When A Document Is In Two Or More Copies Executed At Or About The Same

Time, With Identical Contents, All Such Copies Are Equally Regarded As
Originals
by The Lawyer's Post March 20, 2015 Comments Off on When A Document Is In
Two Or More Copies Executed At Or About The Same Time, With Identical
Contents, All Such Copies Are Equally Regarded As Originals
In 2000, Capitol Shoes Factory, a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of
shoes, and Traveler Kids, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing,
importing and distribution of shoes and sandals agreed to a business arrangement
whereby TKI would import shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its factory in China
according to the designs and specifications of TKI. TKI would pay 30% of the purchase
by way of letters of credit, while 70 % would be thru telegraphic transfer. Averring that
TKI has unpaid accounts amounting to US$325,451.39 and manufactured
US$92,000.00 pursuant to its designs and specifications, and TKI failed to pay despite
numerous concessions and extensions, CSFL, after demand sent, filed a complaint for
sum of money and damages against TKI. At trial, CSFL thru its witness, identified
several invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI, but
TKI objected to its presentation being mere photocopies of documents. TKI also
objected to presentation of evidence to prove the amount of attorneys fees as the issue
of attorneys fees was not raised as an issue during the pre-trial. CSFL then rested its
case and filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, marking as evidence the earlier documents
objected to by TKI for being mere photocopies, and documents proving the amount for
its claim of attorneys fees. Despite vigorous opposition from TKI, the trial court admitted
the exhibits, and ordered TKI to present its evidence. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order, but the RTC denied it, asseverating that the documentary
exhibits can be admitted as the duplicate originals were already identified by CSFLs
principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu. As to the documents proving claim for attorneys
fees, the same may be admitted as the issue of attorneys fees was impliedly raised as
issue on whether TKI should be liable to CSFL. TKI then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals to question the RTC orders; lacking any TRO to suspend trial, the
RTC considered TKI as having waived its right to present evidence and for CSFL to
present its memorandum. The Court of Appeals, acting on the petition for certiorari filed
by TKI, partially granted it. Applying Section 3 of Rule 130, it ruled that Susan Chius
identification of the photocopies merely established its due execution and existence of
the original invoices. It did not however present the originals of the documents contrary
to Section 5 of Rule 120, hence it denied its admission. As to attorneys fees, the CA
agreed with the RTC. CSFL thus fled a petition for review of the CA decision.
The Supreme Court:
The Court finds merit in the petition.
After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered elevated, the Court
is of the considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips
denominated as Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1, which were duplicate
originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document.

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
xxxx
In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and Associated Bank[1], it
was stressed that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of
the said decision read:
Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the
original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it
must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific)
presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes. (Rollo, p.
42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is
undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore
admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not
bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In
People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that
the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to
be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature
being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either
of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.
[Emphases supplied]
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFLs principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain
that Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 were duplicate originals of invoices and
order slips, and not mere photocopies. She testified as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q

The documents that you have brought today, to what records do they belong?

A Those originals are from our company because one copy was sent to the customer
and one we keep in our company, Sir.
Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular transaction Miss
Witness, how many copies do you prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the
invoice will you prepare?
A

Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office sir.

Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that were retained to
you in your office, the copies you brought to court?

Yes sir[2].

[Emphases supplied]
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly
explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular
transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court combed
through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered
were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the
subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time. The
Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not
apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the
assertion ofTKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their
photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these
but were missed by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what
were produced in court and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs
further reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the
records[3].
The Court notes that this case involves a foreign entity and has been pending since
October 6, 2005[4]. It is about time that this case be decided on the merits. At this
juncture, the Court reminds counsel for TKI of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see
to it that the orderly administration of justice be not unduly impeded.
After the admission of CSFLs exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let trial proceed in
due course instead of immediately resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own
testimonial and documentary evidence and in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal
the same in accordance with law. After all, the RTC stated that, granting that the
questioned exhibits were not admissible, there still remained enough evidence to
substantiate plaintiffs claim on which the Court can validly render judgment upon
application of the pertinent law and/or jurisprudence[5]. In the case of Johnson Lee v.
People of the Philippines[6], it was written:
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the
public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the
photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original
copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission
of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court
admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the
admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his
evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate
appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only
questions of law may be properly raised.

[Emphases supplied]
WHEREFORE, the October 5, 2011 Decision and the January 16, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120413, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as the exclusion of Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 are
concerned. The May 13, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon
City, is REINSTATED.
The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for appropriate proceedings.
The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it with dispatch.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200065, September 24, 2014, CAPITAL SHOES
FACTORY, LTD., PETITIONER, VS. TRAVELER KIDS, INC., RESPONDENT.
RA 7610: A Child Is Deemed Subjected To Other Sexual Abuse When He Or She
Engages In Lascivious Conduct Under The Influence Or Coercion Of An Adult
by The Lawyer's Post January 17, 2015 Comments Off on RA 7610: A Child Is
Deemed Subjected To Other Sexual Abuse When He Or She Engages In Lascivious
Conduct Under The Influence Or Coercion Of An Adult

Vivencio, Executive Director of a credit cooperative, was charged with violation of

Section 5(b) Article III of Republic Act 7610, after he allegedly mashed the breast of
AAA, daughter of BBB who works as secretary and treasurer at the credit cooperative.
AAA was left alone after BBB left for some errands. Vivencio then closed the door of the
office, ashes AAA if she was feeling any pain, and when she answered tooth ache,
proceeded to mash her breast. Not content with the breast, Vivencio also slid his hand
towards her abdomen. When BBB returned, AAA narrated the incident, thus they
reported it to the legal department. After trial, Vivencio was convicted as charred by the
RTC, thus he appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed it. In his appeal to the
Supreme Court, he alleges the following errors: he was charged with two offenses, one
for violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, and one for violation of RA 7610; the prosecutor had
no authority to filed the case, as the complaint for acts of lasciviousness was not signed
by the mother or victim; further, the case for violation of Section 5(b) only applies when
the child is engaged in prostitution; AAA, not being engaged in prostitution, the case
should not apply to him.
The Supreme Court:
The petition is bereft of any merit.
First, Roallos claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged
him with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the
crime in the Information is clear Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The mention of the phrase acts of lasciviousness in the Information does not mean
that Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of

the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited
to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
In any case, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information.
The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed
against Roallos clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]
2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse[; and]
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. (Emphasis supplied)
The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts
towards AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It
likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos,
was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.
In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding
Roallos criminally liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident. Further, the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed lascivious
conduct towards AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by
the lower courts, which this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual
findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the
court below. The Court finds no reason to overturn the factual findings as the lower
courts in this case.
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit.
[T]he law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The
very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No.
7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult.

