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Building a DICOM/HL7 compliant

Anonymizer Service conforming to


HIPAA De-identification Regulations
Winter Project Work December-January 2014-15
by
Sanchit Alekh
under the guidance of
Mr. Gaur Sunder

Advanced Computing Training School


Centre for Development of Advanced Computing
Westend Center III, Aundh
Pune - 411007 , Maharashtra

Contents
1 Introduction
1.1

1.2

An Introduction to the Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.1

DICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.2

Health Level 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.3

HIPAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An Introduction to the SDKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.1

C-DAC Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for DICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2

C-DAC Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for HL7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Why De-identify DICOM and HL7 Files?

11

3 Implementation

13

3.1

Analysis after Preliminary Study of DICOM Standard . . . . . . . .

13

3.2

Clinical Trial De-identification Profiles - Supplement 142 . . . . . .

14

3.3

Determining the Attributes to be De-identified . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.4

How the determined attributes are De-identified . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.5

PERT Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.6

Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

4 Results and Conclusion

23

5 Scope for Future Work

24

ii

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Mr Gaur Sunder for building the foundation
of the project, as well as providing necessary technical guidance at the outset,
which made the direction of the project absolutely lucid and clear. He would also
like to acknowledge Mr Aditya Kumar Sinha for giving him a chance to work
on a Winter Project at C-DAC Aundh, Pune, and for the constant support and
motivation through the course of the project. A special mention to Ms Vineeta
Tiwari and Ms Avanti Joshi who were always present for any kind of assistance
related to the project, and who monitored the progress on a daily basis to make it
reach its conclusion.

Date: January 2nd 2015

Certificate
This is to certify that Mr. Sanchit Alekh has successfully completed the project
titled Building a DICOM/HL7 compliant Anonymizer Service conforming to HIPAA De-identication Regulations under the guidance of Mr. Gaur
Sunder as a Project Trainee at the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, Pune
This Project Report is the proof and record of the bonafide research work carried
out by him from December 2014-January 2015.

Mr. Aditya Kumar Sinha


Principal Technical Officer
Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, Pune

Date: January 2nd 2015

Abstract
DICOM and HL7 have emerged as the most widely used standards for representation
and communication of medical textual as well as imaging data. However, as the
amount of transactions between PACS systems increase, so does the probability of
data pilferage, which puts a huge amount of sensitive Patient Health Information
at risk. Ensuring HIPAA conformance is a now a legal requirement in the United
States. We have used CDACs DICOM and HL7 Software Development Kit to
create an Anonymizer Service that takes in a DICOM/HL7 compliant data, deidentifies it to comply to HIPAA, and serializes the modified file, which can then
be used for transmission to external PACS or for research. The software identifies
and extracts the DICOM and HL7 tags for the 18 Personal Health Identifiers, as
prescribed by HIPAA and feeds in dummy anonymized data in place of the original
data.

Keywords: DICOM, HL7, HIPAA, PACS, De-identification, Anonymization

Chapter 1
Introduction
In the present age of unprecedented blast of data, not just in Medical Sciences, but
in different other domains, privacy has become an important concern. With reference to Medical Informatics, if databases containing sensitive archived information
are made available to the public, there can be a serious breach of privacy. Legal
systems such as HIPAA are in place, to ensure that medical service providers can
not unscrupulously reveal Personal Health Information (PHI). At the same time,
we are presented with a trade-off. The information removed while de-identifying
structured or unstructured data must not affect the dataset to an extent that it
becomes useless for research.
As Medical Science spreads its wings, need was felt to adopt standards for the
methods of exchange of data, data security and storage, queries and communication.
Additionally, the reliance on automated information systems has made imperative
to make sure that data architecture across different applications are not ad-hoc
and idiosyncratic. At the same time, with sophisticated machinery operating in
the Health Domain, need was also felt to minimize incompatibility and maximize
interoperability [14]. Keeping the aforementioned points in mind, two standards,
namely HL7 (abbreviation for Health Level Seven) and DICOM (abbreviation for
Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) rose into prevalence.

