary in order to update the resolution plan and
prepare for the possible resolution of the institution and
for valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution
in accordance with Article 36.
2. Member States shall ensure that the competent
authorities shall notify the resolution authorities without
delay upon determining that the conditions laid down in
paragraph 1 have been met in relation to an institution
and that the powers of the resolution authorities include
the power to require the institution to contact potential
purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the
institution, subject to the conditions laid down in Article
39(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in
Article 84.
3. For each of the measures referred to in paragraph 1,
competent authorities shall set an appropriate deadline
for completion, and to enable the competent authority to
evaluate the effectiveness of the measure.
1093/2010 to promote the consistent application of the
trigger for use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article.
paragraph 4, EBA may develop draft regulatory technical
standards in order to specify a minimum set of triggers
for the use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1.
87
Articolul 28
Demiterea conducerii superioare i a organului de conducere
n cazul n care situaia financiar a unei institu ii se
deterioreaz n mod semnificativ sau atunci cnd se produc
nclcri grave ale legislaiei, reglementrilor sau statutelor
instituiei, ori grave nereguli administrative i cnd alte
msuri luate n conformitate cu articolul 27 nu sunt
suficiente pentru a pune capt acestei deteriorri, statele
membre se asigur c autoritile competente pot solicita
demiterea conducerii superioare sau a organului de
conducere a instituiei, n ansamblul su, sau cu privire la
persoanele componente. Numirea noii conduceri superioare
sau a noului organ de conducere se efectueaz n
conformitate cu dreptul intern i dreptul Uniunii i face
obiectul aprobrii din partea autoritii competente.
Articolul 29
Administratorul temporar
(1) n cazul n care nlocuirea conducerii superioare sau a
organului de conducere astfel cum se menioneaz la
articolul 28 este considerat, de ctre autoritatea competent,
ca fiind insuficient pentru remedierea situa iei, statele
membre se asigur c autoritile competente sunt abilitate
s numeasc unul sau mai muli administratori temporari ai
instituiei. n funcie de ceea ce este propor ional n situa ia
dat, autoritile competente pot numi orice administrator
temporar, fie pentru a nlocui temporar organul de conducere
a instituiei, fie pentru a colabora temporar cu organul de
conducere a instituiei, iar acest lucru este precizat de
autoritatea competent n momentul numirii. n cazul n care
numete un administrator temporar pentru a colabora cu
organul de conducere a instituiei, autoritatea competent
precizeaz de asemenea, n momentul numirii, rolul,
sarcinile i competenele administratorului temporar, precum
i eventualele cerine pentru organul de conducere a
instituiei, i anume de a se consulta cu administratorul
temporar sau de a obine aprobarea acestuia nainte de a lua
anumite decizii sau msuri. Autoritii competente i se
solicit s fac public numirea oricrui administrator
temporar, cu excepia cazului n care administratorul
temporar nu deine competena de a reprezenta instituia. n
plus, statele membre trebuie s se asigure c orice
administrator temporar deine calificrile, cuno tinele i
capacitatea necesare pentru ndeplinirea funciilor sale i nu
este implicat n niciun conflict de interese.
(2) n funcie de ceea ce este proporional n situaia dat,
autoritatea
competent
precizeaz
competenele
administratorului temporar n momentul numirii acestuia.
Printre aceste competene se pot numra toate sau unele
dintre competenele deinute de organul de conducere ale
Article 28
Removal of senior management and management body
Where there is a significant deterioration in the financial
situation of an institution or where there are serious
infringements of law, of regulations or of the statutes of
the institution, or serious administrative irregularities,
and other measures taken in accordance with Article 27
are not sufficient to reverse that deterioration, Member
States shall ensure that competent authorities may
require the removal of the senior management or
management body of the institution, in its entirety or
with regard to individuals. The appointment of the new
senior management or management body shall be done
in accordance with national and Union law and be
subject to the approval or consent of the competent
authority.
Article 29
Temporary administrator
1. Where replacement of the senior management or
management body as referred to in Article 28 is deemed
to be insufficient by the competent authority to remedy
the situation, Member States shall ensure that competent
authorities may appoint one or more temporary
administrators to the institution. Competent authorities
may, based on what is proportionate in the
circumstances, appoint any temporary administrator
either to replace the management body of the institution
temporarily or to work temporarily with the management
body of the institution and the competent authority shall
specify its decision at the time of appointment. If the
competent authority appoints a temporary administrator
to work with the management body of the institution, the
competent authority shall further specify at the time of
such an appointment the role, duties and powers of the
temporary administrator and any requirements for the
management body of the institution to consult or to
obtain the consent of the temporary administrator prior to
taking specific decisions or actions. The competent
authority shall be required to make public the
appointment of any temporary administrator except
where the temporary administrator does not have the
power to represent the institution. Member States shall
further ensure that any temporary administrator has the
qualifications, ability and knowledge required to carry
out his or her functions and is free of any conflict of
interests.
2. The competent authority shall specify the powers of
the temporary administrator at the time of the
appointment of the temporary administrator based on
what is proportionate in the circumstances. Such powers
may include some or all of the powers of the
88
instituiei n conformitate cu statutul instituiei i cu dreptul

intern, inclusiv competena de a exercita toate sau o parte din
funciile administrative ale organului de conducere a
instituiei. Competenele administratorului temporar n raport
cu instituia sunt n conformitate cu dreptul societ ilor
aplicabil.
(3) Rolul i funciile administratorului temporar sunt
precizate de autoritatea competent n momentul numirii
acestuia i pot include estimarea poziiei financiare a
instituiei, gestionarea activitii sau a unei pri a activit ii
instituiei n vederea meninerii sau restabilirii pozi iei
financiare a instituiei i adoptarea de msuri n vederea
restabilirii gestionrii corecte i prudente a activit ii
instituiei. Autoritatea competent precizeaz, n momentul
numirii administratorului temporar, eventualele limite ale
rolului i funciilor acestuia.
(4) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile competente
dein competena exclusiv de a numi i de a destitui orice
administrator temporar. Autoritatea competent poate
destitui un administrator temporar n orice moment i din
orice motiv. Autoritatea competent poate modifica n orice
moment mandatul administratorului temporar, sub rezerva
prezentului articol.
(5) Autoritatea competent poate solicita ca anumite acte ale
unui administrator temporar s fac obiectul aprobrii
prealabile a autoritii competente. Autoritatea competent
precizeaz orice astfel de cerine n momentul numirii unui
administrator temporar sau n momentul oricrei modificri a
condiiilor mandatului administratorului temporar.
n orice caz, administratorul temporar poate exercita
competena de a convoca adunarea general a ac ionarilor
instituiei i de a stabili ordinea de zi a acestei adunri numai
cu aprobarea prealabil a autoritii competente.
(6) Autoritatea competent poate solicita administratorului
temporar s ntocmeasc rapoarte privind poziia financiar a
instituiei i msurile ntreprinse pe parcursul mandatului
su, la intervale stabilite de autoritatea competent, precum
i la sfritul mandatului su.
(7) Numirea unui administrator temporar nu trebuie s
depeasc un an. Aceast perioad poate fi rennoit n mod
excepional n cazul n care condiiile de numire a unui
administrator temporar continu s fie ndeplinite.
Autoritatea competent are responsabilitatea de a decide n
ce msur condiiile sunt adecvate pentru meninerea unui
administrator temporar i de a justifica o astfel de decizie n
faa acionarilor.
(8) Sub rezerva prezentului articol, numirea unui
management body of the institution under the statutes of

the institution and under national law, including the
power to exercise some or all of the administrative
functions of the management body of the institution. The
powers of the temporary administrator in relation to the
institution shall comply with the applicable company
law.
3. The role and functions of the temporary administrator
shall be specified by competent authority at the time of
appointment and may include ascertaining the financial
position of the institution, managing the business or part
of the business of the institution with a view to
preserving or restoring the financial position of the
institution and taking measures to restore the sound and
prudent management of the business of the institution.
The competent authority shall specify any limits on the
role and functions of the temporary administrator at the
time of appointment.
4. Member States shall ensure that the competent
authorities have the exclusive power to appoint and
remove any temporary administrator. The competent
authority may remove a temporary administrator at any
time and for any reason. The competent authority may
vary the terms of appointment of a temporary
administrator at any time subject to this Article.
5. The competent authority may require that certain acts
of a temporary administrator be subject to the prior
consent of the competent authority. The competent
authority shall specify any such requirements at the time
of appointment of a temporary administrator or at the
time of any variation of the terms of appointment of a
temporary administrator.
In any case, the temporary administrator may exercise
the power to convene a general meeting of the
shareholders of the institution and to set the agenda of
such a meeting only with the prior consent of the
competent authority.
6. The competent authority may require that a temporary
administrator draws up reports on the financial position
of the institution and on the acts performed in the course
of its appointment, at intervals set by the competent
authority and at the end of his or her mandate.
7. The appointment of a temporary administrator shall
not last more than one year. That period may be
exceptionally renewed if the conditions for appointing
the temporary administrator continue to be met. The
competent authority shall be responsible for determining
whether conditions are appropriate to maintain a
temporary administrator and justifying any such decision
to shareholders.
8. Subject to this Article the appointment of a temporary
89
administrator temporar nu aduce atingere drepturilor

acionarilor n conformitate cu dreptul Uniunii sau dreptul
comercial naional.
(9) n conformitate cu dreptul intern, statele membre pot
limita rspunderea oricrui administrator temporar n ceea ce
privete actele i omisiunile survenite n exercitarea
atribuiilor acestuia n calitate de administrator temporar n
conformitate cu alineatul (3).
(10) Un administrator temporar numit n temeiul prezentului
articol nu este considerat ca membru din umbr sau de facto
al organului de conducere n temeiul dreptului intern.
Articolul 30
Coordonarea msurilor de intervenie timpurie i numirea
administratorului temporar n cazul grupurilor
(1) Atunci cnd condiiile de impunere a cerinelor prevzute
la articolul 27 sau de numire a unui administrator temporar
n conformitate cu articolul 29 sunt ndeplinite n legtur cu
o ntreprindere-mam din Uniune, supraveghetorul
consolidant notific ABE i se consult cu celelalte autoriti
competente din cadrul colegiului de supraveghere.
(2) n urma acestei notificri i consultri, supraveghetorul
consolidant decide dac s aplice vreuna dintre msurile
prevzute la articolul 27 sau s numeasc un administrator
temporar n conformitate cu articolul 29 n raport cu
ntreprinderea-mam relevant din Uniune, innd seama de
impactul acestor msuri asupra entitilor din grup situate n
alte state membre. Supraveghetorul consolidant notific
aceast decizie celorlalte autorit i competente din cadrul
colegiului de supraveghere i ABE.
(3) Atunci cnd condiiile de impunere a cerinelor prevzute
la articolul 27 sau de numire a unui administrator temporar
n conformitate cu articolul 29 sunt ndeplinite n legtur cu
o filial a unei ntreprinderi-mam din Uniune, autoritatea
competent responsabil cu supravegherea la nivel
individual care intenioneaz s ia o msur n conformitate
cu articolele respective notific ABE i se consult cu
supraveghetorul consolidant.
La primirea notificrii, supraveghetorul consolidant poate
evalua impactul probabil al impunerii cerinelor prevzute la
articolul 27 sau al numirii unui administrator temporar n
conformitate cu articolul 29 asupra institu iei n cauz,
asupra grupului sau asupra entitilor din grup situate n alte
state membre. Aceast autoritate comunic evaluarea
respectiv autoritii competente n termen de trei zile.
n urma acestei notificri i consultri, autoritatea
competent decide dac s aplice vreuna dintre msurile
prevzute la articolul 27 sau s numeasc un administrator
temporar n conformitate cu articolul 29. La luarea acestei
administrator shall not prejudice the rights of the

shareholders in accordance with Union or national
company law.
9. Member States may limit the liability of any
temporary administrator in accordance with national law
for acts and omissions in the discharge of his or her
duties as temporary administrator in accordance with
paragraph 3.
10. A temporary administrator appointed pursuant to this
Article shall not be deemed to be a shadow director or a
de facto director under national law.
Article 30
Coordination of early intervention measures and
appointment of temporary administrator in relation to
groups
1. Where the conditions for the imposition of
requirements under Article 27 or the appointment of a
temporary administrator in accordance with Article 29
are met in relation to a Union parent undertaking, the
consolidating supervisor shall notify EBA and consult
the other competent authorities within the supervisory
college.
2. Following that notification and consultation the
consolidating supervisor shall decide whether to apply
any of the measures in Article 27 or appoint a temporary
administrator under Article 29 in respect of the relevant
Union parent undertaking, taking into account the impact
of those measures on the group entities in other Member
States. The consolidating supervisor shall notify the
decision to the other competent authorities within the
supervisory college and EBA.
3. Where the conditions for the imposition of
requirements under Article 27 or the appointment of a
temporary administrator under Article 29 are met in
relation to a subsidiary of an Union parent undertaking,
the competent authority responsible for the supervision
on an individual basis that intends to take a measure in
accordance with those Articles shall notify EBA and
consult the consolidating supervisor.
On receiving the notification the consolidating
supervisor may assess the likely impact of the imposition
of requirements under Article 27 or the appointment of a
temporary administrator in accordance with Article 29 to
the institution in question, on the group or on group
entities in other Member States. It shall communicate
that assessment to the competent authority within three
days.
Following that notification and consultation the
competent authority shall decide whether to apply any of
the measures in Article 27 or appoint a temporary
administrator under Article 29. The decision shall give
90
decizii se ine seama n mod corespunztor de orice evaluare

realizat de supraveghetorul consolidant. Autoritatea
competent notific decizia supraveghetorului consolidant i
celorlalte autoriti competente din cadrul colegiului de
supraveghere, precum i ABE.
(4) n cazul n care mai multe autoriti competente
intenioneaz s numeasc un administrator temporar sau s
aplice oricare din msurile de la articolul 27 mai multor
instituii din cadrul aceluiai grup, supraveghetorul
consolidant i celelalte autoriti competente relevante
evalueaz n ce msur numirea aceluia i administrator
temporar pentru toate entitile n cauz sau coordonarea
aplicrii oricrora din msurile menionate la articolul 27
mai multor instituii ar fi mai adecvat pentru a facilita
gsirea unor soluii pentru restabilirea pozi iei financiare a
instituiei n cauz. Aceast evaluare ia forma unei decizii
comune a supraveghetorului consolidant i a celorlalte
autoriti competente relevante. Decizia comun se ia n
termen de cinci zile de la data notificrii men ionate la
alineatul (1). Decizia comun trebuie s fie motivat i
trebuie prezentat sub forma unui document transmis
ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune de ctre supraveghetorul
consolidant.
ABE poate acorda asisten autoritilor competente, la
cererea uneia dintre acestea, pentru a ajunge la un acord n
1093/2010.
n absena unei decizii comune n termen de cinci zile,
supraveghetorul consolidant i autoritile competente ale
filialelor pot lua decizii individuale privind numirea unui
administrator temporar n instituiile fa de care sunt
responsabile i privind aplicarea oricreia din msurile
menionate la articolul 27.
(5) n cazul n care o autoritate competent implicat nu este
de acord cu decizia notificat n conformitate cu alineatul (1)
sau cu alineatul (3), sau n absena unei decizii comune n
conformitate cu alineatul (4), autoritatea competent poate
sesiza ABE n conformitate cu alineatul (6).
(6) La solicitarea oricrei autoriti competente, ABE poate
s acorde asisten autoritilor competente care
intenioneaz s aplice una sau mai multe dintre msurile
menionate la articolul 27 alineatul (1) litera (a) din prezenta
directiv n ceea ce privete punctele 4, 10, 11 i 19 din
seciunea A din anexa la prezenta directiv, la articolul 27
alineatul (1) litera (e) din prezenta directiv sau la articolul
27 alineatul (1) litera (g) din prezenta directiv pentru
ajungerea la un acord n conformitate cu articolul 19
alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(7) Decizia fiecrei autoriti competente trebuie s fie
motivat. Aceast decizie ine seama de opiniile i rezervele
exprimate de celelalte autoriti competente pe parcursul
due consideration to any assessment of the consolidating

supervisor. The competent authority shall notify the
decision to the consolidating supervisor and other
competent authorities within the supervisory college and
EBA.
4. Where more than one competent authority intends to
appoint a temporary administrator or apply any of the
measures in Article 27 to more than one institution in the
same group, the consolidating supervisor and the other
relevant competent authorities shall consider whether it
is more appropriate to appoint the same temporary
administrator for all the entities concerned or to
coordinate the application of any measures in Article 27
to more than one institution in order to facilitate
solutions restoring the financial position of the institution
concerned. The assessment shall take the form of a joint
decision of the consolidating supervisor and the other
relevant competent authorities. The joint decision shall
be reached within five days from the date of the
notification referred to in paragraph 1. The joint decision
shall be reasoned and set out in a document, which shall
be provided by the consolidating supervisor to the Union
parent undertaking.
EBA may at the request of a competent authority assist
the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in
1093/2010.
In the absence of a joint decision within five days the
consolidating supervisor and the competent authorities of
subsidiaries may take individual decisions on the
appointment of a temporary administrator to the
institutions for which they have responsibility and on the
application of any of the measures in Article 27.
5. Where a competent authority concerned does not agree
with the decision notified in accordance with paragraph 1
or 3, or in the absence of a joint decision under
paragraph 4, the competent authority may refer the
matter to EBA in accordance with paragraph 6.
6. EBA may at the request of any competent authority
assist the competent authorities that intend to apply one
or more of the measures in point (a) of Article 27(1) of
this Directive with respect to the points (4), (10), (11)
and (19) of Section A of the Annex to this Directive, in
point (e) of Article 27(1) of this Directive or in point (g)
of Article 27(1) of this Directive in reaching an
agreement in accordance with Article 19(3) of
7. The decision of each competent authority shall be
reasoned. The decision shall take into account the views
and reservations of the other competent authorities
91
perioadei de consultare menionate la alineatul (1) sau la

alineatul (3) sau pe parcursul perioadei de 5 zile men ionate
la alineatul (4) precum i de impactul poten ial al deciziei
asupra stabilitii financiare din statele membre vizate.
Deciziile sunt transmise ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune de
ctre supraveghetorul consolidant i filialelor de ctre
autoritile competente respective.
n situaiile menionate la alineatul (6) din prezentul articol,
n care nainte de sfritul perioadei de consultare
menionate la alineatele (1) i (3) din prezentul articol sau
pn la finalul perioadei de cinci zile menionate la alineatul
(4) din prezentul articol, oricare dintre autorit ile
competente implicate a adus problema n atenia ABE n
(UE) nr. 1093/2010, supraveghetorul consolidant i celelalte
autoriti competente i amn deciziile i ateapt decizia
pe care ABE o poate lua n conformitate cu articolul 19
alineatul (3) din regulamentul menionat, adoptnd apoi
propriile lor decizii n conformitate cu decizia ABE.
Perioada de cinci zile se consider a fi perioad de conciliere
n nelesul regulamentului menionat. ABE adopt propria
sa decizie n termen de trei zile. Problema nu poate fi adus
n atenia ABE dup expirarea perioadei de cinci zile sau
dup ce s-a ajuns la o decizie comun.
(8) n absena unei decizii din partea ABE n termen de trei
zile, se aplic deciziile individuale luate n conformitate cu
alineatele (1) sau (3), sau cu alineatul (4) al treilea paragraf.
TITLUL IV
REZOLUIA
CAPITOLUL I
Obiective, condiii i principii generale
Articolul 31
Obiectivele rezoluiei
(1) Atunci cnd aplic instrumente i exercit competen e de
rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie trebuie s in cont de
obiectivele rezoluiei i s aleag acele instrumente i
competene care permit realizarea n cel mai nalt grad a
obiectivelor relevante pentru fiecare situa ie n parte.
(2) Obiectivele rezoluiei menionate la alineatul (1) din
prezentul articol sunt:
(a) | asigurarea continuitii funciilor critice;
(b) | evitarea efectelor negative semnificative asupra
stabilitii financiare, n special prin prevenirea contagiunii,
inclusiv asupra infrastructurilor pieei i prin men inerea
disciplinei pe pia;
(c) | protejarea fondurilor publice prin reducerea la minimum
a sprijinului financiar public extraordinar;
(d) | protecia deponenilor care intr sub incidena Directivei
expressed during the consultation period referred to in

paragraph 1 or 3 or the five-day period referred to in
paragraph 4 as well as the potential impact of the
decision on financial stability in the Member States
concerned. The decisions shall be provided by the
consolidating supervisor to the Union parent undertaking
and to the subsidiaries by the respective competent
authorities.
In the cases referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article,
where, before the end of the consultation period referred
to in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article or at the end of
the five-day period referred to in paragraph 4 of this
Article, any of the competent authorities concerned has
referred the matter to EBA in accordance with Article
19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the
consolidating supervisor and the other competent
authorities shall defer their decisions and await any
19(3) of that Regulation, and shall take their decision in
accordance with the decision of EBA. The five-day
decision within three days. The matter shall not be
referred to EBA after the end of the five-day period or
after a joint decision has been reached.
8. In the absence of a decision by EBA within three days,
individual decisions taken in accordance with paragraph
1 or 3, or the third subparagraph of paragraph 4, shall
apply.
TITLE IV
RESOLUTION
CHAPTER I
Objectives, conditions and general principles
Article 31
Resolution objectives
1. When applying the resolution tools and exercising the
resolution powers, resolution authorities shall have
regard to the resolution objectives, and choose the tools
and powers that best achieve the objectives that are
relevant in the circumstances of the case.
2. The resolution objectives referred to in paragraph 1
are:
(a) | to ensure the continuity of critical functions;
(b) | to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial
system, in particular by preventing contagion, including
to market infrastructures, and by maintaining market
discipline;
(c) | to protect public funds by minimising reliance on
extraordinary public financial support;
(d) | to protect depositors covered by Directive
92
2014/49/UE i a investitorilor aflai sub incidena Directivei

97/9/CE;
(e) | protejarea fondurilor i a activelor clienilor.
Atunci cnd urmrete obiectivele de mai sus, autoritatea de
rezoluie ncearc s reduc la minimum costul rezolu iei i
s evite distrugerea valorii, cu excep ia cazului n care
aceasta este necesar pentru a realiza obiectivele rezolu iei.
(3) Sub rezerva unei serii de dispoziii din prezenta directiv,
obiectivele rezoluiei au o importan egal, iar autorit ile
de rezoluie trebuie s le aplice n mod echilibrat, n func ie
de natura i de circumstanele proprii fiecrui caz.
Articolul 32
Condiii pentru declanarea procedurii de rezoluie
(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie iau
o msur de rezoluie cu privire la una dintre institu iile
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (a) numai dac
autoritatea de rezoluie consider c sunt ndeplinite toate
condiiile urmtoare:
(a) | stabilirea faptului c instituia este n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate se
face de ctre autoritatea competent, dup consultarea
autoritii de rezoluie sau, sub rezerva condi iilor prevzute
n alineatul (2), de ctre autoritatea de rezolu ie dup
consultarea autoritii competente;
(b) | avnd n vedere calendarul i alte circumstan e
relevante, nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil potrivit
creia intrarea n dificultate a unei institu ii ar putea fi
mpiedicat, ntr-o perioad rezonabil, prin msuri
alternative ale sectorului privat, inclusiv msuri luate de
ctre un SIP, sau prin msuri de supraveghere, inclusiv
msuri de intervenie timpurie sau msuri de reducere a
valorii contabile sau de conversie a instrumentelor de capital
relevante, n conformitate cu articolul 59 alineatul (2) luate
n legtur cu instituia n cauz;
(c) | msura de rezoluie este necesar n interesul public n
sensul alineatului (5).
(2) Statele membre pot s prevad faptul c, pe lng
autoritatea competent, stabilirea faptului c institu ia este n
curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n
dificultate conform alineatului (1) litera (a) poate fi fcut i
de autoritatea de rezoluie, n urma consultrii autorit ii
competente, n cazul n care autoritile de rezolu ie n
temeiul dreptului intern dispun de instrumentele necesare
pentru a stabili acest lucru, n special de acces adecvat la
informaiile relevante. Autoritatea competent prezint
autoritii de rezoluie orice informaii relevante pe care
aceasta din urm le solicit pentru a- i putea realiza
evaluarea fr ntrziere.
(3) Adoptarea prealabil a unei msuri de intervenie
timpurie n conformitate cu articolul 27 nu constituie o
2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC;

(e) | to protect client funds and client assets.
When pursuing the above objectives, the resolution
authority shall seek to minimise the cost of resolution
and avoid destruction of value unless necessary to
achieve the resolution objectives.
3. Subject to different provisions of this Directive, the
resolution objectives are of equal significance, and
resolution authorities shall balance them as appropriate
to the nature and circumstances of each case.
Article 32
Conditions for resolution
shall take a resolution action in relation to an institution
referred to in point (a) of Article 1(1) only if the
resolution authority considers that all of the following
conditions are met:
(a) | the determination that the institution is failing or is
likely to fail has been made by the competent authority,
after consulting the resolution authority or,; subject to the
conditions laid down in paragraph 2, by the resolution
authority after consulting the competent authority;
(b) | having regard to timing and other relevant
circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any
alternative private sector measures, including measures
by an IPS, or supervisory action, including early
intervention measures or the write down or conversion of
relevant capital instruments in accordance with Article
59(2) taken in respect of the institution, would prevent
the failure of the institution within a reasonable
timeframe;
(c) | a resolution action is necessary in the public interest
pursuant to paragraph 5.
2. Member States may provide that, in addition to the
competent authority, the determination that the institution
is failing or likely to fail under point (a) of paragraph 1
can be made by the resolution authority, after consulting
the competent authority, where resolution authorities
under national law have the necessary tools for making
such a determination including, in particular, adequate
access to the relevant information. The competent
authority shall provide the resolution authority with any
relevant information that the latter requests in order to
perform its assessment without delay.
3. The previous adoption of an early intervention
measure according to Article 27 is not a condition for
93
condiie pentru adoptarea unei msuri de rezoluie.

(4) n sensul alineatului (1) litera (a), se consider c o
instituie este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este
susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, dac este ndeplinit cel
puin una dintre condiiile urmtoare:
(a) | instituia ncalc cerinele deinerii n continuare a
autorizaiei sau, potrivit unor elemente obiective, se poate
conchide c instituia le va nclca n viitorul apropiat, ntr-o
msur suficient pentru a justifica retragerea autoriza iei de
ctre autoritatea competent, inclusiv cazul n care institu ia
a suportat sau este susceptibil de a suporta pierderi care i
vor epuiza toate sau o parte semnificativ din fondurile
proprii, dar fr a se limita la acesta;
(b) | activul instituiei este inferior pasivului sau, potrivit
unor elemente obiective, se poate conchide c acest lucru se
va petrece n viitorul apropiat;
(c) | instituia se afl n imposibilitatea de a- i achita datoriile
sau alte pasive la scaden sau, potrivit unor elemente
obiective, se poate conchide c acest lucru se va petrece n
viitorul apropiat;
(d) | este necesar un sprijin financiar public extraordinar, cu
excepia cazului n care, pentru evita sau a remedia o
perturbare grav a economiei unui stat membru i a men ine
stabilitatea financiar, sprijinul financiar public extraordinar
mbrac oricare dintre formele urmtoare: | (i) | o garan ie de
stat n sprijinul facilitilor de lichiditate oferite de bncile
centrale n conformitate cu condiiile bncilor centrale; | (ii) |
o garanie de stat pentru pasivele nou-emise; sau | (iii) | o
injecie de fonduri proprii sau achiziionarea de instrumente
de capital la preuri i n condiii care nu confer un avantaj
instituiei, n cazul n care, la momentul acordrii sprijinului
public, nu exist nici circumstanele menionate la literele
(a), (b) sau (c) din prezentul alineat, nici circumstan ele
menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (3).
n fiecare din cazurile menionate la litera (d) punctele (i),
(ii) i (iii) din primul paragraf, msurile de garantare sau
msurile echivalente acestora menionate la aceste puncte se
limiteaz la instituiile solvabile i sunt condiionate de
aprobarea final n temeiul cadrului Uniunii privind
ajutoarele de stat. Msurile respective au caracter temporar i
preventiv i sunt proporionale n raport cu remedierea
consecinelor pe care le are perturbarea grav i nu sunt
utilizate pentru a compensa pierderile pe care instituia le-a
suportat sau este susceptibil se le suporte n viitorul
apropiat.
Msurile de sprijin menionate la litera (d) punctul (iii) se
limiteaz la injeciile necesare pentru a soluiona deficitul de
capital a crui existen a fost stabilit n cadrul simulrii
situaiilor de criz la nivel naional, la nivelul Uniunii sau la
nivelul MUS, la evaluri ale calitii activelor sau la exerci ii
taking a resolution action.

4. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1, an
institution shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail
in one or more of the following circumstances:
(a) | the institution infringes or there are objective
elements to support a determination that the institution
will, in the near future, infringe the requirements for
continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the
withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent
authority including but not limited to because the
institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that
will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds;
(b) | the assets of the institution are or there are objective
elements to support a determination that the assets of the
institution will, in the near future, be less than its
liabilities;
(c) | the institution is or there are objective elements to
support a determination that the institution will, in the
near future, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities
as they fall due;
(d) | extraordinary public financial support is required
except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in
the economy of a Member State and preserve financial
stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes
any of the following forms: | (i) | a State guarantee to
back liquidity facilities provided by central banks
according to the central banks conditions; | (ii) | a State
guarantee of newly issued liabilities; or | (iii) | an
injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments
at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage
upon the institution, where neither the circumstances
referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph nor
the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present
at the time the public support is granted.
In each of the cases mentioned in points (d)(i), (ii) and
(iii) of the first subparagraph, the guarantee or equivalent
measures referred to therein shall be confined to solvent
institutions and shall be conditional on final approval
under the Union State aid framework. Those measures
shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature and
shall be proportionate to remedy the consequences of the
serious disturbance and shall not be used to offset losses
that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the
near future.
Support measures under point (d)(iii) of the first
subparagraph shall be limited to injections necessary to
address capital shortfall established in the national,
Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews or
equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central
94
echivalente desfurate de ctre Banca Central European,

ABE sau de ctre autoritile naionale, dup caz, confirmate
de ctre autoritatea competent.
Pn la 3 ianuarie 2015, ABE emite orientri n conformitate
cu articolul 16 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 privind
tipul de simulri, evaluri sau exerci ii men ionate anterior
care pot duce la un asemenea sprijin.
Pn la 31 decembrie 2015, Comisia examineaz dac exist
n continuare nevoia de a permite msurile de sprijin
menionate la litera (d) punctul (iii) din primul paragraf i
condiiile ce trebuie ndeplinite n cazul continurii i
informeaz n acest sens Parlamentul European i Consiliul.
Dup caz, raportul respectiv este nsoit de o propunere
legislativ.
(5) n sensul alineatului (1) litera (c) din prezentul articol, o
msur de rezoluie este considerat de interes public dac
este necesar pentru a realiza i este propor ional cu cel
puin unul dintre obiectivele rezoluiei menionate la
articolul 31, iar lichidarea instituiei conform procedurii
obinuite de insolven nu ar permite atingerea obiectivelor
rezoluiei n aceeai msur.
(6) Pn la 3 iulie 2015, ABE emite orientri n conformitate
cu articolul 16 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 pentru
a promova convergena practicilor de supraveghere i de
rezoluie n ceea ce privete interpretarea diferitelor
circumstane n care se consider c o instituie este n curs
de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n
dificultate.
Articolul 33
Condiii de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie n cazul
instituiilor financiare i al societilor financiare holding
(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie pot
lua msuri de rezoluie n legtur cu o instituie financiar
menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b) atunci cnd
condiiile prevzute la articolul 32 alineatul (1) sunt
ndeplinite att n ceea ce privete instituia financiar, ct i
n ceea ce privete ntreprinderea-mam care face obiectul
supravegherii consolidate.
lua msuri de rezoluie n legtur cu o entitate men ionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) sau (d) atunci cnd
condiiile prevzute la articolul 32 alineatul (1) sunt
ndeplinite att n ceea ce privete entitatea men ionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) sau (d), ct i n ceea ce
privete una sau mai multe filiale ale acesteia care sunt
instituii sau, n cazul n care filiala nu este stabilit n
Uniune, autoritatea din ara ter care a stabilit c aceasta
ndeplinete condiiile pentru declanarea procedurii de
rezoluie n conformitate cu legislaia rii ter e respective.
(3) n cazul n care instituiile-filiale ale unei societ i
Bank, EBA or national authorities, where applicable,

confirmed by the competent authority.
EBA shall, by 3 January 2015, issue guidelines in
1093/2010 on the type of tests, reviews or exercises
referred to above which may lead to such support.
By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall review
whether there is a continuing need for allowing the
support measures under point (d)(iii) of the first
subparagraph and the conditions that need to be met in
the case of continuation and report thereon to the
European Parliament and to the Council. If appropriate,
that report shall be accompanied by a legislative
proposal.
5. For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1 of this
Article, a resolution action shall be treated as in the
public interest if it is necessary for the achievement of
and is proportionate to one or more of the resolution
objectives referred to in Article 31 and winding up of the
institution under normal insolvency proceedings would
not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent.
1093/2010 to promote the convergence of supervisory
and resolution practices regarding the interpretation of
the different circumstances when an institution shall be
considered to be failing or likely to fail.
Article 33
Conditions for resolution with regard to financial
institutions and holding companies
may take a resolution action in relation to a financial
institution referred to in point (b) of Article 1(1), when
the conditions laid down in Article 32(1), are met with
regard to both the financial institution and with regard to
the parent undertaking subject to consolidated
supervision.
may take a resolution action in relation to an entity
referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), when the
conditions laid down in Article 32(1) are met with regard
to both the entity referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article
1(1) and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which
are institutions or, where the subsidiary is not established
in the Union, the third-country authority has determined
that it meets the conditions for resolution under the law
of that third country.
3. Where the subsidiary institutions of a mixed-activity
95
holding cu activitate mixt sunt deinute, direct sau indirect,

de ctre o societate financiar holding intermediar, statele
membre se asigur c msurile de rezoluie viznd rezolu ia
grupului sunt luate n raport cu societatea financiar holding
intermediar i nu iau msuri de rezoluie viznd rezolu ia
grupului n raport cu societatea holding cu activitate mixt.
(4) Sub rezerva dispoziiilor alineatului (3) din prezentul
articol, n pofida faptului c o entitate menionat la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d)nu ndepline te condi iile
stabilite la articolul 32 alineatul (1), autoritile de rezolu ie
pot lua msuri de rezoluie cu privire la o entitate men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d) atunci cnd una
sau mai multe dintre instituiile-filiale ndeplinesc condi iile
stabilite la articolul 32 alineatele (1), (4) i (5), i activele i
pasivele acestora sunt de aa natur nct intrarea lor n
dificultate amenin o instituie sau grupul n ansamblul su,
sau legislaia n materie de insolven a statului membru
impune ca grupurile s fie tratate n ansamblu iar msurile de
rezoluie luate cu privire la entitatea menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d) sunt necesare pentru rezolu ia
unor asemenea instituii-filiale, sau pentru rezolu ia grupului
n ansamblul su.
n sensul alineatului (2) i al primului paragraf din prezentul
alineat, atunci cnd se evalueaz dac condiiile prevzute la
articolul 32 alineatul (1) sunt ndeplinite n ce prive te una
sau mai multe instituii-filiale, autoritatea de rezolu ie a
instituiei i autoritatea de rezoluie a entitii men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (c) sau (d), printr-un acord
comun, pot s nu ia n consideraie niciun transfer intragrup
de capital sau pierderi ntre entitile, inclusiv exercitarea
conversie.
Articole 34
Principii generale care reglementeaz rezolu ia
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd autoritile de
rezoluie aplic instrumente i exercit competen e de
rezoluie, ele iau toate msurile necesare pentru a garanta c
msurile de rezoluie sunt luate n conformitate cu
urmtoarele principii:
(a) | acionarii instituiei aflate n rezoluie sunt primii care
suport pierderi;
(b) | creditorii instituiei aflate n rezoluie suport pierderi
ulterior acionarilor, n conformitate cu ordinea prioritii
creanelor acestora din cadrul procedurii obi nuite de
insolven, cu excepia cazului n care n prezenta directiv
se prevede n mod expres altceva;
(c) | organul de conducere i conducerea superioar ale
instituiei aflate n rezoluie sunt nlocuite, cu excepia
cazurilor n care pstrarea integral sau par ial a organului
de conducere sau a conducerii superioare, n func ie de
holding company are held directly or indirectly by an

intermediate financial holding company, Member States
shall ensure that resolution actions for the purposes of
group resolution are taken in relation to the intermediate
financial holding company, and shall not take resolution
actions for the purposes of group resolution in relation to
the mixed-activity holding company.
4. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, notwithstanding
the fact that an entity referred to in point (c) or (d) of
Article 1(1) does not meet the conditions established in
Article 32(1), resolution authorities may take resolution
action with regard to an entity referred to in point (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) when one or more of the subsidiaries
which are institutions comply with the conditions
established in Article 32(1), (4) and (5) and their assets
and liabilities are such that their failure threatens an
institution or the group as a whole or the insolvency law
of the Member State requires that groups be treated as a
whole and resolution action with regard to the entity
referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is necessary
for the resolution of such subsidiaries which are
institutions or for the resolution of the group as a whole.
For the purposes of paragraph 2 and of the first
subparagraph of this paragraph, when assessing whether
the conditions in Article 32(1) are met in respect of one
or more subsidiaries which are institutions, the resolution
authority of the institution and the resolution authority of
the entity referred to in point (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
may by way of joint agreement disregard any intra-group
capital or loss transfers between the entities, including
the exercise of write down or conversion powers.
Article 34
General principles governing resolution
1. Member States shall ensure that, when applying the
resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers,
resolution authorities take all appropriate measures to
ensure that the resolution action is taken in accordance
with the following principles:
(a) | the shareholders of the institution under resolution
bear first losses;
(b) | creditors of the institution under resolution bear
losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order
of priority of their claims under normal insolvency
proceedings, save as expressly provided otherwise in this
Directive;
(c) | management body and senior management of the
institution under resolution are replaced, except in those
cases when the retention of the management body and
senior management, in whole or in part, as appropriate to
96
circumstane, este considerat necesar pentru realizarea

obiectivelor rezoluiei;
(d) | organul de conducere i conducerea superioar a
instituiei aflat n rezoluie ofer ntreaga asisten necesar
pentru realizarea obiectivelor rezoluiei;
(e) | persoanele fizice i juridice sunt trase la rspundere, n
temeiul legislaiei statului membru, n conformitate cu
dreptul civil sau penal, pentru responsabilitatea lor legat de
intrarea n dificultate a instituiei;
(f) | cu excepia unor dispoziii contrare din prezenta
directiv, creditorii din aceeai categorie sunt trata i n mod
egal;
(g) | niciun creditor nu suport pierderi mai mari dect cele
pe care le-ar fi suportat n cazul n care institu ia sau
entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c)
sau (d) ar fi fost lichidat prin intermediul procedurii
obinuite de insolven conform mecanismelor de siguran
de la articolele 73-75;
(h) | depozitele acoperite sunt protejate n ntregime; i
(i) | msurile de rezoluie se iau conform mecanismelor de
siguran din prezenta directiv.
(2) n cazul n care o instituie este o entitate din grup,
autoritile de rezoluie, fr a aduce atingere articolului 31,
aplic instrumente i exercit competene de rezoluie ntr-un
mod care reduce la minimum impactul asupra altor entit i
din grup i asupra grupului n ansamblu, precum i efectele
negative asupra stabilitii financiare n Uniunea European
i n statele sale membre, n special n rile n care grupul i
desfoar activitatea.
(3) Cnd aplic instrumente i exercit competen e de
rezoluie, statele membre se asigur c respect, dup caz,
cadrul Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat.
(4) n cazul n care unei instituii sau entiti men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) i se aplic un
instrument de vnzare a activitii, un instrument al
instituiei-punte sau un instrument de separare a activelor, se
consider c instituia sau entitatea face obiectul procedurii
de insolven sau al unei proceduri asemntoare de
insolven n sensul articolului 5 alineatul (1) din Directiva
2001/23/CE a Consiliului (30).
(5) Atunci cnd aplic instrumente de rezolu ie i exercit
informeaz i se consult cu reprezentanii angajailor, dac
este cazul.
(6) Autoritile de rezoluie aplic instrumente de rezoluie i
exercit competene de rezoluie fr a aduce atingere
dispoziiilor privind reprezentarea angajailor n organele de
conducere ale ntreprinderilor, conform dreptului intern sau
the circumstances, is considered to be necessary for the

achievement of the resolution objectives;
(d) | management body and senior management of the
institution under resolution shall provide all necessary
assistance for the achievement of the resolution
objectives;
(e) | natural and legal persons are made liable, subject to
Member State law, under civil or criminal law for their
responsibility for the failure of the institution;
(f) | except where otherwise provided in this Directive,
creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable
manner;
(g) | no creditor shall incur greater losses than would
have been incurred if the institution or entity referred to
in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) had been wound up
under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with
the safeguards in Articles 73 to 75;
(h) | covered deposits are fully protected; and
(i) | resolution action is taken in accordance with the
safeguards in this Directive.
2. Where an institution is a group entity resolution
authorities shall, without prejudice to Article 31, apply
resolution tools and exercise resolution powers in a way
that minimises the impact on other group entities and on
the group as a whole and minimises the adverse effects
on financial stability in the Union and its Member States,
in particular, in the countries where the group operates.
resolution powers, Member States shall ensure that they
comply with the Union State aid framework, where
applicable.
4. Where the sale of business tool, the bridge institution
tool or the asset separation tool is applied to an
Article 1(1), that institution or entity shall be considered
to be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or analogous
insolvency proceedings for the purposes of Article 5(1)
of Council Directive 2001/23/EC (30).
resolution powers, resolution authorities shall inform and
consult employee representatives where appropriate.
6. Resolution authorities shall apply resolution tools and
exercise resolution powers without prejudice to
provisions on the representation of employees in
management bodies as provided for in national law or
97
practicii naionale.
CAPITOLUL II
Administratorul special
Articolul 35
Administratorul special
desemna un administrator special care s nlocuiasc organul
de conducere al instituiei aflate n procedur de rezolu ie.
Autoritile
de
rezoluie
fac
public
numirea
administratorului special. n plus, statele membre se asigur
c administratorul special deine calificrile, cuno tin ele i
capacitatea necesare ndeplinirii funciilor sale.
(2) Administratorul special dispune de toate competen ele
acionarilor i ale organului de conducere al instituiei. Cu
toate acestea, administratorul special nu poate exercita aceste
competene dect sub controlul autoritii de rezolu ie.
(3) Administratorul special are obligaia statutar de a lua
toate msurile necesare pentru a promova obiectivele
rezoluiei menionate la articolul 31 i pentru a pune n
aplicare msurile de rezoluie n conformitate cu decizia
autoritii de rezoluie. Dup caz, aceast obligaie are
prioritate fa de orice alt obligaie de conducere rezultnd
din statutul instituiei sau din dreptul intern, dac acestea
sunt incompatibile. Msurile n cauz pot include o majorare
a capitalului, reorganizarea structurii de proprietate a
instituiei sau preluarea controlului de ctre instituii solide
din punct de vedere financiar i organizaional, n
conformitate cu instrumentele de rezoluie menionate la
capitolul IV.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie pot stabili limite ale ac iunilor
administratorului special sau pot solicita ca anumite acte ale
administratorului special s fac obiectul aprobrii prealabile
a autoritii de rezoluie. Autoritile de rezoluie pot destitui
administratorul special n orice moment.
(5) Statele membre solicit administratorului special s
ntocmeasc i s prezinte autoritii de rezoluie
responsabile cu numirea sa, la intervale regulate stabilite de
aceasta, precum i la nceputul i la sfr itul mandatului su,
rapoarte privind situaia economic i financiar a instituiei
i msurile ntreprinse cu ocazia exercitrii atribuiilor sale.
(6) Mandatul unui administrator special nu poate dep i un
an. Mandatul poate fi rennoit, n cazuri excep ionale, dac
autoritatea de rezoluie consider c sunt n continuare
ndeplinite condiiile de numire a unui administrator special.
(7) n cazul n care mai multe autoriti de rezoluie
intenioneaz s numeasc un administrator special pentru o
entitate afiliat la un grup, ele evalueaz n ce msur
numirea aceluiai administrator special pentru toate entit ile
n cauz ar fi mai oportun pentru a facilita gsirea unor
practice.
CHAPTER II
Special management
Article 35
Special management
may appoint a special manager to replace the
management body of the institution under resolution.
Resolution authorities shall make public the appointment
of a special manager. Member States shall further ensure
that the special manager has the qualifications, ability
and knowledge required to carry out his or her functions.
2. The special manager shall have all the powers of the
shareholders and the management body of the institution.
However, the special manager may only exercise such
powers under the control of the resolution authority.
3. The special manager shall have the statutory duty to
take all the measures necessary to promote the resolution
objectives referred to in Article 31 and implement
resolution actions according to the decision of the
resolution authority. Where necessary, that duty shall
override any other duty of management in accordance
with the statutes of the institution or national law, insofar
as they are inconsistent. Those measures may include an
increase of capital, reorganisation of the ownership
structure of the institution or takeovers by institutions
that are financially and organisationally sound in
accordance with the resolution tools referred to in
Chapter IV.
4. Resolution authorities may set limits to the action of a
special manager or require that certain acts of the special
manager be subject to the resolution authoritys prior
consent. The resolution authorities may remove the
special manager at any time.
5. Member States shall require that a special manager
draw up reports for the appointing resolution authority
on the economic and financial situation of the institution
and on the acts performed in the conduct of his or her
duties, at regular intervals set by the resolution authority
and at the beginning and the end of his or her mandate.
6. A special manager shall not be appointed for more
than one year. That period may be renewed, on an
exceptional basis, if the resolution authority determines
that the conditions for appointment of a special manager
continue to be met.
7. Where more than one resolution authority intends to
appoint a special manager in relation to an entity
affiliated to a group, they shall consider whether it is
more appropriate to appoint the same special manager
for all the entities concerned in order to facilitate
98
soluii de restabilire a soliditii financiare ale entit ilor n

cauz.
(8) n caz de insolven, dac dreptul intern prevede numirea
unui administrator de insolven, acesta poate fi considerat
administrator special n sensul prezentului articol.
CAPITOLUL III
Evaluare
Articolul 36
Evaluare n scopul rezoluiei
(1) nainte de a lua vreo msur de rezolu ie sau de a
exercita competena de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital relevante, autorit ile
de rezoluie se asigur c o persoan independent de orice
autoritate public, inclusiv de autoritatea de rezolu ie i de
instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d), efectueaz o evaluare corect, prudent
i realist a activelor i pasivelor instituiei sau entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d).
Sub rezerva alineatului (13) din prezentul articol i a
articolului 85, n cazul n care sunt respectate toate cerin ele
enunate la prezentul articol, evaluarea se consider a fi
definitiv.
(2) Dac o evaluare independent n conformitate cu
alineatul (1) nu este posibil, autoritile de rezolu ie pot
efectua o evaluare provizorie a activelor i pasivelor
instituiei sau ale entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), n conformitate cu alineatul (9) din
prezentul articol.
(3) Obiectivul evalurii este acela de a evalua valoarea
activelor i pasivelor instituiei sau entitii menionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) care ndepline te
condiiile de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie menionate
la articolele 32 i 33.
(4) Scopurile evalurii sunt:
(a) | s fundamenteze stabilirea faptului c s-au ndeplinit
condiiile de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie sau
condiiile de reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie a
instrumentelor de capital;
(b) | n cazul n care sunt ndeplinite condi iile de declan are
a procedurii de rezoluie, s fundamenteze decizia privind
msura de rezoluie corespunztoare care trebuie luat n
legtur cu instituia sau cu entitatea men ionat la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d);
(c) | n cazul n care este exercitat competen a de reducere a
valorii contabile sau de conversie a instrumentelor de capital
relevante, s fundamenteze decizia privind amploarea
anulrii sau dilurii aciunilor sau a altor instrumente de
proprietate, precum i amploarea reducerii valorii contabile
sau a conversiei instrumentelor de capital relevante;
solutions redressing the financial soundness of the

entities concerned.
8. In the event of insolvency, where national law
provides for the appointment of insolvency management,
such management may constitute special management as
referred to in this Article.
CHAPTER III
Valuation
Article 36
Valuation for the purposes of resolution
1. Before taking resolution action or exercising the
power to write down or convert relevant capital
instruments resolution authorities shall ensure that a fair,
prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities
of the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) is carried out by a person independent
from any public authority, including the resolution
authority, and the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1). Subject to paragraph 13 of
this Article and to Article 85, where all the requirements
laid down in this Article are met, the valuation shall be
considered to be definitive.
2. Where an independent valuation according to
paragraph 1 is not possible, resolution authorities may
carry out a provisional valuation of the assets and
liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), in accordance with
3. The objective of the valuation shall be to assess the
value of the assets and liabilities of the institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
that meets the conditions for resolution of Articles 32 and
33.
4. The purposes of the valuation shall be:
(a) | to inform the determination of whether the
conditions for resolution or the conditions for the write
down or conversion of capital instruments are met;
(b) | if the conditions for resolution are met, to inform the
decision on the appropriate resolution action to be taken
in respect of the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(c) | when the power to write down or convert relevant
capital instruments is applied, to inform the decision on
the extent of the cancellation or dilution of shares or
other instruments of ownership, and the extent of the
write down or conversion of relevant capital instruments;
99
(d) | n cazul n care se aplic instrumentul de recapitalizare

intern, s fundamenteze decizia privind amploarea reducerii
valorii contabile sau a conversiei pasivelor eligibile;
(e) | n cazul n care se aplic instrumentul institu iei-punte
sau instrumentul de separare a activelor, s fundamenteze
decizia privind activele, drepturile, pasivele sau ac iunile sau
alte instrumente de proprietate care urmeaz s fie
transferate i decizia privind valoarea eventualelor
contraprestaii ce trebuie pltite instituiei aflate n rezolu ie
sau, dup caz, deintorilor aciunilor sau ai altor instrumente
de proprietate;
(f) | n cazul n care se aplic instrumentul de vnzare a
activitii, s fundamenteze decizia privind activele,
drepturile, pasivele sau aciunile sau alte instrumente de
proprietate care urmeaz s fie transferate i s
fundamenteze interpretarea pe care autoritatea de rezolu ie o
d condiiilor comerciale n sensul articolului 38;
(g) | n toate situaiile, s asigure c eventualele pierderi
privind activele instituiei sau entitii menionate la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sunt recunoscute n
ntregime n momentul aplicrii instrumentelor de rezolu ie
sau al exercitrii competenei de reducere a valorii contabile
sau de conversie a instrumentelor de capital relevante.
(5) Fr a aduce atingere, dup caz, cadrului Uniunii privind
ajutoarele de stat, evaluarea se bazeaz pe estimri prudente,
inclusiv n ceea ce privete ratele de default i gravitatea
pierderilor. Evaluarea nu se bazeaz pe nicio poten ial
furnizare viitoare de sprijin financiar public extraordinar sau
de asisten privind lichiditatea n situaii de urgen din
partea bncii centrale sau orice asisten sub form de
lichiditi din partea bncii centrale acordat cu garan ii,
dobnzi sau durate non-standard instituiei sau entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d)
din momentul n care se ia msura de rezoluie sau n care se
exercit competena de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital relevante. n plus,
evaluarea ine seama de faptul c, n cazul n care se aplic
unul dintre instrumentele de rezoluie:
(a) | autoritatea de rezoluie i orice mecanisme de finanare
care acioneaz n temeiul articolului 101 poate recupera
eventualele cheltuieli rezonabile suportate n mod
corespunztor de la instituia aflat n rezoluie, n
(b) | mecanismul de finanare a rezoluiei poate percepe
dobnzi sau taxe n legtur cu eventualele mprumuturi sau
garanii furnizate instituiei aflate n rezolu ie, n
conformitate cu articolul 101.
(6) Evaluarea trebuie s fie nsoit de urmtoarele
informaii, care trebuie s figureze n registrele i eviden ele
contabile ale instituiei sau ale entitii men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d):
(d) | when the bail-in tool is applied, to inform the

decision on the extent of the write down or conversion of
eligible liabilities;
(e) | when the bridge institution tool or asset separation
tool is applied, to inform the decision on the assets,
rights, liabilities or shares or other instruments of
ownership to be transferred and the decision on the value
of any consideration to be paid to the institution under
resolution or, as the case may be, to the owners of the
shares or other instruments of ownership;
(f) | when the sale of business tool is applied, to inform
the decision on the assets, rights, liabilities or shares or
other instruments of ownership to be transferred and to
inform the resolution authoritys understanding of what
constitutes commercial terms for the purposes of Article
38;
(g) | in all cases, to ensure that any losses on the assets of
the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d)
of Article 1(1) are fully recognised at the moment the
resolution tools are applied or the power to write down
or convert relevant capital instruments is exercised.
5. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework,
where applicable, the valuation shall be based on prudent
assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity
of losses. The valuation shall not assume any potential
future provision of extraordinary public financial support
or central bank emergency liquidity assistance or any
central bank liquidity assistance provided under nonstandard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms to
of Article 1(1) from the point at which resolution action
is taken or the power to write down or convert relevant
capital instruments is exercised. Furthermore, the
valuation shall take account of the fact that, if any
resolution tool is applied:
(a) | the resolution authority and any financing
arrangement acting pursuant to Article 101 may recover
any reasonable expenses properly incurred from the
institution under resolution, in accordance with Article
37(7);
(b) | the resolution financing arrangement may charge
interest or fees in respect of any loans or guarantees
provided to the institution under resolution, in
accordance with Article 101.
6. The valuation shall be supplemented by the following
information as appearing in the accounting books and
records of the institution or entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1):
100
(a) | un bilan actualizat i un raport privind pozi ia

financiar a instituiei sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d);
(b) | o analiz i o estimare a valorii contabile a activelor;
(c) | o list a soldului din bilan i din afara bilanului a
datoriilor care figureaz n registrele i eviden ele contabile
ale instituiei sau ale entitii menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), cu indicarea creditelor
relevante i a rangurilor de prioritate ale acestora, conform
legislaiei aplicabile privind insolvena;
(7) Dup caz, n vederea fundamentrii deciziilor men ionate
la alineatul (4) literele (e) i (f), informa iile de la alineatul
(6) litera (b) pot fi nsoite de o analiz i de o estimare a
valorii activelor i pasivelor instituiei sau ale entitii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) pe
baza valorii de pia.
(8) Evaluarea indic repartizarea creditorilor pe categorii n
funcie de rangurile de prioritate conform legislaiei
aplicabile privind insolvena i furnizeaz o estimare a
tratamentului de care ar fi putut beneficia fiecare dintre
categoriile de acionari i de creditori dac instituia sau
entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c)
sau (d) ar fi fost lichidat conform procedurilor obi nuite de
insolven.
Aceast estimare nu afecteaz aplicarea principiului nici un
creditor nu trebuie s fie dezavantajat n conformitate cu
articolul 74.
(9) n cazul n care, din cauza caracterului urgent al situa iei,
nu este posibil respectarea cerinelor prevzute la alineatele
(6) i (8) sau se aplic alineatul (2), trebuie efectuat o
evaluare provizorie. Evaluarea provizorie respect efectuat
cerinele prevzute la alineatul (3) i, pe ct este posibil n
mod rezonabil avnd n vedere situaia dat, cu cerin ele de
la alineatele (1), (6) i (8).
Evaluarea provizorie menionat la prezentul alineat
cuprinde o rezerv pentru pierderi suplimentare, cu
justificarea adecvat.
(10) O evaluare care nu respect toate cerin ele prevzute n
prezentul articol este considerat provizorie pn la
momentul n care o persoan independent efectueaz o
evaluare care respect pe deplin toate cerin ele prevzute la
prezentul articol. Aceast evaluare definitiv ex post se
efectueaz ct mai curnd posibil. Ea poate fi efectuat fie
separat de evaluarea menionat la articolul 74, fie simultan
cu cea efectuat de aceeai persoan independent, ns este
distinct de aceasta.
Evaluarea definitiv ex post se realizeaz n urmtoarele
scopuri:
(a) | s asigure c eventualele pierderi privind activele
(a) | an updated balance sheet and a report on the

financial position of the institution or entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(b) | an analysis and an estimate of the accounting value
of the assets;
(c) | the list of outstanding on balance sheet and off
balance sheet liabilities shown in the books and records
(d) of Article 1(1), with an indication of the respective
credits and priority levels under the applicable
insolvency law.
7. Where appropriate, to inform the decisions referred to
in points (e) and (f) of paragraph 4, the information in
point (b) of paragraph 6 may be complemented by an
analysis and estimate of the value of the assets and
liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) on a market value basis.
8. The valuation shall indicate the subdivision of the
creditors in classes in accordance with their priority
levels under the applicable insolvency law and an
estimate of the treatment that each class of shareholders
and creditors would have been expected to receive, if the
Article 1(1) were wound up under normal insolvency
proceedings.
That estimate shall not affect the application of the no
creditor worse off principle to be carried out under
Article 74.
9. Where due to the urgency in the circumstances of the
case it is not possible to comply with the requirements in
paragraphs 6 and 8 or paragraph 2 applies, a provisional
valuation shall be carried out. The provisional valuation
shall comply with the requirements in paragraph 3 and in
so far as reasonably practicable in the circumstances with
the requirements of paragraphs 1, 6 and 8.
The provisional valuation referred to in this paragraph
shall include a buffer for additional losses, with
appropriate justification.
10. A valuation that does not comply with all the
requirements laid down in this Article shall be
considered to be provisional until an independent person
has carried out a valuation that is fully compliant with all
the requirements laid down in this Article. That ex-post
definitive valuation shall be carried out as soon as
practicable. It may be carried out either separately from
the valuation referred to in Article 74, or simultaneously
with and by the same independent person as that
valuation, but shall be distinct from it.
The purposes of the ex-post definitive valuation shall be:
(a) | to ensure that any losses on the assets of the
101

(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sunt recunoscute n ntregime n
registrele contabile ale instituiei sau ale entit ii men ionate
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d);
(b) | s fundamenteze o decizie de a reajusta crean ele
creditorilor sau s majoreze valoarea contrapresta iilor
pltite, n conformitate cu alineatul (11).
(11) n situaia n care evaluarea definitiv ex post estimeaz
c valoarea activului net al instituiei sau al entit ii
este mai mare dect valoarea activului net al instituiei sau al
entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c)
sau (d) estimat de evaluarea provizorie, autoritatea de
rezoluie are posibilitatea:
(a) | s-i exercite competena de a majora valoarea
creanelor creditorilor sau a proprietarilor de instrumente de
capital relevante care au fost reduse n cadrul instrumentului
de recapitalizare intern;
(b) | s mputerniceasc o instituie-punte sau un vehicul de
gestionare a activelor s efectueze o plat suplimentar de
contraprestaii aferente activelor, drepturilor sau datoriilor
fa de instituia aflat n rezoluie sau, dup caz, aferente
aciunilor sau instrumentelor de proprietate ctre de intorii
aciunilor sau altor instrumente de proprietate.
(12) Fr a aduce atingere alineatului (1), evaluarea
provizorie efectuat n conformitate cu alineatele (9) i (10)
este un temei valabil pentru ca autoritile de rezolu ie s ia
msuri de rezoluie, inclusiv s preia controlul unei instituii
sau entiti n curs de a intra n dificultate men ionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d), sau s i
exercite competena de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital.
(13) Evaluarea face parte integrant din decizia de aplicare a
unui instrument sau de exercitare a unei competen e de
rezoluie sau din decizia de exercitare a competen ei de
reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie a
instrumentelor de capital. Evaluarea n sine nu face obiectul
unei ci de atac separate, dar poate fi supus unei ci de atac
mpreun cu decizia luat n conformitate cu articolul 85.
reglementare pentru a preciza circumstan ele n care o
persoan este independent de autoritatea de rezoluie i de
litera (b), (c) sau (d) n sensul aplicrii alineatului (1) din
prezentul articol i a articolului 74.
(15) ABE poate elabora proiecte de standarde tehnice de
reglementare pentru a preciza criteriile de mai jos, n sensul
aplicrii alineatelor (1), (3) i (9) din prezentul articol i a
articolului 74:
(a) | metodologia utilizat pentru evaluarea valorii activelor
i pasivelor instituiei sau ale entitii menionate la articolul

Article 1(1) are fully recognised in the books of accounts
(d) of Article 1(1);
(b) | to inform a decision to write back creditors claims
or to increase the value of the consideration paid, in
accordance with paragraph 11.
11. In the event that the ex-post definitive valuations
estimate of the net asset value of the institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is higher
than the provisional valuations estimate of the net asset
value of the institution or entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1), the resolution authority may:
(a) | exercise its power to increase the value of the claims
of creditors or owners of relevant capital instruments
which have been written down under the bail-in tool;
(b) | instruct a bridge institution or asset management
vehicle to make a further payment of consideration in
respect of the assets, rights, liabilities to the institution
under resolution, or as the case may be, in respect of the
shares or instruments of ownership to the owners of the
shares or other instruments of ownership.
12. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a provisional valuation
conducted in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 shall
be a valid basis for resolution authorities take resolution
actions, including taking control of a failing institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), or
to exercise the write down or conversion power of capital
instruments.
13. The valuation shall be an integral part of the decision
to apply a resolution tool or exercise a resolution power,
or the decision to exercise the write down or conversion
power of capital instruments. The valuation itself shall
not be subject to a separate right of appeal but may be
subject to an appeal together with the decision in
standards to specify the circumstances in which a person
is independent from both the resolution authority and the
Article 1(1) for the purposes of paragraph 1of this
Article, and for the purposes of Article 74.
15. EBA may develop draft regulatory technical
standards to specify the following criteria for the
purposes of paragraphs 1, 3 and 9 of this Article, and for
the purposes of Article 74:
(a) | the methodology for assessing the value of the assets
and liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in
102

(b) | separarea evalurilor n temeiul articolelor 36 i 74;
(c) | metodologia utilizat pentru calcularea i includerea
unei rezerve pentru pierderi suplimentare n evaluarea
provizorie.
(16) ABE nainteaz proiectele de standarde tehnice
menionate la alineatul (14) Comisiei pn la 3 iulie 2015.
tehnice de reglementare menionate la alineatele (14) i (15),
n conformitate cu articolele 10-14 din Regulamentul (UE)
nr. 1093/2010.
CAPITOLUL IV
Instrumente de rezoluie
Seciunea 1
Principii generale
Articolul 37
Principii generale ale instrumentelor de rezoluie
dein competenele necesare pentru a aplica instrumentele de
rezoluie instituiilor i entitilor menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) care ndeplinesc condi iile
de declanare a procedurii de rezoluie.
(2) n cazul n care autoritatea de rezolu ie decide s aplice
un instrument de rezoluie unei instituii sau entiti
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d),
iar msura de rezoluie respectiv ar duce la suportarea unor
pierderi de ctre creditori sau la conversia crean elor
acestora, autoritatea de rezoluie i exercit competen a de
reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie a
instrumentelor de capital n conformitate cu articolul 59
imediat nainte sau odat cu aplicarea instrumentului de
rezoluie.
(3) Instrumentele de rezoluie menionate la alineatul (1)
sunt urmtoarele:
(a) | instrumentul de vnzare a activitii;
(b) | instrumentul instituiei-punte;
(c) | instrumentul de separare a activelor;
(d) | instrumentul de recapitalizare intern.
(4) Sub rezerva alineatului (5), autorit ile de rezolu ie pot
aplica instrumentele de rezoluie fie individual, fie ntr-o
combinaie oarecare.
(5) Autoritile de rezoluie pot aplica instrumentul de
separare a activelor numai mpreun cu un alt instrument de
rezoluie.
(6) n cazul n care doar instrumentele de rezolu ie
menionate la alineatul (3) litera (a) sau (b) din prezentul
articol sunt utilizate pentru a transfera doar par ial active,
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);

(b) | the separation of the valuations under Articles 36
and 74;
(c) | the methodology for calculating and including a
buffer for additional losses in the provisional valuation.
16. EBA shall submit the draft regulatory technical
standards referred to in paragraph 14 to the Commission
by 3 July 2015.
regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraphs
14 and 15 in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of
CHAPTER IV
Resolution tools
Section 1
General principles
Article 37
General principles of resolution tools
have the necessary powers to apply the resolution tools
to institutions and to entities referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1) that meet the applicable conditions
for resolution.
2. Where a resolution authority decides to apply a
resolution tool to an institution or entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), and that resolution
action would result in losses being borne by creditors or
their claims being converted, the resolution authority
shall exercise the power to write down and convert
capital instruments in accordance with Article 59
immediately before or together with the application of
the resolution tool.
3. The resolution tools referred to in paragraph 1 are the
following:
(a) | the sale of business tool;
(b) | the bridge institution tool;
(c) | the asset separation tool;
(d) | the bail-in tool.
4. Subject to paragraph 5, resolution authorities may
apply the resolution tools individually or in any
combination.
5. Resolution authorities may apply the asset separation
tool only together with another resolution tool.
6. Where only the resolution tools referred to in point (a)
or (b) of paragraph 3 of this Article are used, and they are
used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities
103
drepturi sau pasive ale unei instituii aflate n rezolu ie,

instituia sau entitatea rezidual menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) de la care au fost
transferate activele, drepturile sau pasivele este lichidat n
baza procedurii obinuite de insolven. Acest lucru se
realizeaz ntr-un termen rezonabil, avnd n vedere orice
eventual situaie n care instituia sau entitatea men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) trebuie s
furnizeze servicii sau sprijin n conformitate cu articolul 65,
pentru a permite beneficiarului s- i desf oare activit ile
sau serviciile achiziionate n temeiul transferului, precum i
orice alt motiv care face continuarea pr ii reziduale a
instituiei sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d) necesar pentru atingerea obiectivelor
rezoluiei sau respectarea principiilor prevzute la articolul
34.
(7) Autoritatea de rezoluie i orice mecanism de finan are ce
acioneaz n temeiul articolului 101 poate recupera orice
eventuale cheltuieli rezonabile suportate n mod
corespunztor n legtur cu utilizarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie, cu exercitarea competenelor de rezolu ie sau cu
utilizarea instrumentelor guvernamentale de stabilizare
financiar, ntr-una sau mai multe dintre modalitile
urmtoare:
(a) | ca deducere din orice contrapresta ii pltite de beneficiar
instituiei aflate n rezoluie sau, dup caz, deintorilor
aciunilor sau ai altor instrumente de proprietate;
(b) | de la instituia aflat n rezoluie, n calitate de creditor
preferenial; or
(c) | din eventualele ncasri ca urmare a ncetrii
funcionrii instituiei-punte sau a vehiculului de gestionare a
activelor, n calitate de creditor preferenial.
(8) Statele membre se asigur c normele legisla iei
naionale n materie de insolven referitoare la anularea sau
inopozabilitatea actelor prejudiciabile masei creditorilor nu
se aplic transferurilor de active, drepturi sau pasive de la o
instituie aflat n rezoluie ctre o alt entitate n virtutea
aplicrii unui instrument de rezoluie, a exercitrii unei
competene de rezoluie sau a utilizrii unui instrument
guvernamental de stabilizare financiar.
(9) Statele membre pot s confere autoritilor de rezoluie
instrumente i competene suplimentare care s poat fi
exercitate n cazul n care o instituie sau o entitate
menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d)
ndeplinete condiiile de declanare a procedurii de
rezoluie, dac:
(a) | atunci cnd sunt aplicate unui grup transfrontalier,
aceste competene suplimentare nu ridic obstacole n calea
unei rezoluii eficiente a grupului; i
(b) | ele respect obiectivele rezoluiei i principiile generale
of the institution under resolution, the residual institution

from which the assets, rights or liabilities have been
transferred, shall be wound up under normal insolvency
proceedings. Such winding up shall be done within a
reasonable timeframe, having regard to any need for that
Article 1(1) to provide services or support pursuant to
Article 65 in order to enable the recipient to carry out the
activities or services acquired by virtue of that transfer,
and any other reason that the continuation of the residual
Article 1(1) is necessary to achieve the resolution
objectives or comply with the principles referred to in
Article 34.
7. The resolution authority and any financing
arrangement acting pursuant to Article 101 may recover
any reasonable expenses properly incurred in connection
with the use of the resolution tools or powers or
government financial stabilisation tools in one or more of
the following ways:
(a) | as a deduction from any consideration paid by a

recipient to the institution under resolution or, as the case
may be, to the owners of the shares or other instruments
of ownership;
(b) | from the institution under resolution, as a preferred
creditor; or
(c) | from any proceeds generated as a result of the
termination of the operation of the bridge institution or
the asset management vehicle, as a preferred creditor.
8. Member States shall ensure that rules under national
insolvency law relating to the voidability or
unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to creditors do
not apply to transfers of assets, rights or liabilities from
an institution under resolution to another entity by virtue
of the application of a resolution tool or exercise of a
resolution power, or use of a government financial
stabilisation tool.
9. Member States may confer upon resolution authorities
additional tools and powers exercisable where an
Article 1(1) meets the conditions for resolution, provided
that:
(a) | when applied to a cross-border group, those
additional powers do not pose obstacles to effective
group resolution; and
(b) | they are consistent with the resolution objectives
104
care reglementeaz rezoluia, menionate la articolele 31 i