Second, Roallos claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without
any warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise
untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v. People, the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped
from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal
of the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People, the Court stressed that the absence of a proper
preliminary investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived
his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in
the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and
must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance
and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already
submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable
cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in
his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he
never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict, entered a plea of
not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by
attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his
own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once
again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence
of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and
actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection
to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation.
Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed
to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated.
The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by

vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right
has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of
the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.
In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must
show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which
ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more
delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought
for by the prosecution did not, in any way, seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay
in the proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not
render the charge against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not
conform to the filing of the Information against Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously
pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos claim, AAA
executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of Roallos.[26] The foregoing
circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the charge
against Roallos.
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Notwithstanding that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Roallos shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is
prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other
hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and
maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; medium
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and
maximum reclusion perpetua.[27]
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in
this case, both the RTC and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the minimum
term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
the maximum term. The Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts in
the amount of P15,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil
indemnity awarded by the CA. The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in

the amount of P20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of moral damages awarded
by the RTC to P50,000.00 and imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to
reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P15,000.00, as well as the
award of civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all
monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013, VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y
TRILLANES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To
Establish Paternity And Filiation
by The Lawyer's Post December 17, 2014 Comments Off on Mere Physical
Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish
Paternity And Filiation
Florencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against Camelo.
According to her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a household
helper and it was there that she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While
working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they had sexual
intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she discovered that she
was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife, suspecting
her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo brought her to
Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
Camelo. On the other hand, Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the
son. He averred that in the course of her employment, Florencia would often go home to
her husband and return to work the next morning, which displeased his wife and sent
home Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited
her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They had sexual
intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being pregnant.
The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that owing to the
physical resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son who was
presented in open court, there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo.
Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus elevated his case to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the
appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not
affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living
and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that
a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as
evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004, CAMELO CABATANIA,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT
PATERNITY AND FILIATION PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To
Establish Paternity And Filiation
by The Lawyer's Post December 17, 2014 Comments Off on Mere Physical
Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish Paternity
And Filiation
Florencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against Camelo.
According to her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a household
helper and it was there that she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While

working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they had sexual
intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she discovered that she
was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife, suspecting
her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo brought her to
Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to
Camelo. On the other hand, Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the
son. He averred that in the course of her employment, Florencia would often go home to
her husband and return to work the next morning, which displeased his wife and sent
home Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited
her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They had sexual
intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being pregnant.
The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that owing to the
physical resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son who was
presented in open court, there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo.
Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus elevated his case to the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary
recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the
appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not
affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living
and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that
a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as
evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

RA 9225: Where The Private Handwritten Document Was Accompanied By Other

Relevant And Competent Evidence, It Suffices That The Claim For Filiation Be
Shown To Be Handwritten By The Acknowledging Parent
by The Lawyer's Post February 14, 2015 Comments Off on RA 9225: Where The
Private Handwritten Document Was Accompanied By Other Relevant And
Competent Evidence, It Suffices That The Claim For Filiation Be Shown To Be
Handwritten By The Acknowledging Parent
Jenie and Christian Dominique lived together as husband and wife in 2005, thus Jenie
became pregnant. In September, 2005, however, Dominique died. Two months later,
Jenie gave birth to Christian. She then applied for registration of the birth of Christian,
attaching his Certificate of Live Birth, the Affidavit To Use Surname Of The Father, which
she executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by Dominiques
father, Domingo. Attached to the affidavit to use surname is an Autobiography written
by Dominique during his lifetime, where he narrated his personal circumstances, and
the fact that he had fallen in love with Jenie, and that the latter is pregnant and living
with him at their house. It was unsigned by Dominique, however. The City Civil Registrar
of Antipolo, by letter, denied his application for registration of birth certificate, averring
that the same does not comply with Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004, because the minor was born out of wedlock, Dominique died prior to his birth,
thus cannot execute anymore the Affidavit Of Acknowledgment of Paternity or the
Affidavit To Use Surname. Rebiffed, Jenie filed a case for injunction/registration of name
against the City Civil Registrar before the RTC of Antipolo, reiterating therein the
allegetions as well as the documentary evidence presented before the LCR, the
Autobiography being her evidence in chief. Joseph, lone brother of Dominique,
corroborated her testimony. However, the RTC, after trial, dismissed her complaint for
lack of cause of action. According to the RTC, the private hand-written instrument, even
if written by Dominique, does not contain an express admission of his paternity. Thus,
Jenie appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. She submits that Art. 176
of the Family Code does not expressly require that the private hand-written instrument
containing the fathers admission of paternity be signed by the father. The Office of the
Solicitor General, agreeing with the respondents, submits that the Authobiography
contains an admission of pregnancy, not paternity.
The Supreme Court:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an
admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.[1]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by
the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related
provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his
signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and
on
the
same
evidence
as
legitimate
children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument
and
signed
by
the
parent
concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must
affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph
2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not
unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the
law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[2] Third, Jenies
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father
Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary
rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL
IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba[3], the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws,
Establishing Filiation

Rules,

and

Jurisprudence

The
relevant
provisions
of
the
Family
Code
provide
as
follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and
on
the
same
evidence
as
legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule
130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of
its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received
as evidence of pedigree.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence
to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the
issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New
Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the
claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation,
or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in
resolving questions affecting him.[4] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.[5] (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[6] Too, (t)he
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[7]
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is
to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is
DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate
of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.

