TORTS AND DAMAGES 1ST SET

1. CASTILLO VS CA
2. PICART VS SMITH
3. UMALI VS BACANI
4. ANDAMO VS IAC
5. AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO
6. SINGSON VS BPI
7. FABRE VS CA
8. GSIS VS CA
9. BARREDO VS GARCIA
10. DIONISIO VS ALVENDIA

CASTILLO VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989
BERNABE CASTILLO (In his own behalf, and in behalf of SERAPION CASTILLO, who has
since then become deceased, and EULOGIO CASTILLO, his minor child) and GENEROSA
GALANG CASTILLO,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITO ROSARIO and CRESENCIA
ROSARIO, respondents-appellees.
Lino R. Eugenio for petitioners.
Eduardo G. Rosario for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the February 13, 1978
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52567-R, entitled "Bernabe Castillo, et al. v. Juanita
Rosario, et al," affirming the dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the complaint for
damages filed by petitioners against private respondents. Said dismissal was decreed on the basis
of the evidence before the trial court as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
07684-CR, entitled "People v. Juanito Rosario."
Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac,
Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their respective vehicles.
The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that fateful day; each party
pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate cause of the accident. Thus, as expected in
cases like this, the main issue is: Who was at fault? According to the petitioners, the accident
happened as follows: 1
On May 2, 1985, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner Bernabe Castillo
was driving his jeep with Plate No. J-4649 '64 Manila on the right lane of the
McArthur Highway with Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated
in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child, as passengers, bound and northward
for Binmaley, Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per hour. Just past San Nicolas
bridge, Villasis, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more or less, a speeding
oncoming car with Plate No. L-27045 '64 Cavite, along the same lane (facing north)
he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He switched on his headlights to
signal the car to return to its own right lane as the way was not clear for it to overtake
the truck.

The car turned out to be driven by the private respondent, Juanito Rosario, with his
wife, Cresencia Rosario. The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its
direction southward on the right lane (facing north). In order to evade the impending
collision, petitioner Bernabe Castillo swerved his jeep to the right towards the
shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his feet on it, even, immediately
after the impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The jeep's rear left
wheel was on the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it; while the car left long tiremarks, specially its left rear wheel. The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushedin radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper badly dented. The car had a flat tire on
its right front wheel; its right fender badly dented as the headlamp on top of it. The
bumber stooped downward, because it went thru under the bumper of the jeep.
lwph1.t

The driver of the jeep, including his passengers suffered physical injuries. Bernabe
Castillo, with the patella of his right knee, fractured, suffered serious physical injuries,
in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the
windshield, was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple
slight and less serious injuries.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have their own version of the accident and thus asseverate
as follows: 2
Sometime in the early afternoon of May 2, 1965, the private respondents, together
with their small daughter, were on their way from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to
Olongapo City where they resided at the time and where Juanito Rosario, a member
of the US Navy, had been temporarily stationed. They rode in the family car. (TSN,
C. Rosario, p. 35; J. Rosario, pp. 2, 12 Annex "D", "Request for Admission")
At or about 2:30 p.m. of the same date, as Juanito Rosario who was driving the car,
and his two passengers, were along MacArthur Highway in Barrio Bacag, Villasis,
Pangasinan, going towards the south, they saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded
cargo truck. (TSN, B. Castillo, p. 532, Annex "B", "Request for Admission") The truck
was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Juanito Rosario decided to
overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as
additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times at the time he was
overtaking the truck. (TSN, Juanito Rosario, pp. 4, 11; C. Rosario, pp. 31-41, Annex
"B", "Request for Admission")
Then as the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front
left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and
naturally making steering and control difficult. Because of the tendency of the car to
veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the
direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally brought
the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road (facing south). (TSN, C. Rosario, p.
31; J. Rosario, pp. 4, 17, Annex "D", "Request for Admission")
But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder of the road and
just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the
jeep driven by Bernabe Castillo which came from the opposite direction. (TSN, C.
Rosario, p. 32; J. Rosario, p. 6, "Request for Admission") Both vehicles were
damaged, the car suffering the heavier damage. (Please see Annex "C", "Request
for Admission") Passengers of the jeep sustained injuries while those of the car were
badly shaken.

On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by petitioners
and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the collision, was instituted by the petitioners in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
filed an information dated September 29, 1965 against Juanito Rosario, private respondent herein,
for double physical injuries; double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Respondent Juanito Rosario was
prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which rendered a decision 3 acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel, filed a "Request for Admission" 4 on April 3, 1972
in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the truthfulness of the facts set forth therein as well as the
correctness and genuineness of the documents attached thereto. On May 5,1972, petitioners filled a
"Manifestation", 5 admitting the allegations in the "Request for Admission" with some qualifications. Later,
both parties submitted their respective memoranda.