1.1
1.1.1

An Introduction to the Standards


DICOM

DICOM is an ISO certified standard (ISO 12052) that defines the formats for medical images that can be exchanged with the data and quality necessary for clinical
use. Additionally, it also defines the data structures (formats) for medical images
and related data, network oriented services, e. g. image transmission, query of an
image archive (PACS), print and RIS - PACS - modality integration. DICOM is implemented in almost every radiology, cardiology imaging, and radiotherapy device
(X-ray, CT, MRI, ultrasound, etc.), and increasingly in devices in other medical
domains such as ophthalmology and dentistry. With tens of thousands of imaging
devices in use, DICOM is one of the most widely deployed Healthcare Messaging
standards in the world. There are literally billions of DICOM images currently in
use for clinical care. Since its first publication in 1993, DICOM has revolutionized
the practice of radiology, allowing the replacement of X-ray film with a fully digital
workflow. Much as the Internet has become the platform for new consumer information applications, DICOM has enabled advanced medical imaging applications that
have changed the face of clinical medicine. From the emergency department, to cardiac stress testing, to breast cancer detection, DICOM is the standard that makes
medical imaging work for doctors and for patients. [10]In 1995, DICOM was accepted as a formal standard in Europe (MEDICOM, ENV 12052). The latest official
documentation of DICOM can be found at http://medical.nema.org/standard.html

1.1.2

Health Level 7

Health Level Seven refers to the set of ANSI certified international standards for
the exchange of clinical and administrative information between Hospital Information Systems. The standard aims to achieve a reduction in custom interface programming, support exchanges among the widest variety of technical environments,
programming languages and operating systems, and to be built upon the experi5

ence of existing protocols and accepted industry-wide standard protocols. The term
Level 7 refers to the highest level of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model
of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). HL7 corresponds to
the conceptual definition of an application-to-application interface operating in the
seventh layer of the OSI model, and therefore the reference. The Standard currently addresses the interfaces among various systems that send or receive patient
admissions/registration, discharge or transfer (ADT) data, queries, resource and
patient scheduling, orders, results, clinical observations, billing, master file update
information, medical records, scheduling, patient referral, and patient care. It does
not try to assume a particular architecture with respect to the placement of data
within applications but is designed to support a central patient care system as well
as a more distributed environment where data resides in departmental systems.
Instead, HL7 serves as a way for inherently disparate applications and data architectures operating in a heterogeneous system environment to communicate with
each other. [14] In the current project, we used the version 2.5 of Health Level 7.
The full documentation of the various versions of Health Level 7 can be found at
http://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/index.cfm?ref=nav

1.1.3

HIPAA

HIPAA stands for Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act - 1996. A
major goal of the Privacy Rule is to assure that individuals health information is
properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to provide
and promote high quality health care and to protect the public health and well
being. The Rule strikes a balance that permits important uses of information, while
protecting the privacy of people who seek care and healing. Given that the health
care marketplace is diverse, the rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive
to cover the variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed.[9] In its
definition of Personal Health Identifiers, HIPAA enlists 18 attributes that must be
de-identified before the medical data can be made public for research and analysis.[2]
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They are :1. Names


2. All geographical subdivisions smaller than a State, including street address,
city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the
initial three digits of a zip code, if according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census: (1) The geographic unit formed
by combining all zip codes with the same three initial digits contains more
than 20,000 people; and (2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such
geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual,
including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all
ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age,
except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single category
of age 90 or older
4. Phone numbers
5. Fax numbers
6. Electronic mail addresses
7. Social Security numbers
8. Medical record numbers
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers
10. Account numbers
11. Certificate/license numbers
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers

13. Device identifiers and serial numbers


14. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs)
15. Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers
16. Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints
17. Full face photographic images and any comparable images
18. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code