False Affidavit Of Cohabitation Renders A Marriage Void For Lack Of Marriage License
by The Lawyer's Post December 17, 2014 Comments Off on False Affidavit Of
Cohabitation Renders A Marriage Void For Lack Of Marriage License

Jose filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Felisa before the RTC of Pasay
City. According to him, she was deceived by Felisa, who was his landlady, into signing a set of
papers which he later found out to be their marriage contract, when she invited him to Pasay City
Hall to fetch a package. Furthermore, their marriage was celebrated without a license, as the
affidavit of cohabitation they executed was false, they not having complied with the 5-year
requirement of cohabitation prior to marriage since they were introduced to each other five
months before their marriage. In her answer, Felisa averred that her marriage to Jose is valid;
they maintained the relationship between man and wife without marriage since 1980 but deferred
marriage on account of they age; while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with Rufina, to which she filed criminal and civil actions against him, resulting in his
suspension by the Office of the Ombudsman for one year.
The RTC dismissed Joses complaint, citing it as incredible and ruled his marriage to Felisa valid
in the absence of fraud or trickery, which even if present was already barred by prescription. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA initially dismissed Joses case but reversed itself on
motion for reconsideration. According to the CA, applying Ninal vs. Bayadog, it ruled that
inasmuch as Jose and Felisas period of cohabitation did not extend for at least five years, their
marriage was solemnised without a marriage license, hence vid from the very beginning. It was
at this juncture that the OSG filed a petition for review of the CA ruling, alleging that Jose did
not come to court with clean hands, hence he must not benefit, on account of equity, on his
fraudulent conduct. Further, the presumption of marriage must be upheld.
The Supreme Court:
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review. It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
xxx
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which
is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are

consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. [G.R. No. 179474]FELISA
TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent

In Unions Between A Man And A Woman Who Are Incapacitated To Marry Each Other,
The Ownership Over The Property Or Properties Acquired During The Subsistence Of
That Relationship Shall Be Based On The Actual Contribution Of The Parties

The Facts:

Esteban (Abletes) and Soccoro (Torres) were married in 1980. Both had children from prior
marriage, Evangeline (Abuda) was the daughter of Esteban from a previous wife who died in
1960, while Ediberto Ventura (petitioner) was the grandson of Socorro from her marriage to
Crispin, but they themselves had no common children. At the time of her marriage to Esteban,
Socorro had a valid and subsisting marriage with Crispin. In 1968, Esteban acquired one-half of
a lot situated in 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila, while Evangeline
bought the other half for her father in 1970. When the title to the property (TCT No. 141782)
was released in 1980, it was registered in the name of Esteban Abletes, married to Socorro
Torres. Evangeline also alleged that she and her father operated small business establishments
at 903 and 905 Delpan St,. Tondo, Manila. When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer,
according to Edilberto, he decided to sell the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband. Esteban died in 1997, while Socorro died in 1999. In 2000, Leonora, Edilbertos
mother discovered the sale of the properties to Evangeline, which she then relayed to Edilberto.
The latter, represented by Leonora filed a petition for annulment of deeds of sale before the RTC

of Manila, alleging that the sales were fraudulent as Estebans signature in the deeds were
forged. Evangeline countered that because of the prior marriage by Socorro to Crispin, her
marriage to Esteban was null and void, hence, Socorro and her heirs may not claim any right or
interest over the properties she and her father acquired.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Evangeline and Paulino. Since the marriage of Socorro
and Esteban were void, the applicable rule was Article 831 of the Civil Code, which was the
governing law at the time the two were married. It also applied Ninal vs. Badayog2ratiocinating
that no prior judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed in order to establish the nullity
of the marriage. The Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal, and governed by Articles
1443 and 4854 of the Civil Code. Applying the foregoing provisions, the RTC determined that
they were properties of Esteban, and since Socorro did not contribute any funds to the acquisition
of the properties, she was never a co-owner thereof, and she or her heirs cannot claim any right
over the properties.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, but clarified that the applicable law is Article 1485 of the
Family Code, and applied the ruling in Saguid vs CA6. It held that the provisions apply even if
cohabitation or acquisition of the property occurred prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
In this case, Edilberto failed to provide evidence that Socorro contributed to the acquisition of
the properties.
Edilberto elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not Esteban and Socorro were co-woners of the Delpan and Vitas properties, thus
entitling Edilberto as heir of Socorro to a share of the properties.
The Courts ruling:
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry
each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship
shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v.
Descallar7 in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.8
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there
is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land
was issued to Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres.9
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
married to Socorro Torres is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that
Socorro co-owned the property.10 The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title
was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system
merely confirms, and does not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition
wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
[R]egistration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact
that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.
Edilberto claims that Estebans actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortisations.11 Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilbertos claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.12 Furthermore, even if
payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment
was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtors consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for
the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorros
alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
[s]ettled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x.
Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013,EDILBERTO U. VENTURA, JR.,
PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES PAULINO AND EVANGELINE ABUDA, RESPONDENTS.

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void.
2

384 Phil. 661 (2000).

Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.4 Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary
shall be void.The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.5 x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Qualified Theft: As Long As The Property

Taken Does Not Belong To The Accused Who
Has A Valid Claim Thereover, It Is Immaterial
Whether Said Offender Stole It From The Owner, A Mere Possessor, Or Even A Thief Of The Property
by The Lawyer's Post March 7, 2015 Comments Off on Qualified Theft: As Long As The Property
Taken Does Not Belong To The Accused Who Has A Valid Claim Thereover, It Is Immaterial Whether
Said Offender Stole It From The Owner, A Mere Possessor, Or Even A Thief Of The Property

Anita, was employed as accounting clerk of Video City Commercial Inc (VCCI) and Viva Video Inc., (Viva), sister
companies engaged in video rentals and manages a chain of stores, which are either company-owned or operated as
joint-ventures with franchisees, and assigned to the account, among others, of Jefferson Tan. The latter was mostly
out of the country, hence he pre-signed checks to cover the stores disbursements and entrusted them to Anita. The
pre-signed checks were from an account maintained jointly with Jefferson and VCCI at BPI Family Bank, Sta.
Mesa. For any disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00, only the signature of Jefferson is required, as agreed with
the bank. Because of Jeffersons frequent absence, Anita used the joint-venture account of the latter with VCCI and
used it as a clearinghouse to make unauthorised transfer of funds. Anita deposited VCCI checks from other accounts,
then withdrew the funds using Jeffersons pre-signed checks. The theft was discovered only after Anita went on
maternity leave and later resigned, after she refused to turn over financial records in her possession. An audit
discovered that she made unauthorised withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to P4,877,759,60. A case for
qualified theft was filed against her by VCCI. During trial, the prosecution presented Jose, the assistant
manager/acting cashier of BPI who presented the microfilm of the checks, the encashed checks, and the deposit
slips. From this, it was discovered that she encashed a total of 42 checks with a total amount of P797, 187.85. Anita
opted not to present evidence, hence the RTC convicted her for qualified theft, and sentenced her to 8 years anfd 1
day of prision mayor as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The CA upheld her
conviction, hence she appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she should not have been convicted of qualified
theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private complainants ownership of the thing stolen. She also stresses that
the checks and vouchers presented by the prosecution were not originals and secondary evidence was not presented
in lieu of the original.
The Supreme Court:
The appeal lacks merit.
A careful review of the records of this case and the parties submissions leads the Court to conclude that there exists
no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA. We note that the arguments raised by petitioner in her petition are
a mere rehash of her arguments raised before, and correctly resolved by, the CA.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308[1] of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[2] Theft becomes qualified when
any of the following circumstances under Article 310[3] is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant;
(2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.[4]

Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does not
belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCIs consent and with grave abuse of
confidence by taking advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecutions evidence proved
that petitioner was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as accountant and
bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then
withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other
words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the above findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the CA and fully
supported by the evidence on record. Time and again, the Court has held that the facts found by the trial court, as
affirmed in toto by the CA, are as a general rule, conclusive upon this Court[5] in the absence of any showing of
grave abuse of discretion. In this case, none of the exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of said findings
of facts are applicable.[6] The Court gives weight and respect to the trial courts findings in criminal prosecution
because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[7] Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives
deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses.
Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift to petitioners argument that full ownership of the thing
stolen needed to be established first before she could be convicted of qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA,
the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken
does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from
the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.[8] In any event, as stated above, the factual findings of
the courts a quo as to the ownership of the amount petitioner stole is conclusive upon this Court, the finding being
adequately supported by the evidence on record.
However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioners guilt, a modification is called for as regards
the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado[9] is instructive. Pursuant to said
case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is
P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is
deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty.
However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed
simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees
higher, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858 affirming the
conviction of petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty is increased to reclusion perpetua.

Parricide: It Is Astoundingly Impossible For All Safety Features Of The Gun

To Go Off At Precisely The Same Time Or In Succession
The Facts:

George (Zapata) started his drinking session with his brother Manny and cousin Edwin at around3 PM of May 11,
2002. At around 7PM of the same day, a gunshot wound rang out n the room of George and his wife Queeny.
George killed his wife Queeny, and left her at the sala soaked in her own blood. He then fled from the scene without
seeking help from his wife. Manny and Edwin also fled the scene. Georges neighbours were alerted to the gunshot
and they were the ones who brought Queeny to the Amang Rodriguez Hospital. Geroge and his 3 year old daughter
were brought to the Municipal Hall of San Mateo. The police officer meanwhile conducted investigation of the
crime after they were informed by the guard at the hospital that a victim of a gunshot wound was brought to the
hospital. At Georges house they were able to recover one Cal. 45 pistol empty shell inside their bedroom. The
medico-legal officer testified that Queeny died of a single gunshot wound. In his defense, George claimed that the
shooting of his wife was accidental. He wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the
gun. In his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife.
After trial, the RTC found Geogre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, which ruling was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his brief before the Supreme Court, he argues that there was no criminal intent
on the killing of his wife as it was accidental.
The Courts ruling:
We are not persuaded.
There is no doubt that appellant intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court
and the appellate court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
Appellants claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from the
cabinet is incredible. First, as correctly noted by the CA, appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines
and is thus assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. In this case, appellant
1

apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a locked drawer or
cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these
safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting making appellants claim of accident highly
unbelievable. As aptly noted by the trial court:
x x x The gun including the magazine in this case was carelessly placed on top of a cabinet and not on a locked
drawer or shelf. x x x Secondly, the gun was loaded. x x x Third, the gun was cocked. The hammer of the gun was
set to a firing position. Accused argued that the gun may have been cocked when the same hit the side of the cabinet
when it slipped while he was getting it. x x x How convenient that the gun had by plain mishap of hitting the side
[of] the cabinet x x x cocked itself. Fourth, the accused accidentally squeezed the trigger when he tried to catch the
gun to prevent it from falling on the ground. There is physical impossibility for the accused to have squeezed the
trigger when he was allegedly trying to catch the gun. Instinct dictates that to be able to catch a falling object, you
have to catch it with both hands or at least with an open hand with fingers spread or moved apart. It is surprising that
the finger x x x found itself on the gun trigger and instinctively squeezed the same. The probability that the finger
would accidentally slip on the minute hole of the trigger at such spur of the moment and at an awkward position is
very remote, if not virtually impossible.
It is astoundingly impossible for all safety features of the gun to go off at precisely the same time or in succession.
As admitted by the accused, a .45 caliber pistol has four or five safety features to prevent any accidental discharge of
the firearm. First, the user must load the magazine. Second, you have to put a round in the firing chamber. Third, the
gun must be cocked. Fourth, the safety grip was held and was put off. Fifth, the user must be able to squeeze the
trigger despite the presence of a trigger guard. Considering that herein accused is a soldier, adept or skilled in the
handling of guns, it is highly disturbing why he allowed all safety features of the gun to falter causing it to fire

[accidentally]. With all safety mechanisms installed in the gun, the occurrence of such a misfortune is only possible
if there is human intervention, purposely done and not by mere chance or stroke of bad luck

Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the point of entry negate appellants claim that he pressed the trigger when
the gun fell on the floor. As correctly pointed out by the CA, [i]f the shot came from the floor where the gun
allegedly fell, the shot should have been in an upward direction. However, as testified to by the medico-legal
3

officer, the bullets point of entry was at the breast region and it exited at the lower back of the body. In short, the
4

assailant was in front of the victim and the shot was directed posteriorwards.
Moreover, appellants actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his assertion that he did not intend to
harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, appellant would have immediately sought help from his
relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead, he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her
blood. Appellant would not have become alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the
crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife. We concur with the observation of the trial court that

It was this accidental firing that accused x x x had allegedly hit his wife fatally. According to the accused, upon
seeing his wife, he embraced her and let her sit. He saw that his daughter was crying so he first brought her to his
cousin Edwin. He went back to his wife and let her [sit] on a plastic chair. He shouted to his companions to get a
vehicle. His wife was already motionless. His wife fell down and his brother [seated] her again. When he got
impatient, he went out of the house. He heard a siren so he got confused and left the house and proceeded to Fort
Bonifacio. x x x Having seen his wife bleeding, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately carry and rush his
own wife to the hospital for immediate medical care and attention. It was a most unusual reaction for a man who has
accidentally shot his wife to just [seat] her on a chair and leisurely wait for a vehicle to bring his wife to a hospital. x
x x Being the husband, he is expected to come to the succor of his wife. Laying seriously ill and hovering between
life and death, x x x accused even left his wife. x x x Such actuations of the accused is a clear manifestation that he
intended all the consequences of his nefarious acts. x x x If he was truly innocent, he would not have fled. By having
opted to escape instead of attending to his wife, accuseds guilt had been indubitably established. Accuseds flight
from the scene of the crime sealed his fate. x x x
It is likewise noteworthy to point out that neither one of the relatives of the accused, Manny Zapata (brother) and
Edwin Bautista (cousin) who were at the scene volunteered to bring the victim to the hospital. x x x