On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as the records of
the criminal case attached in the "Request for Admission" of the private respondents, the Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered a decision 6 on December 28, 1972, dismissing the complaint of the
petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the
petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 13, 1978,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 7 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 8 The petitioners-appellants raise in issue before Us
the following questions, to wit:

1) Is the decision of the Court of Appeals, where its dispositive part, or "fallo", states
that the guilt of the (appellant) accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
final and conclusive, on an action for damages based on quasi-delict?;
2) Are the testimonies given in a criminal case, without strict compliance with Section
41 Rule 130 and without opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who made
these testimonies, admissible evidence in a subsequent case and can be the basis of
a valid decision?;
3) Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision of the
appellate court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the blame on the
plaintiff but in its dispositive part, declares the guilt of the accused not proved beyond
reasonable doubt ? 9
The main thrust of this petition for review which stems from a cause of action based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana (being a recovery for damages arising from the vehicular accident), is that
petitioners were deprived of due process because their civil action was decided on the basis of
private respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence.
There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct
from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. According to a number of
cases, 10 a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the

Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case. 11

In the case of Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 468, 470-471, this Court
held:
... in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
..., the judgment of acquittal does not operate to extinguish the civil liability of the
defendant based on the same incident. The civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil action might arise did not exist.
In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the Court of Appeals after a
painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles as
depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the
road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon
each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car
who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. 12
Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery
of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that no negligence was committed by
Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners.
Respondent Appellate Court states:
In acquitting defendant-appellee Juanito Rosario in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR on
October 28, 1968, this Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of
Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder [of the
road] where the car was that was actually the proximate cause of the collision.' (Ibid.,
p. 183) With this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee Juanito Rosario
from civil liability. Since plaintiffs-appellants' civil action is predicated upon Juanito
Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the
criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil
responsibility arising therefrom. (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067;
Faraon vs. Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785,
787788; Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675). 13
It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita
Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the
car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court of
Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did
not exist.

As earlier stated, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was an affirmation of the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the trial of the case before the Court of First Instance,
the private respondents were not present, in view of the fact that they were out of the country at that
time. Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal case, in
accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14 These records were attached to their
"Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by petitioners. The said records were mostly
composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections,
the propriety and correctness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the civil
case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the ground
that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We have to disagree. A careful reading
of the transcripts would reveal that then counsel for petitioners, Atty. Nicodemo Ferrer, actively
participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various objections, 15 in the course of
the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

Thus, the admission of the said testimonies cannot be set aside.

Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has held time and again that the findings of facts by the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. 16
In Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 and Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167, it
was held that:
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the
Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6)
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7)
said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted
by evidence on record.
Finding that the questioned decision does not fall under any of the exceptions cited above, we find
no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

PICART VS SMITH
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12219

March 15, 1918

AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum
of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.
From a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant
from liability the plaintiff has appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on
the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the
plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to
the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of
the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right
to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left
hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident
occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge

was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the
bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side;
but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while
the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of
the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this,
the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of
horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye
of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under
these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps
be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part
of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce
the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The
defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed
upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road
bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and
broken. It appeared in evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had
dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff was, at the moment
of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in
front or behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its
negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the
damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will be
seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The liability of the
company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one
now before us, where the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective
parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to
say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of
the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in the defendant's
answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the
court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question
occurred, the plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace
charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed.
Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for
the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability arising from
negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of
the peace in dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the
plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in this case. I do so
because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly
applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is
concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in
a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery.
But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment
the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is
applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself
and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes
the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note
especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)

UMALI VS BACANI
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976
TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.
Julia M. Armas for petitioner.
Antonio de los Reyes for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan Branch IX, in
Civil Case No. U2412, entitled, "Fidel H. Saynes, plaintiff-appellee versus Teodoro C. Umali,
defendant-appellant", which found the death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years
and 8 months, as "due to the fault or negligence of the defendant (Umali) as owner and manager of
the Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability of defendant is mitigated by the contributory
negligence of the parents of the boy "in not providing for the proper and delegate supervision and
control over their son The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:
Wherefore, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff by ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the
death of his son, Manuel Saynes; the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) for actual expenses for and in connection with the burial of said
deceased child, and the further sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for moral
damages and Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as reasonable attorney's fee, or a total
of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P9,700.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of this
suit. It Is So Ordered.
Undisputed facts appearing of record are:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan,
which started from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted up to about midnight of
the same day. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground
along the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said municipality and near the transmission
line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a
result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric
post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.