34.
(10) n situaia extraordinar a unei crize sistemice,
autoritatea de rezoluie poate cuta finanare din surse de
finanare alternative prin utilizarea instrumentelor de
stabilizare guvernamentale prevzute la articolele 56-58
atunci cnd sunt ndeplinite urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | acionarii i deintorii de alte instrumente de
proprietate, precum i deintorii de instrumente de capital
relevante i de alte pasive eligibile au adus o contribuie, prin
reducerea valorii contabile, prin conversie sau prin alte
modaliti, n vederea absorbiei pierderilor i a
recapitalizrii instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n valoare de cel
puin 8 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile proprii
ale instituiei respective, cuantificat la momentul lurii
msurii de rezoluie n conformitate cu evaluarea prevzut
la articolul 36;
(b) | aceasta va fi condiionat de aprobarea prealabil i
final n conformitate cu cadrul Uniunii privind ajutoarele de
stat.
Seciunea 2
Instrumentul de vnzare a activitii
Articolul 38
Instrumentul de vnzare a activitii
competena de a transfera ctre un cumprtor care nu este o
instituie-punte:
(a) | aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate emise de o
instituie aflat n rezoluie;
(b) | orice categorii de active, drepturi sau pasive ale unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie sau totalitatea acestora.
Sub rezerva alineatelor (8) i (9) din prezentul articol i a
articolului 85, transferul menionat la primul paragraf are loc
fr n a obine acordul acionarilor institu iei aflate n
rezoluie sau al oricrei pri tere, alta dect cumprtorul i
fr a se conforma vreunei cerine procedurale prevzute de
dreptul comercial sau de cel al titlurilor de valoare, altele
dect cele incluse la articolul 39.
(2) Un transfer efectuat n conformitate cu alineatul (1) se
efectueaz n condiii comerciale, avnd n vedere
circumstanele i n conformitate cu cadrul Uniunii privind
ajutoarele de stat.
(3) n conformitate cu alineatul (2) din prezentul articol,
autoritile de rezoluie iau toate msurile rezonabile pentru
a obine un transfer n condiii comerciale care sunt
conforme evalurii efectuate n conformitate cu articolul 36,
avnd n vedere circumstanele cazului.
(4) Sub rezerva articolului 37 alineatul (7), orice
contraprestaie pltit de cumprtor se face n favoarea:
and the general principles governing resolution referred

to in Articles 31 and 34.
10. In the very extraordinary situation of a systemic
crisis, the resolution authority may seek funding from
alternative financing sources through the use of
government stabilisation tools provided for in Articles 56
to 58 when the following conditions are met:
(a) | a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation
equal to an amount not less than 8 % of total liabilities
including own funds of the institution under resolution,
measured at the time of resolution action in accordance
with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been
made by the shareholders and the holders of other
instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital
instruments and other eligible liabilities through write
down, conversion or otherwise;
(b) | it shall be conditional on prior and final approval
under the Union State aid framework.
Section 2
The sale of business tool
Article 38
The sale of business tool
have the power to transfer to a purchaser that is not a
bridge institution:
(a) | shares or other instruments of ownership issued by
an institution under resolution;
(b) | all or any assets, rights or liabilities of an institution
under resolution;
Subject to paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Article and to
Article 85, the transfer referred to in the first
subparagraph shall take place without obtaining the
consent of the shareholders of the institution under
resolution or any third party other than the purchaser, and
without complying with any procedural requirements
under company or securities law other than those
included in Article 39.
2. A transfer made pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be made
on commercial terms, having regard to the
circumstances, and in accordance with the Union State
aid framework.
3. In accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article,
resolution authorities shall take all reasonable steps to
obtain commercial terms for the transfer that conform
with the valuation conducted under Article 36, having
regard to the circumstances of the case.
4. Subject to Article 37(7), any consideration paid by the
purchaser shall benefit:
105
(a) | proprietarilor aciunilor sau instrumentelor de

proprietate, n cazul n care vnzarea activit ii s-a efectuat
prin transferarea aciunilor sau instrumentelor de proprietate
emise de instituia aflat n rezoluie de la deintorii
respectivelor aciuni sau instrumente la cumprtor;
(b) | instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n cazul n care vnzarea
activitii s-a efectuat prin transferarea unora sau a tuturor
activelor sau pasivelor instituiei aflate n rezoluie la
cumprtor.
(5) Atunci cnd aplic instrumentul de vnzare a activit ii,
autoritatea de rezoluie poate exercita competen a de transfer
n mod repetat, pentru a efectua transferuri suplimentare de
aciuni ori de alte instrumente de proprietate emise de o
instituie aflat n rezoluie sau, dup caz, de active, drepturi
sau pasive ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
(6) Dup aplicarea instrumentului de vnzare a activit ii i
cu aprobarea cumprtorului, autorit ile de rezoluie pot
exercita competenele de transfer n ceea ce prive te activele,
drepturile ori pasivele transferate cumprtorului, n vederea
transferului activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor napoi la
instituia aflat n rezoluie, ori al aciunilor sau al altor
instrumente de proprietate napoi la proprietarii lor ini iali,
iar instituia aflat n rezoluie sau proprietarii ini iali au
obligaia de a accepta orice astfel de active, drepturi sau
pasive, aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate.
(7) Cumprtorul are autorizaia corespunztoare de
desfurare a activitilor pe care le dobndete atunci cnd
transferul este efectuat n conformitate cu alineatul (1).
Statele membre se asigur c cererea de autorizare,
coroborat cu transferul, este luat n considerare n timp
util.
(8) Prin derogare de la articolele 22-25 din Directiva
2013/36/UE de la obligaia de a informa autorit ile
competente de la articolul 26 din Directiva 2013/36/UE,
articolul 10 alineatul (3), articolul 11 alineatele (1) i (2) i
articolele 12 i 13 din Directiva 2014/65/UE i de la
obligaia de notificare menionat la articolul 11 alineatul (3)
din respectiva directiv, n cazul n care o vnzare de ac iuni
sau alte instrumente de proprietate n virtutea aplicrii
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii ar duce la
achiziionarea sau majorarea unei participa ii calificate ntr-o
instituie de tipul celor menionate la articolul 22 alineatul
(1) din Directiva 2013/36/UE sau la articolul 11 alineatul (1)
din Directiva 2014/65/UE, autoritatea competent a acelei
instituii efectueaz evaluarea necesar n temeiul acelor
articole n timp util, astfel nct s nu ntrzie aplicarea
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii i s mpiedice msura
de rezoluie s i ating obiectivele relevante ale rezoluiei.
(9) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazul n care autoritatea
competent a respectivei instituii nu a finalizat evaluarea
menionat la alineatul (8) de la data transferului de ac iuni
(a) | the owners of the shares or other instruments of

ownership, where the sale of business has been effected
by transferring shares or instruments of ownership issued
by the institution under resolution from the holders of
those shares or instruments to the purchaser;
(b) | the institution under resolution, where the sale of
business has been effected by transferring some or all of
the assets or liabilities of the institution under resolution
to the purchaser.
5. When applying the sale of business tool the resolution
authority may exercise the transfer power more than
once in order to make supplemental transfers of shares or
other instruments of ownership issued by an institution
under resolution or, as the case may be, assets, rights or
liabilities of the institution under resolution.
6. Following an application of the sale of business tool,
resolution authorities may, with the consent of the
purchaser, exercise the transfer powers in respect of
assets, rights or liabilities transferred to the purchaser in
order to transfer the assets, rights or liabilities back to the
institution under resolution, or the shares or other
instruments of ownership back to their original owners,
and the institution under resolution or original owners
shall be obliged to take back any such assets, rights or
liabilities, or shares or other instruments of ownership.
7. A purchaser shall have the appropriate authorisation to
carry out the business it acquires when the transfer is
made pursuant to paragraph 1. Competent authorities
shall ensure that an application for authorisation shall be
considered, in conjunction with the transfer, in a timely
manner.
8. By way of derogation from Articles 22 to 25 of
Directive 2013/36/EU, from the requirement to inform
the competent authorities in Article 26 of Directive
2013/36/EU, from Article 10(3), Article 11(1) and (2)
and Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2014/65/EU and
from the requirement to give a notice in Article 11(3) of
that Directive, where a transfer of shares or other
instruments of ownership by virtue of an application of
the sale of business tool would result in the acquisition of
or increase in a qualifying holding in an institution of a
kind referred to in Article 22(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU
or Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, the competent
authority of that institution shall carry out the assessment
required under those Articles in a timely manner that
does not delay the application of the sale of business tool
and prevent the resolution action from achieving the
relevant resolution objectives.
9. Member States shall ensure that if the competent
authority of that institution has not completed the
assessment referred to in paragraph 8 from the date of
106
sau de alte instrumente de proprietate n cursul aplicrii

instrumentului de vnzare a activitii de ctre autoritatea de
rezoluie, se aplic urmtoarele dispozi ii:
(a) | respectivul transfer de aciuni sau de alte instrumente de
proprietate ctre cumprtor are efect juridic imediat;
(b) | n cursul perioadei de evaluare i n cursul eventualelor
perioade de dezinvestire prevzute la litera (f), dreptul
cumprtorului de vot aferent respectivelor ac iuni sau altor
instrumente de proprietate este suspendat i i revine doar
autoritii de rezoluie, care nu are nicio obligaie de a
exercita vreun astfel de drept de vot i care nu are nici o
rspundere pentru exercitarea sau neexercitarea respectivelor
drepturi de vot;
(c) | n cursul perioadei de evaluare i n cursul oricrei
perioade de dezinvestire prevzute la litera (f), sanciunile i
celelalte msuri aplicate nclcrii condi iilor pentru achizi ii
sau cedri ale participaiilor calificate avute n vedere la
articolele 66, 67 i 68 din Directiva 2013/36/UE nu se aplic
respectivelor transferuri de aciuni sau de alte instrumente de
proprietate;
(d) | autoritatea competent, imediat dup finalizarea
evalurii, notific n scris autoritii de rezoluie i
cumprtorului decizia autoritii competente de a aproba
sau, n conformitate cu articolul 22 alineatul (5) din
Directiva 2013/36/UE, de a se opune respectivului transfer
de aciuni sau de alte instrumente de proprietate ctre
cumprtor;
(e) | n cazul n care autoritatea competent aprob un astfel
de transfer de aciuni sau de alte instrumente de proprietate
ctre cumprtor, dreptul de vot aferent respectivelor ac iuni
sau altor instrumente de proprietate se consider acordat n
ntregime cumprtorului, imediat dup primirea de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie i de ctre cumprtor a respectivei
notificri de aprobare din partea autoritii competente;
(f) | dac autoritatea competent se opune respectivului
transfer de aciuni sau de alte instrumente de proprietate
ctre cumprtor, atunci: | (i) | dreptul de vot aferent
respectivelor aciuni sau altor instrumente de proprietate
prevzut la punctul (b) rmne n vigoare n ntregime; | (ii) |
autoritatea de rezoluie poate cere cumprtorului s cedeze
respectivele aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate ntrun termen de dezinvestire determinat de autoritatea de
rezoluie dup ce a luat n considerare condi iile de pia
prevalente; i | (iii) | n cazul n care cumprtorul nu
finalizeaz respectiva dezinvestire n termenul de
dezinvestire stabilit de autoritatea de rezoluie, atunci
autoritatea competent, cu aprobarea autoritii de rezolu ie,
poate impune cumprtorului sanciuni i alte msuri pentru
nclcarea cerinelor de achiziie sau de cedare a
participaiilorcalificate menionate la articolele 66, 67 i 68
transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership in

the application of the sale of business tool by the
resolution authority, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) | such a transfer of shares or other instruments of
ownership to the acquirer shall have immediate legal
effect;
(b) | during the assessment period and during any
divestment period provided by point (f), the acquirers
voting rights attached to such shares or other instruments
of ownership shall be suspended and vested solely in the
resolution authority, which shall have no obligation to
exercise any such voting rights and which shall have no
liability whatsoever for exercising or refraining from
exercising any such voting rights;
(c) | during the assessment period and during any
divestment period provided by point (f), the penalties and
other measures for infringing the requirements for
acquisitions or disposals of qualifying holdings
contemplated by Articles 66, 67 and 68 of Directive
2013/36/EU shall not apply to such a transfer of shares
or other instruments of ownership;
(d) | promptly upon completion of the assessment by the
competent authority, the competent authority shall notify
the resolution authority and the acquirer in writing of
whether the competent authority approves or, in
accordance with Article 22(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU,
opposes such a transfer of shares or other instruments of
ownership to the acquirer;
(e) | if the competent authority approves such a transfer
of shares or other instruments of ownership to the
acquirer, then the voting rights attached to such shares or
other instruments of ownership shall be deemed to be
fully vested in the acquirer immediately upon receipt by
the resolution authority and the acquirer of such an
approval notice from the competent authority;
(f) | if the competent authority opposes such a transfer of
shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer,
then: | (i) | the voting rights attached to such shares or
other instruments of ownership as provided by point (b)
shall remain in full force and effect; | (ii) | the resolution
authority may require the acquirer to divest such shares
or other instruments of ownership within a divestment
period determined by the resolution authority having
taken into account prevailing market conditions; and |
(iii) | if the acquirer does not complete such a divestment
within the divestment period established by the
resolution authority, then the competent authority, with
the consent of the resolution authority, may impose on
the acquirer penalties and other measures for infringing
the requirements for acquisitions or disposals of
qualifying holdings contemplated by Articles 66, 67, and
107

(10) Transferurile efectuate n virtutea aplicrii
instrumentului de vnzare a activitii fac obiectul
mecanismelor de siguran menionate n capitolul VII din
titlul IV.
(11) n sensul exercitrii libertilor de a presta servicii sau
de a se stabili ntr-un alt stat membru n conformitate cu
Directiva 2013/36/UE sau cu Directiva 2014/65/UE,
cumprtorul este considerat a fi o continuare a institu iei
aflate n rezoluie i poate continua s exercite toate
drepturile exercitate de instituia aflat n rezoluie aferente
activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor transferate.
(12) Statele membre se asigur c cumprtorul men ionate
la alineatul (1) poate continua s exercite drepturile conferite
de calitatea de membru i drepturile de acces la sistemele de
plat, compensare i decontare, la bursele de valori, la
schemele de compensare pentru investitori i la schemele de
garantare a depozitelor ale instituiei aflate n rezolu ie, cu
condiia ca aceasta s ndeplineasc criteriile legate de
calitatea de membru i criteriile de participare pentru lua
parte la astfel de sisteme.
Fr a aduce atingere primului paragraf, statele membre se
asigur c:
(a) | accesul nu este refuzat pentru motivul c cumprtorul
nu dispune de un rating din partea unei agen ii de rating de
credit sau c ratingul respectiv nu este propor ional cu
nivelurile de rating impuse pentru a beneficia de accesul la
sistemele menionate n primul paragraf;
(b) | n cazul n care cumprtorul nu ndepline te criteriile
legate de calitatea de membru sau criteriile de participare la
un sistem relevant de plat, compensare sau decontare, la
bursa de valori, la o schemde compensaii pentru investitori
sau la o schem de garantare a depozitelor, drepturile
menionate la primul paragraf se exercit pentru o perioad
de timp care poate fi precizat de autoritatea de rezolu ie,
demaxim 24 de luni, care poate fi prelungit la cererea
cumprtorului adresat autoritii de rezolu ie.
(13) Fr a aduce atingere titlului IV capitolul VII, ac ionarii
sau creditorii instituiei aflate n rezoluie i alte pr i ter e
ale cror active, drepturi sau pasive nu sunt transferate nu au
niciun fel de drepturi asupra activelor, drepturilor sau
pasivelor transferate, ori n legtur cu acestea.
Articolul 39
Instrumentul de vnzare a activitii: cerine procedurale
(1) Sub rezerva alineatului (3) din prezentul articol, atunci
cnd aplic unei instituii sau entiti menionate la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) instrumentul de vnzare a
activitii, autoritatea de rezoluie scoate pe pia sau ia
msuri n vederea scoaterii pe pia a activelor, drepturilor,
68 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
10. Transfers made by virtue of the sale of business tool
shall be subject to the safeguards referred to in Chapter
VII of Title IV.
11. For the purposes of exercising the rights to provide
services or to establish itself in another Member State in
accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive
2014/65/EU, the purchaser shall be considered to be a
continuation of the institution under resolution, and may
continue to exercise any such right that was exercised by
the institution under resolution in respect of the assets,
rights or liabilities transferred.
12. Member States shall ensure that the purchaser
referred to in paragraph 1 may continue to exercise the
rights of membership and access to payment, clearing
and settlement systems, stock exchanges, investor
compensation schemes and deposit guarantee schemes of
the institution under resolution, provided that it meets the
membership and participation criteria for participation in
such systems.
Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States
shall ensure that:
(a) | access is not denied on the ground that the purchaser
does not possess a rating from a credit rating agency, or
that rating is not commensurate to the rating levels
required to be granted access to the systems referred to in
the first subparagraph;
(b) | where the purchaser does not meet the membership
or participation criteria for a relevant payment, clearing
or settlement system, stock exchange, investor
compensation scheme or deposit guarantee scheme, the
rights referred to in the first subparagraph are exercised
for such a period of time as may be specified by the
resolution authority, not exceeding 24 months, renewable
on application by the purchaser to the resolution
authority.
13. Without prejudice to Chapter VII of Title IV,
shareholders or creditors of the institution under
resolution and other third parties whose assets, rights or
liabilities are not transferred shall not have any rights
over or in relation to the assets, rights or liabilities
transferred.
Article 39
Sale of business tool: procedural requirements
1. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, when applying
the sale of business tool to an institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), a
resolution authority shall market, or make arrangements
for the marketing of the assets, rights, liabilities, shares
108
pasivelor, aciunilor sau a altor instrumente de proprietate a

acelei instituii pe care autoritatea inten ioneaz s le
transfere. Grupuri de drepturi, active i pasive pot fi scoase
pe pia separat.
(2) Fr a aduce atingere, dup caz, cadrului Uniunii pentru
ajutoarele de stat, scoaterea pe pia menionat la alineatul
(1) se efectueaz n conformitate cu urmtoarele criterii:
(a) | ea trebuie s fie ct se poate de transparent i nu
trebuie s prezinte n mod semnificativ incorect activele,
drepturile, pasivele, aciunile sau alte instrumente de
proprietate a acelei instituii pe care autoritatea inten ioneaz
s le transfere, avnd n vedere circumstan ele i n special
necesitatea de a menine stabilitatea financiar;
(b) | ea nu trebuie s favorizeze sau s discrimineze n mod
necuvenit anumii cumprtori poteniali;
(c) | ea trebuie s fie liber de orice conflict de interese;
(d) | ea nu trebuie s confere niciun avantaj necuvenit
vreunui cumprtor potenial;
(e) | ea trebuie s in seama de nevoia ca aciunea de
rezoluie s se desfoare cu rapiditate;
(f) | scopul su trebuie s fie maximizarea, pe ct posibil, a
preului de vnzare al aciunilor sau altor instrumente de
proprietate, al activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor n cauz.
Sub rezerva prezentului alineat litera (b), principiile
menionate n prezentul alineat nu trebuie s mpiedice
solicitarea anumitor cumprtori poteniali de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie.
Orice publicare a scoaterii pe pia a instituiei sau a entit ii
din prezenta directiv, n mod normal necesar n
(UE) nr. 596/2014, poate fi amnat n conformitate cu
articolul 17 alineatul (4) sau (5) din respectivul regulament.
(3) Autoritatea de rezoluie poate aplica instrumentul de
vnzare a activitii fr respectarea cerin ei privind
scoaterea pe pia prevzut la alineatul (1), n cazul n care
stabilete faptul c respectarea acestor cerin e ar putea
submina unul sau mai multe dintre obiectivele rezolu iei i
mai ales dac sunt ndeplinite urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | acesta consider c intrarea n dificultate sau
susceptibila intrare n dificultate a institu iei aflate n
rezoluie ar crea sau ar nruti o amenin are deja grav la
adresa stabilitii financiare; i
(b) | acesta consider c respectarea cerin elor susmenionate ar putea submina eficacitatea instrumentului de
vnzare a activitii n ceea ce privete eliminarea respectivei
ameninri sau atingerea obiectivelor rezoluiei men ionate la
articolul 31 alineatul (2) litera (b).
or other instruments of ownership of that institution that

the authority intends to transfer. Pools of rights, assets,
and liabilities may be marketed separately.
2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework,
where applicable, the marketing referred to in paragraph
1 shall be carried out in accordance with the following
criteria:
(a) | it shall be as transparent as possible and shall not
materially misrepresent the assets, rights, liabilities,
shares or other instruments of ownership of that
institution that the authority intends to transfer, having
regard to the circumstances and in particular the need to
maintain financial stability;
(b) | it shall not unduly favour or discriminate between
potential purchasers;
(c) | it shall be free from any conflict of interest;
(d) | it shall not confer any unfair advantage on a
potential purchaser;
(e) | it shall take account of the need to effect a rapid
resolution action;
(f) | it shall aim at maximising, as far as possible, the sale
price for the shares or other instruments of ownership,
assets, rights or liabilities involved.
Subject to point (b) of the first subparagraph, the
principles referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent
the resolution authority from soliciting particular
potential purchasers.
Any public disclosure of the marketing of the institution
of this Directive that would otherwise be required in
596/2014 may be delayed in accordance with Article
17(4) or (5) of that Regulation.
3. The resolution authority may apply the sale of
business tool without complying with the requirement to
market as laid down in paragraph 1 when it determines
that compliance with those requirements would be likely
to undermine one or more of the resolution objectives
and in particular if the following conditions are met:
(a) | it considers that there is a material threat to financial
stability arising from or aggravated by the failure or
likely failure of the institution under resolution; and
(b) | it considers that compliance with those requirements
would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of the
sale of business tool in addressing that threat or
achieving the resolution objective referred to in point (b)
of Article 31(2).
109

1093/2010 prin care specific circumstanele de facto care
constituie o ameninare grav i elementele legate de
eficacitatea instrumentului de vnzare a activit ii
menionate la alineatul (3) literele (a) i (b).
Seciunea 3
Instrumentul instituiei-punte
Articolul 40
Instrumentul instituiei punte
(1) Pentru ca instrumentul instituiei-punte s fie eficace i
pentru a ine seama de necesitatea de a pstra func iile critice
ale instituiei-punte, statele membre trebuie s se asigure c
autoritile de rezoluie dein competena de a transfera ctre
o instituie-punte:
(a) | aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate emise de una
sau de mai multe instituii aflate n rezoluie;
(b) | oricare dintre activele, drepturile sau pasivele uneia sau
ale mai multor instituii aflate n rezoluie sau totalitatea
acestora.
Sub rezerva articolului 85, transferul menionat la primul
paragraf poate avea loc fr a obine aprobarea ac ionarilor
instituiilor aflate n rezoluie sau a oricrei pr i ter e, alta
dect instituia-punte i fr respectarea niciunei cerin e
procedurale prevzute de dreptul comercial sau de cel al
titlurilor de valoare.
(2) Instituia-punte este o persoan juridic care ndepline te
toate cerinele urmtoare:
(a) | ea se afl total sau parial n proprietatea uneia sau mai
multor autoriti publice printre care se pot numra
autoritatea de rezoluie sau mecanismul de finanare a
rezoluiei i este controlat de autoritatea de rezoluie;
(b) | este creat n scopul de a primi i a de ine unele sau
toate aciunile sau alte instrumente de proprietate emise de o
instituie aflat n rezoluie ori unele sau toate activele,
drepturile i pasivele uneia sau mai multor instituii aflate n
rezoluie n vederea pstrrii accesului la funciile critice i a
vnzrii instituiei sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d).
Aplicarea instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n scopul
menionat la articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (b) nu trebuie s
aduc atingere capacitii autoritii de rezoluie de a
exercita un control asupra instituiei-punte.
(3) Atunci cnd aplic instrumentul instituiei-punte,
autoritatea de rezoluie se asigur c valoarea total a
pasivelor transferate instituiei-punte nu depe te valoarea
total a drepturilor i activelor transferate de la institu ia
aflat n rezoluie sau furnizate din alte surse.

1093/2010 specifying the factual circumstances
amounting to a material threat and the elements relating
to the effectiveness of the sale of business tool provided
for in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3.
Section 3
The bridge institution tool
Article 40
Bridge institution tool
1. In order to give effect to the bridge institution tool and
having regard to the need to maintain critical functions in
the bridge institution, Member States shall ensure that
resolution authorities have the power to transfer to a
bridge institution:
(a) | shares or other instruments of ownership issued by
one or more institutions under resolution;
(b) | all or any assets, rights or liabilities of one or more
institutions under resolution.
Subject to Article 85, the transfer referred to in the first
subparagraph may take place without obtaining the
consent of the shareholders of the institutions under
resolution or any third party other than the bridge
institution, and without complying with any procedural
requirements under company or securities law.
2. The bridge institution shall be a legal person that
meets all of the following requirements:
(a) | it is wholly or partially owned by one or more public
authorities which may include the resolution authority or
the resolution financing arrangement and is controlled by
the resolution authority;
(b) | it is created for the purpose of receiving and holding
some or all of the shares or other instruments of
ownership issued by an institution under resolution or
some or all of the assets, rights and liabilities of one or
more institutions under resolution with a view to
maintaining access to critical functions and selling the
Article 1(1).
The application of the bail-in tool for the purpose
referred to in point (b) of Article 43(2) shall not interfere
with the ability of the resolution authority to control the
bridge institution.
3. When applying the bridge institution tool, the
resolution authority shall ensure that the total value of
liabilities transferred to the bridge institution does not
exceed the total value of the rights and assets transferred
from the institution under resolution or provided by other
sources.
110
contraprestaie pltit de instituia-punte se face n favoarea:

(a) | proprietarilor aciunilor sau instrumentelor de
proprietate, n cazul n care transferul ctre institu ia-punte sa efectuat prin transferarea aciunilor sau instrumentelor de
proprietate emise de instituia aflat n rezolu ie de la
deintorii respectivelor aciuni sau instrumente la instituiapunte;
(b) | instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n cazul n care transferul
ctre instituia-punte s-a efectuat prin transferarea unora sau
a tuturor activelor sau pasivelor instituiei aflate n rezolu ie
la instituia-punte.
(5) Atunci cnd aplic instrumentul instituiei-punte,
autoritatea de rezoluie poate exercita competen a de transfer
n mod repetat, pentru a efectua transferuri suplimentare de
aciuni sau de alte instrumente de proprietate emise de o
instituie aflat n rezoluie sau, dup caz, de active, drepturi
sau pasive ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
(6) n urma aplicrii instrumentului instituiei-punte,
autoritatea de rezoluie poate:
(a) | transfera napoi drepturile, activele sau pasivele de la
instituia-punte la instituia aflat n rezoluie, sau ac iunile
sau alte instrumente de proprietate napoi la proprietarii lor
iniiali, iar instituia aflat n rezoluie sau proprietarii ini iali
au obligaia de a reprimi toate aceste active, drepturi sau
pasive, sau aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate, dac
i numai dac sunt ndeplinite condiiile prevzute la
alineatul (7);
(b) | transfera aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate, sau
active, drepturi sau pasive de la instituia-punte ctre o ter
parte.
(7) Autoritile de rezoluie pot transfera napoi ac iuni sau
alte instrumente de proprietate sau active, drepturi sau pasive
de la instituia-punte ntr-una dintre urmtoarele situaii:
(a) | atunci cnd posibilitatea ca anumite ac iuni sau alte
instrumente de proprietate, active, drepturi sau pasive
specifice s fie transferate napoi este precizat n mod
expres n cadrul instrumentului prin care este efectuat
transferul;
(b) | atunci cnd aceste aciuni sau alte instrumente de
proprietate, active, drepturi sau pasive specifice nu
ndeplinesc condiiile de transfer sau nu se ncadreaz n
categoria aciunilor sau altor instrumente de proprietate,
activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor specificate n cadrul
instrumentului prin care este efectuat transferul.
Un astfel de transfer napoi se poate efectua n orice moment
dat i n conformitate cu orice alte condiii stipulate n cadrul
instrumentului respectiv pentru scopul n cauz.
(8) Transferurile ntre instituia aflat n rezolu ie sau
proprietarii iniiali ai aciunilor sau ai altor instrumente de
bridge institution shall benefit:

(a) | the owners of the shares or instruments of
ownership, where the transfer to the bridge institution
has been effected by transferring shares or instruments of
ownership issued by the institution under resolution from
the holders of those shares or instruments to the bridge
institution;
(b) | the institution under resolution, where the transfer to
the bridge institution has been effected by transferring
some or all of the assets or liabilities of the institution
under resolution to the bridge institution.
5. When applying the bridge institution tool, the
resolution authority may exercise the transfer power
more than once in order to make supplemental transfers
of shares or other instruments of ownership issued by an
institution under resolution or, as the case may be, assets,
rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution.
6. Following an application of the bridge institution tool,
the resolution authority may:
(a) | transfer rights, assets or liabilities back from the
bridge institution to the institution under resolution, or
the shares or other instruments of ownership back to their
original owners, and the institution under resolution or
original owners shall be obliged to take back any such
assets, rights or liabilities, or shares or other instruments
of ownership, provided that the conditions laid down in
paragraph 7 are met;
(b) | transfer, shares or other instruments of ownership, or
assets, rights or liabilities from the bridge institution to a
third party.
7. Resolution authorities may transfer shares or other
instruments of ownership, or assets, rights or liabilities
back from the bridge institution in one of the following
circumstances:
(a) | the possibility that the specific shares or other
instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities
might be transferred back is stated expressly in the
instrument by which the transfer was made;
(b) | the specific shares or other instruments of
ownership, assets, rights or liabilities do not in fact fall
within the classes of, or meet the conditions for transfer
of shares or other instruments of ownership, assets, rights
or liabilities specified in the instrument by which the
transfer was made.
Such a transfer back may be made within any period, and
shall comply with any other conditions, stated in that
instrument for the relevant purpose.
8. Transfers between the institution under resolution, or
the original owners of shares or other instruments of
111
proprietate pe de o parte i instituia-punte pe de alt parte

fac obiectul mecanismelor de siguran prevzute n titlul IV
capitolul VII.
(9) n sensul exercitrii libertilor de a presta servicii sau de
a se stabili ntr-un alt stat membru n conformitate cu
Directiva 2013/36/UE sau cu Directiva 2014/65/UE,
instituia-punte este considerat a fi o continuare a institu iei
aflate n rezoluie i poate continua s exercite toate
drepturile exercitate de instituia aflat n rezoluie aferente
activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor transferate.
n alte scopuri, autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita ca o
instituie-punte s fie considerat drept o continuare a
instituiei aflate n rezoluie i s poat continua s exercite
toate drepturile exercitate de instituia aflat n rezoluie
aferente activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor transferate.
(10) Statele membre se asigur c instituia-punte poate
continua s exercite drepturile conferite de calitatea de
membru i drepturile de acces la sistemele de plat,
compensare i decontare, la bursele de valori, la schemele de
compensare pentru investitori i la schemele de garantare a
depozitelor ale instituiei aflate n rezolu ie, cu condi ia ca
aceasta s ndeplineasc criteriile legate de calitatea de
membru i criteriile de participare pentru lua parte la astfel
de sisteme.
Fr a aduce atingere primului paragraf, statele membre se
asigur c:
(a) | accesul nu este refuzat pentru motivul c institu ia-punte
nu dispune de un rating din partea unei agen ii de rating de
credit sau c ratingul respectiv nu este propor ional cu
nivelurile de rating impuse pentru a beneficia de accesul la
sistemele menionate la primul paragraf;
(b) | n cazul n care instituia-punte nu ntrune te criteriile
legate de calitatea de membru sau criteriile de participare la
un sistem relevant de plat, compensare sau decontare, la
bursa de valori, la o schem de compensare pentru investitori
sau la un sistem de garantare a depozitelor, drepturile
menionate la primul paragraf se exercit pentru o perioad
de timp care poate fi precizat de autoritatea de rezolu ie, de
maximum 24 de luni, care poate fi prelungit la cererea
instituiei-punte adresat autoritii de rezoluie.
ale cror active, drepturi sau pasive nu sunt transferate
instituiei-punte nu au niciun fel de drepturi asupra activelor,
drepturilor sau pasivelor transferate instituiei-punte,
organului de conducere sau conducerii superioare ori n
legtur cu acestea.
(12) Obiectivele instituiei-punte nu implic nicio ndatorire
sau responsabilitate fa de acionarii sau creditorii institu iei
ownership, on the one hand, and the bridge institution on

the other, shall be subject to the safeguards referred to in
Chapter VII of Title IV.
9. For the purposes of exercising the rights to provide
services or to establish itself in another Member State in
accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive
2014/65/EU, a bridge institution shall be considered to
be a continuation of the institution under resolution, and
may continue to exercise any such right that was
exercised by the institution under resolution in respect of
the assets, rights or liabilities transferred.
For other purposes, resolution authorities may require
that a bridge institution be considered to be a
continuation of the institution under resolution, and be
able to continue to exercise any right that was exercised
by the institution under resolution in respect of the
assets, rights or liabilities transferred.
10. Member States shall ensure that the bridge institution
may continue to exercise the rights of membership and
access to payment, clearing and settlement systems,
stock exchanges, investor compensation schemes and
deposit guarantee schemes of the institution under
resolution, provided that it meets the membership and
participation criteria for participation in such systems.
Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States

shall ensure that:
(a) | access is not denied on the ground that the bridge
institution does not possess a rating from a credit rating
agency, or that rating is not commensurate to the rating
levels required to be granted access to the systems
referred to in the first subparagraph;
(b) | where the bridge institution does not meet the
membership or participation criteria for a relevant
payment, clearing or settlement system, stock exchange,
investor compensation scheme or deposit guarantee
scheme, the rights referred to in the first subparagraph
are exercised for such a period of time as may be
specified by the resolution authority, not exceeding 24
months, renewable on application by the bridge
institution to the resolution authority.
11. Without prejudice to Chapter VII of Title IV,
liabilities are not transferred to the bridge institution
shall not have any rights over or in relation to the assets,
rights or liabilities transferred to the bridge institution, its
management body or senior management.
12. The objectives of the bridge institution shall not
imply any duty or responsibility to shareholders or
112
aflate n rezoluie, iar organul de conducere sau conducerea

superioar nu are nicio rspundere fa de acionarii sau
creditorii respectivi pentru actele i omisiunile svr ite n
ndeplinirea atribuiilor lor, cu excepia cazului n care actul
sau omisiunea n cauz implic o neglijen sau o abatere
grav n conformitate cu dreptul intern, care afecteaz n
mod direct drepturile acionarilor sau creditorilor.
n conformitate cu dreptul intern, statele membre pot limita
mai mult rspunderea instituiilor-punte i a organului de
conducere sau a conducerii superioare a acestora n ceea ce
privete actele i omisiunile svrite n ndeplinirea
atribuiilor lor.
Articolul 41
Funcionarea unei instituii-punte
(1) Statele membre se asigur c funcionarea unei institu ii
punte respect urmtoarele cerine:
(a) | coninutul documentelor constitutive ale instituiei-punte
este aprobat de autoritatea de rezoluie;
(b) | sub rezerva structurii de proprietate a instituiei-punte,
autoritatea de rezoluie nume te sau aprob organul de
conducere al instituiei punte;
(c) | autoritatea de rezoluie aprob remunera iile membrilor
organului de conducere i stabilete responsabilitile lor
corespunztoare;
(d) | autoritatea de rezoluie aprob strategia i profilul de
risc ale instituiei-punte;
(e) | instituia-punte este autorizat n conformitate cu
Directiva 2013/36/UE sau, dup caz, cu Directiva
2014/65/UE, i deine autorizaiile necesare, n temeiul
dreptului intern aplicabile, pentru desfurarea activit ilor
sau furnizarea serviciilor pe care le achizi ioneaz n urma
unui transfer efectuat conform articolului 63 din prezenta
Directiv;
(f) | instituia-punte respect, dup caz, dispozi iile
Regulamentului (UE) 575/2013 i ale Directivelor
2013/36/UE i 2014/65/UE, i face obiectul unei
supravegheri n conformitate cu respectivele dispoziii.
(g) | instituia-punte funcioneaz n conformitate cu cadrul
Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat, iar autoritatea de rezolu ie
poate prevedea restricii asupra activitii sale n consecin .
Fr a aduce atingere dispoziiilor menionate la literele (e)
i (f) din primul paragraf i n cazul n care este necesar
pentru a ndeplini obiectivele rezoluiei, instituia-punte
poate fi instituit i autorizat fr respectarea Directivei
2013/36/UE sau Directivei 2014/65/UE, pentru o perioad
scurt de timp, la nceputul funcionrii sale. n acest scop,
autoritatea de rezoluie nainteaz autorit ii competente o
cerere n acest sens. Dac decide s acorde o astfel de
autorizaie, autoritatea competent indic intervalul n care
creditors of the institution under resolution, and the

management body or senior management shall have no
liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and
omissions in the discharge of their duties unless the act
or omission implies gross negligence or serious
misconduct in accordance with national law which
directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.
Member States may further limit the liability of a bridge
institution and its management body or senior
management in accordance with national law for acts and
omissions in the discharge of their duties.
Article 41
Operation of a bridge institution
1. Member States shall ensure that the operation of a
bridge institution respects the following requirements:
(a) | the contents of the bridge institutions constitutional
documents are approved by the resolution authority;
(b) | subject to the bridge institutions ownership
structure, the resolution authority either appoints or
approves the bridge institutions management body;
(c) | the resolution authority approves the remuneration
of the members of the management body and determines
their appropriate responsibilities;
(d) | the resolution authority approves the strategy and
risk profile of the bridge institution;
(e) | the bridge institution is authorised in accordance
with Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU, as
applicable, and has the necessary authorisation under the
applicable national law to carry out the activities or
services that it acquires by virtue of a transfer made
pursuant to Article 63 of this Directive;
(f) | the bridge institution complies with the requirements
of, and is subject to supervision in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and with Directives
2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable;
(g) | the operation of the bridge institution shall be in
accordance with the Union State aid framework and the
resolution authority may specify restrictions on its
operations accordingly.
Notwithstanding the provisions referred to in points (e)
and (f) of the first subparagraph and where necessary to
meet the resolution objectives, the bridge institution may
be established and authorised without complying with
Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU for a
short period of time at the beginning of its operation. To
that end, the resolution authority shall submit a request in
that sense to the competent authority. If the competent
authority decides to grant such an authorisation, it shall
113
instituia-punte este scutit

respectivelor directive.
de
respectarea
cerinelor
(2) Sub rezerva eventualelor restricii aplicate n

conformitate cu normele Uniunii sau cele naionale n
materie de concuren, conducerea instituiei-punte
gestioneaz instituia-punte n vederea pstrrii accesului la
funciile critice i a vnzrii instituiei sau a entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), a
activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor sale ctre unul sau mai
muli cumprtori din sectorul privat, atunci cnd condi iile
sunt prielnice i n termenul specificat la alineatul (4) din
prezentul articol sau la alineatul (6) din prezentul articol,
dup caz.
(3) Autoritatea de rezoluie decide c o institu ie-punte nu
mai reprezint o instituie-punte n conformitate cu articolul
40 alineatul (2) n momentul apariiei oricreia dintre
urmtoarele situaii:
(a) | fuzionarea instituiei-punte cu o alt entitate;
(b) | instituia-punte nu mai respect cerinele articolului 40
alineatul (2);
(c) | vnzarea tuturor sau aproape a tuturor activelor,
drepturilor sau pasivelor instituiei-punte ctre o ter parte;
(d) | expirarea perioadei specificate la alineatul (5) sau, dup
caz, la alineatul (6);
(e) | activele instituiei-punte sunt complet lichidate, iar
pasivele sale sunt achitate integral.
(4) Atunci cnd autoritatea de rezoluie ncearc s vnd
instituia-punte sau activele, drepturile ori pasivele acesteia,
statele membre se asigur c instituia-punte sau activele ori
pasivele relevante sunt puse n vnzare n mod deschis i
transparent i c vnzarea nu le denatureaz n mod
semnificativ, nu favorizeaz sau discrimineaz n mod
necuvenit anumii cumprtori poteniali.
Toate aceste vnzri trebuie efectuate n condi ii comerciale,
avnd n vedere circumstanele i n conformitate cu cadrul
Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat.
(5) n cazul n care nu se aplic niciuna dintre situaiile
menionate la alineatul (3) literele (a), (b), (c) i (e),
autoritatea de rezoluie pune capt funcionrii instituieipunte ct mai curnd posibil, i n orice caz, dup o perioad
de doi ani de la data efecturii ultimului transfer, n temeiul
instrumentului instituiei-punte, de la o instituie aflat n
rezoluie.
(6) Autoritatea de rezoluie poate prelungi perioada
menionat la alineatul (5) cu una sau mai multe perioade
suplimentare de un an, atunci cnd o astfel de prelungire:
(a) | vine n sprijinul realizrii uneia dintre situa iile
menionate la alineatul (3) litera (a), (b), (c) sau (e); sau
(b) | este necesar pentru a asigura continuitatea unor servicii
indicate the period for which the bridge institution is

waived from complying with the requirements of those
Directives.
2. Subject to any restrictions imposed in accordance with
Union or national competition rules, the management of
the bridge institution shall operate the bridge institution
with a view to maintaining access to critical functions
and selling the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), its assets, rights or
liabilities, to one or more private sector purchasers when
conditions are appropriate and within the period
specified in paragraph 4 of this Article or, where
applicable, paragraph 6 of this Article.
3. The resolution authority shall take a decision that the
bridge institution is no longer a bridge institution within
the meaning of Article 40(2) in any of the following
cases, whichever occurs first:
(a) | the bridge institution merges with another entity;
(b) | the bridge institution ceases to meet the
requirements of Article 40(2);
(c) | the sale of all or substantially all of the bridge
institutions assets, rights or liabilities to a third party;
(d) | the expiry of the period specified in paragraph 5 or,
where applicable, paragraph 6;
(e) | the bridge institutions assets are completely wound
down and its liabilities are completely discharged.
4. Member States shall ensure, in cases when the
resolution authority seeks to sell the bridge institution or
its assets, rights or liabilities, that the bridge institution or
the relevant assets or liabilities are marketed openly and
transparently, and that the sale does not materially
misrepresent them or unduly favour or discriminate
between potential purchasers.
Any such sale shall be made on commercial terms,
having regard to the circumstances and in accordance
with the Union State aid framework.
5. If none of the outcomes referred to in points (a), (b),
(c) and (e) of paragraph 3 applies, the resolution
authority shall terminate the operation of a bridge
institution as soon as possible and in any event two years
after the date on which the last transfer from an
institution under resolution pursuant to the bridge
institution tool was made.
6. The resolution authority may extend the period
referred to in paragraph 5 for one or more additional oneyear periods where such an extension:
(a) | supports the outcomes referred to in point (a), (b),
(c) or (e) of paragraph 3; or
(b) | is necessary to ensure the continuity of essential
114
bancare i financiare eseniale.

(7) Toate deciziile autoritii de rezoluie de a prelungi
perioada menionat la alineatul (5) se motiveaz i cuprind
o evaluare detaliat a situaiei care justific prelungirea,
inclusiv a condiiilor i perspectivelor pieei.
(8) n cazul n care funcionarea unei institu ii-punte
nceteaz n situaiile menionate la alineatul (3) litera (c) sau
(d), instituia-punte este lichidat n conformitate cu
Sub rezerva articolului 37 alineatul (7), toate ncasrile ca
urmare a ncetrii funcionrii instituiei-punte revin
acionarilor instituiei-punte.
(9) n cazul n care o instituie-punte este utilizat cu scopul
de a transfera activele i pasivele aparinnd mai multor
instituii aflate n rezoluie, obligaia prevzut la alineatul
(8) se refer la activele i pasivele transferate de la fiecare
dintre aceste instituii aflate n rezoluie i nu la institu iapunte n sine.
Seciunea 4
Instrumentul de separare a activelor
Articolul 42
Instrumentul de separare a activelor
(1) Pentru ca instrumentul de separare a activelor s fie
eficace, statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezolu ie
dein competena de a transfera activele, drepturile sau
pasivele unei instituii aflate n rezoluie sau ale unei
instituii-punte ctre unul sau mai multe vehicule de
gestionare a activelor.
Sub rezerva articolului 85, transferul menionat la primul
paragraf poate avea loc fr a obine acordul acionarilor
instituiilor aflate n rezoluie sau al oricrei pr i ter e, alta
dect instituia-punte i fr a se conforma vreunei cerin e
procedurale prevzute de dreptul comercial sau de dreptul
titlurilor de valoare.
(2) n sensul instrumentului de separare a activelor, un
vehicul de gestionare a activelor este o persoan juridic ce
ndeplinete toate cerinele de mai jos:
(a) | este total sau parial n proprietatea uneia sau mai multor
autoriti publice printre care se pot numra autoritatea de
rezoluie sau mecanismul de finanare a rezolu iei i este
controlat de autoritatea de rezoluie;
(b) | a fost creat n scopul de a primi, par ial sau integral,
activele, drepturile i pasivele uneia sau ale mai multor
instituii aflate n rezoluie sau ale unei instituii-punte.
(3) Vehiculul de gestionare a activelor gestioneaz activele
care i sunt transferate cu scopul de a optimiza valoarea
acestora prin intermediul unei eventuale vnzri sau prin
lichidarea lor ordonat.
banking or financial services.

7. Any decision of the resolution authority to extend the
period referred to in paragraph 5 shall be reasoned and
shall contain a detailed assessment of the situation,
including of the market conditions and outlook, that
justifies the extension.
8. Where the operations of a bridge institution are
terminated in the circumstances referred to in point (c) or
(d) of paragraph 3, the bridge institution shall be wound
up under normal insolvency proceedings.
Subject to Article 37(7), any proceeds generated as a
result of the termination of the operation of the bridge
institution shall benefit the shareholders of the bridge
institution.
9. Where a bridge institution is used for the purpose of
transferring assets and liabilities of more than one
institution under resolution the obligation referred to in
paragraph 8 shall refer to the assets and liabilities
transferred from each of the institutions under resolution
and not to the bridge institution itself.
Section 4
The asset separation tool
Article 42
Asset separation tool
1. In order to give effect to the asset separation tool,
Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities
have the power to transfer assets, rights or liabilities of
an institution under resolution or a bridge institution to
one or more asset management vehicles.
Subject to Article 85, the transfer referred to in the first
subparagraph may take place without obtaining the
consent of the shareholders of the institutions under
resolution or any third party other than the bridge
institution, and without complying with any procedural
requirements under company or securities law.
2. For the purposes of the asset separation tool, an asset
management vehicle shall be a legal person that meets all
of the following requirements:
(a) | it is wholly or partially owned by one or more public
authorities which may include the resolution authority or
the resolution financing arrangement and is controlled by
(b) | it has been created for the purpose of receiving some
or all of the assets, rights and liabilities of one or more
institutions under resolution or a bridge institution.
3. The asset management vehicle shall manage the assets
transferred to it with a view to maximising their value
through eventual sale or orderly wind down.
115
(4) Statele membre se asigur c funcionarea unui vehicul

de gestionare a activelor respect urmtoarele dispozi ii:
(a) | coninutul documentelor constitutive ale vehiculului de
gestionare a activelor este aprobat de autoritatea de rezolu ie;
(b) | sub rezerva structurii de proprietate a vehiculului de
gestionare a activelor, autoritatea de rezolu ie nume te sau
aprob organul de conducere al vehiculului de gestionare a
activelor;
(c) | autoritatea de rezoluie aprob remunera iile membrilor
organului de conducere i stabilete responsabilitile lor
corespunztoare;
(d) | autoritatea de rezoluie aprob strategia i profilul de
risc ale vehiculului de gestionare a activelor;
(5) Autoritile de rezoluie pot exercita competena
menionat la alineatul (1) pentru a transfera active, drepturi
sau pasive numai n cazul n care:
(a) | situaia de pe piaa specific a acelor active este de a a
natur nct lichidarea lor n cadrul procedurii obi nuite de
insolven ar putea avea un efect negativ asupra uneia sau
mai multor piee financiare;
(b) | un astfel de transfer este necesar pentru a asigura buna
funcionare a instituiei aflate n rezoluie sau a institu ieipunte; sau
(c) | un astfel de transfer este necesar pentru a maximiza
ncasrile rezultate din lichidare.
(6) Atunci cnd aplic instrumentul de separare a activelor,
autoritile de rezoluie stabilesc contrapresta ia n schimbul
creia sunt transferate activele, drepturile i pasivele ctre
vehiculul de gestionare a activelor n conformitate cu
principiile stabilite la articolul 36 i n conformitate cu
cadrul Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat. Prezentul alineat nu
mpiedic contraprestaia s aib o valoare nominal sau
negativ.
contraprestaie pltit de vehiculul de gestionare a activelor
aferente activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor dobndite n mod
direct de la instituia aflat n rezolu ie se fac n favoarea
instituiei aflat n rezoluie. Contraprestaia poate fi pltit
sub forma unei datorii emise de vehiculul de gestionare a
activelor.
(8) n cazul n care s-a aplicat instrumentul institu iei punte,
un vehicul de gestionare a activelor poate, dup aplicarea
instrumentului instituiei-punte, s dobndeasc active,
drepturi sau pasive de la instituia-punte.
(9) Autoritile de rezoluie pot transfera active, drepturi sau
pasive de la instituia aflat n rezoluie la unul sau mai
multe vehicule de gestionare a activelor n mai multe rnduri
i pot transfera napoi active, drepturi sau pasive de la unul
4. Member States shall ensure that the operation of an

asset management vehicle respects the following
provisions:
(a) | the contents of the asset management vehicles
constitutional documents are approved by the resolution
authority;
(b) | subject to the asset management vehicles ownership
structure, the resolution authority either appoints or
approves the vehicles management body;
(c) | the resolution authority approves the remuneration
of the members of the management body and determines
their appropriate responsibilities;
(d) | the resolution authority approves the strategy and
risk profile of the asset management vehicle.
5. Resolution authorities may exercise the power
specified in paragraph 1 to transfer assets, rights or
liabilities only if:
(a) | the situation of the particular market for those assets
is of such a nature that the liquidation of those assets
under normal insolvency proceedings could have an
adverse effect on one or more financial markets.
(b) | such a transfer is necessary to ensure the proper
functioning of the institution under resolution or bridge
institution; or
(c) | such a transfer is necessary to maximise liquidation
proceeds.
6. When applying the asset separation tool, resolution
authorities shall determine the consideration for which
assets, rights and liabilities are transferred to the asset
management vehicle in accordance with the principles
established in Article 36 and in accordance with the
Union State aid framework. This paragraph does not
prevent the consideration having nominal or negative
value.
asset management vehicle in respect of the assets, rights
or liabilities acquired directly from the institution under
resolution shall benefit the institution under resolution.
Consideration may be paid in the form of debt issued by
the asset management vehicle.
8. Where the bridge institution tool has been applied, an
asset management vehicle may, subsequent to the
application of the bridge institution tool, acquire assets,
rights or liabilities from the bridge institution.
9. Resolution authorities may transfer assets, rights or
liabilities from the institution under resolution to one or
more asset management vehicles on more than one
occasion and transfer assets, rights or liabilities back
116
sau mai multe vehicule de gestionare a activelor la instituia

aflat n rezoluie, dac i numai dac sunt ndeplinite
condiiile menionate la alineatul (10).
Instituia aflat n rezoluie are obligaia de a reprimi orice
active, drepturi sau pasive de acest fel.
(10) Autoritile de rezoluie pot transfera napoi drepturi,
active sau pasive, de la vehiculul de gestionare a activelor la
instituia aflat n rezoluie, ntr-una dintre urmtoarele
situaii:
(a) | atunci cnd posibilitatea ca anumite drepturi, active sau
pasive specifice s fie transferate napoi este precizat n
mod expres n cadrul instrumentului prin care este efectuat
transferul;
(b) | atunci cnd aceste drepturi, active sau pasive specifice
nu ndeplinesc condiiile de transfer sau nu se ncadreaz n
categoria drepturilor, activelor sau pasivelor specificate n
cadrul instrumentului prin care este efectuat transferul.
n oricare dintre cazurile prevzute la literele (a) i (b),
transferul napoi se poate efectua n orice momentt i
respect orice alte condiii stipulate n cadrul instrumentului
respectiv pentru scopul n cauz.
(11) Transferurile ntre instituia aflat n rezoluie i
vehiculul de gestionare a activelor trebuie s fac obiectul
mecanismelor de siguran privind transferurile par iale de
proprietate specificate n titlul IV capitolul VII.
ale cror active, drepturi sau pasive nu sunt transferate
vehiculului de gestionare a activelor nu au niciun fel de
drepturi asupra activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor transferate
vehiculului de gestionare a activelor sau organului de
conducere sau conducerii superioare ale acestuia, ori n
legtur cu acestea.
(13) Obiectivele vehiculului de gestionare a activelor nu
implic nicio ndatorire sau responsabilitate fa de ac ionarii
sau creditorii instituiei aflate n rezoluie, iar organul de
conducere sau conducerea superioar nu are nicio rspundere
fa de acionarii sau creditorii respectivi pentru actele sau
omisiunile svrite n ndeplinirea atribuiilor lor, cu
excepia cazului n care actul sau omisiunea n cauz implic
o neglijen sau o abatere grav n conformitate cu dreptul
intern, care afecteaz n mod direct drepturile ac ionarilor
sau creditorilor.
n conformitate cu dreptul intern, statele membre pot limita
mai mult rspunderea vehiculelor de gestionare a activelor i
a organului de conducere sau a conducerii superioare a
acestora n ceea ce privete actele i omisiunile svr ite n
ndeplinirea atribuiilor lor.
(14) Pn la 3 iulie 2015, ABE emite orientri, n
conformitate articolul 16 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010 pentru a promova convergena procedurilor de
from one or more asset management vehicles to the

institution under resolution provided that the conditions
specified in paragraph 10 are met.
The institution under resolution shall be obliged to take
back any such assets, rights or liabilities.
10. Resolution authorities may transfer rights, assets or
liabilities back from the asset management vehicle to the
institution under resolution in one of the following
circumstances:
(a) | the possibility that the specific rights, assets or
liabilities might be transferred back is stated expressly in
the instrument by which the transfer was made;
(b) | the specific rights, assets or liabilities do not in fact
fall within the classes of, or meet the conditions for
transfer of, rights, assets or liabilities specified in the
instrument by which the transfer was made.
In either of the cases referred in points (a) and (b), the
transfer back may be made within any period, and shall
comply with any other conditions, stated in that
instrument for the relevant purpose.
11. Transfers between the institution under resolution and
the asset management vehicle shall be subject to the
safeguards for partial property transfers specified in
Chapter VII of Title IV.
12. Without prejudice to Chapter VII of Title IV
liabilities are not transferred to the asset management
vehicle shall not have any rights over or in relation to the
assets, rights or liabilities transferred to the asset
management vehicle or its management body or senior
management.
13. The objectives of an asset management vehicle shall
not imply any duty or responsibility to shareholders or
creditors of the institution under resolution, and the
management body or senior management shall have no
liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and
omissions in the discharge of their duties unless the act
or omission implies gross negligence or serious
misconduct in accordance with national law which
directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.
Member States may further limit the liability of an asset
management vehicle and its management body or senior
management in accordance with national law for acts and
omissions in the discharge of their duties.
1093/2010 to promote the convergence of supervisory
117
supraveghere i de rezoluie n ceea ce privete stabilirea

situaiilor n care, n conformitate cu alineatul (5) din
prezentul articol, lichidarea activelor sau a pasivelor n
cadrul procedurii obinuite de insolven ar putea avea un
efect negativ pe una sau mai mule piee financiare.
Seciunea 5
Instrumentul de recapitalizare intern
Subseciunea 1
Obiectivul i domeniul de aplicare al instrumentului de
recapitalizare intern
Articolul 43
Instrumentul de recapitalizare intern
(1) Pentru ca instrumentul de recapitalizare intern s fie
eficace, statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezolu ie
dein competenele de rezoluie menionate la articolul 63
alineatul (1).
aplica instrumentul de recapitalizare intern n vederea
ndeplinirii obiectivelor rezoluiei specificate la articolul 31,
n conformitate cu principiile rezoluiei specificate la
articolul 34 pentru oricare din urmtoarele scopuri:
(a) | recapitalizarea unei instituii sau a unei entit i
din prezenta directiv care ndeplinete condi iile de
declanare a procedurii de rezoluie ntr-o msur suficient
pentru a restabili capacitatea acesteia de a se conforma
condiiilor de autorizare (n msura n care respectivele
condiii se aplic entitii) i de a continua s- i desf oare
activitile pentru care este autorizat n conformitate cu
Directiva 2013/36/UE sau cu Directiva 2014/65/UE, n cazul
n care entitatea este autorizat n conformitate cu
respectivele directive i pentru a menine un nivel suficient
de ncredere a pieei n instituie sau entitate;
(b) | conversia n titluri de capital sau reducerea valorii
principalului creanelor sau al instrumentelor de datorie care
sunt transferate: | (i) | ctre o instituie-punte, n vederea unui
aport de capital ctre respectiva instituie-punte; sau | (ii) | n
cadrul instrumentului de vnzare a activit ii sau al
instrumentului de separare a activelor.
aplica instrumentul de recapitalizare intern n scopul
menionat la alineatul (2) litera (a) din prezentul articol,
numai n cazul n care exist o perspectiv rezonabil
potrivit creia aplicarea acestui instrument, mpreun cu alte
msuri relevante, inclusiv msuri puse n aplicare n
conformitate cu planul de reorganizare a activitii men ionat
la articolul 52 va avea drept rezultat nu doar realizarea
obiectivelor relevante ale rezoluiei, ci i restabilirea
viabilitii pe termen lung i a soliditii financiare a
instituiei sau a entitii n cauz menionate la articolul 1
and resolution practices regarding the determination

when, in accordance to paragraph 5 of this Article the
liquidation of the assets or liabilities under normal
insolvency proceeding could have an adverse effect on
one or more financial markets.
Section 5
The bail-in tool
Subsection 1
Objective and scope of the bail-in tool
Article 43
The bail-in tool
1. In order to give effect to the bail-in tool, Member
States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the
resolution powers specified in Article 63(1).
may apply the bail-in tool to meet the resolution
objectives specified in Article 31, in accordance with the
resolution principles specified in Article 34 for any of the
following purposes:
(a) | to recapitalise an institution or an entity referred to
in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of this Directive
that meets the conditions for resolution to the extent
sufficient to restore its ability to comply with the
conditions for authorisation (to the extent that those
conditions apply to the entity) and to continue to carry
out the activities for which it is authorised under
Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU, where
the entity is authorised under those Directives, and to
sustain sufficient market confidence in the institution or
entity;
(b) | to convert to equity or reduce the principal amount
of claims or debt instruments that are transferred: | (i) | to
a bridge institution with a view to providing capital for
that bridge institution; or | (ii) | under the sale of business
tool or the asset separation tool.
may apply the bail-in tool for the purpose referred to in
point (a) of paragraph 2 of this Article only if there is a
reasonable prospect that the application of that tool
together with other relevant measures including
measures implemented in accordance with the business
reorganisation plan required by Article 52 will, in
addition to achieving relevant resolution objectives,
restore the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1) in question to financial soundness
and long-term viability.
118

Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie pot
aplica oricare dintre instrumentele de rezoluie prevzute la
articolul 37 alineatul (3) literele (a), (b) i (c) i instrumentul
de recapitalizare intern menionat la alineatul (2) litera (b)
din prezentul articol, n cazul n care condi iile prevzute la
primul paragraf nu sunt ndeplinite.
aplica instrumentul de recapitalizare intern tuturor
instituiilor sau entitilor menionate la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) respectnd, n fiecare caz, forma
juridic a instituiei sau a entitii n cauz, sau c pot
schimba forma juridic.
Articolul 44
Domeniul de aplicare al instrumentului de recapitalizare
intern
(1) Statele membre se asigur c instrumentul de
recapitalizare intern poate fi aplicat tuturor pasivelor unei
instituii sau entiti menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d), care nu sunt excluse din domeniul de
aplicare al acestui instrument n conformitate cu alineatul (2)
sau (3) din prezentul articol.
(2) Autoritile de rezoluie nu exercit competen ele de
reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie n cazul
urmtoarelor pasive fie c sunt reglementate de dreptul unui
stat membru, fie de dreptul unui stat ter:
(a) | depozitele acoperite;
(b) | obligaiile garantateinclusiv obligaiunile garantate i
pasivele sub forma unor instrumente financiare utilizate n
scopul acoperirii riscurilor, care constituie o parte integrant
a portofoliului de acoperire i care, n temeiul dreptului
intern, sunt garantate n mod asemntor cu obligaiunile
garantate;
(c) | orice datorie care rezult n virtutea de inerii de ctre
litera (b), (c) sau (d) din prezenta directiv a unor active sau
lichiditi aparinnd clienilor, inclusiv active sau lichidit i
aparinnd clienilor deinute n numele unui OPCVM, n
conformitate cu definiia de la articolul 1 alineatul (2) din
Directiva 2009/65/CE, sau de un FIA, n conformitate cu
definiia de la articolul 4 alineatul (1) litera (a) din Directiva
2011/61/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (31),
cu condiia ca respectivul client s fie protejat n baza
legislaiei aplicabile privind insolvena;
(d) | orice datorie care rezult n virtutea existenei unei
relaii fiduciare ntre instituie sau entitatea men ionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) (n calitate de
fiduciar) i o alt persoan (n calitate de beneficiar), cu
condiia ca respectivul beneficiar s fie protejat n baza
legislaiei aplicabile privind insolvena sau n baza dreptului
civil;

may apply any of the resolution tools referred to in
points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 37(3), and the bail-in
tool referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article,
where the conditions laid down in the first subparagraph
are not met.
may apply the bail-in tool to all institutions or entities
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) while
respecting in each case the legal form of the institution or
entity concerned or may change the legal form.
Article 44
Scope of bail-in tool
1. Member States shall ensure that the bail-in tool may
be applied to all liabilities of an institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that are
not excluded from the scope of that tool pursuant to
paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Article.
2. Resolution authorities shall not exercise the write
down or conversion powers in relation to the following
liabilities whether they are governed by the law of a
Member State or of a third country:
(a) | covered deposits;
(b) | secured liabilities including covered bonds and
liabilities in the form of financial instruments used for
hedging purposes which form an integral part of the
cover pool and which according to national law are
secured in a way similar to covered bonds;
(c) | any liability that arises by virtue of the holding by
of Article 1(1) of this Directive of client assets or client
money including client assets or client money held on
behalf of UCITS as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive
2009/65/EC or of AIFs as defined in point (a) of Article
4(1) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council (31), provided that such a client is
protected under the applicable insolvency law;
(d) | any liability that arises by virtue of a fiduciary

relationship between the institution or entity referred to
in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) (as fiduciary) and
another person (as beneficiary) provided that such a
beneficiary is protected under the applicable insolvency
or civil law;
119
(e) | datorii fa de instituii, excluznd entitile care fac

parte din acelai grup, cu o scaden ini ial de sub apte
zile;
(f) | datorii cu o scaden rezidual de sub apte zile fa de
sisteme sau operatorii de sisteme desemnai n conformitate
cu Directiva 98/26/CE, sau participanii la astfel de sisteme
i care rezult din participarea la un astfel de sistem;
(g) | o datorie fa de oricare dintre urmtoarele persoane: |
(i) | un angajat, n ceea ce privete salariile, beneficiile de
tipul pensiilor sau alte forme de remuneraie fix acumulate,
cu excepia componentei variabile a remuneraiei care nu
este reglementat printr-un contract colectiv de munc; | (ii) |
un creditor comercial, n ceea ce prive te furnizarea ctre
litera (b), (c) sau (d) de mrfuri sau servicii care sunt
cruciale pentru desfurarea zilnic a activitilor sale,
inclusiv servicii informatice, servicii de utiliti, precum i
nchirierea, ntreinerea i reparaiile spa iilor de lucru; | (iii) |
autoriti fiscale i de asigurri sociale, cu condi ia ca
datoriile respective s fie considerate crean e privilegiate n
baza legii aplicabile; | (iv) | scheme de garantare a
depozitelor care decurg din contribuiile datorate n
conformitate cu Directiva 2014/49/UE.
Litera (g) punctul (i) din primul paragraf nu se aplic
componentei variabile a remuneraiei personalului cu
competene pentru asumarea de riscuri semnificative astfel
cum este identificat la articolul 92 alineatul (2) din Directiva
2013/36/UE.
Statele membre se asigur c toate activele garantate
asociate unui portofoliu de acoperire a obliga iunilor
garantate rmn neafectate, segregate i cu fonduri
suficiente. Nici respectiva dispoziie i nici primul paragraf
litera (b) nu mpiedic autoritile de rezoluie s- i exercite,
dup caz, respectivele competene n legtur cu orice parte
a unei obligaii garantate sau a unei datorii pentru care s-a
depus o garanie real care depete valoarea activelor,
gajului, a dreptului de retenie sau a garan iei reale care o
acoper.
Primul paragraf litera (a) nu mpiedic autorit ile de
rezoluie s-i exercite, dup caz, respectivele competen e n
legtur cu orice parte a unui depozit care dep e te nivelul
de acoperire prevzut la articolul 6 din Directiva
2014/49/UE.
Fr a aduce atingere normelor privind expunerile mari din
cadrul Regulamentului (UE) nr. 575/2013 i Directivei
2013/36/UE, statele membre se asigur c, pentru a garanta
posibiliti de soluionare a instituiilor i grupurilor,
autoritile de rezoluie limiteaz, n conformitate cu
articolul 17 alineatul (5) litera (b) din prezenta directiv,
msura n care alte instituii dein pasive eligibile pentru un
(e) | liabilities to institutions, excluding entities that are

part of the same group, with an original maturity of less
than seven days;
(f) | liabilities with a remaining maturity of less than
seven days, owed to systems or operators of systems
designated according to Directive 98/26/EC or their
participants and arising from the participation in such a
system;
(g) | a liability to any one of the following: | (i) | an
employee, in relation to accrued salary, pension benefits
or other fixed remuneration, except for the variable
component of remuneration that is not regulated by a
collective bargaining agreement; | (ii) | a commercial or
trade creditor arising from the provision to the institution
of goods or services that are critical to the daily
functioning of its operations, including IT services,
utilities and the rental, servicing and upkeep of premises;
| (iii) | tax and social security authorities, provided that
those liabilities are preferred under the applicable law; |
(iv) | deposit guarantee schemes arising from
contributions due in accordance with Directive
2014/49/EU.
Point (g)(i) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to
the variable component of the remuneration of material
risk takers as identified in Article 92(2) of Directive
2013/36/EU.
Member States shall ensure that all secured assets
relating to a covered bond cover pool remain unaffected,
segregated and with enough funding. Neither that
requirement nor point (b) of the first subparagraph shall
prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from
exercising those powers in relation to any part of a
secured liability or a liability for which collateral has
been pledged that exceeds the value of the assets, pledge,
lien or collateral against which it is secured.
Point (a) of the first subparagraph shall not prevent
resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising
those powers in relation to any amount of a deposit that
exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of
Without prejudice to the large exposure rules in
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive
2013/36/EU, Member States shall ensure that in order to
provide for the resolvability of institutions and groups,
resolution authorities limit, in accordance with point (b)
of Article 17(5) of this Directive, the extent to which
other institutions hold liabilities eligible for a bail-in tool,
120
instrument de recapitalizare intern, cu excepia pasivelor

care sunt deinute de entiti care fac parte din acela i grup.
(3) n situaii excepionale, atunci cnd se aplic
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern, autoritatea de
rezoluie poate exclude, integral sau par ial, anumite pasive
de la aplicarea competenelor de reducere a valorii contabile
sau de conversie, n cazurile n care:
(a) | recapitalizarea pasivului respectiv nu este posibil ntrun termen rezonabil, n pofida eforturilor depuse cu bun
credin de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie;
(b) | excluderea este strict necesar i este propor ional
pentru a obine continuitatea funciilor critice i a liniilor de
activitate eseniale ntr-un mod care s men in capacitatea
instituiei aflate n rezoluie de a continua operaiunile,
serviciile i tranzaciile-cheie;
(c) | excluderea este strict necesar i propor ional pentru
evitarea declanrii unei contaminri la scar larg, n
special n ceea ce privete depozitele eligibile de inute de
persoane fizice i de microntreprinderi, ntreprinderi mici i
mijlocii, care ar perturba grav funcionarea pie elor
financiare, inclusiv a infrastructurilor pie ei financiare, ntrun mod care ar putea determina o perturbare grav a
economiei unui stat membru sau a Uniunii; sau
(d) | aplicarea instrumentului de recapitalizare intern
respectivelor pasive ar provoca o distrugere a valorii care ar
face ca pierderile suportate de al i creditori s fie mai mari
dect n cazul n care respectivele pasive ar fi fost excluse de
la recapitalizarea intern.
n cazul n care o autoritate de rezoluie decide s exclud,
integral sau parial, un pasiv eligibil sau o categorie de
pasive eligibile n temeiul prezentului alineat, nivelul
reducerii valorii contabile sau al conversiei aplicate altor
pasive eligibile poate fi crescut pentru a ine seama de
excluderile respective, cu condiia ca nivelul reducerii valorii
contabile sau al conversiei aplicate altor pasive eligibile s
respecte principiul prevzut la articolul 34 alineatul (1) litera
(g).
(4) n cazul n care o autoritate de rezolu ie decide s
exclud, integral sau parial, un pasiv eligibil sau o categorie
de pasive eligibile n temeiul prezentului articol, iar
pierderile care ar fi fost suportate de pasivele respective nu
au fost transferate complet altor creditori, mecanismul de
finanare a rezoluiei poate face o contribuie n beneficiul
instituiei aflate n rezoluie n unul sau mai multe din
urmtoarele scopuri:
(a) | de a acoperi orice pierderi care nu au fost absorbite de
pasive eligibile i de a restabili la zero valoarea activului net
al instituiei aflate n rezoluie n conformitate cu articolul 46
alineatul (1) litera (a);
(b) | de a achiziiona aciuni sau alte instrumente de
proprietate sau de capital n instituia aflat n rezolu ie,
save for liabilities that are held at entities that are part of
the same group.
3. In exceptional circumstances, where the bail-in tool is
applied, the resolution authority may exclude or partially
exclude certain liabilities from the application of the
write-down or conversion powers where:
(a) | it is not possible to bail-in that liability within a
reasonable time notwithstanding the good faith efforts of
(b) | the exclusion is strictly necessary and is
proportionate to achieve the continuity of critical
functions and core business lines in a manner that
maintains the ability of the institution under resolution to
continue key operations, services and transactions;
(c) | the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate
to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion, in
particular as regards eligible deposits held by natural
persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises,
which would severely disrupt the functioning of financial
markets, including of financial market infrastructures, in
a manner that could cause a serious disturbance to the
economy of a Member State or of the Union; or
(d) | the application of the bail-in tool to those liabilities
would cause a destruction in value such that the losses
borne by other creditors would be higher than if those
liabilities were excluded from bail-in.
Where a resolution authority decides to exclude or
partially exclude an eligible liability or class of eligible
liabilities under this paragraph, the level of write down
or conversion applied to other eligible liabilities may be
increased to take account of such exclusions, provided
that the level of write down and conversion applied to
other eligible liabilities complies with the principle in
point (g) of Article 34(1).
4. Where a resolution authority decides to exclude or
partially exclude an eligible liability or class of eligible
liabilities pursuant to this Article, and the losses that
would have been borne by those liabilities have not been
passed on fully to other creditors, the resolution
financing arrangement may make a contribution to the
institution under resolution to do one or both of the
following:
(a) | cover any losses which have not been absorbed by
eligible liabilities and restore the net asset value of the
institution under resolution to zero in accordance with
point (a) of Article 46(1);
(b) | purchase shares or other instruments of ownership
or capital instruments in the institution under resolution,
121
pentru a recapitaliza instituia n conformitate cu articolul 46