In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: (1) the death of the
deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. All these elements have been proven beyond doubt.
6]

Both the trial court and the appellate court properly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant, however, is not eligible for parole. The award of P42,983.80 as actual damages is likewise proper as the
7

same is supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is also proper. However, the awards of
civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence . In addition, all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
8

finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed December 8, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01376 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the
awards of civil indemnity are increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00; and all monetary
awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Parricide: It Is Astoundingly Impossible For All Safety Features Of

The Gun To Go Off At Precisely The Same Time Or In Succession
The Facts:
George (Zapata) started his drinking session with his brother Manny and cousin Edwin at around3 PM of May 11,
2002. At around 7PM of the same day, a gunshot wound rang out n the room of George and his wife Queeny.
George killed his wife Queeny, and left her at the sala soaked in her own blood. He then fled from the scene without
seeking help from his wife. Manny and Edwin also fled the scene. Georges neighbours were alerted to the gunshot
and they were the ones who brought Queeny to the Amang Rodriguez Hospital. Geroge and his 3 year old daughter
were brought to the Municipal Hall of San Mateo. The police officer meanwhile conducted investigation of the
crime after they were informed by the guard at the hospital that a victim of a gunshot wound was brought to the
hospital. At Georges house they were able to recover one Cal. 45 pistol empty shell inside their bedroom. The
medico-legal officer testified that Queeny died of a single gunshot wound. In his defense, George claimed that the
shooting of his wife was accidental. He wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the
gun. In his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife.
After trial, the RTC found Geogre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, which ruling was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his brief before the Supreme Court, he argues that there was no criminal intent
on the killing of his wife as it was accidental.
The Courts ruling:
We are not persuaded.
There is no doubt that appellant intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court
and the appellate court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
Appellants claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from the
cabinet is incredible. First, as correctly noted by the CA, appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines
and is thus assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. In this case, appellant
1

apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a locked drawer or
cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these
safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting making appellants claim of accident highly
unbelievable. As aptly noted by the trial court:
x x x The gun including the magazine in this case was carelessly placed on top of a cabinet and not on a locked
drawer or shelf. x x x Secondly, the gun was loaded. x x x Third, the gun was cocked. The hammer of the gun was
set to a firing position. Accused argued that the gun may have been cocked when the same hit the side of the cabinet
when it slipped while he was getting it. x x x How convenient that the gun had by plain mishap of hitting the side
[of] the cabinet x x x cocked itself. Fourth, the accused accidentally squeezed the trigger when he tried to catch the
gun to prevent it from falling on the ground. There is physical impossibility for the accused to have squeezed the
trigger when he was allegedly trying to catch the gun. Instinct dictates that to be able to catch a falling object, you
have to catch it with both hands or at least with an open hand with fingers spread or moved apart. It is surprising that
the finger x x x found itself on the gun trigger and instinctively squeezed the same. The probability that the finger
would accidentally slip on the minute hole of the trigger at such spur of the moment and at an awkward position is
very remote, if not virtually impossible.
It is astoundingly impossible for all safety features of the gun to go off at precisely the same time or in succession.
As admitted by the accused, a .45 caliber pistol has four or five safety features to prevent any accidental discharge of
the firearm. First, the user must load the magazine. Second, you have to put a round in the firing chamber. Third, the

gun must be cocked. Fourth, the safety grip was held and was put off. Fifth, the user must be able to squeeze the
trigger despite the presence of a trigger guard. Considering that herein accused is a soldier, adept or skilled in the
handling of guns, it is highly disturbing why he allowed all safety features of the gun to falter causing it to fire
[accidentally]. With all safety mechanisms installed in the gun, the occurrence of such a misfortune is only possible
if there is human intervention, purposely done and not by mere chance or stroke of bad luck

Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the point of entry negate appellants claim that he pressed the trigger when
the gun fell on the floor. As correctly pointed out by the CA, [i]f the shot came from the floor where the gun
allegedly fell, the shot should have been in an upward direction. However, as testified to by the medico-legal
3

officer, the bullets point of entry was at the breast region and it exited at the lower back of the body. In short, the
4

assailant was in front of the victim and the shot was directed posteriorwards.
Moreover, appellants actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his assertion that he did not intend to
harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, appellant would have immediately sought help from his
relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead, he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her
blood. Appellant would not have become alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the
crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife. We concur with the observation of the trial court that

It was this accidental firing that accused x x x had allegedly hit his wife fatally. According to the accused, upon
seeing his wife, he embraced her and let her sit. He saw that his daughter was crying so he first brought her to his
cousin Edwin. He went back to his wife and let her [sit] on a plastic chair. He shouted to his companions to get a
vehicle. His wife was already motionless. His wife fell down and his brother [seated] her again. When he got
impatient, he went out of the house. He heard a siren so he got confused and left the house and proceeded to Fort
Bonifacio. x x x Having seen his wife bleeding, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately carry and rush his
own wife to the hospital for immediate medical care and attention. It was a most unusual reaction for a man who has
accidentally shot his wife to just [seat] her on a chair and leisurely wait for a vehicle to bring his wife to a hospital. x
x x Being the husband, he is expected to come to the succor of his wife. Laying seriously ill and hovering between
life and death, x x x accused even left his wife. x x x Such actuations of the accused is a clear manifestation that he
intended all the consequences of his nefarious acts. x x x If he was truly innocent, he would not have fled. By having
opted to escape instead of attending to his wife, accuseds guilt had been indubitably established. Accuseds flight
from the scene of the crime sealed his fate. x x x
It is likewise noteworthy to point out that neither one of the relatives of the accused, Manny Zapata (brother) and
Edwin Bautista (cousin) who were at the scene volunteered to bring the victim to the hospital. x x x