On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno of San
Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the
people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw
Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified
him right then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told
the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman
to fix it.
Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small
boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is
just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire
was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It
was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the broken wire was fixed at
about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by the lineman of the electric plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and
manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution
could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused
the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part
of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of
negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at
the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which
were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the
defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds
the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the
necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the
employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May
14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property,
they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily
done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third, employee Cipriano
Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already made
aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to
life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his
mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life
and property.
On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the
parents' negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily
see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees
resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character,
anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the
same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory
negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave
the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the
house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate
respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the
fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of

negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any
other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was
allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that
morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants'
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the
employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil.
109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove
that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This defense
was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to
deviate from its finding.
Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired any reversible error committed by the trial Court in
this case, either in its appreciation of the evidence on questions of facts or on the interpretation and
application of laws government quasi-delicts and liabilities emanating therefrom. The inevitable
conclusion is that no error amounting to grave abuse of discretion was committed and the decision
must be left untouched.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court dated June 27, 1974 is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

ANDAMO VS IAC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction
by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued
on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollowblocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the

same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject
of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no

pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an

acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay
City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere
fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony
of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business
of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for

first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention,
thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for,
a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court
of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat
and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of
the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to

present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first
class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
1awphl.nt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.

SINGSON VS BPI
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24837

June 27, 1968

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of
the said Bank, defendants.
Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.
Aviado and Aranda for defendants.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First
Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants
therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the
plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said
judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and
executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the
Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits
against the Bank were concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed
from, from which we quote:
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of
execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the
Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said
garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the
deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and
Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the
plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the
Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of
P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and
check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn
against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank. Believing that
the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his
deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the
said bank. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the

latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him that his
check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the reason that
his account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated
in the said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them. In view
thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963,
claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment,
which was served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank
took steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the
plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to
disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from his account
had already been removed. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank on
April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the
said Special Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice
of Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify
the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the
account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president,
Santiago Freixas, for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
1w ph1.t

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a
quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case
does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs
have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.
The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict,
their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however,
that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,3 involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the
relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award
of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven4 in the sum of P1,000, in addition
to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000,
as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

FABRE VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996

MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC.,
AMYLINE ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V. QUE, JR., ICLI
CORDOVA, ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD BAUTISTA,
JOCELYN GARCIA, YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO
NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPES, JULIUS CAESAR, GARCIA,
ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C. CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-MARA,
TERESITA REGALA, MELINDA TORRES, MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA CABATINGAN, MARA
NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA, MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO,
CARLOS RANARIO, ROSAMARIA T. RADOC and BERNADETTE FERRER, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR No. 28245,
dated September 30, 1992, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay damages to private respondent
Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They
used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for
two weeks, His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's College in Malate,
Manila.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF)
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from
Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the
amount of P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. However,
as several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of
Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the
minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first

trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At
11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to
east direction, which he described as "siete." The road was slippery because it was raining, causing
the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder.
The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus
Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its
front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came down by a wooden seat which came off after
being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain
and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the
bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he
was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it
was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the basis of their
finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with
the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage
to the latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners
Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.
As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from
the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence
regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after the accident, she was taken to the
Nazareth Hospital in Baay, Lingayen. As this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was
transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An
x-ray was taken and the damage to her spine was determined to be too severe to be treated there.
She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati
Medical Center where she underwent an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a long
distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendants
which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio
were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim for damages, the Court is
therefore not in a position to award damages to the other plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendants Mr. &
Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees;
6) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to exercise due
care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the place of the
accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves presumptively negligent.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OF NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
III WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN
THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.
Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages in the amount of
P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable an award of
P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that she was a

casual employee of a company called "Suaco," earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer of Avon
products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that as casual employees
do not have security of tenure, the award of P600,000.00, considering Amyline Antonio's earnings, is
without factual basis as there is no assurance that she would be regularly earning these amounts.
With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although
the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort." 2 In either case, the question is whether the bus driver,
petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.

The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus,
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we
regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by
Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and as a consequence, the road was slippery, and
it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead.
However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. 3 By then it was too late for him
to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil's first
one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony 4 that
the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at
50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.