alineatul (1) litera (b).
(5) Mecanismul de finanare a rezoluiei poate face o
contribuie menionat la alineatul (4) numai n cazul n care:
(a) | acionarii i deintorii de alte instrumente de
proprietate, precum i deintorii de instrumente de capital
relevante i de alte pasive eligibile au adus o contribuie, prin
reducerea valorii contabile, prin conversie sau prin alte
modaliti, n vederea absorbiei pierderilor i a
recapitalizrii instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n valoare de cel
puin 8 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile proprii
ale instituiei respective, cuantificat la momentul lurii
msurii de rezoluie n conformitate cu evaluarea prevzut
la articolul 36; i
(b) | contribuia mecanismului de finanare a rezolu iei nu
depete 5 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile
proprii ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie, cuantificat la
momentul lurii msurii de rezoluie n conformitate cu
evaluarea prevzut la articolul 36.
(6) Contribuia mecanismului de finanare a rezoluiei
menionat la alineatul (4) poate fi finanat prin:
(a) | suma aflat la dispoziia mecanismului de finan are care
a fost obinut prin contribuii de la instituii i sucursale din
Uniune n conformitate cu articolul 100 alineatul (6) i
articolul 103;
(b) | suma care poate fi obinut prin contribu ii ex post n
conformitate cu articolul 104 n termen de trei ani; i
(c) | n cazul n care sumele men ionate la literele (a) i (b)
din acest alineat sunt insuficiente, sume obinute din surse de
finanare alternative n conformitate cu articolul 105.
(7) n circumstane extraordinare, autoritatea de rezolu ie
poate urmri s obin finanare suplimentar din surse de
finanare alternative dup ce:
(a) | a fost atins limita de 5 % menionat la alineatul (5)
litera (b); i
(b) | toate pasivele negarantate i neprivilegiate, altele dect
depozitele eligibile, au fost reduse sau convertite integral.
Ca alternativ sau n mod suplimentar, atunci cnd sunt
ndeplinite condiiile stabilite la primul paragraf, mecanismul
de finanare a rezoluiei poate face o contribuie din resursele
care au fost percepute prin contribuii ex ante n conformitate
cu articolul 100 alineatul (6) i articolul 103 i care nu au
fost nc utilizate.
(8) Prin derogare de la alineatul (5) litera (a), mecanismul de
finanare a rezoluiei poate, de asemenea, s fac o
contribuie, astfel cum se menioneaz la alineatul (4), numai
in order to recapitalise the institution in accordance with

point (b) of Article 46(1).
5. The resolution financing arrangement may make a
contribution referred to in paragraph 4 only where:
(a) | a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation
equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total
liabilities including own funds of the institution under
resolution, measured at the time of resolution action in
accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36,
has been made by the shareholders and the holders of
other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant
capital instruments and other eligible liabilities through
write down, conversion or otherwise; and
(b) | the contribution of the resolution financing
arrangement does not exceed 5 % of the total liabilities
including own funds of the institution under resolution,
measured at the time of resolution action in accordance
with the valuation provided for in Article 36.
6. The contribution of the resolution financing
arrangement referred to in paragraph 4 may be financed
by:
(a) | the amount available to the resolution financing
arrangement which has been raised through contributions
by institutions and Union branches in accordance with
Article 100(6) and Article 103;
(b) | the amount that can be raised through ex-post
contributions in accordance with Article 104 within three
years; and
(c) | where the amounts referred to (a) and (b) of this
paragraph are insufficient, amounts raised from
alternative financing sources in accordance with Article
105.
7. In extraordinary circumstances, the resolution
authority may seek further funding from alternative
financing sources after:
(a) | the 5 % limit specified in paragraph 5(b) has been
reached; and
(b) | all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than
eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in
full.
As an alternative or in addition, where the conditions laid
down in the first subparagraph are met, the resolution
financing arrangement may make a contribution from
resources which have been raised through ex-ante
contributions in accordance with Article 100(6) and
Article 103 and which have not yet been used.
8. By way of derogation from paragraph 5 (a), the
resolution financing arrangement may also make a
contribution as referred to in paragraph 4 provided that:
122
dac:
(a) | contribuia la absorbia pierderilor i recapitalizare
menionat la alineatul (5) punctul (i) are o valoare de cel
puin 20 % din activele ponderate n funcie de risc ale
instituiei n cauz;
(b) | mecanismul de finanare a rezoluiei al statului membru
n cauz are la dispoziie, prin intermediul contribuiilor ex
ante (excluznd contribuiile ctre o schem de garantare a
depozitelor) percepute n conformitate cu articolul 100
alineatul (6) i articolul 103, o sum cel puin egal cu 3 %
din depozitele acoperite ale tuturor instituiilor de credit
autorizate pe teritoriul statului membru respectiv; i
(c) | instituia n cauz deine active n valoare mai mic de
900 de miliarde EUR pe baz consolidat.
(9) Atunci cnd i exercit competenele discreionare
menionate la alineatul (3), autoritile de rezoluie acord
atenia cuvenit:
(a) | principiului conform cruia pierderile ar trebui s fie
suportate n primul rnd de acionari i, n al doilea rnd, n
general, de ctre creditorii instituiei aflate n rezolu ie, n
ordinea de preferin;
(b) | nivelului capacitii de absorbie a pierderilor de care ar
mai dispune instituia aflat n rezoluie n cazul excluderii
pasivului sau a categoriei de pasive; i
(c) | necesitii de a pstra resurse corespunztoare pentru
finanarea rezoluiei.
(10) Excluderile prevzute la alineatul (3) pot fi aplicate fie
pentru a exclude complet un pasiv de la reducerea valorii
contabile, fie pentru a limita amploarea reducerii valorii
contabile aplicate respectivului pasiv.
(11) Se confer Comisiei competena de a adopta acte
delegate n conformitate cu articolul 115 pentru a specifica
n detaliu situaiile n care excluderea este necesar pentru
atingerea obiectivelor menionate la alineatul (3) din
prezentul articol.
(12) nainte de a exercita competena discreionar de a
exclude un pasiv n temeiul alineatului (3), autoritatea de
rezoluie notific Comisia. n cazul n care excluderea ar
necesita o contribuie din mecanismul de finan are a
rezoluiei sau dintr-o surs de finanare alternativ n temeiul
alineatelor (4)-(8), Comisia poate, n termen de 24 de ore de
la primirea unei astfel de notificri sau ntr-un termen mai
lung, cu acordul autoritii de rezoluie, s interzic sau s
solicite modificri la excluderea propus, dac nu sunt
ndeplinite cerinele din prezentul articol i din actele
delegate, cu scopul de a proteja integritatea pie ei interne.
Aceasta nu aduce atingere aplicrii de ctre Comisie a
cadrului Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat.
Subseciunea 2
Cerin minim privind fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile
(a) | the contribution to loss absorption and

recapitalisation referred to in point (a) of paragraph 5 is
equal to an amount not less than 20 % of the risk
weighted assets of the institution concerned;
(b) | the resolution financing arrangement of the Member
State concerned has at its disposal, by way of ex-ante
contributions (not including contributions to a deposit
guarantee scheme) raised in accordance with Article
100(6) and Article 103, an amount which is at least equal
to 3 % of covered deposits of all the credit institutions
authorised in the territory of that Member State; and
(c) | the institution concerned has assets below EUR 900
billion on a consolidated basis.
9. When exercising the discretions under paragraph 3,
resolution authorities shall give due consideration to:
(a) | the principle that losses should be borne first by
shareholders and next, in general, by creditors of the
institution under resolution in order of preference;
(b) | the level of loss absorbing capacity that would
remain in the institution under resolution if the liability
or class of liabilities were excluded; and
(c) | the need to maintain adequate resources for
resolution financing.
10. Exclusions under paragraph 3 may be applied either
to completely exclude a liability from write down or to
limit the extent of the write down applied to that liability.
specify further the circumstances when exclusion is
necessary to achieve the objectives specified in
12. Before exercising the discretion to exclude a liability
under paragraph 3, the resolution authority shall notify
the Commission. Where the exclusion would require a
contribution by the resolution financing arrangement or
an alternative financing source under paragraphs 4 to 8,
the Commission may, within 24 hours of receipt of such
a notification, or a longer period with the agreement of
the resolution authority, prohibit or require amendments
to the proposed exclusion if the requirements of this
Article and delegated acts are not met in order to protect
the integrity of the internal market. This is without
prejudice to the application by the Commission of the
Union State aid framework.
Subsection 2
Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
123
Articolul 45
Aplicarea cerinei minime
(1) Statele membre se asigur c instituiile ndeplinesc, n
permanen, o cerin minim privind fondurile proprii i
pasivele eligibile. Cerina minim se calculeaz ca suma
fondurilor proprii i a pasivelor eligibile, exprimat ca
procentaj din totalul pasivelor i al fondurilor proprii ale
instituiei.
n sensul primului paragraf, datoriile care provin din
instrumente financiare derivate sunt incluse n pasivele totale
pe baza faptului c drepturile la compensare ale contrapr ii
sunt recunoscute pe deplin.
reglementare care specific n detaliu criteriile de evaluare
menionate la alineatul (6) literele (a)-(f) pe baza crora
urmeaz s se stabileasc, pentru fiecare instituie n parte, o
cerin minim privind fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile,
inclusiv datoriile subordonate i datoriile cu rang prioritar
negarantate cu o scaden de cel puin 12 luni, care fac
obiectul competenei de recapitalizare intern i care se
ncadreaz n categoria fondurilor proprii.
tehnice de reglementare menionate n primul paragraf n
1093/2010.
Statele membre pot s prevad criterii suplimentare pe baza
crora se stabilete cerina minim privind fondurile proprii
i pasivele eligibile.
(3) Fr a aduce atingere alineatului (1), autorit ile de
rezoluie excepteaz instituiile de credit ipotecar finan ate
prin obligaiuni garantate care, conform dreptului intern, nu
pot primi depozite, de obligaia de a ndeplini, n orice
moment, o cerin minim de fonduri proprii i de pasive
eligibile, deoarece:
(a) | aceste instituii vor lichidate prin aplicarea procedurilor
naionale de insolven sau prin alte tipuri de proceduri puse
n aplicare n conformitate cu articolele 38, 40 sau 42 din
prezenta directiv, prevzute pentru aceste institu ii; i
(b) | procedurile naionale de insolven respective, sau
celelalte tipuri de proceduri, vor garanta faptul c creditorii
acestor instituii, inclusiv deintorii de obligaiuni garantate,
dup caz, vor suporta pierderile ntr-un mod care s permit
atingerea obiectivelor rezoluiei.
(4) Pasivele eligibile sunt incluse n suma fondurilor proprii
i a pasivelor eligibile menionat la alineatul (1) numai n
cazul n care ndeplinesc urmtoarele condi ii:
(a) | instrumentul este emis i achitat integral;
liabilities
Article 45
Application of the minimum requirement
1. Member States shall ensure that institutions meet, at
all times, a minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities. The minimum requirement shall be
calculated as the amount of own funds and eligible
liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities
and own funds of the institution.
For the purpose of the first subparagraph derivative
liabilities shall be included in the total liabilities on the
basis that full recognition is given to counterparty netting
rights.
2. EBA shall draft technical regulatory standards which
specify further the assessment criteria mentioned in
points (a) to (f) of paragraph 6 on the basis of which, for
each institution, a minimum requirement for own funds
and eligible liabilities, including subordinated debt and
senior unsecured debt with at least 12 months remaining
on their terms that are subject to the bail-in power and
those that qualify as own funds, is to be determined.
Member States may provide for additional criteria on the
basis of which the minimum requirement for own funds
and eligible liabilities shall be determined.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, resolution authorities
shall exempt mortgage credit institutions financed by
covered bonds which, according to national law are not
allowed to receive deposits from the obligation to meet,
at all times, a minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities, as:
(a) | those institutions will be wound-up through national
insolvency procedures, or other types of procedure
implemented in accordance with Article 38, 40 or 42 of
this Directive, provided for those institutions; and
(b) | such national insolvency procedures, or other types
of procedure, will ensure that creditors of those
institutions, including holders of covered bonds where
relevant, will bear losses in a way that meets the
resolution objectives.
4. Eligible liabilities shall be included in the amount of
own funds and eligible liabilities referred to in paragraph
1 only if they satisfy the following conditions:
(a) | the instrument is issued and fully paid up;
124
(b) | pasivul nu este datorat instituiei nse i i nu face

obiectul unei garanii acordate de aceasta;
(c) | achiziionarea instrumentului nu a fost finanat, direct
sau indirect, de instituie;
(d) | pasivul are o scaden rezidual de cel pu in un an;
(e) | pasivul nu provine dintr-un instrument financiar derivat;
(f) | pasivul nu provine dintr-un depozit care beneficiaz de
preferin n ierarhia naional a creanelor, n conformitate
cu articolul 108.
n sensul literei (d), atunci cnd un pasiv confer
proprietarului su un drept de rambursare anticipat,
scadena pasivului respectiv este prima dat la care se na te
acest drept.
(5) Atunci cnd un pasiv este reglementat de dreptul unei ri
tere, autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita instituiei s
demonstreze c orice decizie a unei autoriti de rezoluie de
a reduce valoarea contabil a pasivului respectiv sau de a-l
converti ar fi eficient n contextul dreptului rii ter e
respective, innd seama de termenii contractului care
reglementeaz pasivul, de acordurile interna ionale privind
recunoaterea procedurilor de rezoluie i de alte chestiuni
relevante. n cazul n care autoritatea de rezolu ie nu
consider c o decizie este eficient n contextul dreptului
rii tere respective, pasivul nu este inclus n calculul
cerinei minime privind fondurile proprii i pasivele
eligibile.
(6) Cerina minim privind fondurile proprii i pasivele
eligibile ale fiecrei instituii n conformitate cu alineatul (1)
este determinat de ctre autoritatea de rezolu ie, n urma
consultrii cu autoritatea competent, cel pu in pe baza
urmtoarelor criterii:
(a) | necesitatea de a garanta faptul c institu ia poate face
obiectul procedurii de rezoluie prin aplicarea instrumentelor
de rezoluie, inclusiv, dup caz, a instrumentului de
recapitalizare intern, ntr-un mod care s permit atingerea
obiectivelor rezoluiei;
(b) | necesitatea de a garanta, dup caz, c instituia deine o
cantitate suficient de pasive eligibile pentru a garanta c, n
cazul aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern
pierderile pot fi absorbite, iar ponderea fondurilor proprii de
nivel 1 de baz ale instituiei poate fi readus la un nivel care
s-i permit s respecte n continuare condiiile de autorizare
i s-i desfoare n continuare activitile pentru care a fost
autorizat n temeiul Directivei 2013/36/UE sau Directivei
2014/65/UE, precum i s menin n continuare un grad
suficient de ncredere a pieei n respectiva institu ie sau
entitate;
(c) | necesitatea de a garanta c, dac planul de rezolu ie
anticipeaz c anumite clase de pasive eligibile ar putea fi
excluse din recapitalizarea intern n temeiul articolului 44
(b) | the liability is not owed to, secured by or guaranteed

by the institution itself;
(c) | the purchase of the instrument was not funded
directly or indirectly by the institution;
(d) | the liability has a remaining maturity of at least one
year;
(e) | the liability does not arise from a derivative;
(f) | the liability does not arise from a deposit which
benefits from preference in the national insolvency
hierarchy in accordance with Article 108.
For the purpose of point (d) where a liability confers
upon its owner a right to early reimbursement, the
maturity of that liability shall be the first date where such
a right arises.
5. Where a liability is governed by the law of a thirdcountry, resolution authorities may require the institution
to demonstrate that any decision of a resolution authority
to write down or convert that liability would be effective
under the law of that third country, having regard to the
terms of the contract governing the liability, international
agreements on the recognition of resolution proceedings
and other relevant matters. If the resolution authority is
not satisfied that any decision would be effective under
the law of that third country, the liability shall not be
counted towards the minimum requirement for own
funds and eligible liabilities.
6. The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities of each institution pursuant to paragraph 1
shall be determined by the resolution authority, after
consulting the competent authority, at least on the basis
of the following criteria:
(a) | the need to ensure that the institution can be
resolved by the application of the resolution tools
including, where appropriate, the bail-in tool, in a way
that meets the resolution objectives;
(b) | the need to ensure, in appropriate cases, that the
institution has sufficient eligible liabilities to ensure that,
if the bail-in tool were to be applied, losses could be
absorbed and the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of the
institution could be restored to a level necessary to
enable it to continue to comply with the conditions for
authorisation and to continue to carry out the activities
for which it is authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU or
Directive 2014/65/EU and to sustain sufficient market
confidence in the institution or entity;
(c) | the need to ensure that, if the resolution plan
anticipates that certain classes of eligible liabilities might
be excluded from bail-in under Article 44(3) or that
125
alineatul (3) sau c anumite clase de pasive eligibile ar putea

fi transferate integral unui destinatar n cadrul unui transfer
parial, instituia deine suficiente alte pasive eligibile pentru
a garanta c pierderile ar putea fi absorbite i c ponderea
fondurilor proprii de nivel 1 de baz ale instituiei ar putea fi
readus la un nivel necesar pentru a-i permite s respecte n
continuare condiiile de autorizare i s-i desf oare n
continuare activitile pentru care a fost autorizat n temeiul
Directivei 2013/36/UE sau al Directivei 2014/65/UE;
(d) | dimensiunea, modelul economic, modelul de finanare i
profilul de risc ale instituiei;
(e) | msura n care schema de garantare a depozitelor ar
putea contribui la finanarea rezoluiei n conformitate cu
articolul 109;
(f) | msura n care intrarea n dificultate a institu iei ar avea
efecte negative asupra stabilitii financiare, mai exact din
cauza contagiunii rezultate de pe urma interconectrii sale cu
alte instituii sau cu restul sistemului financiar,
(7) Instituiile respect cerinele minime stabilite n prezentul
articol n mod individual.
O autoritate de rezoluie poate, n urma consultrii cu o
autoritate competent, s decid s aplice cerin a minim
stabilit n prezentul articol n cazul unei entit i men ionate
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d).
(8) Pe lng alineatul (7), ntreprinderile-mam din Uniune
respect cerinele minime stabilite n prezentul articol pe
baz consolidat.
Cerina minim pentru fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile
la nivelul consolidat al unei ntreprinderi-mam din Uniune
este determinat de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului, n
urma consultrii supraveghetorului consolidant, n
conformitate cu alineatul (9), cel puin pe baza criteriilor
prevzute la alineatul (6) i dac filialele grupului din rile
tere trebuie s fac obiectul unei proceduri de rezolu ie n
mod separat n temeiul planului de rezoluie.
(9) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului i autoritile de
rezoluie responsabile pentru filiale la nivel individual fac tot
posibilul pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun privind nivelul
cerinei minime aplicate la nivel consolidat.
Decizia comun este pe deplin motivat i este pus la
dispoziia ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului.
n absena unei decizii comune n termen de patru luni,
autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului ia o decizie privind cerina
minim consolidat dup examinarea atent a evalurii
filialelor, efectuat de autoritile de rezoluie competente.
Dac pn la finalul perioadei de patru luni, oricare dintre
autoritile de rezoluie relevante aduce problema n atenia
certain classes of eligible liabilities might be transferred

to a recipient in full under a partial transfer, that the
institution has sufficient other eligible liabilities to
ensure that losses could be absorbed and the Common
Equity Tier 1 ratio of the institution could be restored to
a level necessary to enable it to continue to comply with
the conditions for authorisation and to continue to carry
out the activities for which it is authorised under
Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU;
(d) | the size, the business model, the funding model and
the risk profile of the institution;
(e) | the extent to which the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
could contribute to the financing of resolution in
(f) | the extent to which the failure of the institution
would have adverse effects on financial stability,
including, due to its interconnectedness with other
institutions or with the rest of the financial system
through contagion to other institutions.
7. Institutions shall comply with the minimum
requirements laid down in this Article on an individual
basis.
A resolution authority may, after consulting a competent
authority, decide to apply the minimum requirement laid
down in this Article to an entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1).
8. In addition to paragraph 7, Union parent undertakings
shall comply with the minimum requirements laid down
in this Article on a consolidated basis.
The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities at consolidated level of an Union parent
undertaking shall be determined by the group-level
resolution authority, after consulting the consolidating
supervisor, in accordance with paragraph 9, at least on
the basis of the criteria laid down in paragraph 6 and of
whether the third-country subsidiaries of the group are to
be resolved separately according to the resolution plan.
9. The group-level resolution authority and the resolution
authorities responsible for the subsidiaries on an
individual basis shall do everything within their power to
reach a joint decision on the level of the minimum
requirement applied at the consolidated level.
The joint decision shall be fully reasoned and shall be
provided to the Union parent undertaking by the grouplevel resolution authority.
In the absence of such a joint decision within four
months, a decision shall be taken on the consolidated
minimum requirement by the group-level resolution
authority after duly taking into consideration the
assessment of subsidiaries performed by the relevant
resolution authorities. If, at the end of the four-month
126
ABE n conformitate cu articolul 19 din Regulamentul (UE)

nr. 1093/2010, autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului i amn
decizia i ateapt orice decizie care poate fi luat de ABE n
conformitate cu articolul 19 alineatul (3) din regulamentul
menionat, adoptnd propria sa decizie n conformitate cu
decizia ABE. Perioada de patru luni se consider a fi
perioada de conciliere n nelesul regulamentului menionat.
ABE adopt propria decizie n termen de o lun. Problema
nu poate fi adus n atenia ABE dup expirarea perioadei de
patru luni sau dup ce s-a ajuns la o decizie comun. n
absena unei decizii a ABE n termen de o lun, se aplic
decizia autoritii de rezoluie a grupului.
Decizia comun i decizia autoritii de rezoluie a grupului

luate n absena unei decizii comune au caracter obligatoriu
pentru autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre vizate.
Decizia comun i orice decizie luat n absen a unei decizii
comune sunt revizuite i, dup caz, actualizate periodic.
(10) Autoritile de rezoluie stabilesc cerin a minim care
urmeaz s fie aplicat filialelor grupului, la nivel individual.
Cerinele minime respective se stabilesc la un nivel
corespunztor pentru filial, innd seama de urmtoarele:
(a) | criteriile menionate la alineatul (6), n special
dimensiunea, modelul economic i profilul de risc ale
filialei, inclusiv fondurile sale proprii; i
(b) | cerina consolidat care a fost stabilit pentru grup n
Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului i autoritile de rezolu ie
responsabile pentru filiale la nivel individual fac tot posibilul
pentru a ajunge la o decizie comun privind nivelul cerin ei
minime care urmeaz s fie aplicat fiecrei filiale vizate la
nivel individual.
Decizia comun este pe deplin motivat i este pus la
dispoziia filialelor i a instituiei-mam din Uniune de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie a filialelor i, respectiv, de ctre
n absena unei astfel de decizii comune a autorit ilor de
rezoluie n termen de patru luni, decizia este luat de ctre
autoritile de rezoluie respective ale filialelor, innd seama
n mod corespunztor de avizele i rezervele exprimate de
Dac pn la finalul perioadei de patru luni, autoritatea de
rezoluie a grupului aduce problema n atenia ABE n
1093/2010, autoritile de rezoluie responsabile pentru
period, any of the resolution authorities concerned has

referred the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19
of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the group-level
The joint decision and the decision taken by the grouplevel resolution authority in the absence of a joint
decision shall be binding on the resolution authorities in
the Member States concerned.
The joint decision and any decision taken in the absence
of a joint decision shall be reviewed and where relevant
updated on a regular basis.
10. Resolution authorities shall set the minimum
requirement to be applied to the groups subsidiaries on
an individual basis. Those minimum requirements shall
be set at a level appropriate for the subsidiary having
regard to:
(a) | the criteria listed in paragraph 6, in particular the
size, business model and risk profile of the subsidiary,
including its own funds; and
(b) | the consolidated requirement that has been set for
the group under paragraph 9.
The group-level resolution authority and the resolution
authorities responsible for subsidiaries on an individual
basis shall do everything within their power to reach a
joint decision on the level of the minimum requirement
to be applied to each respective subsidiary at an
individual level.
The joint decision shall be fully reasoned and shall be
provided to the subsidiaries and to the Union parent
institution by the resolution authority of the subsidiaries
and by the group-level resolution authority, respectively.
In the absence of such a joint decision between the
resolution authorities within a period of four months the
decision shall be taken by the respective resolution
authorities of the subsidiaries duly considering the views
and reservations expressed by the group-level resolution
authority.
If, at the end of the four-month period, the group-level
resolution authority has referred the matter to EBA in
1093/2010, the resolution authorities responsible for the
127
filiale la nivel individual i amn deciziile i ateapt orice

decizie pe care ABE o poate lua n conformitate cu articolul
19 alineatul (3) din regulamentul menionat, adoptnd
propria lor decizie n conformitate cu decizia ABE. Perioada
de patru luni se consider a reprezenta etapa de conciliere n
sensul regulamentului menionat. ABE adopt propria
decizie n termen de o lun. Problema nu poate fi adus n
atenia ABE dup expirarea perioadei de patru luni sau dup
ce s-a ajuns la o decizie comun. Autoritatea de rezolu ie a
grupului nu sesizeaz ABE respectiva chestiune n vederea
medierii cu caracter obligatoriu n cazul n care nivelul
stabilit de autoritatea de rezoluie a filialei se ncadreaz n
limita unui punct procentual fa de nivelul consolidat
stabilit n conformitate cu alineatul (9) din prezentul articol.
n absena unei decizii a ABE n termen de o lun, se aplic
deciziile autoritilor de rezoluie ale filialelor.
Decizia comun i orice decizii luate de autoritile de
rezoluie ale filialelor n absena unei decizii comune au
caracter obligatoriu pentru autoritile de rezolu ie vizate.
Decizia comun i orice decizie luat n absen a unei decizii
comune sunt revizuite i, dup caz, actualizate periodic.
(11) Autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului poate acorda unei
instituii-mam din Uniune o derogare deplin de la
aplicarea cerinei minime individuale, n cazul n care:
(a) | instituia-mam din Uniune respect, pe baz
consolidat, cerina minim stabilit la alineatul (8); i
(b) | autoritatea competent a instituiei-mam din Uniune a
acordat instituiei o derogare deplin de la aplicarea
cerinelor individuale de capital, n conformitate cu articolul
7 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013.
(12) Autoritatea de rezoluie a unei filiale poate acorda
respectivei filiale o derogare deplin de la aplicarea
alineatului (7), n cazul n care:
(a) | att filiala, ct i ntreprinderea-mam a acesteia fac
obiectul autorizrii i supravegherii de ctre acela i stat
membru;
(b) | filiala este inclus n supravegherea pe baz consolidat
a instituiei care este ntreprinderea-mam;
(c) | instituia situat la cel mai nalt nivel n cadrul grupului
din statul membru al filialei, n cazul n care este diferit de
instituia-mam
din Uniune, respect,
pe
baz
subconsolidat, cerina minim stabilit n conformitate cu
alineatul (7);
(d) | nu exist niciun impediment practic sau legal
semnificativ, actual sau potenial, n calea transferului
subsidiaries on an individual basis shall defer their

decisions and await any decision that EBA may take in
shall take their decisions in accordance with the decision
of EBA. The four-month period shall be deemed to be
the conciliation period within the meaning of that
been reached. The group-level resolution authority shall
not refer the matter to EBA for binding mediation where
the level set by the resolution authority of the subsidiary
is within one percentage point of the consolidated level
set under paragraph 9 of this Article.
In the absence of an EBA decision within one month, the
decisions of the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries
shall apply.
The joint decision and any decisions taken by the
resolution authorities of the subsidiaries in the absence of
a joint decision shall be binding on the resolution
authorities concerned.
The joint decision and any decisions taken in the absence
of a joint decision shall be reviewed and where relevant
updated on a regular basis.
11. The group-level resolution authority may fully waive
the application of the individual minimum requirement to
an Union parent institution where:
(a) | the Union parent institution complies on a
consolidated basis with the minimum requirement set
under paragraph 8; and
(b) | the competent authority of the Union parent
institution has fully waived the application of individual
capital requirements to the institution in accordance with
Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
12. The resolution authority of a subsidiary may fully
waive the application of paragraph 7 to that subsidiary
where:
(a) | both the subsidiary and its parent undertaking are
subject to authorisation and supervision by the same
Member State;
(b) | the subsidiary is included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the institution which is the parent
undertaking;
(c) | the highest level group institution in the Member
State of the subsidiary, where different to the Union
parent institution, complies on a sub-consolidated basis
with the minimum requirement set under paragraph 7;
(d) | there is no current or foreseen material practical or
legal impediment to the prompt transfer of own funds or
128
prompt de fonduri proprii sau a rambursrii rapide a

pasivelor ctre filial de ctre ntreprinderea sa mam;
(e) | fie ntreprinderea-mam ndeplinete cerin ele autorit ii
competente privind gestionarea prudent a filialei i a
declarat, cu consimmntul autoritii competente, c
garanteaz angajamentele asumate de filial, fie riscurile
filialei sunt nesemnificative;
(f) | procedurile de evaluare, msurare i control al riscului
aplicate de ntreprinderea-mam includ filiala;
(g) | ntreprinderea-mam deine mai mult de 50 % din
drepturile de vot aferente aciunilor din capitalul filialei sau
are dreptul de a numi sau de a revoca majoritatea membrilor
organului de conducere al filialei; i
(h) | autoritatea competent a filialei a acordat filialei o
derogare deplin de la aplicarea cerinelor individuale de
capital, n conformitate cu articolul 7 alineatul (1) din
(13) Deciziile luate n conformitate cu prezentul articol pot
prevedea ca cerina minim pentru fondurile proprii i
pasivele eligibile s fie respectat parial la nivel consolidat
sau individual, prin instrumente contractuale de
recapitalizare intern.
(14) Pentru a se califica drept instrument contractual de
recapitalizare intern n temeiul alineatului (13), autoritatea
de rezoluie consider oportun ca instrumentul:
(a) | s conin o clauz contractual care prevede faptul c,
n cazul n care autoritatea de rezoluie decide s aplice
instituiei respective instrumentul de recapitalizare intern,
acesta este redus sau convertit n msura necesar, nainte ca
alte pasive eligibile s fie reduse sau convertite; i
(b) | s fac obiectul unui acord, al unui angajament sau al
unei dispoziii de subordonare cu caracter obligatoriu potrivit
crora, n eventualitatea unor proceduri obi nuite de
insolven, instrumentul este de rang inferior altor pasive
eligibile s fie reduse n temeiul articolului 43 alineatul (1)
litera (d) i nu poate fi rambursat dect dup lichidarea altor
pasive eligibile datorate la momentul respectiv.
(15) Autoritile de rezoluie, n colaborare cu autorit ile
competente, solicit i verific respectarea de ctre institu ii
a cerinelor minime privind fondurile proprii i pasivele
eligibile stabilite la alineatul (1) i, dup caz, a cerin elor
stabilite la alineatul (13), i iau toate deciziile n
conformitate cu prezentul articol, n paralel cu elaborarea i
actualizarea planurilor de rezoluie.
(16) Autoritile de rezoluie, n colaborare cu autorit ile
competente, informeaz ABE cu privire la cerina minim
privind fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile i, dup caz, cu
repayment of liabilities to the subsidiary by its parent

undertaking;
(e) | either the parent undertaking satisfies the competent
authority regarding the prudent management of the
subsidiary and has declared, with the consent of the
competent authority, that it guarantees the commitments
entered into by the subsidiary, or the risks in the
subsidiary are of no significance;
(f) | the risk evaluation, measurement and control
procedures of the parent undertaking cover the
subsidiary;
(g) | the parent undertaking holds more than 50 % of the
voting rights attached to shares in the capital of the
subsidiary or has the right to appoint or remove a
majority of the members of the management body of the
subsidiary; and
(h) | the competent authority of the subsidiary has fully
waived the application of individual capital requirements
to the subsidiary under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013.
13. The decisions taken in accordance with this Article
may provide that the minimum requirement for own
funds and eligible liabilities is partially met at
consolidated or individual level through contractual bailin instruments.
14. To qualify as a contractual bail-in instrument under
paragraph 13, the resolution authority shall be satisfied
that the instrument:
(a) | contains a contractual term providing that, where a
resolution authority decides to apply the bail-in tool to
that institution, the instrument shall be written down or
converted to the extent required before other eligible
liabilities are written down or converted; and
(b) | is subject to a binding subordination agreement,
undertaking or provision under which in the event of
normal insolvency proceedings, it ranks below other
eligible liabilities and cannot be repaid until other
eligible liabilities outstanding at the time have been
settled.
15. Resolution authorities, in coordination with
competent authorities, shall require and verify that
institutions meet the minimum requirement for own
funds and eligible liabilities laid down in paragraph 1
and where relevant the requirement laid down in
paragraph 13, and shall take any decision pursuant to this
Article in parallel with the development and the
maintenance of resolution plans.
16. Resolution authorities, in coordination with
competent authorities, shall inform EBA of the minimum
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, and
129
privire la cerina stabilit la alineatul (13), stabilite pentru

fiecare instituie aflat sub jurisdicia lor.
n aplicare pentru a specifica formate, modele i defini ii
uniforme pentru identificarea i transmiterea ctre ABE a
informaiilor de ctre autoritile de rezoluie, n colaborare
cu autoritile competente, n sensul alineatului (16).
1093/2010.
(18) Pe baza rezultatelor raportului menionat la alineatul
(19), pn la 31 decembrie 2016 Comisia nainteaz, dup
caz, Parlamentului European i Consiliului o propunere
legislativ privind aplicarea armonizat a cerin ei minime
privind fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile. Propunerea
respectiv include, dup caz, propuneri de introducere a unui
numr adecvat de niveluri minime ale cerin ei minime,
innd seama de diferitele modele de afaceri ale instituiilor
i grupurilor. Propunerea include orice ajustri adecvate ale
parametrilor cerinei minime i, dac este necesar, modificri
corespunztoare referitoare la aplicarea cerinei minime n
cazul grupurilor.
(19) ABE transmite un raport Comisiei, pn la 31 octombrie

2016, cu privire la cel puin urmtoarele aspecte:
(a) | modul n care a fost implementat la nivel na ional
cerina minim privind fondurile proprii i pasivele eligibile
i, n special, dac au existat divergene referitoare la
nivelurile stabilite pentru instituii comparabile ntre statele
membre;
(b) | modul n care a fost aplicat n statele membre
competena de a impune instituiilor s respecte cerin a
minim prin instrumente contractuale de recapitalizare
intern i dac au existat divergene n respectivele abordri;
(c) | identificarea modelelor de afaceri care reflect
profilurile de risc globale ale instituiei;
(d) | nivelul adecvat al cerinei minime pentru fiecare dintre
modelele de afaceri identificate la litera (c);
(e) | dac ar trebui stabilit o sfer de aplicare pentru cerin a
minim aferent fiecrui model de afaceri;
(f) | perioada de tranziie adecvat pentru ca institu iile s
where relevant the requirement laid down in paragraph

13, that have been set for each institution under their
jurisdiction.
standards to specify uniform formats, templates and
definitions for the identification and transmission of
information by resolution authorities, in coordination
with competent authorities, to EBA for the purposes of
paragraph 16.
18. Based on the results of the report referred to in
paragraph 19, the Commission shall, if appropriate,
submit by 31 December 2016 to the European Parliament
and the Council a legislative proposal on the harmonised
application of the minimum requirement for own funds
and eligible liabilities. That proposal shall include, where
appropriate, proposals for the introduction of an
appropriate number of minimum levels of the minimum
requirement, taking account of the different business
models of institutions and groups. The proposal shall
include any appropriate adjustments to the parameters of
the minimum requirement, and if necessary, appropriate
amendments to the application of the minimum
requirement to groups.
19. EBA shall submit a report to the Commission by 31
October 2016 on at least the following:
(a) | how the minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities has been implemented at national
level, and in particular whether there have been
divergences in the levels set for comparable institutions
across Member States;
(b) | how the power to require institutions to meet the
minimum requirement through contractual bail-in
instruments has been applied across Member States and
whether there have been divergences in those
approaches;
(c) | the identification of business models that reflect the
overall risk profiles of the institution;
(d) | the appropriate level of the minimum requirement
for each of the business models identified under point
(c);
(e) | whether a range for the level of the minimum
requirement of each business model should be
established;
(f) | the appropriate transitional period for institutions to
130
realizeze respectarea eventualelor niveluri minime

armonizate prevzute;
(g) | dac cerinele prevzute la articolul 45 sunt suficiente
pentru a garanta c fiecare instituie dispune de o capacitate
de absorbie a pierderilor adecvat i, n caz contrar, ce
mbuntiri suplimentare sunt necesare pentru a asigura
realizarea acestui obiectiv;
(h) | dac sunt necesare modificri ale metodologiei de calcul
prevzute la prezentul articol pentru a garanta c cerin a
minim poate fi utilizat drept indicator adecvat al
capacitii unei instituii de absorbie a pierderilor;
(i) | dac este oportun ca cerina s se bazeze pe totalul
pasivelor i fondurile proprii i, n special, dac este mai
oportun s se utilizeze ca numitor pentru cerin activele
ponderate n funcie de risc ale instituiei;
(j) | dac abordarea prezentului articol privind aplicarea
cerinei minime n cazul grupurilor este oportun i, n
special, dac ea asigur n mod adecvat faptul c capacitatea
de absorbie a pierderilor n cadrul grupului este situat n
entitile n care ar putea aprea pierderi sau este accesibil
acestora;
(k) | dac condiiile pentru derogri de la cerina minim sunt
adecvate i, n special, dac astfel de derogri ar trebui s fie
disponibile pentru filiale la nivel transfrontalier;
(l) | dac este oportun ca autoritile de rezolu ie s poat
solicita ca cerina minim s fie respectat prin instrumente
contractuale de recapitalizare intern i dac este oportun o
armonizare suplimentar a abordrii privind instrumentele
contractuale de recapitalizare intern;
(m) | dac cerinele instrumentelor contractuale de
recapitalizare intern prevzute la alineatul (14) sunt
adecvate; i
(n) | dac este oportun ca instituiilor i grupurilor s li se
impun s fac public cerina lor minim de fonduri proprii
i pasive eligibile sau nivelul lor de fonduri proprii i pasive
eligibile i, dac acesta este cazul, cu ce frecven i n ce
format se fac publice aceste informaii.
(20) Raportul menionat la alineatul (19) acoper cel pu in
perioada cuprins ntre 2 iulie 2014 i 30 iunie 2016 i ia n
considerare cel puin urmtoarele aspecte:
(a) | impactul cerinei minime i al oricror propuneri de
niveluri armonizate ale cerinei minime asupra: | (i) | pie elor
financiare n general i pieelor de datorii negarantate i
instrumente financiare derivate n special; | (ii) | modelelor
de afaceri i structurilor bilanurilor instituiilor, n special
profilul de finanare i strategia de finanare a institu iilor,
precum i asupra structurii juridice i opera ionale a
grupurilor; | (iii) | rentabilitii instituiilor, n special asupra
costului de finanare al acestora; | (iv) | migrrii expunerilor
ctre entiti care nu fac obiectul supravegherii pruden iale; |
achieve compliance with any harmonised minimum

levels prescribed;
(g) | whether the requirements laid down in Article 45 are
sufficient to ensure that each institution has adequate
loss-absorbing capacity and, if not, which further
enhancements are needed in order to ensure that
objective;
(h) | whether changes to the calculation methodology
provided for in this Article are necessary to ensure that
the minimum requirement can be used as an appropriate
indicator of an institutions loss-absorbing capacity;
(i) | whether it is appropriate to base the requirement on
total liabilities and own funds and in particular whether it
is more appropriate to use the institutions risk-weighted
assets as a denominator for the requirement;
(j) | whether the approach of this Article on the
application of the minimum requirement to groups is
appropriate, and in particular whether the approach
adequately ensures that loss absorbing capacity in the
group is located in, or accessible to, the entities where
losses might arise;
(k) | whether the conditions for waivers from the
minimum requirement are appropriate, and in particular
whether such waivers should be available for subsidiaries
on a cross-border basis;
(l) | whether it is appropriate that resolution authorities
may require that the minimum requirement be met
through contractual bail-in instruments, and whether
further harmonisation of the approach to contractual bailin instruments is appropriate;
(m) | whether the requirements for contractual bail-in
instruments laid down in paragraph 14 are appropriate;
and
(n) | whether it is appropriate for institutions and groups
to be required to disclose their minimum requirement for
own funds and eligible liabilities, or their level of own
funds and eligible liabilities, and if so the frequency and
format of such disclosure.
20. The report in paragraph 19 shall cover at least the
period from 2 July 2014 until 30 June 2016 and shall
take account of at least the following:
(a) | the impact of the minimum requirement, and any
proposed harmonised levels of the minimum requirement
on: | (i) | financial markets in general and markets for
unsecured debt and derivatives in particular; | (ii) |
business models and balance sheet structures of
institutions, in particular the funding profile and funding
strategy of institutions, and the legal and operational
structure of groups; | (iii) | the profitability of institutions,
in particular their cost of funding; | (iv) | the migration of
exposures to entities which are not subject to prudential
131
(v) | inovaiei financiare; | (vi) | prevalenei instrumentelor

contractuale de recapitalizare intern, precum i asupra
naturii i capacitii de comercializare a acestor instrumente;
| (vii) | comportamentului instituiilor n ceea ce prive te
asumarea de riscuri; | (viii) | nivelului grevrii cu sarcini a
activelor instituiilor; | (ix) | aciunilor ntreprinse de institu ii
pentru a respecta cerinele minime, n special msura n care
cerinele minime au fost respectate prin reducerea efectului
de levier aferent activelor, emisiunea de titluri de datorie pe
termen lung i mobilizarea de capital; i | (x) | nivelului de
creditare al instituiilor de credit, cu un accent special pe
acordarea de credite microntreprinderilor, ntreprinderilor
mici i mijlocii, autoritilor locale, administraiilor
regionale i entitilor din sectorul public i pe finan area
comerului, inclusiv mprumuturi acoperite de sistemele
oficiale de asigurare a creditelor de export;
(b) | interaciunea dintre cerinele minime i cerin ele de
fonduri proprii, efectul de levier i cerinele de lichiditate
stabilite n Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 i n Directiva
2013/36/UE.
(c) | capacitatea instituiilor de a mobiliza n mod
independent capital sau finanare de pe pie e pentru a
respecta eventualele cerine minime armonizate propuse.
(d) | coerena cu cerinele minime legate de eventualele
standarde internaionale elaborate de forurile internaionale.
Subseciunea 3
Punerea n aplicare a instrumentului de recapitalizare intern
Articolul 46
Stabilirea valorii recapitalizrii interne
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, la aplicarea instrumentului
de recapitalizare intern, autoritile de rezoluie stabilesc, pe
baza unei evaluri care respect articolul 36:
(a) | dup caz, cuantumul cu care trebuie reduse pasivele
eligibile pentru a garanta faptul c valoarea activului net al
instituiei aflate n rezoluie este egal cu zero; i
(b) | dup caz, cuantumul cu care pasivele eligibile trebuie
convertite n aciuni sau n alte tipuri de instrumente de
capital pentru a restabili ponderea fondurilor proprii de nivel
1 de baz, fie a: | (i) | instituiei aflate n rezolu ie; sau | (ii) |
instituiei-punte.
(2) Evaluarea menionat la alineatul (1) al prezentului
articol stabilete valoarea cu care trebuie reduse sau
convertite pasivele eligibile pentru a restabili ponderea
fondurilor proprii de nivel 1 de baz ale instituiei aflate n
rezoluie sau, dup caz, stabilete ponderea instituiei-punte,
innd seama de orice contribuie la capital din partea
mecanismului de finanare a rezoluiei n temeiul articolului
101 alineatul (1) litera (d) din prezenta directiv i pentru a
supervision; | (v) | financial innovation; | (vi) | the

prevalence of contractual bail-in instruments, and the
nature and marketability of such instruments; | (vii) | the
risk-taking behaviour of institutions; | (viii) | the level of
asset encumbrance of institutions; | (ix) | the actions
taken by institutions to comply with minimum
requirements, and in particular the extent to which
minimum requirements have been met by asset
deleveraging, long-term debt issuance and capital
raising; and | (x) | the level of lending by credit
institutions, with a particular focus on lending to micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises, local authorities,
regional governments and public sector entities and on
trade financing, including lending under official export
credit insurance schemes;
(b) | the interaction of the minimum requirements with
the own funds requirements, leverage ratio and the
liquidity requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 and in Directive 2013/36/EU;
(c) | the capacity of institutions to independently raise
capital or funding from markets in order to meet any
proposed harmonised minimum requirements;
(d) | consistency with the minimum requirements relating
to any international standards developed by international
fora.
Subsection 3
Implementation of the bail-in tool
Article 46
Assessment of amount of bail-in
bail-in tool, resolution authorities assess on the basis of a
valuation that complies with Article 36 the aggregate of:
(a) | where relevant, the amount by which eligible
liabilities must be written down in order to ensure that
the net asset value of the institution under resolution is
equal to zero; and
(b) | where relevant, the amount by which eligible
liabilities must be converted into shares or other types of
capital instruments in order to restore the Common
Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of either: | (i) | the institution
under resolution; or | (ii) | the bridge institution.
2. The assessment referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall establish the amount by which eligible
liabilities need to be written down or converted in order
to restore the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the
institution under resolution or where applicable establish
the ratio of the bridge institution taking into account any
contribution of capital by the resolution financing
arrangement pursuant to point (d) of Article 101(1) of
132
menine o ncredere suficient a pieei n institu ia aflat n

rezoluie sau n instituia-punte i pentru a-i permite acesteia,
pe o perioad de cel puin un an, s respecte condi iile de
autorizare i s-i desfoare n continuare activit ile pentru
care a fost autorizat n conformitate cu Directiva
2013/36/UE sau Directiva 2014/65/UE.
Atunci cnd autoritile de rezoluie inten ioneaz s
foloseasc instrumentul de separare a activelor men ionat la
articolul 42, valoarea cu care trebuie reduse pasivele eligibile
va ine seama de o estimare prudent a necesitilor de
fonduri proprii ale vehiculului de gestionare a activelor, dup
caz.
(3) Atunci cnd capitalul a fost redus n conformitate cu
articolele 59-62 i recapitalizarea intern a fost aplicat n
temeiul articolului 43 alineatul (2) i se constat c nivelul
reducerii valorii contabile pe baza evalurii preliminare
menionate la articolul 36 depete cerinele atunci cnd
este evaluat definitiv n conformitate cu articolul 36 alineatul
(10), ar trebui s se aplice un mecanism de majorare a valorii
contabile pentru a rambursa creditorii i apoi acionarii, att
ct este necesar.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie instituie i menin mecanisme
care s garanteze faptul c procesul de verificare i evaluare
se bazeaz pe informaii ct mai actualizate i mai
exhaustive posibil referitoare la activele i pasivele instituiei
aflate n rezoluie.
Articolul 47
Tratamentul acionarilor n cadrul recapitalizrii interne sau
al reducerii valorii contabile sau al conversiei instrumentelor
de capital
de recapitalizare intern de la articolul 43 alineatul (2) sau la
reducerea valorii contabile sau la conversia instrumentelor
de capital de la articolul 59, autoritile de rezolu ie iau, n
ceea ce-i privete pe acionari i pe de intorii altor
instrumente de proprietate, cel puin una dintre urmtoarele
msuri:
(a) | anuleaz aciunile sau alte instrumente de proprietate
existente sau le transfer creditorilor care fac obiectul unei
recapitalizri interne;
(b) | cu condiia ca, n conformitate cu evaluarea efectuat n
temeiul articolului 36, instituia aflat n rezolu ie s aib o
valoare net pozitiv, dilueaz acionarii existeni i
deintorii altor instrumente de proprietate ca urmare a
conversiei n aciuni i alte instrumente de proprietate a: | (i)
| instrumentelor de capital relevante, emise de institu ie n
temeiul competenei menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (2);
sau | (ii) | pasivelor eligibile emise de instituia aflat n
rezoluie n temeiul competenei menionate la articolul 63
alineatul (1) litera (f).
this Directive, and to sustain sufficient market

confidence in the institution under resolution or the
bridge institution and enable it to continue to meet, for at
least one year, the conditions for authorisation and to
continue to carry out the activities for which it is
authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive
2014/65/EU.
Where resolution authorities intend to use the asset
separation tool referred to in Article 42, the amount by
which eligible liabilities need to be reduced shall take
into account a prudent estimate of the capital needs of
the asset management vehicle as appropriate.
3. Where capital has been written down in accordance
with Articles 59 to 62 and bail-in has been applied
pursuant to Article 43(2) and the level of write-down
based on the preliminary valuation according to Article
36 is found to exceed requirements when assessed
against the definitive valuation according to Article
36(10), a write-up mechanism may be applied to
reimburse creditors and then shareholders to the extent
necessary.
4. Resolution authorities shall establish and maintain
arrangements to ensure that the assessment and valuation
is based on information about the assets and liabilities of
the institution under resolution that is as up to date and
comprehensive as is reasonably possible.
Article 47
Treatment of shareholders in bail-in or write down or
conversion of capital instruments
bail-in tool in Article 43(2) or the write down or
conversion of capital instruments in Article 59,
resolution authorities take in respect of shareholders and
holders of other instruments of ownership one or both of
the following actions:
(a) | cancel existing shares or other instruments of
ownership or transfer them to bailed-in creditors;
(b) | provided that, in accordance to the valuation carried
out under Article 36, the institution under resolution has
a positive net value, dilute existing shareholders and
holders of other instruments of ownership as a result of
the conversion into shares or other instruments of
ownership of: | (i) | relevant capital instruments issued by
the institution pursuant to the power referred to in Article
59(2); or | (ii) | eligible liabilities issued by the institution
under resolution pursuant to the power referred to in
point (f) of Article 63(1).
133
n ceea ce privete litera (b) al primului paragraf, conversia

este efectuat la o rat de conversie care dilueaz
semnificativ deinerile existente de aciuni i alte instrumente
de proprietate.
(2) Msurile menionate la alineatul (1) se aplic referitor la
acionarii i deintorii altor instrumente de proprietate ale
cror aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate au fost
emise sau acordate n urmtoarele circumstane:
(a) | ca urmare a conversiei unor instrumente de datorie n
aciuni sau n alte instrumente de proprietate n conformitate
cu clauzele contractuale ale instrumentelor ini iale de
datorie, efectuat cu ocazia producerii unui eveniment care a
precedat sau care a avut loc n acela i timp cu evaluarea
autoritii de rezoluie potrivit creia instituia sau entitatea
ndeplinea condiiile de declanare a unei proceduri de
rezoluie;
(b) | ca urmare a conversiei instrumentelor de capital
relevante n instrumentele de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz, n conformitate cu articolul 60.
(3) Atunci cnd examineaz msurile de luat n conformitate
cu alineatul (1), autoritile de rezoluie au n vedere:
(a) | evaluarea efectuat n conformitate cu articolul 36;
(b) | cuantumul cu care autoritatea de rezolu ie a evaluat c
instrumentele de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz trebuie s
fie reduse i instrumentele de capital relevante trebuie reduse
sau convertite n temeiul artioclului 60 alineatul (1); i
(c) | cuantumul agregat evaluat de autoritatea de rezolu ie n
temeiul articolului 46.
(4) Prin derogare de la articolele 22-25 din Directiva
2013/36/UE, de la obligaia de comunicare menionat la
articolul 26 din Directiva 2013/36/UE, articolul 10 alineatul
(3), articolul 11 alineatele (1) i (2) i articolele 12 i 13 din
Directiva 2014/65/UE i de la obligaia de notificare
menionat la articolul 11 alineatul (3) din Directiva
2014/65/UE, n cazul n care aplicarea instrumentului de
recapitalizare intern sau a conversiei instrumentelor de
capital ar duce la achiziionarea sau sporirea unei participa ii
calificate ntr-o instituie de tipul celor menionate la
articolul 22 alineatul (1) din Directiva 2013/36/UE sau la
articolul 11 alineatul (1) din Directiva 2014/65/UE,
autoritile competente efectueaz evaluarea necesar n
temeiul articolelor respective n timp util, astfel nct s nu
ntrzie aplicarea instrumentului de recapitalizare intern sau
a conversiei instrumentelor de capital sau s nu mpiedice
aciunea de rezoluie s i ating obiectivele relevante ale
rezoluiei.
(5) n cazul n care autoritatea competent a institu iei
With regard to point (b) of the first subparagraph, the

conversion shall be conducted at a rate of conversion that
severely dilutes existing holdings of shares or other
instruments of ownership.
2. The actions referred to in paragraph 1 shall also be
taken in respect of shareholders and holders of other
instruments of ownership where the shares or other
instruments of ownership in question were issued or
conferred in the following circumstances:
(a) | pursuant to conversion of debt instruments to shares
or other instruments of ownership in accordance with
contractual terms of the original debt instruments on the
occurrence of an event that preceded or occurred at the
same time as the assessment by the resolution authority
that the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) met the conditions for resolution;
(b) | pursuant to the conversion of relevant capital

instruments to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments
pursuant to Article 60.
3. When considering which action to take in accordance
with paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall have regard
to:
(a) | the valuation carried out in accordance with Article
36;
(b) | the amount by which the resolution authority has
assessed that Common Equity Tier 1 items must be
reduced and relevant capital instruments must be written
down or converted pursuant to Article 60(1); and
(c) | the aggregate amount assessed by the resolution
authority pursuant to Article 46.
4. By way of derogation from Articles 22 to 25 of
Directive 2013/36/EU, the requirement to give a notice
in Article 26 of Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 10(3),
Article 11(1) and(2) and Articles 12 and 13of Directive
2014/65/EU and the requirement to give a notice in
Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU, where the
application of the bail-in tool or the conversion of capital
instruments would result in the acquisition of or increase
in a qualifying holding in an institution as referred to in
Article 22(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU or Article 11(1) of
Directive 2014/65/EU, competent authorities shall carry
out the assessment required under those Articles in a
timely manner that does not delay the application of the
bail-in tool or the conversion of capital instruments, or
prevent resolution action from achieving the relevant
resolution objectives.
5. If the competent authority of that institution has not

134
respective nu a finalizat evaluarea necesar n temeiul

alineatului (4) la data aplicrii instrumentului de
recapitalizare intern sau a conversiei instrumentelor de
capital, dispoziiile stabilite la articolul 38 alineatul (9) se
aplic oricrei achiziii sau sporiri a participa iei calificate de
ctre un achizitor, rezultat n urma aplicrii instrumentului
de recapitalizare intern sau a conversiei instrumentelor de
capital.
(6) Pn la 3 iulie 2016, ABE emite orientri, n
1093/2010, privind circumstanele adecvate aplicrii
fiecreia dintre msurile menionate la alineatul (1) din
prezentul articol, innd cont de factorii enumera i la
alineatul (3) din prezentul articol.
Articolul 48
Ordinea reducerii valorii contabile i a conversiei
de recapitalizare intern, autoritile de rezolu ie exercit
competenele de reducere a valorii contabile i de conversie,
sub rezerva oricror excluderi menionate la articolul 44
alineatele (2) i (3), cu respectarea urmtoarele cerin e:
(a) | instrumentele de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz sunt
reduse n conformitate cu articolul 60 alineatul (1) litera (a);
(b) | dac i numai dac reducerea total n temeiul literei (a)
este inferioar sumei cuantumulrilor menionate la articolul
47 alineatul (3) literele (b) i (c), autorit ile reduc valoarea
contabil a principalului acelor instrumente de fonduri
proprii de nivel 1 suplimentar, n msura n care este necesar
i n limitele capacitii acestora;
(c) | dac i numai dac reducerea total n temeiul literelor
(a) i (b) este inferioar sumei cuantumulrilor men ioante la
articolul 47 alineatul (3) literele (b) i (c), autorit ile reduc
valoarea contabil a principalului acelor instrumente de
fonduri proprii de nivel 2, n msura n care este necesar i n
limitele capacitii acestora;
(d) | dac i numai dac deprecierea total a ac iunilor sau a
altor instrumente de proprietate i a instrumentelor de capital
relevante n temeiul literelor (a), (b) i (c) este inferioar
sumei cuantumulrilor menioante la articolul 47 alineatul (3)
literele (b) i (c), autoritile reduc, n msura n care este
necesar, principalul datoriilor subordonate care nu reprezint
instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 suplimentar sau de
nivel 2, n conformitate cu ierarhia creanelor din procedura
obinuit de insolven, coroborat cu reducerea valorii
contabile prevzut la literele (a), (b) i (c), pentru a ob ine
cuantumul agregat menionat la la articolul 47 alineatul (3)
literele (b) i (c);
(e) | dac i numai dac deprecierea total a ac iunilor sau a
altor instrumente de proprietate i a instrumentelor de capital
relevante, precum i a pasivelor eligibile n temeiul literelor
(a)-(d) din prezentul alineat este inferioar sumei
completed the assessment required under paragraph 4 on

the date of application of the bail-in tool or the
conversion of capital instruments, Article 38(9) shall
apply to any acquisition of or increase in a qualifying
holding by an acquirer resulting from the application of
the bail-in tool or the conversion of capital instruments.
6. EBA shall, by 3 July 2016, issue guidelines, in

1093/2010, on the circumstances in which each of the
actions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article would be
appropriate, having regard to the factors specified in
Article 48
Sequence of write down and conversion
bail-in tool, resolution authorities exercise the write
down and conversion powers, subject to any exclusions
under Article 44(2) and (3), meeting the following
requirements:
(a) | Common Equity Tier 1 items are reduced in
accordance with point (a) of Article 60(1);
(b) | if, and only if, the total reduction pursuant to point
(a) is less than the sum of the amounts referred to in
points (b) and (c) of Article 47(3), authorities reduce the
principal amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments to the
extent required and to the extent of their capacity;
(c) | if, and only if, the total reduction pursuant to points
(a) and (b) is less than the sum of the amounts referred to
in points (b) and (c) of Article 47(3), authorities reduce
the principal amount of Tier 2 instruments to the extent
required and to the extent of their capacity;
(d) | if, and only if, the total reduction of shares or other
instruments of ownership and relevant capital
instruments pursuant to points (a), (b) and (c) is less than
the sum of the amounts referred to in points (b) and (c)
of Article 47(3), authorities reduce to the extent required
the principal amount of subordinated debt that is not
Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital in accordance with the
hierarchy of claims in normal insolvency proceedings, in
conjunction with the write down pursuant to points (a),
(b) and (c) to produce the sum of the amounts referred to
in points (b) and (c) of Article 47(3);
(e) | if, and only if, the total reduction of shares or other
instruments of ownership, relevant capital instruments
and eligible liabilities pursuant to points (a) to (d) of this
paragraph is less than the sum of the amounts referred to
135
cuantumulrilor menioante la articolul 47 alineatul (3)

literele (b) i (d), autoritile reduc n msura n care este
necesar, conform articolului 44, valoarea principalului sau a
sumei de plat restante aferente acelor pasive eligibile
rmase n conformitate cu ierarhia creanelor n procedurile
obinuite de insolven, inclusiv a ierarhiei depozitelor
menionate la articolul 108, coroborat cu reducerea valorii
contabile prevzut la literele (a), (b), (c) i (d) din prezentul
alineat, pentru a obine cuantumul agregat men ionat la
articolul 47 alineatul (3) literele (b) i (c).
(2) La aplicarea competenelor de reducere a valorii
contabile sau de conversie, autoritile de rezoluie aloc
pierderile reprezentate de suma cuantumulrilor men ioante la
articolul 47 alineatul (3) literele (b) i (c) n mod egal ntre
aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate i pasive eligibile
de acelai rang, prin reducerea n mod egal a principalului
sau a sumei de plat restante aferente aciunilor sau altor
instrumente de proprietate i pasivelor eligibile respective,
proporional cu valoarea acestora, cu excepia cazului n care
se permite o repartiie diferit a pierderilor ntre pasivele de
acelai rang n situaiile menionate la articolul 44 alineatul
(3).
Prezentul alineat nu mpiedic acordarea unui tratament mai
favorabil pasivelor care au fost excluse de la recapitalizarea
intern n conformitate cu articolul 44 alineatele (2) i (3), n
comparaie cu pasivele eligibile de acelai nivel ierarhic, n
cadrul unei proceduri de insolven obinuite.
(3) nainte de a aplica reducerea valorii contabile sau
conversia menionat la alineatul (1) litera (e), autoritile de
rezoluie convertesc sau reduc valoarea contabil a
principalului instrumentelor menionate la alineatul (1)
literele (b), (c) i (d), atunci cnd aceste instrumente con in
urmtoarele clauze i nu au fost deja convertite:
(a) | reducerea valorii principalului instrumentului, n caz de
producere a unui eveniment care afecteaz situa ia
financiar, solvabilitatea sau fondurile proprii ale institu iei
sau entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b),
(c) sau (d);
(b) | conversia instrumentelor n aciuni sau n alte
instrumente de proprietate, n caz de producere a unui astfel
de eveniment.
(4) n cazul n care valoarea contabil a principalului unui
instrument a fost redus, dar nu la zero, n conformitate cu
clauzele menionate la alineatul (3) litera (a) nainte de
aplicarea recapitalizrii interne n conformitate cu alineatul
(1), autoritile de rezoluie exercit competen ele de
reducere a valorii contabile i de conversie n ceea ce
privete valoarea rezidual a principalului n cauz, n
(5) Atunci cnd decide dac pasivele trebuie reduse sau
convertite n titluri de capital, autoritile de rezoluie nu
in points (b) and (d) of Article 47(3), authorities reduce

to the extent required the principal amount of, or
outstanding amount payable in respect of, the rest of
eligible liabilities in accordance with the hierarchy of
claims in normal insolvency proceedings, including the
ranking of deposits provided for in Article 108, pursuant
to Article 44, in conjunction with the write down
pursuant to points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this paragraph to
produce the sum of the amounts referred to in points (b)
and (c) of Article 47(3).
2. When applying the write down or conversion powers,
resolution authorities shall allocate the losses represented
by the sum of the amounts referred to in points (b) and
(c) of Article 47(3) equally between shares or other
instruments of ownership and eligible liabilities of the
same rank by reducing the principal amount of, or
outstanding amount payable in respect of, those shares or
other instruments of ownership and eligible liabilities to
the same extent pro rata to their value except where a
different allocation of losses amongst liabilities of the
same rank is allowed in the circumstances specified in
Article 44(3).
This paragraph shall not prevent liabilities which have
been excluded from bail-in in accordance with Article
44(2) and (3) from receiving more favourable treatment
than eligible liabilities which are of the same rank in
normal insolvency proceedings.
3. Before applying the write down or conversion referred
to in point (e) of paragraph 1, resolution authorities shall
convert or reduce the principal amount on instruments
referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 when
those instruments contain the following terms and have
not already been converted:
(a) | terms that provide for the principal amount of the
instrument to be reduced on the occurrence of any event
that refers to the financial situation, solvency or levels of
own funds of the institution or entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(b) | terms that provide for the conversion of the
instruments to shares or other instruments of ownership
on the occurrence of any such event.
4. Where the principal amount of an instrument has been
reduced, but not to zero, in accordance with terms of the
kind referred to in point (a) of paragraph 3 before the
application of the bail-in pursuant to paragraph 1,
resolution authorities shall apply the write-down and
conversion powers to the residual amount of that
principal in accordance with paragraph 1.
5. When deciding on whether liabilities are to be written
down or converted into equity, resolution authorities
136
convertesc o categorie de pasive n timp ce o alt categorie

de pasive, care este subordonat primei, rmne n esen
neconvertit n titluri de capital sau fr reducerea valorii, cu
excepia unor dispoziii contrare n temeiul articolului 44
alineatele (2) i (3).
(6) n sensul prezentului articol, pn la 3 ianuarie 2016,
ABE emite orientri n conformitate cu articolul 16 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 pentru orice interpretare
referitoare la interaciunile dintre dispozi iile prezentei
directive i cele ale Regulamentului (UE) nr. 575/2013 i
Directivei 2013/36/UE.
Articolul 49
Instrumente financiare derivate
(1) Statele membre garanteaz c prezentul articol este
respectat n momentul aplicrii de ctre autorit ile de
rezoluie a competenelor de reducere a valorii contabile i
de conversie datoriilor care provin din instrumente financiare
derivate.
(2) Autoritile de rezoluie i exercit competen ele de
reducere a valorii contabile i de conversie n raport cu o
datorie care provine dintr-un instrument financiar derivat
numai n momentul nchiderii sau dup nchiderea
instrumentelor financiare derivate. La intrarea n procedura
de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie sunt mputernicite s
pun capt i s nchid orice contract derivat n acest scop.
n cazul n care o datorie derivat a fost exclus de la
aplicarea instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n temeiul
articolului 44 alineatul (3), autoritile de rezoluie nu sunt
obligate s pun capt contractului derivat sau s l nchid.
(3) n cazul n care tranzaciile derivate fac obiectul unui
acord de compensare, autoritatea de rezolu ie sau un
evaluator independent stabilete, ca parte a evalurii
desfurate n conformitate cu articolul 36, pasivul ce rezult
din respectivele tranzacii pe o baz net, n conformitate cu
dispoziiile acordului n cauz.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie stabilesc cuantumul datoriei ce
provin din instrumente financiare derivate pe baza:
(a) | unor metode adecvate pentru determinarea valorii
categoriilor de instrumente financiare derivate, inclusiv a
tranzaciilor care fac obiectul unor acorduri de compensare;
(b) | unor principii de stabilire a momentului exact la care
trebuie determinat valoarea unei pozi ii pe instrumente
financiare derivate; i
(c) | unor metodologii adecvate pentru compararea
distrugerii valorii care ar rezulta din nchiderea i
recapitalizarea intern a instrumentelor financiare derivate
cu valoarea pierderilor care ar fi suportate de instrumentele
financiare derivate ntr-o recapitalizare intern.
(5) ABE, dup consultarea Autoritii europene de
shall not convert one class of liabilities, while a class of

liabilities that is subordinated to that class remains
substantially unconverted into equity or not written
down, unless otherwise permitted under Article 44(2)
and (3).
6. For the purposes of this Article, EBA shall, by 3
January 2016, issue guidelines in accordance with Article
16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 for any
interpretation relating to the interrelationship between
the provisions of this Directive and those of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU.
Article 49
Derivatives
1. Member States shall ensure that this Article is
complied with when resolution authorities apply the
write-down and conversion powers to liabilities arising
from derivatives.
2. Resolution authorities shall exercise the write-down
and conversion powers in relation to a liability arising
from a derivative only upon or after closing-out the
derivatives. Upon entry into resolution, resolution
authorities shall be empowered to terminate and close
out any derivative contract for that purpose.
Where a derivative liability has been excluded from the
application of the bail-in tool under Article 44(3),
resolution authorities shall not be obliged to terminate or
close out the derivative contract.
3. Where derivative transactions are subject to a netting
agreement, the resolution authority or an independent
valuer shall determine as part of the valuation under
Article 36 the liability arising from those transactions on
a net basis in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
4. Resolution authorities shall determine the value of
liabilities arising from derivatives in accordance with the
following:
(a) | appropriate methodologies for determining the value
of classes of derivatives, including transactions that are
subject to netting agreements;
(b) | principles for establishing the relevant point in time
at which the value of a derivative position should be
established; and
(c) | appropriate methodologies for comparing the
destruction in value that would arise from the close out
and bail-in of derivatives with the amount of losses that
would be borne by derivatives in a bail-in.
5. EBA, after consulting the European Supervisory
137
supraveghere (Autoritatea European pentru Valori

Mobiliare i Piee) (AEVMP), instituit prin Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1095/2010, elaboreaz proiecte de standarde tehnice
de reglementare pentru precizarea metodologiilor i a
principiilor menionate la alineatul (4) literele (a), (b) i (c)
privind evaluarea pasivelor ce rezult din instrumente
financiare derivate:
n ceea ce privete tranzaciile cu instrumente financiare
derivate care fac obiectul unui acord de compensare, ABE ia
n considerare metodologia pentru nchidere stabilit n
acordul de compensare. ABE nainteaz Comisiei aceste
proiecte de standarde tehnice de reglementare pn la 3
ianuarie 2016.
tehnice de reglementare pn la 3 ianuarie 2016.
1093/2010.
Articolul 50
Rata de conversie a datoriilor n titluri de capital
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd i exercit
competenele prevzute la articolul 59 alineatul (3) i la
articolul 63 alineatul (1) litera (f), autoritile de rezolu ie
pot aplica rate de conversie diferite pentru categorii de
instrumente de capital i pasive diferite, n conformitate cu
cel puin unul dintre principiile menionate la alineatele (2) i
(3) din prezentul articol.
(2) Rata de conversie trebuie s reprezinte, pentru creditorul
afectat, o despgubire adecvat pentru pierderile suportate ca
urmare a exercitrii competenelor de reducere a valorii
contabile i de conversie.
(3) Atunci cnd sunt aplicate rate de conversie diferite n
conformitate cu alineatul (1), rata de conversie aplicabil
pasivelor considerate cu rang prioritar n temeiul legii
aplicabile privind insolvena este mai mare dect cea aplicat
pasivelor subordonate.
(4) Pn la 3 ianuarie 2016, ABE elaboreaz orientri, n
1093/2010, referitoare la stabilirea ratelor de conversie.
Orientrile indic n special modul n care creditorii afecta i
pot fi compensai n mod corespunztor prin intermediul
ratei de conversie i ratele de conversie relative care ar putea
reflecta n mod adecvat prioritatea datoriilor cu rang prioritar
n temeiul legii aplicabile privind insolvena.
Articolul 51
Msurile de redresare i de reorganizare care trebuie s
nsoeasc recapitalizarea intern
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazul n care autorit ile
de rezoluie aplic instrumentul de recapitalizare intern
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority)

(ESMA), established by Regulation (EU) No
1095/2010, shall develop draft regulatory technical
standards specifying methodologies and the principles
referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 4 on the
valuation of liabilities arising from derivatives.
In relation to derivative transactions that are subject to a
netting agreement, EBA shall take into account the
methodology for close-out set out in the netting
agreement.