In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: (1) the death of the
deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. All these elements have been proven beyond doubt.
6]

Both the trial court and the appellate court properly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant, however, is not eligible for parole. The award of P42,983.80 as actual damages is likewise proper as the
7

same is supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is also proper. However, the awards of
civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence . In addition, all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
8

finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed December 8, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01376 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the

awards of civil indemnity are increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00; and all monetary
awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Wills and Succession: Reserva Troncal

by The Lawyer's Post October 9, 2014 Comments Off on Wills and Succession: Reserva Troncal

Petitioners are the grandchildren of Placido and Dominga. The two had four children, Antonio, Exequiel, married to
Leonor, Antonio and Valentin. Petitioners are nephews and nieces of Exequiel. According to them, the properties
subject of this case were part of the properties of Placida and Domingo, which were given to Exequiel as part of an
oral partition. After his death, it passed on to his spouse, Leonor, and only daughter, Gregoria. Leonor died, leaving
her share to Gregoria who died without any issue. Upon Gregorias death, the property was adjudicated unto herself
by Julia, the sole surviving sister of Leonor. Hence, the properties should have been reserved in their behalf by Julia
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserve troncal. In her defense, Julia
denied that the property came from the estate of Placido and Dominga.
The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioners and ordered the propertys reconveyance to the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reversed the RTCs decision. It ruled that reserve troncal is not applicable
in this case as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga, nor did Gregoria predeceased Exequiel, assuming
the properties were part of the estate of Placido and Domingo, which it did not.
Thus, petitioners elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Is reserva troncal applicable in this case?
No, according to the Supreme Court.
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista.
The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within
the third degree from which the property came.
xxx
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the
ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute.
The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property.17
It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether
Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from
whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the
properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus
from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is
that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus)
acquired the properties as inheritance.

xxx
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the
other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
Not being Gregorias ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the
collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the
computation is made. In the case of Julias collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria
to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents (second
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within
the third degree and not her ascendant.
xxx
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree
of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her
first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal
right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only
recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
In Florentino v. Florentino, the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the
third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners
cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregorias
relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
dismissed, only on this point, is correct.
If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code,
which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.

Where A Filipino Citizen Sells Land To An Alien Who Later Sells The Land
To A Filipino, The Invalidity Of The First Transfer Is Corrected By The
Subsequent Sale To A Citizen
by The Lawyer's Post May 2, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:

Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot 398 from the Dinglasans in 1936. When Lee died in 1944 without will, he
was succeeded by his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who extrajudicially settled the estate among themselves
and partitioned Lot 398. When the brothers died, Lot 398 was transferred by succession to their respective wives,
Elizabeth and Pacita Yu-Lee. In the 1956 case of Dinglasan vs. Lee Bun Ting , the Court held that the sellers
1

(Dinglasan) cannot invalidate the sale of land (Lot 398) to the buyers who are Chinese citizen on the ground of in
pare delicto; in the latter case of Lee Bun Ting vs Judge Aligaen , the Court again dismissed the case on the ground
2

of res judicata, being a mere relitigation of the Dinglasan case.

On January 26, 1995, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Complaint for Reversion of Lot 398, praying that the
sale of Lot 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void, and for Lot 398 to be reverted to the public domain
for State disposal in accordance with law. In their answer, Elizabeth and Pacita invoked the affirmative defense of
prescription; Lee a buyer in good faith and for value, and that they were qualified to own by succession Lot 398,
being Filipino citizens.
The RTC ruled in favour of the OSG and declared the sale of Lot 398 to Lee Liong as null and void. His being a
purchaser I good fait and for value did not cure the nullity of the sale, and prescription does not run against the State.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the RTC. It ruled that the transfer of the land to Elizabeth and Pacita who
are both Filipino citizens may no longer be impugned even though the initial sale was void, considering that the
objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep our lands in Filipino
hands, has been achieved.
The OSG elevated its case to the Supreme Court. It argues that since the acquisition of Lot 398 was null and void, it
did not form part of estate of Lee Liong, and thus cannot be transmitted by succession to his heirs and eventually to
Elizabeth and Pacita.
The Courts ruling:
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void, Lot No. 398 never became part of the
deceased Lee Liongs estate. Hence, Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liongs surviving
heirs and eventually to private respondents.
We do not subscribe to petitioners position. The circumstances of this case are similar to the case of De Castro v.
Teng Queen Tan, wherein a residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his
3

heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to a
son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged
violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto,
the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since
become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons
extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by
succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who are Filipino citizens.
We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that Lot No. 398 has already been
transfered to Filipino citizens. In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines involving Lot No. 398,
4

this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to aliens

disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was
already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus:
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the
Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as
hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the
hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs
and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino
citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect
lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy
violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the
property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. (Emphasis supplied)
5

In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40 years from the promulgation of the case
of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for violating the
6

constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when
Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then
reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner
instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private
respondents who are Filipino citizens.
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured. As held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority:.Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently
7

acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the
buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a
qualified party. (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents
9

who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings
will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9
May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.
SO ORDERED.

Solicitation For Religious Purposes May Be Subject To Proper Regulation by

The State In The Exercise Of Police Power (1994).
by The Lawyer's Post April 7, 2015 Comments Off on Solicitation For Religious Purposes May Be Subject To
Proper Regulation by The State In The Exercise Of Police Power (1994).

A group of senior citizens comprising the Samahan ng Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the
purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, led by Martin, the chairman, approached Judge
Adoracion Angeles, a resident of the place and asked for a contribution of P1,500.00. The latter filed a complaint
against them for soliciting without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development in violation of