1.2

An Introduction to the SDKs

The code for this project was written in Java SE 1.7 on Eclipse IDE using the
Centre for Development of Advanced Computings Medical Informatics Standards
SDK for DICOM and HL7

1.2.1

C-DAC Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for DICOM

C-DACs Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for DICOM is


a toolkit that provides APIs for applications/ medical devices to comply with NEMAs DICOM Standard. The toolkit is designed to be easily programmable allowing
DICOM developers to build sophisticated and complex applications on top of it.
The layered approach gives ability to build applications exploiting different levels
of capabilities defined by DICOM standard. The toolkit provides comprehensive
implementation of all standard-defined IODs with supported transfer syntax. It
also has complete support for all Composite and Normalized services defined in the
standard. This enables developers to build DICOM-defined SCU/SCP components
for any required set of IODs for required set of transfer syntaxes. The toolkit is
provided as pre-built set of SKUs of combination of DIMSE Services and IODs.
Object oriented approach of the toolkit allows developers to build applications in
8

short time. The toolkit provides default implementations for almost all the functionalities defined by the standard. This enables rapid development of applications
through default mechanisms. [3] Some of the most notable features of the SDK are
as follows : Complete set of supported IODs and DIMSE Services
Common API Framework
Rapid Application Development Tool
High Return on Investment
Dual View Approach
Highly configurable and extensible
Debugging, Validation and logging support
Memory and speed efficient

1.2.2

C-DAC Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for HL7

C-DACs Medical Informatics Standards Software Development Kit for HL7 is a


toolkit that provides APIs for applications/ medical devices to comply with Health
Level 7s HL7 Standard.It is a rapid application development tool which provides
high return on investment through cost effective implementation of the standard.The
toolkit provides comprehensive implementation of all standard-defined systems like
Patient Administration System, Financial Management System, etc. All HL7 defined messages/ events and queries are supported by the toolkit. This enables
programmers to build comprehensive Health Information Systems using toolkit.
Since the toolkit helps building applications and is itself not an application, it is
designed to be highly configurable and extensible. It can be configured for logging
9

mechanism, internationalization support. HL7 defined value tables are available


by default with the library. Along with this, the programmer can add custom
value tables to the library. The toolkit performs strict validations as per HL7 standard specifications. Logging support is customizable and it supports different levels
during logging enabling developers to debug applications and view data generated
during protocol violation.[4]Some of the notable features of the SDK are : Complete set of HL7-defined systems
Common API Framework
Rapid Application Development Tool
High Return on Investment
Object-Oriented Approach
Highly configurable and extensible
Debugging, Validation and logging support

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Chapter 2
Why De-identify DICOM and
HL7 Files?
Electronic Health Records are changing the landscape of Medical Sciences. They are
not only making patient-data more accessible and organized, but also cost-effective.
A survey by the eHealth Initiative [5] proved the increasing impact of e-health systems on Health Information Exchange. In the survey conducted, about 69 percent
of the 130 participants reported a positive effect on cost reduction resulting from
reduced staff time, less redundant tests and a reduction of patient admissions. Over
two-thirds of US hospitals (68 percent) had either fully or partially implemented
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) in 2006. EHRs promise long-term cost reduction (about $175 billion a year in the US) and faster processing in the evaluation
of patient data [6]
However, such a massive prevalent usage of EHRs have led to a compromise of
patient privacy. The introduction of electronic health systems is accompanied by the
discussion of security and privacy issues. For example, HIPAA privacy Complaints
grew by 6% in 2008 [7][13]and surveys show that the majority of organizations
is unprepared for many security threats. DICOM offers a low degree of security
mechanisms, and it is unto the implementer to implement the security features that
form a part of DICOM.
11