Considering the foregoing the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark,
that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only
20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and
should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that
his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervisions of their
employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a
professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications,
experience and record of service. 5 Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and issuance of proper instructions as
well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. 6

In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not
consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St.
Scholastica's College in Metro Manila. 7 They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They
had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as
whether he could remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were
irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La
Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer. 8

Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible by the
congregation's delayed meeting) could have a averted the mishap and (2) under the contract, the
WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of these contentions hold water.
The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the
cause of the accident. With respect to the second contention, it was held in an early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to which he
wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from
a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence or the automobile driver. 9
As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not
have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial court and of the appellate
court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify findings them
guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we think the
Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages because private
respondents did not question this award as inadequate. 11 To the contrary, the award of P500,000.00
for compensatory damages which the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable considering the contingent

nature of her income as a casual employee of a company and as distributor of beauty products and the
fact that the possibility that she might be able to work again has not been foreclosed. In fact she testified
that one of her previous employers had expressed willingness to employ her again.

With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals do
not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless
supported by evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls
squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases
of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award
of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence
amounted to bad faith. 12 Amyline Antonio's testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and
copassengers, fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the
injuries caused by petitioners' negligence.

The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was also properly made. However, for the
same reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the award of compensatory
damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral damages and reduce
the award of attorney's fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in whose favor the awards were
made, have not appealed. 13
As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the theory of quasi
delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts below held,
petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond jointly and severally
to private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 14 on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the bus company and the driver jointly
and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express,
Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 15 a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow
passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered
injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured passengers.

The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another
vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, 16 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 17 and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 18 the
bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latters' heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability
was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, 19 thus:

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56
Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances
they are liable on quasi-delict. 20
It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 21 this Court exonerated the
jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families while holding the owners of the
jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there explained:

The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo (the driver) and spouses Mangune and
Carreon (the jeepney owners) were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and
Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly
and severally liable with carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind
this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver
(see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). 22
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her coplaintiffs did not stake out their
claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of
contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as
many parties as may be liable on such causes of action 23 so long as private respondent and her
coplaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the
plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus, justifying the holding that the carrier
and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to
produce the same injury.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to award
of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline
Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees; and
6) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

GSIS VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101439 June 21, 1999

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (former Tenth Division), VICTORIA JAIME VDA. DE KHO, for herself and
minor ROY ROLAND, GLORIA KHO VDA. DE CALABIA for herself and minors MARY GRACE,
WILLIE, JR., VOLTAIRE, GLENN, and MAY, all surnamed CALABIA, DANIEL KHO, JOSEFINA
KHO, EMERITA KHO APEGO, ANTONIO KHO and TERESITA KHO, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:p
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) assails the January 15, 1991 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 19849, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
Branch II, dated April 30, 1985, stating in part:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx
In Civil Case No. 2256:
a) Dismissing the complaint against defendant Victor Uy;
b) Ordering defendants Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty Company, Inc., Guillermo Corbeta, NFA
and GSIS to pay jointly and severally the following sums of money:
i. to pay plaintiff Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia, the sum of P8,935.06 for doctor's fees,
medicines, hospitalizations and medical expenses; P2,319.00 for transportation expenses; and
P53.30 for telegrams; P10,000.00 for the injuries she sustained; P12,000.00 loss of income for six
months.
ii. to plaintiff Victoria Kho, the sum P832.00 for hospitalization and medicines; P10,000.00 for
the injuries she sustained;
iii. to the heirs of Wellie [Willie] Calabia, Roland Kho and Maxima Uhmad [Ugmad] Vda. de
Kho, the sum of P7,500.00 as funeral expenses less P5,000.00 advanced by defendant Victor Uy.

iv. to the heirs of Wellie [Willie] Calabia, Sr., heirs of Roland Kho and heirs of Maxima
Ugmad Vda. de Kho; P30,000.00 each as compensatory damages.
c) To pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation;
d) Dismissing defendants counterclaim, and cross-claim; and
e) To pay the costs.
That this decision is without prejudice as to the right Mabuhay Insurance & Guaranty Co., Inc., and
NFA to recover from Guillermo Corbeta and GSIS the amounts they may have paid by virtue
hereof. 2
For purposes of this review, we deem as also assailed the disposition by the trial court in its Order
issued on July 12, 1985, modifying its original decision, by awarding moral damages to the heirs of
the deceased victims, as follows:
Considering that the dispositive portion of the decision in this case, an award of
P10,000.00 each made to plaintiffs Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia . . ., for injuries they
sustained, this award, through [sic] not clearly stated in the decision, is the moral
damages the instant motion seeks to obtain. However, the prayer for moral damages
for the death of the three (3) persons above-mentioned is proper. (citation omitted)
In view of the foregoing, the prayer of plaintiffs Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia and
Victoria Kho for an award of moral damages in their favor is hereby denied. However,
as for the death of Wellie [Willie] Calabia, Sr., Rolando Kho and Maxima Ugmad Vda.
de Kho, an award of moral damages is hereby made, and ordering and directing
defendants Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty Company Inc., Guillermo Corbeta,
National Food Authority and Government Service Insurance System to pay jointly
and severally the following sums to wit :
P10,000.00 to the heirs of Wellie [Willie]Calabia, Sr.
P10,000.00 to the heirs of Rolando Kho and
P10,000.00 to the heirs of Maxima Ugmad Vda. de Kho.
xxx xxx xxx
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The relevant facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
National Food Authority (NFA, formerly National Grains Authority) was the owner of a Chevrolet
truck which was insured against liabilities for death of and injuries to third persons with the GSIS.
On May 9, 1979, at about 7:00 in the evening at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the said truck driven by
Guillermo Corbeta collided with a public utility vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw. The Toyota Tamaraw was
owned and operated by Victor Uy, under the name and style of "Victory Line." The Tamaraw was a
total wreck.