Presidential Decree 1564, before the MTC of Malolos Bulacan. After trial, the court convicted them and sentenced
them to a fine of P200.00 but with a recommendation that they be pardoned on the basis that they acted in good faith
and they would not have been criminally liable were it not for the existence of PD 1564. Only Martin appealed to
the Regional Trial Court. The latter court however, affirmed the findings of the MTC, increased the fine to
P1,000.00 and sentenced him to imprisonment of six months in view of the alleged perversity of the act committed
by the accused. Thus Martin elevated the case to the Supreme Court. He argues that PD 1564 does not apply to
solicitations for religious purposes, as it was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute; penal laws
should be strictly construed in favour of the accused; and, to penalise solicitations for religious purposes would be
constitute a violation of freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Courts ruling:
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law),
provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable
or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services
and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a
permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the
Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary
permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any
permit issued under Act 4075.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned[1].
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that charitable institutions, churches
and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. There are certain provisions in statutes wherein
these two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations
exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code;
Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and Section 234 (b)
(exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and religious in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are charitable in nature, since religious activities
depend for their support on voluntary contributions[2]. However, religious purpose is not interchangeable with the

expression charitable purpose. While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable
purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a charitable purpose which is not religious in the
legal sense of the term[3]. Although the term charitable may include matters which are religious, it is a broader
term and includes matters which are not religious, and, accordingly, there is a distinction between charitable
purpose and religious purpose, except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the
distinction has been done away with by statute[4]. The word charitable, therefore, like most other words, is
capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very
wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad
application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are
cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for religious purposes have been liberally construed as covered in
the law granting tax exemptions for charitable purposes. Thus, the term charitable purposes, within the meaning
of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes
only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes[5]. A gift for
religious purposes was considered as a bequest for charitable use as regards exemption from inheritance tax[6].
On the other hand, to subsume the religious purpose of the solicitation within the concept of charitable purpose
which under Presidential Decree No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and
Development, under paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly,
the term charitable should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Thereby, we
adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be
adopted as would favor the accused.
For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and
to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of
two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions
is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal
unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment[7].
The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts[8]. The word charitable is a matter of description rather than of
precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances[9]. The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined
by circumstances in the abstract.
Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given
which include the words charitable and religious make use of the disjunctive or. In its elementary sense, or
as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When or is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be
taken separately[10]. Accordingly, charitable and religious, which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive or should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration
why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1564.

II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise, it
will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently, solicitations
appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory
powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such
an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the
exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it
forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus,
the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom[11].
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish
his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience[12].
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which
may be so called can be tolerated[13]. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not
necessarily invalid as one interfering with the free exercise of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion[14]. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of
solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of
funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible obstacle to its exercise[15].
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by persons and
associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people
who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not
there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes.
That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter
of common knowledge.
Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere
should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy[16]. The
objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer
when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed[17].
Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest[18].

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable therefor.
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the trial
court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioners act which thereby caused damage to the complainant. It
must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended executive
clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the
solicitation from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and
difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that
petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be reflective upon her objectivity,
considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears
stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary[19], should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence,
and must resist any pressure from whatever source[20].
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno
is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Only The Father, Or In Exceptional Case His Heirs, May Impugn

The Legitimacy Of A Child
by The Lawyer's Post December 22, 2014 Comments Off on Only The Father, Or In Exceptional Case
His Heirs, May Impugn The Legitimacy Of A Child

Corazon, legally married but living separately with her husband, Rammon, cohabited with the late William Liyao
from 1965 up to the time of the latters untimely demise in 1975. They lived together in a succession of rented
houses in the company of her legitimate children, Enrique and Bernadette, with the knowledge and consent of
Williams two children from his subsisting marriage, Tita Rose and Linda Christina. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave
birth to William Jr. However, William Liyao Sr., died on December 9, 1975. Hence, on November 29, 1976,
Corazon, representing William Liyao Jr., filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate spurious child

of William Liyao Sr., later amended to include the allegation that William was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of William Liyao Jr., having been recognised and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime. In support of her allegations Corazon presented the following evidence: All the
medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing of William Jr. were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,
introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together; several pictures were also taken during
the lifetime of William Sr., showing him and William Jr. and his legal staff vacationing in Baguio City; she and
William Sr. attending various social gathering together; and during his last birthday, William Sr. expressly
acknowledged his son William Jr. in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion, and other friends. Het testimony was
corroborated by her legitimate daughters Enrique and Bernadette, who alleged that they have not seen their father
since they were children, and that William Liyao Sr. was very fond of their half-brother.
On the other hand, the legitimate daughters of William Liyao Sr., painted a totally different picture: She alleged that
their father was a strict disciplinarian who believed in the sanctity of the family, and was never used in sleeping in
other peoples homes. He was very conservative. Prior to his death, he suffered two heart attacks. She knew for a
fact that Corazon and Ramon were very much married; she did not come across any check to show William paid for
rentals of the home where he and Corazon stayed. Tita Rose on the other hand denied that her father and mother
were separated.
The RTC ruled in favour of Corazon and declared William Sr. as the illegitimate son of William Jr.. which the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside, stating that the law favours legitimacy rather than illegitimacy. The birth
certificate of William Liyao Jr was not sufficient to show paternity, it appearing that William Sr had no hand in the
preparation thereof and his signature did not appear thereon, mores with the bank account allegedly opened by
William Liyao Sr. On the other hand, Corazon and Ramon were seen with each other at the approximate period of
William Jr.s birth. On motion for reconsideration, Corazons appeal was again denied, hence she elevated her case
to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a
policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband,
Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to
have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, Contract of Separation, executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of
rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning
the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the
late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot
allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect
the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in
testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the
legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the
time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was
initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It
is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on
the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
Petition denied.

Mother May Be Deprived Of Temporary Custody Of Child For Compelling

Reason
by The Lawyer's Post December 22, 2014 Comments Off on Mother May Be Deprived Of Temporary
Custody Of Child For Compelling Reason

Dinah, then a nursing student, gave birth to Gardin Faith, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar, a physician. They
stayed at his parents residence, where Gardin Faith was a welcome addition to the family. A year later, Dinah found
work as a registered nurse and left for the USA, while Gardin Faith was left in the care of Edgar. While Dinah was
in the United States, Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, which the trial court granted,
rendering judgment on March 9, 1992 appointing Edgar as the legal guardian of Gardin Faith. When Dinah learned
of the judgment on April 1, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the trial court allowed, setting
aside its original judgment and allowing her to file her opposition to the petition for guardianship. Dinah also filed a
motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. The trial court denied Edgars motion for reconsideration and

granted Dinahs motion to remand custody, thus Edgar filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court initialy dismissed the petition but eventually modified its Resolution, by allowing Edgar to have
custody of Gardin Faith because it would wreak havoc on Gardin Faiths psychological make-up if it allowed Dinah
to have custody when eventually Edgar would win in the pending guardianship case. Subjecting her to emotional
seesaw while the case for guardianship is pending is not for the best interest of the child, who have stayed with her
father and his family all her life, the court further added. Thus, Dinah elevated her case to the Supreme Court,
questioning the grant of custody to Edgar, averring that she is entitled to the custody of the court.
The Supreme Court:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. In
arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
In turn, the parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus
provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled,
among other rights, to keep them in their company. In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child
relationship encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the other. We
explained this in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals:
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are
concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of
their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may
be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child; those cases must indeed
be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover,
moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.

