Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs

Last modified on Thursday, September 24, 1998, by Malcolm R. Forster

Points of Disagreement between Lakatos and Kuhn
1. Subjective or objective? Kuhns demarcation criterion appears to be
subjective--it depends on what scientists do and what they believe (their
psychology). In contrast, Lakatos insists that "a statement may be
pseudoscientific even if it is eminently plausible and everyone believes in
it." Belief that earth is flat may count as an example of that. And "it may be
scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable and nobody believes in it."
Copernicus's theory that the sun moves like that, and very few believed in
evolution when Darwin introduced his theory.
2. Sociology or logic? Another point of disagreement between Kuhn and Lakatos
is whether a demarcation criterion should be talking about which statements
are scientific or pseudoscientific, or whether it should be saying which
community is scientific or unscientific. Lakatos, as a neo-Popperian, was
raised in the tradition in which logic was the main tool in philosophy of
science, whereas Kuhn is more interested in the sociology of science.
3. Religion or Science? Kuhn compares science to religion, but Lakatos rejects
this comparison.
Main Point of Agreement between Lakatos and Kuhn
Any good science can be practiced in a pseudoscientific way. The demarcation
between science and pseudoscience refers to its method and not just what the
theory says (its content).

For example, some evolutionists may be tempted to fill in auxiliary

assumptions in an ad hoc way by working backwards from what is to be
explained. For example, if see from the fossil record that horses teeth
become elongated, we may be tempted into using evolutionary theory to
infer that there was some change in the environment that made shorter teeth
less fit, and then explain the change by appealing to the law of natural
selection that "only the fittest survive."

It would be equally easy for Newtonian mechanics to be practiced in a

pseudoscientific way. After all, Newtons law of inertia says that a body
continues in a straight line with uniform velocity until acted on by a force, and
then defines a force as anything that diverts a body from uniform motion in a
straight line.

Lakatos on Poppers Demarcation Criterion

1. Lakatos argues that falsifiable already refers to how science is practiced. He

interprets Popper as demanding that scientists "specify in advance a crucial
experiment (or observation) which can falsify it, and it is pseudoscientific if
one refuses to specify such a potential falsifier. If so, Popper does not
demarcate scientific statements for pseudoscientific ones, but rather
scientific method from non-scientific method."
2. While Poppers criterion does focus on practice, it is still wrong because it
"ignores the remarkable tenacity of theories." Scientists will either invent
some rescue hypothesis (accommodate the theory) or ignore the problem
and direct their attention to other problems. For example, some problems
may be too hard (nobody rejected Newtonian mechanics because it couldnt
predict all the properties of turbulent fluid flow, or the chaotic motion of a
physical pendulum).
A Puzzle about Prediction
Earlier, we saw that Popper's two examples, Adler's theory at one extreme, and
Einstein's theory at the other, illustrated a difference between accommodation and
prediction. Adler's theory merely accommodated the facts because it worked
backwards from the evidence E to the auxiliary assumption A needed so that the
theory T entailed E (T & A E). At the other extreme, if intellectual honesty
requires that a scientist specify a potential falsifier in advance, then they must
specify A in advance. That is a sufficient condition for the theory to make a
prediction. But is it necessary?
Lakatoss Picture of Science
The typical unit of science is not an isolated hypothesis, but rather a research
programme, consisting in a hard core (theory), protective belt (auxiliary
assumptions) and a heuristic.
Lakatos quote: A heuristic is a "powerful problem solving machinery, which with
the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even
turns them into positive evidence. For instance, if a planet does not move exactly as
it should, the Newtonian scientist checks his conjectures concerning atmospheric
refraction, concerning propagation of light in magnetic storms, and hundreds of
other conjectures that are all part of the programme. He may even invent a hitherto
unknown planet and calculate its position, mass and velocity in order to explain the
anomaly." (Lakatos, 1977, p. 5)

In Kuhn's terminology: Heuristics are hints about how to solve normal science
puzzles.

In my terms: A heuristic is a hint about how to change the auxiliary

assumptions so that the theory better fits the facts.

The negative heuristic forbids scientists to question or criticize the hard core of a
research programme. "The positive heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of
suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the 'refutable variants' of the
research programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the 'refutable' protective belt."
(Lakatos, 1970, p.135).
Example: Le Verrier and Adams were faced with the following problem in Newton's
theory of planetary motion. There were discrepancies (unpredicted wobbles) in the
motion of the outermost planet known at the time (Uranus). They postulated that
these might be caused by a hitherto unknown planet. Based on that conjecture they
recalculated the solutions to Newton's equations, and fit the solutions to the known
data for Uranus. That fit even predicted the position of the postulated planet,
whereupon Neptune was seen for the first time once telescopes were pointed in that
direction (actually, it was later discovered that it had been seen before, but
mistaken for a comet).

In this example, the positive heuristic used was something like this: "If there
is an anomaly in Newton's theory on the assumption that there are n planets,
then try assuming that there are n+1 planets."