Both DICOM and HL7 standards were made for easy interoperability of Medical
Data, and privacy concerns were not top priority. The Security Modules were added
later, but not without inherent deficiencies. The security of DICOM is heavily
dependent on the encryption of the Communication Channels. However, for highly
sensitive medical data, this is often not sufficient. Therefore security measures need
to be coupled with health archive systems such as the PACS.[1] Abouakil et. al
suggested a method of policy based disclosure system, where patient must have the
right to decide who should be able to access his/her data. [1] Insider threats have
become a more serious problem than external attackers, and therefore sharing data
with all doctors without policy-based access is problematic. [8]
Moreover, research conducted by Lakhani et. al has shown that out of the
existing DICOM anonymizers, only two DICOM programs anonymized 100% of
tags directly containing PHI named by HIPPA. DICOMWORKS anonymized the
least PHI (18%), followed by MIRC (45%), DVTK (55%), RUBO (64%), OSIRIX
(64%), FP IMAGE (100%), and DICOM ANON LIGHT (100%) using their default settings. All of the programs failed to anonymize some degree of patient- or
study-specific information that could potentially represent or lead to discovery of
PHI or patient identity. MIRC anonymized the least of this information (16%),
followed by DICOMWORKS (26%), OSIRIX (39%), FP IMAGE (50%), RUBO
(53%), DVTK (66%), and DICOM ANON LIGHT (84%). Many freely available
DICOM anonymizers still leave PHI and other specific information that could represent or lead to the identity of a patient, and therefore vigilance should be used
even after anonymization.[12] However, if HIPAA-conformance is not ensured, DICOM data can not be published for research purposes, and can not be freely shared.
Therefore, the need for a fresh approach to DICOM anonymization was felt, which
led to the birth of this project.

12

Chapter 3
Implementation
3.1

Analysis after Preliminary Study of DICOM


Standard

After a comprehensive study of the DICOM 2014c standard as well as its security
profiles, it was found that since DICOM specifies all its attributes across all Information Object Definitions in the form of tags, which are a compiund of group and
element numbers, the first step of any de-identification process would be to extract
the tags of potentially identifying Patient Information, as prescribed by HIPAA
in its set of 18 Personal Health Identifiers (PHI). On the basis of a Preliminary
Analysis, a broad Project Outline was constructed, which is illustrated in Fig 4.1
Data Dictionary in the DICOM standard contains the registry of all DICOM
Data Elements and all DICOM Unique Identifiers that are defined within the standard, therefore the software would have to parse the Data Dictionary and find the
pre-identified tags. Fig 4.2 shows the DICOM Data Dictionary format (taken from
Table 6-1 of the DICOM Standard Documentation) . C-DACs DICOM SDK defines the DictionaryReader class that gives the populated instance of the DICOM
Dictionary through which all DICOM specified data elements can be accessed. The
following code snippet, for example, creates an instance of the DictionaryReader

13

class called as newDictionary, and retrieves the name of the attribute given by the
tag 0x0020, 0x000E, which is then printed to console.

DictionaryReader newDictionary = DictionaryReader.createInstance();


String strName = dicreader.getName(0x0020,0x000E);
System.out.println(strName);

Figure 3.1: Proposed Workflow after Preliminary Analysis

3.2

Clinical Trial De-identification Profiles - Supplement 142

Supplement 142 was introduced later, as an addition to the DICOM Security Profile, and was later added to the DICOM documentation as part of Chapter 15, ie.
14

Figure 3.2: Typical Structure of DICOM Data Dictionary


DICOM Security Modules. DICOM Supplement 142 states the following :In clinical trials, images are often acquired during the course of clinical care, in
which case the patients individually identifiable information needs to be removed to
protect the patients privacy. In addition, there is often a need to remove other information not directly related to the patients identity per se, but which might assist in
recovering their identity or bias the image interpretation in some way. Conversely,
it is important to preserve certain specific information for quality control and analysis that is essential to the conduct of the clinical trial, which might otherwise be
removed. Since many clinical trials are conducted globally, both nationally and locally specific privacy concerns (such as espoused by the EU Directive and HIPAA
rule and individual IRBs and ethics committees) need to be addressed. Data and
images acquired for clinical trials are also often released for secondary re-use, in
which case addressing privacy concerns requires great vigilance. In general, it is
impractical to leave the decisions as to what to retain or remove the individual sites
or trials. There are also other scenarios in which de-identification may be required,
15