This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children.
Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic
care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child.[9] Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is separated
from his child:
While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that
of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.[10]
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for
compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The
court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be
unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears
that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has
been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as
the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on
questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing
claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now
exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of
which parent should have the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein
private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood
that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her
father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

Adoption: Husband And Wife Shall Jointly

Adopt
by The Lawyer's Post November 6, 2014 Comments Off on Adoption: Husband And Wife Shall Jointly
Adopt

Monina, an optometrist and her then husband, Primo were childless. Lucia entrusted to them two minor children
whose parents were unknown. Monina and Primo then made it appear that they were the childrens parents and
named them Michelle and Michael Jude. The spouses reared the children as of they were their own; they studied in
exclusive schools, and all their records indicate the surname Lim. On November 28, 1998, Primo died. Monina
remarried an American citizen, Angel Olario, on December 27, 2000. On April 24, 2002, Monina filed a petition for

adoption before the RTC to formalise the adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old, and Michael 18 years old.
Michelle and her husband, Michael, and Angel, Moninas husband, gave their respective Affidavits of Consent
signifying their assent to the petition for adoption. Both Michelle and Michael were issued Certifications that they
were abandoned children.
The Regional Trial Court, however, dismissed the petition, holding that since Monina remarried, the petition should
have been filed jointly by her and her American husband, Angel, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 (c) Article
III of Republic Act 8552.
Her motion for reconsideration denied by the RTC, Monina appealed directly to the Supreme Court, on the sole
question of whether, having remarried, she can singly adopt. She posits that joint adoption is not necessary in this
case, both adoptees having attained legal age thus joint parental authority is not anymore required.
The Supreme Court denied the petition thus:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the
petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has
legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the
latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
xxx
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support
from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow

childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v.
Vergara:
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is
intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with
her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

False Affidavit of Cohabitation? No Marriage

by The Lawyer's Post September 15, 2014 Comments Off on False Affidavit of Cohabitation? No Marriage

A fake Affidavit of Cohabitation executed by both parties intending to marry each other, in order to exempt them
from the requirement of a marriage license, without complying with the 5-year period of cohabitation required by
law, renders the marriage void from the very beginning. Many couples resort to this short cut because it is the
easiest way to get married without having to go thru the formalities of applying for a marriage license.
Annabelle and Reinel were sweethearts, so they decided to marry each other. To do so, they applied for a marriage
license. When they went back to the Office of the City Civil Registrar, they discovered that their marriage license
was already expired, so in order to get married as soon as possible, they executed an Affidavit to show that they had
been living together as husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage license
requirement. (Article 34 of the Family Code) They were married on the same day before a judge. After their
marriage, they never lived together as husband and wife. After several months, Annabelle gave birth to Reianna
Tricia. In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming he had not given support to her and
their child. Reinel in his answer alleged that their marriage is not valid, the Affidavit they executed in lieu of a
marriage license being a falsity as they never cohabited with each other five years before their marriage, hence they
were not exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. He also denied parentage of Reianna Tricia as he
had never seen nor acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle is void for lack of a marriage license, but
opined that Reianna Tricia is the natural child of Reinel, hence entitled to support.
Reinel elevated his case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied his appeal. According to the appellate court, the rule is that a child born during the
subsistence of a marriage is the legitimate child of the spouses, hence, Reianna should be considered as the
legitimate child of Reinel. The Court also ruled that since the case is for support, the court cannot attack collaterally
the marriage, so that a proper judicial declaration should be resorted to in order to declare the marriage of Reinel and
Annabelle as void for lack of a marriage license.
The Supreme Court summarised the issues as:

1. May the trial court declare the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle even though the case before it is for
support? In other words, may the marriage be attacked collaterally?
2. Is Reianna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?
Addressing both issues the Supreme Court ruled:
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
xxx
On the issue of the false affidavit:
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
On the paternity of Reiann Tricia:
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which
ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3,
C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2
and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act
of kissing the petitioner

False Affidavit of Cohabitation? No Marriage

by The Lawyer's Post September 15, 2014 Comments Off on False Affidavit of Cohabitation? No Marriage

A fake Affidavit of Cohabitation executed by both parties intending to marry each other, in order to exempt them
from the requirement of a marriage license, without complying with the 5-year period of cohabitation required by
law, renders the marriage void from the very beginning. Many couples resort to this short cut because it is the
easiest way to get married without having to go thru the formalities of applying for a marriage license.
Annabelle and Reinel were sweethearts, so they decided to marry each other. To do so, they applied for a marriage
license. When they went back to the Office of the City Civil Registrar, they discovered that their marriage license
was already expired, so in order to get married as soon as possible, they executed an Affidavit to show that they had
been living together as husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage license
requirement. (Article 34 of the Family Code) They were married on the same day before a judge. After their

marriage, they never lived together as husband and wife. After several months, Annabelle gave birth to Reianna
Tricia. In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming he had not given support to her and
their child. Reinel in his answer alleged that their marriage is not valid, the Affidavit they executed in lieu of a
marriage license being a falsity as they never cohabited with each other five years before their marriage, hence they
were not exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. He also denied parentage of Reianna Tricia as he
had never seen nor acknowledged the child.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle is void for lack of a marriage license, but
opined that Reianna Tricia is the natural child of Reinel, hence entitled to support.
Reinel elevated his case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied his appeal. According to the appellate court, the rule is that a child born during the
subsistence of a marriage is the legitimate child of the spouses, hence, Reianna should be considered as the
legitimate child of Reinel. The Court also ruled that since the case is for support, the court cannot attack collaterally
the marriage, so that a proper judicial declaration should be resorted to in order to declare the marriage of Reinel and
Annabelle as void for lack of a marriage license.
The Supreme Court summarised the issues as:
1. May the trial court declare the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle even though the case before it is for
support? In other words, may the marriage be attacked collaterally?
2. Is Reianna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?
Addressing both issues the Supreme Court ruled:
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
xxx
On the issue of the false affidavit:
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through

with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
On the paternity of Reiann Tricia:
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which
ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3,
C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2
and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act
of kissing the petitioner