standards to the Commission by 3 January 2016.
Article 50
Rate of conversion of debt to equity
1. Member States shall ensure that, when resolution
authorities exercise the powers specified in Article 59(3)
and point (f) of Article 63(1), they may apply a different
conversion rate to different classes of capital instruments
and liabilities in accordance with one or both of the
principles referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
Article.
2. The conversion rate shall represent appropriate
compensation to the affected creditor for any loss
incurred by virtue of the exercise of the write down and
conversion powers.
3. When different conversion rates are applied according
to paragraph 1, the conversion rate applicable to
liabilities that are considered to be senior under
applicable insolvency law shall be higher than the
conversion rate applicable to subordinated liabilities.
1093/2010 on the setting of conversion rates.
Those guidelines shall indicate, in particular, how
affected creditors may be appropriately compensated by
means of the conversion rate, and the relative conversion
rates that might be appropriate to reflect the priority of
senior liabilities under applicable insolvency law.
Article 51
Recovery and reorganisation measures to accompany
bail-in
1. Member States shall ensure that, where resolution
authorities apply the bail-in tool to recapitalise an
138
pentru a recapitaliza o instituie sau o entitate men ionat la

articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) n conformitate
cu articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (a), se adopt dispozi ii
pentru a garanta elaborarea i punerea n aplicare a unui plan
de reorganizare a activitii pentru instituia sau entitatea, n
(2) Dispoziiile menionate la alineatul (1) din prezentul
articol pot include numirea de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie a
uneia sau mai multor persoane numite n conformitate cu
articolul 72 alineatul (1) cu obiectivul de a elabora i pune n
aplicare planul de reorganizare a activit ii prevzut la
articolul 52.
Articolul 52
Planul de reorganizare a activitii
(1) Statele membre solicit organului de conducere sau
persoanei sau persoanelor desemnate n temeiul articolului
72 alineatul (1), n termen de o lun de la aplicarea n
conformitate cu articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (a) a
instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n legtur cu o
instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d), s elaboreze i s prezinte autorit ilor
de rezoluie un plan de reorganizare a activit ii care
satisface cerinele stipulate la alineatele (4) i (5) din
prezentul articol. n cazul n care este aplicabil cadrul
Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat, statele membre se asigur
c acest plan este compatibil cu planul de restructurare pe
care instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) este obligat s-l prezinte Comisiei
n temeiul respectivului cadru.
(2) Atunci cnd instrumentul de recapitalizare intern
menionat la articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (a) este aplicat
pentru dou sau mai multe entiti din grup, planul de
reorganizare a activitii este elaborat de instituia-mam din
Uniune i acoper toate instituiile din cadrul grupului, n
conformitate cu procedura specificat la articolele 7 i 8 i
este prezentat autoritii de rezoluie a grupului. Autoritatea
de rezoluie a grupului comunic planul celorlalte autorit i
de rezoluie implicate i ABE.
(3) n situaii excepionale i dac acest lucru este necesar
pentru realizarea obiectivelor rezoluiei, autoritatea de
rezoluie poate prelungi perioada menionat la alineatul (1)
cu o perioad de maximum dou luni ncepnd cu data
aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern.
Atunci cnd planul de reorganizare a activitii trebuie
notificat conform cadrului Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat,
autoritatea de rezoluie poate prelungi perioada men ionat la
alineatul (1) fie cu maximum dou luni ncepnd cu data
aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern, fie pn la
data limit stabilit de cadrul Uniunii privind ajutoarele de
stat, indiferent care dintre situaii intervine mai nti.
(4) Planul de reorganizare a activitii define te msuri care

Article 1(1) in accordance with point (a) of Article 43(2),
arrangements are adopted to ensure that a business
reorganisation plan for that institution or entity is drawn
up and implemented in accordance with Article 52.
2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article may include the appointment by the resolution
authority of a person or persons appointed in accordance
with Article 72(1) with the objective of drawing up and
implementing the business reorganisation plan required
by Article 52.
Article 52
Business reorganisation plan
1. Member States shall require that, within one month
after the application of the bail-in tool to an institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) in
accordance with point (a) of Article 43(2), the
management body or the person or persons appointed in
accordance with Article 72(1) shall draw up and submit
to the resolution authority, a business reorganisation plan
that satisfies the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 of
this Article. Where the Union State aid framework is
applicable, Member States shall ensure that such a plan
is compatible with the restructuring plan that the
Article 1(1) is required to submit to the Commission
under that framework.
2. When the bail-in tool in point (a) of Article 43(2) is
applied to two or more group entities, the business
reorganisation plan shall be prepared by the Union parent
institution and cover all of the institutions in the group in
accordance with the procedure specified in Articles 7 and
8 and shall be submitted to the group-level resolution
authority. The group-level resolution authority shall
communicate the plan to other resolution authorities
concerned and to EBA.
3. In exceptional circumstances, and if it is necessary for
achieving the resolution objectives, the resolution
authority may extend the period in paragraph 1 up to a
maximum of two months since the application of the
bail-in tool.
Where the business reorganisation plan is required to be
notified within the Union State aid framework, the
resolution authority may extend the period in paragraph
1 up to a maximum of two months since the application
of the bail-in tool or until the deadline laid down by the
Union State aid framework, whichever occurs earlier.
4. A business reorganisation plan shall set out measures
139
vizeaz restabilirea viabilitii pe termen lung a institu iei

sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b),
(c) sau (d) sau a unor pri ale activit ii acestora, ntr-un
termen rezonabil. Aceste msuri se bazeaz pe ipoteze
realiste cu privire la condiiile economice i financiare de pe
pia, n care va funciona instituia sau entitatea men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d).
Planul de reorganizare a activitii ia n considerare, printre
altele, situaia actual i perspectivele de viitor ale pie elor
financiare, reflectnd att ipotezele cele mai optimiste, ct i
pe cele mai pesimiste, inclusiv o combinaie de evenimente
care s permit identificarea principalelor puncte vulnerabile
ale instituiei. Ipotezele trebuie s fie comparate cu indicatori
de sector adecvai.
(5) Planul de reorganizare a activitii include cel puin
urmtoarele elemente:
(a) | un diagnostic detaliat al factorilor i problemelor care au
fcut ca instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s fie n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau s fie susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, i
circumstanele care au condus la dificult ile acesteia;
(b) | o descriere a msurilor care urmeaz s fie adoptate,
viznd restabilirea viabilitii pe termen lung a instituiei sau
a entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c)
sau (d);
(c) | un calendar de punere n aplicare a msurilor respective;
(6) Msurile menite s restabileasc viabilitatea pe termen
lung a unei instituii sau a unei entiti menionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) pot include:
(a) | reorganizarea activitilor institu iei sau entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d);
(b) | schimbri ale sistemelor operaionale i ale
infrastructurii din cadrul instituiei;
(c) | ncetarea activitilor productoare de pierderi;
(d) | restructurarea activitilor existente care pot fi fcute
competitive;
(e) | vnzarea de active sau de linii de activitate.
(7) n termen de o lun de la data depunerii planului de
reorganizare a activitii, autoritatea de rezoluie relevant
evalueaz probabilitatea ca planul, n cazul n care este pus
n aplicare, s restabileasc viabilitatea pe termen lung a
instituiei sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d). Evaluarea este realizat de comun
acord cu autoritatea competent relevant.
n cazul n care autoritatea de rezoluie i autoritatea
competent estimeaz c planul va atinge acest obiectiv,
autoritatea de rezoluie l aprob.
(8) n cazul n care estimeaz c planul nu va atinge
obiectivul stabilit la alineatul (7), autoritatea de rezoluie, de
aiming to restore the long-term viability of the institution

or parts of its business within a reasonable timescale.
Those measures shall be based on realistic assumptions
as to the economic and financial market conditions under
which the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1) will operate.
The business reorganisation plan shall take account, inter
alia, of the current state and future prospects of the
financial markets, reflecting best-case and worst-case
assumptions, including a combination of events allowing
the identification of the institutions main vulnerabilities.
Assumptions shall be compared with appropriate sectorwide benchmarks.
5. A business reorganisation plan shall include at least the
following elements:
(a) | a detailed diagnosis of the factors and problems that
caused the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1) to fail or to be likely to fail, and the
circumstances that led to its difficulties;
(b) | a description of the measures aiming to restore the
long-term viability of the institution or entity referred to
in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that are to be
adopted;
(c) | a timetable for the implementation of those
measures.
6. Measures aiming to restore the long-term viability of
an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d)
of Article 1(1) may include:
(a) | the reorganisation of the activities of the institution
or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(b) | changes to the operational systems and
infrastructure within the institution;
(c) | the withdrawal from loss-making activities;
(d) | the restructuring of existing activities that can be
made competitive;
(e) | the sale of assets or of business lines.
7. Within one month of the date of submission of the
business reorganisation plan, the relevant resolution
authority shall assess the likelihood that the plan, if
implemented, will restore the long-term viability of the
Article 1(1). The assessment shall be completed in
agreement with the relevant competent authority.
If the resolution authority and the competent authority
are satisfied that the plan would achieve that objective,
the resolution authority shall approve the plan.
8. If the resolution authority is not satisfied that the plan
would achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 7,
140
comun acord cu autoritatea competent, notific preocuprile

sale organului de conducere sau persoanei sau persoanelor
desemnate n temeiul articolului 72 alineatul (1) i solicit
modificarea planului ntr-un mod care s rspund acestor
preocupri.
(9) n termen de dou sptmni de la data primirii
notificrii menionate la alineatul (8), organul de conducere
sau persoana sau persoanele desemnate n temeiul articolului
72 alineatul (1) prezint autoritii de rezolu ie un plan
modificat pentru aprobare. Autoritatea de rezolu ie evalueaz
planul modificat i comunic organului de conducere sau
persoanei sau persoanelor desemnate n temeiul articolului
72 alineatul (1) n termen de o sptmn n ce msur
estimeaz c planul, astfel modificat, rspunde preocuprilor
notificate sau sunt necesare modificri suplimentare.
(10) Organul de conducere sau persoana sau persoanele
desemnate n temeiul articolului 72 alineatul (1) pun n
aplicare planul de reorganizare aprobat de autoritatea de
rezoluie i de autoritatea competent i i transmit autorit ii
de rezoluie un raport cel puin la fiecare ase luni n legtur
cu progresele nregistrate n ceea ce prive te punerea n
aplicare a planului.
(11) Organul de conducere sau persoana sau persoanele
desemnate n temeiul articolului 72 alineatul (1) revizuiesc
planul dac, n opinia autoritii de rezoluie, de comun
acord cu autoritatea competent, acest lucru este necesar n
vederea ndeplinirii obiectivului prevzut la alineatul (4) i
prezint orice astfel de revizuire autorit ii de rezolu ie
pentru aprobare.
reglementare pentru a preciza:
(a) | elementele minime care trebuie incluse n planul de
reorganizare a activitii n conformitate cu alineatul (5); i
(b) | coninutul minim al rapoartelor menionate la alineatul
(10).
tehnice de reglementare pn la 3 ianuarie 2016.
1093/2010.
(13) Pn la 3 ianuarie 2016, ABE elaboreaz orientri n
1093/2010 prin care specific criteriile minime pe care
trebuie s le ndeplineasc un plan de reorganizare a
activitii n vederea aprobrii de ctre autoritatea de
rezoluie n conformitate cu alineatul (7).
(14) Lund n considerare, dup caz, experiena dobndit n
aplicarea orientrilor menionate la alineatul (13), ABE poate
elabora proiecte de standarde tehnice de reglementare pentru
the resolution authority, in agreement with the competent

authority, shall notify the management body or the
person or persons appointed in accordance with Article
72(1) of its concerns and require the amendment of the
plan in a way that addresses those concerns.
9. Within two weeks from the date of receipt of the
notification referred to in paragraph 8, the management
body or the person or persons appointed in accordance
with Article 72(1) shall submit an amended plan to the
resolution authority for approval. The resolution
authority shall assess the amended plan, and shall notify
the management body or the person or persons appointed
in accordance with Article 72(1) within one week
whether it is satisfied that the plan, as amended,
addresses the concerns notified or whether further
amendment is required.
10. The management body or the person or persons
appointed in accordance with Article 72(1) shall
implement the reorganisation plan as agreed by the
resolution authority and competent authority, and shall
submit a report to the resolution authority at least every
six months on progress in the implementation of the
plan.
11. The management body or the person or persons
appointed in accordance with Article 72(1) shall revise
the plan if, in the opinion of the resolution authority with
the agreement of the competent authority, it is necessary
to achieve the aim referred to in paragraph 4, and shall
submit any such revision to the resolution authority for
approval.
standards to specify further:
(a) | the minimum elements that should be included in a
business reorganisation plan pursuant to paragraph 5; and
(b) | the minimum contents of the reports pursuant to
paragraph 10.
standards to the Commission by 3 January 2016.
1093/2010 to specify further the minimum criteria that a
business reorganisation plan is to fulfil for approval by
the resolution authority pursuant to paragraph 7.
paragraph 13, EBA may develop draft regulatory
141
a specifica n detaliu criteriile minime pe care trebuie s le

ndeplineasc un plan de reorganizare a activitii n vederea
aprobrii de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie n conformitate cu
alineatul (7).
1093/2010.
Subseciunea 4
Instrumentul de recapitalizare intern: dispoziii auxiliare
Articolul 53
Efectul recapitalizrii interne
(1) Statele membre se asigur c n cazul n care autorit ile
de rezoluie exercit una dintre competenele men ionate la
articolul 59 alineatul (2) i la articolul 63 alineatul (1)
literele (e)-(i), reducerea valorii principalului sau a datoriei
restante, conversia sau anularea produc imediat efecte i
devin obligatorii att pentru instituia aflat n rezolu ie, ct
i pentru creditorii i acionarii afectai.
(2) Statele membre se asigur c autoritatea de rezoluie
deine competena de a ndeplini sau de a solicita
ndeplinirea tuturor sarcinilor administrative i procedurale
necesare pentru a da efect exercitrii uneia dintre
competenele menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (2) i la
articolul 63 alineatul (1) literele (e)-(i), inclusiv:
(a) | modificarea tuturor registrelor relevante;
(b) | radierea sau retragerea de la tranzacionare a ac iunilor
sau a altor instrumente de proprietate, sau a instrumentelor
de datorie;
(c) | cotarea sau admiterea la tranzac ionare a noilor ac iuni
sau a altor instrumente de proprietate.
(d) | cotarea din nou sau readmiterea oricror instrumente de
datorie care au fost reduse, fr a fi necesar emiterea unui
prospect n conformitate cu Directiva 2003/71/CE a
Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (32).
(3) n cazul n care o autoritate de rezolu ie reduce la zero
valoarea contabil a principalului sau suma restant de plat
aferent unui pasiv, prin intermediul competenei men ionate
la articolul 63 alineatul (1) litera (e), pasivul respectiv i
orice alte obligaii sau creane conexe care nu au ajuns la
scaden la momentul exercitrii competenei sunt
considerate ca fiind achitate n totalitate i nu sunt opozabile
nici instituiei aflate n rezoluie n cadrul vreunei proceduri
ulterioare, nici oricrei entiti care i succede acesteia, n
cadrul vreunei proceduri ulterioare de lichidare.
(4) n cazul n care autoritile de rezolu ie reduc n parte,
dar nu n totalitate, valoarea principalului sau a sumelor de
plat restante aferente unui pasiv, prin intermediul
competenei menionate la articolul 63 alineatul (1) litera (e):
technical standards in order to specify further the

minimum criteria that a business reorganisation plan is to
fulfil for approval by the resolution authority pursuant to
paragraph 7.
Subsection 4
Bail-in tool: ancillary provisions
Article 53
Effect of bail-in
1. Member States shall ensure that where a resolution
authority exercises a power referred to in Article 59(2)
and in points (e) to (i) of Article 63(1), the reduction of
principal or outstanding amount due, conversion or
cancellation takes effect and is immediately binding on
the institution under resolution and affected creditors and
shareholders.
2. Member States shall ensure that the resolution
authority shall have the power to complete or require the
completion of all the administrative and procedural tasks
necessary to give effect to the exercise of a power
referred to in Article 59(2) and in points (e) to (i) of
Article 63(1), including:
(a) | the amendment of all relevant registers;
(b) | the delisting or removal from trading of shares or
other instruments of ownership or debt instruments;
(c) | the listing or admission to trading of new shares or
other instruments of ownership;
(d) | the relisting or readmission of any debt instruments
which have been written down, without the requirement
for the issuing of a prospectus pursuant to Directive
Council (32).
3. Where a resolution authority reduces to zero the
principal amount of, or outstanding amount payable in
respect of, a liability by means of the power referred to
in point (e) of Article 63(1), that liability and any
obligations or claims arising in relation to it that are not
accrued at the time when the power is exercised shall be
treated as discharged for all purposes, and shall not be
provable in any subsequent proceedings in relation to the
institution under resolution or any successor entity in any
subsequent winding up.
4. Where a resolution authority reduces in part, but not in
full, the principal amount of, or outstanding amount
payable in respect of, a liability by means of the power
referred to in point (e) of Article 63(1):
142
(a) | pasivul este achitat proporional cu valoarea redus;

(b) | instrumentul sau acordul relevant care a dat na tere
pasivului iniial continu s se aplice n raport cu valoarea
rezidual a principalului, sau cu suma de plat restant
aferent pasivului, sub rezerva unei eventuale modificri a
cuantumului dobnzii de plat pentru a ine cont de
reducerea valorii principalului, precum i sub rezerva
oricrei alte modificri ulterioare a clauzelor pe care
autoritatea de rezoluie ar putea s o fac n virtutea
competenei menionate la articolul 63 alineatul (1) litera (j).
Articolul 54
Eliminarea impedimentelor procedurale din calea
recapitalizrii interne
(1) Fr a aduce atingere articolului 63 alineatul (1) litera (i),
statele membre solicit, dup caz, instituiilor i entit ilor
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s
dein n permanen o cantitate suficient de capital social
autorizat sau alte instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz, astfel nct, n cazul n care autoritatea de rezolu ie iar exercita competenele prevzute la articolul 63 alineatul
(1) literele (e) i (f) n legtur cu o institu ie sau o entitate
sau oricare dintre filialele sale, instituia sau entitatea
menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s
nu fie mpiedicat s emit suficiente aciuni sau alte
instrumente de proprietate noi pentru a garanta o conversie
eficace a pasivelor n aciuni sau n alte instrumente de
proprietate.
(2) n contextul elaborrii i actualizrii planului de rezolu ie
al unei instituii date sau al unui grup dat, autoritile de
rezoluie evalueaz oportunitatea impunerii asupra institu iei
sau entitii menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b),
(c) sau (d) a obligaiei prevzute la alineatul (1), innd cont
n special de msurile de rezoluie prevzute n acel plan.
Dac planul de rezoluie prevede posibilitatea aplicrii
instrumentului de recapitalizare intern, autorit ile verific
n ce msur capitalul social autorizat sau alte instrumente de
fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz sunt suficiente pentru a
acoperi suma cuantumulrilor menioante la articolul 47
alineatul (3) literele (b) i (c).
(3) Statele membre se asigur c propriile documentele
constitutive sau propriul statut, inclusiv drepturile de
preempiune ale acionarilor sau obligaia de a obine
aprobarea acionarilor pentru o mrire de capital, nu dau
natere unor obstacole de natur procedural pentru
conversia pasivelor n aciuni sau n alte instrumente de
proprietate.
(4) Prezentul articol nu aduce atingere modificrilor
directivelor
82/891/CEE,
2004/25/CE,
2005/56/CE,
(a) | the liability shall be discharged to the extent of the

amount reduced;
(b) | the relevant instrument or agreement that created the
original liability shall continue to apply in relation to the
residual principal amount of, or outstanding amount
payable in respect of the liability, subject to any
modification of the amount of interest payable to reflect
the reduction of the principal amount, and any further
modification of the terms that the resolution authority
might make by means of the power referred to in point
(j) of Article 63(1).
Article 54
Removal of procedural impediments to bail-in
1. Without prejudice to point (i) of Article 63(1),
Member States shall, where applicable, require
institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and
(d) of Article 1(1) to maintain at all times a sufficient
amount of authorised share capital or of other Common
Equity Tier 1 instruments, so that, in the event that the
resolution authority exercises the powers referred to in
points (e) and (f) of Article 63(1) in relation to an
institution or an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d)
of Article 1(1) or any of its subsidiaries, the institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is
not prevented from issuing sufficient new shares or other
instruments of ownership to ensure that the conversion of
liabilities into shares or other instruments of ownership
could be carried out effectively.
2. Resolution authorities shall assess whether it is
appropriate to impose the requirement laid down in
paragraph 1 in the case of a particular institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) in the
context of the development and maintenance of the
resolution plan for that institution or group, having
regard, in particular, to the resolution actions
contemplated in that plan. If the resolution plan provides
for the possible application of the bail-in tool, authorities
shall verify that the authorised share capital or other
Common Equity Tier 1 instruments is sufficient to cover
the sum of the amounts referred to in points (b) and (c)
of Article 47(3).
3. Member States shall ensure that there are no
procedural impediments to the conversion of liabilities to
shares or other instruments of ownership existing by
virtue of their instruments of incorporation or statutes,
including pre-emption rights for shareholders or
requirements for the consent of shareholders to an
increase in capital.
4. This Article is without prejudice to the amendments to
Directives 82/891/EEC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
143
2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE i Directiva 2012/30/UE enunate

n titlul X din prezenta directiv.
Articolul 55
Recunoaterea contractual a recapitalizrii interne
(1) Statele membre solicit instituiilor i entitilor
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d) s
includ un termen contractual pn la care creditorul sau
partea la acordul care creeaz pasivul recunoa te c acesta
poate face obiectul competenelor de reducere a valorii
contabile i de conversie i este de acord s se supun
oricrei msuri de reducere a valorii principalului sau a
sumei de plat restante, de conversie sau de anulare efectuate
de o autoritate de rezoluie care exercit competen ele
respective, cu condiia ca acest pasiv:
(a) | s nu fie excluse n temeiul articolului 44 alineatul (2);
(b) | s nu fie depozite menionate la articolul 108 litera (a);
(c) | s fie reglementate de dreptul unei ri tere; i
(d) | s fie emise sau contractate dup data la care un stat
membru aplic prevederile adoptate n vederea transpunerii
prezentei seciuni.
Primul paragraf nu se plic n cazul n care autoritatea de
rezoluie a unui stat membru stabilete c pasivele sau
instrumentele menionate la primul paragraf pot face obiectul
competenelor de reducere a valorii contabile i de conversie
exercitate de ctre autoritatea de rezolu ie dintr-un stat
membru n conformitate cu dreptul rii tere sau cu un acord
cu caracter obligatoriu ncheiat cu ara ter respectiv.
Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie pot
solicita instituiilor i entitilor menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d) s furnizeze autorit ilor un
aviz juridic privind caracterul executoriu i eficacitatea unei
asemenea clauze.
(2) Dac o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) nu include n prevederile
contractuale aplicabile pasivelor relevante o clauz de tipul
celei prevzute la alineatul (1), aceast nendeplinire a
obligaiilor nu mpiedic autoritatea de rezolu ie s- i
exercite competenele de reducere a valorii contabile i de
conversie n legtur cu pasivul respectiv.
reglementare pentru a stabili n detaliu lista pasivelor care
fac obiectul excluderii de la alineatul (1) i coninutul
clauzelor cerute la alineatul respectiv, lund n considerare
diferitele modele de afaceri ale instituiilor.
conformitate articolele 10-14 din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
1093/2010.
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU and Directive 2012/30/EU set

out in Title X of this Directive.
Article 55
Contractual recognition of bail-in
1. Member States shall require institutions and entities
referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to
include a contractual term by which the creditor or party
to the agreement creating the liability recognises that
liability may be subject to the write-down and
conversion powers and agrees to be bound by any
reduction of the principal or outstanding amount due,
conversion or cancellation that is effected by the exercise
of those powers by a resolution authority, provided that
such liability is:
(a) | not excluded under Article 44(2);
(b) | not a deposit referred to in point (a) of Article 108;
(c) | governed by the law of a third country; and
(d) | issued or entered into after the date on which a
Member State applies the provisions adopted in order to
transpose this Section.
The first subparagraph shall not apply where the
resolution authority of a Member State determines that
the liabilities or instruments referred to in the first
subparagraph can be subject to write down and
conversion powers by the resolution authority of a
Member State pursuant to the law of the third country or
to a binding agreement concluded with that third country.
may require institutions and entities referred to in points
(b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) to provide authorities with
a legal opinion relating to the legal enforceability and
effectiveness of such a term.
2. If an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) fails to include in the contractual
provisions governing a relevant liability a term required
in accordance paragraph 1, that failure shall not prevent
the resolution authority from exercising the write down
and conversion powers in relation to that liability.
in order to further determine the list of liabilities to
which the exclusion in paragraph 1 applies, and the
contents of the term required in that paragraph, taking
into account banks different business models.
144
Articolul 56
Instrumente publice de stabilizare financiar
(1) Statele membre pot acorda sprijin financiar public
extraordinar prin intermediul unor instrumente suplimentare
de stabilizare financiar n conformitate cu alineatul (3) din
prezentul articol, articolul 37 alineatul (10) i cu cadrul
Uniunii privind ajutoarele de stat, pentru a participa la
rezoluia unei instituii sau a unei entiti menionate la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), inclusiv
intervenind direct n vederea evitrii lichidrii acesteia, cu
scopul de a ndeplini obiectivele rezoluiei menioante la
articolul 31 alineatul (2) n legtur cu statul membru sau cu
Uniunea n ansamblul su. O astfel de msur se ia sub
conducerea ministerului competent sau a guvernului n
strns cooperare cu autoritatea de rezoluie.
(2) Pentru a asigura eficacitatea instrumentelor publice de
stabilizare financiar, statele membre se asigur c
ministerele sau guvernele lor competente dispun de
competenele de rezoluie prevzute la articolele 63-72 i se
asigur c articolele 66, 68, 83 i 117 sunt aplicate.
(3) Instrumentele publice de stabilizare financiar se
utilizeaz n ultim instan, n urma evalurii i valorificrii
la maximum a celorlalte instrumente de rezolu ie,
meninnd, n acelai timp, stabilitatea financiar, a a cum a
fost stabilit de ministerul sau guvernul su competent dup
consultarea cu autoritatea de rezoluie.
(4) Atunci cnd se recurge la instrumentele publice de
stabilizare financiar, statele membre se asigur c
ministerele sau guvernele lor competente i autoritatea de
rezoluie aplic doar dac sunt ndeplinite toate condi iile de
la articolul 32 alineatul (1) precum i una dintre urmtoarele
condiii:
(a) | ministerul competent sau guvernul i autoritatea de
rezoluie, dup consultarea bncii centrale i a autorit ii
competente, stabilesc c aplicarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie nu ar fi suficient pentru evitarea efectelor negative
semnificative asupra stabilitii financiare;
(b) | ministerul competent sau guvernul i autoritatea de
rezoluie stabilesc c aplicarea instrumentelor de rezolu ie nu
ar fi suficient pentru protejarea interesului public, n cazul
n care instituiei i-a fost deja acordat anterior un aport
extraordinar de lichiditate din partea bncii centrale;
(c) | n ceea ce privete instrumentul de trecere temporar n
proprietate public, ministerul competent sau guvernul, dup
consultarea autoritii competente i a autorit ii de rezolu ie,
stabilete c aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie nu ar fi
suficient pentru protejarea interesului public, n cazul n
care instituiei i-a fost deja acordat anterior sprijin financiar
publicprin intermediul instrumentului de sprijin financiar
Article 56
Government financial stabilisation tools
1. Member States may provide extraordinary public
financial support through additional financial
stabilisation tools in accordance with paragraph 3 of this
Article, Article 37(10) and with Union State aid
framework, for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of an institution or an entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), including by
intervening directly in order to avoid its winding up, with
a view to meeting the objectives for resolution referred to
in Article 31(2) in relation to the Member State or the
Union as a whole. Such an action shall be carried out
under the leadership of the competent ministry or the
government in close cooperation with the resolution
authority.
2. In order to give effect to the government financial
stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that their
competent ministries or governments have the relevant
resolution powers specified in Articles 63 to 72, and shall
ensure that Articles 66, 68, 83 and 117 apply.
3. The government financial stabilisation tools shall be
used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited
the other resolution tools to the maximum extent
practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as
determined by the competent ministry or the government
after consulting the resolution authority.
4. When applying the government financial stabilisation
tools, Member States shall ensure that their competent
ministries or governments and the resolution authority
apply the tools only if all the conditions laid down in
Article 32(1) as well as one of the following conditions
are met:
(a) | the competent ministry or government and the
resolution authority, after consulting the central bank and
the competent authority, determine that the application of
the resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a
significant adverse effect on the financial system;
(b) | the competent ministry or government and the
resolution authority determine that the application of the
resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public
interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from
the central bank has previously been given to the
institution;
(c) | in respect of the temporary public ownership tool,
the competent ministry or government, after consulting
the competent authority and the resolution authority,
determines that the application of the resolution tools
would not suffice to protect the public interest, where
public equity support through the equity support tool has
previously been given to the institution.
145
prin aport de capital.

(5) Instrumentele de stabilizare financiar constau n:
(a) | instrumentul de sprijin financiar prin aport public de
capital prevzut la articolul 57;
(b) | instrumentul de trecerea temporar n proprietate
public prevzut la articolul 58.
Articolul 57
Instrumentul de sprijin financiar prin aport public de capital
(1) Respectnd legislaia naional privind societile
comerciale, statele membre pot s participe la recapitalizarea
unei instituii sau a unei entiti menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) din prezenta directiv prin
aport de capital n schimbul urmtoarelor instrumente, sub
rezerva condiiilor prevzute n Regulamentul (UE) nr.
575/2013:
(a) | instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz;
(b) | instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 suplimentar
sau de nivel 2.
(2) Statele membre se asigur, in msura n care participarea
lor ntr-o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul
1alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) o permite, c institu iile
sau entitile care fac obiectul instrumentului de sprijin
financiar prin aport de capital public n conformitate cu
prezentul articol sunt administrate n mod profesionist i
comercial.
(3) n cazul n care un stat membru furnizeaz instrumentul
de sprijin financiar prin aport public de capital n
conformitate cu prezentul articol, acesta asigur transferul
participrii ntr-o instituie sau o entitate men ionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) n sectorul
privat imediat ce circumstanele economice i financiare o
permit.
Articolul 58
Instrumentul de trecerea temporar n proprietate public
(1) Statele membre pot trece temporar n proprietate public
o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d).
(2) n acest scop, un stat membru poate face unul sau mai
multe ordine de transfer n care beneficiarul transferului este:
(a) | o persoan desemnat de statul membru; sau
(b) | o ntreprindere deinut n ntregime de statul membru.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c instituiile sau entitile
care fac obiectul instrumentului de trecere temporar n
proprietate public n conformitate cu prezentul articol sunt
administrate n mod profesionist i comercial i redevin
private imediat ce circumstanele economice i financiare o
permit.
CAPITOLUL V
5. The financial stabilisation tools shall consist of the

following:
(a) | public equity support tool as referred to in Article
57;
(b) | temporary public ownership tool as referred to in
Article 58.
Article 57
Public equity support tool
1. Member States may, while complying with national
company law, participate in the recapitalisation of an
of Article 1(1) of this Directive by providing capital to
the latter in exchange for the following instruments,
subject to the requirements of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013:
(a) | Common Equity Tier 1 instruments;
(b) | Additional Tier 1 instruments or Tier 2 instruments.
2. Member States shall ensure, to the extent that their
shareholding in an institution or an entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) permits, that such
institutions or entities subject to public equity support
tool in accordance with this Article are managed on a
commercial and professional basis.
3. Where a Member State provides public equity support
tool in accordance with this Article, it shall ensure that its
holding in the institution or an entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is transferred to the private
sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances
allow.
Article 58
Temporary public ownership tool
1. Member States may take an institution or an entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) into
temporary public ownership.
2. For that purpose a Member State may make one or
more share transfer orders in which the transferee is:
(a) | a nominee of the Member State; or
(b) | a company wholly owned by the Member State.
3. Member States shall ensure that institutions or entities
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) subject
to the temporary public ownership tool in accordance
with this Article are managed on a commercial and
professional basis and that they are transferred to the
private sector as soon as commercial and financial
circumstances allow.
CHAPTER V
146
Reducerea valorii contabile a instrumentelor de capital

Articolul 59
Obligaia de reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie a
instrumentelor de capital
(1) Competena de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital relevante poate fi
exercitat fie:
(a) | independent de msura de rezoluie; sau
(b) | n combinaie cu o msur de rezoluie, atunci cnd sunt
ndeplinite condiiile pentru declanare a procedurii de
rezoluie specificate la articolele 32 i 33.
competena de a reduce valoarea contabil a instrumentelor
de capital relevante sau de a le converti n ac iuni sau alte
instrumente de proprietate ale instituiilor i entit ilor
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d).
(3) Statele membre solicit ca autoritile de rezolu ie s- i
exercite competena de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie n conformitate cu articolul 60 i fr ntrziere n
ceea ce privete instrumentele de capital relevante emise de
ctre o instituie sau entitate menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), atunci cnd este
satisfcut cel puin una dintre urmtoarele condi ii:
(a) | dac s-a stabilit faptul c condiiile pentru declan area
procedurii de rezoluie specificate la articolele 32 i 33 au
fost ndeplinite nainte de luarea unei eventuale msuri de
rezoluie;
(b) | autoritatea corespunztoare stabile te c, dac
respectiva competen nu este exercitat n ceea ce prive te
instrumentele de capital relevante, instituia sau entitatea
menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) va
nceta s mai fie viabil;
(c) | n cazul instrumentelor de capital relevante emise de o
filial i n cazul n care aceste instrumente de capital sunt
contabilizate n scopul respectrii cerin elor de fonduri
proprii pe baz individual i consolidat, autoritatea
corespunztoare a statului membru al supraveghetorului
consolidant i autoritatea corespunztoare a statului membru
al filialei stabilesc mpreun, sub forma unei decizii comune
n conformitate cu articolul 92 alineatele (3) i (4), faptul c,
n caz de neexercitare a competenei de reducere a valorii
contabile sau de conversie n privina acestor instrumente,
grupul nu va mai fi viabil;
(d) | n cazul instrumentelor de capital relevante emise la
nivelul ntreprinderii-mam i n cazul n care aceste
instrumente de capital sunt contabilizate n scopul respectrii
cerinelor de fonduri proprii pe baz individual la nivelul
ntreprinderii-mam sau pe baz consolidat, iar autoritatea
corespunztoare a statului membru al supraveghetorului
consolidant stabilete c, n caz de neexercitare a
Write down of capital instruments

Article 59
Requirement to write down or convert capital
instruments
1. The power to write down or convert relevant capital
instruments may be exercised either:
(a) | independently of resolution action; or
(b) | in combination with a resolution action, where the
conditions for resolution specified in Articles 32 and 33
are met.
authorities have the power to write down or convert
relevant capital instruments into shares or other
instruments of ownership of institutions and entities
referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1).
3. Member States shall require that resolution authorities
exercise the write down or conversion power, in
accordance with Article 60 and without delay, in relation
to relevant capital instruments issued by an institution or
an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
when one or more of the following circumstances apply:
(a) | where the determination has been made that
conditions for resolution specified in Articles 32 and 33
have been met, before any resolution action is taken;
(b) | the appropriate authority determines that unless that
power is exercised in relation to the relevant capital
instruments, the institution or the entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) will no longer be
viable;
(c) | in the case of relevant capital instruments issued by
a subsidiary and where those capital instruments are
recognised for the purposes of meeting own funds
requirements on an individual and on a consolidated
basis, the appropriate authority of the Member State of
the consolidating supervisor and the appropriate
authority of the Member State of the subsidiary make a
joint determination taking the form of a joint decision in
accordance with Article 92(3) and (4) that unless the
write down or conversion power is exercised in relation
to those instruments, the group will no longer be viable;
(d) | in the case of relevant capital instruments issued at
the level of the parent undertaking and where those
capital instruments are recognised for the purposes of
meeting own funds requirements on an individual basis
at the level of the parent undertaking or on a
consolidated basis, and the appropriate authority of the
Member State of the consolidating supervisor makes a
147
competenei de reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie

n privina acestor instrumente, grupul nu va mai fi viabil;
(e) | instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) solicit sprijin financiar public
extraordinar, cu excepia oricreia dintre circumstan ele
prevzute la articolul 32 alineatul (4) litera (d) punctul (iii).
(4) n sensul alineatului (3), se consider c o instituie sau o
entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c)
sau (d) sau un grup nu mai sunt viabile numai dac sunt
ndeplinite ambele condiii de mai jos:
(a) | instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sau grupul este n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate;
(b) | avnd n vedere calendarul i alte circumstan e
relevante, nu exist nicio perspectiv rezonabil potrivit
creia intrarea n dificultate a instituiei sau a entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) ar
putea fi mpiedicat n timp util prin vreo msur, fie ea o
msur alternativ a sectorului privat sau o msur de
supraveghere (inclusiv msurile de intervenie timpurie), n
afara unei msuri de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital, individual sau n
combinaie cu o msur de rezoluie.
(5) n sensul alineatului (4) litera (a) din prezentul articol, se
consider c o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) este n curs de a intra n
dificultate sau este susceptibil de a intra n dificultate dac
este ndeplinit una sau sunt ndeplinite mai multe dintre
condiiile prevzute la articolul 32 alineatul (4).
(6) n sensul alineatului (4) litera (a), se consider c un grup
este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a
intra n dificultate dac grupul ncalc, sau exist elemente
obiective care sprijin concluzia c grupul respectiv va
nclca n viitorul apropiat cerinele prudeniale consolidate,
ntr-o msur suficient pentru a justifica ac iunea din partea
autoritii competente,
inclusiv, dar fr a se limita la considerentul c grupul a
suportat sau este susceptibil de a suporta pierderi care i vor
epuiza toate sau o parte semnificativ a fondurilor proprii.
(7) Un instrument de capital relevant emis de o filial nu este
redus ntr-o msur mai mare sau convertit n condi ii mai
negative n temeiul alineatului (3) litera (c) dect cele cu
care au fost reduse sau convertite instrumentele de capital de
nivel egal la nivelul ntreprinderii-mam.
(8) Dac o autoritate corespunztoare ajunge la concluzia
menionat la alineatul (3) din prezentul articol, ea
informeaz imediat autoritatea de rezolu ie responsabil cu
litera (b), (c) sau (d) n cauz, n cazul n care cele dou
determination that unless the write down or conversion

power is exercised in relation to those instruments, the
group will no longer be viable;
(e) | extraordinary public financial support is required by
the institution or the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) except in any of the circumstances set
out in point (d)(iii) of Article 32(4).
4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, an institution or an
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) or
a group shall be deemed to be no longer viable only if
both of the following conditions are met:
(a) | the institution or the entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) or the group is failing or likely
to fail;
(b) | having regard to timing and other relevant
circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any
action, including alternative private sector measures or
supervisory action (including early intervention
measures), other than the write down or conversion of
capital instruments, independently or in combination
with a resolution action, would prevent the failure of the
institution or the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d)
of Article 1(1) or the group within a reasonable
timeframe.
5. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 4 of this
Article, an institution or an entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) shall be deemed to be failing or
likely to fail where one or more of the circumstances set
out in Article 32(4) occurs.
6. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 4, a group
shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail where the
group infringes or there are objective elements to support
a determination that the group, in the near future, will
infringe its consolidated prudential requirements in a
way that would justify action by the competent authority
including but not limited to because the group has
incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or
a significant amount of its own funds.
7. A relevant capital instrument issued by a subsidiary
shall not be written down to a greater extent or converted
on worse terms pursuant to point (c) of paragraph 3 than
equally ranked capital instruments at the level of the
parent undertaking which have been written down or
converted.
8. Where an appropriate authority makes a determination
referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, it shall
immediately notify the resolution authority responsible
for the institution or for the entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) in question, if different.
148
autoriti sunt distincte.

(9) nainte de a ajunge la concluzia menionat la alineatul
(3) litera (c) din prezentul articol n legtur cu o filial care
emite instrumente de capital relevante, contabilizate n
scopul ndeplinirii cerinelor de fonduri proprii, pe baz
individual i consolidat, autoritatea corespunztoare
respect cerinele de notificare i de consultare prevzute la
articolul 62.
(10) nainte de a-i exercita competena de a reduce valoarea
contabil a instrumentelor de capital sau de a le converti,
autoritile de rezoluie se asigur c se efectueaz o
evaluare a activelor i a pasivelor instituiei sau ale entit ii
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), n
conformitate cu articolul 36. Aceast evaluare st la baza
calculrii reducerii valorii contabile care urmeaz s fie
aplicat instrumentelor de capital relevante n scopul de a
absorbi pierderile i a nivelului de conversie care urmeaz s
fie aplicat instrumentelor de capital relevante n scopul
recapitalizrii instituiei sau entitii menionate la articolul 1
Articolul 60
Dispoziii care reglementeaz reducerea valorii contabile a
instrumentelor de capital sau conversia acestora
(1) Atunci cnd se conformeaz cerinei prevzute la
articolul 59, autoritile de rezoluie exercit competen a de
reducere a valorii contabile sau de conversie n conformitate
cu ordinea de prioritate a creanelor n temeiul procedurii
obinuite de insolven, n aa fel nct ea s produc
urmtoarele rezultate:
(a) | instrumentele de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz se
reduc n primul rnd n funcie de pierderi i n limitele
capacitii lor, iar autoritatea de rezoluie ia una sau ambele
msuri specificate la articolul 47 alineatul (1) cu privire la
deintorii instrumentelor de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz;
(b) | valoarea principalului instrumentelor de fonduri proprii
de nivel 1 suplimentar relevanteste redus sau convertit n
instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz, n
proporia impus pentru a atinge obiectivele rezoluiei
stabilite la articolul 31 i n limitele capacit ii
instrumentelor de capital relevante, reinndu-se valoarea cea
mai mic:
(c) | valoarea principalului instrumentelor de fonduri proprii
de nivel 2 este redus sau convertit n instrumente de
fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz, n proporia impus pentru
a atinge obiectivele rezoluiei stabilite la articolul 31 i n
limitele capacitii instrumentelor de capital relevante,
reinndu-se valoarea cea mai mic.
(2) Atunci cnd valoarea principalului unui instrument de
capital relevant este redus:
9. Before making a determination referred to in point (c)

of paragraph 3of this Article in relation to a subsidiary
that issues relevant capital instruments that are
recognised for the purposes of meeting the own funds
requirements on an individual and on a consolidated
basis, the appropriate authority shall comply with the
notification and consultation requirements laid down in
Article 62.
10. Before exercising the power to write down or convert
capital instruments, resolution authorities shall ensure
that a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the
of Article 1(1) is carried out in accordance with Article
36. That valuation shall form the basis of the calculation
of the write down to be applied to the relevant capital
instruments in order to absorb losses and the level of
conversion to be applied to relevant capital instruments
in order to recapitalise the institution or the entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1).
Article 60
Provisions governing the write down or conversion of
capital instruments
1. When complying with the requirement laid down in
Article 59, resolution authorities shall exercise the write
down or conversion power in accordance with the
priority of claims under normal insolvency proceedings,
in a way that produces the following results:
(a) | Common Equity Tier 1 items are reduced first in
proportion to the losses and to the extent of their capacity
and the resolution authority takes one or both of the
actions specified in Article 47(1) in respect of holders of
Common Equity Tier 1 instruments;
(b) | the principal amount of Additional Tier 1
instruments is written down or converted into Common
Equity Tier 1 instruments or both, to the extent required
to achieve the resolution objectives set out in Article 31
or to the extent of the capacity of the relevant capital
instruments, whichever is lower;
(c) | the principal amount of Tier 2 instruments is written
down or converted into Common Equity Tier 1
instruments or both, to the extent required to achieve the
resolution objectives set out in Article 31 or to the extent
of the capacity of the relevant capital instruments,
whichever is lower.
2. Where the principal amount of a relevant capital
instrument is written down:
149
(a) | reducerea valorii respectivului principal este

permanent, sub rezerva oricrei majorri n conformitate cu
mecanismul de rambursare din articolul 46 alineatul (3);
(b) | fa de deintorul instrumentului de capital relevant nu
subzist nicio datorie n cadrul respectivei valori a
instrumentului care a fost redus sau n legtur cu aceasta, cu
excepia datoriilor ajunse deja la scaden i a oricror
datorii legate de daunele care pot aprea ca rezultat al unei
ci de atac formulate mpotriva legalitii exercitrii
competenei de reducere a valorii contabile;
(c) | nu se pltete nici o despgubire deintorilor de
instrumente de capital relevante, n afara celor prevzute la
alineatul (3).
Dispoziiile prevzute la litera (b) nu mpiedic furnizarea de
instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz ctre un
deintor de instrumente de capital relevante n conformitate
cu alineatul (3).
(3) Pentru a efectua, n temeiul alineatului (1) litera (b) din
prezentul articol, o conversie a instrumentelor de capital
relevante, autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita institu iilor i
entitilor menionate la articolul 1 literele (b), (c) i (d) s
emit instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz
pentru deintorii instrumentelor de capital relevante.
Instrumentele de capital relevante pot fi convertite numai n
cazul n care sunt ndeplinite urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | respectivele instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz sunt emise de ctre instituia sau entitatea menionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sau de ctre o
ntreprindere-mam a respectivei instituii sau entit i
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d),
cu acordul autoritii de rezoluie a instituiei sau entit ii
sau, dup caz, al autoritii de rezoluie a ntreprinderiimam;
(b) | respectivele instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz sunt emise anterior oricrei emisiuni de aciuni sau de
instrumente de proprietate efectuate de ctre institu ia sau
entitatea respectiv, menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1)
litera (b), (c) sau (d) n vederea unui aport de capital din
partea statului sau a unei entiti publice;
(c) | respectivele instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de
baz sunt atribuite i transferate fr ntrziere, dup
exercitarea competenei de conversie;
(d) | rata de conversie care determin numrul de
instrumente de fonduri proprii de nivel 1 de baz care sunt
furnizate pentru fiecare instrument de capital relevant
respect principiile stabilite la articolul 50 i toate orientrile
elaborate de ABE n temeiul articolului 50 alineatul (4).
(4) n sensul furnizrii de instrumente de fonduri proprii de
nivel 1 de baz n conformitate cu alineatul (3), autorit ile
de rezoluie pot solicita instituiilor i entitilor menionate
(a) | the reduction of that principal amount shall be

permanent, subject to any write up in accordance with
the reimbursement mechanism in Article 46(3);
(b) | no liability to the holder of the relevant capital
instrument shall remain under or in connection with that
amount of the instrument, which has been written down,
except for any liability already accrued, and any liability
for damages that may arise as a result of an appeal
challenging the legality of the exercise of the write-down
power;
(c) | no compensation is paid to any holder of the
relevant capital instruments other than in accordance
with paragraph 3.
Point (b) shall not prevent the provision of Common
Equity Tier 1 instruments to a holder of relevant capital
instruments in accordance with paragraph 3.
3. In order to effect a conversion of relevant capital
instruments under point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article,
resolution authorities may require institutions and
entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article
1(1) to issue Common Equity Tier 1 instruments to the
holders of the relevant capital instruments. Relevant
capital instruments may only be converted where the
following conditions are met:
(a) | those Common Equity Tier 1 instruments are issued
by the institution or the entity referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1) or by a parent undertaking of the
of Article 1(1), with the agreement of the resolution
authority of the institution or the entity referred to in
points (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) or, where relevant, of
the resolution authority of the parent undertaking;
(b) | those Common Equity Tier 1 instruments are issued
prior to any issuance of shares or other instruments of
ownership by that institution or that entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) for the purposes of
provision of own funds by the State or a government
entity;
(c) | those Common Equity Tier 1 instruments are
awarded and transferred without delay following the
exercise of the conversion power;
(d) | the conversion rate that determines the number of
Common Equity Tier 1 instruments that are provided in
respect of each relevant capital instrument complies with
the principles set out in Article 50 and any guidelines
developed by EBA pursuant to Article 50(4).
4. For the purposes of the provision of Common Equity
Tier 1 instruments in accordance with paragraph 3,
resolution authorities may require institutions and
150
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s men in n

permanen autorizaia prealabil necesar emiterii
numrului relevant de instrumente de fonduri proprii de
nivel 1 de baz.
(5) n cazul n care o instituie ndeplinete condi iile de
declanare a procedurii de rezoluie, iar autoritatea de
rezoluie decide s aplice instituiei un instrument de
rezoluie, nainte de aplicarea respectivului instrument
autoritatea de rezoluie trebuie s se conformeze cerin elor
prevzute la articolul 59 alineatul (3).
Articolul 61
Autoritile responsabile cu constatarea
(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile responsabile cu
efectuarea constatrilor menionate la articolul 59 alineatul
(3) sunt cele stabilite la prezentul articol.
(2) Fiecare stat membru desemneaz, n conformitate cu
dreptul intern, o autoritate corespunztoare responsabil de
efectuarea constatrilor n temeiul articolului 59. Autoritatea
corespunztoare poate fi autoritatea competent sau
autoritatea de rezoluie, n conformitate cu articolul 32.
(3) n cazul n care instrumentele de capital relevante sunt
contabilizate n scopul ndeplinirii cerinelor de fonduri
proprii pe baz individual n conformitate cu articolul 92
din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013, autoritatea
responsabil cu efectuarea constatrilor menionate la
articolul 59 alineatul (3) din prezenta directiv este
autoritatea corespunztoare a statului membru n care a fost
autorizat instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), n conformitate cu titlul III
(4) n cazul n care instrumentele de capital relevante sunt
emise de o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) reprezentnd o filial i
sunt contabilizate n vederea ndeplinirii cerin elor de
fonduri proprii pe baz individual i pe baz consolidat,
autoritatea responsabil cu efectuarea constatrilor
menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (3) este urmtoarea:
(a) | autoritatea corespunztoare din statul membru n care a
fost nfiinat instituia sau entitatea menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) din prezenta directiv care
a emis acele instrumente n conformitate cu titlul III din
Directiva 2013/36/UE este responsabil cu efectuarea
constatrilor menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (3) litera (b)
din prezenta directiv;
(b) | autoritatea corespunztoare din statul membru al
supraveghetorului consolidant i autoritatea corespunztoare
din statul membru n care a fost nfiinat institu ia sau
entitatea menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b),
(c) sau (d) din prezenta directiv care a emis acele
instrumente n conformitate cu titlul III din Directiva
2013/36/UE sunt responsabile cu efectuarea constatrii
entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article

1(1) to maintain at all times the necessary prior
authorisation to issue the relevant number of Common
Equity Tier 1 instruments.
5. Where an institution meets the conditions for
resolution and the resolution authority decides to apply a
resolution tool to that institution, the resolution authority
shall comply with the requirement laid down in Article
59(3) before applying the resolution tool.
Article 61
Authorities responsible for determination
1. Member States shall ensure that the authorities
responsible for making the determinations referred to in
Article 59(3) are those set out in this Article.
2. Each Member State shall designate in national law the
appropriate authority which shall be responsible for
making determinations pursuant to Article 59. The
appropriate authority may be the competent authority or
the resolution authority, in accordance with Article 32.
3. Where the relevant capital instruments are recognised
for the purposes of meeting the own funds requirements
in accordance with Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 on an individual basis, the authority
responsible for making the determination referred to in
Article 59(3) of this Directive shall be the appropriate
authority of the Member State where the institution or
the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
has been authorised in accordance with Title III of
4. Where relevant capital instruments are issued by an
of Article 1(1) that is a subsidiary and are recognised for
the purposes of meeting the own funds requirements on
an individual and on a consolidated basis, the authority
responsible for making the determinations referred to in
Articles 59(3) shall be the following:
(a) | the appropriate authority of the Member State where
the institution or the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) of this Directive that issued those
instruments has been established in accordance with Title
III of Directive 2013/36/EU shall be responsible for
making the determinations referred to in (b) of Article
59(3) of this Directive;
(b) | the appropriate authority of the Member State of the
consolidating supervisor and the appropriate authority of
the Member State where the institution or the entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of this
Directive that issued those instruments has been
established in accordance with Title III of Directive
2013/36/EU shall be responsible for making the joint
151
comune, sub forma unei decizii comune, men ionate la

articolul 59 alineatul (3) litera (c) din prezenta directiv.
Articolul 62
Aplicare consolidat: procedura de constatare
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, nainte de a face una dintre
constatrile menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (3) literele
(b), (c), (d) sau (e) n legtur cu o filial care emite
instrumente de capital relevante contabilizate n vederea
ndeplinirii cerinelor de fonduri proprii pe baz individual
i pe baz consolidat, autoritile corespunztoare respect
urmtoarele cerine:
(a) | o autoritate corespunztoare care intenioneaz s
efectueze una dintre constatrile menionate la articolul 59
alineatul (3) litera (b), (c), (d) sau (e) notific fr ntrziere
supraveghetorul consolidant i, dac nu este una i aceea i,
autoritatea corespunztoare din statul membru n care este
situat supraveghetorul consolidant;
(b) | o autoritate corespunztoare care inten ioneaz s
efectueze una dintre constatrile menionate la articolul 59
alineatul (3) litera (c) notific fr ntrziere autoritatea
competent responsabil a fiecrei instituii sau entit i
care a emis instrumentele de capital relevante n raport cu
care trebuie exercitat competena de reducere a valorii
contabile sau de conversie, n cazul n care respectiva
constatare ar fi efectuat, precum i, dac sunt diferite, de
autoritile corespunztoare i supraveghetorul consolidant
din statele membre n care sunt situate.
(2) Atunci cnd se face o constatare men ionat la literele
(c), (d) sau (e) din articolul 59 alineatul (3) n cazul unei
instituii sau unui grup cu activitate transfrontalier,
autoritile corespunztoare in seama de impactul potenial
al rezoluiei n toate statele membre n care i desf oar
activitatea instituia sau grupul.
(3) O notificare transmis de o autoritate corespunztoare n
conformitate cu alineatul (1) trebuie nsoit de o explica ie a
motivelor pentru care acesta are n vedere efectuarea
constatrii n cauz.
(4) n cazul transmiterii unei notificri n conformitate cu
alineatul (1), autoritatea corespunztoare, dup consultarea
cu autoritile notificate, trebuie s examineze urmtoarele
aspecte:
(a) | existena unei eventuale msuri alternative, care ar putea
nlocui exercitarea competenei de reducere a valorii
contabile sau de conversie n conformitate cu articolul 59
alineatul (3);
(b) | dac o astfel de msur alternativ exist, ct de fezabil
ar fi aplicarea sa;
(c) | dac aplicarea unei astfel de msuri alternative este
fezabil, care sunt perspectivele reale ca aceast msur s
determination taking the form of a joint decision referred

to in point (c) of Article 59(3) of this Directive.
Article 62
Consolidated application: procedure for determination
1. Member States shall ensure that, before making a
determination referred to in point (b), (c), (d) or (e) of
Article 59(3) in relation to a subsidiary that issues
relevant capital instruments that are recognised for the
purposes of meeting the own funds requirements on an
individual and a consolidated basis, appropriate
authorities comply with the following requirements:
(a) | an appropriate authority that is considering whether
to make a determination referred to in point (b), (c), (d)
or (e) of Article 59(3) notifies, without delay, the
consolidating supervisor and, if different, the appropriate
authority in the Member State where the consolidating
supervisor is located;
(b) | an appropriate authority that is considering whether
to make a determination referred to in point (c) of Article
59(3) notifies, without delay, the competent authority
responsible for each institution or entity referred to in
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) that has issued the
relevant capital instruments in relation to which the write
down or conversion power is to be exercised if that
determination were made, and, if different, the
appropriate authorities in the Member States where those
competent authorities and the consolidating supervisor
are located.
2. When making a determination referred to in point (c),
(d) or (e) of Article 59(3) in the case of an institution or
of a group with cross-border activity, the appropriate
authorities shall take into account the potential impact of
the resolution in all the Member States where the
institution or the group operate.
3. An appropriate authority shall accompany a
notification made pursuant to paragraph 1 with an
explanation of the reasons why it is considering making
the determination in question.
4. Where a notification has been made pursuant to
paragraph 1, the appropriate authority, after consulting
the authorities notified, shall assess the following
matters:
(a) | whether an alternative measure to the exercise of the
write down or conversion power in accordance with
Article 59(3) is available;
(b) | if such an alternative measure is available, whether
it can feasibly be applied;
(c) | if such an alternative measure could feasibly be
applied, whether there is a realistic prospect that it would
152
abordeze, ntr-un interval de timp corespunztor, acele

circumstane care altminteri ar necesita efectuarea uneia
dintre constatrile menionate la articolul 59 alineatul (3).
(5) n sensul alineatului (4) din prezentul articol, msuri
alternative nseamn msurile de intervenie timpurie
menionate la articolul 27 din prezenta directiv, msurile
prevzute la articolul 104 alineatul (1) din Directiva
2013/36/UE sau un transfer de fonduri ori de capital de la
ntreprinderea-mam.
(6) n cazul n care, n conformitate cu alineatul (4),
autoritatea corespunztoare, dup consultarea autorit ilor
notificate, estimeaz c una sau mai multe msuri alternative
sunt disponibile, c aplicarea lor este fezabil i c ele ar
permite obinerea rezultatului menionat la litera (c) de la
alineatul respectiv, autoritile n cauz trebuie s garanteze
aplicarea acestor msuri.
(7) n cazul n care, n situaia men ionat la alineatul (1)
litera (a) i n conformitate cu alineatul (4) din prezentul
articol, autoritatea corespunztoare, dup consultarea
autoritilor notificate, estimeaz c nu exist msuri
alternative care ar permite obinerea rezultatului men ionat la
alineatul (4) litera (c), autoritatea corespunztoare decide n
ce msur este oportun efectuarea constatrii avute n
vedere, menionat la articolul 59 alineatul (3).
(8) Dac o autoritate corespunztoare decide s fac o
constatare n temeiul articolului 59 alineatul (3) litera (c), ea
trimite imediat o notificare autoritilor corespunztoare din
statele membre n care sunt situate filialele n cauz, iar
constatarea ia forma unei decizii comune n conformitate cu
articolul 92 alineatele (3) i (4). n absena unei decizii
comune, nu poate fi efectuat nici o constatare n temeiul
articolului 59 alineatul (3) litera (c).
(9) Autoritile de rezoluie ale statelor membre n care este
situat fiecare dintre filialele n cauz pune cu promptitudine
n aplicare decizia de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie a instrumentelor de capital, adoptat n
conformitate cu prezentul articol, innd cont n mod
corespunztor de caracterul urgent al situaiei.
CAPITOLUL VI
Competene de rezoluie
Articolul 63
Competene generale
dein toate competenele necesare pentru a aplica
instrumentele de rezoluie instituiilor, precum i entitilor
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d)
care ndeplinesc condiiile de declanare a procedurii de
rezoluie. n special, autoritile de rezolu ie trebuie s de in
urmtoarele competene de rezoluie, pe care le pot exercita
separat sau n orice combinaie:
address, in an adequate timeframe, the circumstances that

would otherwise require a determination referred to in
Article 59(3) to be made.
5. For the purposes of paragraph 4 of this Article,
alternative measures mean early intervention measures
referred to in Article 27 of this Directive, measures
referred to in Article 104(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU or
a transfer of funds or capital from the parent undertaking.
6. Where, pursuant to paragraph 4, the appropriate
authority, after consulting the notified authorities,
assesses that one or more alternative measures are
available, can feasibly be applied and would deliver the
outcome referred to in point (c) of that paragraph, it shall
ensure that those measures are applied.
7. Where, in a case referred to in point (a) of paragraph
1, and pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, the
appropriate authority, after consulting the notified
authorities, assesses that no alternative measures are
available that would deliver the outcome referred to in
point (c) of paragraph 4, the appropriate authority shall
decide whether the determination referred to in Article
59(3) under consideration is appropriate.
8. Where an appropriate authority decides to make a
determination under point (c) of Article 59(3), it shall
immediately notify the appropriate authorities of the
Member States in which the affected subsidiaries are
located and the determination shall take the form of a
joint decision as set out in Article 92(3) and (4). In the
absence of a joint decision no determination under point
(c) of Article 59(3) shall be made.
9. The resolution authorities of the Member States where
each of the affected subsidiaries are located shall
promptly implement a decision to write down or convert
capital instruments made in accordance with this Article
having due regard to the urgency of the circumstances.
CHAPTER VI
Resolution powers
Article 63
General powers
authorities have all the powers necessary to apply the
resolution tools to institutions and to entities referred to
in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) that meet the
applicable conditions for resolution. In particular, the
resolution authorities shall have the following resolution
powers, which they may exercise individually or in any
combination:
153
(a) | competena de a solicita oricrei persoane s prezinte

orice fel de informaie solicitat autorit ii de rezoluie
pentru luarea unei decizii privind adoptarea unei msuri de
rezoluie i pentru pregtirea respectivei msuri, inclusiv
actualizri i completri ale informaiilor furnizate n cadrul
planurilor de rezoluie, precum i informaii care urmeaz s
fie furnizate prin intermediul inspeciilor la fa a locului;
(b) | competena de a prelua controlul asupra unei institu ii
aflate n rezoluie i de a exercita toate drepturile i
competenele conferite acionarilor, altor proprietari i
organului de conducere al instituiei aflate n rezolu ie;
(c) | competena de a transfera aciuni i alte instrumente de
proprietate emise de o instituie aflat n rezoluie;
(d) | competena de a transfera unei alte entit i, cu
consimmntul acesteia, anumite drepturi, active sau pasive
ale unei instituii aflate n rezoluie;
(e) | competena de a reduce, inclusiv la zero, valoarea
contabil a principalului sau suma restant datorat n
temeiul pasivelor eligibile ale unei instituii aflate n
rezoluie;
(f) | competena de a converti pasivele eligibile ale unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie n aciuni ordinare sau n alte
instrumente de proprietate ale instituiei respective sau ale
sau (d), ale unei instituii-mam relevante sau ale unei
instituii-punte ctre care sunt transferate activele, drepturile
sau pasivele instituiei sau ale entitii menionate la articolul
(g) | competena de a anula instrumente de datorie emise de o
instituie aflat n rezoluie, cu excepia obligaiilor garantate
prin garanii mobiliare care fac obiectul articolului 44
alineatul (2);
(h) | competena de a reduce, inclusiv la zero, valoarea
nominal a aciunilor sau a altor instrumente de proprietate
ale unei instituii aflate n rezoluie, precum i de a anula
astfel de aciuni sau alte instrumente de proprietate;
(i) | competena de a solicita unei instituii aflate n rezolu ie
sau unei instituii-mam relevante emiterea unor noi ac iuni,
a altor instrumente de proprietate sau a altor instrumente de
capital, inclusiv a unor aciuni prefereniale i a unor
instrumente convertibile contingente;
(j) | competena de a modifica sau de a ajusta scaden a
instrumentelor de datorie i a altor pasive eligibile emise de
o instituie aflat n rezoluie sau competena de a modifica
suma dobnzilor de plat n cadrul instrumentelor respective
i al altor pasive eligibile sau data la care dobnda devine
exigibil, inclusiv prin suspendarea temporar a pl ilor cu
excepia obligaiilor garantate prin garanii mobiliare care
fac obiectul articolului 44 alineatul (2);
(k) | competena de a lichida i a rezilia contracte financiare
sau contracte derivate n scopul aplicrii articolului 49;
(a) | the power to require any person to provide any

information required for the resolution authority to
decide upon and prepare a resolution action, including
updates and supplements of information provided in the
resolution plans and including requiring information to
be provided through on-site inspections;
(b) | the power to take control of an institution under
resolution and exercise all the rights and powers
conferred upon the shareholders, other owners and the
management body of the institution under resolution;
(c) | the power to transfer shares or other instruments of
ownership issued by an institution under resolution;
(d) | the power to transfer to another entity, with the
consent of that entity, rights, assets or liabilities of an
institution under resolution;
(e) | the power to reduce, including to reduce to zero, the
principal amount of or outstanding amount due in respect
of eligible liabilities, of an institution under resolution;
(f) | the power to convert eligible liabilities of an
institution under resolution into ordinary shares or other
instruments of ownership of that institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), a
relevant parent institution or a bridge institution to which
assets, rights or liabilities of the institution or the entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) are
transferred;
(g) | the power to cancel debt instruments issued by an
institution under resolution except for secured liabilities
subject to Article 44(2);
(h) | the power to reduce, including to reduce to zero, the
nominal amount of shares or other instruments of
ownership of an institution under resolution and to
cancel such shares or other instruments of ownership;
(i) | the power to require an institution under resolution
or a relevant parent institution to issue new shares or
other instruments of ownership or other capital
instruments, including preference shares and contingent
convertible instruments;
(j) | the power to amend or alter the maturity of debt
instruments and other eligible liabilities issued by an
institution under resolution or amend the amount of
interest payable under such instruments and other
eligible liabilities, or the date on which the interest
becomes payable, including by suspending payment for a
temporary period, except for secured liabilities subject to
Article 44(2);
(k) | the power to close out and terminate financial
contracts or derivatives contracts for the purposes of
154
(l) | competena de a demite sau de a nlocui organul de

conducere i conducerea superioar ale unei instituii aflate
n rezoluie;
(m) | competena de a impune autoritii competente s
evalueze cumprtorul unei participaii calificate n timp util
prin derogare de la termenele prevzute la articolul 22 din
Directiva 2013/36/UE i la articolul 12 din directiva
2014/65/UE.
(2) Statele membre iau toate msurile necesare pentru a se
asigura c, atunci cnd aplic instrumente i exercit
competenele de rezoluie, autoritile de rezolu ie nu fac
obiectul nici uneia dintre urmtoarele cerine care s-ar aplica
n mod normal n virtutea dreptului intern, a contractelor sau
a altor dispoziii:
(a) | sub rezerva articolului 3 alineatul (6) i a articolului 85
alineatul (1), obligaia de a obine aprobarea sau acordul
oricrei persoane, fie ea public sau privat, inclusiv al
acionarilor sau al creditorilor instituiei aflate n rezoluie;
(b) | naintea exercitrii competenei, obliga ia procedural
de a notifica o persoan anume, inclusiv eventuala obligaie
de a publica orice notificare sau prospect ori de a depune sau
de a nregistra orice document la oricare alt autoritate.
n special, statele membre se asigur c autorit ile de
rezoluie pot exercita competenele prevzute la prezentul
articol, indiferent de restriciile sau de cerin ele referitoare la
obinerea acordului care s-ar aplica n mod normal
transferului respectiv de instrumente financiare, drepturi,
active sau pasive.
Litera (b) din prezentul paragraf nu aduce atingere cerin elor
prevzute la articolul 81 i la articolul 83 sau oricror alte
obligaii de notificare n temeiul cadrului Uniunii privind
ajutoarele de stat.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c, n msura n care niciuna
dintre competenele enumerate la alineatul (1) din prezentul
articol nu se aplic unei entiti care face obiectul articolului
1 alineatul (1) din prezenta directiv, ca urmare a formei sale
juridice specifice, autoritile de rezoluie de in competen e
pe ct posibil similare, inclusiv n privina efectelor acestora.
(4) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd autoritile de
rezoluie exercit competenele n temeiul alineatului (3),
mecanismele de siguran din prezenta directiv sau
mecanismele de siguran care au acela i efect se aplic
persoanelor afectate, inclusiv acionarilor, creditorilor sau
contraprilor.
Articolul 64
Competene auxiliare
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd exercit o
competen de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie au
applying Article 49;