such as creation of teaching files, other types of publication, as well as submission


of images and associated information to registries, such as oncology or radiation
dose registries. [11]
The Supplement 142 contained an exhaustive list of attributes and their tags
and the actions for de-identification of the DICOM file. An illustration of what
fields and content a typical Supplement 142 table contained is illustrated in Fig
4.3 On the basis of what data was removed, DICOM created four kinds of Clinical
trials de-identification profiles. They were :1. Retain Patient Characteristics
2. Retain Device Information
3. Retain UIDs
4. Retain Safe Private Option

3.3

Determining the Attributes to be De-identified

The two reference sources from where the names of the attributes can be retrieved
is by using the DICOM Data Dictionary in entirety, HIPAA Safe Harbor List [2]
and the exhaustive list given by DICOM Supplement 142 [11]. However, since the
aim of the project is to build a HIPAA-conforming anonymizer, the best approach is
to pick up those attributes from the exhaustive list given in Supplement 142 which
also do not comply to HIPAA regulations.
Eg. when we try to look at the first out of the 18 PHI attributes as given
by HIPAA, i.e. name, and try to find out the exact attibutes and their tags of
all the name attributes in the Supplement 142 document, we come across 22 such
attributes, which are given in Fig 4.4. Therefore, in the de-identification process,
for the PHIs of type Name, these 22 attributes will be de-identified by the software.

16

Figure 3.3: De-identification Table as given in the Supplement 142

17

Figure 3.4: Name Attributes to be De-identified

18

3.4

How the determined attributes are De-identified

Once the required attributes have been determined, the SDK can be used to parse
the DICOM file, de-identify the relevant attributes, and serialize the file back in the
DICOM format. A Deidentifier class has been created that will execute the process
of the De-identification. In the implementation, two arrays are created for each PHI
type, storing the group and element numbers of the attributes to be de-identified.
An instance of the Data Dictionary is created, and for each of the indexed groupelement pair thus formed, the code looks up the name of the attribute from the
Data Dictionary. The code then retrieves the DataElement for that group-element
pair, and instead, puts in the de-identified string given by Anonymized + name of
attribute . As for example, if the group-element pair is 0x0010,0x0010, then the
de-identified string will be Anonymized Patient Name.

3.5

PERT Chart

For a month-long project, time management and planning are detrimental and play
a major role in determining the efficacy of the project. Fig 3.5 illustrates the project
timeline in the form of a Pert Chart.

Figure 3.5: PERT Chart for the Project

19

3.6

Code

import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;

import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.baselibs.DCMInit;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.baselibs.ImplicitDE;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.utils.DicomConstants;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.commoninterface.IDataElement;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.commoninterface.IDataSet;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.commoninterface.IDicomFileHeader;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.commoninterface.IDictionaryReader;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.commoninterface.ITransferSyntax;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.dicomparserserializers.DicomParser;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.dicomparserserializers.DicomSerializer;
import
cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.dictionaryreaderwriters.DictionaryReader;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.enums.EnumLoggingLevel;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.enums.EnumValidationMode;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.utils.DicomConfig;
import cdac.medinfo.sdk.dcm30_04.utils.ICollectionIterator;

public class Deidentifier {

int name_group[] =
{0x0070,0x4008,0x0040,0x0008,0x0008,0x0008,0x0040,0x0008,0x0010,0x0010,0x0010,
0x0010,0x0040,0x0008,0x0040,0x0018,0x0008,0x300E,0x0040,0x0040,0x0008,0x0040
};
int name_element[] = {0x0084,0x0119,0x4037,0x0080,0x1040,0x1060,
0x1010,0x1070,0x0001,0x1005,0x1060,0x0010,0x0242,0x1050,0xA123,0x1030,0x0090,