All the collision victims were passengers of the Toyota Tamaraw. Five (5) passengers died 4 while
ten (10) others sustained bodily injuries. Among those injured were private respondents, Victoria Jaime
Vda. de Kho and Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia. Among the dead were Maxima Ugmad Vda. de Kho,
Roland Kho and Willie Calabia, Sr.

Three (3) cases were filed with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
The first, Civil Case No. 2196 for quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees, was commenced by Uy
on June 5, 1979 against NFA and Corbeta. On August 27, 1979, the second, Civil Case No. 2225 for
damages, was filed by an injured passenger, Librado Taer, against Uy, the operator of the public
utility vehicle, and insurer, Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty Co. (MIGC). In turn, Uy filed a crossclaim against MIGC and a third-party complaint against Corbeta and NFA. The third, Civil Case No.
2256, was instituted by herein private respondents on November 26, 1979 against the following:
NFA and Corbeta for damages due to quasi-delict; GSIS as insurer of the truck; Uy for breach of
contract of carriage; and MIGC as insurer of the Toyota Tamaraw. These cases were consolidated
and partially tried by Judge Fortunate A. Vailoces, of the then Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City.
These cases were later on transferred to Branch II of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City. Trial
ensued and on April 30, 1985, the court rendered its decision 5 holding that Corbeta's negligence was
the proximate cause of the collision. The findings of the trial court stated that the truck which crossed over
to the other lane was speeding because after the collision, its left front wheel was detached and the truck
traveled for about fifty (50) meters and fell into a ravine. 6Likewise, the court concluded that if both
vehicles had traveled in their respective lanes, the incident would not have occurred. 7 However, the
Chevy cargo truck had crossed over to the other lane which, under traffic rules, was the lane of the
Toyota Tamaraw. 8

In Civil Case No. 2196, the trial court awarded Uy the total amount of one hundred nine thousand
one hundred (P109,100.00) pesos for damages. In Civil Case No. 2225, said court dismissed the
case against Uy and ordered MIGC, Corbeta and NFA to pay plaintiff Taer, jointly and severally, the
total amount of forty thousand five hundred fifty-nine pesos and ninety four centavos (P40,559.94)
for actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorney's fees. Damages were likewise awarded
to the herein private respondents in Civil Case No. 2256, as earlier mentioned.
Corbeta and NFA appealed the decision of the trial court in Civil Case Nos. 2196, 2225, and 2256 to
the Court of Appeals. GSIS also elevated the decision in Civil Case No. 2256 to the same appellate
court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. Nos. 19847, 19848, and 19849.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the conclusions of the trial court and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, and finding no reversible
error, the decisions of the Court a quo in Civil Cases Nos. 2196, 2225 and 2256 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED. 9
On February 5 and 6, 1991, GSIS and NFA filed their motions for reconsideration respectively, which
were denied by the respondent court in its Resolution 10 dated August 13, 1991.
On October 4, 1991, only GSIS filed this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
assigned errors:
1. The respondent court erred in holding GSIS solidarily liable with NFA.

2. The respondent court erred in holding GSIS liable beyond the terms and conditions of the contract
of insurance and the limitations under Insurance Memorandum Circular (IMC) No. 5-78.
3. The respondent court erred in holding GSIS liable without proof that a notice of claim had been
filed within six (6) months from the date of the accident.
We find pertinent the following issues:
1) Whether the respondent court erred in holding GSIS solidarily liable with the negligent
insured/owner-operator of the Chevrolet truck for damages awarded to private respondents which
are beyond the limitations of the insurance policy and the Insurance Memorandum Circular No. 5-78.
2) Whether the respondent court failed to consider that the private respondents have no cause of
action against the petitioner, allegedly for failure of the victims to file an insurance claim within six (6)
months from the date of the accident.
Petitioner denies solidary liability with the NFA or the negligent operator of the cargo truck because it
claims that they are liable under different obligations. It asserts that the NFA's liability is based
on quasi-delict, while petitioner's liability is based on the contract of insurance. Citing articles
1207 11 and 1208 12 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, petitioner states that when there are two or more
debtors or two or more creditors, the obligation as a general rule is joint. It claims that the only exceptions
are: (1) when there is a stipulation for solidary obligation; (2) when the nature of the obligation requires
solidary liability; and (3) when the law declares the obligation to be solidary. However, since neither the
provision of the contract nor the insurance law provides for solidary liability, petitioner asserts that the
presumption is that its obligation arising from a contract of insurance is joint.