(l) | the power to remove or replace the management
body and senior management of an institution under
resolution;
(m) | the power to require the competent authority to
assess the buyer of a qualifying holding in a timely
manner by way of derogation from the time-limits laid
down in Article 22 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article
12 of Directive 2014/65/EU.
2. Member States shall take all necessary measures to
ensure that, when applying the resolution tools and
exercising the resolution powers, resolution authorities
are not subject to any of the following requirements that
would otherwise apply by virtue of national law or
contract or otherwise:
(a) | subject to Article 3(6) and Article 85(1),
requirements to obtain approval or consent from any
person either public or private, including the
resolution;
(b) | prior to the exercise of the power, procedural
requirements to notify any person including any
requirement to publish any notice or prospectus or to file
or register any document with any other authority.
In particular, Member States shall ensure that resolution
authorities can exercise the powers under this Article
irrespective of any restriction on, or requirement for
consent for, transfer of the financial instruments, rights,
assets or liabilities in question that might otherwise
apply.
Point (b) of the first subparagraph is without prejudice to
the requirements laid down in Articles 81 and 83 and any
notification requirements under the Union State aid
framework.
3. Member States shall ensure that, to the extent that any
of the powers listed in paragraph 1 of this Article is not
applicable to an entity within the scope of Article 1(1) of
this Directive as a result of its specific legal form,
resolution authorities shall have powers which are as
similar as possible including in terms of their effects.
4. Member States shall ensure that, when resolution
authorities exercise the powers pursuant to paragraph 3
the safeguards provided for in this Directive, or
safeguards that deliver the same effect, shall be applied
to the persons affected, including shareholders, creditors
and counterparties.
Article 64
Ancillary powers
1. Member States shall ensure that, when exercising a
resolution power, resolution authorities have the power
155
competena:
(a) | sub rezerva articolului 78, de a lua msuri, astfel nct
un transfer s poat fi efectuat n condi iile n care
instrumentele financiare, drepturile, activele sau datoriile
transferate sunt libere de orice obliga ie sau grevare cu
sarcini; n acest sens, orice drept de compensare n
conformitate cu prezenta directiv nu se consider obliga ie
sau grevare cu sarcini;
(b) | de a revoca drepturile de a achiziiona alte ac iuni sau
alte instrumente de proprietate;
(c) | de a solicita autoritii relevante ncetarea sau
suspendarea admiterii la tranzacionare pe o pia
reglementat sau a cotrii oficiale a instrumentelor financiare
conform Directivei 2001/34/CE a Parlamentului European i
a Consiliului (33);
(d) | de a lua msuri, astfel nct destinatarul s fie tratat n
acelai mod n care ar fi tratat instituia aflat n rezolu ie n
legtur cu orice drepturi sau obligaii ale instituiei aflate n
rezoluie, ori aciuni ntreprinse de aceasta, inclusiv, sub
rezerva articolelor 38 i 40, eventuale drepturi sau obliga ii
referitoare la participarea la infrastructura pie ei;
(e) | solicita instituiei aflate n rezoluie sau destinatarului s
furnizeze celeilalte pri informaii i asisten; i
(f) | de a anula sau modifica clauzele unui contract la care
instituia aflat n rezoluie este parte sau de a se substitui
unei entiti destinatare n calitate de parte semnatar;
(2) Autoritile de rezoluie exercit competen ele
menionate la alineatul (1) n cazul n care autoritatea de
rezoluie consider oportun s contribuie la asigurarea
faptului c msurile de rezoluie sunt eficiente sau la
atingerea unuia sau a mai multor obiective ale rezolu iei.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd exercit o
competen de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie au
competena de a institui acorduri de continuitate, necesare
pentru a garanta att eficiena msurilor de rezoluie, ct i
capacitatea destinatarului, dup caz, de a desf ura
activitatea care i-a fost transferat. Aceste acorduri de
continuitate includ, n special:
(a) | continuitatea contractelor ncheiate de institu ia aflat n
rezoluie, astfel nct destinatarul s i asume drepturile i
pasivele instituiei aflate n rezoluie referitoare la orice
instrument financiar, drept, activ sau pasiv transferat i s se
substituie instituiei aflate n rezoluie, n mod explicit sau
implicit, n toate documentele contractuale relevante;
(b) | substituirea instituiei aflate n rezoluie cu destinatarul,
n cadrul oricrei proceduri judiciare referitoare la orice
instrument financiar, drept, activ sau pasiv transferat.
to:
(a) | subject to Article 78, provide for a transfer to take
effect free from any liability or encumbrance affecting
the financial instruments, rights, assets or liabilities
transferred; for that purpose, any right of compensation
in accordance with this Directive shall not be considered
to be a liability or an encumbrance;
(b) | remove rights to acquire further shares or other
instruments of ownership;
(c) | require the relevant authority to discontinue or
suspend the admission to trading on a regulated market
or the official listing of financial instruments pursuant to
Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council (33);
(d) | provide for the recipient to be treated as if it were
the institution under resolution for the purposes of any
rights or obligations of, or actions taken by, the
institution under resolution, including, subject to Articles
38 and 40, any rights or obligations relating to
participation in a market infrastructure;
(e) | require the institution under resolution or the
recipient to provide the other with information and
assistance; and
(f) | cancel or modify the terms of a contract to which the
institution under resolution is a party or substitute a
recipient as a party.
2. Resolution authorities shall exercise the powers
specified in paragraph 1 where it is considered by the
resolution authority to be appropriate to help to ensure
that a resolution action is effective or to achieve one or
more resolution objectives.
3. Member States shall ensure that, when exercising a
resolution power, resolution authorities have the power
to provide for continuity arrangements necessary to
ensure that the resolution action is effective and, where
relevant, the business transferred may be operated by the
recipient. Such continuity arrangements shall include, in
particular:
(a) | the continuity of contracts entered into by the
institution under resolution, so that the recipient assumes
the rights and liabilities of the institution under
resolution relating to any financial instrument, right,
asset or liability that has been transferred and is
substituted for the institution under resolution, expressly
or implicitly in all relevant contractual documents;
(b) | the substitution of the recipient for the institution
under resolution in any legal proceedings relating to any
financial instrument, right, asset or liability that has been
transferred.
156
(4) Competenele menionate la alineatul (1) litera (d) i la

alineatul (3) litera (b) nu aduc atingere:
(a) | dreptului de reziliere a contractului de munc de inut de
angajaii instituiei aflate n rezoluie;
(b) | sub rezerva articolelor 69, 70 i 71, niciunui drept al
unei pri la un contract de a-i exercita drepturile
contractuale, inclusiv dreptul de reziliere, atunci cnd
clauzele contractuale o permit, n temeiul unui act sau al unei
omisiuni comise fie de ctre instituia aflat n rezoluie,
anterior transferului n cauz, fie de ctre destinatar, ulterior
respectivului transfer.
Articolul 65
Competena de a solicita furnizarea de servicii i facilit i
competena de a solicita unei instituii aflate n rezolu ie sau
oricreia dintre entitile din grupul su, s furnizeze orice
servicii sau faciliti necesare pentru a permite unui
destinatar s exercite eficient activitile care i-au fost
transferate.
Primul paragraf se aplic inclusiv n cazul n care institu iei
aflate n rezoluie sau entitii n cauz i-a fost aplicat
(2) Statele membre se asigur c propriile autorit i de
rezoluie au competena de a asigura respectarea de ctre
entitile membre ale unui grup stabilite pe teritoriul lor a
obligaiilor impuse n conformitate cu alineatul (1) de ctre
autoritile de rezoluie din alte state membre.
(3) Serviciile i facilitile menionate la alineatele (1) i (2)
se limiteaz la servicii i facilit i opera ionale i nu includ
niciun fel de sprijin financiar.
(4) Serviciile i facilitile menionate la alineatele (1) i (2)
sunt furnizate n urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | n aceleai condiii, n cadrul unui acord, n cazul n care
serviciile i facilitile au fost furnizate institu iei aflate n
rezoluie n perioada imediat anterioar lurii msurii de
rezoluie i pe durata acelui acord;
(b) | n cazul n care nu exist un acord sau acordul a expirat,
n condiii rezonabile.
1093/2010, n vederea stabilirii listei minime de servicii sau
faciliti necesare pentru a permite unui destinatar s exercite
n mod eficient o activitate care i-a fost transferat.
Articolul 66
Competena de a pune n aplicare msuri de gestionare a
crizelor sau msuri de prevenire a crizelor luate de alte state
membre
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd un transfer de
aciuni, de alte instrumente de proprietate sau de active,
drepturi i pasive include fie active situate n alt stat membru
4. The powers in point (d) of paragraph 1 and point (b) of

paragraph 3 shall not affect the following:
(a) | the right of an employee of the institution under
resolution to terminate a contract of employment;
(b) | subject to Articles 69, 70 and 71, any right of a party
to a contract to exercise rights under the contract,
including the right to terminate, where entitled to do so
in accordance with the terms of the contract by virtue of
an act or omission by the institution under resolution
prior to the relevant transfer, or by the recipient after the
relevant transfer.
Article 65
Power to require the provision of services and facilities
have the power to require an institution under resolution,
or any of its group entities, to provide any services or
facilities that are necessary to enable a recipient to
operate effectively the business transferred to it.
The first subparagraph shall apply including where the
institution under resolution or relevant group entity has
entered into normal insolvency proceedings.
2. Member States shall ensure that their resolution
authorities have powers to enforce obligations imposed,
pursuant to paragraph 1, on group entities established in
their territory by resolution authorities in other Member
States.
3. The services and facilities referred to in paragraphs 1
and 2 are restricted to operational services and facilities
and do not include any form of financial support.
4. The services and facilities provided in accordance with
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be on the following terms:
(a) | where the services and facilities were provided
under an agreement to the institution under resolution
immediately before the resolution action was taken and
for the duration of that agreement, on the same terms;
(b) | where there is no agreement or where the agreement
has expired, on reasonable terms.
1093/2010 to specify the minimum list of services or
facilities that are necessary to enable a recipient to
effectively operate a business transferred to it.
Article 66
Power to enforce crisis management measures or crisis
prevention measures by other Member States
1. Member States shall ensure that, where a transfer of
shares, other instruments of ownership, or assets, rights
or liabilities includes assets that are located in a Member
157
dect statul autoritii de rezoluie, fie drepturi sau obliga ii

ce decurg n temeiul legislaiei unui alt stat membrul dect
statul autoritii de rezoluie, transferul produce efecte n
acest alt stat membru sau n conformitate cu legisla ia acestui
alt stat membru.
(2) Statele membre acord autoritii de rezoluie care a
efectuat sau intenioneaz s efectueze transferul toat
asistena rezonabil necesar pentru a se asigura c ac iunile
sau alte instrumente de proprietate ori activele, drepturile i
pasivele sunt transferate ctre destinatar n conformitate cu
toate dispoziiile dreptului intern aplicabile.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c acionarii, creditorii i
prile tere afectate de transferul de aciuni, alte instrumente
de proprietate, active, drepturi sau pasive men ionate la
alineatul (1) nu au dreptul de a mpiedica, contesta sau
retrage transferul din circuit n temeiul niciunei dispozi ii
legislative a statului membru n care sunt situate activele sau
n temeiul niciunei dispoziii legislative aplicabile ac iunilor,
altor instrumente de proprietate, drepturilor sau pasivelor.
(4) Atunci cnd o autoritate de rezoluie a unui stat membru
(denumit n continuare statul membru A) exercit
competenele de reducere a valorii contabile i de conversie,
inclusiv n ceea ce privete instrumentele de fonduri proprii,
n conformitate cu articolul 59, iar pasivele eligibile sau
instrumentele de fonduri proprii relevante ale institu iei
aflate n rezoluie includ:
(a) | instrumente sau pasive reglementate de legisla ia unui
alt stat membru dect statul autoritii de rezoluie care a
exercitat competenele de reducere a valorii contabile sau de
conversie (denumit n continuare statul membru B);
(b) | pasive datorate creditorilor situai n statul membru B,
Statul membru B se asigur c principalul acestor pasive sau
al acestor instrumente este redus, sau c pasivele ori
instrumentele sunt convertite ca urmare a exercitrii
conversie de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie din statul membru
A.
(5) Statele membre se asigur c creditorii afecta i de
exercitare a competenelor de reducere a valorii contabile
sau de conversie menionate la alineatul (4) nu au dreptul de
a contesta reducerea sau, dup caz, convertirea principalului
instrumentului sau al pasivului n temeiul niciunei dispoziii
legislative din statul membru B.
(6) Fiecare stat membru se asigur c urmtoarele elemente
sunt determinate n conformitate cu legislaia statului
membru al autoritii de rezoluie:
(a) | dreptul acionarilor, creditorilor i al prilor ter e de a
contesta printr-o cale de atac, n conformitate cu articolul 85,
transferul menionat la alineatul (1) din prezentul articol al
aciunilor, altor instrumente de proprietate, activelor,
State other than the State of the resolution authority or

rights or liabilities under the law of a Member State other
than the State of the resolution authority, the transfer has
effect in or under the law of that other Member State.
2. Member States shall provide the resolution authority
that has made or intends to make the transfer with all
reasonable assistance to ensure that the shares or other
instruments of ownership or assets, rights or liabilities
are transferred to the recipient in accordance with any
applicable requirements of national law.
3. Member States shall ensure that shareholders,
creditors and third parties that are affected by the transfer
of shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, rights
or liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 are not entitled to
prevent, challenge, or set aside the transfer under any
provision of law of the Member State where the assets
are located or of the law governing the shares, other
instruments of ownership, rights or liabilities.
4. Where a resolution authority of a Member State
(Member State A) exercises the write-down or
conversion powers, including in relation to capital
instruments in accordance with Article 59, and the
eligible liabilities or relevant capital instruments of the
institution under resolution include the following:
(a) | instruments or liabilities that are governed by the
law of a Member State other than the State of the
resolution authority that exercised the write down or
conversion powers (Member State B);
(b) | liabilities owed to creditors located in Member State
B.
Member State B shall ensure that the principal amount of
those liabilities or instruments is reduced, or liabilities or
instruments are converted, in accordance with the
exercise of the write-down or conversion powers by the
resolution authority of Member State A,
5. Member States shall ensure that creditors that are
affected by the exercise of write-down or conversion
powers referred to in paragraph 4 are not entitled to
challenge the reduction of the principal amount of the
instrument or liability or its conversion, as the case may
be, under any provision of law of Member State B.
6. Each Member State shall ensure that the following are
determined in accordance with the law of the Member
State of the resolution authority:
(a) | the right for shareholders, creditors and third parties
to challenge, by way of appeal pursuant to Article 85, a
transfer of shares, other instruments of ownership, assets,
rights or liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 of this
158
drepturilor sau pasivelor;

(b) | dreptul creditorilor de a contesta printr-o cale de atac, n
conformitate cu articolul 85, reducerea principalului sau
conversia unui instrument ori a unui pasiv menionat la
prezentul articol alineatul (4) literele (a) sau (b);
(c) | mecanismele de siguran menionate n capitolul VII
referitoare la transferurile pariale ale activelor, drepturilor i
pasivelor prevzute la alineatul (1).
Articolul 67
Competena n ceea ce privete activele, drepturile, ac iunile
i alte instrumente de proprietate situate n ri ter e
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazurile n care o
msur de rezoluie implic luarea de msuri cu privire la
activele situate ntr-o ar ter sau cu privire la aciuni, alte
instrumente de proprietate, drepturi sau pasive reglementate
de dreptul unei ri tere, autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita
ca:
(a) | administratorul, lichidatorul sau orice alt persoan care
exercit controlul asupra instituiei aflate n rezoluie i
destinatarul s fie obligai s ia toate msurile necesare
pentru a se asigura c transferul, reducerea valorii contabile,
conversia sau msura respectiv are loc;
(b) | administratorul, lichidatorul sau orice alt persoan care
exercit controlul asupra instituiei aflate n rezoluie s aib
obligaia de a deine aciunile, alte instrumente de
proprietate, activele sau drepturile sau de a achita datoriile n
numele destinatarului pn cnd transferul, reducerea valorii
contabile, conversia sau msura respectiv produce efecte;
(c) | cheltuielile rezonabile ale destinatarului, efectuate
corespunztor, asociate aplicrii oricrei msuri necesare n
conformitate cu literele (a) i (b) din prezentul alineat, sunt
acoperite prin oricare dintre metodele prevzute la articolul
37 alineatul (7).
(2) n cazul n care autoritatea de rezoluie stabile te c, n
ciuda tuturor msurilor necesare luate de administrator,
lichidator sau orice alt persoan n conformitate cu alineatul
(1) litera (a), este foarte puin probabil ca transferul,
conversia sau msura respectiv s fie pus n practic n
raport cu anumite active situate ntr-o ar ter sau anumite
aciuni, alte instrumente de proprietate, drepturi sau pasive
reglementate de legislaia unei ri tere, autoritatea de
rezoluie nu procedeaz la efectuarea transferului, reducerea
valorii contabile, efectuarea conversiunii sau msurii
respective. n cazul n care autoritatea a ordonat transferul,
reducerea valorii contabile, conversia sau msura respectiv,
ordinul este nul n cazul activelor, ac iunilor, instrumentelor
de proprietate, drepturilor sau datoriilor respective.
Articolul 68
Excluderea anumitor termeni contractuali n cazul
Article;
(b) | the right for creditors to challenge, by way of appeal
pursuant to Article 85, the reduction of the principal
amount, or the conversion, of an instrument or liability
covered by points (a) or (b) of paragraph 4 of this
Article;
(c) | the safeguards for partial transfers, as referred to in
Chapter VII, in relation to assets, rights or liabilities
referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 67
Power in respect of assets, rights, liabilities, shares and
other instruments of ownership located in third countries
1. Member States shall provide that, in cases in which
resolution action involves action taken in respect of
assets located in a third country or shares, other
instruments of ownership, rights or liabilities governed
by the law of a third country, resolution authorities may
require that:
(a) | the administrator, receiver or other person exercising
control of the institution under resolution and the
recipient take all necessary steps to ensure that the
transfer, write down, conversion or action becomes
effective;
(b) | the administrator, receiver or other person exercising
control of the institution under resolution hold the shares,
other instruments of ownership, assets or rights or
discharge the liabilities on behalf of the recipient until
the transfer, write down, conversion or action becomes
effective;
(c) | the reasonable expenses of the recipient properly
incurred in carrying out any action required under points
(a) and (b) of this paragraph are met in any of the ways
referred to in Article 37(7).
2. Where the resolution authority assesses that, in spite of
all the necessary steps taken by the administrator,
receiver or other person in accordance with paragraph
1(a), it is highly unlikely that the transfer, conversion or
action will become effective in relation to certain assets
located in a third country or certain shares, other
instruments of ownership, rights or liabilities under the
law of a third country, the resolution authority shall not
proceed with the transfer, write down, conversion or
action. If it has already ordered the transfer, write down,
conversion or action, that order shall be void in relation
to the assets, shares, instruments of ownership, rights or
liabilities concerned.
Article 68
Exclusion of
certain contractual
terms
in
early
159
interveniei timpurii i al rezoluiei

(1) O msur de prevenire sau de gestionare a crizei, luat n
cazul unei entiti n conformitate cu prezenta directiv, care
include producerea oricrui eveniment direct legat de
aplicarea unei asemenea msuri, nu este considerat n sine
drept eveniment care determin executarea n sensul
Directivei 2002/47/CE ori drept procedur de insolven n
sensul Directivei 98/26/CE, cu condiia ca obliga iile
contractuale substaniale, inclusiv plata i obliga iile de
livrare, precum i furnizarea de garanii, s fie ndeplinite n
continuare.
Mai mult, msura de prevenire sau de gestionare a crizei nu
este considerat n sine a fi un eveniment care determin
executarea ori o procedur de insolven n cadrul unui
contract ncheiat de:
(a) | o filial a instituiei ale crei obligaii contractuale sunt
garantate sau susinute n alt mod de ntreprinderea-mam
sau de oricare alt entitate din grup; sau
(b) | orice entitate care face parte din acela i grup ca i
instituia care include clauze de tip cross-default
(declararea simultan a exigibilitii obliga iilor ca urmare a
nendeplinirii culpabile a uneia dintre ele).
(2) n cazul n care procedurile de rezoluie din ri ter e sunt
recunoscute n conformitate cu articolul 94 sau n alte cazuri
n care autoritatea de rezoluie decide astfel, aceste proceduri
constituie msuri de gestionare a crizelor n sensul
prezentului articol.
(3) Cu condiia ca obligaiile contractuale substaniale,
inclusiv plata i obligaiile de livrare, precum i furnizarea
de garanii, s fie ndeplinite n continuare, o msur de
prevenire sau de gestionare a crizei, inclusiv producerea
oricrui eveniment direct legat de aplicarea unei astfel de
msuri, nu d n sine niciunei persoane posibilitatea:
(a) | de a exercita vreun drept de reziliere, de suspendare,
modificare, de grup de compensare sau de compensare
reciproc, inclusiv legat de un contract ncheiat de: | (i) | o
filial, ale crei obligaii contractuale sunt garantate sau
susinute n alt mod de o entitate de grup; | (ii) | oricare
entitate din grup care include clauze de tip cross-default;
(b) | de a intra n posesia oricror elemente de patrimoniu ale
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sau ale oricrei alte entit i din grup
n legtur cu un contract care include clauze de tip crossdefault, de a-i exercita controlul asupra acestora sau de a
executa vreo garanie n ceea ce le privete;
(c) | de a aduce atingere drepturilor contractuale ale
instituiei sau ale entitii vizate menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sau ale oricrei alte entit i
din grup n legtur cu un contract care include clauze de tip
intervention and resolution

1. A crisis prevention measure or a crisis management
measure taken in relation to an entity in accordance with
this Directive, including the occurrence of any event
directly linked to the application of such a measure, shall
not, per se, under a contract entered into by the entity, be
deemed to be an enforcement event within the meaning
of Directive 2002/47/EC or as insolvency proceedings
within the meaning of Directive 98/26/EC provided that
the substantive obligations under the contract, including
payment and delivery obligations and the provision of
collateral, continue to be performed.
In addition, a crisis prevention measure or crisis
management measure shall not, per se, be deemed to be
an enforcement event or insolvency proceedings under a
contract entered into by:
(a) | a subsidiary, the obligations under which are
guaranteed or otherwise supported by the parent
undertaking or by any group entity; or
(b) | any entity of a group which includes cross-default
provisions.
2. Where third country resolution proceedings are

recognised pursuant to Article 94, or otherwise where a
resolution authority so decides, such proceedings shall
for the purposes of this Article constitute a crisis
management measure.
3. Provided that the substantive obligations under the
contract, including payment and delivery obligations,
and provision of collateral, continue to be performed, a
crisis prevention measure or a crisis management
measure, including the occurrence of any event directly
linked to the application of such a measure, shall not, per
se, make it possible for anyone to:
(a) | exercise any termination, suspension, modification,
netting or set-off rights, including in relation to a contract
entered into by: | (i) | a subsidiary, the obligations under
which are guaranteed or otherwise supported by a group
entity; | (ii) | any group entity which includes crossdefault provisions;
(b) | obtain possession, exercise control or enforce any
security over any property of the institution or the entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
concerned or any group entity in relation to a contract
which includes cross-default provisions;
(c) | affect any contractual rights of the institution or the
concerned or any group entity in relation to a contract
which includes cross-default provisions.
160
cross-default.
(4) Prezentul articol nu aduce atingere dreptului unei
persoane de a ntreprinde una dintre aciunile menionate la
alineatul (3), atunci cnd acest drept se na te n urma unei
situaii, alta dect msura de prevenire sau gestionare a
crizelor sau producerea vreunui eveniment legat direct de
aplicarea unei astfel de msuri.
(5) Suspendarea sau limitarea n temeiul articolului 69, 70
sau 71 nu constituie nerespectarea obliga iei contractuale n
sensul alineatelor (1) i (2) din prezentul articol.
(6) Dispoziiile prezentului articol sunt considerate norme de
aplicare imediat n sensul articolului 9 din Regulamentul
(CE) nr. 593/2008 al Parlamentului European i al
Consiliului (34).
Articolul 69
Competena de a suspenda anumite obligaii
competena de a suspenda orice obligaie de plat sau de
livrare decurgnd dintr-un contract la care o instituie aflat
n rezoluie este parte, ncepnd de la data publicrii avizului
de suspendare n conformitate cu articolul 83 alineatul (4)
pn la ora 24.00 a zilei lucrtoare urmtoare celei de
publicare n statul membru n care este stabilit autoritatea
de rezoluie a instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
(2) Atunci cnd o obligaie de plat sau de livrare ar fi
devenit scadent pe perioada suspendrii, aceast obliga ie
devine exigibil imediat dup expirarea perioadei de
suspendare.
(3) Dac obligaiile contractuale de plat sau de livrare ale
unei instituii aflate n rezoluie sunt suspendate n temeiul
alineatului (1), obligaiile de plat sau de livrare ale
contrapartidelor instituiei respective n temeiul aceluia i
contract se suspend n acelai interval de timp.
(4) Nicio decizie de suspendare luat n temeiul dispozi iilor
alineatului (1) nu se aplic:
(a) | depozitelor eligibile;
(b) | obligaiilor de plat i de livrare datorate sistemelor sau
operatorilor de sisteme numii n sensul Directivei 98/26/CE,
contraprilor centrale i bncilor centrale.
(c) | creanelor eligibile, n scopurile prevzute n Directiva
97/9/CE.
(5) Atunci cnd i exercit o competen n temeiul
prezentului articol, autoritile de rezolu ie in seama de
impactul pe care l-ar putea avea exercitarea respectivei
competene asupra bunei funcionri a pieelor financiare.
Articolul 70
Competena de a limita executarea garaniilor reale
4. This Article shall not affect the right of a person to

take an action referred to in paragraph 3 where that right
arises by virtue of an event other than the crisis
prevention measure, the crisis management measure or
the occurrence of any event directly linked to the
application of such a measure.
5. A suspension or restriction under Article 69, 70 or 71
shall not constitute non-performance of a contractual
obligation for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
Article.
6. The provisions contained in this Article shall be
considered to be overriding mandatory provisions within
the meaning of Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
(34).
Article 69
Power to suspend certain obligations
have the power to suspend any payment or delivery
obligations pursuant to any contract to which an
institution under resolution is a party from the
publication of a notice of the suspension in accordance
with Article 83(4) until midnight in the Member State of
the resolution authority of the institution under resolution
at the end of the business day following that publication.
2. When a payment or delivery obligation would have
been due during the suspension period the payment or
delivery obligation shall be due immediately upon expiry
of the suspension period.
3. If an institution under resolutions payment or delivery
obligations under a contract are suspended under
paragraph 1, the payment or delivery obligations of the
institution under resolutions counterparties under that
contract shall be suspended for the same period of time.
4. Any suspension under paragraph 1 shall not apply to:
(a) | eligible deposits;
(b) | payment and delivery obligations owed to systems
or operators of systems designated for the purposes of
Directive 98/26/EC, central counterparties, and central
banks;
(c) | eligible claims for the purpose of Directive 97/9/EC.
5. When exercising a power under this Article, resolution
authorities shall have regard to the impact the exercise of
that power might have on the orderly functioning of
financial markets.
Article 70
Power to restrict the enforcement of security interests
161

dein competena de a impune limitri creditorilor garanta i
ai unei instituii aflate n rezoluie n ceea ce prive te
executarea garaniilor reale deinute n legtur cu activele
respectivei instituii ncepnd de la data publicrii avizului
de limitare n conformitate cu articolul 83 alineatul (4) pn
la ora 24.00 a zilei lucrtoare urmtoare celei de publicare n
statul membru n care este stabilit instituia aflat n
rezoluie.
(2) Autoritile de rezoluie nu exercit competena
prevzut la alineatul (1) n legtur cu garaniile reale
deinute de sisteme sau operatori de sisteme desemnate n
sensul Directivei 98/26/CE, contrapri centrale i bnci
centrale, n legtur cu activele gajate sau furnizate cu titlu
de marj sau de garanie real de ctre institu ia aflat n
rezoluie.
(3) n cazurile n care se aplic articolul 80, autorit ile de
rezoluie se asigur c toate limitrile impuse n temeiul
competenei menionate la alineatul (1) din prezentul articol
sunt aplicate n mod coerent tuturor entitilor din grup care
fac obiectul unor msuri de rezoluie.
Articolul 71
Competena de suspendare temporar a drepturilor de
reziliere
competena de a suspenda drepturile de reziliere ale oricrei
pri care are un contract cu o institu ie aflat n rezolu ie,
ncepnd de la data publicrii avizului n conformitate cu
articolul 83 alineatul (4) pn la ora 24.00 a zilei lucrtoare
urmtoare celei de publicare n statul membru n care este
stabilit autoritatea de rezoluie a instituiei aflate n
rezoluie, cu condiia ca plata i obligaiile de livrare, precum
i furnizarea de garanii, s fie ndeplinite n continuare
competena de a suspenda drepturile de reziliere ale oricrei
pri care are un contract cu o filial a unei instituii aflate n
rezoluie atunci cnd:
(a) | obligaiile contractuale sunt garantate sau susinute n alt
mod de instituia aflat n rezoluie;
(b) | drepturile contractuale de reziliere se ntemeiaz
exclusiv pe insolvena sau pe starea financiar a institu iei
aflate n rezoluie; i
(c) | s-a exercitat sau se poate exercita competena de transfer
n cazul instituiei aflate n rezolu ie, fie: | (i) | toate activele
i pasivele filialei care fac obiectul contractului au fost sau
pot fi transferate destinatarului i nsuite de acesta; sau | (ii)

have the power to restrict secured creditors of an
institution under resolution from enforcing security
interests in relation to any assets of that institution under
resolution from the publication of a notice of the
restriction in accordance with Article 83(4) until
midnight in the Member State of the resolution authority
of the institution under resolution at the end of the
business day following that publication.
2. Resolution authorities shall not exercise the power
referred to in paragraph 1 in relation to any security
interest of systems or operators of systems designated for
the purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, central
counterparties, and central banks over assets pledged or
provided by way of margin or collateral by the institution
under resolution.
3. Where Article 80 applies, resolution authorities shall
ensure that any restrictions imposed pursuant to the
power referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are
consistent for all group entities in relation to which a
resolution action is taken.
that power might have on the orderly functioning of
financial markets.
Article 71
Power to temporarily suspend termination rights
have the power to suspend the termination rights of any
party to a contract with an institution under resolution
from the publication of the notice pursuant to Article
83(4) until midnight in the Member State of the
resolution authority of the institution under resolution at
the end of the business day following that publication,
provided that the payment and delivery obligations and
the provision of collateral continue to be performed.
have the power to suspend the termination rights of any
party to a contract with a subsidiary of an institution
under resolution where:
(a) | the obligations under that contract are guaranteed or
are otherwise supported by the institution under
resolution;
(b) | the termination rights under that contract are based
solely on the insolvency or financial condition of the
institution under resolution; and
(c) | in the case of a transfer power that has been or may
be exercised in relation to the institution under
resolution, either: | (i) | all the assets and liabilities of the
subsidiary relating to that contract have been or may be
162
| autoritatea de rezoluie furnizeaz, prin orice alt mijloc, o

protecie adecvat pentru respectivele obliga ii.
Suspendarea intr n vigoare de la data publicrii avizului n
temeiul articolului 83 alineatul (4) pn la ora 24.00 a zilei
lucrtoare urmtoare celei de publicare n statul membru n
care este stabilit filiala instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
(3) Orice suspendare n temeiul alineatului (1) sau (2) nu se
aplic sistemelor sau operatorilor de sisteme desemnate n
sensul Directivei 98/26/CE, contraprilor centrale sau
bncilor centrale.
(4) O persoan poate exercita un drept de reziliere n temeiul
unui contract nainte de expirarea perioadei men ionate la
alineatul (1) sau (2), n cazul n care persoana respectiv
primete un aviz din partea autoritii de rezoluie prin care i
se aduce la cunotin faptul c drepturile i pasivele care fac
obiectul contractului nu vor fi:
(a) | transferate unei alte entiti; sau
(b) | supuse reducerii valorii contabile sau conversiei
aferente aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern n
conformitate cu articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (a).
(5) n cazul n care autoritatea de rezoluie exercit
competena de suspendare a drepturilor de reziliere
prevzut la alineatul (1) sau (2) din prezentul articol i n
cazul n care nu s-a dat un aviz n temeiul alineatului (4) din
prezentul articol, aceste drepturi pot fi exercitate la expirarea
perioadei de suspendare, sub rezerva articolului 68, dup
cum urmeaz:
(a) | dac drepturile i obligaiile ce decurg n temeiul
contractului au fost transferate ctre o alt entitate, o
contraparte poate exercita drepturile de reziliere n
conformitate cu clauzele contractului respectiv doar n cazul
continurii sau producerii ulterioare a vreunui eveniment
care determin executarea de ctre entitatea destinatar;
(b) | dac instituia aflat n rezoluie i pstreaz drepturile
i obligaiile care decurg n temeiul contractului, iar
autoritatea de rezoluie nu a aplicat instituiei respective
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern n conformitate cu
articolul 43 alineatul (2) litera (a), o contraparte poate
exercita dreptul de reziliere, n conformitate cu clauzele
respectivului contract la expirarea suspendrii n temeiul
alineatului (1).
(7) Autoritile competente sau autoritile de rezoluie pot
solicita unei instituii sau unei entiti menionate la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s pstreze eviden e
detaliate ale contractelor financiare.
transferred to and assumed by the recipient; or | (ii) | the

resolution authority provides in any other way adequate
protection for such obligations.
The suspension shall take effect from the publication of
the notice pursuant to Article 83(4) until midnight in the
Member State where the subsidiary of the institution
under resolution is established on the business day
following that publication.
3. Any suspension under paragraph 1 or 2 shall not apply
to systems or operators of systems designated for the
purposes of Directive 98/26/EC, central counterparties,
or central banks.
4. A person may exercise a termination right under a
contract before the end of the period referred to in
paragraph 1 or 2 if that person receives notice from the
resolution authority that the rights and liabilities covered
by the contract shall not be:
(a) | transferred to another entity; or
(b) | subject to write down or conversion on the
application of the bail-in tool in accordance with point
(a) of Article 43(2).
5. Where a resolution authority exercises the power
specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article to suspend
termination rights, and where no notice has been given
pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, those rights may
be exercised on the expiry of the period of suspension,
subject to Article 68, as follows:
(a) | if the rights and liabilities covered by the contract
have been transferred to another entity, a counterparty
may exercise termination rights in accordance with the
terms of that contract only on the occurrence of any
continuing or subsequent enforcement event by the
recipient entity;
(b) | if the rights and liabilities covered by the contract
remain with the institution under resolution and the
resolution authority has not applied the bail-in tool in
accordance with Article 43(2)(a)to that contract, a
counterparty may exercise termination rights in
accordance with the terms of that contract on the expiry
of a suspension under paragraph 1.
that power might have on the orderly functioning of the
financial markets.
7. Competent authorities or resolution authorities may
require an institution or an entity referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to maintain detailed records of
financial contracts.
163
La cererea unei autoriti competente sau a unei autorit i de

rezoluie, registrele centrale de tranzacii pun informa iile
necesare la dispoziia autoritilor competente sau a
autoritilor de rezoluie pentru a le permite s- i
ndeplineasc responsabilitile i mandatele n conformitate
cu articolul 81 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 648/2012.
reglementare pentru a preciza urmtoarele elemente n sensul
alineatului (7):
(a) | un set minim de informaii privind contractele financiare
care trebuie s figureze n registrele detaliate; i
(b) | circumstanele n care trebuie impus aceast cerin .
1093/2010.
Articolul 72
Exercitarea competenelor de rezoluie
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, n vederea aplicrii unei
msuri de rezoluie, autoritile de rezolu ie sunt n msur
s exercite un control asupra instituiei aflate n rezoluie
care s le permit:
(a) | s asigure funcionarea i s desfoare activit ile i
serviciile instituiei aflate n rezoluie, dispunnd de toate
competenele acionarilor si i ale organului su de
conducere; i
(b) | s gestioneze i s dispun de activele i de patrimoniul
instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
Controlul menionat la primul paragraf poate fi exercitat
direct de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie sau indirect, de ctre
una sau mai multe persoane desemnate de autoritatea de
rezoluie. Statele membre se asigur c drepturile de vot
conferite de aciuni sau de alte instrumentele de proprietate
ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie nu pot fi exercitate n timpul
perioadei de rezoluie.
(2) Sub rezerva articolului 85 alineatul (1), statele membre
se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie au posibilitatea de a lua
msuri de rezoluie prin ordonan, n conformitate cu
competenele i procedurile administrative na ionale, fr a
exercita controlul asupra instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
(3) Autoritile de rezoluie decid, de la caz la caz,
oportunitatea aplicrii unei msuri de rezolu ie prin
intermediul mijloacelor specificate la alineatul (1) sau (2),
innd cont de obiectivele rezoluiei i de principiile generale
care o reglementeaz, de circumstanele specifice institu iei
Upon the request of a competent authority or a resolution

authority, a trade repository shall make the necessary
information available to competent authorities or
resolution authorities to enable them to fulfil their
respective responsibilities and mandates in accordance
with Article 81 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
specifying the following elements for the purposes of
paragraph 7:
(a) | a minimum set of the information on financial
contracts that should be contained in the detailed records;
and
(b) | the circumstances in which the requirement should
be imposed.
Article 72
Exercise of the resolution powers
1. Member States shall ensure that, in order to take a
resolution action, resolution authorities are able to
exercise control over the institution under resolution, so
as to:
(a) | operate and conduct the activities and services of the
institution under resolution with all the powers of its
shareholders and management body; and
(b) | manage and dispose of the assets and property of the
institution under resolution.
The control referred to in the first subparagraph may be
exercised directly by the resolution authority or
indirectly by a person or persons appointed by the
resolution authority. Member States shall ensure that
voting rights conferred by shares or other instruments of
ownership of the institution under resolution cannot be
exercised during the period of resolution.
2. Subject to Article 85(1), Member States shall ensure
that resolution authorities are able to take a resolution
action through executive order in accordance with
national administrative competences and procedures,
without exercising control over the institution under
resolution.
3. Resolution authorities shall decide in each particular
case whether it is appropriate to carry out the resolution
action through the means specified in paragraph 1 or in
paragraph 2, having regard to the resolution objectives
and the general principles governing resolution, the
164
aflate n rezoluie i de necesitatea de a facilita rezolu ia

eficient a grupurilor transfrontaliere.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie nu sunt considerate ca membri
din umbr sau de facto ai organului de conducere n temeiul
dreptului intern.
CAPITOLUL VII
Mecanisme de siguran
Articolul 73
Tratamentul acionarilor i al creditorilor n caz de transfer
parial i aplicare a instrumentului de recapitalizare intern
Statele membre se asigur c, n cazurile n care au fost
aplicate unul sau mai multe instrumente de rezolu ie i n
special n sensul articolului 75:
(a) | cu excepia cazurilor n care se aplic litera (b), n cazul
n care autoritile de rezoluie transfer doar anumite pr i
din drepturile, activele i pasivele instituiei aflate n
rezoluie, acionarii i acei creditori ale cror crean e nu au
fost transferate primesc ca soluionare a creanelor lor o
sum cel puin egal cu cea pe care ar fi primit-o dac
instituia aflat n rezoluie ar fi fost lichidat prin procedura
obinuit de insolven la momentul lurii deciziei
menionate la articolul 82;
(b) | n cazul n care autoritile de rezolu ie aplic
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern, ac ionarii i creditorii
ale cror creane au fost reduse sau convertite n titluri de
capital nu acumuleaz pierderi mai mari dect cele pe care
le-ar fi nregistrat dac instituia aflat n rezolu ie ar fi fost
lichidat prin procedura obinuit de insolven imediat la
momentul lurii deciziei menionate la articolul 82.
Articolul 74
Evaluarea diferenei de tratament
(1) n scopul de a evalua dac acionarii i creditorii ar fi
beneficiat de un tratament mai bun n cazul n care institu ia
aflat n rezoluie ar fi urmat o procedur obi nuit de
insolven, inclusiv, dar fr a se limita la sensul articolului
73, statele membre se asigur de efectuarea unei evaluri de
ctre o persoan independent ct mai curnd posibil, dup
ce msura sau msurile de rezoluie au fost luate. Aceast
evaluare este distinct de evaluarea efectuat n conformitate
cu articolul 36.
(2) Evaluarea de la alineatul (1) identific:
(a) | tratamentul pe care acionarii i creditorii l-ar fi primit,
sau schemele de garantare a depozitelor relevante, n cazul n
care instituia aflat n rezoluie, n legtur cu care o msur
sau mai multe msuri de rezoluie au fost luate, ar fi intrat n
procedura obinuit de insolven n momentul lurii deciziei
menionate la articolul 82;
(b) | tratamentul efectiv de care acionarii i creditorii au
beneficiat n cadrul rezoluiei instituiei aflate n rezolu ie; i
specific circumstances of the institution under resolution

in question and the need to facilitate the effective
resolution of cross-border groups.
4. Resolution authorities shall not be deemed to be
shadow directors or de facto directors under national law.
CHAPTER VII
Safeguards
Article 73
Treatment of shareholders and creditors in the case of
partial transfers and application of the bail-in tool
Member States shall ensure that, where one or more
resolution tools have been applied and, in particular for
the purposes of Article 75:
(a) | except where point (b) applies, where resolution
authorities transfer only parts of the rights, assets and
liabilities of the institution under resolution, the
shareholders and those creditors whose claims have not
been transferred, receive in satisfaction of their claims at
least as much as what they would have received if the
institution under resolution had been wound up under
normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the
decision referred to in Article 82 was taken;
(b) | where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool,
the shareholders and creditors whose claims have been
written down or converted to equity do not incur greater
losses than they would have incurred if the institution
under resolution had been wound up under normal
insolvency proceedings immediately at the time when the
decision referred to in Article 82 was taken.
Article 74
Valuation of difference in treatment
1. For the purposes of assessing whether shareholders
and creditors would have received better treatment if the
institution under resolution had entered into normal
insolvency proceedings, including but not limited to for
the purpose of Article 73, Member States shall ensure
that a valuation is carried out by an independent person
as soon as possible after the resolution action or actions
have been effected. That valuation shall be distinct from
the valuation carried out under Article 36.
2. The valuation in paragraph 1 shall determine:
(a) | the treatment that shareholders and creditors, or the
relevant deposit guarantee schemes, would have received
if the institution under resolution with respect to which
the resolution action or actions have been effected had
entered normal insolvency proceedings at the time when
the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken;
(b) | the actual treatment that shareholders and creditors
have received, in the resolution of the institution under
165
(c) | existena unei eventuale diferene ntre tratamentul

menionat la litera (a) i cel menionat la litera (b).
(3) Evaluarea:
(a) | ia n calcul ipoteza c conform creia institu ia aflat n
rezoluie, n raport cu care o msur sau mai multe msuri de
rezoluie au fost luate, ar fi intrat n procedura obi nuit de
insolven n momentul lurii deciziei menionate la articolul
82;
(b) | s ia n calcul ipoteza c msura sau msurile de
rezoluie nu ar fi fost luate;
(c) | nu ine cont de acordarea vreunui sprijin financiar public
extraordinar instituiei aflate n rezoluie.
reglementare care s specifice metodologia de efectuare a
evalurii conform prezentului articol, n special metodologia
de evaluare a tratamentului de care ar fi beneficiat ac ionarii
i creditorii dac instituia aflat n rezoluie ar fi intrat n
procedura obinuit de insolven n momentul lurii deciziei
1093/2010.
Articolul 75
Mecanisme de siguran pentru acionari i creditori
Statele membre se asigur c, n cazul n care evaluarea
efectuat n conformitate cu articolul 74 stabile te c oricare
dintre acionarii sau creditorii menionai la articolul 73 sau
schema de garantare a depozitelor n conformitate cu
articolul 109 alineatul (1) a acumulat pierderi mai mari dect
cele pe care le-ar fi nregistrat dac instituia ar fi fost
lichidat prin procedura obinuit de insolven, acesta are
dreptul la plata diferenei din partea mecanismelor de
finanare a rezoluiei.
Articolul 76
Mecanisme de siguran pentru contrapri n caz de transfer
parial
(1) Statele membre se asigur c msurile de protec ie
menionate la alineatul (2) se aplic n cazurile urmtoare:
(a) | atunci cnd o autoritate de rezolu ie transfer o parte,
dar nu totalitatea activelor, drepturilor sau pasivelor unei
instituii aflate n rezoluie ctre o alt entitate sau, n
exercitarea instrumentului de rezoluie, de la o institu iepunte sau vehicul de gestionare a activelor ctre o alt
persoan;
(b) | atunci cnd o autoritate de rezoluie exercit
competenele menionate la articolul 64 alineatul (1) litera
resolution; and
(c) | if there is any difference between the treatment
referred to in point (a) and the treatment referred to in
point (b).
3. The valuation shall:
(a) | assume that the institution under resolution with
respect to which the resolution action or actions have
been effected, would have entered normal insolvency
proceedings at the time when the decision referred to in
Article 82 was taken;
(b) | assume that the resolution action or actions had not
been effected;
(c) | disregard any provision of extraordinary public
financial support to the institution under resolution.
4. EBA may develop draft regulatory technical standards
specifying the methodology for carrying out the
valuation in this Article, in particular the methodology
for assessing the treatment that shareholders and
creditors would have received if the institution under
resolution had entered insolvency proceedings at the time
when the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken.
Article 75
Safeguard for shareholders and creditors
Member States shall ensure that if the valuation carried
out under Article 74 determines that any shareholder or
creditor referred to in Article 73, or the deposit guarantee
scheme in accordance with Article 109(1), has incurred
greater losses than it would have incurred in a winding
up under normal insolvency proceedings, it is entitled to
the payment of the difference from the resolution
financing arrangements.
Article 76
Safeguard for counterparties in partial transfers
1. Member States shall ensure that the protections
specified in paragraph 2 apply in the following
circumstances:
(a) | a resolution authority transfers some but not all of
the assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under
resolution to another entity or, in the exercise of a
resolution tool, from a bridge institution or asset
management vehicle to another person;
(b) | a resolution authority exercises the powers specified
in point (f) of Article 64(1).
166
(f).
(2) Statele membre trebuie s garanteze protecia
corespunztoare a urmtoarelor acorduri i a contrapr ilor la
aceste acorduri:
(a) | contracte de garanie real, n virtutea crora o persoan
dispune, cu titlu de garanie, de un drept real sau contingent
n legtur cu activele sau drepturile care fac obiectul unui
transfer, indiferent dac aceast valoare mobiliar este
garantat prin active sau drepturi specifice ori printr-o
garanie mobiliar (floating charge) sau printr-un acord
similar;
(b) | contracte de garanie financiar cu transfer de
proprietate, prin care garaniile reale care garanteaz sau
acoper executarea anumitor obligaii specifice sunt
furnizate printr-un transfer deplin de drepturi de proprietate
asupra activelor efectuat de furnizorul garaniei reale ctre
beneficiarul garaniei, cu condiia ca beneficiarul s restituie
aceste active n cazul n care respectivele obliga ii specifice
sunt executate;
(c) | acorduri de compensare reciproc, prin care dou sau
mai multe creane sau obligaii datorate ntre instituia aflat
n rezoluie i o contraparte pot face obiectul unei
compensri reciproce;
(d) | acorduri de compensare;
(e) | obligaiuni garantate;
(f) | mecanisme de finanare structurate, inclusiv
securitizrile i instrumentele utilizate n scopul acoperirii,
care constituie o parte integrant a portofoliului de acoperire
i care, n temeiul dreptului intern, sunt garantate n mod
asemntor cu obligaiunile garantate, care implic acordarea
de garanii mobiliare i deinerea acestora de ctre una dintre
prile la acord ori un administrator fiduciar, un agent sau o
persoan agreat.
Forma de protecie adecvat pentru categoriile de acorduri
menionate la literele (a)-(f) din prezentul alineat este
precizat n mod mai detaliat la articolele 77-80 i face
obiectul limitrilor prevzute la articolele 68-71.
(3) Cerina prevzut la alineatul (2) se aplic indiferent de
numrul prilor implicate n aceste acorduri i de
posibilitatea ca ele:
(a) | s fie create prin contract, fiducie sau prin alte mijloace
ori s decurg n mod automat din aplicarea legii;
(b) | s decurg sau s fie reglementate n ntregime sau
parial din dreptul altui stat membru sau al unei ri tere.
(4) Comisia poate adopta acte delegate n conformitate cu
articolul 115, pentru a preciza mai n detaliu categoriile de
acorduri care se ncadreaz n domeniul de aplicare al
dispoziiilor alineatului (2) literele (a)-(f) din prezentul
articol.
2. Member States shall ensure appropriate protection of

the following arrangements and of the counterparties to
the following arrangements:
(a) | security arrangements, under which a person has by
way of security an actual or contingent interest in the
assets or rights that are subject to transfer, irrespective of
whether that interest is secured by specific assets or
rights or by way of a floating charge or similar
arrangement;
(b) | title transfer financial collateral arrangements under
which collateral to secure or cover the performance of
specified obligations is provided by a transfer of full
ownership of assets from the collateral provider to the
collateral taker, on terms providing for the collateral
taker to transfer assets if those specified obligations are
performed;
(c) | set-off arrangements under which two or more
claims or obligations owed between the institution under
resolution and a counterparty can be set off against each
other;
(d) | netting arrangements;
(e) | covered bonds;
(f) | structured finance arrangements, including
securitisations and instruments used for hedging
purposes which form an integral part of the cover pool
and which according to national law are secured in a way
similar to the covered bonds, which involve the granting
and holding of security by a party to the arrangement or a
trustee, agent or nominee.
The form of protection that is appropriate, for the classes
of arrangements specified in points (a) to (f) of this
paragraph is further specified in Articles 77 to 80, and
shall be subject to the restrictions specified in Articles 68
to 71.
3. The requirement under paragraph 2 applies
irrespective of the number of parties involved in the
arrangements and of whether the arrangements:
(a) | are created by contract, trusts or other means, or
arise automatically by operation of law;
(b) | arise under or are governed in whole or in part by
the law of another Member State or of a third country.
4. The Commission shall adopt delegated acts in
accordance with Article 115 further specifying the
classes of arrangement that fall within the scope of points
(a) to (f) of paragraph 2 of this Article.
167
Articolul 77
Protecie pentru garaniile financiare i acordurile de
compensare i compensare reciproc
(1) Statele membre se asigur c exist o protec ie adecvat
n cazul contractelor de garanie financiar cu transfer de
proprietate i al acordurilor de compensare reciproc i al
acordurilor de compensare pentru a preveni transferul unei
pri, dar nu a totalitii drepturilor i pasivelor protejate n
temeiul unui astfel de contract sau acord, ntre institu ia
aflat n rezoluie i o alt persoan, precum i modificarea
sau rezilierea acestor drepturi i datorii protejate n temeiul
unui contract de garanie financiar cu transfer de proprietate
sau al unui acord de compensare reciproc i al acordurilor
de compensare prin exercitarea competenelor auxiliare.
n sensul primului paragraf, drepturile i pasivele trebuie s
fie considerate ca fiind protejate n temeiul unui astfel de
acord n cazul n care prile la acord au dreptul la
compensarea sau compensarea reciproc a acestor drepturi i
pasive.
(2) Fr a aduce atingere alineatului (1), atunci cnd este
necesar pentru asigurarea disponibilitii depozitelor
acoperite, autoritatea de rezoluie poate:
(a) | s transfere depozite acoperite care fac parte din
mecanismele menionate alineatul (1) fr a transfera alte
active, drepturi i pasive care fac parte din acela i mecanism;
i
(b) | s transfere, s modifice sau s rezilieze acele active,
drepturi sau pasive fr a transfera depozitele acoperite.
Articolul 78
Protecie pentru contractele de garanie real
(1) Statele membre se asigur c pasivele acoperite printr-un
contract de garanie beneficiaz de o protec ie adecvat,
astfel nct s se mpiedice:
(a) | transferul activelor cu care este garantat pasivul, cu
excepia cazului n care sunt deopotriv transferate att
pasivul respectiv, ct i dreptul de a beneficia de garan ie
real;
(b) | transferul unei obligaii garantate, cu excep ia cazului n
care este transferat i dreptul de a beneficia de garan ie real;
(c) | transferul dreptului de a beneficia de garan ie real, cu
excepia cazului n care este transferat i obliga ia
garantat;
(d) | modificarea sau rezilierea unui contract de garan ie prin
exercitarea competenelor auxiliare, dac respectiva
modificare sau reziliere are drept efect ncetarea garantrii
pasivului.
(2) Fr a aduce atingere alineatului (1), atunci cnd este
necesar pentru asigurarea disponibilitii depozitelor
acoperite, autoritatea de rezoluie poate:
Article 77
Protection for financial collateral, set off and netting
agreements
1. Member States shall ensure that there is appropriate
protection for title transfer financial collateral
arrangements and set-off and netting arrangements so as
to prevent the transfer of some, but not all, of the rights
and liabilities that are protected under a title transfer
financial collateral arrangement, a set-off arrangement or
a netting arrangement between the institution under
resolution and another person and the modification or
termination of rights and liabilities that are protected
under such a title transfer financial collateral
arrangement, a set-off arrangement or a netting
arrangement through the use of ancillary powers.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, rights and
liabilities are to be treated as protected under such an
arrangement if the parties to the arrangement are entitled
to set-off or net those rights and liabilities.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, where necessary in
order to ensure availability of the covered deposits the
resolution authority may:
(a) | transfer covered deposits which are part of any of
the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 1 without
transferring other assets, rights or liabilities that are part
of the same arrangement; and
(b) | transfer, modify or terminate those assets, rights or
liabilities without transferring the covered deposits.
Article 78
Protection for security arrangements
protection for liabilities secured under a security
arrangement so as to prevent one of the following:
(a) | the transfer of assets against which the liability is
secured unless that liability and benefit of the security
are also transferred;
(b) | the transfer of a secured liability unless the benefit
of the security are also transferred;
(c) | the transfer of the benefit of the security unless the
secured liability is also transferred; or
(d) | the modification or termination of a security
arrangement through the use of ancillary powers, if the
effect of that modification or termination is that the
liability ceases to be secured.
168

mecanismele menionate la alineatul (1) fr a transfera alte
active, drepturi i pasive care fac parte din acela i mecanism;
i
Articolul 79
Protecie pentru mecanismele de finanare structurate i
pentru obligaiunile garantate
(1) Statele membre se asigur c exist o protec ie adecvat
pentru mecanismele de finanare structurate, inclusiv
mecanismele menionate la articolul 76 alineatul (2) literele
(e) i (f) astfel nct s se previn oricare dintre
circumstanele urmtoare:
(a) | transferul unei pri, dar nu a totalit ii activelor,
drepturilor i pasivelor care reprezint o parte sau totalitatea
unui mecanism de finanare structurat, inclusiv a
mecanismelor menionate la articolul 76 alineatul (2) literele
(e) i (f), la care instituia de credit aflat n rezolu ie este
parte;
(b) | rezilierea sau modificarea, prin exercitarea
competenelor auxiliare, a activelor, drepturilor i pasivelor
care reprezint o parte sau totalitatea unui mecanism de
finanare structurat, inclusiv a mecanismelor men ionate la
articolul 76 alineatul (2) literele (e) i (f), la care institu ia de
credit aflat n rezoluie este parte.
(2) n pofida alineatului (1), atunci cnd este necesar pentru
asigurarea disponibilitii depozitelor acoperite autoritatea de
rezoluie poate:
mecanismele menionate la alineatul (1) fr a transfera alte
active, drepturi i pasive care fac parte din acela i mecanism,
i
Articolul 80
Transferuri pariale: protecia sistemelor de tranzacionare,
decontare i compensare
(1) Statele membre se asigur c aplicarea unui instrument
de rezoluie nu afecteaz nici normele referitoare la
sistemele reglementate de Directiva 98/26/CE, nici
funcionarea acestora, atunci cnd autoritatea de rezoluie:
(a) | transfer o parte, dar nu totalitatea activelor, drepturilor
sau pasivelor unei instituii aflate n rezoluie ctre o alt
entitate; sau
(b) | exercit competenele prevzute la articolul 64 pentru a
anula sau modifica clauzele unui contract la care institu ia
aflat n rezoluie este parte sau pentru a nlocui un
destinatar ca parte semnatar;
(2) n special, transferul, anularea sau modificarea

of the same arrangement; and
liabilities without transferring the covered deposits
Article 79
Protection for structured finance arrangements and
covered bonds
protection for structured finance arrangements including
arrangements referred to in points (e) and (f) of Article
76(2) so as to prevent either of the following:
(a) | the transfer of some, but not all, of the assets, rights
and liabilities which constitute or form part of a
structured finance arrangement, including arrangements
referred to in points (e) and (f) of Article 76(2), to which
the institution under resolution is a party;
(b) | the termination or modification through the use of
ancillary powers of the assets, rights and liabilities which
constitute or form part of a structured finance
arrangement, including arrangements referred to in
points (e) and (f) of Article 76(2), to which the institution
under resolution is a party.
of the same arrangement, and
liabilities without transferring the covered deposits.
Article 80
Partial transfers: protection of trading, clearing and
settlement systems
1. Member States shall ensure that the application of a
resolution tool does not affect the operation of systems
and rules of systems covered by Directive 98/26/EC,
where the resolution authority:
(a) | transfers some but not all of the assets, rights or
liabilities of an institution under resolution to another
entity; or
(b) | uses powers under Article 64 to cancel or amend the
terms of a contract to which the institution under
resolution is a party or to substitute a recipient as a party.
2. In particular, a transfer, cancellation or amendment as
169
menionat la alineatul (1) din prezentul articol nu revoc un

ordin de transfer contravenind articolului 5 din Directiva
98/26/CE i nici nu modific sau anuleaz caracterul
executoriu al ordinelor de transfer i al compensrii n
conformitate cu articolele 3 i 5 din respectiva directiv,
utilizarea de fonduri, titluri de valoare sau faciliti de credit
n conformitate cu dispoziiile articolului 4 din respectiva
directiv sau protecia garaniilor suplimentare n
conformitate cu articolul 9 din respectiva directiv.
CAPITOLUL VIII
Obligaii procedurale
Articolul 81
Cerine de notificare
(1) Statele membre solicit conducerii unei institu ii sau a
oricreia dintre entitile menionate la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s informeze autoritatea competent
n cazul n care consider c institu ia sau entitatea
respectiv este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este
susceptibil de a intra n dificultate, n sensul articolului 32
alineatul (4).
(2) Autoritile competente informeaz autoritile de
rezoluie relevante n legtur cu orice notificri primite n
temeiul alineatului (1) din prezentul articol i cu orice msuri
de prevenire a crizelor sau orice msuri men ionate la
articolul 104 din Directiva 2013/36/UE pe care le impun
unei instituii sau unei entiti menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) din prezenta directiv.
(3) n cazul n care o autoritate competent sau o autoritate
de rezoluie stabilete c sunt ndeplinite condiiile prevzute
la literele (a) i (b) de la articolul 32 alineatul (1) n ceea ce
privete o instituie sau o entitate menionat la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), aceasta comunic aceast
constatare fr ntrziere urmtoarelor autorit i, dac sunt
diferite:
(a) | autoritii de rezoluie a instituiei respective sau a
sau (d);
(b) | autoritii competente a instituiei respective sau a
sau (d);
(c) | autoritii competente a unei eventuale sucursale a
instituiei respective sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1
(d) | autoritii de rezoluie a unei eventuale sucursale a
instituiei respective sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1
(e) | bncii centrale;
(f) | schemei de garantare a depozitelor la care este afiliat o
instituie de credit, pentru a permite, acolo unde este cazul,
exercitarea funciilor schemei n cauz;
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not revoke

a transfer order in contravention of Article 5 of Directive
98/26/EC; and shall not modify or negate the
enforceability of transfer orders and netting as required
by Articles 3 and 5 of that Directive, the use of funds,
securities or credit facilities as required by Article 4
thereof or protection of collateral security as required by
Article 9 thereof.
CHAPTER VIII
Procedural obligations
Article 81
Notification requirements
1. Member States shall require the management body of
an institution or any entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) to notify the competent authority
where they consider that the institution or the entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is failing
or likely to fail, within the meaning specified in Article
32(4).
2. Competent authorities shall inform the relevant
resolution authorities of any notifications received under
paragraph 1 of this Article, and of any crisis prevention
measures, or any actions referred to in Article 104 of
Directive 2013/36/EU they require an institution or an
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of
this Directive to take.
3. Where a competent authority or resolution authority
determines that the conditions referred to in points (a)
and (b) of Article 32(1) are met in relation to an
of Article 1(1), it shall communicate that determination
without delay to the following authorities, if different:
(a) | the resolution authority for that institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(b) | the competent authority for that institution or entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(c) | the competent authority of any branch of that
Article 1(1);
(d) | the resolution authority of any branch of that
Article 1, (1)
(e) | the central bank;
(f) | the deposit guarantee scheme to which a credit
institution is affiliated where necessary to enable the
functions of the deposit guarantee scheme to be
170
(g) | organului care rspunde de mecanismele de finanare a

rezoluiei, pentru a permite, acolo unde este cazul,
exercitarea funciilor mecanismelor n cauz;
(h) | autoritii de rezoluie a grupului, dup caz;
(i) | ministerului competent;
(j) | n cazul n care instituia sau entitatea men ionat la
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) din prezenta
directiv face obiectul supravegherii pe baz consolidat n
conformitate cu titlul VII capitolul 3 din Directiva
2013/36/UE, supraveghetorului consolidant; i
(k) | CERS i autoritatea macroprudenial na ionale
desemnat.
(4) n cazul n care transmiterea informa iilor men ionat la
alineatele (3) literele (f) i (g) nu garanteaz nivelul adecvat
de confidenialitate, autoritatea competent sau autoritatea de
rezoluie stabilete proceduri de comunicare alternative care
ndeplinesc aceleai obiective, asigurnd totodat nivelul
adecvat de confidenialitate.
Articolul 82
Decizia autoritii de rezoluie
(1) La primirea unei comunicri din partea autorit ii
competente n conformitate cu alineatul (3) de la articolul 81
sau din proprie iniiativ, autoritatea de rezolu ie stabile te,
n conformitate cu articolul 32 alineatul (1) i articolul 33, n
ce msur sunt ndeplinite condiiile de la paragraful
respectiv n legtur cu instituia sau cu entitatea men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) n cauz.
(2) Decizia prin care se stabilete dac se iau sau nu msuri
de rezoluie n raport cu o instituie sau o entitate men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) con ine
urmtoarele informaii:
(a) | motivele deciziei respective, inclusiv stabilirea faptului
c instituia ndeplinete sau nu condiiile pentru rezoluie;
(b) | msura pe care autoritatea de rezoluie inten ioneaz s
o ia, inclusiv, dac este cazul, decizia de a cere lichidarea,
numirea unui administrator sau orice alt msur prevzut
de procedura obinuit de insolven sau, sub rezerva
articolului 37 alineatul (9) de dreptul intern.
reglementare pentru a preciza procedurile i con inutul legate
de urmtoarele cerine:
(a) | notificrile menionate la articolul 81 alineatele (1), (2)
i (3),
(b) | avizul de suspendare menionat la articolul 83.
discharged;
(g) | the body in charge of the resolution financing
arrangements where necessary to enable the functions of
the resolution financing arrangements to be discharged;
(h) | where applicable, the group-level resolution
authority;
(i) | the competent ministry;
(j) | where the institution or the entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) of this Directive is subject to
supervision on consolidated basis under Chapter 3 of
Title VII of Directive 2013/36/EU, the consolidating
supervisor; and
(k) | the ESRB and the designated national macroprudential authority.
4. Where the transmission of information referred to in
paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) does not guarantee the
appropriate level of confidentiality, the competent
authority or resolution authority shall establish
alternative communication procedures that achieve the
same objectives while ensuring the appropriate level of
confidentiality.
Article 82
Decision of the resolution authority
1. On receiving a communication from the competent
authority pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 81, or on its
own initiative, the resolution authority shall determine, in
accordance with Article 32(1) and Article 33, whether the
conditions of that paragraph are met in respect of the
of Article 1(1) in question.
2. A decision whether or not to take resolution action in
relation to an institution or an entity referred to in point
(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) shall contain the following
information:
(a) | the reasons for that decision, including the
determination that the institution meets or does not meet
the conditions for resolution;
(b) | the action that the resolution authority intends to
take including, where appropriate, the determination to
apply for winding up, the appointment of an
administrator or any other measure under applicable
normal insolvency proceedings or, subject to Article
37(9), under national law.
in order to specify the procedures and contents relating to
the following requirements:
(a) | the notifications referred to in Article 81(1), (2) and
(3);
(b) | the notice of suspension referred to in Article 83.
171

1093/2010.
Articolul 83
Obligaii procedurale ale autoritilor de rezoluie
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, dup luarea unei msuri de
rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie se conformeaz cerin elor
prevzute la alineatele (2), (3) i (4), imediat ce acest lucru
devine n mod rezonabil posibil.
(2) Autoritatea de rezoluie notific instituiei aflate n
rezoluie i urmtoarelor autoriti, dac sunt diferite:
(a) | autoritii competente a instituiei aflate n rezoluie;
(b) | autoritii competente a unei eventuale sucursale a
instituiei aflate n rezoluie;
(c) | bncii centrale;
(d) | schemei de garantare a depozitelor la care este afiliat
instituia aflat n rezoluie;
(e) | organului care rspunde de mecanismele de finan are a
rezoluiei;
(f) | autoritii de rezoluie a grupului, dup caz;
(g) | ministerului competent;
(h) | n cazul n care instituia aflat n rezoluie face obiectul
supravegherii pe baz consolidat n conformitate cu titlul
VII capitolul 3 din Directiva 2013/36/UE, supraveghetorului
consolidant;
(i) | autoritii macroprudeniale naionale desemnate i
CERS;
(j) | Comisiei, Bncii Centrale Europene, AEVMP, Autoritii
europene de supraveghere (Autoritatea European pentru
Asigurri i Pensii Ocupaionale) (EIOPA) instituit prin
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1094/2010 i ABE;
(k) | n cazul n care instituia aflat n rezoluie este o
instituie definit n termenii articolului 2 litera (b) din
Directiva 98/26/CE, operatorilor sistemelor din care face
parte respectiva instituie.
(3) Notificarea menionat la alineatul (2) conine o copie a
oricrui ordin sau instrument prin intermediul cruia sunt
exercitate competenele relevante i precizeaz data de la
care msura sau msurile de rezoluie produc efecte.
(4) Autoritatea de rezoluie public sau asigur publicarea
unei copii a ordinului sau a instrumentului prin intermediul
cruia este luat msura de rezolu ie, fie a unei informri
care sumarizeaz efectele msurii de rezolu ie i, mai exact,
efectele asupra clienilor de retail i, dac este cazul,

Article 83
Procedural obligations of resolution authorities
1. Member States shall ensure that, as soon as reasonably
practicable after taking a resolution action, resolution
authorities comply with the requirements laid down in
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
2. The resolution authority shall notify the institution
under resolution and the following authorities, if
different:
(a) | the competent authority for the institution under
resolution;
(b) | the competent authority of any branch of the
institution under resolution;
(c) | the central bank;
(d) | the deposit guarantee scheme to which the credit
institution under resolution is affiliated;
(e) | the body in charge of the resolution financing
arrangements;
(f) | where applicable, the group-level resolution
authority;
(g) | the competent ministry;
(h) | where the institution under resolution is subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis under Chapter 3 of
Title VII of Directive 2013/36/EU, the consolidating
supervisor;
(i) | the designated national macroprudential authority
and the ESRB;
(j) | the Commission, the European Central Bank,
ESMA, the European Supervisory Authority (European
Investment and Occupational Pensions Authority)
(EIOPA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010
and EBA;
(k) | where the institution under resolution is an
institution as defined in Article 2(b) of Directive
98/26/EC, the operators of the systems in which it
participates.
3. The notification referred to in paragraph 2 shall
include a copy of any order or instrument by which the
relevant powers are exercised and indicate the date from
which the resolution action or actions are effective.
4. The resolution authority shall publish or ensure the
publication of a copy of the order or instrument by which
the resolution action is taken, or a notice summarising
the effects of the resolution action, and in particular the
effects on retail customers and, if applicable, the terms
172
condiiile i perioada de suspendare sau limitare men ionat

la articolele 69, 70 i 71, prin urmtoarele mijloace:
(a) | pe site-ul su internet oficial;
(b) | pe site-ul internet al autoritii competente, dac aceasta
este diferit de autoritatea de rezoluie i pe site-ul internet al
ABE;
(c) | pe site-ul internet al instituiei aflate n rezolu ie;
(d) | n cazurile n care aciunile, alte instrumente de
proprietate sau instrumentele de datorie ale institu iei aflate
n rezoluie sunt admise la tranzacionare pe o pia
reglementat, mijloacele utilizate pentru divulgarea
informaiilor reglementate referitoare la instituia aflat n
rezoluie, n conformitate cu articolul 21 alineatul (1) din
Directiva 2004/109/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (35).
(5) n cazul n care aciunile sau instrumentele de proprietate
ale acesteia nu sunt admise la tranzacionare pe o pia
reglementat, autoritatea de rezoluie se asigur c
documentele care atest existena instrumentelor men ionate
la alineatul (4) sunt trimise acionarilor i creditorilor ai
instituiei aflate n rezoluie care sunt cunoscui din registrele
sau bazele de date ale instituiei aflate n rezoluie care sunt
disponibile autoritii de rezoluie.
Articolul 84
Confidenialitate
(1) Cerinele privind secretul profesional sunt obligatorii
pentru urmtoarele persoane:
(a) | autoritile de rezoluie;
(b) | autoritile competente i ABE;
(c) | ministerele competente;
(d) | administratorii speciali sau administratorii temporari
desemnai n conformitate cu prezenta directiv;
(e) | cumprtorii poteniali, att cei contacta i de autorit ile
competente, ct i cei solicitai de autoritile de rezolu ie,
indiferent dac acest contact sau aceast solicitare a avut loc
sau nu n cadrul pregtirii n vederea utilizrii instrumentului
de vnzare a activitii sau dac solicitarea respectiv a
condus sau nu la o achiziie;
(f) | auditorii, contabilii, consilierii juridici i profesionali,
evaluatorii i ali experi angajai direct sau indirect de
autoritile de rezoluie, de autoritile competente, de
ministerele competente sau de cumprtorii poten iali
menionai la litera (e);
(g) | organismele care administreaz schemede garantare a
depozitelor;
(h) | organisme care administreaz sisteme de compensare
pentru investitori;
(i) | organismului care rspunde de mecanismele de finan are
a rezoluiei;
(j) | bncile centrale i alte autoriti implicate n procesul de
and period of suspension or restriction referred to in

