Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203335

April 22, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,

JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN
MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI
Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA,
CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY
OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENESCASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R. BAGARES, and
GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICEDEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI
CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE ELONA OF THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and
alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in
her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M.
REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of
Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson
of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of
Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R.

LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Womens Party, ADOLFO ARES

P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the
Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive
Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office,
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the
Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA.
MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN
JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights
Center), Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice,
HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the
Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of
Investigation (all of the Executive Department of
Government),Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP),
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM
AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA
QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND
THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-tora10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES
AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS
ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN
RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
10175,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A.
ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER
RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P.
MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN;
BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S.
REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH
S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA,
JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR
PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President
of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate
President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO
R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his
capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications
Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his
capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN.
NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine
National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203501

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as
President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Justice;
LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive
Director, Information and Communications Technology Office;
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL
NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by
BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and in his
personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND
ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN
THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT
10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILAPHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM, represented by
Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S.

Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY

ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI LARDIZABALDADO, IMELDA MORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M.
RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA,
ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO
FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C.
CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DO OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME,
and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
A number of petitioners seek reconsideration of the Court's February 18,
2014 Decision that declared invalid and unconstitutional certain provisions of
Republic Act 10125 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and upheld the
validity of the others. The respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, also seek reconsideration of portions of that decision. After
going over their motions, however, the Court sees no substantial arguments
from either side to warrant the reversal of its February 18, 2014 Decision.
The point about the legislative bicameral committee's insertions of certain
provisions that were neither in the House bill nor in the Senate bill is
something that the Court is not inclined to investigate since insertions are
within the power of those committees to make so long as the passage of the
law complies with the constitutional requirements. 1 The Cybercrime
Prevention Act went through both houses and they approved it. Any issue
concerning alleged non-compliance with the governing rules of both houses
regarding committee insertions have to be internally resolved by each house.
In any event, the Court will briefly address certain aspects of the decision
that drew the most objections.
Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one degree
higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and certain
special laws are committed with the use of information and communication
technologies (ICT). Some of the petitioners insist that Section 6 is invalid

since it produces an unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would

hinder free expression.
Petitioner Bloggers and Netizens for Democracy insist that Section 6 cannot
stand in the absence of a definition of the term "information and
communication technology".2 But petitioner seems to forget the basic tenet
that statutes should not be read in isolation from one another. The
parameters of that ICT exist in many other laws. Indeed those parameters
have been used as basis for establishing government systems and
classifying evidence.3These along with common usage provide the needed
boundary within which the law may be applied.
The Court had ample opportunity to consider the proposition that Section 6
violates the equal protection clause via the parties pleadings, oral
arguments, and memoranda. But, as the Decision stressed, the power to fix
the penalties for violations of penal laws, like the cybercrime law, exclusively
belongs to Congress.
In any event, Section 6 of the cybercrime law merely makes the commission
of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance that raises
by one degree the penalties corresponding to such crimes. This is not at all
arbitrary since a substantial distinction exists between crimes committed
through the use of ICT and similar crimes committed using conventional
means.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur,4 Frank La Rue, acknowledged the
material distinction. He pointed out that "[t]he vast potential and benefits of
the Internet are rooted in its unique characteristics, such as its speed,
worldwide reach and relative anonymity." For this reason, while many
governments advocate freedom online, they recognize the necessity to
regulate certain aspects of the use of this media to protect the most
vulnerable.5
Not infrequently, certain users of the technology have found means to evade
being identified and for this reason have been emboldened to reach far more
victims or cause greater harm or both. It is, therefore, logical for Congress to
consider as aggravating the deliberate use of available ICT by those who ply
their wicked trades.
Compared to traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse. In
traditional estafa for example, the offender could reach his victim only at a
particular place and a particular time. It is rare that he could consummate
his crime without exposing himself to detection and prosecution. Fraud
online, however, crosses national boundaries, generally depriving its victim
of the means to obtain reparation of the wrong done and seek prosecution