Petitioner's position insofar as joint liability is concerned is not tenable. It is now established that the
injured or the heirs of a deceased victim of a vehicular accident may sue directly the insurer of the
vehicle. Note that common carriers are required to secure Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability
Insurance [CMVLI] coverage as provided under Sec. 374 13 of the Insurance Code, precisely for the
benefit of victims of vehicular accidents and to extend them immediate relief. 14 As this Court held
in Shafter vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, Br. 75: 15

Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance (third party liability, or TPL) is primarily
intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent
third parties or passengers as a result of a negligent operation and use of motor
vehicles. The victims and/or their defendants [dependents] are assured of immediate
financial assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners.
xxx xxx xxx
The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the
insurer. The general purpose of statutes enabling an injured person to proceed
directly against the insurer is to protect injured persons against the insolvency of the
insured who causes such injury, and to give such injured person a certain beneficial
interest in the proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be liberally construed so
that their intended purpose may be accomplished. It has even been held that such a
provision creates a contractual relation which injures to the benefit of any and every
person who may be negligently injured by the named insured as if such injured
person were specifically named in the policy. (S 449 7 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 118-119) 16

However, although the victim may proceed directly against the insurer for indemnity, the third party
liability is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and those required by law. While it is true that
where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, and such third
persons can directly 17 sue the insurer, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against
third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held liable in solidum with the insured and/or the
other parties found at fault. 18 For the liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured carrier
or vehicle owner is based on tort. 19 The liability of GSIS based on the insurance contract is direct, but not
solidary with that of the NFA. The latter's liability is based separately on Article 2180 20 of the Civil
Code. 21

Obviously, the insurer could be held liable only up to the extent of what was provided for by the
contract of insurance, in accordance with CMVLI law. At the time of the incident, the schedule of
indemnities for death and/or bodily injuries, professional fees, hospital and other charges payable
under a CMVLI coverage was provided under the Insurance Memorandum Circular (IMC) No. 5-78
which was approved on November 10, 1978. As therein provided, the maximum indemnity for death
was twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per victim. 22 The schedules for medical expenses were also
provided by said IMC, specifically in paragraphs (C) to (G).

Consequently, heirs of the victims who died in the May 9, 1979 vehicular incident, could proceed (1)
against GSIS for the indemnity of P12,000 for each dead victim, and against NFA and Guillermo
Corbeta for any other damages or expenses claimed; or (2) against NFA and Corbeta to pay them
all their claims in full.
It follows also that injured victims, Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia and Victoria Kho, could claim their
medical expenses for eight thousand nine hundred thirty-five pesos and six centavos (P8,935.06)
and eight hundred thirty-two (P832.00) pesos, from any of the following: GSIS, NFA, or Corbeta. As
to the other damages, only NFA or Corbeta may be held liable therefor.
Computation of hospital charges and fees for the services rendered to the injured victims was
conclusively established by the trial court. The petitioner failed to object to the evidence thereon,
when presented by the private respondents during the trial. Thus, these factual bases for the award
of damages may no longer be attacked. For generally, findings of the judge who tried the case and
heard the witnesses could not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and
particular circumstances which have been overlooked but which, if properly considered, might affect
the result of the case. 23 Thus, considering the evidence on record including the schedule of indemnities
provided under IMC No. 5-78, we find no cogent reason to disturb the computation of medical charges
and expenses that justify the award of damages by the trial court.

As to the second issue, the petitioner contends that it cannot be held liable without proof nor
allegation that the private respondents filed before its office a notice of claim within six (6) months
from the date of the accident. This requirement, according to the petitioner, gives the insurer the
opportunity to investigate the veracity of the claim, and non-compliance therewith constitutes waiver.
Since the claim was not reported to the insurer, the petitioner avers that the presumption is that the
victim opted to pursue his claim against the motor vehicle owner or against the tortfeasor.
However, in this case the records reveal that on September 7, 1979, the private respondents sent a
notice of loss to the petitioner informing the latter of the accident. Included as "Exihibit J'' 24 in the
records, this notice constitutes evidence of the loss they suffered by reason of the vehicular collision.
They stressed further that the petitioner did not deny receipt of notice of claim during the trial, and it would
be too late now to state otherwise.