Articles 69, 70 and 71, by the following means:
(a) | on its official website;
(b) | on the website of the competent authority, if
different from the resolution authority, and on the
website of EBA;
(c) | on the website of the institution under resolution;
(d) | where the shares, other instruments of ownership or
debt instruments of the institution under resolution are
admitted to trading on a regulated market, the means
used for the disclosure of regulated information
concerning the institution under resolution in accordance
with Article 21(1) of Directive 2004/109/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (35).
5. If the shares, instruments of ownership or debt
instruments are not admitted to trading on a regulated
market, the resolution authority shall ensure that the
documents providing proof of the instruments referred to
in paragraph 4 are sent to the shareholders and creditors
of the institution under resolution that are known through
the registers or databases of the institution under
resolution which are available to the resolution authority.
Article 84
Confidentiality
1. The requirements of professional secrecy shall be
binding in respect of the following persons:
(a) | resolution authorities;
(b) | competent authorities and EBA;
(c) | competent ministries;
(d) | special managers or temporary administrators
appointed under this Directive;
(e) | potential acquirers that are contacted by the
competent authorities or solicited by the resolution
authorities, irrespective of whether that contact or
solicitation was made as preparation for the use of the
sale of business tool, and irrespective of whether the
solicitation resulted in an acquisition;
(f) | auditors, accountants, legal and professional
advisors, valuers and other experts directly or indirectly
engaged by the resolution authorities, competent
authorities, competent ministries or by the potential
acquirers referred to in point (e);
(g) | bodies which administer deposit guarantee schemes;
(h) | bodies which administer investor compensation
schemes;
(i) | the body in charge of the resolution financing
arrangements;
(j) | central banks and other authorities involved in the
173
rezoluie;
(k) | o instituie-punte sau un vehicul de gestionare a
activelor;
(l) | orice alte persoane care furnizeaz sau au furnizat
servicii direct sau indirect, permanent sau ocazional
persoanelor menionate la literele (a)-(k);
(m) | conducerea superioar, membrii organului de
conducere i angajaii organismelor sau entit ilor
menionate la literele (a)-(k) naintea, n timpul i dup
numirea acestora.
(2) Pentru a se asigura c cerinele privind confiden ialitatea
stabilite la alineatele (1) i (3) sunt respectate, persoanele
menionate la alineatul (1) literele (a), (b), (c), (g), (h), (j) i
(k) se asigur c sunt instituite norme interne, inclusiv norme
pentru a garanta caracterul secret al informa iilor ntre
persoanele implicate direct n procesul de rezoluie.
(3) Fr a aduce atingere caracterului general al cerin elor
prevzute la alineatul (1), persoanelor menionate la alineatul
respectiv li se interzice divulgarea informa iilor confideniale
primite n exerciiul activitilor lor profesionale sau de la o
autoritate competent sau o autoritate de rezoluie n legtur
cu atribuiile acesteia n temeiul prezentei directive, ctre
orice persoan sau autoritate, cu excep ia cazului n care
aceast divulgare se face n exercitarea atribu iilor lor n
temeiul acestei directive sau sub form de rezumat sau n
form agregat, astfel nct instituiile sau entitile
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) s
nu poat fi identificate, fie cu consimmntul expres i
prealabil al autoritii, al instituiei sau al entitii menionate
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) care a furnizat
informaiile respective.
Statele membre se asigur c nicio informaie confiden ial
nu este divulgat de ctre persoanele menionate la alineatul
(1) i c sunt evaluate efectele posibile ale divulgrii
informaiei respective asupra interesului public n ceea ce
privete politica financiar, monetar i economic, precum
i asupra intereselor comerciale ale persoanelor fizice i
juridice, asupra scopului inspeciilor, asupra anchetelor i
asupra auditurilor.
Procedura de verificare a efectelor divulgrii informa iilor
include o evaluare specific a efectelor oricrei divulgri a
coninutului i detaliilor planului de redresare i restructurare
astfel cum este menionat la articolele 5, 7, 10, 11 i 12 i
rezultatul evalurilor realizate n conformitate cu articolele
6, 8 i 15.
Orice persoan sau entitate menionat la alineatul (1) face
obiectul rspunderii civile n cazul nclcrii prezentului
articol, n conformitate cu dreptul intern.
(4) Prezentul articol nu mpiedic:
(a) | angajaii i experii organismelor sau ai entitilor
resolution process;
(k) | a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle;
(l) | any other persons who provide or have provided
services directly or indirectly, permanently or
occasionally, to persons referred to in points (a) to (k);
(m) | senior management, members of the management
body, and employees of the bodies or entities referred to
in points (a) to (k) before, during and after their
appointment.
2. With a view to ensuring that the confidentiality
requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 and 3 are
complied with, the persons in points (a), (b), (c), (g), (h),
(j) and (k) of paragraph 1 shall ensure that there are
internal rules in place, including rules to secure secrecy
of information between persons directly involved in the
resolution process.
3. Without prejudice to the generality of the requirements
under paragraph 1, the persons referred to in that
paragraph shall be prohibited from disclosing
confidential information received during the course of
their professional activities or from a competent
authority or resolution authority in connection with its
functions under this Directive, to any person or authority
unless it is in the exercise of their functions under this
Directive or in summary or collective form such that
individual institutions or entities referred to in point (b),
(c) or (d) of Article 1(1) cannot be identified or with the
express and prior consent of the authority or the
of Article 1(1) which provided the information.
Member States shall ensure that no confidential
information is disclosed by the persons referred to in
paragraph 1 and that the possible effects of disclosing
information on the public interest as regards financial,
monetary or economic policy, on the commercial
interests of natural and legal persons, on the purpose of
inspections, on investigations and on audits, are assessed.
The procedure for checking the effects of disclosing
information shall include a specific assessment of the
effects of any disclosure of the contents and details of
recovery and resolution plan as referred to in Articles 5,
7, 10, 11 and 12 and the result of any assessment carried
out under Articles 6, 8 and 15.
Any person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
subject to civil liability in the event of an infringement of
this Article, in accordance with national law.
4. This Article shall not prevent:
(a) | employees and experts of the bodies or entities
174
menionate la literele (a)-(j) de la alineatul (1) s fac schimb

de informaii ntre ei sau n cadrul fiecrui organism sau
entiti n parte; sau
(b) | autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile competente,
inclusiv angajaii i experii acestora, s fac schimb de
informaii ntre ele, precum i cu alte autorit i de rezolu ie
din Uniune, cu alte autoriti competente din Uniune, cu
ministere competente, cu bnci centrale, cu scheme de
garantare a depozitelor, cu sisteme de compensare pentru
investitori, cu autoriti responsabile de procedura obi nuit
de insolven, cu autoriti responsabile de meninerea
stabilitii sistemului financiar n statele membre prin
utilizarea normelor macroprudeniale cu persoane
nsrcinate cu desfurarea auditurilor statutare ale
conturilor, cu ABE sau, sub rezerva articolului 98, cu
autoriti din ri tere care ndeplinesc funcii echivalente cu
cele ale autoritilor de rezoluie sau, n condi ii de strict
confidenialitate, cu un potenial cumprtor sau cu orice alt
persoan, dac este cazul, n scopul planificrii sau al
executrii unei msuri de rezoluie.
(5) Fr a aduce atingere oricror altor prevederi ale
prezentului articol, statele membre pot autoriza schimburile
de informaii cu oricare dintre urmtoarele:
(a) | n condiii de stric confidenialitate, cu orice alt
persoan, atunci cnd este necesar n vederea planificrii sau
a efecturii unei aciuni de rezoluie;
(b) | cu comisiile parlamentare de anchet din statul membru
respectiv, curile de conturi din statul membru respectiv i
alte entiti cu atribuii de anchetare n statul lor membru, n
condiii corespunztoare; i
(c) | cu autoritile naionale responsabile cu supravegherea
sistemelor de plat, autoritile responsabile de procedura
obinuit de insolven, autoritile care au sarcina public
de a supraveghea alte entiti din sectorul financiar,
autoritile reponsabile de supravegherea pieelor financiare
i a ntreprinderilor de asigurare precum i inspectorii care
acioneaz n numele acestora, autoritile statelor membre
care au responsabilitatea de a menine stabilitatea sistemului
financiar n statele membre prin utilizarea reglementrilor
macroprudeniale, autoritile responsabile cu protejarea
stabilitii sistemului financiar, precum i persoanele
responsabile cu auditarea legal;
(6) Dispoziiile prezentului articol nu aduc atingere dreptului
intern privind divulgarea informaiilor n vederea procedurii
judiciare n dosare penale sau civile.
1093/2010, pentru a specifica modul n care ar trebui
furnizate informaiile sub form de rezumat sau n form
agregat, n sensul alineatului (3).
CAPITOLUL IX
referred to in points (a) to (j) of paragraph 1 from sharing

information among themselves within each body or
entity; or
(b) | resolution authorities and competent authorities,
including their employees and experts, from sharing
information with each other and with other Union
resolution authorities, other Union competent authorities,
competent ministries, central banks, deposit guarantee
schemes, investor compensation schemes, authorities
responsible for normal insolvency proceedings,
authorities responsible for maintaining the stability of the
financial system in Member States through the use of
macroprudential rules, persons charged with carrying out
statutory audits of accounts, EBA, or, subject to Article
98, third-country authorities that carry out equivalent
functions to resolution authorities, or, subject to strict
confidentiality requirements, to a potential acquirer for
the purposes of planning or carrying out a resolution
action.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article,
Member States may authorise the exchange of
information with any of the following:
(a) | subject to strict confidentiality requirements, any
other person where necessary for the purposes of
planning or carrying out a resolution action;
(b) | parliamentary enquiry committees in their Member
State, courts of auditors in their Member State and other
entities in charge of enquiries in their Member State,
under appropriate conditions; and
(c) | national authorities responsible for overseeing
payment systems, the authorities responsible for normal
insolvency proceedings, the authorities entrusted with the
public duty of supervising other financial sector entities,
the authorities responsible for the supervision of
financial markets and insurance undertakings and
inspectors acting on their behalf, the authorities of
Member States responsible for maintaining the stability
of the financial system in Member States through the use
of macroprudential rules, the authorities responsible for
protecting the stability of the financial system, and
persons charged carrying out statutory audits;
6. This Article shall be without prejudice to national law
concerning the disclosure of information for the purpose
of legal proceedings in criminal or civil cases.
1093/2010 to specify how information should be
provided in summary or collective form for the purposes
of paragraph 3.
CHAPTER IX
175
Dreptul la recurs i excluderea altor msuri

Articolul 85
Aprobarea judiciar ex ante i dreptul de a contesta deciziile
(1) Statele membre pot solicita ca decizia de adoptare a unei
msuri de prevenire sau de gestionare a crizelor s fac
obiectul unei aprobri judiciare ex ante, cu condi ia ca, n
ceea ce privete decizia de adoptare a unei msuri de
gestionare a crizelor, n conformitate cu dreptul intern,
procedura pentru solicitarea aprobrii i examinarea de ctre
instan s fie rapide.
(2) Statele membre prevd n dreptul intern dreptul de a
formula o cale de atac mpotriva deciziei de a lua o msur
de prevenire a crizelor sau a deciziei de a exercita o
competen, alta dect cea referitoare la msurile de
gestionare a crizelor, n temeiul prezentei directive.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c toate persoanele afectate de
decizia de a lua msuri de gestionare a crizelor au dreptul la
o cale de atac mpotriva deciziei respective. Statele membre
se asigur c controlul este rapid i c instanele na ionale
utilizeaz evaluri economice complexe ale faptelor realizate
de autoritatea de rezoluie ca baz a propriei lor evaluri.
(4) Dreptul la o cale de atac menionat la alineatul (3) se
exercit sub rezerva urmtoarelor dispozi ii:
(a) | introducerea unei ci de atac nu implic suspendarea
automat a efectelor deciziei contestate;
(b) | decizia autoritii de rezoluie este executorie imediat i
d natere unei prezumii refutabile potrivit creia
suspendarea executrii deciziei ar fi contrar interesului
public.
Atunci cnd acest lucru este necesar pentru a proteja
interesul unor pri tere care, acionnd cu bun-credin, au
cumprat aciuni, alte instrumente de proprietate, active,
drepturi sau pasive ale unei instituii aflate n rezolu ie, n
temeiul utilizrii instrumentelor de rezoluie sau al exercitrii
competenelor de rezoluie de ctre autorit ile de rezolu ie,
anularea unei decizii luate de o autoritate de rezolu ie nu
afecteaz niciun act administrativ adoptat ulterior i nicio
tranzacie ncheiat ulterior de ctre autoritatea de rezolu ie
n cauz pe baza deciziei sale anulate. n acest caz, cile de
recurs mpotriva unei decizii sau msuri prejudiciabile a
autoritilor de rezoluie trebuie s se limiteze la acordarea
de compensaii pentru pierderile suferite de reclamant ca
urmare a deciziei sau a msurii respective.
Articolul 86
Restricii referitoare la alte proceduri judiciare
(1) Fr a aduce atingere articolului 82 alineatul (2) litera
(b), statele membre se asigur c, n privin a unei institu ii
Right of appeal and exclusion of other actions

Article 85
Ex-ante judicial approval and rights to challenge
decisions
1. Member States may require that a decision to take a
crisis prevention measure or a crisis management
measure is subject to ex-ante judicial approval, provided
that in respect of a decision to take a crisis management
measure, according to national law, the procedure
relating to the application for approval and the courts
consideration are expeditious.
2. Member States shall provide in national law for a right
of appeal against a decision to take a crisis prevention
measure or a decision to exercise any power, other than a
crisis management measure, under this Directive.
3. Member States shall ensure that all persons affected by
a decision to take a crisis management measure, have the
right to appeal against that decision. Member States shall
ensure that the review is expeditious and that national
courts use the complex economic assessments of the
facts carried out by the resolution authority as a basis for
their own assessment.
4. The right to appeal referred to in paragraph 3 shall be
subject to the following provisions:
(a) | the lodging of an appeal shall not entail any
automatic suspension of the effects of the challenged
decision;
(b) | the decision of the resolution authority shall be
immediately enforceable and it shall give rise to a
rebuttable presumption that a suspension of its
enforcement would be against the public interest.
Where it is necessary to protect the interests of third
parties acting in good faith who have acquired shares,
other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or
liabilities of an institution under resolution by virtue of
the use of resolution tools or exercise of resolution
powers by a resolution authority, the annulment of a
decision of a resolution authority shall not affect any
subsequent administrative acts or transactions concluded
by the resolution authority concerned which were based
on the annulled decision. In that case, remedies for a
wrongful decision or action by the resolution authorities
shall be limited to compensation for the loss suffered by
the applicant as a result of the decision or act.
Article 86
Restrictions on other proceedings
1. Without prejudice to point (b) of Article 82(2),
Member States shall ensure with respect to an institution
176
aflate n rezoluie sau a unei instituii sau a unei entit i

pentru care se consider c sunt ndeplinite condiiile pentru
procedura de rezoluie, procedura obinuit de insolven nu
este declanat dect la iniiativa autoritii de rezolu ie,
precum i c decizia de aplicare a procedurii obi nuite de
insolven n cazul unei instituii sau al unei entit i
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) nu
poate fi luat dect cu consimmntul autorit ii de
rezoluie.
(2) n sensul alineatului (1), statele membre se asigur c:
(a) | autoritilor competente i autoritilor de rezolu ie li se
notific fr ntrziere orice cerere de deschidere a
procedurii obinuite de insolven n raport cu o instituie sau
cu o entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b),
(c) sau (d), indiferent dac instituia sau entitatea respectiv
se afl n rezoluie sau dac a fost fcut public o decizie n
conformitate cu articolul 83 alineatele (4) i (5);
(b) | cererea nu este stabilit dect dac s-au fcut notificrile
menionate la litera (a) i dac survine una dintre
urmtoarele situaii: | (i) | autoritatea de rezoluie a informat
autoritile responsabile de procedura obinuit de insolven
cu privire la intenia sa de a nu lua nicio msur de rezolu ie
n raport cu instituia sau cu entitatea menionat la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d); | (ii) | a expirat un
termen de apte zile de la data efecturii notificrilor
menionate la litera (a).
(3) Fr a aduce atingere niciunei limitri privind executarea
garaniilor reale mobiliare impuse n temeiul articolului 70,
statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd este necesar n
vederea aplicrii eficace a instrumentelor i competen elor
de rezoluie, autoritile de rezoluie pot solicita instanei s
suspende, pentru o perioad adecvat conform obiectivului
urmrit, orice aciune sau procedur judiciar la care este sau
devine parte o instituie aflat n rezoluie.
TITLUL V
REZOLUIA GRUPURILOR TRANSFRONTALIERE
Articolul 87
Principii generale referitoare la procesul decizional care
implic mai multe state membre
Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd iau, n temeiul
prezentei directive, decizii sau msuri care pot afecta unul
sau mai multe state membre, autoritile lor in seama de
urmtoarele principii generale:
(a) | necesitatea imperativ a eficacit ii procesului
decizional i a pstrrii costurilor rezoluiei la un nivel ct
under resolution or an institution or an entity referred to

in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) in relation to which
the conditions for resolution have been determined to be
met, that normal insolvency proceedings shall not be
commenced except at the initiative of the resolution
authority and that a decision placing an institution or an
into normal insolvency proceedings shall be taken only
with the consent of the resolution authority.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, Member States shall
ensure that:
(a) | competent authorities and resolution authorities are
notified without delay of any application for the opening
of normal insolvency proceedings in relation to an
of Article 1(1), irrespective of whether the institution or
the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
is under resolution or a decision has been made public in
accordance with Article 83(4) and (5);
(b) | the application is not determined unless the
notifications referred to in point (a) have been made and
either of the following occurs: | (i) | the resolution
authority has notified the authorities responsible for
normal insolvency proceedings that it does not intend to
take any resolution action in relation to the institution or
the entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article
1(1); | (ii) | a period of seven days beginning with the
date on which the notifications referred to in point (a)
were made has expired.
3. Without prejudice to any restriction on the
enforcement of security interests imposed pursuant to
Article 70, Member States shall ensure that, if necessary
for the effective application of the resolution tools and
powers, resolution authorities may request the court to
apply a stay for an appropriate period of time in
accordance with the objective pursued, on any judicial
action or proceeding in which an institution under
resolution is or becomes a party.
TITLE V
CROSS-BORDER GROUP RESOLUTION
Article 87
General principles regarding decision-making involving
more than one Member State
Member States shall ensure that, when making decisions
or taking action pursuant to this Directive which may
have an impact in one or more other Member States,
their authorities have regard to the following general
principles:
(a) | the imperatives of efficacy of decision-making and
of keeping resolution costs as low as possible when
177
mai sczut posibil, n momentul lurii msurilor de rezoluie;

(b) | deciziile i msurile sunt luate n timp util i n regim de
urgen, atunci cnd se impune acest lucru;
(c) | autoritile de rezoluie, autoritile competente i alte
autoriti coopereaz pentru a se asigura c deciziile i
msurile sunt luate de o manier coordonat i eficient;
(d) | rolurile i responsabilitile autoritilor relevante din
fiecare stat membru sunt clar definite;
(e) | se acord o atenie corespunztoare intereselor statelor
membre n care sunt stabilite ntreprinderile-mam din
Uniune, n special impactului oricrei decizii, aciuni sau
inaciuni asupra stabilitii financiare, resurselor fiscale,
fondului de rezoluie, schemei de garantare a depozitelor sau
schemei de compensaii pentru investitori din statele membre
respective;
(f) | se acord o atenie corespunztoare intereselor fiecrui
stat membru n care este stabilit o filial, n special
impactului oricrei decizii, aciuni sau inac iuni asupra
stabilitii financiare, resurselor fiscale, fondului de
rezoluie, schemei de garantare a depozitelor sau schemei de
compensaii pentru investitori din statele membre respective;
(g) | se acord o atenie corespunztoare intereselor fiecrui
stat membru n care sunt stabilite sucursale semnificative, n
special impactului oricrei decizii, aciuni sau inac iuni
asupra stabilitii financiare a statelor membre respective;
(h) | se acord o atenie corespunztoare obiectivelor privind
echilibrarea intereselor diferitelor state membre implicate i
evitarea prejudicierii nedrepte ori a protejrii necuvenite a
intereselor anumitor state membre, inclusiv evitarea alocrii
inechitabile ntre statele membre a sarcinii suportate;
(i) | orice obligaie n temeiul prezentei directive de a
consulta o autoritate nainte de luarea oricrei decizii sau
msuri s implice cel puin obligaia de a consulta autoritatea
respectiv cu privire la acele elemente ale deciziei sau
msurii propuse care au sau probabil vor avea: | (i) | efecte
asupra ntreprinderii-mam din Uniune, a filialei sau a
sucursalei, dup caz; | (ii) | impact asupra stabilit ii statului
membru n care ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune, filiala sau
sucursala (dup caz) este stabilit sau situat;
(j) | atunci cnd adopt msuri de rezolu ie, autorit ile de
rezoluie s in seama i s urmreasc planurile de
rezoluie menionate la articolul 13, cu excepia cazului n
care autoritile de rezoluie consider, avnd n vedere
ndeplinite mai eficace prin adoptarea de msuri care nu sunt
prevzute n planurile de rezoluie;
(k) | necesitatea transparenei, ori de cte ori exist
taking resolution action;

(b) | that decisions are made and action is taken in a
timely manner and with due urgency when required;
(c) | that resolution authorities, competent authorities and
other authorities cooperate with each other to ensure that
decisions are made and action is taken in a coordinated
and efficient manner;
(d) | that the roles and responsibilities of relevant
authorities within each Member State are e defined
clearly;
(e) | that due consideration is given to the interests of the
Member States where the Union parent undertakings are
established, in particular the impact of any decision or
action or inaction on the financial stability, fiscal
resources, resolution fund, deposit guarantee scheme or
investor compensation scheme of those Member States;
(f) | that due consideration is given to the interests of
each individual Member State where a subsidiary is
established, in particular the impact of any decision or
action or inaction on the financial stability, fiscal
resources, resolution fund, deposit guarantee scheme or
investor compensation scheme of those Member States;
(g) | that due consideration is given to the interests of
each Member State where significant branches are
located, in particular the impact of any decision or action
or inaction on the financial stability of those Member
States;
(h) | that due consideration is given to the objectives of
balancing the interests of the various Member States
involved and of avoiding unfairly prejudicing or unfairly
protecting the interests of particular Member States,
including avoiding unfair burden allocation across
Member States;
(i) | that any obligation under this Directive to consult an
authority before any decision or action is taken implies at
least that such an obligation to consult that authority on
those elements of the proposed decision or action which
have or which are likely to have: | (i) | an effect on the
Union parent undertaking, the subsidiary or the branch,;
and | (ii) | an impact on the stability of the Member State
where the Union parent undertaking, the subsidiary or
the branch, is established or located;
(j) | that resolution authorities, when taking resolution
actions, take into account and follow the resolution plans
referred to in Article 13 unless the resolution authorities
consider, taking into account the circumstances of the
case, that the resolution objectives will be achieved more
effectively by taking actions which are not provided for
in the resolution plans;
(k) | that the requirement for transparency whenever a
178
probabilitatea ca o decizie sau msur propus s aib

implicaii asupra stabilitii financiare, resurselor fiscale,
fondului de rezoluie, schemei de garantare a depozitelor sau
schemei de compensaii pentru investitori din oricare stat
membru relevant; i
(l) | recunoaterea faptului c cea mai mare probabilitate de a
obine un rezultat care s duc la scderea costului global al
rezoluiei revine coordonrii i cooperrii.
Articolul 88
Colegii de rezoluie
(1) Autoritile de rezoluie la nivel de grup instituie colegii
de rezoluie pentru a ndeplini sarcinile prevzute la
articolele 12, 13, 16, 18, 45, 91 i 92 i, dup caz, pentru a
asigura cooperarea i coordonarea cu autoritile de rezoluie
din ri tere.
n special, colegiile de rezoluie furnizeaz autorit ilor de
rezoluie ale grupurilor, celorlalte autorit i de rezolu ie
relevanti, dup caz, autoritilor competente i
supraveghetorilor consolidani n cauz un cadru pentru
ndeplinirea urmtoarelor sarcini:
(a) | schimbul de informaii care prezint interes din punctul
de vedere al elaborrii planurilor de rezoluie a grupurilor, al
aplicrii n cazul grupurilor a competen elor de pregtire i
prevenire, precum i al rezoluiei grupurilor;
(b) | elaborarea planurilor de rezoluie a grupurilor n
conformitate cu articolele 12 i 13;
(c) | evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare a grupurilor n
(d) | exercitarea competenelor de abordare sau nlturare a
obstacolelor din calea posibilitilor de soluionare a
grupurilor n conformitate cu articolul 18;
(e) | luarea deciziei cu privire la necesitatea de a institui o
schem de rezoluie a grupului menionat la articolului 91
sau 92;
(f) | obinerea acordului privind schema de rezolu ie a
grupului propus n conformitate cu articolul 91 sau 92;
(g) | coordonarea comunicrii publice a strategiilor i
schemelor de rezoluie a grupului;
(h) | coordonarea utilizrii mecanismelor de finan are
prevzute n titlul VII;
(i) | stabilirea cerinelor minime pentru grupuri la nivel
consolidat i la nivel de filial n temeiul articolului 45.
n plus, colegiile de rezoluie pot fi utilizate drept forum de
discuii pe orice tem legat de rezoluia grupurilor
transfrontaliere.
(2) Membrii colegiului de rezoluie sunt urmtorii:
(a) | autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup;
(b) | autoritile de rezoluie din fiecare stat membru n care
este stabilit o filial inclus n supravegherea pe baz
proposed decision or action is likely to have implications

on the financial stability, fiscal resources, resolution
fund, deposit guarantee scheme or investor compensation
scheme of any relevant Member State; and
(l) | recognition that coordination and cooperation are
most likely to achieve a result which lowers the overall
cost of resolution.
Article 88
Resolution colleges
1. Group-level resolution authorities shall establish
resolution colleges to carry out the tasks referred to in
Articles 12, 13, 16, 18, 45, 91 and 92, and, where
appropriate, to ensure cooperation and coordination with
third-country resolution authorities.
In particular, resolution colleges shall provide a
framework for the group-level resolution authority, the
other resolution authorities and, where appropriate,
competent authorities and consolidating supervisors
concerned to perform the following tasks:
(a) | exchanging information relevant for the
development of group resolution plans, for the
application to groups of preparatory and preventative
powers and for group resolution;
(b) | developing group resolution plans pursuant to
Articles 12 and 13;
(c) | assessing the resolvability of groups pursuant to
Article 16;
(d) | exercising powers to address or remove
impediments to the resolvability of groups pursuant to
Article 18;
(e) | deciding on the need to establish a group resolution
scheme as referred to in Article 91 or 92;
(f) | reaching the agreement on a group resolution
scheme proposed in accordance with Article 91 or 92;
(g) | coordinating public communication of group
resolution strategies and schemes;
(h) | coordinating the use of financing arrangements
established under Title VII;
(i) | setting the minimum requirements for groups at
consolidated and subsidiary level under Article 45.
In addition, resolution colleges may be used as a forum
to discuss any issues relating to cross-border group
resolution.
2. The following shall be members of the resolution
college:
(a) | the group-level resolution authority;
(b) | the resolution authorities of each Member State in
which a subsidiary covered by consolidated supervision
179
consolidat;
(c) | autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n care este
stabilit ntreprinderea-mam a uneia sau mai multor
instituii din grup, care este o entitate menionat la articolul
1 alineatul (1) litera (d);
(d) | autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n care sunt
situate sucursale semnificative;
(e) | supraveghetorul consolidant i autorit ile competente
din statele membre n care autoritatea de rezoluie este
membr a colegiului de rezoluie. n cazul n care autoritatea
competent a unui stat membru nu este banca central a
acestuia, autoritatea competent poate decide s fie nso it
de un reprezentant al bncii centrale a respectivului stat
membru;
(f) | ministerele competente, n cazul n care autorit ile de
rezoluie care sunt membre ale colegiului de rezoluie nu
sunt ministerele competente;
(g) | autoritatea responsabil de schema de garantare a
depozitelor al unui stat membru, n cazul n care autoritatea
de rezoluie din statul membru respectiv este membr a unui
colegiu de rezoluie;
(h) | ABE, sub rezerva alineatului (4).
(3) Autoritile de rezoluie din ri tere, n cazul n care o
ntreprindere-mam sau o instituie stabilit n Uniune are o
instituie filial sau o sucursal care ar fi considerat
semnificativ dac ar fi situat n Uniune, pot, la cerere, s
fie invitate s participe n calitate de observatori n cadrul
colegiului de rezoluie ca observatori, cu condi ia ca acestea
s fac obiectul unor cerine de confidenialitate echivalente,
n opinia autoritii de rezoluie la nivel de grup, cu cele
(4) ABE contribuie la promovarea i monitorizarea
funcionrii efective, eficiente i consecvente a colegiilor de
rezoluie n conformitate cu standarde internaionale. n acest
scop, ABE este invitat s participe la reuniunile colegiului
de rezoluie. ABE nu are niciun drept de vot, n msura n
care au loc votri n cadrul colegiilor de rezolu ie.
(5) Autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup prezideaz
colegiul de rezoluie. n aceast calitate, autoritatea
respectiv:
(a) | stabilete reguli i proceduri scrise pentru func ionarea
colegiului de rezoluie, n urma consultrii celorlali membri
ai colegiului de rezoluie;
(b) | coordoneaz toate activitile colegiului de rezolu ie;
(c) | i convoac i i prezideaz toate reuniunile i
informeaz toi membrii colegiului de rezolu ie pe deplin i
anticipat n legtur cu organizarea reuniunilor colegiului de
rezoluie, principalele aspecte care urmeaz a fi discutate i
punctele ce vor fi examinate;
is established;
(c) | the resolution authorities of Member States where a
parent undertaking of one or more institutions of the
group, that is an entity referred to in point (d) of Article
1(1), are established;
(d) | the resolution authorities of Member States in which
significant branches are located;
(e) | the consolidating supervisor and the competent
authorities of the Member States where the resolution
authority is a member of the resolution college. Where
the competent authority of a Member State is not the
Member States central bank, the competent authority
may decide to be accompanied by a representative from
the Member States central bank;
(f) | the competent ministries, where the resolution
authorities which are members of the resolution college
are not the competent ministries;
(g) | the authority that is responsible for the deposit
guarantee scheme of a Member State, where the
resolution authority of that Member State is a member of
a resolution college;
(h) | EBA, subject to paragraph 4.
3. The resolution authorities of third countries where a
parent undertaking or an institution established in the
Union has a subsidiary institution or a branch that would
be considered to be significant were it located in the
Union may, at their request, be invited to participate in
the resolution college as observers, provided that they are
subject to confidentiality requirements equivalent, in the
opinion of the group-level resolution authority, to those
established by Article 98.
4. EBA shall contribute to promoting and monitoring the
efficient, effective and consistent functioning of
resolution colleges, taking into account international
standards. EBA shall be invited to attend the meetings of
the resolution college for that purpose. EBA shall not
have any voting rights to the extent that any voting takes
place within the framework of resolution colleges.
5. The group-level resolution authority shall be the chair
of the resolution college. In that capacity it shall:
(a) | establish written arrangements and procedures for
the functioning of the resolution college, after consulting
the other members of the resolution college;
(b) | coordinate all activities of the resolution college;
(c) | convene and chair all its meetings and keep all
members of the resolution college fully informed in
advance of the organisation of meetings of the resolution
college, of the main issues to be discussed and of the
items to be considered;
180
(d) | notific membrii colegiului de rezolu ie cu privire la

eventualele reuniuni planificate, astfel nct ace tia s poat
solicita s participe la ele;
(e) | decide care membri i care observatori sunt invita i s
participe la anumite reuniuni ale colegiului de rezolu ie, pe
baza unor nevoi specifice, innd seama de relevana
subiectului care urmeaz s fie discutat pentru acei membri
i observatori i n special de impactul potenial asupra
stabilitii financiare a statului membru n cauz;
(f) | informeaz, n timp util, toi membrii colegiului n
legtur cu deciziile adoptate n cadrul acestor reuniuni,
precum i cu rezultatele lor.
Membrii care particip la colegiul de rezolu ie coopereaz
strns.
Fr a aduce atingere literei (e), autoritile de rezolu ie au
dreptul s participe la reuniunile colegiului de rezolu ie ori
de cte ori sunt nscrise pe ordinea de zi puncte care fac
obiectul adoptrii n comun a deciziilor sau care se refer la
o entitate din grup situat n statul membru al acestor
autoriti.
(6) Autoritile de rezoluie la nivel de grup nu sunt obligate
s instituie un colegiu de rezoluie n cazul n care alte
grupuri sau colegii ndeplinesc aceleai func ii i sarcini cu
cele menionate la prezentul articol i respect toate
condiiile i procedurile, inclusiv pe cele care vizeaz
componena i participarea la colegiile de rezoluie, stabilite
la prezentul articol i la articolul 90. n acest caz, toate
trimiterile la colegii de rezoluie din prezenta directiv sunt
de asemenea nelese ca trimiteri la aceste alte grupuri sau
colegii.
(7) ABE elaboreaz, innd seama de standardele
internaionale, proiecte de standarde tehnice de reglementare
pentru a preciza regulile de funcionare operaional a
colegiilor de rezoluie pentru ndeplinirea sarcinilor
menionate la alineatul (1).
1093/2010.
Articolul 89
Colegii de rezoluie europene
(1) n cazul n care o instituie dintr-o ar ter sau o
ntreprindere-mam dintr-o ar ter deine filiale din
Uniune stabilite n dou sau mai multe state membre, sau
dou sau mai multe sucursale din Uniune care sunt
considerate semnificative de ctre dou sau mai multe state
membre, autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n care
(d) | notify the members of the resolution college of any

planned meetings so that they can request to participate;
(e) | decide which members and observers shall be
invited to attend particular meetings of the resolution
college, on the basis of specific needs, taking into
account the relevance of the issue to be discussed for
those members and observers, in particular the potential
impact on financial stability in the Member States
concerned;
(f) | keep all of the members of the college informed, in a
timely manner, of the decisions and outcomes of those
meetings.
The members participating in the resolution college shall
cooperate closely.
Notwithstanding point (e), resolution authorities shall be
entitled to participate in resolution college meetings
whenever matters subject to joint decision-making or
relating to a group entity located in their Member State
are on the agenda.
6. Group-level resolution authorities are not obliged to
establish a resolution college if other groups or colleges
perform the same functions and carry out the same tasks
specified in this Article and comply with all the
conditions and procedures, including those covering
membership and participation in resolution colleges,
established in this Article and in Article 90. In such a
case, all references to resolution colleges in this
Directive shall also be understood as references to those
other groups or colleges.
7. EBA shall, taking into account international standards,
develop draft regulatory standards in order to specify the
operational functioning of the resolution colleges for the
performance of the tasks referred to in paragraph 1.
regulatory standards referred to in the first subparagraph
in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU)
No 1093/2010.
Article 89
European resolution colleges
1. Where a third country institution or third country
parent undertaking has Union subsidiaries established in
two or more Member States, or two or more Union
branches that are regarded as significant by two or more
Member States, the resolution authorities of Member
States where those Union subsidiaries are established or
181
sunt stabilite respectivele filiale din Uniune sau n care sunt

situate respectivele sucursale semnificative, instituie un
colegiu de rezoluie european.
(2) Colegiul de rezoluie european va ndeplini funciile i
sarcinile prevzute la articolul 88 n ceea ce prive te
instituiile-filiale i sucursalele, n msura n care aceste
sarcini sunt relevante.
(3) n cazul n care filialele din Uniune sau sucursalele
semnificative sunt deinute de o societate financiar holding
intermediar stabilit n Uniune sau n cazul n care
sucursalele de importan semnificativ fac parte din acesta
n conformitate cu articolul 127 alineatul (3) al treilea
paragraf din Directiva 2013/36/UE, colegiul de rezolu ie
european este prezidat de autoritatea de rezoluie din statul
membru n care este situat supraveghetorul consolidant n
sensul supravegherii consolidate prevzute n respectiva
directiv.
n cazul n care nu se aplic primul paragraf, membrii
colegiului de rezoluie european aleg i aleg de comun acord
preedintele.
(4) Pe baza unui acord reciproc al tuturor prilor relevante,
statele membre pot renuna la cerina de a nfiina un colegiu
de rezoluie european dac alte grupuri sau colegii, inclusiv
colegiul de rezoluie nfiinat n temeiul articolului 88,
ndeplinesc aceleai funcii i sarcini cu cele men ionate la
prezentul articol i respect toate condiiile i procedurile,
inclusiv pe cele care vizeaz componen a i participarea la
colegiile de rezoluie europene, stabilite la prezentul articol
i la articolul 90. n acest caz, toate trimiterile la colegii de
rezoluie europene din prezenta directiv trebuie de
asemenea nelese ca trimiteri la aceste alte grupuri sau
colegii.
(5) Sub rezerva alineatelor (3) i (4) din prezentul articol,
colegiile de rezoluie europene funcioneaz altminteri n
Articolul 90
Schimbul de informaii
(1) Sub rezerva articolului 84, autoritile de rezolu ie i
autoritile competente i furnizeaz reciproc, la cerere,
toate informaiile relevante pentru ndeplinirea sarcinilor lor
n temeiul prezentei directive.
(2) Autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup coordoneaz
fluxul tuturor informaiilor relevante ntre autorit ile de
rezoluie. n special, autoritatea de rezolu ie la nivel de grup
furnizeaz autoritilor de rezoluie din alte state membre
toate informaiile relevante, n timp util, n vederea facilitrii
ndeplinirii sarcinilor menionate la articolul 88 alineatul (1)
al doilea paragraf literele (b)-(i).
(3) n urma unei cereri de informaii furnizate de o autoritate
de rezoluie dintr-o ar ter, autoritatea de rezolu ie cere
where those significant branches are located shall

establish a European resolution college.
2. The European resolution college shall perform the
functions and carry out the tasks specified in Article 88
with respect to the subsidiary institutions and, in so far as
those tasks are relevant, to branches.
3. Where the Union subsidiaries are held by, or the
significant branches are of, a financial holding company
established within the Union in accordance with the third
subparagraph of Article 127(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU,
the European resolution college shall be chaired by the
resolution authority of the Member State where the
consolidating supervisor is located for the purposes of
consolidated supervision under that Directive.
Where the first subparagraph does not apply, the

members of the European resolution college shall
nominate and agree the chair.
4. Member States may, by mutual agreement of all the
relevant parties, waive the requirement to establish a
European resolution college if other groups or colleges,
including a resolution college established under Article
88, perform the same functions and carry out the same
tasks specified in this Article and comply with all the
conditions and procedures, including those covering
membership and participation in European resolution
colleges, established in this Article and in Article 90. In
such a case, all references to European resolution
colleges in this Directive shall also be understood as
references to those other groups or colleges.
5. Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, the
European resolution college shall otherwise function in
Article 90
Information exchange
1. Subject to Article 84, resolution authorities and
competent authorities shall provide one another on
request with all the information relevant for the exercise
of the other authorities tasks under this Directive.
2. The group-level resolution authority shall coordinate
the flow of all relevant information between resolution
authorities. In particular, the group-level resolution
authority shall provide the resolution authorities in other
Member States with all the relevant information in a
timely manner with a view to facilitating the exercise of
the tasks referred to in points (b) to (i) of the second
subparagraph of Article 88(1).
3. Upon a request for information which has been
provided by a third-country resolution authority, the
182
aprobarea autoritii de rezoluie din ara ter cu privire la

transmiterea mai departe a acestor informaii, cu excepia
cazului n care autoritatea de rezolu ie din ara ter i-a dat
deja acordul cu privire la transmiterea mai departe a acestor
informaii.
Autoritie de rezoluie nu sunt obligate s transmit
informaii furnizate de o autoritate de rezoluie dintr-o ar
ter dac autoritatea de rezoluie din ara ter nu i-a dat
consimmntul cu privire la transmiterea mai departe a
acestora.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie partajeaz informa iile cu
ministerul competent atunci cnd acestea se refer la o
decizie sau o chestiune care impune notificarea, consultarea
sau acordul ministerului competent sau care ar putea avea
implicaii asupra fondurilor publice.
Articolul 91
Rezoluia grupului care implic o filial a acestuia
(1) Atunci cnd o autoritate de rezoluie decide c o instituie
sau oricare dintre entitile menionate la articolul 1 alineatul
(1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) care este filial ntr-un grup
ntrunete condiiile menionate la articolul 32 sau la
articolul 33, autoritatea respectiv notific fr ntrziere
autoritii de rezoluie la nivel de grup (dac este vorba de o
autoritate distinct), supraveghetorului consolidant i
membrilor colegiului de rezoluie constituit pentru grupul n
cauz urmtoarele informaii:
(a) | decizia potrivit creia instituia sau entitatea men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) ntrune te
condiiile menionate la articolul 32 sau la articolul 33;
(b) | msurile de rezoluie sau de insolven pe care
autoritatea de rezoluie le consider adecvate pentru institu ia
n cauz sau pentru entitatea menionat la articolul 1
(2) La primirea unei notificri n conformitate cu alineatul
(1), autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup, dup
consultarea cu ceilali membri ai colegiului de rezolu ie
relevant, evalueaz impactul potenial al msurilor de
rezoluie ori al altor msuri notificate n conformitate cu
alineatul (1) litera (b) asupra grupului i asupra entitilor din
grup din alte state membre, precum i, n special,
probabilitatea ca msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri s
duc la ndeplinirea condiiilor de rezoluie n raport cu o
entitate din grup dintr-un alt stat membru.
(3) Dac, dup consultarea celorlali membri ai colegiului de
rezoluie, autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup estimeaz
c msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri notificate n
conformitate cu alineatul (1) litera (b) nu ar spori
probabilitatea ndeplinirii condiiilor prevzute la articolul
32 sau la articolul 33 n raport cu o entitate din grup dintr-un
alt stat membru, autoritatea de rezoluie responsabil pentru
instituia respectiv sau pentru entitatea menionat la
resolution authority shall seek the consent of the thirdcountry resolution authority for the onward transmission
of that information, save where the third-country
resolution authority has already consented to the onward
transmission of that information.
Resolution authorities shall not be obliged to transmit
information provided from a third-country resolution
authority if the third-country resolution authority has not
consented to its onward transmission.
4. Resolution authorities shall share information with the
competent ministry when it relates to a decision or matter
which requires notification, consultation or consent of
the competent ministry or which may have implications
for public funds.
Article 91
Group resolution involving a subsidiary of the group
1. Where a resolution authority decides that an institution
or any entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article
1(1) that is a subsidiary in a group meets the conditions
referred to in Article 32 or 33, that authority shall notify
the following information without delay to the grouplevel resolution authority, if different, to the
consolidating supervisor, and to the members of the
resolution college for the group in question:
(a) | the decision that the institution or entity referred to
in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) meets the
conditions referred to in Article 32 or 33;
(b) | the resolution actions or insolvency measures that
the resolution authority considers to be appropriate for
that institution or that entity referred to in point (b), (c)
or (d) of Article 1(1).
2. On receiving a notification under paragraph 1, the
group-level resolution authority, after consulting the
other members of the relevant resolution college, shall
assess the likely impact of the resolution actions or other
measures notified in accordance with point (b) of
paragraph 1, on the group and on group entities in other
Member States, and, in particular, whether the resolution
actions or other measures would make it likely that the
conditions for resolution would be satisfied in relation to
a group entity in another Member State.
3. If the group-level resolution authority, after consulting
the other members of the resolution college, assesses that
the resolution actions or other measures notified in
accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1, would not
make it likely that the conditions laid down in Article 32
or 33 would be satisfied in relation to a group entity in
another Member State, the resolution authority
responsible for that institution or that entity referred to in
183
articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) poate aplica
msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri pe care le-a notificat n
conformitate cu alineatul (1) litera (b) din prezentul articol.
(4) Dac, dup consultarea celorlali membri ai colegiului de
rezoluie, autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup estimeaz
c msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri notificate n
conformitate cu alineatul (1) litera (b) din prezentul articol ar
spori probabilitatea ndeplinirii condiiilor prevzute la
articolul 32 sau la articolul 33 n raport cu o entitate din grup
dintr-un alt stat membru, autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului
propune o schem de rezoluie a grupului i o prezint
colegiului de rezoluie n termen de maxim 24 de ore de la
primirea notificrii n conformitate cu alineatul (1). Perioada
de 24 de ore poate fi extins cu acordul autorit ii de
rezoluie care a trimis notificarea menionat la alineatul (1)
din prezentul articol.
(5) n absena unei evaluri din partea autorit ii de rezoluie
la nivel de grup n termen de 24 de ore sau o perioad mai
lung de timp care a fost convenit, dup primirea notificrii
n conformitate cu alineatul (1), autoritatea de rezolu ie care
a trimis notificarea menionat la alineatul (1) poate lua
msuri de rezoluie sau alte msuri pe care le-a notificat n
conformitate cu litera (b) de la acest alineat.
(6) Schema de rezoluie a grupului menionat la alineatul
(4) trebuie:
(a) | s in seama i s urmeze planurile de rezolu ie
menionate la articolul 13, cu excepia cazului n care
autoritile de rezoluie consider, avnd n vedere
obinute mai eficace prin adoptarea de msuri care nu sunt
prevzute n planurile de rezoluie;
(b) | s descrie msurile de rezoluie care ar trebui ntreprinse
de autoritile de rezoluie relevante n legtur cu
ntreprinderea-mam din Uniune sau cu anumite entit i din
grup n scopul de a ndeplini obiectivele rezoluiei i
principiile prevzute la articolele 31 i 34;
(c) | s precizeze modul n care trebuie coordonate aceste
msuri de rezoluie;
(d) | s stabileasc un plan de finanarecare s in cont de
planul de rezoluie a grupului, de principiile de partajare a
responsabilitii stabilite n conformitate cu articolul 12
alineatul (3) litera (f) i de mutualizare astfel cum este
menionat la articolul 107.
(7) Sub rezerva alineatului (8), schema de rezoluie a
grupului ia forma unei decizii comune a autoritii de
rezoluie la nivel de grup i a autorit ilor de rezoluie
responsabile de filialele care fac obiectul acestei scheme.
ABE poate, la cererea unei autoriti de rezoluie, s acorde
asisten autoritilor de rezoluie, pentru obinerea unei
decizii comune n conformitate cu articolul 31 litera (c) din
point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) may take the

resolution actions or other measures that it notified in
accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. If the group-level resolution authority, after consulting
the other members of the resolution college, assesses that
the resolution actions or other measures notified in
accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article,
would make it likely that the conditions laid down in
Article 32 or 33 would be satisfied in relation to a group
entity in another Member State, the group-level
resolution authority shall, no later than 24 hours after
receiving the notification under paragraph 1, propose a
group resolution scheme and submit it to the resolution
college. That 24-hour period may be extended with the
consent of the resolution authority which made the
notification referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
5. In the absence of an assessment by the group-level
resolution authority within 24 hours, or a longer period
that has been agreed, after receiving the notification
under paragraph 1, the resolution authority which made
the notification referred to in paragraph 1 may take the
resolution actions or other measures that it notified in
accordance with point (b) of that paragraph.
6. A group resolution scheme required under paragraph 4
shall:
(a) | take into account and follow the resolution plans as
referred to in Article 13 unless resolution authorities
assess, taking into account circumstances of the case,
that resolution objectives will be achieved more
effectively by taking actions which are not provided for
in the resolution plans;
(b) | outline the resolution actions that should be taken by
the relevant resolution authorities in relation to the Union
parent undertaking or particular group entities with the
aim of meeting the resolution objectives and principles
referred to in Articles 31 and 34;
(c) | specify how those resolution actions should be
coordinated;
(d) | establish a financing plan which takes into account
the group resolution plan, principles for sharing
responsibility as established in accordance with point (f)
of Article 12(3) and the mutualisation as referred to in
Article 107.
7. Subject to paragraph 8, the group resolution scheme
shall take the form of a joint decision of the group-level
resolution authority and the resolution authorities
responsible for the subsidiaries that are covered by the
group resolution scheme.
184

(8) n cazul n care oricare dintre autorit ile de rezolu ie nu
este de acord cu schema de rezoluie a grupului propus de
autoritatea de rezoluie la nivel de grup sau se abate de la
aceasta sau consider c, din motive de stabilitate financiar,
trebuie s ia msuri de rezoluie independente sau alte
msuri dect cele propuse n schem n raport cu o institu ie
sau cu o entitate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera
(b), (c) sau (d), ea prezint n detaliu motivele dezacordului
sau motivele abaterii de la schema de rezolu ie, le notific
autoritii de rezoluie a grupului i celorlalte autorit i de
rezoluie care fac obiectul schemei de rezolu ie la nivel de
grup i informeaz aceste autoriti cu privire la ac iunile sau
msurile pe care le va lua. Atunci cnd prezint motivele
dezacordului su, autoritatea de rezoluie respectiv ine
seama de planurile de rezoluie menionate la articolul 13, de
impactul potenial asupra stabilitii financiare din statele
membre n cauz, precum i de efectul potenial al aciunilor
sau msurilor asupra altor pri ale grupului.
(9) Autoritile de rezoluie care nu i-au exprimat
dezacordul n temeiul alineatului (8) pot ajunge la o decizie
comun privind o schem de rezoluie a grupului care
acoper entitile din grup aflate statul membru.
absena deciziei comune, menionate la alineatul (8), sunt
recunoscute ca fiind determinante i sunt aplicate de ctre
autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n cauz.
(11) Autoritile execut toate msurile menionate la
prezentul articol fr ntrziere i innd seama n mod
(12) n toate situaiile n care nu este pus n aplicare o
schem de rezoluie a grupului, iar autorit ile de rezolu ie
aplic msuri de rezoluie n legtur cu oricare entitate din
grup, autoritile de rezoluie respective coopereaz
ndeaproape n cadrul colegiului de rezoluie n vederea
realizrii unei strategii de rezoluie coordonate pentru toate
entitile din grup care este n curs de a intra n dificultate
sau sunt susceptibile de a intra n dificultate.
(13) Autoritile de rezoluie care iau orice msur de
rezoluie n raport cu oricare entitate din grup informeaz
periodic i complet membrii colegiului de rezoluie cu
privire la msurile sau iniiativele respective i la aplicarea
acestora.
Articolul 92
Rezoluia grupurilor
(1) n cazul n care o autoritate de rezolu ie la nivel de grup
decide c o ntreprindere-mam din Uniune pentru care este
competent ntrunete condiiile menionate la articolul 32
sau la articolul 33, aceasta notific fr ntrziere
1093/2010.
8. If any resolution authority disagrees with or departs
from the group resolution scheme proposed by the
group-level resolution authority or considers that it needs
to take independent resolution actions or measures other
than those proposed in the scheme in relation to an
of Article 1(1) for reasons of financial stability, it shall
set out in detail the reasons for the disagreement or the
reasons to depart from the group resolution scheme,
notify the group-level resolution authority and the other
resolution authorities that are covered by the group
resolution scheme of the reasons and inform them about
the actions or measures it will take. When setting out the
reasons for its disagreement, that resolution authority
shall take into consideration the resolution plans as
referred to in Article 13, the potential impact on financial
stability in the Member States concerned as well as the
potential effect of the actions or measures on other parts
of the group.
9. The resolution authorities which did not disagree
resolution scheme covering group entities in their
Member State.
the decisions taken by the resolution authorities in the
resolution authorities in the Member States concerned.
11. Authorities shall perform all actions under this Article
without delay, and with due regard to the urgency of the
situation.
12. In any case where a group resolution scheme is not
implemented and resolution authorities take resolution
actions in relation to any group entity, those resolution
authorities shall cooperate closely within the resolution
college with a view to achieving a coordinated resolution
strategy for all the group entities that are failing or likely
to fail.
13. Resolution authorities that take any resolution action
in relation to any group entity shall inform the members
of the resolution college regularly and fully about those
actions or measures and their on-going progress.
Article 92
Group resolution
1. Where a group-level resolution authority decides that a
Union parent undertaking for which it is responsible
meets the conditions referred to in Article 32 or 33 it
shall notify the information referred to in points (a) and
185
informaiile prevzute la articolul 91 alineatul (1) literele (a)

i (b) supraveghetorului consolidant, dac aceasta este o
autoritate distinct, precum i celorlal i membri ai colegiului
de rezoluie al grupului n cauz.
Msurile de rezoluie sau de insolven luate n sensul
articolului 91 alineatul (1) litera (b) pot include punerea n
aplicare a unei scheme de rezoluie a grupului ntocmite n
conformitate cu articolul 91 alineatul (6) dac sunt
ndeplinite oricare dintre urmtoarele situa ii:
(a) | msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri la nivelul entit iimam, notificate n conformitate cu articolul 91 alineatul (1)
litera (b), fac probabil ndeplinirea condiiilor prevzute la
articolul 32 sau la articolul 33 n raport cu o entitate din grup
dintr-un alt stat membru;
(b) | msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri luate numai la
nivelul entitii-mam nu sunt suficiente pentru stabilizarea
situaiei sau nu asigur, probabil, un rezultat optim;
(c) | una sau mai multe filiale ndeplinesc condiiile
menionate la articolul 32 sau la articolul 33, conform
hotrrii autoritilor de rezoluie responsabile pentru
filialele respective; sau
(d) | msurile de rezoluie sau alte msuri luate la nivelul
grupului avantajeaz filialele din grup n a a fel nct o
schem de rezoluie a grupului devine adecvat.
(2) n cazul n care msurile propuse de autoritatea de
rezoluie a grupului n temeiul alineatului (1) nu includ o
schem de rezoluie a grupului, autoritatea de rezoluie a
grupului i ia decizia dup consultarea membrilor colegiului
de rezoluie.
Decizia autoritii de rezoluie la nivel de grup ia n
considerare:
(a) | i d curs planurilor de rezoluie menionate la articolul
13, cu excepia cazului n care autoritile de rezolu ie
consider, innd seama de circumstanele cazului, c
obiectivele rezoluiei vor fi realizate ntr-un mod mai eficient
prin adoptarea unor msuri care nu sunt prevzute n
planurile de rezoluie;
(b) | stabilitatea financiar din statele membre respective.
(3) n cazul n care msurile propuse de autoritatea de
rezoluie la nivel de grup n temeiul alineatului (1) includ o
schem de rezoluie a grupului, aceasta ia forma unei decizii
comune a autoritii de rezoluie la nivel de grup i a
autoritilor de rezoluie responsabile de filialele care fac
obiectul schemei respective.
ABE poate s acorde asisten autorit ilor de rezolu ie, la
cererea unei autoriti de rezoluie, n ceea ce prive te
adoptarea unei decizii comune n conformitate cu articolul
31 litera (c) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
(b) of Article 91(1) without delay to the consolidating

supervisor, if different, and to the other members of the
resolution college of the group in question.
The resolution actions or insolvency measures for the
purposes of point (b) of Article 91(1) may include the
implementation of a group resolution scheme drawn up
in accordance with Article 91(6) in any of the following
circumstances:
(a) | resolution actions or other measures at parent level
notified in accordance with point (b) of Article 91(1)
make it likely that the conditions laid down in Article 32
or 33 would be fulfilled in relation to a group entity in
another Member State;
(b) | resolution actions or other measures at parent level
only are not sufficient to stabilise the situation or are not
likely to provide an optimum outcome;
(c) | one or more subsidiaries meet the conditions
referred to in Article 32 or 33 according to a
determination by the resolution authorities responsible
for those subsidiaries; or
(d) | resolution actions or other measures at group level
will benefit the subsidiaries of the group in a way which
makes a group resolution scheme appropriate.
2. Where the actions proposed by the group-level
resolution authority under paragraph 1 do not include a
group resolution scheme, the group-level resolution
authority shall take its decision after consulting the
The decision of the group-level resolution authority shall
take into account:
(a) | and follow the resolution plans as referred to in
Article 13 unless resolution authorities assess, taking into
account circumstances of the case, that resolution
objectives will be achieved more effectively by taking
actions which are not provided for in the resolution
plans;
(b) | the financial stability of the Member States
concerned.
3. Where the actions proposed by the group-level
resolution authority under paragraph 1 include a group
resolution scheme, the group resolution scheme shall
take the form of a joint decision of the group-level
resolution authority and the resolution authorities
responsible for the subsidiaries that are covered by the
group resolution scheme.
1093/2010.
186
(4) n cazul n care oricare dintre autorit ile de rezolu ie nu

este de acord cu schema de rezoluie la nivel de grup propus
de autoritatea de rezoluie a grupului sau consider c, din
motive de stabilitate financiar, trebuie s ia msuri de
rezoluie independente sau alte msuri dect cele propuse n
schem n raport cu o instituie sau cu o entitate men ionat
la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), ea prezint n
detaliu motivele dezacordului sau motivele de abatere de la
schema de rezoluie a grupului, le notific autorit ii de
rezoluie a grupului i celorlalte autorit i de rezolu ie care
fac obiectul schemei de rezoluie la nivel de grup i
informeaz aceste autoriti cu privire la ac iunile sau
msurile pe care intenioneaz s le ia. Atunci cnd prezint
motivele dezacordului su, autoritatea de rezolu ie respectiv
ine seama de planurile de rezoluie la care se face referire la
articolul 13, de impactul potenial asupra stabilitii
financiare din statele membre n cauz, precum i de efectul
potenial al aciunilor sau msurilor asupra altor pr i ale
grupului.
(5) Autoritile de rezoluie care nu i-au exprimat
dezacordul fa de schema de rezoluie a grupului n temeiul
alineatului (4) pot ajunge la o decizie comun privind o
schem de rezoluie a grupului care se refer la entitile din
grup aflate n statul membru.
absena deciziei comune menionate la alineatul (4) sunt
recunoscute ca fiind determinante i sunt aplicate de ctre
autoritile de rezoluie din statele membre n cauz.
(7) Autoritile execut toate msurile menionate la
prezentul articol fr ntrziere i innd seama n mod
n toate situaiile n care nu este pus n aplicare o schem de
rezoluie a grupului, iar autoritile de rezoluie aplic msuri
de rezoluie n legtur cu oricare entitate din grup,
autoritile de rezoluie respective coopereaz ndeaproape n
cadrul colegiului de rezoluie n vederea realizrii unei
strategii de rezoluie coordonate pentru toate entit ile din
grup afectate.
Autoritile de rezoluie care iau msuri de rezoluie n raport
cu oricare entitate din grup informeaz periodic i complet
membrii colegiului de rezoluie cu privire la ac iunile sau
msurile respective i la progresele nregistrate n legtur cu
aplicarea acestora.
TITLUL VI
RELAII CU RI TERE
Articolul 93
Acorduri cu ri tere
(1) n conformitate cu articolul 218 din TFUE, Comisia
poate nainta Consiliului propuneri n vederea negocierii
unor acorduri cu una sau mai multe ri ter e referitoare la
4. If any resolution authority disagrees with or departs

from the group resolution scheme proposed by the
group-level resolution authority or considers that it needs
to take independent resolution actions or measures other
than those proposed in the scheme in relation to an
Article 1(1) for reasons of financial stability, it shall set
out in detail the reasons for the disagreement or the
reasons to depart from the group resolution scheme,
notify the group-level resolution authority and the other
resolution authorities that are covered by the group
resolution scheme of the reasons and inform them about
the actions or measures it intends to take. When setting
out the reasons for its disagreement, that resolution
authority shall give consideration to the resolution plans
as referred to in Article 13, the potential impact on
financial stability in the Member States concerned as
well as the potential effect of the actions or measures on
other parts of the group.
5. Resolution authorities which did not disagree with the
group resolution scheme under the paragraph 4 may
reach a joint decision on a group resolution scheme
covering group entities in their Member State.
the decisions taken by the resolution authorities in the
resolution authorities in the Member States concerned.
7. Authorities shall perform all actions under this Article
without delay, and with due regard to the urgency of the
situation.
In any case where a group resolution scheme is not
implemented and resolution authorities take resolution
action in relation to any group entity, those resolution
authorities shall cooperate closely within the resolution
college with a view to achieving a coordinated resolution
strategy for all affected group entities.
Resolution authorities that take resolution action in
relation to any group entity shall inform the members of
the resolution college regularly and fully about those
actions or measures and their on-going progress.
TITLE VI
RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
Article 93
Agreements with third countries
1. In accordance with Article 218 TFEU, the
Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the
negotiation of agreements with one or more third
187
modalitile de cooperare dintre autorit ile de rezolu ie i

autoritile relevante din ri tere, printre altele, cu scopul de
a face schimb de informaii referitor la planificarea redresrii
i rezoluiei n ceea ce privete instituiile, instituiile
financiare, ntreprinderile-mam i instituiile din ri ter e,
n special n urmtoarele situaii:
(a) | n cazurile n care o instituie-mam dintr-o ar ter are
instituii-filiale sau sucursale n situaia n care sucursalele
respective sunt considerate semnificative n dou sau mai
multe state membre;
(b) | n cazurile n care o ntreprindere-mam care este
stabilit ntr-un stat membru i are o filial sau o sucursal
semnificativ n cel puin un alt stat membru de ine una sau
mai multe instituii-filiale n ri tere;
(c) | n cazurile n care o instituie care este stabilit ntr-un
stat membru i are o ntreprindere-mam, o filial sau o
sucursal semnificativ n cel puin un alt stat membru de ine
una sau mai multe sucursale ntr-una sau mai multe ri tere.
(2) Acordurile menionate la alineatul (1) i propun s
garanteze n special instituirea de procese i mecanisme ntre
autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile relevante din ri ter e
n vederea cooperrii pentru ndeplinirea a unor sau tutror
sarcinilor i exercitarea a unor sau tutror competen elor
(3) Acordurile menionate la alineatul (1) nu conin dispozi ii
care s vizeze n mod individual vreo instituie, instituie
financiar, ntreprindere-mam sau instituie dintr-o ar
ter.
(4) Statele membre pot ncheia acorduri bilaterale cu o ar
ter n ceea ce privete aspectele menionate la alineatele (1)
i (2) pn la data intrrii n vigoare a unuia dintre acordurile
menionate la alineatul (1) cu ara ter relevant, n msura
n care acordurile bilaterale respective sunt conforme cu
prezentul titlu.
Articolul 94
Recunoaterea i executarea procedurilor de rezolu ie din ri
tere
(1) Prezentul articol se aplic procedurilor de rezolu ie din
ri tere cu excepia cazului n care intr n vigoare un acord
internaional menionat la articolul 93 alineatul (1) cu ara
ter relevant i pn la momentul intrrii n vigoare a
acestui acord. Prezentul articol se aplic i ulterior intrrii n
vigoare a unui acord internaional, menionat la articolul 93
alineatul (1), cu ara ter relevant, n msura n care
recunoaterea i executarea procedurilor de rezolu ie din ara
ter nu sunt reglementate prin acordul respectiv.
(2) n cazul n care exist un colegiu de rezoluie european
nfiinat n conformitate cu articolul 89, acesta adopt o
decizie comun cu privire la oportunitatea recunoa terii, cu
countries regarding the means of cooperation between

the resolution authorities and the relevant third country
authorities, inter alia, for the purpose of information
sharing in connection with recovery and resolution
planning in relation to institutions, financial institutions,
parent undertakings and third country institutions, with
regard to the following situations:
(a) | in cases where a third country parent undertaking
has subsidiary institutions or branches where such
branches are regarded as significant in two or more
Member States;
(b) | in cases where a parent undertaking established in a
Member State and which has a subsidiary or a significant
branch in at least one other Member State has one or
more third country subsidiary institutions;
(c) | in cases where an institution established in a
Member State and which has a parent undertaking, a
subsidiary or a significant branch in at least one other
Member State has one or more branches in one or more
third countries.
2. The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall, in
particular, seek to ensure the establishment of processes
and arrangements between resolution authorities and the
relevant third country authorities for cooperation in
carrying out some or all of the tasks and exercising some
or all of the powers indicated in Article 97.
3. The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall not
make provision in relation to individual institutions,
financial institutions, parent undertakings or third
country institutions.
4. Member States may enter into bilateral agreements
with a third country regarding the matters referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 until the entry into force of an
agreement referred to in paragraph 1 with the relevant
third country to the extent that such bilateral agreements
are not inconsistent with this Title.
Article 94
Recognition and enforcement of third-country resolution
proceedings
1. This Article shall apply in respect of third-country
resolution proceedings unless and until an international
agreement as referred to in Article 93(1) enters into force
with the relevant third country. It shall also apply
following the entry into force of an international
agreement as referred to in Article 93(1) with the
relevant third country to the extent that recognition and
enforcement of third-country resolution proceedings is
not governed by that agreement.
2. Where there is a European resolution college
established in accordance with Article 89, it shall take a
joint decision on whether to recognise, except as
188
excepia cazurilor prevzute la articolul 95, a procedurilor de

rezoluie ale rilor tere privind instituiile sau
ntreprinderile-mam din rile tere care:
(a) | au filiale din Uniune stabilite n dou sau mai multe
state membre sau sucursale din Uniune situate i considerate
semnificative de dou sau mai multe state membre; sau
(b) | dein, n orice alt mod, active, drepturi sau pasive situate
n dou sau mai multe state membre sau sunt reglementate
de dreptul statelor membre respective.
n cazul n care se adopt decizia comun privind
recunoaterea procedurilor de rezoluie din ri ter e,
autoritile de rezoluie naionale relevante fac demersuri
pentru executarea procedurilor de rezoluie recunoscute din
ri tere, n conformitate cu dreptul intern.
(3) Dac autoritile de rezoluie care fac parte din colegiul
de rezoluie european nu iau o decizie comun, sau dac nu
exist un colegiu de rezoluie european, fiecare autoritate de
rezoluie implicat ia o decizie cu privire la oportunitatea
recunoaterii i a executrii, cu excepia cazurilor prevzute
la articolul 95, a procedurilor de rezoluie din ri ter e
privind o instituie sau o ntreprindere-mam dintr-o ar
ter.
Decizia ine seama n mod corespunztor de interesele
fiecrui stat membru n care i desf oar activitatea o
instituie sau o ntreprindere-mam dintr-o ar ter i n
special de impactul potenial al recunoaterii i al executrii
procedurilor de rezoluie din ri tere asupra celorlalte pr i
ale grupului i a stabilitii financiare din statele membre
respective.
(4) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie sunt
cel puin abilitate s aplice urmtoarele msuri:
(a) | exercitarea competenelor de rezolu ie n legtur cu
urmtoarele: | (i) | active ale unei instituii sau ntreprinderimam dintr-o ar ter care sunt situate n statul membru al
autoritii de rezoluie sau sunt reglementate de legislaia
acestuia; | (ii) | drepturi sau pasive ale unei institu ii dintr-o
ar ter care sunt nregistrate de sucursala din Uniune n
statul membru al autoritii de rezoluie sau sunt
reglementate de legislaia acestuia ori pentru care exist
creane cu titlu executoriu privind astfel de drepturi sau
pasive n statul membru al autoritii de rezoluie;
(b) | efectuarea transferului de aciuni sau instrumente de
proprietate ntr-o filial din Uniune stabilit n statul membru
de desemnare, inclusiv solicitnd unei alte persoane s ia
msuri pentru efectuarea acestui transfer;
(c) | exercitarea competenelor prevzute la articolul 69, 70
sau 71 n legtur cu drepturile oricrei pr i dintr-un
contract cu o entitate menionat la alineatul (2) din
prezentul articol, atunci cnd aceste competen e sunt
necesare pentru a executa proceduri de rezolu ie din ri
tere; i
provided for in Article 95, third-country resolution

proceedings relating to a third-country institution or a
parent undertaking that:
(a) | has Union subsidiaries established in, or Union
branches located in and regarded as significant by, two or
more Member States; or
(b) | has assets, rights or liabilities located in two or more
Member States or are governed by the law of those
Member States.
Where the joint decision on the recognition of the thirdcountry resolution proceedings is reached, respective
national resolution authorities shall seek the enforcement
of the recognised third-country resolution proceedings in
accordance with their national law.
resolution authorities participating in the European
resolution college, or in the absence of a European
resolution college, each resolution authority concerned
shall make its own decision on whether to recognise and
enforce, except as provided for in Article 95, thirdcountry resolution proceedings relating to a third-country
institution or a parent undertaking.
The decision shall give due consideration to the interests
of each individual Member State where a third-country
institution or parent undertaking operates, and in
particular to the potential impact of the recognition and
enforcement of the third-country resolution proceedings
on the other parts of the group and the financial stability
in those Member States.
are, as a minimum, empowered to do the following:
(a) | exercise the resolution powers in relation to the
following: | (i) | assets of a third-country institution or
parent undertaking that are located in their Member State
or governed by the law of their Member State; | (ii) |
rights or liabilities of a third-country institution that are
booked by the Union branch in their Member State or
governed by the law of their Member State, or where
claims in relation to such rights and liabilities are
enforceable in their Member State;
(b) | perfect, including to require another person to take
action to perfect, a transfer of shares or other instruments
of ownership in a Union subsidiary established in the
designating Member State;
(c) | exercise the powers in Article 69, 70 or 71 in
relation to the rights of any party to a contract with an
entity referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, where
such powers are necessary in order to enforce thirdcountry resolution proceedings; and
189
(d) | retragerea caracterului executoriu al oricrui drept

contractual de a rezilia, lichida sau accelera contracte, de a
aduce atingere drepturilor contractuale ale entit ilor
menionate la alineatul (2) i ale altor entit i din grup, n
cazul n care un astfel de drept decurge din msurile de
rezoluie luate cu privire la instituia dintr-o ar ter ,
ntreprinderiea-mam a entitilor respective sau la alte
entiti din grup, fie de autoritatea de rezoluie din ara ter ,
fie n temeiul cerinelor legale sau de reglementare privind
mecanismele de rezoluie din ara respectiv, cu condi ia s
fie n continuare ndeplinite obligaiile materiale stabilite
prin contract, inclusiv obligaiile de plat i de livrare i
furnizarea de garanii.
(5) Autoritile de rezoluie pot lua, pentru a apra interesele
publice dupa caz, msuri de rezoluie cu privire la o
ntreprindere-mam n cazul n care autoritatea competent
din ara ter relevant stabilete c o instituie care este
nregistrat n ara ter respectiv sa ndepline te condi iile
pentru declanarea procedurii de rezoluie n conformitate cu
legislaia rii tere respective. n acest scop, statele membre
se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie au competena de a
utiliza orice competene n materie de rezolu ie cu privire la
respectiva ntreprindere-mam i se aplic articolul 68.
(6) Recunoaterea i executarea procedurilor de rezolu ie din
ri tere nu aduc atingere procedurilor obi nuite de
insolven n temeiul dreptului intern care sunt aplicabile,
dup caz, n conformitate cu prezenta directiv.
Articolul 95
Dreptul de a refuza recunoaterea sau executarea
procedurilor de rezoluie din ri tere
Dup consultarea altor autoriti de rezoluie, n cazul n care
un colegiu de rezoluie european este stabilit prin articolul
89, autoritatea de rezoluie poate refuza recunoa terea sau
executarea procedurilor de rezoluie din ri ter e n
conformitate cu articolul 94 alineatul (2), n cazul n care
consider:
(a) | c procedurile de rezoluie din ara ter ar avea efecte
negative asupra stabilitii financiare din statul membru n
care i are sediul autoritatea de rezoluie sau c procedurile
respective ar avea efecte negative asupra stabilit ii
financiare din alte state membre;
(b) | c pentru realizarea unuia sau mai multora dintre
obiectivele rezoluiei este necesar luarea unei msuri de
rezoluie independente n conformitate cu articolul 96 n
raport cu o sucursal din Uniune;
(c) | creditorii, inclusiv n special deponen ii localiza i sau
care trebuie pltii ntr-un stat membru ar beneficia de
acelai tratament ca cel al creditorilor din ara ter i
deponenii cu drepturi legale similare conform procedurii de
rezoluie din ara ter de origine.
(d) | render unenforceable any right to terminate,

liquidate or accelerate contracts, or affect the contractual
rights, of entities referred to in paragraph 2 and other
group entities, where such a right arises from resolution
action taken in respect of the third-country institution,
parent undertaking of such entities or other group
entities, whether by the third-country resolution authority
itself or otherwise pursuant to legal or regulatory
requirements as to resolution arrangements in that
country, provided that the substantive obligations under
the contract, including payment and delivery obligations,
and provision of collateral, continue to be performed.
5. Resolution authorities may take, where necessary in
the public interest, resolution action with respect to a
parent undertaking where the relevant third-country
authority determines that an institution that is
incorporated in that third country meets the conditions
for resolution under the law of that third country. To that
end, Member States shall ensure that resolution
authorities are empowered to use any resolution power in
respect of that parent undertaking, and Article 68 shall
apply.
6. The recognition and enforcement of third-country
resolution proceedings shall be without prejudice to any
normal insolvency proceedings under national law
applicable, where appropriate, in accordance with this
Directive.
Article 95
Right to refuse recognition or enforcement of thirdcountry resolution proceedings
The resolution authority, after consulting other resolution
authorities, where a European resolution college is
established under Article 89, may refuse to recognise or
to enforce third-country resolution proceedings pursuant
to Article 94(2) if it considers:
(a) | that the third-country resolution proceedings would
have adverse effects on financial stability in the Member
State in which the resolution authority is based or that
the proceedings would have adverse effects on financial
stability in another Member State;
(b) | that independent resolution action under Article 96
in relation to a Union branch is necessary to achieve one
or more of the resolution objectives;
(c) | that creditors, including in particular depositors
located or payable in a Member State, would not receive
the same treatment as third-country creditors and
depositors with similar legal rights under the thirdcountry home resolution proceedings;
190
(d) | c recunoaterea sau executarea procedurii de rezolu ie

din ara ter ar avea implicaii fiscale semnificative pentru
statul membru; sau
(e) | c efectele unei asemenea recunoa teri sau executri ar
contraveni dreptului intern.
Articolul 96
Rezoluia sucursalelor din Uniune
dein competenele necesare pentru a lua msuri n raport cu
o sucursal din Uniune care nu face obiectul niciunei
proceduri de rezoluie dintr-o ar ter sau face obiectul unei
proceduri dintr-o ar ter i c se aplic una din situa iile
specificate la articolul 95.
Statele membre se asigur c articolul 68 se aplic exercitrii
acestor competene.
(2) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie sunt
abilitate s exercite competenele prevzute la alineatul (1)
n cazul n care acestea consider c aplicarea unei msuri
este necesar n interesul public i dac cel puin una dintre
urmtoarele condiii este ndeplinit:
(a) | sucursala din Uniune nu mai ndeplinete sau risc s nu
ndeplineasc condiiile impuse de dreptul intern pentru
autorizare i funcionare n statul membru respectiv i nu
exist nicio perspectiv conform creia vreo msur de
supraveghere, ori vreo msur a sectorului privat ori vreo
msur ntreprins de ara ter relevant ar putea restabili
conformitatea sucursalei sau preveni intrarea sa n
dificultate, ntr-un interval de timp rezonabil;
(b) | instituia din ara ter nu este, n opinia autorit ii de
rezoluie, capabil sau dispus, sau risc s se afle n
incapacitate de a-i achita obligaiile fa de creditorii din
Uniune, sau obligaiile create sau nregistrate prin sucursala
sa, pe msur ce ele devin exigibile, iar autoritatea de
rezoluie este convins c nicio procedur de rezoluie sau de
insolven dintr-o ar ter nu a fost sau nu va fi declan at
n legtur cu respectiva instituie din ara ter ntr-un
interval de timp rezonabil;
(c) | autoritatea relevant din ara ter a ini iat o procedur
de rezoluie din ara ter n legtur cu institu ia din ara
ter sau a notificat autoritii de rezoluie intenia sa de a
iniia o astfel de procedur.
(3) n cazul n care ia o msur independent n legtur cu o
sucursal din Uniune, o autoritate de rezoluie are n vedere
obiectivele rezoluiei i ia msura n conformitate cu
urmtoarele principii i cerine, n msura n care acestea
sunt relevante:
(a) | principiile stabilite la articolul 34;
(b) | cerinele referitoare la aplicarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie menionate n capitolul III din titlul IV.
Articolul 97
(d) | that recognition or enforcement of the third-country

resolution proceedings would have material fiscal
implications for the Member State; or
(e) | that the effects of such recognition or enforcement
would be contrary to the national law.
Article 96
Resolution of Union branches
have the powers necessary to act in relation to a Union
branch that is not subject to any third-country resolution
proceedings or that is subject to third-country
proceedings and one of the circumstances referred to in
Article 95 applies.
Member States shall ensure that Article 68 applies to the
exercise of such powers.
2. Member States shall ensure that the powers required in
paragraph 1 may be exercised by resolution authorities
where the resolution authority considers that action is
necessary in the public interest and one or more of the
following conditions is met:
(a) | the Union branch no longer meets, or is likely not to
meet, the conditions imposed by national law for its
authorisation and operation within that Member State
and there is no prospect that any private sector,
supervisory or relevant third-country action would
restore the branch to compliance or prevent failure in a
reasonable timeframe;
(b) | the third-country institution is, in the opinion of the
resolution authority, unable or unwilling, or is likely to
be unable, to pay its obligations to Union creditors, or
obligations that have been created or booked through the
branch, as they fall due and the resolution authority is
satisfied that no third-country resolution proceedings or
insolvency proceedings have been or will be initiated in
relation to that third-country institution in a reasonable
timeframe;
(c) | the relevant third-country authority has initiated
third-country resolution proceedings in relation to the
third-country institution, or has notified to the resolution
authority its intention to initiate such a proceeding.
3. Where a resolution authority takes an independent
action in relation to a Union branch, it shall have regard
to the resolution objectives and take the action in
accordance with the following principles and
requirements, insofar as they are relevant:
(a) | the principles set out in Article 34;
(b) | the requirements relating to the application of the
resolution tools in Chapter III of Title IV.
Article 97
191
Cooperarea cu autoritile din ri tere