and punishment of the absent criminal. Cybercriminals enjoy the advantage

of anonymity, like wearing a mask during a heist.
Petitioners share the Chief Justices concern for the overall impact of those
penalties, being one degree higher than those imposed on ordinary crimes,
including the fact that the prescriptive periods for the equivalent
cybercrimes have become longer.6
Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the Court has something
to say. Rather, it is substantive law since it assumes the existence of an
authority to punish a wrong, which authority the Constitution vests in
Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that Congress may provide a
variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit. What it cannot
do is pass a law that extends the periods of prescription to impact crimes
committed before its passage.7
It is pointed out that the legislative discretion to fix the penalty for crimes is
not absolute especially when this discretion is exercised in violation of the
freedom of expression. The increase in the penalty for online libel creates,
according to this view, greater and unusual chilling effect that violates the
protection afforded to such freedom.
But what the stiffer penalty for online libel truly targets are those who
choose to use this most pervasive of media without qualms, tearing down
the reputation of private individuals who value their names and community
standing. The law does not remotely and could not have any chilling effect
on the right of the people to disagree, a most protected right, the exercise of
which does not constitute libel.
The majority of the movants believe that the Courts decision upholding the
constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which penalizes online libel, effectively
tramples upon the right to free expression.1wphi1 But libel is not a
protected speech. There is no freedom to unjustly destroy the reputation of a
decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid prostitute.
As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not
protected by the Constitution.8 Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms
of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and are
considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As explained by the US
Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New Hampsire:9
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional

problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or "fighting" words those which, by their very utterance, inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would
raise no question under that instrument." (Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional guarantee against prior restraint and subsequent
punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of "actual malice," and the legal
protection afforded by "privilege communications" all ensure that protected
speech remains to be protected and guarded. As long as the expression or
speech falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to
ensure that the rights of the people are protected.
At bottom, the deepest concerns of the movants seem to be the fact that the
government seeks to regulate activities in the internet at all. For them, the
Internet is a place where a everyone should be free to do and say whatever
he or she wants. But that is anarchical. Any good thing can be converted to
evil use if there are no laws to prohibit such use. Indeed, both the United
States and the Philippines have promulgated laws that regulate the use of
and access to the Internet.10
The movants argue that Section 4(c)(4) is both vague and overbroad. But,
again, online libel is not a new crime. It is essentially the old crime of libel
found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the
cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the
freedom of expression from its reach applies to online libel. Any
apprehended vagueness in its provisions has long been settled by
precedents.
The parties' other arguments in their respective motions for reconsideration
are mere reiterations that the Court already considered and ruled upon when
it promulgated its earlier Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES with finality the various motions for
reconsideration that both the petitioners and the respondents, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO
Associate Justice

A.

ABAD

WE CONCUR:
See
MARIA
Chief Justice

Concurring
LOURDES

&
P.

Dissenting
A.

Opinion
SERENO

PRESVITERO J.
JR.*
Associate Justice

VELASCO,

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

See
my
ARTURO
D.
Associate Justice

Dissent
BRION

DIOSDADO
M.
Associate Justice

LUCAS
P.
Associate Justice

ANTONIO
T.
Associate Justice

CARPIO

PERALTA

BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE
PORTUGAL
Associate Justice

JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice

MENDOZA

No
ESTELA
M.
BERNABE*
Associate Justice

part
PERLAS-

BIENVENIDO
L.
Associate Justice

See
MARVIC
Associate Justice

MARIO

PEREZ

REYES

VICTOR

F.

dissent
LEONEN

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
MARIA
Chief Justice

LOURDES

P.

A.

SERENO

Footnotes
* No part.
1

Tatad v. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321

(1997), citing Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455,
115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 &
115931, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
2

Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2357.

An Act Providing And Use Of Electronic Commercial And NonCommercial Transactions, Penalties For Unlawful Use Thereof, And
Other Purposes, Republic Act 8792, June 14, 2000.
4

Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to

freedom of opinion and expression.
5

La Rue accepts that "legitimate types of information may be

restricted [such as] child pornography (to protect the rights of
children), hate speech (to protect the rights of affected communities),
defamation (to protect the rights and reputation of others against
unwarranted attacks), direct and public incitement to commit genocide
(to protect the rights of others), and advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence (to protect the rights of others, such as the right to life)."
(Citations omitted) (A/HRC/17/27, p.8); see Maria Luisa Isabel L.
Rosales, Today the Internet, Tomorrow Cable TV?: Situating the Internet
as a Human Right, 57 ATENEO L.J. 463, 484-85 (2012).
6

Philippine Bar Association, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2397;

Bloggers and Netizens for Democracy, Motion for Reconsideration, p.
2362.
7

People of the Philippine Islands v. Parel, G.R. No. L-18260, January 27,
1923, citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes, pp.
426-428.
8

Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 41 (1912), cited in Bernas, S.J. The

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,
3rd ed., Rex Book Store, Manila, 2003.

315 U.S. 568 (1942), cited in Gorospe, R. Constitutional Law: Notes

and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and Suffrage, Vol. I, Rex
Book Store, Manila, 2006, p. 672.