20

0x0008,0x0006,0x0010,0x1010,0xA075};
int num_name = 22;
DictionaryReader dicreader;
IDataSet objIDataSet = null;
IDataElement objIDataElement = null;
ITransferSyntax objITransferSyntax = null;
IDicomFileHeader objDicomFileHeader = null;
DicomParser objDicomParser = null;

public IDataSet deidentifyName(IDataSet dataset, boolean pass){

dicreader = DictionaryReader.createInstance();
int iterator;
String value;
objITransferSyntax = dataset.getTransferSyntax();

//Im saving the dictionary reference in a variable called as


strName
for(iterator=0 ; iterator<num_name; iterator++){
String strName = dicreader.getName(iterator,iterator);
System.out.println("Deidentifying" + strName);

if(dataset.isPresent(iterator, iterator)){
value = (String) dataset.getDataForTag(iterator,
iterator).getValue();
System.out.println("Initial value was" + value);

IDataElement anonymized = new


ImplicitDE(iterator,iterator,"Anonymized "+
strName,objITransferSyntax,dicreader);
dataset.addDataElement(anonymized);

21

value = (String) dataset.getDataForTag(iterator,


iterator).getValue();
System.out.println("Anonymized value is" + value);
}
}
return dataset;
}

22

Chapter 4
Results and Conclusion
Although adopting a straight-forward approach to DICOM De-identification, the
application was able to identify the attribute tags to be anonymized, parse and
extract the tag data from the supplied DICOM file, feed it with the dummy data,
and serialize it into a new DICOM file. In this way, while maintaining the Value
Representations of the DICOM File Structure and the Information-Object Definitions intact, the file follows a Part-10 DICOM compliance, as well as the legality is
maintained as HIPAA has been conformed to. A PACS server can now be used to
facilitate DICOM communication over the network, as well as act as a authenticator
of Image Origin and a hospital-wide HIPAA compliance guarantor.
De-identification, on one hand, should be able to remove all the risky elements,
but the same time, should not remove important notes which can be detrimental
for Biomedical Research. Such free-text notes in DICOM headers can be passed
through an open-source anonymizer service such as MIST, which consists automatic
de-identification to comply to HIPAA standards. MIST is a Machine-Learning tool,
which needs to be manually-trained on a corpus of data. Then, a standard model
is formed, which is then used for the de-identification. By conforming to HIPAA
regulations, the application creates a data set, that is not only legal for research
and analysis purposes, but also contains important information in its original form,
which may be very important for Biomedical Research.
23

Chapter 5
Scope for Future Work
De-identification of DICOM and HL7 data is only a one-step approach towards
ensuring data privacy. Violations are still possible. Using a modality of security
measures such as Digital Signature Profile, Secure Transport Connection Profile,
Media Storage Security Profiles along with de-identification results in a wholesome
approach where data sniffing over the communication network is also taken into
account. The application currently does not implement DIMSE services for communication of the DICOM files, and which will be the next priority in terms of
research. Moreover, as hospitals shift to Web-based services, WADO (Web Access
to DICOM Objects) shall also come into play, and Part-10 DICOM compliance shall
not serve the purpose. An issue with any irreversible data removal is possible loss
of important information that you might need to use later. This might well be one
of the major disadvantages of de-identification. Some alternative approaches such
as an efficient method of selective anonymization or pseudonymization along with
other DICOM Security Profiles can be used to ensure better Data Security. These
issues will be addressed in our future work.

24

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[13] Forrester Research. The value of corporate secrets: How compliance and collaboration affect enterprise perceptions of risk.
[14] Health Level Seven. Hl7 messaging standard version 2.5, 2003.

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