The Role of Background Evidence

We have identified auxiliary assumptions with Lakatos's protective belt. That is, we
are assuming that auxiliary assumptions are always provisional in some sense.
However, we must now decide whether to count statements of background
evidence, prior observations, and data, as auxiliary assumptions. They are auxiliary
in the sense that they are needed in order to make predictions. In the Le VerrierAdams example it would be impossible to predict the position of the postulated
planet without making use of the observed positions of Uranus, and the other
planets. Let use refer to this background data by the letter D ('D' for data). We now
replace the previous pattern of inference (T & A E) by the pattern:
T & A & D E.
We still refer to A as the auxiliary assumption, but with the explicit understanding
that it excludes the background observational evidence or data D.
Models
It may be useful at this point to introduce the concept of a model. A model is
theoretical statement, (often in the form of an equation) usually deduced from a
theory with the aid a auxiliary assumptions. That is, a model M is equal to a theory
T combined with an auxiliary assumption A (which will be long list of assumptions in
most cases). That is, M = T & A.
Example: In the LeVerrier-Adams example, there was first a Newtonian model of
planetary motion that assumed that there are only 7 planets. There were

discrepancies between the predictions of this model and the observed motions of
Uranus. Therefore, the model was replaced by one that assumed the existence of 8
planets. Not only did that accommodate the anomalous motion of Uranus, but it
predicted position of the eighth planet, whereupon Neptune was discovered.
Remarks:
1. A model M is falsified when M & D E because D is not blamed for the failed
prediction. Therefore, models are falsifiable, or refutable, even though
theories are not.
2. The notion of a 'model' corresponds to Lakatos's notion of a 'refutable variant
of a theory'. If a Lakatosian heuristic defines an ordered list of auxiliary
assumptions, A0, A1, A2, A3, ... then it also defines an ordered list of models M0,
M1, M2, M3, ...
3. This use of the term 'model' differs from two other uses that are common in
the philosophy of science. (a) A 'model' as in a model airplane. Such models
do appear in science, such as in the 'model of the DNA molecule' Watson and
Crick used, which was made of wooden balls joined with sticks. (b) 'Model' in
the sense used by mathematicians in model theory. There it has a rather
technical meaning, which corresponds roughly to what logicians call an
interpretation of a language (an assignment of objects to names, set of
objects to properties, a set of object pairs to relations, and so on).
4. Scientists use the term 'model' all the time, and it very rarely fits sense (a)
and absolutely never fits sense (b). Our use of the term best fits the standard
scientific usage.
Solution to the Puzzle about Prediction
If a heuristics exists, then a scientist has an ordered list of suggested models M0, M1,
M2, M3, ... Now the theory T is no longer falsifiable in Popper's methodological sense,
for if a scientist tries makes the prediction E0 from model M0 and E0 proves to be
false, then the scientist does not blame T, but instead moves to M1, because it is
next on the ordered list, and so on. Scientists now predict E1 because M1 & B E1.
And so on. There is no falsifiability of the theory, but it can still make predictions.
Thus, the idea of a heuristic may save the distinction between accommodation and
prediction, and thereby providing a weaker sufficient condition for prediction.

Note that the research program makes a different set of predictions at

different times. This allows Lakatos to introduce the idea of novel
predictions--new predictions not make before.

When Should One Model Supercede Another?

Lakatos does not believe that falsification is important in science, but like Kuhn, he
does recognize that theories, or paradigms, are superceded in science. He objects
to Kuhn's description of this process, of scientific revolutions, as being a like a
religious conversion, or a social revolution. Lakatos things that the process is more
objective. Here is his view.
Thesis: A model M supercedes a model M if and only if (1) M has excess
empirical content over T : that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in
light of, or even forbidden by M; (2) M explains the previous success of M, that is,
all the unrefuted content of M is contained (within the limits of observational error)
in the content of M ; and (3) some excess content of M is corroborated. (see
Lakatos, 1970, p. 116; the phrase "should supercede" is my paraphrase, and I have
replaced 'theory' by 'model'.)

This is Lakatos's account of normal science.

Lakatos introduces some new terminology to help formulate his theory of science.
1. A problemshift is a series of models ...M1, M2, ... such that (i) each can explain
the empirical success of its predecessor, and (ii) each can explain at least
some of the emprical failure of it predecessor as well. In other words, a
Lakatosian problemshift occurs whenever a Kuhnian solution to a normal
science puzzle is found, since to be a solution is must remove the anomaly
with creating new one. Note that a problemshift does not have to make novel
predictions.
2. A theoretically progressive problemshift is a problemshift that predicts some
novel facts.
3. A problemshift is empirically progressive if it is theoretically progressive and
some of the novel predictions have been corroborated.
Note: In Lakatos's original writings, Lakatos uses the word 'theory' instead of
'model', but only because he fails to make the distinction. I think that he models in
mind.
Definition: A problemshift is progressive if it is theoretically and empirically
progressive. Otherwise the problemshift is degenerating. The idea of a degenerating
problemshift corresponds to Kuhn's notion of crisis.
Example 1: The LeVerrier-Adams discovery of Neptune is a great example of a
problemshift that was progressive, because (1) it led to novel predictions (the
position of Neptune), which (2) were then corroborated.
Example 2: Ptolemaic astronomy was degenerating not because it failed to be
theoretically progressive (Ptolemaic astronomers had the option of adding more
epicycles) but because it was not empirically progressive. That is, adding an

epicycle would lead to novel predictions, but they were not corroborated
(confirmed).
Lakatos on Revolutions
What is Lakatos's theory about when one theory should supercede another? In fact,
Lakatos does not provide such a criterion. Not even when one research program is
degenerating and another is progressive does Lakatos say that scientists do or
should only work on the progressive one, because like the stock-market, they may
change their status over time.

