IMBONG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two
delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed
Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall
be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative
district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5,
and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality
of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set
the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within
the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application
with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the
Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office
in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

25APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),
and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
(1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
(2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on
the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375
failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the
Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules

and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are

declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy,
and resources.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no
leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the
TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of
their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive
of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional
mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his
view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may
be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other
rulings.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November
10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early
morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting
age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC
and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be
null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue
whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates
the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The
jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both
subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in
Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which
states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to
assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not
separately but together.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Digested

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELFEXECUTING

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel
sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came
to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII

Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such
a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a

convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs)
for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President.
Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because
apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and a future "emperor of
the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and
the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to
shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be
included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the
Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the
qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the
capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional
provision?

CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political
party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that
the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of
qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and
he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,

entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason
for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded
as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations
owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office
are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long
as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for
office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide
candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by

irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the
remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international

lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a
high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only
requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the
day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended
by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does
not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP
is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to
forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046
and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA

[IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE

MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

>NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO. 183591

Posted on May 7, 2010 by krizsexzy
>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in
2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all
natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local
statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions
on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF
is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions
of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and
the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access
to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are
complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16
Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date
of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites
in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of
the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative

body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of

October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency
to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2
(2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..
The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so

that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.