(1) Prezentul articol se aplic n legtur cu cooperarea cu
rile tere cu excepia cazului n care intr n vigoare
acordul internaional menionat la articolul 93 alineatul (1)
cu ara ter relevant i pn la momentul intrrii n vigoare
a acestui acord. Prezentul articol se aplic i ulterior intrrii
n vigoare a unui acord internaional, prevzut la articolul 93
alineatul (1), cu ara ter relevant, n msura n care
obiectul prezentului articol nu este reglementat prin acordul
respectiv.
(2) ABE poate s ncheie acorduri-cadru de cooperare
neobligatorii cu urmtoarele autoriti relevante din rile
tere:
(a) | n cazurile n care o filial din Uniune este stabilit n
dou sau mai multe state membre, autoritile relevante din
ara ter n care este stabilit ntreprinderea-mam sau o
societate menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) i
(d);
(b) | n cazurile n care o instituie dintr-o ar ter i
desfoar activitatea prin sucursale din Uniune n dou sau
mai multe state membre, autoritatea relevant a rii ter e n
care este stabilit respectiva instituie;
(c) | n cazurile n care o ntreprindere-mam sau o societate
menionat la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) i (d)
stabilite ntr-un stat membru cu o instituie-filial sau cu o
sucursal semnificativ ntr-un alt stat membru are, de
asemenea, una sau mai multe instituii-filiale n ri tere,
autoritile relevante din rile tere n care au fost stabilite
respectivele instituii-filiale;
(d) | n cazurile n care o instituie cu o institu ie-filial sau
cu o sucursal semnificativ ntr-un alt stat membru a
nfiinat una sau mai multe sucursale ntr-una sau mai multe
ri tere, autoritile relevante din rile tere n care au fost
situate respectivele sucursale.
Acordurile menionate la prezentul alineat nu vizeaz
instituii n mod individual. Aceste acorduri nu impun
obligaii legale pentru statele membre.
(3) Acordurile-cadru de cooperare menionate la alineatul (2)
instituie procese i acorduri ntre autoritile participante
privind schimbul de informaii necesare pentru cooperarea
pentru ndeplinirea parial sau integral a urmtoarelor
sarcini i pentru exercitarea unor sau tuturor competen elor
urmtoare n raport cu instituiile menionate la alineatul (2)
literele (a)-(d) sau cu grupurile care le includ:
(a) | elaborarea de planuri de rezoluie n conformitate cu
articolele 10-13 i cu cerine similare impuse de legisla ia
rilor tere relevante;
(b) | evaluarea posibilitilor de soluionare ale acestor
instituii i grupuri n conformitate cu articolele 15 i 16 i cu
cerine similare impuse de legislaia rilor tere relevante;
Cooperation with third-country authorities

1. This Article shall apply in respect of cooperation with
a third country unless and until an international
agreement as referred to in Article 93(1) enters into force
with the relevant third country. It shall also apply
following the entry into force of an international
agreement provided for in Article 93(1) with the relevant
third country to the extent that the subject matter of this
Article is not governed by that agreement.
2. EBA may conclude non-binding framework
cooperation arrangements with the following relevant
third-country authorities:
(a) | in cases where a Union subsidiary is established in
two or more Member States, the relevant authorities of
the third country where the parent undertaking or a
company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1(1)
are established;
(b) | in cases where a third-country institution operates
Union branches in two or more Member States, the
relevant authority of the third country where that
institution is established;
(c) | in cases where a parent undertaking or a company
referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1(1)
established in a Member State with a subsidiary
institution or significant branch in another Member State
also has one or more third-country subsidiary
institutions, the relevant authorities of the third countries
where those subsidiary institutions are established;
(d) | in cases where an institution with a subsidiary
institution or significant branch in another Member State
has established one or more branches in one or more
third countries, the relevant authorities of the third
countries where those branches are located.
The arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall not
make provision in relation to specific institutions. They
shall not impose legal obligations upon Member States.
3. The framework cooperation agreements referred to in
paragraph 2 shall establish processes and arrangements
between the participating authorities for sharing
information necessary for and cooperation in carrying
out some or all or the following tasks and exercising
some or all of the following powers in relation to
institutions referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2
or groups including such institutions:
(a) | the development of resolution plans in accordance
with Articles 10 to 13 and similar requirements under the
law of the relevant third countries;
(b) | the assessment of the resolvability of such
institutions and groups, in accordance with Articles 15
and 16 and similar requirements under the law of the
192
(c) | aplicarea competenelor de abordare sau nlturare a

obstacolelor din calea posibilitilor de soluionare n
conformitate cu articolele 17 i 18 i a oricror alte
competene similare prevzute de legislaia rilor ter e
relevante;
(d) | aplicarea msurilor de intervenie timpurie n
conformitate cu articolul 27 i a oricror alte competene
similare prevzute de legislaia rilor tere relevante;
(e) | aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie i exercitarea
competenelor de rezoluie, precum i a unor competen e
similare care pot fi exercitate de ctre autorit ile relevante
din ara ter.
(4) Autoritile competente sau, dup caz, autoritile de
rezoluie ncheie acorduri de cooperare neobligatorii n
conformitate cu acordul-cadru ncheiat de ABE cu
autoritile relevante din rile tere menionate la alineatul
(2).
Prezentul articol nu mpiedic statele membre sau autorit ile
competente ale acestora s ncheie acorduri bilaterale sau
multilaterale cu ri tere, n conformitate cu articolul 33 din
(5) Acordurile de cooperare ncheiate ntre autorit ile de
rezoluie ale statelor membre i cele ale rilor ter e n
conformitate cu prezentul articol pot s includ dispozi ii
privind urmtoarele aspecte:
(a) | schimbul de informaii necesar pentru pregtirea i
actualizarea planurilor de rezoluie;
(b) | consultarea i cooperarea pentru elaborarea planurilor
de rezoluie, inclusiv a principiilor care guverneaz
exercitarea competenelor menionate la articolele 94 i 96 i
a unor competene similare prevzute de legislaia rilor
tere relevante;
(c) | schimbul de informaii necesare pentru aplicarea
instrumentelor de rezoluie i exercitarea competenelor de
rezoluie i a unor competene similare prevzute de
legislaia rilor tere relevante;
(d) | avertizri timpurii adresate prilor la acordul de
cooperare sau consultarea acestora nainte de luarea oricrei
msuri importante n temeiul prezentei directive sau al
legislaiei rilor tere relevante n raport cu instituia sau
grupul care face obiectul acordului;
(e) | coordonarea comunicrilor publice n cazul lurii unor
msuri comune de rezoluie;
(f) | procedurile i acordurile privind schimbul de informa ii
i cooperarea n conformitate cu literele (a)-(e), inclusiv,
dup caz, prin instituirea i utilizarea unor grupuri de
gestionare a crizelor.
(6) Statele membre notific ABE n legtur cu toate
relevant third countries;

(c) | the application of powers to address or remove
impediments to resolvability pursuant to Articles 17 and
18 and any similar powers under the law of the relevant
third countries;
(d) | the application of early intervention measures
pursuant to Article 27 and similar powers under the law
of the relevant third countries;
(e) | the application of resolution tools and exercise of
resolution powers and similar powers exercisable by the
relevant third-country authorities.
4. Competent authorities or resolution authorities, where
appropriate, shall conclude non-binding cooperation
arrangements in line with EBA framework arrangement
with the relevant third-country authorities indicated in
paragraph 2.
This Article shall not prevent Member States or their
competent authorities from concluding bilateral or
multilateral arrangements with third countries, in
1093/2010.
5. Cooperation arrangements concluded between
resolution authorities of Member States and third
countries in accordance with this Article may include
provisions on the following matters:
(a) | the exchange of information necessary for the
preparation and maintenance of resolution plans;
(b) | consultation and cooperation in the development of
resolution plans, including principles for the exercise of
powers under Articles 94 and 96 and similar powers
under the law of the relevant third countries;
(c) | the exchange of information necessary for the
application of resolution tools and exercise of resolution
powers and similar powers under the law of the relevant
third countries;
(d) | early warning to or consultation of parties to the
cooperation arrangement before taking any significant
action under this Directive or relevant third-country law
affecting the institution or group to which the
arrangement relates;
(e) | the coordination of public communication in the
case of joint resolution actions;
(f) | procedures and arrangements for the exchange of
information and cooperation under points (a) to (e),
including, where appropriate, through the establishment
and operation of crisis management groups.
6. Member States shall notify EBA of any cooperation
193
acordurile de cooperare ncheiate de autorit ile de rezoluie

i autoritile competente n conformitate cu prezentul
articol.
Articolul 98
Confidenialitate
(1) Statele membre se asigur c autoritile de rezoluie,
autoritile competente i ministerele competente fac schimb
de informaii confideniale, care includ i planuri de
redresare, cu autoritile relevante din rile ter e numai dac
sunt ndeplinite urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | autoritile rilor tere respective fac obiectul unor
cerine i standarde n materie de secret profesional care sunt
considerate a fi, n opinia tuturor autorit ilor implicate, cel
puin echivalente cu cele impuse la articolul 84; | n cazul n
care schimbul de informaii se refer la date cu caracter
personal, procesarea i transmiterea acestor date ctre
autoritile rilor tere fac obiectul dreptului n vigoare la
nivelul Uniunii i la cel naional n ceea ce privete protec ia
datelor.
(b) | informaiile sunt necesare pentru ndeplinirea de ctre
autoritile relevante din rile tere a funciilor de rezolu ie
prevzute de dreptul intern al acestora care sunt comparabile
cu cele prevzute n prezenta directiv i, sub rezerva
dispoziiilor prezentului alineat litera (a), informa iile nu
sunt utilizate n niciun alt scop.
(2) n cazul n care informaiile confideniale provin de la un
alt stat membru, autoritile de rezoluie, autoritile
competente i ministerele competente nu divulg aceste
informaii autoritilor relevante din rile ter e dect dac
sunt ndeplinite urmtoarele condiii:
(a) | autoritatea relevant a statului membru din care provin
informaiile (denumit n continuare autoritatea de origine)
este de acord cu aceast divulgare;
(b) | informaiile sunt divulgate doar n scopurile permise de
ctre autoritatea de origine.
(3) n sensul prezentului articol, informaiile sunt considerate
confideniale dac ele fac obiectul cerin elor de
confidenialitate n temeiul dreptului Uniunii.
TITLUL VII
MECANISMELE DE FINANARE
Articolul 99
Sistemul european al mecanismelor de finanare
Se instituie sistemul european al mecanismelor de finan are,
care se compune din:
(a) | mecanismele de finanare naionale instituite n
(b) | mprumuturile dintre mecanismele de finanare
naionale prevzute la articolul 106;
(c) | mutualizarea mecanismelor de finanare na ionale n
cazul rezoluiei grupurilor conform prevederilor articolului
arrangements that resolution authorities and competent

authorities have concluded in accordance with this
Article.
Article 98
Exchange of confidential information
1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities,
competent authorities and competent ministries exchange
confidential information, including recovery plans, with
relevant third-country authorities only if the following
conditions are met:
(a) | those third-country authorities are subject to
requirements and standards of professional secrecy at
least considered to be equivalent, in the opinion of all the
authorities concerned, to those imposed by Article 84. |
In so far as the exchange of information relates to
personal data, the handling and transmission of such
personal data to third-country authorities shall be
governed by the applicable Union and national data
protection law.
(b) | the information is necessary for the performance by
the relevant third-country authorities of their resolution
functions under national law that are comparable to those
under this Directive and, subject to point (a) of this
paragraph, is not used for any other purposes.
2. Where confidential information originates in another
Member State, resolution authorities, competent
authorities and competent ministries shall not disclose
that information to relevant third-country authorities
unless the following conditions are met:
(a) | the relevant authority of the Member State where the
information originated (the originating authority) agrees
to that disclosure;
(b) | the information is disclosed only for the purposes
permitted by the originating authority.
3. For the purposes of this Article, information is deemed
to be confidential if it is subject to confidentiality
requirements under Union law.
TITLE VII
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
Article 99
European system of financing arrangements
A European system of financing arrangements shall be
established and shall consist of:
(a) | national financing arrangements established in
(b) | the borrowing between national financing
arrangements as specified in Article 106,
(c) | the mutualisation of national financing arrangements
in the case of a group resolution as referred to in Article
194
107.
Articolul 100
Cerina privind instituirea de mecanisme de finanare a
rezoluiei
(1) Statele membre instituie unul sau mai multe mecanisme
de finanare n scopul asigurrii aplicrii efective a
instrumentelor i competenelor de rezoluie de ctre
autoritatea de rezoluie.
Statele membre se asigur c utilizarea mecanismelor de
finanare poate fi declanat de ctre o autoritate public
desemnat sau de o autoritate nvestit cu competen e
administrative publice.
Mecanismele de finanare trebuie utilizate doar n
conformitate cu obiectivele rezoluiei i cu principiile
stipulate la articolele 31 i 34.
(2) Statele membre pot folosi aceea i structur
administrativ ca i mecanismele lor de finan are pentru
schema lor de garantare a depozitelor.
(3) Statele membre se asigur c mecanismele de finan are
dispun de resurse de finanare adecvate.
(4) n sensul alineatului (3), mecanismele de finan are
dispun n special de competena de a:
(a) | percepe contribuii ex ante menionate la articolul 103,
n vederea atingerii nivelului-int menionat la articolul 102;
(b) | percepe contribuii ex post extraordinare, men ionate la
articolul 104, n cazul n care contribuiile men ionate la
litera (a) sunt insuficiente; i
(c) | contracta mprumuturi i de a obine alte forme de
sprijin menionate la articolul 105.
(5) Cu excepia cazurilor permise n temeiul alineatului (6),
fiecare stat membru i instituie mecanismele de finanare
naionale printr-un fond a crui utilizare poate fi declan at
de autoritatea sa de rezoluie, n scopurile prevzute la
articolul 101 alineatul (1).
(6) Fr a aduce atingere alineatului (5) din prezentul articol,
un stat membru poate, n scopul de a-i ndeplini obligaiile
n temeiul prezentului articol alineatul (1), s i instituie
mecanisme de finanare naionale prin contribuii obligatorii
din partea instituiilor care sunt autorizate pe teritoriul su;
contribuiile respective au la baz criteriile men ionate la
articolul 103 alineatul (7) i nu sunt deinute printr-un fond
controlat de autoritatea sa de rezoluie, dac toate condi iile
urmtoare sunt ndeplinite:
(a) | suma perceput prin contribuii este cel pu in egal cu
suma care se impune a fi perceput n temeiul articolului
102;
(b) | autoritatea de rezoluie a statului membru are dreptul la
o sum egal cu valoarea respectivelor contribuii, pe care
statul membru o pune imediat la dispoziia autorit ii de
107.
Article 100
Requirement to establish resolution financing
arrangements
1. Member States shall establish one or more financing
arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective
application by the resolution authority of the resolution
tools and powers.
Member States shall ensure that the use of the financing
arrangements may be triggered by a designated public
authority or authority entrusted with public
administrative powers.
The financing arrangements shall be used only in
accordance with the resolution objectives and the
principles set out in Articles 31 and 34.
2. Member States may use the same administrative
structure as their financing arrangements for the purposes
of their deposit guarantee scheme.
3. Member States shall ensure that the financing
arrangements have adequate financial resources.
4. For the purpose of paragraph 3, financing
arrangements shall in particular have the power to:
(a) | raise ex-ante contributions as referred to in Article
103 with a view to reaching the target level specified in
Article 102;
(b) | raise ex-post extraordinary contributions as referred
to in Article 104 where the contributions specified in
point (a) are insufficient; and
(c) | contract borrowings and other forms of support as
referred to in Article 105.
5. Save where permitted under paragraph 6, each
Member State shall establish its national financing
arrangements through a fund, the use of which may be
triggered by its resolution authority for the purposes set
out in Article 101(1).
6. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, a Member
State may, for the purpose of fulfilling its obligations
under paragraph 1 of this Article, establish its national
financing arrangements through mandatory contributions
from institutions which are authorised in its territory,
which contributions are based on the criteria referred to
in Article 103(7) and which are not held through a fund
controlled by its resolution authority provided that all of
the following conditions are met:
(a) | the amount raised by contributions is at least equal
to the amount that is required to be raised under Article
102;
(b) | the Member States resolution authority is entitled to
an amount that is equal to the amount of such
contributions, which the Member State makes
195
rezoluie n cauz la solicitarea acesteia din urm, pentru a fi

utilizate exclusiv n scopurile prevzute la articolul 101;
(c) | statul membru notific Comisiei decizia sa de a se
prevala de competena discreionar de a- i structura
mecanismele de finanare n conformitate cu prezentul
alineat;
(d) | statul membru notific Comisiei cel puin anual suma
menionat la litera (b); i
(e) | cu excepia cazurilor prevzute n prezentul alineat,
mecanismele de finanare respect articolele 99-102,
articolul 103 alineatele (1)-(4) i (6) i articolele 104-109.
n sensul prezentului alineat, printre mijloacele financiare
disponibile de care se ine seama pentru a atinge nivelul- int
specificat la articolul 102 se pot numra contribuii
obligatorii ale oricrei scheme de contribuii obligatorii
instituite de un stat membru ntre 17 iunie 2010 i 2 iulie
2014 din partea instituiilor de pe teritoriul su, cu scopul de
a acoperi costurile aferente riscului sistemic, intrrii n
dificultate i rezoluiei instituiilor, cu condiia ca statul
membru s respecte prevederile din prezentul titlu.
Contribuiile la schemele de garantare a depozitelor nu sunt
luate n considerare n ceea ce prive te atingerea niveluluiint pentru mecanismele de finanare a rezoluiei prevzut la
articolul 102.
Articolul 101
Utilizarea mecanismelor de finanare a rezolu iei
(1) Mecanismele de finanare instituite conform articolului
100 pot fi utilizate de autoritatea de rezolu ie numai n
msura necesar pentru a asigura aplicarea efectiv a
instrumentelor de rezoluie, n urmtoarele scopuri:
(a) | pentru garantarea activelor sau pasivelor institu iei aflate
n rezoluie, a filialelor sale, a unei instituii-punte sau a unui
vehicul de gestionare a activelor;
(b) | pentru a acorda mprumuturi instituiei n aflate n
rezoluie, filialelor sale, unei instituii punte sau unui vehicul
de gestionare a activelor;
(c) | pentru a cumpra active ale instituiei aflate n rezolu ie;
(d) | pentru a furniza contribuii unei institu ii-punte i unui
vehicul de gestionare a activelor;
(e) | pentru a plti despgubiri acionarilor sau creditorilor n
(f) | pentru a furniza o contribuie instituiei aflate n
rezoluie n locul reducerii valorii contabile sau conversiei
datoriilor anumitor creditori, atunci cnd se aplic
instrumentul de recapitalizare intern, iar autoritatea de
rezoluie decide s exclud anumii creditori din domeniul de
aplicare al recapitalizrii interne, n conformitate cu articolul
44 alineatele (3)-(8);
immediately available to that resolution authority upon

the latters request, for use exclusively for the purposes
set out in Article 101;
(c) | the Member State notifies the Commission of its
decision to avail itself of the discretion to structure its
financing arrangements in accordance with this
paragraph;
(d) | the Member State notifies the Commission of the
amount referred to in point (b) at least annually; and
(e) | save as laid down in this paragraph, the financing
arrangements comply with Articles 99 to 102, Article
103(1) to (4) and (6) and Articles 104 to 109.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the available financial
means to be taken into account in order to reach the
target level specified in Article 102 may include
mandatory contributions from any scheme of mandatory
contributions established by a Member State at any date
between 17 June 2010 and 2 July 2014 from institutions
in its territory for the purposes of covering the costs
relating to systemic risk, failure and resolution of
institutions, provided that the Member State complies
with this Title. Contributions to deposit guarantee
schemes shall not count towards the target level for
resolution financing arrangements set out in Article 102.
Article 101
Use of the resolution financing arrangements
1. The financing arrangements established in accordance
with Article 100 may be used by the resolution authority
only to the extent necessary to ensure the effective
application of the resolution tools, for the following
purposes:
(a) | to guarantee the assets or the liabilities of the
institution under resolution, its subsidiaries, a bridge
institution or an asset management vehicle;
(b) | to make loans to the institution under resolution, its
subsidiaries, a bridge institution or an asset management
vehicle;
(c) | to purchase assets of the institution under resolution;
(d) | to make contributions to a bridge institution and an
asset management vehicle;
(e) | to pay compensation to shareholders or creditors in
(f) | to make a contribution to the institution under
resolution in lieu of the write down or conversion of
liabilities of certain creditors, when the bail-in tool is
applied and the resolution authority decides to exclude
certain creditors from the scope of bail-in in accordance
with Article 44(3) to (8);
196
(g) | pentru a acorda mprumuturi altor mecanisme de

finanare, n mod voluntar, n conformitate cu articolul 106;
(h) | pentru orice fel de combinaie a msurilor men ionate la
literele (a)-(g).
Mecanismele de finanare pot fi utilizate pentru luarea
msurilor menionate la primul paragraf i n ceea ce prive te
cumprtorul, n cadrul instrumentului de vnzare a
activitii.
(2) Mecanismul de finanare a rezoluiei nu se utilizeaz n
mod direct pentru a absorbi pierderile unei instituii sau ale
unei entiti menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera (b),
(c) sau (d) sau pentru a recapitaliza o astfel de institu ie sau
de entitate. n cazul n care utilizarea mecanismului de
finanare a rezoluiei n scopurile prevzute la alineatul (1)
din prezentul articol are drept rezultat indirect transferarea
ctre acest mecanism de finanare a unei pr i din pierderile
unei instituii sau ale unei entiti menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d), se aplic principiile care
reglementeaz utilizarea mecanismului de finanare a
rezoluiei prevzute la articolul 44.
Articolul 102
Nivelul-int
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, pn la 31 decembrie
2024, mijloacele financiare disponibile ale propriilor
mecanisme de finanare se ridic la cel puin 1 % din suma
depozitelor acoperite ale tuturor instituiilor autorizate pe
propriul teritoriu. Statele membre pot stabili niveluri-int
superioare acestei valori.
(2) Pe parcursul perioadei iniiale prevzute la alineatul (1),
contribuiile la mecanismele de finanare percepute n
conformitate cu articolul 103 trebuie repartizate ct mai
uniform posibil n timp, pn la atingerea nivelului- int
prevzut, dar inndu-se seama n mod corespunztor de
etapa ciclului de activitate i de impactul pe care
contribuiile prociclice l pot avea asupra poziiei financiare
a instituiilor care contribuie.
Statele membre pot prelungi perioada de timp iniial cu
maximum patru ani dac mecanismele de finan are fac pl i
cumulate care depesc 0,5 % din depozitele acoperite ale
tuturor instituiilor autorizate pe teritoriul lor, garantate n
temeiul Directivei 2014/49/UE.
(3) n cazul n care, dup scurgerea perioadei de timp ini iale
menionate la alineatul (1), mijloacele financiare disponibile
scad sub nivelul-int menionat la alineatul respectiv, se
reiau contribuiile obinuite n conformitate cu articolul 103,
pn cnd este atins nivelul-int. Dup atingerea niveluluiint pentru prima dat i dac mijloacele financiare
disponibile scad ulterior la mai puin de dou treimi din
nivelul-int, contribuiile respective se stabilesc la un nivel
care s permit atingerea nivelului- int n termen de ase
(g) | to lend to other financing arrangements on a

voluntary basis in accordance with Article 106;
(h) | to take any combination of the actions referred to in
points (a) to (g).
The financing arrangements may be used to take the
actions referred to in the first subparagraph also with
respect to the purchaser in the context of the sale of
business tool.
2. The resolution financing arrangement shall not be used
directly to absorb the losses of an institution or an entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) or to
recapitalise such an institution or an entity. In the event
that the use of the resolution financing arrangement for
the purposes in paragraph 1 of this Article indirectly
results in part of the losses of an institution or an entity
referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) being
passed on to the resolution financing arrangement, the
principles governing the use of the resolution financing
arrangement set out in Article 44 shall apply.
Article 102
Target level
1. Member States shall ensure that, by 31 December
2024, the available financial means of their financing
arrangements reach at least 1 % of the amount of covered
deposits of all the institutions authorised in their territory.
Member States may set target levels in excess of that
amount.
2. During the initial period of time referred to in
paragraph 1, contributions to the financing arrangements
raised in accordance with Article 103 shall be spread out
in time as evenly as possible until the target level is
reached, but with due account of the phase of the
business cycle and the impact pro-cyclical contributions
may have on the financial position of contributing
institutions.
Member States may extend the initial period of time for a
maximum of four years if the financing arrangements
have made cumulative disbursements in excess of 0,5 %
of covered deposits of all the institutions authorised in
their territory which are guaranteed under Directive
2014/49/EU.
3. If, after the initial period of time referred to in
paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish
below the target level specified in that paragraph, the
regular contributions raised in accordance with Article
103 shall resume until the target level is reached. After
the target level has been reached for the first time and
where the available financial means have subsequently
been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level,
those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for
197
ani.
Contribuia obinuit ine seama n mod corespunztor de
etapa unui ciclu de activitate i de impactul pe care
contribuiile prociclice l pot avea atunci cnd se stabilesc
contribuiile anuale n contextul prezentului alineat.
(4) ABE nainteaz Comisiei, pn n 31 octombrie 2016, un
raport care cuprinde recomandri cu privire la punctul de
referin adecvat pentru stabilirea nivelului- int pentru
mecanismele de finanare a rezoluiei i, mai ales, indic
dac totalul pasivelor constituie o baz mai potrivit dect
depozitele acoperite.
(5) Pe baza rezultatelor raportului menionat la alineatul (4),
pn la 31 decembrie 2016, Comisia nainteaz, dup caz,
Parlamentului European i Consiliului o propunere
legislativ privind baza pentru nivelul-int pentru
mecanismele de finanare a rezoluiei.
Articolul 103
Contribuii ex ante
(1) Pentru a atinge nivelul-int menionat la articolul 102,
statele membre se asigur c respectivele contribuii sunt
percepute cel puin anual de la instituiile autorizate pe
teritoriul lor, inclusiv de la sucursalele din Uniune.
(2) Contribuia fiecrei instituii se determin ca raport ntre
valoarea pasivelor sale (cu excepia fondurilor proprii) minus
depozitele acoperite, i valoarea pasivelor agregate (cu
excepia fondurilor proprii), minus depozitele acoperite, ale
tuturor instituiilor autorizate pe teritoriul statului membru.
Aceste contribuii se ajusteaz proporional cu profilul de
risc al instituiilor conform criteriilor adoptate n temeiul
alineatului (7) din prezentul articol.
(3) Mijloacele financiare disponibile pentru a fi luate n
considerare n scopul atingerii nivelului-int menionat la
articolul 102 pot include angajamente de plat irevocabile
garantate n ntregime prin active cu risc sczut negrevate de
drepturi ale unor teri, puse la dispoziia autoritilor de
rezoluie i destinate exclusiv utilizrii n scopurile
menionate la articolul 101 alineatul (1). Partea
angajamentelor de plat irevocabile nu trebuie s dep easc
30 % din suma total a contribuiilor percepute n
conformitate cu prezentul articol.
(4) Statele membre se asigur c obligaia de plat a
contribuiilor prevzute la prezentul articol este executorie n
temeiul dreptului intern, iar contribuiile datorate sunt pltite
integral.
Statele membre stabilesc obligaii adecvate n materie de
reglementare contabilizare, raportare i alte obliga ii pentru a
se asigura de plata integral a contribuiilor datorate. Statele
membre asigur msuri viznd verificarea n mod
reaching the target level within six years.

The regular contribution shall take due account of the
phase of the business cycle, and the impact procyclical
contributions may have when setting annual
contributions in the context of this paragraph.
4. EBA shall submit a report to the Commission by 31
October 2016 with recommendations on the appropriate
reference point for setting the target level for resolution
financing arrangements, and in particular whether total
liabilities constitute a more appropriate basis than
covered deposits.
5. Based on the results of the report referred to in
paragraph 4, the Commission shall, if appropriate,
submit, by 31 December 2016, to the European
Parliament and to the Council a legislative proposal on
the basis for the target level for resolution financing
arrangements.
Article 103
Ex-ante contributions
1. In order to reach the target level specified in Article
102, Member States shall ensure that contributions are
raised at least annually from the institutions authorised in
their territory including Union branches.
2. The contribution of each institution shall be pro rata to
the amount of its liabilities (excluding own funds) less
covered deposits, with respect to the aggregate liabilities
(excluding own funds) less covered deposits of all the
institutions authorised in the territory of the Member
State.
Those contributions shall be adjusted in proportion to the
risk profile of institutions, in accordance with the criteria
adopted under paragraph 7.
3. The available financial means to be taken into account
in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102
may include irrevocable payment commitments which
are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets
unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free
disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the
resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article
101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments
shall not exceed 30 % of the total amount of
contributions raised in accordance with this Article.
4. Member States shall ensure that the obligation to pay
the contributions specified in this Article is enforceable
under national law, and that due contributions are fully
paid.
Member States shall set up appropriate regulatory,
accounting, reporting and other obligations to ensure that
due contributions are fully paid. Member States shall
ensure measures for the proper verification of whether
198
corespunztor a achitrii corecte a contribu iilor. Statele

membre asigur msuri viznd prevenirea evaziunii, fraudei
si abuzului.
(5) Sumele percepute n temeiul prezentului articol sunt
utilizate exclusiv n scopurile menionate la articolul 101
alineatul (1).
(6) Sub rezerva articolelor 37, 38, 40, 41 i 42, sumele
primite din partea instituiei aflate n rezolu ie sau a
instituiei-punte, dobnzile i alte venituri generate de
investiii, precum i toate celelalte venituri pot fi afectate
mecanismelor de finanare.
delegate n conformitate cu articolul 115, pentru a specifica
noiunea de ajustare a contribuiilor proporional cu profilul
de risc al instituiilor, menionat la alineatul (2) de la
prezentul articol, innd seama de toate elementele
urmtoare:
(a) | expunerea la risc a instituiei, inclusiv importan a
activitilor sale de tranzacionare, expunerile sale
extrabilaniere i gradul su de ndatorare;
(b) | stabilitatea i diversitatea surselor de finan are ale
societii i ale activelor foarte lichide, negrevate;
(c) | situaia financiar a instituiei;
(d) | probabilitatea ca instituia s fie supus unei proceduri
de rezoluie;
(e) | msura n care instituia a beneficiat n trecut de sprijin
financiar public extraordinar;
(f) | complexitatea structurii instituiei i posibilit ile de
soluionare ale acesteia;
(g) | importana instituiei pentru stabilitatea sistemului
financiar sau a economiei unuia sau mai multor state
membre sau a Uniunii;
(h) | faptul c instituia face parte dintr-un SIP.
delegate n conformitate cu articolul 115, pentru a preciza:
(a) | obligaiile n materie de nregistrare, contabilitate i
raportare, precum i celelalte obligaii menionate la
alineatul (4) viznd asigurarea achitrii efective a
contribuiilor;
(b) | msurile menionate la alineatul (4) viznd asigurarea
verificrii n mod corespunztor a achitrii corecte a
contribuiilor.
Articolul 104
Contribuii ex post extraordinare
(1) n cazul n care mijloacele financiare disponibile nu sunt
suficiente pentru a acoperi pierderile, costurile sau alte
cheltuieli ocazionate de utilizarea mecanismelor de finan are,
statele membre se asigur c sunt percepute contribu ii ex
post extraordinare de la instituiile autorizate pe teritoriul lor,
the contributions have been paid correctly. Member

States shall ensure measures to prevent evasion,
avoidance and abuse.
5. The amounts raised in accordance with this Article
shall only be used for the purposes specified in Article
101(1).
6. Subject to Articles 37, 38, 40, 41 and 42, the amounts
received from the institution under resolution or the
bridge institution, the interest and other earnings on
investments and any other earnings may benefit the
financing arrangements.
specify the notion of adjusting contributions in
proportion to the risk profile of institutions as referred to
in paragraph 2 of this Article, taking into account all of
the following:
(a) | the risk exposure of the institution, including the
importance of its trading activities, its off-balance sheet
exposures and its degree of leverage;
(b) | the stability and variety of the companys sources of
funding and unencumbered highly liquid assets;
(c) | the financial condition of the institution;
(d) | the probability that the institution enters into
resolution;
(e) | the extent to which the institution has previously
benefited from extraordinary public financial support;
(f) | the complexity of the structure of the institution and
its resolvability;
(g) | the importance of the institution to the stability of
the financial system or economy of one or more Member
States or of the Union;
(h) | the fact that the institution is part of an IPS.
specify:
(a) | the registration, accounting, reporting obligations
and other obligations referred to in paragraph 4 intended
to ensure that the contributions are in fact paid;
(b) | the measures referred to in paragraph 4 to ensure
proper verification of whether the contributions have
been paid correctly.
Article 104
Extraordinary ex-post contributions
1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient
to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by
the use of the financing arrangements, Member States
shall ensure that extraordinary ex-post contributions are
raised from the institutions authorised in their territory, in
199
pentru acoperirea sumelor suplimentare. Aceste contribu ii

ex post extraordinare sunt repartizate instituiilor n
conformitate cu normele prevzute la articolul 103 alineatul
(2).
Contribuiile ex post extraordinare nu depesc de trei ori
suma anual a contribuiilor stabilite n conformitate cu
articolul 103.
(2) Contribuiilor percepute n temeiul prezentului articol li
se aplic articolul 103 alineatele (4)-(8).
(3) Autoritatea de rezoluie poate amna, integral sau par ial,
obligaia unei instituii de a plti contribuiile ex post
extraordinare la mecanismul de finanare a rezolu iei n cazul
n care contribuiile ar periclita lichiditatea sau solvabilitatea
instituiei. O astfel de amnare nu poate fi acordat pentru o
perioad mai mare de ase luni, dar poate fi rennoit la
cererea instituiei. Contribuiile amnate n temeiul
prezentului paragraf sunt achitate atunci cnd plata nu mai
pericliteaz lichiditatea i solvabilitatea institu iei.
(4) Comisia este mputernicit s adopte acte delegate n
conformitate cu articolul 115 pentru a preciza circumstan ele
i condiiile n care contribuia unei instituii poate fi
amnat n temeiul alineatul (3) din prezentul articol.
Articolul 105
Mijloace de finanare alternative
Statele membre se asigur c mecanismele de finan are care
intr sub jurisdicia lor sunt abilitate s contracteze
mprumuturi sau alte forme de sprijin de la institu ii,
instituii financiare sau alte pri tere, n cazurile n care
sumele percepute n conformitate cu articolul 103 nu sunt
suficiente pentru a acoperi pierderile, costurile sau celelalte
cheltuieli ocazionate de utilizarea mecanismelor de finan are,
iar contribuiile ex post extraordinare prevzute la articolul
104 nu sunt imediat accesibile sau suficiente.
Articolul 106
mprumuturi ntre mecanismele de finanare
care intr sub jurisdicia lor pot s solicite mprumuturi de la
toate celelalte mecanisme de finanare de pe teritoriul
Uniunii, n cazurile n care:
(a) | sumele percepute n conformitate cu articolul 103 nu
sunt suficiente pentru a acoperi pierderile, costurile sau
celelalte cheltuieli ocazionate de utilizarea mecanismelor de
finanare;
(b) | contribuiile ex post extraordinare prevzute la articolul
104 nu sunt imediat accesibile; i
(c) | mecanismele de finanare alternative prevzute la
articolul 105 nu sunt imediat accesibile n condi ii
order to cover the additional amounts. Those

extraordinary ex-post contributions shall be allocated
between institutions in accordance with the rules laid
down in Article 103(2).
Extraordinary ex-post contributions shall not exceed
three times the annual amount of contributions
determined in accordance with Article 103.
2. Article 103(4) to (8) shall be applicable to the
contributions raised under this Article.
3. The resolution authority may defer, in whole or in part,
an institutions payment of extraordinary ex-post
contributions to the resolution financing arrangement if
the payment of those contributions would jeopardise the
liquidity or solvency of the institution. Such a deferral
shall not be granted for a period of longer than six
months but may be renewed upon the request of the
institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this
paragraph shall be paid when such a payment no longer
jeopardises the institutions liquidity or solvency.
delegated acts in accordance with Article 115 to specify
the circumstances and conditions under which the
payment of contributions by an institution may be
deferred pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.
Article 105
Alternative funding means
Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements
under their jurisdiction are enabled to contract
borrowings or other forms of support from institutions,
financial institutions or other third parties in the event
that the amounts raised in accordance with Article 103
are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other
expenses incurred by the use of the financing
arrangements,
and
the
extraordinary
ex-post
contributions provided for in Article 104 are not
immediately accessible or sufficient.
Article 106
Borrowing between financing arrangements
1. Member States shall ensure that financing
arrangements under their jurisdiction may make a request
to borrow from all other financing arrangements within
the Union, in the event that:
(a) | the amounts raised under Article 103 are not
sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses
incurred by the use of the financing arrangements;
(b) | the extraordinary ex-post contributions provided for
in Article 104 are not immediately accessible; and
(c) | the alternative funding means provided for in Article
105 are not immediately accessible on reasonable terms.
200
rezonabile.
care intr sub jurisdicia lor sunt abilitate s acorde
mprumuturi altor mecanisme de finanare de pe teritoriul
Uniunii n situaiile menionate la alineatul (1).
(3) n urma unei solicitri efectuate n temeiul alineatului
(1), fiecare dintre celelalte mecanisme de finan are de pe
teritoriul Uniunii decide dac s acorde sau nu un mprumut
mecanismului de finanare solicitant. Statele membre pot
solicita ca aceast decizie s fie luat dup consultarea sau
cu acordul ministerului competent sau al guvernului. Decizia
este luat n regim de urgen.
(4) Rata dobnzii, perioada de rambursare i ali termeni i
alte condiii ale mprumuturilor se stabilesc de comun acord
de mecanismul de finanare care prime te mprumutul i
celelalte mecanisme de finanare care au decis s participe.
mprumuturile fiecrui mecanism de finanare participant
trebuie s aib aceeai rat a dobnzii, aceea i perioad de
rambursare, aceiai termeni i acelea i condi ii, cu excep ia
cazului n care mecanismele de finanare participante convin,
n unanimitate, s procedeze altfel.
(5) Suma acordat ca mprumut de fiecare acoperite de
finanare a rezoluiei participant este determinat pe baza
raportului dintre valoarea depozitelor acoperite din statul
membru al respectivului mecanism de finanare a rezolu iei,
i suma agregat a depozitelor acoperite din statele membre
ale mecanismelor de finanare a rezoluiei participante.
Aceste rate de contribuie pot fi modificate prin acordul
tuturor mecanismelor de finanare participante.
(6) Sumele de rambursat datorate, n temeiul prezentului
articol, unui mecanism de finanare a rezolu iei dintr-un alt
stat membru se trateaz ca active ale mecanismului de
finanare a rezoluiei care a acordat mprumutul i pot fi
luate n considerare la atingerea nivelului- int aferent
mecanismului de finanare respectiv.
Articolul 107
Mutualizarea mecanismelor de finanare na ionale n cazul
rezoluiei grupurilor
(1) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazul rezoluiei
grupurilor n conformitate cu articolul 91 sau cu articolul 92,
mecanismul de finanare naional al fiecrei instituii care
face parte din grup contribuie la finanarea rezoluie grupului
n conformitate cu prezentul articol.
(2) n sensul alineatului (1), autoritatea de rezolu ie a
grupului, n urma consultrii cu autoritile de rezolu ie ale
instituiilor care fac parte din grup, propune, dac este
necesar nainte de luarea oricror msuri de rezolu ie, un
plan de finanare ca element component al schemei de
rezoluie a grupului prevzute la articolele 91 i 92.
Planul de finanare se stabilete n conformitate cu procedura
decizional menionat la articolele 91 i 92.
2. Member States shall ensure that financing

arrangements under their jurisdiction have the power to
lend to other financing arrangements within the Union in
the circumstances specified in paragraph 1.
3. Following a request under paragraph 1, each of the
other financing arrangements in the Union shall decide
whether to lend to the financing arrangement which has
made the request. Member States may require that that
decision is taken after consulting, or with the consent of,
the competent ministry or the government. The decision
shall be taken with due urgency.
4. The rate of interest, repayment period and other terms
and conditions of the loans shall be agreed between the
borrowing financing arrangement and the other financing
arrangements which have decided to participate. The
loan of every participating financing arrangement shall
have the same interest rate, repayment period and other
terms and conditions, unless all participating financing
arrangements agree otherwise.
5. The amount lent by each participating resolution
financing arrangement shall be pro rata to the amount of
covered deposits in the Member State of that resolution
financing arrangement, with respect to the aggregate of
covered deposits in the Member States of participating
resolution financing arrangements. Those rates of
contribution may vary upon agreement of all
participating financing arrangements.
6. An outstanding loan to a resolution financing
arrangement of another Member State under this Article
shall be treated as an asset of the resolution financing
arrangement which provided the loan and may be
counted towards that financing arrangements target
level.
Article 107
Mutualisation of national financing arrangements in the
case of a group resolution
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the case of a group
resolution as referred to in Article 91 or Article 92, the
national financing arrangement of each institution that is
part of a group contributes to the financing of the group
resolution in accordance with this Article.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the group-level
resolution authority, after consulting the resolution
authorities of the institutions that are part of the group,
shall propose, if necessary before taking any resolution
action, a financing plan as part of the group resolution
scheme provided for in Articles 91 and 92.
The financing plan shall be agreed in accordance with
the decision-making procedure referred to in Articles 91
201
(3) Planul de finanare include:

(a) | o evaluare n conformitate cu articolul 36 n ceea ce
privete entitile din grup afectate;
(b) | pierderile care urmeaz s fie recunoscute de fiecare
entitate din grup afectat la momentul punerii n aplicare a
instrumentelor de rezoluie;
(c) | pentru fiecare entitate din grup afectat, pierderile care
ar urma s fie suferite de fiecare categorie de acionari i de
creditori;
(d) | eventuala contribuie pe care ar trebui s o aduc
schemele de garantare a depozitelor n conformitate cu
articolul 109 alineatul (1);
(e) | contribuia total prin mecanismele de finan are a
rezoluiei i scopul i forma contribuiei;
(f) | baza pentru calcularea sumei cu care fiecare dintre
mecanismele naionale de finanare ale statelor membre n
care sunt situate entitile afectate din grup trebuie s
contribuie la finanarea rezoluiei grupului pentru
constituirea contribuiei totale menionate la litera (e);
(g) | suma cu care mecanismele naionale de finan are ale
fiecrei entiti din grup afectat trebuie s contribuie la
finanarea rezoluiei grupului, precum i forma respectivelor
contribuii;
(h) | valoarea mprumuturilor pe care mecanismele de
finanare ale statelor membre n care sunt situate entit ile
din grup afectate le vor contracta de la institu ii, instituii
financiare i alte tere pri, n temeiul articolului 105;
(i) | un calendar al utilizrii mecanismelor de finan are ale
statelor membre n care sunt situate entit ile din grup
afectate, calendar care ar trebui s poat fi extins dac este
necesar.
(4) Baza pentru repartizarea contribuiei men ionate la
alineatul (3) litera (e) este conform cu alineatul (5) de la
prezentul articol i cu principiile specificate n planul de
rezoluie a grupului, n conformitate cu articolul 12 alineatul
(3) litera (f), cu excepia cazului n care, n planul de
finanare, se convine s se procedeze altfel.
(5) Dac nu se convine altfel n planul de finan are, baza
pentru calcularea contribuiei fiecrui mecanism na ional de
finanare ia n considerare, cu precdere, urmtoarele:
(a) | proporia din activele ponderate n func ie de risc ale
grupului care este deinut n instituiile i de entit ile
menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (b), (c) i (d)
stabilite n statul membru al mecanismului respectiv de
finanare a rezoluiei;
(b) | proporia din activele grupului care este deinut n
and 92.
3. The financing plan shall include:
(a) | a valuation in accordance with Article 36 in respect
of the affected group entities;
(b) | the losses to be recognised by each affected group
entity at the moment the resolution tools are exercised;
(c) | for each affected group entity, the losses that would
be suffered by each class of shareholders and creditors;
(d) | any contribution that deposit guarantee schemes
would be required to make in accordance with Article
109(1);
(e) | the total contribution by resolution financing
arrangements and the purpose and form of the
contribution;
(f) | the basis for calculating the amount that each of the
national financing arrangements of the Member States
where affected group entities are located is required to
contribute to the financing of the group resolution in
order to build up the total contribution referred to in
point (e);
(g) | the amount that the national financing arrangement
of each affected group entity is required to contribute to
the financing of the group resolution and the form of
those contributions;
(h) | the amount of borrowing that the financing
arrangements of the Member States where the affected
group entities are located, will contract from institutions,
financial institutions and other third parties under Article
105;
(i) | a timeframe for the use of the financing
arrangements of the Member States where the affected
group entities are located, which should be capable of
being extended where appropriate.
4. The basis for apportioning the contribution referred to
in point (e) of paragraph 3 shall be consistent with
paragraph 5 of this Article and with the principles set out
in the group resolution plan in accordance with point (f)
of Article 12(3), unless otherwise agreed in the financing
plan.
5. Unless agreed otherwise in the financing plan, the
basis for calculating the contribution of each national
financing arrangement shall in particular have regard to:
(a) | the proportion of the groups risk-weighted assets
held at institutions and entities referred to in points (b),
(c) and (d) of Article 1(1) established in the Member
State of that resolution financing arrangement;
(b) | the proportion of the groups assets held at
202
instituiile i de entitile menionate la articolul 1 alineatul

(1) literele (b), (c) i (d) stabilite n statul membru al
mecanismului respectiv de finanare a rezoluiei;
(c) | proporia din totalul pierderilor care au fcut necesar
rezoluia grupului care are drept surs entit i din grup aflate
sub supravegherea autoritilor competente din statul
membru al mecanismului respectiv de finanare a rezoluiei;
i
(d) | proporia din resursele mecanismelor de finan are a
grupului care este preconizat, conform planului de
finanare, s fie utilizat n beneficiul direct al entit ilor din
grup stabilite n statul membru al mecanismului respectiv de
finanare a rezoluiei.
(6) Statele membre stabilesc n avans norme i proceduri
prin care s se asigure c fiecare mecanism de finan are
naional poate s-i aduc contribuia la finanarea rezoluiei
grupului imediat, fr a aduce atingere alineatului (2).
(7) n sensul prezentului articol, statele membre se asigur c
mecanismele de finanare a grupurilor sunt abilitate, n
condiiile prevzute la articolul 105, s contracteze
mprumuturi sau alte forme de sprijin de la institu ii,
instituii financiare sau alte pri tere.
naionale care intr sub jurisdicia lor pot garanta orice fel de
mprumut contractat de mecanismele de finanare a grupului
n conformitate cu alineatul (7).
(9) Statele membre se asigur c orice venituri sau profituri
care rezult din utilizarea mecanismelor de finanare a
grupului sunt alocate mecanismelor de finanare naionale n
conformitate cu contribuiile lor la finanarea rezoluiei astfel
cum se prevede la alineatul (2).
Articolul 108
Rangul acordat depozitelor n ierarhia n materie de
insolven
Statele membre se asigur c n dreptul intern care
reglementeaz procedurile obinuite de insolven:
(a) | urmtoarele depozite au acela i rang de prioritate care
este superior rangului acordat creanelor deinute de
creditorii obinuii neprivilegiai i negarantai: | (i) | acea
parte din depozitele eligibile ale persoanelor fizice, ale
microntreprinderilor i ale ntreprinderilor mici i mijlocii
care depete nivelul de acoperire prevzut la articolul 6 din
Directiva 2014/49/UE; | (ii) | depozitele persoanelor fizice,
ale microntreprinderilor i ale ntreprinderilor mici i
mijlocii, care ar fi depozite eligibile dac nu ar fi fost fcute
prin intermediul sucursalelor situate n afara Uniunii ale unor
instituii stabilite n Uniune;
(b) | urmtoarele depozite au acelai rang de prioritate care
institutions and entities referred to in points (b), (c) and

(d) of Article 1(1) established in the Member State of
that resolution financing arrangement;
(c) | the proportion of the losses, which have given rise to
the need for group resolution, which originated in group
entities under the supervision of competent authorities in
the Member State of that resolution financing
arrangement; and
(d) | the proportion of the resources of the group
financing arrangements which, under the financing plan,
are expected to be used to benefit group entities
established in the Member State of that resolution
financing arrangement directly.
6. Member States shall establish rules and procedures in
advance to ensure that each national financing
arrangement can effect its contribution to the financing
of group resolution immediately without prejudice to
paragraph 2.
7. For the purpose of this Article, Member States shall
ensure that group financing arrangements are allowed,
under the conditions laid down in Article 105, to contract
borrowings or other forms of support, from institutions,
financial institutions or other third parties.
8. Member States shall ensure that national financing
arrangements under their jurisdiction may guarantee any
borrowing contracted by the group financing
arrangements in accordance with paragraph 7.
9. Member States shall ensure that any proceeds or
benefits that arise from the use of the group financing
arrangements are allocated to national financing
arrangements in accordance with their contributions to
the financing of the resolution as established in
paragraph 2.
Article 108
Ranking of deposits in insolvency hierarchy
Member States shall ensure that in national law
governing normal insolvency proceedings:
(a) | the following have the same priority ranking which
is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of
ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors: | (i) | that
part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the
coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive
2014/49/EU; | (ii) | deposits that would be eligible
deposits from natural persons, micro, small and medium
sized enterprises were they not made through branches
located outside the Union of institutions established
within the Union.
(b) | the following have the same priority ranking which
203
este superior rangului acordat n temeiul literei (a): | (i) |

depozitele acoperite; | (ii) | schemele de garantare a
depozitelor subrogate n drepturile i obligaiile deponenilor
aflai n insolven care beneficiaz de acoperire.
Articolul 109
Utilizarea schemelor de garantare a depozitelor n contextul
rezoluiei
(1) Atunci cnd autoritile de rezoluie iau o msur de
rezoluie i dac aceast msur garanteaz faptul c
deponenii continu s aib acces la propriile depozite,
statele membre se asigur c schema de garantare a
depozitelor la care instituia este afiliat este responsabil:
(a) | n cazul aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare
intern, cuantumul cu care s-ar fi redus depozitele acoperite
pentru a absorbi pierderile din instituie n temeiul articolului
46 alineatul (1) litera (a), dac depozitele acoperite ar fi fost
incluse n domeniul de aplicare al recapitalizrii interne, iar
valoarea lor ar fi fost redus n aceeai msur ca creditorii
care beneficiaz de acelai nivel de prioritate n temeiul
dreptului intern care reglementeaz procedurile obi nuite de
insolven; sau
(b) | n cazul aplicrii unuia sau mai multor instrumente de
rezoluie, altele dect instrumentul de recapitalizare intern,
cuantumul pierderilor pe care deponenii care beneficiaz de
acoperire le-ar fi suferit dac ace tia ar fi nregistrat pierderi
proporionale cu pierderile nregistrate de creditorii care
beneficiaz de acelai nivel de prioritate n temeiul dreptului
intern care reglementeaz procedurile obi nuite de
insolven.
Indiferent de situaie, suma ce trebuie acoperit de schema
de garantare a depozitelor nu poate dep i valoarea
pierderilor pe care acesta ar fi trebuit s le suporte n cazul n
care instituia ar fi fost lichidat prin intermediul procedurii
obinuite de insolven.
n cazul aplicrii instrumentului de recapitalizare intern,
schema de garantare a depozitelor nu are obliga ia de a
contribui la costurile de majorare a capitalului institu iei sau
cele de constituire a capitalului instituiei-punte n temeiul
articolului 46 alineatul (1) litera (b).
Dac se stabilete, printr-o evaluare n temeiul articolului 74,
c schema de garantare a depozitelor a realizat o contribu ie
la rezoluie mai mare dect pierderile nete pe care ar fi fost
nevoit s le suporte dac instituia ar fi fost lichidat n
cadrul unei proceduri obinuite de insolven, schema de
garantare a depozitelor este ndreptit s beneficieze de
plata diferenei din mecanismul de finanare a rezolu iei, n
(2) Statele membre se asigur c stabilirea sumei acoperite
de schema de garantare a depozitelor n conformitate cu
alineatul (1) din prezentul articol respect condi iile
is higher than the ranking provided for under point (a): |

(i) | covered deposits; | (ii) | deposit guarantee schemes
subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered
depositors in insolvency.
Article 109
Use of deposit guarantee schemes in the context of
resolution
1. Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution
authorities take resolution action, and provided that that
action ensures that depositors continue to have access to
their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the
institution is affiliated is liable for:
(a) | when the bail-in tool is applied, the amount by
which covered deposits would have been written down in
order to absorb the losses in the institution pursuant to
point (a) of Article 46(1), had covered deposits been
included within the scope of bail-in and been written
down to the same extent as creditors with the same level
of priority under the national law governing normal
insolvency proceedings; or
(b) | when one or more resolution tools other than the
bail-in tool is applied, the amount of losses that covered
depositors would have suffered, had covered depositors
suffered losses in proportion to the losses suffered by
creditors with the same level of priority under the
national law governing normal insolvency proceedings.
In all cases, the liability of the deposit guarantee scheme

shall not be greater than the amount of losses that it
would have had to bear had the institution been wound
up under normal insolvency proceedings.
When the bail-in tool is applied, the deposit guarantee
scheme shall not be required to make any contribution
towards the costs of recapitalising the institution or
bridge institution pursuant to point (b) of Article 46(1).
Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74
that the deposit guarantee schemes contribution to
resolution was greater than the net losses it would have
incurred had the institution been wound up under normal
insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme
shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the
resolution financing arrangement in accordance with
Article 75.
2. Member States shall ensure that the determination of
the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme is
liable in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article
complies with the conditions referred to in Article 36.
204
(3) Contribuia schemelor de garantare a depozitelor n

sensul alineatului (1) trebuie vrsat n numerar.
(4) Atunci cnd depozitele eligibile la o instituie aflat n
rezoluie sunt transferate unei alte entit i prin instrumentul
de vnzare a activitii sau prin instrumentul instituieipunte, deponenii nu au nicio crean, n temeiul Directivei
2014/49/UE, fa de schema de garantare a depozitelor n
legtur cu orice parte a depozitelor acestora care nu este
transferat de la instituia aflat n rezolu ie, cu condi ia ca
valoarea fondurilor transferate s fie cel puin egal cu
nivelul de acoperire agregat prevzut la articolul 6 din
Directiva 2014/49/UE.
(5) Fr a aduce atingere alineatelor (1)-(4), n cazul n care
mijloacele financiare disponibile ale unei scheme de
garantare a depozitelor sunt utilizate n conformitate cu
dispoziiile alineatelor respective i sunt reduse ulterior la
mai puin de dou treimi din nivelul-int al schemei de
garantare a depozitelor, contribuia periodic la schema de
garantare a depozitelor se stabilete la un nivel care s
permit atingerea nivelului-int n termen de ase ani.
n toate cazurile, rspunderea unei scheme de garantare a
depozitelor nu este mai mare dect suma egal cu 50 % din
nivelul su int, n temeiul articolului 10 din Directiva
2014/49/UE. innd cont de caracteristicile specifice ale
sectorului lor bancar, statele membre pot stabili un procent
mai mare de 50 %.
Indiferent de situaie, participarea sistemului de garantare a
depozitelor prevzut n temeiul prezentei directive nu
depete cuantumul pierderilor care ar fi fost suferite n
cazul unei lichidri realizate prin procedura obi nuit de
insolven.
TITLUL VIII
SANCIUNI
Articolul 110
Sanciuni administrative i alte msuri administrative
(1) Fr a aduce atingere dreptului statelor membre de a
prevedea i de a impune sanciuni penale, statele membre
prevd norme privind sanciuni administrative i alte msuri
administrative aplicabile n cazul n care dispozi iile de drept
intern adoptate pentru transpunerea prezentei directive nu
sunt respectate i iau toate msurile necesare pentru a asigura
punerea n aplicare a acestora. n cazul n care statele
membre decid s nu stabileasc norme pentru sanciuni
administrative pentru nclcri care fac obiectul dreptului
penal intern, acestea i comunic Comisiei dispozi iile de
drept penal relevante. Sanciunile administrative i celelalte
msuri administrative sunt eficace, proporionale i
disuasive.
(2) Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd obliga iile
menionate la alineatul (1) se aplic instituiilor, institu iilor
3. The contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme

for the purpose of paragraph 1 shall be made in cash.
4. Where eligible deposits at an institution under
resolution are transferred to another entity through the
sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool, the
depositors have no claim under Directive 2014/49/EU
against the deposit guarantee scheme in relation to any
part of their deposits at the institution under resolution
that are not transferred, provided that the amount of
funds transferred is equal to or more than the aggregate
coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive
2014/49/EU.
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 to 4, if the available
financial means of a deposit guarantee scheme are used
in accordance therewith and are subsequently reduced to
less than two thirds of the target level of the deposit
guarantee scheme, the regular contribution to the deposit
guarantee scheme shall be set at a level allowing for
reaching the target level within six years.
In all cases, the liability of a deposit guarantee scheme
shall not be greater than the amount equal to 50 % of its
target level pursuant to Article 10 of Directive
2014/49/EU. Member States, may, by taking into account
the specificities of their national banking sector, set a
percentage which is higher than 50 %.
In any circumstances, the deposit guarantee schemes
participation under this Directive shall not exceed the
losses it would have incurred in a winding up under
normal insolvency proceedings.
TITLE VIII
PENALTIES
Article 110
Administrative penalties and other administrative
measures
1. Without prejudice to the right of Member States to
provide for and impose criminal penalties, Member
States shall lay down rules on administrative penalties
and other administrative measures applicable where the
national provisions transposing this Directive have not
been complied with, and shall take all measures
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Where
Member States decide not to lay down rules for
administrative penalties for infringements which are
subject to national criminal law they shall communicate
to the Commission the relevant criminal law provisions.
The administrative penalties and other administrative
measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2. Member States shall ensure that, where obligations
referred to in the first paragraph apply to institutions,
205
financiare i ntreprinderilor-mam din Uniune n cazul unei

nclcri pot fi aplicate sanciuni administrative, n condi iile
prevzute de dreptul intern, membrilor organului de
conducerie, precum i altor persoane fizice care se fac
vinovate de respectiva nclcare n temeiul dreptului intern.
(3) Competenele de aplicare a sancionilor administrative
prevzute n prezenta directiv sunt atribuite autorit ilor de
rezoluie sau autoritilor competente, n cazul n care
acestea difer unele de celelalte, n funcie de tipul de
nclcare. Autoritile de rezoluie i autorit ile competente
au toate competenele de colectare de informa ii i
competenele de investigare necesare exercitarea atribu iilor
lor corespunztoare. Atunci cnd i exercit competen ele
de aplicare a sancionilor, autoritile de rezolu ie i
autoritile competente colaboreaz ndeaproape pentru a se
asigura c sanciunile administrative sau celelalte msuri
administrative produc efectele scontate i i coordoneaz
aciunile n cazurile cu caracter transfrontalier.
(4) Autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile competente i
exercit competenele administrative de aplicare a
saniunilor n conformitate cu prezenta directiv i cu dreptul
intern, n oricare din urmtoarele moduri:
(a) | direct;
(b) | n colaborare cu alte autoriti;
(c) | sub responsabilitatea lor, prin delegare ctre astfel de
autoriti;
(d) | prin sesizarea autoritilor judiciare competente.
Articolul 111
Dispoziii specifice
(1) Statele membre se asigur c actele cu putere de lege i
actele administrative naionale prevd sanc iuni i alte
msuri administrative cel puin pentru urmtoarele cazuri:
(a) | nerespectarea obligaiei de a elabora, de a pstra i de a
actualiza planul de redresare i planul de redresare a
grupului, cu nclcarea dispoziiilor articolului 5 sau 7;
(b) | nerespectarea obligaiei de a notifica autorit ii
competente intenia de a acorda sprijin financiar grupului, cu
nclcarea dispoziiilor articolului 25;
(c) | nerespectarea obligaiei de a furniza toate informa iile
necesare pentru elaborarea planurilor de rezolu ie, cu
nclcarea dispoziiilor articolului 11;
(d) | nerespectarea de ctre organul de conducere al unei
instituii sau al unei entiti menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) a obliga iei de a notifica
autoritii competente faptul c instituia sau entitatea
este n curs de a intra n dificultate sau este susceptibil de a
intra n dificultate, cu nclcarea dispozi iilor articolului 81
financial institutions and Union parent undertakings, in

the event of an infringement, administrative penalties can
be applied, subject to the conditions laid down in
national law, to the members of the management body,
and to other natural persons who under national law are
responsible for the infringement.
3. The powers to impose administrative penalties
provided for in this Directive shall be attributed to
resolution authorities or, where different, to competent
authorities, depending on the type of infringement.
Resolution authorities and competent authorities shall
have all information-gathering and investigatory powers
that are necessary for the exercise of their respective
functions. In the exercise of their powers to impose
penalties, resolution authorities and competent
authorities shall cooperate closely to ensure that
administrative penalties or other administrative measures
produce the desired results and coordinate their action
when dealing with cross-border cases.
4. Resolution authorities and competent authorities shall
exercise their administrative powers to impose penalties
in accordance with this Directive and national law in any
of the following ways:
(a) | directly;
(b) | in collaboration with other authorities;
(c) | under their responsibility by delegation to such
authorities;
(d) | by application to the competent judicial authorities.
Article 111
Specific provisions
1. Member States shall ensure that their laws, regulations
and administrative provisions provide for penalties and
other administrative measures at least in respect of the
following situations:
(a) | failure to draw up, maintain and update recovery
plans and group recovery plans, infringing Article 5 or 7;
(b) | failure to notify an intention to provide group
financial support to the competent authority infringing
Article 25;
(c) | failure to provide all the information necessary for
the development of resolution plans infringing Article
11;
(d) | failure of the management body of an institution or
an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1)
to notify the competent authority when the institution or
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is
failing or likely to fail, infringing Article 81(1).
206
alineatul (1).
(2) Statele membre se asigur c, n cazurile men ionate la
alineatul (1), sanciunile administrative i celelalte msuri
administrative care pot fi aplicate includ cel pu in
urmtoarele:
(a) | o declaraie public prin care s se indice persoana
fizic, instituia, instituia financiar, ntreprinderea-mam
din Uniune sau alt persoan juridic responsabil de
nclcare i natura nclcrii;
(b) | un ordin prin care i se cere persoanei fizice sau juridice
responsabile s nceteze comportamentul respectiv i s se
abin de la repetarea acelui comportament;
(c) | o interdicie temporar de a exercita funcii n institu iile
sau n entitile menionate la articolul 1 alineatul (1) litera
(b), (c) sau (d), mpotriva oricrui membru al organului de
conducere instituiei sau a entitii menionate la articolul 1
alineatul (1) litera (b), (c) sau (d) sau oricrei alte persoane
fizice considerate responsabile;
(d) | n cazul unei persoane juridice, amenzi administrative
de pn la 10 % din valoarea total anual net a cifrei de
afaceri pe care aceasta a nregistrat-o n exerci iul financiar
precedent. Dac persoana juridic este o filial a unei
ntreprinderi-mam, cifra de afaceri relevant este cea care
rezult din situaiile financiare consolidate ale ntreprinderiimam de cel mai nalt rang n exerciiul financiar precedent;
(e) | n cazul unei persoane fizice, amenzi administrative n
valoare de pn la 5 000 000 EUR sau, n statele membre n
care euro nu este moneda oficial, valoarea echivalent n
moneda naional la 2 iulie 2014;
(f) | amenzi administrative egale cu pn la de dou ori
valoarea beneficiului rezultat din nclcare, n cazul n care
beneficiul poate fi stabilit;
Articolul 112
Publicarea sanciunilor administrative
(1) Statele membre asigur faptul c autoritile de rezolu ie
i autoritile competente public, pe site-ul lor internet
oficial, cel puin sanciunile administrative pe care le-au
impus pentru nclcarea dispoziiilor naionale care transpun
prezenta directiv, atunci cnd aceste sanc iuni nu au fcut
obiectul unei ci de atac sau atunci cnd cile de atac au fost
epuizate. Aceast publicare se realizeaz fr ntrzieri
nejustificate, dup ce persoana fizic sau juridic respectiv
este informat cu privire la sanciune, informa iile publicate
incluznd tipul i natura nclcrii, precum i identitatea
persoanei fizice sau juridice sancionate.
n cazul n care statele membre permit publicarea
sanciunilor mpotriva crora exist o cale de atac,
autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile competente public,
fr ntrzieri nejustificate, pe site-urile lor internet oficiale,
informaii privind situaia cii de atac i rezultatul acestora.
2. Member States shall ensure that, in the cases referred

to in paragraph 1, the administrative penalties and other
administrative measures that can be applied include at
least the following:
(a) | a public statement which indicates the natural
person, institution, financial institution, Union parent
undertaking or other legal person responsible and the
nature of the infringement;
(b) | an order requiring the natural or legal person
responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a
repetition of that conduct;
(c) | a temporary ban against any member of the
management body or senior management of the
of Article 1(1) or any other natural person, who is held
responsible, to exercise functions in institutions or
entities referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1);
(d) | in the case of a legal person, administrative fines of
up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover of that legal
person in the preceding business year. Where the legal
person is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking, the
relevant turnover shall be turnover resulting from the
consolidated accounts of the ultimate parent undertaking
in the preceding business year;
(e) | in the case of a natural person, administrative fines
of up to EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States where
the Euro is not the official currency, the corresponding
value in the national currency on 2 July 2014;
(f) | administrative fines of up to twice the amount of the
benefit derived from the infringement where that benefit
can be determined.
Article 112
Publication of administrative penalties
and competent authorities publish on their official
website at least any administrative penalties imposed by
them for infringing the national provisions transposing
this Directive where such penalties have not been the
subject of an appeal or where the right of appeal has been
exhausted. Such publication shall be made without undue
delay after the natural or legal person is informed of that
penalty including information on the type and nature of
the infringement and the identity of the natural or legal
person on whom the penalty is imposed.
Where Member States permit publication of penalties
against which there is an appeal, resolution authorities
and competent authorities shall, without undue delay,
publish on their official websites information on the
status of that appeal and the outcome thereof.
207
(2) Autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile competente public

sanciunile pe care le impun, fr a indica identitatea
entitilor implicate, ntr-un mod conform cu dreptul
intern,n oricare din urmtoarele situaii:
(a) | atunci cnd sanciunea este impus unei persoane fizice,
iar n urma unei evaluri anterioare obligatorii a
proporionalitii publicrii datelor cu caracter personal, s
dovedete c publicarea este disproporionat;
(b) | atunci cnd publicarea ar pune n pericol stabilitatea
pieelor financiare sau o anchet penal n curs de
desfurare;
(c) | atunci cnd publicarea ar cauza, n msura n care se
poate determina acest lucru, prejudicii dispropor ionate
instituiilor implicate, entitilor implicate de tipul celor
sau persoanelor fizice implicate.
Alternativ, n astfel de cazuri, publicarea datelor respective
poate fi amnat pentru o perioad rezonabil de timp dac
se poate preconiza c, n cursul perioadei respective,
motivele care au justificat publicarea informa iilor, fr a
indica identitatea entitilor implicate, vor nceta s existe.
(3) Autoritile de rezoluie i autoritile competente se
asigur c orice informaie publicat n temeiul prezentului
articol este meninut pe site-ul lor internet oficial pentru o
perioad de cel puin cinci ani. Datele cu caracter personal
incluse n informaiile publicate se pstreaz pe site-ul
internet oficial al autoritii de rezoluie sau al autorit ii
competente numai pentru perioada care este necesar n
conformitate cu normele aplicabile n materie de protec ie a
datelor.
(4) Pn la 3 iulie 2016, ABE nainteaz Comisiei un raport
privind publicarea de ctre statele membre a sanciunilor,
fr a indica identitatea entitilor implicate, n conformitate
cu alineatul (2), n special atunci cnd au existat diferen e
semnificative ntre statele membre n aceast privin . De
asemenea, raportul abordeaz eventualele diferen e
semnificative n ceea ce privete durata publicrii
sanciunilor n temeiul dreptului intern din statele membre
privind publicarea sanciunilor.
Articolul 113
Meninerea de ctre ABE a unei baze de date centrale
(1) Sub rezerva cerinelor de pstrare a secretului profesional
menionate la articolul 84, autoritile de rezoluie i
autoritile competente informeaz ABE cu privire la toate
sanciunile administrative pe care le-au impus n temeiul
articolului 111 i cu privire la stadiul cii de atac i la
rezultatul acesteia. ABE menine o baz de date central a
sanciunilor care i-au fost aduse la cunotin exclusiv n
scopul schimburilor de informaii dintre autoritile de
rezoluie. Baza de date este accesibil doar pentru autorit ile
de rezoluie i este actualizat pe baza informaiilor furnizate