The methodology of scientific research programmes does not offer instant

rationality.

It is not irrational for a scientist to work on a young research programme if she

thinks it shows potential. Nor is it irrational for a scientist to stick with an old
programme in the hope of making it progressive. Thus, Lakatos appears to agree
with Kuhn that theory change is a rather fuzzy phenomenon. But he does insist that
it depends on the assessment of objective facts--the future progressiveness or
degeneration of research programs. The decision of scientists, however, must rely of
their subjective predictions of the future course of science. Unlike Kuhn, Lakatos
does not think that the uncertainty makes these decisions irrational.
Example 3: Prout's program. Prout, in 1815, claimed that the atomic weights of all
pure elements were whole numbers. He knew that the experimental results known
at the time did not confirm his theory, but he thought that this arose because
chemical substances as they naturally occurred were impure. Thus, there ensued a
program of research whereby chemical substances were purified by chemical
means. This program led from one failure to the next. The program at this stage was
degenerating. However, Rutherford's school explained this failure by the fact that
different elements can be chemically identical (as explained by the periodic table).
They proposed that the substances should be purified by physical means (powerful
centrifuges), whereupon the program made a progressive shift. Lakatos (1970,
pp.138-140) uses this as an example of why it would be wrong to advise scientists
to instantly abandon a degenerating research program.
Question: We have talked about Lakatos's view of normal science and
revolutionary science. However, this is separate from the demarcation issue. Popper
thinks that the essence of science lies in the nature of revolutions, but Kuhn thinks
that the essence of science lies in the nature of non-revolutionary science. Where
does Lakatos stand on this issue?
Lakatos's Demarcation Criterion
Lakatos is not explicit about his demarcation criterion in the passage we read, but
he is explicit about in his 1970 article: "We 'accept' problemshifts as 'scientific' only

if they are at least theoretically progressive; if they are not, we 'reject' them as
'pseudoscientific.'" (1970, p. 118)
Presumably, therefore, a research program is scientific if and only if it is at least
theoretically progressive. Note that it is possible for a research program to be
scientific at one time, but not at another. It is even that a program practiced by one
group is scientific, while the practice of another group is pseudoscientific. This is
how Lakatos is agreeing with Kuhn's point that even a good theory can always be
practiced in a pseudoscientific was. Thus, Adler's theory (about inferiority
complexes) might potentially be a good theory, but the fact is that it was being
practiced in a pseudoscientific way (if Popper's account is correct).

Lakatos is agreeing with Kuhn, against Popper, that the essence of science
lies in the nature of normal science.

Example 4: Astrology. Astrology has no theoretically progressive problemshifts, and

therefore no empirically progressive problemshifts. That is, it made no novel
predictions, despite that fact that it made predictions. Therefore, astrology was not
a science.
Example 5: Prout's program. While Prout's program was degenerating, it was still
theoretically progressive, and hence scientific.
Example 6: Jeane Dixon was a self-proclaimed psychic who predicted that JFK's
assassination. She made over 200 predictions each year (most of them wrong of
course). Did her method count as scientific? It would be by Popper's criterion, but
not by Kuhn's or Lakatos's demarcation criteria. Like astrology, there was no
Kuhnian puzzle solving, and no theoretically progressive problemshifts.
Musgrave's Criticisms of Lakatos
In an article called "Method or Madness" (in Cohen, R. S., Feyerabend, P. K.. and
Wartofsky, M. W. (eds) Essays in Memory of Irme Lakatos, Dordrecht, Holland, D.
Reidel), Alan Musgrave (1976) raises some interesting objections to Lakatos's theory
of science, which I have expanded upon in places.
1. Is the negative heuristic needed? Before 1850, Newtonian seldom treated
Newton's law of gravitation as part of the hard core. Therefore, scientists did
not follow Lakatos's methodology and render Newton's laws unfalsifiable by
fiat. And why should scientists have to specify in advance not to modify or
renounce them in the face of difficulties. Surely, it is enough that it is harder
to produce theoretically problemshifts by changing central assumptions
because it is then harder to explain all the successes of the superceded
model. But there is no reason to rule it out in advance.
2. Are positive heuristics always specified in advance? Where was the
positive heuristic in the example of Prout's program? No-one tried physical

separation of chemical substances as soon as the chemical methods failed.

They kept trying to improve the chemical methods. It was only after the
discovery of chemical similarities that the hint or suggestion appeared.
3. Why not compare one research program against another? Musgrave
thinks that Lakatos is overcautious in not recommending any rule for choice
between competing research programs. Why not say, that on the whole, the
scientific community should devote more resources to progressive as
opposed to degenerating research programs?