publish the penalties imposed by them on an anonymous
basis, in a manner which is in accordance with national
law, in any of the following circumstances:
(a) | where the penalty is imposed on a natural person
and publication of personal data is shown to be
disproportionate by an obligatory prior assessment of the
proportionality of such publication;
(b) | where publication would jeopardise the stability of
financial markets or an ongoing criminal investigation;
(c) | where publication would cause, insofar as it can be
determined, disproportionate damage to the institutions
or entities referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article
1(1) or natural persons involved.
Alternatively, in such cases, the publication of the data in
question may be postponed for a reasonable period of
time, if it is foreseeable that the reasons for anonymous
publication will cease to exist within that period.
ensure that any publication in accordance with this
Article shall remain on their official website for a period
of at least five years. Personal data contained in the
publication shall only be kept on the official website of
the resolution authority or the competent authority for
the period which is necessary in accordance with
applicable data protection rules.
4. By 3 July 2016, EBA shall submit a report to the
Commission on the publication of penalties by Member
States on an anonymous basis as provided for under
paragraph 2 and in particular whether there have been
significant divergences between Member States in that
respect. That report shall also address any significant
divergences in the duration of publication of penalties
under national law for Member States for publication of
penalties.
Article 113
Maintenance of central database by EBA
1. Subject to the professional secrecy requirements
referred to in Article 84, resolution authorities and
competent authorities shall inform EBA of all
administrative penalties imposed by them under Article
111 and of the status of that appeal and outcome thereof.
EBA shall maintain a central database of penalties
reported to it solely for the purpose of exchange of
information between resolution authorities which shall
be accessible to resolution authorities only and shall be
updated on the basis of the information provided by
208
de acestea. ABE menine o baz de date central a

sanciunilor care i-au fost aduse la cunotin exclusiv n
scopul schimburilor de informaii dintre autorit ile
competente. Baza de date este accesibil doar pentru
autoritile competente i este actualizat pe baza
informaiilor furnizate de acestea.
(2) ABE menine o pagin web cu link-uri ctre paginile pe
care fiecare autoritate de rezoluie i fiecare autoritate
competent i public sanciunile n temeiul articolului 112
i indic perioada pentru care fiecare stat membru public
sanciunile.
Articolul 114
Aplicarea efectiv a sanciunilor i exercitarea competen elor
de sancionare de ctre autoritile competente i autorit ile
de rezoluie
Statele membre se asigur c, atunci cnd stabilesc tipul
sanciunilor administrative sau al altor msuri administrative
i nivelul amenzilor administrative, autoritile competente i
autoritile de rezoluie iau n considerare toate
circumstanele relevante, inclusiv, dup caz:
(a) | gravitatea i durata nclcrii;
(b) | gradul de responsabilitate al persoanei fizice sau
juridice responsabile;
(c) | soliditatea financiar a persoanei fizice sau juridice
responsabile, astfel cum este indicat, de exemplu, n func ie
de cifra de afaceri total a persoanei juridice responsabile
sau de venitul anual al persoanei fizice responsabile;
(d) | cuantumul profiturilor acumulate sau a pierderilor
evitate de persoana fizica sau juridic responsabil, n
msura n care ele pot fi stabilite;
(e) | pierderile suferite de prile tere din cauza nclcrii, n
msura n care acestea pot fi stabilite;
(f) | msura n care persoana fizic sau juridic responsabile
coopereaz cu autoritatea competent i cu autoritatea de
rezoluie;
(g) | nclcri anterioare comise de persoana fizic sau
juridic responsabil;
(h) | orice consecine potenial sistemice ale nclcrii.
TITLUL IX
COMPETENE DE EXECUTARE
Articolul 115
Exercitarea delegrii de competene
(1) Competena de a adopta acte delegate este conferit
Comisiei n condiiile prevzute n prezentul articol.
(2) Competena de a adopta acte delegate men ionat la
articolul 2 al doilea paragraf, articolul 44 alineatul (11),
articolul 76 alineatul (4), articolul 103 alineatele (7) i (8) i
resolution authorities. EBA shall maintain a central

database of penalties reported to it solely for the purpose
of exchange of information between competent
authorities which shall be accessible to competent
authorities only and shall be updated on the basis of the
information provided by competent authorities.
2. EBA shall maintain a webpage with links to each
resolution authoritys publication of penalties and each
competent authoritys publication of penalties under
Article 112 and indicate the period for which each
Member State publishes penalties.
Article 114
Effective application of penalties and exercise of powers
to impose penalties by competent authorities and
resolution authorities
Member States shall ensure that when determining the
type of administrative penalties or other administrative
measures and the level of administrative fines, the
competent authorities and resolution authorities take into
account all relevant circumstances, including where
appropriate:
(a) | the gravity and the duration of the infringement;
(b) | the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal
person responsible;
(c) | the financial strength of the natural or legal person
responsible, for example, as indicated by the total
turnover of the responsible legal person or the annual
income of the responsible natural person;
(d) | the amount of profits gained or losses avoided by
the natural or legal person responsible, insofar as they
can be determined;
(e) | the losses for third parties caused by the
infringement, insofar as they can be determined;
(f) | the level of cooperation of the natural or legal person
responsible with the competent authority and the
resolution authority;
(g) | previous infringements by the natural or legal
person responsible;
(h) | any potential systemic consequences of the
infringement.
TITLE IX
POWERS OF EXECUTION
Article 115
Exercise of the delegation
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the
Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this
Article.
2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in the
second paragraph of Article 2, Article 44(11), Article
76(4), Article 103(7) and (8) and Article 104(4) shall be
209
la articolul 104 alineatul (4) se confer Comisiei pe o

perioad de timp nedeterminat, de la 2 iulie 2014.
(3) Delegarea de competene menionat la articolul 2 al
doilea paragraf, articolul 44 alineatul (11), articolul 76
alineatul (4), articolul 103 alineatele (7) i (8) i la articolul
104 alineatul (4) poate fi revocat n orice moment de
Parlamentul Europeansau de Consiliu. O decizie de revocare
pune capt delegrii de competene specificat n decizia
respectiv. Decizia produce efecte din ziua care urmeaz
datei publicrii n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene sau la
o dat ulterioar menionat n decizie. Decizia nu aduce
atingere valabilitii actelor delegate care sunt deja n
vigoare.
(4) De ndat ce adopt un act delegat, Comisia l notific
simultan Parlamentului European i Consiliului.
(5) Un act delegat adoptat n temeiul articolului 2 al doilea
paragraf, articolul 44 alineatul (11), articolul 76 alineatul (4),
articolul 103 alineatele (7) i (8) sau la articolul 104 alineatul
(4) intr n vigoare numai dac nici Parlamentul European i
nici Consiliul nu au formulat obieciuni n termen de trei luni
de la notificarea acestuia ctre Parlamentul European i
Consiliu sau dac, nainte de expirarea acestui termen,
Parlamentul European i Consiliul au informat Comisia c
nu vor formula obieciuni. Respectivul termen se prelunge te
cu trei luni la iniiativa Parlamentului European sau a
Consiliului.
(6) Comisia nu adopt acte delegate dac perioada alocat
controlului de ctre Parlamentul European este redus prin
pauze la mai puin de cinci luni, inclusiv orice prelungire.
TITLUL X
MODIFICRI ADUSE DIRECTIVELOR 82/891/CEE,
2001/24/CE, 2002/47/CE, 2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE,
2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE, 2012/30/UE I 2013/36/UE I
REGULAMENTELOR (UE) nr. 1093/2010 I (UE) nr.
648/2012
Articolul 116
Modificare adus Directivei 82/891/CEE
Articolul 1 alineatul (4) din Directiva 82/891/CEE se
nlocuiete cu urmtorul text:
(4) Se aplic articolul 1 alineatele (2), (3) i (4) din
Directiva 2011/35/UE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (36).
Articolul 117
Modificri aduse Directivei 2001/24/CE
Directiva 2001/24/CE se modific dup cum urmeaz:
1. | La articolul 1, se adaug urmtoarele alineate: | (3)
Prezenta directiv se aplic, de asemenea, firmelor de
investiii n sensul articolului 4 alineatul (1) punctul 2 din
conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period

of time from 2 July 2014.
3. The delegation of power referred to in the second
paragraph of Article 2, Article 44(11), Article 76(4),
Article 103(7) and (8) and Article 104(4) may be revoked
at any time by the European Parliament or by the
Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the
delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall
take effect the day following the publication of the
decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or
at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the
validity of any delegated acts already in force.
4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission
shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament
and to the Council.
5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to in the second
paragraph of Article 2, Article 44(11), Article 76(4),
Article 103(7) and (8) or Article 104(4) shall enter into
force only if no objection has been expressed either by
the European Parliament or the Council within three
months of notification of that act to the European
Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that
period, the European Parliament and the Council have
both informed the Commission that they will not object.
That period shall be extended by three months at the
initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.
6. The Commission shall not adopt delegated acts where
the scrutiny time of the European Parliament is reduced
through recess to less than five months, including any
extension.
TITLE X
AMENDMENTS TO DIRECTIVES 82/891/EEC,
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC,
2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU,
2012/30/EU
AND
2013/36/EU AND TO REGULATIONS (EU) NO
1093/2010 AND (EU) NO 648/2012
Article 116
Amendment to Directive 82/891/EEC
Article 1(4) of Directive of 82/891/EEC is replaced by
the following:
4. Article 1(2), (3) and (4) of Directive 2011/35/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council (36) shall
apply.
Article 117
Amendments to Directive 2001/24/EC
Directive 2001/24/EC is amended as follows:
(1) | In Article 1, the following paragraphs are added: |
3. This Directive shall also apply to investment firms as
210

i a Consiliului (37) i sucursalelor acestora situate n state
membre, altele dect cele n care i au sediul central. | (4) n
caz de aplicare a instrumentelor de rezoluie i de exercitare
a competenelor de rezoluie prevzute n Directiva
2014/59/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (38),
prezenta directiv se aplic totodat instituiilor financiare,
societilor i ntreprinderilor-mam care se ncadreaz n
domeniul de aplicare al Directivei 2014/59/UE. | (5)
Articolele 4 i 7 din prezenta directiv nu se aplic n cazul
n care se aplic articolul 83 din Directiva 2014/59/UE. | (6)
Articolul 33 din prezenta directiv nu se aplic n cazul n
care se aplic articolul 84 din Directiva 2014/59/UE.
2. | Articolul 2 se nlocuiete cu urmtorul text: | Articolul 2
| Definiii | n sensul prezentei directive: | | stat membru
de origine nseamn stat membru de origine astfel cum este
definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 43 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013; | | stat membru gazd
nseamn stat membru gazd astfel cum este definit la
nr. 575/2013; | | sucursal nseamn o sucursal astfel
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013; | | autoritate
competent nseamn o autoritate competent astfel cum
este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 40 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 sau o autoritate de rezoluie
n sensul articolului 2 alineatul (1) punctul 18 din Directiva
2014/59/UE n ceea ce privete msurile de reorganizare
luate n temeiul directivei respective; | | administrator
nseamn orice persoan sau organ numit de autorit ile
administrative sau judiciare, a crui sarcin este s
administreze msuri de reorganizare; | | autorit i
administrative sau judiciare nseamn autoritile
administrative sau judiciare ale statelor membre care sunt
competente n materie de msuri de reorganizare i proceduri
de lichidare; | | msuri de reorganizare nseamn msuri
destinate meninerii sau restabilirii situaiei financiare a unei
instituii de credit sau a unei firme de investi ii astfel cum
sunt definite la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 2 din
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 i care ar putea afecta
drepturile preexistente ale unor teri, inclusiv msuri care
implic posibilitatea unei suspendri a plilor, a unei
suspendri a msurilor de executare sau a unei reduceri a
creanelor; aceste msuri includ aplicarea instrumentelor de
rezoluie i exercitarea competenelor de rezoluie prevzute
n Directiva 2014/59/UE; | | lichidator nseamn orice
persoan sau organism numit de autorit ile administrative
sau judiciare a crui sarcin este s administreze proceduri
de lichidare; | | proceduri de lichidare nseamn
proceduri colective deschise i controlate de autorit ile
administrative sau judiciare ale statelor membre, cu scopul
de a lichida bunuri sub supravegherea acelor autorit i,
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the

Council (37) and their branches located in Member
States other than those in which they have their head
offices. | 4. In the event of application of the resolution
tools and exercise of the resolution powers provided for
in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council (38), this Directive shall also apply to the
financial institutions, firms and parent undertakings
falling within the scope of Directive 2014/59/EU. | 5.
Articles 4 and 7 of this Directive shall not apply where
Article 83 of Directive 2014/59/EU applies. | 6. Article
33 of this Directive shall not apply where Article 84 of
Directive 2014/59/EU applies.
(2) | Article 2 is replaced by the following: | Article 2 |
Definitions | For the purposes of this Directive: | |
home Member State shall mean a home Member State
as defined in Article 4(1)(43) of Regulation (EU) No
575/2013; | | host Member State shall mean a host
Member State as defined in Article 4(1)(44) of
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; | | branch shall mean
a branch as defined in Article 4(1)(17) of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013; | | competent authority shall
mean a competent authority as defined in Article 4(1)
(40) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or a resolution
authority within the meaning of Article 2(1)(18) of
Directive 2014/59/EU in respect of reorganisation
measures taken pursuant to that Directive; | |
administrator shall mean any person or body appointed
by the administrative or judicial authorities whose task is
to administer reorganisation measures; | |
administrative or judicial authorities shall mean such
administrative or judicial authorities of the Member
States as are competent for the purposes of
reorganisation measures or winding-up proceedings; |
| reorganisation measures shall mean measures which
are intended to preserve or restore the financial situation
of a credit institution or an investment firm as defined in
Article 4(1), point (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
and which could affect third parties pre-existing rights,
including measures involving the possibility of a
suspension of payments, suspension of enforcement
measures or reduction of claims; those measures include
the application of the resolution tools and the exercise of
resolution powers provided for in Directive 2014/59/EU;
| | liquidator shall mean any person or body
appointed by the administrative or judicial authorities
whose task is to administer winding-up proceedings; |
| winding-up proceedings shall mean collective
proceedings opened and monitored by the administrative
or judicial authorities of a Member State with the aim of
realising assets under the supervision of those
authorities, including where the proceedings are
211
inclusiv cnd procedurile sunt ncheiate printr-un concordat

sau o alt msur similar; | | pia reglementat
nseamn o pia reglementat astfel cum este definit la
articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 21 din Directiva 2014/65/UE
a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (39); | |
instrument nseamn un instrument financiar astfel cum
este definit la articolul 4 alineatul (1) punctul 50 litera (b)
din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013.
3. | Articolul 25 se nlocuiete cu urmtorul text: | Articolul
25 | Acorduri de compensare | Fr a aduce atingere
articolelor 68 i 71 din Directiva 2014/59/UE, acordurile de
compensare intr strict sub incidena legii contractului care
reglementeaz astfel de acorduri.
4. | Articolul 26 se nlocuiete cu urmtorul text: | Articolul
26 | Acorduri de rscumprare | Fr a aduce atingere
articolelor 68 i 71 din Directiva 2014/59/UE i articolului
24 din prezenta directiv, acordurile de rscumprare intr
strict sub incidena legii contractului care reglementeaz
astfel de acorduri.
Articolul 118
Modificare adus Directivei 2002/47/CE
1. | La articolul 1, se adaug urmtorul alineat: | (6)
Articolele 4-7 din prezenta directiv nu se aplic niciunei
restricii privind aplicarea contractelor de garan ie financiar
i niciunei restricii privind efectul vreunui contract de
garanie financiar fr transfer de proprietate, a vreunei
dispoziii de compensare cu exigibilitate imediat sau unei
dispoziii de compensare reciproc care sunt impuse n
temeiul titlului IV capitolul V sau VI din Directiva
2014/59/UE a Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (40)
sau oricrei astfel de restricii impuse n temeiul unor
competene similare conform dreptului intern a unui stat
membru, pentru a facilita rezoluia conform a unei entit i
menionate la alineatul (2) litera (c) punctul (iv) i la
alineatul (2) litera (d) care face obiectul mecanismelor de
siguran cel puin echivalente cu cele prevzute la titlul IV
capitolul VII din Directiva 2014/59/UE.
2. | Articolul 9a se nlocuiete cu urmtorul text: | Articolul
9a | Directivele 2008/48/CE i 2014/59/UE | Prezenta
directiv nu aduce atingere Directivelor 2008/48/CE i
2014/59/UE.
Articolul 119
La articolul 4 alineatul (5) din Directiva 2004/25/CE se
adaug urmtorul paragraf:
Statele membre se asigur c articolul 5 alineatul (1) din
prezenta directiv nu se aplic n cazul utilizrii
instrumentelor, competenelor i mecanismelor de rezolu ie
menionate n titlul IV din Directiva 2014/59/UE a
terminated by a composition or other, similar measure; |

| regulated market shall mean a regulated market as
defined in Article 4(1), point (21) of Directive
Council (39); | | instrument shall mean a financial
instrument as defined in Article 4(1), point (50)(b) of
Netting agreements | Without prejudice to Articles 68 and
71 of Directive 2014/59/EU, netting agreements shall be
governed solely by the law of the contract which governs
such agreements.;
Repurchase agreements | Without prejudice to Articles 68
and 71 of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 24 of this
Directive, repurchase agreements shall be governed
solely by the law of the contract which governs such
agreements..
Article 118
Amendment to Directive 2002/47/EC
(1) | In Article 1, the following paragraph is added: | 6.
Articles 4 to 7 of this Directive shall not apply to any
restriction on the enforcement of financial collateral
arrangements or any restriction on the effect of a security
financial collateral arrangement, any close out netting or
set-off provision that is imposed by virtue of Title IV,
Chapter V or VI of Directive 2014/59/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council (40), or to any
such restriction that is imposed by virtue of similar
powers in the law of a Member State to facilitate the
orderly resolution of any entity referred to in points (c)
(iv) and (d) of paragraph 2 which is subject to safeguards
at least equivalent to those set out in Title IV, Chapter
VII of Directive 2014/59/EU.
(2) | Article 9a is replaced by the following: | Article 9a |

Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/59/EU | This Directive
shall be without prejudice to Directives 2008/48/EC and
2014/59/EU..
Article 119
In Article 4(5) of Directive 2004/25/EC, the following
subparagraph is added:
Member States shall ensure that Article 5(1) of this
Directive does not apply in the case of use of resolution
tools, powers and mechanisms provided for in Title IV of
212

Articolul 120
La articolul 3 din Directiva 2005/56/CE, se adaug
urmtorul alineat:
(4) Statele membre se asigur c prezenta directiv nu se
aplic societii sau societilor care fac obiectul utilizrii
Articolul 121
Modificri aduse Directivei 2007/36/CE
1. | La articolul 1, se adaug alineatul urmtor: | (4) Statele
membre se asigur c prezenta directiv nu se aplic n cazul
utilizrii instrumentelor, competenelor i mecanismelor de
rezoluie menionate n titlul IV din Directiva 2014/59/UE a
2. | La articolul 5, se adaug urmtoarele alineate: | (5)
Statele membre se asigur c, n sensul Directivei
2014/59/UE, adunarea general poate, cu o majoritate de
dou treimi din voturile valabil exprimate, decide sau
modifica statutul pentru a prevedea c o convocare la
adunarea general pentru a decide cu privire la o majorare de
capital se face ntr-un termen mai scurt dect cel prevzut la
alineatul (1) din prezentul articol, cu condi ia ca respectiva
adunare s nu aib loc n termen de zece zile calendaristice
de la data convocrii, s fie ndeplinite condiiile stipulate la
articolul 27 sau 29 din Directiva 2014/59/UE, iar majorarea
de capital s fie necesar pentru a evita condi iile de
declanare a procedurii de rezoluie prevzute la articolele
32 i 33 din directiva respectiv. | (6) n sensul alineatului
(5), obligaia ca fiecare stat membru s stabileasc cte un
singur termen-limit conform articolului 6 alineatul (3),
obligaia de a asigura la timp disponibilitatea unei ordini de
zi revizuite conform articolului 6 alineatul (4) i obliga ia ca
fiecare stat membru s stabileasc o singur dat de referin
conform articolului 7 alineatul (3) nu se aplic.
Articolul 122
Modificare adus Directivei 2011/35/UE
La articolul 1 din Directiva 2011/35/UE, se adaug
urmtorul alineat:
(4) Statele membre se asigur c prezenta directiv nu se
aplic societii sau societilor care fac obiectul utilizrii
the Council (41).

Article 120
In Article 3 of Directive 2005/56/EEC, the following
paragraph is added:
4. Member States shall ensure that this Directive does
not apply to the company or companies that are the
subject of the use of resolution tools, powers and
mechanisms provided for in Title IV of Directive
Council (42).
Article 121
Amendments to Directive 2007/36/EC
(1) | in Article 1, the following paragraph is added: | 4.
Member States shall ensure that this Directive does not
apply in the case of the use of resolution tools, powers
and mechanisms provided for in Title IV of Directive
Council (43).
(2) | in Article 5, the following paragraphs are added: | 5.
Member States shall ensure that for the purposes of
Directive 2014/59/EU the general meeting may, by a
majority of two-thirds of the votes validly cast, issue a
convocation to a general meeting, or modify the statutes
to prescribe that a convocation to a general meeting is
issued, at shorter notice than as laid down in paragraph 1
of this Article, to decide on a capital increase, provided
that that meeting does not take place within ten calendar
days of the convocation, that the conditions of Article 27
or 29 of Directive 2014/59/EU are met, and that the
capital increase is necessary to avoid the conditions for
resolution laid down in Articles 32 and 33 of that
Directive. | 6. For the purposes of paragraph 5, the
obligation on each Member State to set a single deadline
in Article 6(3), the obligation to ensure timely
availability of a revised agenda in Article 6(4) and the
obligation on each Member State to set a single record
date in Article 7(3) shall not apply..
Article 122
Amendment to Directive 2011/35/EU
In Article 1 of Directive 2011/35/EU, the following
paragraph is added:
4. Member States shall ensure that this Directive does
not apply to the company or companies which are the
subject of the use of resolution tools, powers and
mechanisms provided for in Title IV of Directive
Council (44).
213
Articolul 123
La articolul 45 din Directiva 2012/30/UE, se adaug
urmtorul alineat:
(3) Statele membre se asigur c articolul 10, articolul 19
alineatul (1), articolul 29 alineatele (1), (2) i (3), articolul 31
alineatul (2) primul paragraf, articolele 33-36 i articolele
40-42 din prezenta directiv nu se aplic n cazul utilizrii
Articolul 124
La articolul 74 din Directiva 2013/36/UE, se elimin
alineatul (4).
Articolul 125
Modificare adus Regulamentului (UE) nr. 1093/2010
Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 se modific dup cum
urmeaz:
1. | La articolul 4, punctul 2 se nlocuiete cu urmtorul text:
| 2. autoritate competent nseamn: | (i) | autoritate
competent, astfel cum este definit la articolul 4 alineatul
(1) punctul 40 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 i n
sensul Directivelor 2007/64/CE i 2009/110/CE; | (ii) | n
ceea ce privete Directivele 2002/65/CE i 2005/60/CE,
autoritile n a cror competen intr asigurarea
conformitii instituiilor financiare i de credit cu
dispoziiile directivelor respective; | (iii) | n ceea ce prive te
Directiva 2014/49/UE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului (46), autoritatea desemnat astfel cum este
definit la articolul 2 alineatul (1) punctul 18 din directiva
respectiv; | (iv) | n ceea ce privete Directiva 2014/59/UE a
Parlamentului European i a Consiliului (47), o autoritate de
rezoluie, astfel cum este definit la articolul 2 alineatul (1)
punctul 18 din directiva respectiv.
2. | La articolul 40 alineatul (6), se adaug urmtorul
paragraf: | Atunci cnd este chemat s ac ioneze n sensul
Directivei
2014/59/UE,
membrul
Consiliului
supraveghetorilor menionat la alineatul (1) litera (b) poate fi
nsoit, dup caz, de un reprezentant al autorit ilor de
rezoluie din fiecare stat membru. Acest reprezentant nu va
avea drept de vot.
Articolul 126
Modificare adus Regulamentului (UE) nr. 648/2012
La articolul 81 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (UE) nr.
648/2012, se adaug urmtoarea liter:
(k) | autoritile de rezoluie desemnate n temeiul
articolului 3 din Directiva 2014/59/UE a Parlamentului
European i a Consiliului (48).
TITLUL XI
Article 123
In Article 45 of Directive 2012/30/EU, the following
paragraph is added:
3. Member States shall ensure that Article 10, Article
19(1), Article 29(1), (2) and (3), the first subparagraph of
Article 31(2), Articles 33 to 36 and Articles 40, 41 and
42 of this Directive do not apply in the case of use of the
resolution tools, powers and mechanisms provided for in
Title IV of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council (45).
Article 124
In Article 74 of Directive 2013/36/EU, paragraph 4 is
deleted.
Article 125
Amendment to Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 is amended as follows:
(1) | In Article 4, point (2) is replaced by the following: |
(2) competent authority means: | (i) | competent
authority as defined in Article 4(1)(40) of Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013, and within the meaning of Directives
2007/64/EC and 2009/110/EC; | (ii) | with regard to
Directives 2002/65/EC and 2005/60/EC, the authorities
competent for ensuring compliance with the
requirements of those Directives by credit and financial
institutions; | (iii) | with regard to Directive 2014/49/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council (46), a
designated authority as defined in Article 2(1)(18) of that
Directive; | (iv) | with regard to Directive 2014/59/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council (47), a
resolution authority as defined in Article 2(1)(18) of that
Directive.
(2) | In Article 40(6), the following subparagraph is
added: | For the purpose of acting within the scope of
Directive 2014/59/EU, the member of the Board of
Supervisors referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 may,
where appropriate, be accompanied by a representative
from the resolution authority in each Member State, who
shall be non-voting..
Article 126
Amendment to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
In Article 81(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the
following point is added:
(k) | the resolution authorities designated under Article 3
of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and
the Council (48).
TITLE XI
214
DISPOZIII FINALE
Articolul 127
Comitetul de rezoluie al ABE
ABE instituie un comitet permanent intern n temeiul
articolului 41 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010 n
vederea elaborrii deciziilor ABE ce trebuie luate n
conformitate cu articolul 44 din regulamentul respectiv,
inclusiv a deciziilor legate de proiectele de standarde tehnice
de reglementare i proiectele de standarde tehnice de punere
n aplicare, cu privire la atribuiile care au fost stabilite
pentru autoritile de rezoluie, astfel cum se prevede n
prezenta directiv. n conformitate cu articolul 38 alineatul
(1) din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, ABE se asigur n
special c nicio decizie menionat la respectivul articol nu
afecteaz n vreun fel responsabilitile fiscale ale statelor
membre. Respectivul comitet intern cuprinde autorit ile de
rezoluie menionate la articolul 3 din prezenta directiv.
n sensul prezentei directive, ABE coopereaz cu EIOPA i
AEVMP n cadrul Comitetului comun al autorit ilor
europene de supraveghere instituit n temeiul articolului 54
din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010, din Regulamentul
(UE) nr. 1094/2010 i din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1095/2010.
n sensul prezentei directive, ABE asigur o diferen iere
structural ntre comitetul de rezoluie i alte func ii
menionate n Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010. Comitetul
de rezoluie susine elaborarea i coordonarea de planuri de
rezoluie i dezvolt metode de realizare a rezolu iei
instituiilor financiare n curs de a intra n dificultate.
Articolul 128
Cooperarea cu ABE
Autoritile competente i autoritile de rezolu ie
coopereaz cu ABE n sensul prezentei directive, n
conformitate cu Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1093/2010.
Autoritile competente i autoritile de rezolu ie
furnizeaz, fr ntrziere, ABE toate informa iile necesare
ndeplinirii de ctre aceasta a sarcinilor care i revin n
1093/2010.
Articolul 129
Reexaminare
Pn la 1 iunie 2018, Comisia reexamineaz punerea n
aplicare a prezentei directive i nainteaz un raport cu
privire la aceasta Parlamentului European i Consiliului.
Aceasta evalueaz n special urmtoarele:
(a) | necesitatea efecturii oricror modificri n ceea ce
privete reducerea la minimum a divergenelor la nivel
naional, pe baza raportului ABE menionat la articolul 4
alineatul (7);
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 127
EBA Resolution Committee
EBA shall create a permanent internal committee
pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
for the purpose of preparing EBA decisions to be taken
in accordance with Article 44 thereof, including
decisions relating to draft regulatory technical standards
and draft implementing technical standards, relating to
tasks that have been conferred on resolution authorities
as provided for in this Directive. In particular, in
1093/2010, EBA shall ensure that no decision referred to
in that article impinges in any way on the fiscal
responsibilities of Member States. That internal
committee shall be composed of the resolution
authorities referred to in Article 3 of this Directive.
For the purposes of this Directive, EBA shall cooperate
with EIOPA and ESMA within the framework of the
Joint Committee of the European Supervisory
Authorities established in Article 54 of Regulation (EU)
No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of
For the purposes of this Directive, EBA shall ensure
structural separation between the resolution committee
and other functions referred to in Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010. The resolution committee shall promote the
development and coordination of resolution plans and
develop methods for the resolution of failing financial
institutions.
Article 128
Cooperation with EBA
The competent and resolution authorities shall cooperate
with EBA for the purposes of this Directive in
accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
The competent and resolution authorities shall, without
delay, provide EBA with all the information necessary to
carry out its duties in accordance with Article 35 of
Article 129
Review
By 1 June 2018, the Commission shall review the
implementation of this Directive and shall submit a
report thereon to the European Parliament and to the
Council. It shall assess in particular the following:
(a) | on the basis of the report from EBA referred to in
Article 4(7), the need for any amendments with regard to
minimising divergences at national level;
215
(b) | necesitatea efecturii oricror modificri n ceea ce

privete reducerea la minimum a divergenelor la nivel
naional, pe baza raportului ABE menionat la articolul 45
alineatul (19);
(c) | funcionarea i eficiena rolului conferit ABE n
prezenta directiv, inclusiv efectuarea medierii.
Dup caz, rapoartul respectiv este nsoit de o propunere
legislativ.
Fr a aduce atingere reexaminrii prevzute la primul
paragraf, Comisia reexamineaz, pn la 3 iulie 2017, n
mod special aplicarea articolelor 13, 18 i 45 n ceea ce
privete competenele ABE de a efectua o mediere
obligatorie, pentru a ine seama de evoluiile viitoare ale
legislaiei din domeniul serviciilor financiare. Raportul
respectiv i orice eventual propunere care l nsoe te, dup
caz, sunt transmise Parlamentului European i Consiliului.
Articolul 130
Transpunere
(1) Statele membre adopt i public, pn la 31 decembrie
2014, actele cu putere de lege i actele administrative
necesare pentru a se conforma prezentei directive. Statele
membre comunic de ndat Comisiei textul respectivelor
msuri.
Statele membre aplic aceste msuri ncepnd cu 1 ianuarie
2015.
Statele membre aplic ns dispoziiile adoptate pentru a se
conforma prevederilor de la titlul IV capitolul IV sec iunea 5
cel trziu ncepnd cu 1 ianuarie 2016.
(2) Atunci cnd statele membre adopt dispozi iile
menionate la alineatul (1), ele conin o trimitere la prezenta
directiv sau sunt nsoite de o asemenea trimitere la data
publicrii lor oficiale. Statele membre stabilesc modalitatea
de efectuare a acestei trimiteri.
(3) Satele membre comunic Comisiei i ABE textul
principalelor dispoziii de drept intern pe care le adopt n
domeniul reglementat de prezenta directiv.
Articolul 131
Intrarea n vigoare
Prezenta directiv intr n vigoare n a douzecea zi de la
data publicrii n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.
Articolul 124 intr n vigoare la 1 ianuarie 2015.
Articolul 132
Destinatari
Prezenta directiv se adreseaz statelor membre.
Adoptat la Bruxelles, 15 mai 2014.
Pentru Parlamentul European
(b) | on the basis of the report from EBA referred to in

Article 45(19), the need for any amendments with regard
to minimising divergences at national level;
(c) | the functioning and efficiency of the role conferred
on EBA in this Directive, including carrying out of
mediation.
Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a
legislative proposal.
Notwithstanding the review provided for in the first
subparagraph, the Commission shall, by 3 July 2017,
specifically review the application of Articles 13, 18 and
45 as regards EBAs powers to conduct binding
mediation to take account of future developments in
financial services law. That report and any accompanying
proposals, as appropriate, shall be forwarded to the
European Parliament and to the Council.
Article 130
Transposition
1. Member States shall adopt and publish by 31
December 2014 the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They
shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text
of those measures.
Member States shall apply those measures from 1
January 2015.
However, Member States shall apply provisions adopted
in order to comply with Section 5 of Chapter IV of Title
IV from 1 January 2016 at the latest.
2. When Member States adopt the measures referred to in
paragraph 1, they shall contain a reference to this
Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the
occasion of their official publication. Member States
shall determine how such a reference is to be made.
3. Member States shall communicate to the Commission
and to EBA the text of the main provisions of national
law which they adopt in the field covered by this
Directive.
Article 131
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of
the European Union.
Article 124 shall enter into force on 1 January 2015.
Article 132
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 15 May 2014.
For the European Parliament
216
Preedintele
M. SCHULZ
Pentru Consiliu
Preedintele
D. KOURKOULAS
(1) JO C 39, 12.2.2013, p. 1.
(2) JO C 44, 15.2.2013, p. 68.
(3) Poziia Parlamentului European din 15 aprilie 2014
(nepublicat nc n Jurnalul Oficial) i Decizia Consiliului
din 6 mai 2014.
(4) Regulamentul (UE) nr. 575/2013 al Parlamentului
European i al Consiliului din 26 iunie 2013 privind cerinele
prudeniale pentru instituiile de credit i firmele de investi ii
i de modificare a Regulamentului (UE) nr. 648/2012 (JO L
176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).
(5) Directiva 2013/36/UE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului din 26 iunie 2013 cu privire la accesul la
activitatea instituiilor de credit i supravegherea pruden ial
a instituiilor de credit i a firmelor de investiii, de
modificare a Directivei 2002/87/CE i de abrogare a
Directivelor 2006/48/CE i 2006/49/CE (JO L 176,
27.6.2013, p. 338).
(6) Directiva 2002/87/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului din 16 decembrie 2002 privind supravegherea
suplimentar a instituiilor de credit, a ntreprinderilor de
asigurare i a ntreprinderilor de investi ii care apar in unui
conglomerat financiar i de modificare a Directivelor
73/239/CEE,
79/267/CEE,
92/49/CEE,
92/96/CEE,
93/6/CEE i 93/22/CEE ale Consiliului i a Directivelor
98/78/CE i 2000/12/CE ale Parlamentului European i
Consiliului (JO L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1).
European i al Consiliului din 4 iulie 2012 privind
instrumentele financiare derivate extrabursiere, contrapr ile
centrale i registrele centrale de tranzacii (JO L 201,
7.2.2012, p. 1).
European i al Consiliului din 24 noiembrie 2010 de
instituire a Autoritii europene de supraveghere (Autoritatea
Bancar European), de modificare a Deciziei nr.
716/2009/CE i de abrogare a Deciziei 2009/78/CE a
Comisiei (JO L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
European i Consiliului din 24 noiembrie 2010 privind
supravegherea macroprudenial la nivelul Uniunii Europene
a sistemului financiar i de nfiinare a unui Comitet
european pentru risc sistemic (JO L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).
Consiliului din 26 iunie 2013 privind situaiile financiare
anuale, situaiile financiare consolidate i rapoartele conexe
The President
M. SCHULZ
For the Council
The President
D. KOURKOULAS
(1) OJ C 39, 12.2.2013, p. 1.
(2) OJ C 44, 15.2.2013, p. 68.
(3) Position of the European Parliament of 15 April 2014
(not yet published in the Official Journal) and the
decision of the Council of 6 May 2014.
(4) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).
(5) Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the
activity of credit institutions and the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms,
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.
338).
(6) Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the
supplementary supervision of credit institutions,
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a
financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC,
93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and
Council (OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1).
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories
(OJ L 201, 7.2.2012, p. 1).
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Banking Authority), amending Decision No
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision
2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the
financial system and establishing a European Systemic
Risk Board (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual
financial statements, consolidated financial statements
217
ale anumitor tipuri de ntreprinderi, de modificare a

Directivei 2006/43/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului i de abrogare a Directivelor 78/660/CEE i
83/349/CEE ale Consiliului (JO L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19).
Consiliului din 15 mai 2014 privind pieele instrumentelor
financiare i de modificare a Directivei 2002/92/CE i a
Directivei 2011/61/UE (a se vedea pagina 349 din prezentul
Jurnal Oficial).
European i al Consiliului din 16 aprilie 2014 privind abuzul
de pia (regulamentul privind abuzul de pia) i de
abrogare a Directivei 2003/6/CE a Parlamentului European
i a Consiliului i a Directivelor 2003/124/CE, 2003/125/CE
i 2004/72/CE ale Comisiei (a se vedea pagina 1 din
prezentul Jurnal Oficial).
Consiliului din 16 aprilie 2014 privind schemele de
garantare a depozitelor (a se vedea pagina 149 din prezentul
Jurnal Oficial).
(14) Directiva nr. 98/26/CE a Parlamentului European i a
Consiliului din 19 mai 1998 privind caracterul definitiv al
decontrii n sistemele de pli i de decontare a titlurilor de
valoare (JO L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45).
Consiliului din 4 aprilie 2001 privind reorganizarea i
lichidarea instituiilor de credit (JO L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15).
Consiliului din 25 octombrie 2012 de coordonare, n vederea
echivalrii, a garaniilor impuse societilor comerciale n
statele membre, n nelesul articolului 54 al doilea paragraf
din Tratatul privind funcionarea Uniunii Europene, pentru
protejarea intereselor asociailor sau terilor, n ceea ce
privete constituirea societilor comerciale pe ac iuni i
meninerea i modificarea capitalului acestora (JO L 315,
14.11.2012, p. 74).
Consiliului din 5 aprilie 2011 privind fuziunile societilor
comerciale pe aciuni (JO L 110, 29.4.2011, p. 1).
(18) A asea Directiv 82/891/CEE a Consiliului din 17
decembrie 1982 n temeiul articolului 54 alineatul (3) litera
(g) din tratat, privind divizarea societ ilor comerciale pe
aciuni (JO L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 47).
Consiliului din 26 octombrie 2005 privind fuziunile
transfrontaliere ale societilor comerciale pe ac iuni (JO L
310, 25.11.2005, p. 1).
and related reports of certain types of undertakings,

amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182,
29.6.2013, p. 19).
(11) Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (see page 349 of
this Official Journal).
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on
market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC,
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC (See page 1 of this
Official Journal).
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Deposit
Guarantee Schemes (see page 149 of this Official
Journal).
(14) Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in
payment and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166,
11.6.1998, p. 45).
and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation
and winding-up of credit institutions (OJ L 125,
5.5.2001, p. 15).
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination
of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of
members and others, are required by Member States of
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, in respect of the formation of public
limited liability companies and the maintenance and
alteration of their capital, with a view to making such
safeguards equivalent (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 74).
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 concerning mergers of
public limited liability companies (OJ L 110, 29.4.2011,
p. 1).
(18) Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17
December 1982 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty,
concerning the division of public limited liability
companies (OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p. 47).
and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border
mergers of limited liability companies (OJ L 310,
25.11.2005, p. 1).
218

Consiliului din 21 aprilie 2004 privind ofertele publice de
cumprare (JO L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12).
Consiliului din 11 iulie 2007 privind exercitarea anumitor
drepturi ale acionarilor n cadrul societ ilor comerciale
cotate la burs (JO L 184, 14.7.2007, p. 17).
European de Asigurri i Pensii Ocupaionale) de
modificare a Deciziei nr. 716/2009/CE i de abrogare a
Deciziei 2009/79/CE a Comisiei (JO L 331, 15.12.2010, p.
48).
European pentru Valori Mobiliare i Piee), de modificare a
Deciziei nr. 716/2009/CE i de abrogare a Deciziei
2009/77/CE a Comisiei (JO L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).
(24) JO C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14.
(25) Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1024/2013 al Consiliului din 15
octombrie 2013 de conferire a unor atribuii specifice Bncii
Centrale Europene n ceea ce privete politicile legate de
supravegherea prudenial a instituiilor de credit(JO L 287,
29.10.2013, p. 63).
Consiliului din 13 iulie 2009 de coordonare a actelor cu
putere de lege i a actelor administrative privind organismele
de plasament colectiv n valori mobiliare (OPCVM) (JO L
302, 17.11.2009, p. 32).
Consiliului din 6 iunie 2002 privind contractele de garanie
financiar (JO L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).
Consiliului din 3 martie 1997 privind sistemele de
compensare pentru investitori (JO L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22).
(29) Recomandarea 2003/361/CE a Comisiei din 6 mai 2003
privind definirea microntreprinderilor i a ntreprinderilor
mici i mijlocii (JO L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).
(30) Directiva 2001/23/CE a Consiliului din 12 martie 2001
privind apropierea legislaiei statelor membre referitoare la
meninerea drepturilor lucrtorilor n cazul transferului de
ntreprinderi, uniti sau pri de ntreprinderi sau unit i (JO
L 82 22.3.2001, p. 16).
Consiliului din 8 iunie 2011 privind administratorii
fondurilor de investiii alternative i de modificare a
Directivelor 2003/41/CE i 2009/65/CE i a Regulamentelor
(CE) nr. 1060/2009 i (UE) nr. 1095/2010 (JO L 174,

and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (OJ
L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12).
and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of
certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (OJ L
184, 14.7.2007, p. 17).
(European Investment and Occupational Pensions
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and
repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ L 331,
15.12.2010, p. 48).
(European Securities and Markets Authority), amending
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission
Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).
(24) OJ C 369, 17.12.2011, p. 14.
(25) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15
October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287,
29.10.2013, p. 63).
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating
to undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32).
and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral
arrangements (OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).
(28) Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investorcompensation schemes (OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22).
(29) Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6
May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and
medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).
(30) Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees rights in the
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of
undertakings or businesses (OJ L 82 22.3.2001, p. 16).
and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives
2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011,
219
1.7.2011, p. 1).
Consiliului din 4 noiembrie 2003 privind prospectul care
trebuie publicat n cazul unei oferte publice de valori
mobiliare sau pentru admiterea valorilor mobiliare la
tranzacionare i de modificare a Directivei 2001/34/CE (JO
L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64).
Consiliului din 28 mai 2001 privind admiterea valorilor
mobiliare la cota oficial a unei burse de valori i
informaiile care trebuie publicate cu privire la aceste valori
mobiliare (JO L 184, 6.7.2001, p. 1).
(34) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 593/2008 al Parlamentului
European i al Consiliului din 17 iunie 2008 privind legea
aplicabil obligaiilor contractuale (Roma I) (JO L 177,
4.7.2008, p. 6).
Consiliului din 15 decembrie 2004 privind armonizarea
obligaiilor de transparen n ceea ce privete informa ia
referitoare la emitenii ale cror valori mobiliare sunt admise
la tranzacionare pe o pia reglementat i de modificare a
Directivei 2001/34/CE (JO L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38).
Consiliului din 5 aprilie 2011 privind fuziunile societilor
comerciale pe aciuni (JO L 110, 29.4.2011, p. 1).
European i al Consiliului din 26 iunie 2013 privind cerinele
prudeniale pentru instituiile de credit i firmele de investi ii
i de modificare a Regulamentului (UE) nr. 648/2012 (JO L
176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).
Consiliului din 15 mai 2014 de instituire a unui cadru pentru
redresarea i rezoluia instituiilor de credit i a firmelor de
investiii i de modificare a Directivei 82/891/CEE a
Consiliului i a Directivelor 2001/24/CE, 2002/47/CE,
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2012/30/UE i 2013/36/UE ale Parlamentului European i
ale Consiliului, precum i a Regulamentelor (UE) nr.
1093/2010 i (UE) nr. 648/2012 ale Parlamentului European
i ale Consiliului (JO L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).
Consiliului din 15 mai 2014 privind pieele instrumentelor
financiare i de modificare a Directivei 2002/92/CE i a
Directivei 2011/61/UE (JO L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 349).
p. 1).
and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to
the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive
2001/34/EC (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64).
and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of
securities to official stock exchange listing and on
information to be published on those securities (OJ L
184, 6.7.2001, p. 1).
(34) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ L
177, 4.7.2008, p. 6).
and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to
information about issuers whose securities are admitted
to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive
2001/34/EC (OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38).
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 concerning mergers of
public limited liability companies (OJ L 110, 29.4.2011,
p. 1.).
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit
institutions and investment firms and amending Council
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC,
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012,
of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L
173, 12.6.2014. p. 190).;
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ L 173,
12.6.2014, p. 349).;
Directive 82/891/EEC and Directives 2001/24/EC,
220
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,

2012/30/UE i 2013/36/UE, precum i a Regulamentelor
(UE) nr. 1093/2010 i (UE) nr. 648/2012 ale Parlamentului
European i ale Consiliului (JO L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,

2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).;
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)..
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)..
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).;
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)..
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC,
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
221

Consiliului din 16 aprilie 2014 privind schemele de
garantare a depozitelor (JO L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
redresarea i rezoluia instituiilor de credit i a societ ilor
de investiii i de modificare a Directivei 82/891/CEE a
2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/UE,
ANEX
SECIUNEA A
Informaii care trebuie incluse n planurile de redresare
Planul de redresare include cel puin urmtoarele informa ii:
1. | un rezumat al elementelor-cheie ale planului i un
rezumat al capacitii generale de redresare;
2. | un rezumat al modificrilor semnificative ale institu iei
survenite de la cel mai recent plan de redresare depus;
3. | un plan de comunicare i informare care s expun
modul n care ntreprinderea intenioneaz s gestioneze
eventualele reacii negative de pe pia;
4. | gama de aciuni privind capitalul i lichiditile necesare
pentru a menine sau a restabili viabilitatea i pozi ia
financiar a instituiei;
5. | o estimare a calendarului punerii n aplicare a fiecrui
aspect important al planului;
6. | o descriere detaliat a oricror obstacole semnificative n
calea realizrii efective i la timp a planului, inclusiv
consideraii privind impactul asupra restului grupului,
clienilor i partenerilor contractuali;
7. | identificarea funciilor critice;
8. | o descriere detaliat a proceselor pentru determinarea
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and

173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)..
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Deposit
Guarantee Schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190).;
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC,
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
173, 12.6.2014, p. 190)..
ANNEX
SECTION A
Information to be included in recovery plans
The recovery plan shall include the following
information:
(1) | A summary of the key elements of the plan and a
summary of overall recovery capacity;
(2) | a summary of the material changes to the institution
since the most recently filed recovery plan;
(3) | a communication and disclosure plan outlining how
the firm intends to manage any potentially negative
market reactions;
(4) | a range of capital and liquidity actions required to
maintain or restore the viability and financial position of
the institution;
(5) | an estimation of the timeframe for executing each
material aspect of the plan;
(6) | a detailed description of any material impediment to
the effective and timely execution of the plan, including
consideration of impact on the rest of the group,
customers and counterparties;
(7) | identification of critical functions;
(8) | a detailed description of the processes for
222
valorii i a tranzacionabilitii liniilor de activitate de baz,

a operaiunilor i activelor instituiei;
9. | o descriere detaliat a modului n care planificarea
redresrii este integrat n structura guvernan ei corporative
a instituiei, precum i a politicilor i procedurilor care
guverneaz aprobarea planului de redresare i identificarea
persoanelor din organizaie care sunt responsabile cu
pregtirea i punerea n aplicare a planului;
10. | mecanismele i msurile pentru conservarea sau
reconstituirea fondurilor proprii ale instituiei;
11. | mecanismele i msurile pentru a garanta c institu ia
are acces la surse adecvate de finanare de urgen , inclusiv
la poteniale surse de lichiditi, o evaluare a garaniilor
disponibile i o evaluare a posibilitii de a transfera
lichiditi ntre entitile i ntre liniile de activitate din grup,
pentru a garanta c acesta i poate continua activitatea i i
poate ndeplini n continuare obligaiile n momentul n care
devin exigibile;
12. | mecanismele i msurile pentru a reduce riscul i
efectul de levier;
13. | mecanismele i msurile de restructurare a pasivelor;
14. | mecanismele i msurile de restructurare a liniilor de
activitate;
15. | mecanismele i msurile necesare pentru a men ine
accesul continuu la infrastructurile pieelor financiare;
16. | aranjamentele i msurile necesare pentru a men ine
funcionarea continu a proceselor operaionale ale
instituiei, inclusiv infrastructura i serviciile IT;
17. | mecanismele pregtitoare menite s faciliteze vnzarea
activelor sau a liniilor de activitate ntr-un interval de timp
adecvat pentru a restabili soliditatea financiar;
18. | alte aciuni sau strategii de gestionare menite s
restabileasc soliditatea financiar i efectul financiar
anticipat al acestor aciuni sau strategii;
19. | msurile pregtitoare pe care le-a luat sau inten ioneaz
s le ia instituia pentru a facilita punerea n aplicare a
planului de redresare, inclusiv msurile necesare pentru a
permite recapitalizarea n timp util a instituiei;
20. | un cadru de indicatori care identific situa iile n care
pot fi luate msurile adecvate menionate n plan.
SECIUNEA B
Informaii pe care autoritile de rezoluie le pot solicita
instituiilor n scopul elaborrii i actualizrii planurilor de
rezoluie
Autoritile de rezoluie le pot solicita instituiilor s
transmit, n scopul elaborrii i actualizrii planurilor de
rezoluie, cel puin urmtoarele informaii:
1. | o descriere detaliat a structurii organizatorice a
determining the value and marketability of the core

business lines, operations and assets of the institution;
(9) | a detailed description of how recovery planning is
integrated into the corporate governance structure of the
institution as well as the policies and procedures
governing the approval of the recovery plan and
identification of the persons in the organisation
responsible for preparing and implementing the plan;
(10) | arrangements and measures to conserve or restore
the institutions own funds;
(11) | arrangements and measures to ensure that the
institution has adequate access to contingency funding
sources, including potential liquidity sources, an
assessment of available collateral and an assessment of
the possibility to transfer liquidity across group entities
and business lines, to ensure that it can continue to carry
out its operations and meet its obligations as they fall
due;
(12) | arrangements and measures to reduce risk and
leverage;
(13) | arrangements and measures to restructure
liabilities;
(14) | arrangements and measures to restructure business
lines;
(15) | arrangements and measures necessary to maintain
continuous access to financial markets infrastructures;
(16) | arrangements and measures necessary to maintain
the continuous functioning of the institutions operational
processes, including infrastructure and IT services;
(17) | preparatory arrangements to facilitate the sale of
assets or business lines in a timeframe appropriate for the
restoration of financial soundness;
(18) | other management actions or strategies to restore
financial soundness and the anticipated financial effect of
those actions or strategies;
(19) | preparatory measures that the institution has taken
or plans to take in order to facilitate the implementation
of the recovery plan, including those necessary to enable
the timely recapitalisation of the institution;
(20) | a framework of indicators which identifies the
points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan
may be taken.
SECTION B
Information that resolution authorities may request
institutions to provide for the purposes of drawing up and
maintaining resolution plans
Resolution authorities may request institutions to provide
for the purposes of drawing up and maintaining
resolution plans at least the following information:
(1) | a detailed description of the institutions
223
instituiei, inclusiv o list a tuturor persoanelor juridice;
organisational structure including a list of all legal

persons;
2. | identificarea deintorilor direci i a procentului (2) | identification of the direct holders and the
drepturilor de vot i al altor drepturi ale fiecrei persoane percentage of voting and non-voting rights of each legal
juridice;
person;
3. | sediul, jurisdicia locului de nregistrare, licen ele i (3) | the location, jurisdiction of incorporation, licensing
principalii administratori ai fiecrei persoane juridice;
and key management associated with each legal person;
4. | o hart a operaiunilor critice ale instituiei i a liniilor de (4) | a mapping of the institutions critical operations and
activitate de baz, inclusiv deinerile semnificative de active core business lines including material asset holdings and
i pasive aferente respectivelor operaiuni i linii de liabilities relating to such operations and business lines,
activitate, n funcie de persoanele juridice;
by reference to legal persons;
5. | o descriere detaliat a elementelor de pasiv ale institu iei i (5) | a detailed description of the components of the
ale tuturor persoanelor juridice ale acesteia, defalcate cel pu in institutions and all its legal entities liabilities,
pe tipuri i valori ale datoriilor pe termen scurt i lung, separating, at a minimum by types and amounts of
garantate, negarantate i subordonate;
short term and long-term debt, secured, unsecured and
subordinated liabilities;
6. | detalii cu privire la pasivele instituiei care sunt pasive (6) | details of those liabilities of the institution that are
eligibile;
eligible liabilities;
7. | identificarea proceselor necesare pentru a stabili entit ile (7) | an identification of the processes needed to
n favoarea crora instituia a constituit garan ii reale, determine to whom the institution has pledged collateral,
persoana care deine garania i jurisdicia n care este situat the person that holds the collateral and the jurisdiction in
garania;
which the collateral is located;
8. | o descriere a angajamentelor n afara bilan ului ale (8) | a description of the off balance sheet exposures of
instituiei i ale persoanelor sale juridice, inclusiv stabilirea the institution and its legal entities, including a mapping
de corespondene cu operaiunile critice i liniile de to its critical operations and core business lines;
activitate de baz ale instituiei;
9. | principalele operaiuni de acoperire a riscurilor ale (9) | the material hedges of the institution including a
instituiei inclusiv stabilirea de corespondene cu persoanele mapping to legal persons;
juridice;
10. | identificarea principalelor sau a celor mai importante (10) | identification of the major or most critical
contrapri ale instituiei, precum i o analiz a impactului counterparties of the institution as well as an analysis of
intrrii n dificultate a principalelor contrapr i asupra the impact of the failure of major counterparties in the
situaiei financiare a instituiei;
institutions financial situation;
11. | fiecare sistem n care instituia efectueaz tranzac ii (11) | each system on which the institution conducts a
numeroase sau de o valoare semnificativ, inclusiv stabilirea material number or value amount of trades, including a
de corespondene cu persoanele juridice, operaiunile critice mapping to the institutions legal persons, critical
i liniile de activitate de baz ale instituiei;
operations and core business lines;
12. | fiecare sistem de plat, de compensare sau de decontare (12) | each payment, clearing or settlement system of
n cadrul cruia instituia este membru direct sau indirect, which the institution is directly or indirectly a member,
inclusiv stabilirea de corespondene cu persoanele juridice, including a mapping to the institutions legal persons,
operaiunile critice i liniile de activitate de baz ale critical operations and core business lines;
instituiei;
13. | un inventar detaliat i o descriere a principalelor sisteme (13) | a detailed inventory and description of the key
de gestiunare a informaiei, inclusiv cele de gestiunare a management information systems, including those for
riscurilor, de contabilitate i de raportare financiar i risk management, accounting and financial and
statutar utilizate de instituie, inclusiv stabilirea de regulatory reporting used by the institution including a
corespondene cu persoanele juridice, opera iunile critice i mapping to the institutions legal persons, critical
liniile de activitate de baz ale instituiei;
14. | identificarea proprietarilor sistemelor identificate la (14) | an identification of the owners of the systems
punctul 13, a acordurilor privind furnizarea serviciilor legate identified in point (13), service level agreements related
224
de acestea, precum i a oricror programe informatice i

sisteme sau licene, inclusiv stabilirea de coresponden e cu
persoanele juridice, operaiunile critice i liniile de activitate
de baz ale instituiei;
15. | identificarea i descrierea persoanelor juridice i a
interconexiunilor i interdependenelor dintre diferitele
persoane juridice, cum ar fi | | personal, facilit i i
sisteme comune sau partajate; | | mecanisme de capital, de
finanare sau de lichiditate; | | expuneri de credit existente
sau contingente; | | acorduri de garanii personale
ncruciate, acorduri de garanii reale ncruciate, acorduri
privind clauze de tip cross-default i acorduri de tip
compensare ncruciat ntre entiti afiliate; | |
aranjamente privind transferul riscului i aranjamente de
tranzacionare back-to-back; acorduri privind furnizarea de
servicii;
16. | autoritatea competent i autoritatea de rezolu ie pentru
fiecare persoan juridic;
17. | membrul conducerii superioare responsabil cu
furnizarea informaiilor necesare pentru elaborarea planului
de rezoluie al instituiei, precum i persoanele responsabile,
dac difer, cu persoane juridice, operaiuni critice i linii de
activitate de baz diferite;
18. | o descriere a mecanismelor pe care instituia le-a pus la
punct pentru a se asigura c, n caz de rezoluie, autoritatea
de rezoluie va dispune de toate informaiile necesare, astfel
cum au fost stabilite de ctre autoritatea de rezoluie, pentru
aplicarea instrumentelor i a competenelor de rezolu ie;
19. | toate acordurile ncheiate de instituii i de persoanele
lor juridice cu tere pri, a cror ncetare poate fi declan at
de o decizie a autoritilor de a aplica un instrument de
rezoluie i dac urmrile provocate de ncetare pot afecta
aplicarea instrumentului de rezoluie;
20. | o descriere a eventualelor surse de lichiditate n
sprijinul rezoluiei;
21. | informaii privind grevarea cu sarcini a activelor,
activele lichide, activitile n afara bilanului, strategiile de
acoperire mpotriva riscurilor i practicile de nregistrare
contabil.
SECIUNEA C
Chestiuni pe care autoritatea de rezoluie trebuie s le ia n
considerare la evaluarea posibilitii de soluionare a unei
instituii sau a unui grup
Atunci cnd evalueaz posibilitatea de soluionare a unei
instituii sau a unui grup, autoritatea de rezoluie ine cont de
urmtoarele aspecte:
Atunci cnd se evalueaz posibilitatea de soluionare a unui
grup, referirile la o instituie trebuie s includ orice
instituie sau entitate din cadrul unui grup menionat la
thereto, and any software and systems or licenses,

including a mapping to their legal entities, critical
(15) | an identification and mapping of the legal persons
and the interconnections and interdependencies among
the different legal persons such as: | | common or
shared personnel, facilities and systems; | | capital,
funding or liquidity arrangements; | | existing or
contingent credit exposures; | | cross guarantee
agreements, cross-collateral arrangements, cross-default
provisions and cross-affiliate netting arrangements; | |
risks transfers and back-to-back trading arrangements;
service level agreements;
(16) | the competent and resolution authority for each

legal person;
(17) | the member of the management body responsible
for providing the information necessary to prepare the
resolution plan of the institution as well as those
responsible, if different, for the different legal persons,
critical operations and core business lines;
(18) | a description of the arrangements that the
institution has in place to ensure that, in the event of
resolution, the resolution authority will have all the
necessary information, as determined by the resolution
authority, for applying the resolution tools and powers;
(19) | all the agreements entered into by the institutions
and their legal entities with third parties the termination
of which may be triggered by a decision of the
authorities to apply a resolution tool and whether the
consequences of termination may affect the application
of the resolution tool;
(20) | a description of possible liquidity sources for
supporting resolution;
(21) | information on asset encumbrance, liquid assets,
off-balance sheet activities, hedging strategies and
booking practices.
SECTION C
Matters that the resolution authority is to consider when
assessing the resolvability of an institution or group
When assessing the resolvability of an institution or
group, the resolution authority shall consider the
following:
When assessing the resolvability of a group, references
to an institution shall be deemed to include any
institution or entity referred to in point (c) or (d) of
225
articolul 1 alineatul (1) literele (c) sau (d):

1. | msura n care instituia poate stabili corespondene ntre
liniile de activitate de baz, respectiv opera iunile critice i
persoanele juridice;
2. | msura n care structurile juridice i corporative sunt
armonizate cu liniile de activitate de baz i operaiunile
critice;
3. | msura n care sunt n vigoare mecanisme care vizeaz
asigurarea personalului, a infrastructurii, a finanrii, a
lichiditilor i a capitalului pentru a sprijini i men ine
liniile de activitate de baz i operaiunile critice;
4. | msura n care acordurile de servicii ale instituiei sunt
integral executabile n eventualitatea unei rezoluii a
instituiei;
5. | msura n care structura administrativ a instituiei este
adecvat pentru gestionarea i asigurarea conformitii cu
politicile interne ale instituiei cu privire la acordurile sale
privind furnizarea de servicii;
6. | msura n care instituia dispune de un proces pentru
transferarea treptat ctre teri a serviciilor furnizate n
cadrul contractelor privind furnizarea de servicii n caz de
separare a funciilor critice sau a liniilor de activitate de
baz;
7. | msura n care exist planuri i msuri de contingen
pentru a asigura continuitatea n ceea ce prive te accesul la
sistemele de plat i decontare;
8. | capacitatea sistemelor informatice de gestiune de a
garanta c autoritile de rezoluie sunt n msur s
colecteze informaii exacte i complete privind liniile de
activitate de baz i operaiunile critice, astfel nct s se
faciliteze luarea de decizii rapide;
9. | capacitatea sistemelor informatice de gestiune de a
furniza informaiile eseniale pentru rezoluia eficace a
instituiei n orice moment, chiar i atunci cnd condiiile se
schimb rapid;
10. | msura n care instituia i-a testat sistemele informatice
de gestiune pe baza scenariilor de criz astfel cum sunt
definite de autoritatea de rezoluie;
11. | msura n care instituia poate asigura continuitatea
funcionrii sistemelor sale informatice de gestiune, att
pentru instituia afectat, ct i pentru noua instituie n cazul
n care operaiunile critice i liniile de activitate de baz sunt
separate de restul operaiunilor i liniilor de activitate;
12. | msura n care instituia a elaborat proceduri
corespunztoare pentru a se asigura c ofer autorit ilor de
rezoluie informaiile necesare pentru identificarea
deponenilor i a sumelor acoperite de schemele de garantare
a depozitelor;
13. | n cazul n care grupul folosete garanii intragrup,
Article 1(1) within a group:

(1) | the extent to which the institution is able to map
core business lines and critical operations to legal
persons;
(2) | the extent to which legal and corporate structures are
aligned with core business lines and critical operations;
(3) | the extent to which there are arrangements in place
to provide for essential staff, infrastructure, funding,
liquidity and capital to support and maintain the core
business lines and the critical operations;
(4) | the extent to which the service agreements that the
institution maintains are fully enforceable in the event of
resolution of the institution;
(5) | the extent to which the governance structure of the
institution is adequate for managing and ensuring
compliance with the institutions internal policies with
respect to its service level agreements;
(6) | the extent to which the institution has a process for
transitioning the services provided under service level
agreements to third parties in the event of the separation
of critical functions or of core business lines;
(7) | the extent to which there are contingency plans and
measures in place to ensure continuity in access to
payment and settlement systems;
(8) | the adequacy of the management information
systems in ensuring that the resolution authorities are
able to gather accurate and complete information
regarding the core business lines and critical operations
so as to facilitate rapid decision making;
(9) | the capacity of the management information systems
to provide the information essential for the effective
resolution of the institution at all times even under
rapidly changing conditions;
(10) | the extent to which the institution has tested its
management information systems under stress scenarios
as defined by the resolution authority;
(11) | the extent to which the institution can ensure the
continuity of its management information systems both
for the affected institution and the new institution in the
case that the critical operations and core business lines
are separated from the rest of the operations and business
lines;
(12) | the extent to which the institution has established
adequate processes to ensure that it provides the
resolution authorities with the information necessary to
identify depositors and the amounts covered by the
deposit guarantee schemes;
(13) | where the group uses intra-group guarantees, the
226
msura n care garaniile respective sunt furnizate n condi ii

de pia, iar sistemele de gestionare a riscurilor aferente
acestor garanii sunt solide;
14. | n cazul n care grupul se angajeaz n tranzac ii back
to back, msura n care aceste tranzacii sunt efectuate n
condiii de pia, iar sistemele de gestionare a riscurilor
aferente acestor tranzaciile sunt solide;
15. | msura n care utilizarea garaniilor intragrup sau a
tranzaciilor de nregistrare back to back spore te
contaminarea din cadrul grupului;
16. | msura n care structura juridic a grupului mpiedic
aplicarea instrumentelor de rezoluie, ca urmare a numrului
de persoane juridice, a complexitii structurii grupului sau a
dificultii de a stabili corespondene ntre liniile de
activitate i entitile din grup;
17. | valoarea i tipul pasivelor eligibile ale instituiei;
18. | n cazul n care evaluarea implic un holding cu
activitate mixt, msura n care rezoluia entit ilor din grup
care sunt instituii sau instituii financiare ar putea avea un
impact negativ asupra prii nefinanciare a grupului;
19. | existena i soliditatea acordurilor privind furnizarea de
servicii;
20. | dac autoritile rilor tere dispun de instrumentele de
rezoluie necesare pentru a sprijini msurile de rezolu ie
ntreprinse de autoritile de rezoluie din Uniune, precum i
posibilitatea de aciune coordonat ntre autorit ile din
Uniune i din rile tere;
21. | fezabilitatea utilizrii instrumentelor de rezoluie n
conformitate cu obiectivele rezoluiei, innd seama de
instrumentele disponibile i de structura instituiei;
22. | msura n care structura grupului i permite autorit ii
de rezoluie s procedeze la rezoluia ntregului grup sau a
uneia sau mai multora dintre entitile din grup fr s
produc un efect negativ semnificativ, direct sau indirect,
asupra sistemului financiar, ncrederii pieei sau economiei i
cu scopul de a maximiza valoarea grupului n ansamblul su;
23. | mecanismele i mijloacele prin care ar putea fi facilitat
rezoluia n cazul grupurilor care au filiale stabilite n
jurisdicii diferite;
24. | credibilitatea utilizrii instrumentelor de rezolu ie n
conformitate cu obiectivele rezoluiei, innd cont de
impactul posibil asupra creditorilor, contrapr ilor, clienilor
i angajailor, precum i de eventualele msuri pe care le-ar
putea lua autoritile rilor tere;
25. | msura n care impactul rezoluiei instituiei asupra
sistemului financiar i asupra ncrederii pieei financiare
poate fi evaluat n mod adecvat;
extent to which those guarantees are provided at market

conditions and the risk management systems concerning
those guarantees are robust;
(14) | where the group engages in back-to-back
transactions, the extent to which those transactions are
performed at market conditions and the risk management
systems concerning those transactions practices are
robust;
(15) | the extent to which the use of intra-group
guarantees or back-to-back booking transactions
increases contagion across the group;
(16) | the extent to which the legal structure of the group
inhibits the application of the resolution tools as a result
of the number of legal persons, the complexity of the
group structure or the difficulty in aligning business lines
to group entities;
(17) | the amount and type of eligible liabilities of the
institution;
(18) | where the assessment involves a mixed activity
holding company, the extent to which the resolution of
group entities that are institutions or financial institutions
could have a negative impact on the non-financial part of
the group;
(19) | the existence and robustness of service level
agreements;
(20) | whether third-country authorities have the
resolution tools necessary to support resolution actions
by Union resolution authorities, and the scope for
coordinated action between Union and third-country
authorities;
(21) | the feasibility of using resolution tools in such a
way which meets the resolution objectives, given the
tools available and the institutions structure;
(22) | the extent to which the group structure allows the
resolution authority to resolve the whole group or one or
more of its group entities without causing a significant
direct or indirect adverse effect on the financial system,
market confidence or the economy and with a view to
maximising the value of the group as a whole;
(23) | the arrangements and means through which
resolution could be facilitated in the cases of groups that
have subsidiaries established in different jurisdictions;
(24) | the credibility of using resolution tools in such a
way which meets the resolution objectives, given
possible impacts on creditors, counterparties, customers
and employees and possible actions that third-country
authorities may take;
(25) | the extent to which the impact of the institutions
resolution on the financial system and on financial
markets confidence can be adequately evaluated;
227
26. | msura n care rezoluia instituiei ar putea avea un efect

negativ semnificativ, direct sau indirect, asupra sistemului
financiar, asupra ncrederii pieei sau asupra economiei;
27. | msura n care contaminarea altor instituii sau a
pieelor financiare ar putea fi controlat prin aplicarea
instrumentelor i competenelor de rezoluie;
28. | msura n care rezoluia instituiei ar putea avea un efect
semnificativ asupra sistemelor de pli i de decontare.
(26) | the extent to which the resolution of the institution

could have a significant direct or indirect adverse effect
on the financial system, market confidence or the
economy;
(27) | the extent to which contagion to other institutions
or to the financial markets could be contained through
the application of the resolution tools and powers;
(28) | the extent to which the resolution of the institution
could have a significant effect on the operation of
payment and settlement systems.
228

BRRD Bilingv

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

BRRD Bilingv

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

12.6.

2014 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 173/190

12.6.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 173/190

DIRECTIVA 2014/59/UE A PARLAMENTULUI

DIRECTIVE 2014/59/EU OF THE EUROPEAN

dup transmiterea proiectului de act legislativ ctre

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2) | The financial crisis was of systemic dimension in

lichiditate din partea bncilor centrale i garan ii din partea

(5) | Este prin urmare necesar instituirea unui regim care s

support from central banks and guarantees from Member

repartizeze pierderile n mod corect i previzibil. Aceste

(6) | The ongoing review of the regulatory framework, in

(7) | The exercise of such powers and the measures taken

este valabil atunci cnd, din cauza unor abordri diferite,

approaches mean that national authorities do not have the

fac obiectul unei iniiative legislative separate care s

covered by a separate legislative initiative establishing a

interconectare i de complexitate, un plan de redresare ar

complexity, a recovery plan could be reduced to some

(17) | Effective resolution of institutions or group entities

acest sens, coninutul solicitat ar trebui s in cont de natura

schemes. Accordingly, the required content should take

(27) | In order to comply with the principle of

Comitetului european pentru risc sistemic, nfiin at n

European Parliament and of the Council (9).

(30) | Measures proposed to address or remove

(34) | In the case of group resolution plans, the potential

de rezoluie, dup caz. Dac este cazul, ar trebui respectate

processes where appropriate. Where applicable,

desemnat de autoritatea competent. Acetia nu ar mai trebui

the competent authority. They should no longer retain

atunci cnd instituia este n imposibilitatea de a- i plti

except in the particular circumstances laid down in this

considerare impactul potenial al rezoluiei n toate statele

account the potential impact of the resolution in all the

(45) | In order to avoid moral hazard, any failing

procedura obinuit de insolven. Prin urmare, obiectivele

should therefore be to ensure the continuity of critical

(46) | The winding up of a failing institution through

(48) | When applying resolution tools and exercising

intra n dificultatesau sunt susceptibile de a intra n

and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of

(50) | Interference with property rights should not be

creditorii au primit ca plat sau compensare a crean elor

is determined that shareholders and creditors have

obinute mai eficient prin adoptarea de msuri care nu sunt

be achieved more effectively by taking actions which are

(56) | Problems in financial markets in the Union arising

(60) | n cazul n care pentru a transfera serviciile de

(60) | Where the resolution tools have been used to

(61) | The sale of business tool should enable authorities

timp necesar planificrii i structurrii procesului de

plan and structure the resolution of the institution in

(68) | In order to ensure that resolution authorities have

aplicat cu scopul de a reface fondurile proprii ale institu iei

of restoring the capital of the failing institution to enable

excluznd entitile care fac parte din acela i grup, cu o

(71) | As the protection of covered depositors is one of

(73) | Where those exclusions are applied, the level of

de cel puin 8 % din totalul pasivelor, incluznd fondurile

have already been absorbed, and the funding provided by

(74) | In extraordinary circumstances, where liabilities