Although merely factual, we need to emphasize that the alleged delay in reporting the loss by the
insured and/or by the beneficiaries must be promptly raised by the insurer 25 in objecting to the claims.

When the insured presented proof of loss before the trial court, the insurer failed to object to said
presentation. The petitioner should have promptly interposed the defense of delay, or belated
compliance, concerning the notice of claim. Moreover, the petitioner merely waited for the victims or
beneficiaries to file their complaint. As matters stand now, the defense of laches or prescription is
deemed waived because of petitioner's failure to raise it not only before but also during the hearing. 26

To recapitulate, petitioner seeks a definitive ruling only on the extent of its liability, as insurer of NFA,
to those injured or killed in the May 9, 1979 vehicular collision.
As found by the trial court, the driver (Guillermo Corbeta), the operator (NFA), and MIGC, are
solidarily liable for damages as computed below:
SCHEDULE A
I. For the Injured Victims.
1) Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia.
a) Medical expenses P8,935.06
b) Transportation and Telegraph Expenses 2,372.30
c) Other Compensatory/Moral Damages 10,000.00
d) Loss of Income 12,000.00

Total P33,307.36
=========
2) Victoria Kho.
a) Medical expenses P832.00
b) Other Compensatory/Moral Damages 10,000.00

Total P10,832.00
=========
II. For the Heirs of the Deceased Victims:
Compensatory/
Funeral Death Moral

Expenses Indemnity Damages Total

1) Heirs of Willie Calabia, Sr. P2,500.00 P30,000.00 P10,000.00 42,500.00
2) Heirs of Roland Kho 2,500.00 30,000.00 10,000.00 42,500.00
3) Heirs of Maxima Ugmad Vda.
de Kho 2,500.00 30,000.00 10,000.00 42,500.00

Sub-Total P7,500.00 P90,000.00 P30,000.00 P127,500.00
Less: Advances by Victor Uy (5,000.00) NIL (5,000.00)
________ _________ _________ _________
Balance P2,500.00 P90,000.00 P30,000.00 122,500.00
======== ======== ======== ========
III. Total Amount of Attorney's Fees P10,000.00

Note that, the petitioner (GSIS) was impleaded as insurer of NFA. But under the CMVLI law, the
petitioner could only be held liable under its contract of insurance. And pursuant to the CMVLI law,
its liability is primary, and not dependent on the recovery of judgment from the insured. Hence, GSIS
is directly liable to the private respondents, in the following amounts.
SCHEDULE B
I. Injured Victims Medical Expenses

1) Victoria Jaime Vda. de Kho P832.00
2) Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia P8,935.00
II. Heirs of Deceased Victims Death Indemnity

1) Heirs of Willie Calabia, Sr. P12,000.00
2) Heirs of Roland Kho P12,000.00

3) Heirs of Maxima Ugmad Vda. de Kho P12,000.00

The balance of the private respondents' claims as shown on Schedule A above, must be paid by
Corbeta or NFA, or MIGC, the parties found solidarily liable. 27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, but the decision of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby. MODIFIED, as follows:
1. Petitioner Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay
(a) twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) as death indemnity to each
group of heirs of the deceased, Willie Calabia Sr., Roland Kho and
Maxima Ugmad Vda. de Kho; (b) eight hundred thirty-two (P832.00)
pesos for medical expenses of Victoria Jaime Vda. de Kho; and (c)
eight thousand, nine hundred thirty-five pesos and six centavos
(P8,935.06) for medical expenses of Gloria Kho Vda. de Calabia.
2. Guillermo Corbeta, National Foods Authority, and Mabuhay
Insurance & Guaranty Co., Inc., jointly and severally, are ordered to
pay private respondents' claims 28 as adjudged by the Regional Trial
Court of Butuan City, minus the amounts that GSIS must pay to the
injured victims and the heirs of the deceased victims as above stated.

This decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.

BARREDO VS GARCIA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of
First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from
the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact
it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he
must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla
to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds
of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged.
Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903
of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

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xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.

xxx

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xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of
doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall

respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one
shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing
the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx

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ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough
to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to
acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos
. . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 19020910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental
de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with
it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte.
An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question
asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol.
6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia
menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar
los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda
la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de
notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se
enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido
desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria
de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene
al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones.
Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por
razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de
la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.

Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos
de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante
el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el
fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso;
pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito,
materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la
obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give
rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,
like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this
coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the
regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued
and sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it
remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not
been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the nonexistence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime,
which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there
is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its
enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are
similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de
la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao.
Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino
en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de
que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are

personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.
The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol,"
says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts
of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and
for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of
article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that
articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one
should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles
above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia
Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for
damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que
el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado
con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la

sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el
hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o
negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio,
el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el
articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes
en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco
baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del
dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en
relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas
minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that
the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or
negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of
fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused
by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant
herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from
violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own
jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the
taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and

besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with
greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had
unjustly andfraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre
consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico
y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares,
in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery
of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages
of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed

to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of
the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor
on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code
of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by
relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being
transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
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"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
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"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by
the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make
the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil
was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted,
arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws
that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure
now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or

negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in

articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise
to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child,
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to
be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at
the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still
moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-yearold child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,

1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the
mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest,
was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the
franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so
far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year
1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently
driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile
struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the
rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged
in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison
for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903,
held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a

family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six
cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime
of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of
Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected
up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal
Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of
criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
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Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master
to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence
in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good
defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of
or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be
said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced
during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded
and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence.
In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it
is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth

life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in
the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that
of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa

aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

DIONISIO VS ALVENDIA

G.R. No. L-10567

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
November 26, 1957

ANA DIONISIO and CAROLINA ALMODOVAR, petitioners,

vs.
HON. CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA, Judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch XVI), LA MALLORCA, LAMBERTO RAYMUNDO, GERONIMO ASUNCION and
FRANCISCO LIZASO,respondents.
Alberto R. de Joya for petitioners.
Ricardo D. Galano for respondents.
Yabut, Punzalan and Eusebio and Manuel O. Chan for respondents La Mallorca and Raymundo.
PADILLA, J.:
On 29 March 1954 the petitioners brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action to
recover damages from the respondents La Mallorca, a registered partnership, Lamberto Raymundo,
Francisco Lizaso and Geronimo Asuncion, arising from a violent collision between a taxi cab, owned
and operated by the respondent La Mallorca and driven by the respondent Raymundo, and a
passenger jeep, owned and operated by the respondent Lizaso and driven by the respondent
Asuncion, where the petitioners code, at the intersection of General Luna and Bellen streets, City of
Manila, on September 1953, as a result of which the petitioners were thrown out of the jeep and
suffered injuries and "have been suffering from malignant fever, recurrent pains and extreme
nervousness," (Case No. 22439, Annex A.) A motion filed by the respondents Lizaso and Asuncion
to suspend the proceedings in the civil action for damages until after the criminal case for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (case No. 50007), filed against the respondents
Raymundo and Asuncion in the Municipal Court of Manila, shall have been disposed of was denied
by the respondent Court. After the respondents, defendants in the court below, had filed their
answers, the petitioner rested their case and the respondents begun to present their evidence,
motions for the suspension of the proceedings were filed on the same ground as that relied upon in
the first motion already denied. Despite the petitioners' objection to the motions the respondent
Court entered an order granting the suspension prayed for until after the criminal case shall have
been decided (Annex I). A motion for reconsideration (Annex J) was denied (Annex K). Because the
petitioners claim that the suspension ordered by the respondent Court is against the law and there is
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, they come to this Court to pray
for the annulment and setting aside of the order of suspension complained of and for a writ to
compel the respondent Court to resume , the hearing of the civil action and to render judgment
therein.
The respondent Court and the respondents Lizaso and Asuncion answered the petition; but the
respondents La Mallorca and Raymundo failed to answer it despite two extension of time granted by
this Court on motion.
The answering respondents contend that the action for damages in civil case No. 22439 should be
suspended pending determination of criminal case No. 50007 on the following grounds:

1. That this civil action is so directly and closely interwoven with the criminal action that the
outcome of the latter would vitally and greatly affect the former.
2. To avoid the happening of an anomalous situation where a party declared by one court
completely innocent and free from any civil liability may be held by another court liable under
the same set of facts.
3. That the procedure for the prosecution of offenses is more adequate than civil procedure,
and for this reason the criminal action is generally given preference.
4. To avoid multiplicity and complexity of suits.
5. That this Honorable Court could suspend the proceedings in this civil action through the
exercise of its inherent power to grant or refuse continuance.
The rule in the case of Parker vs. Panlilio,* G.R. No. L-4961, 5 March 1952, cannot be involved by
the respondents, because there the suspension of the hearing in the civil action granted by the trial
court was upheld on the ground that it lay within judicial discretion a power inherent in the courts.
Nevertheless, the opinion of this Court in that case upholds the rule that the civil action is separate
and distinct from the criminal proceedings, albeit both arose from the same act of the defendant. If
the opinion in that case is to be construed as laying down the rule that the institution of a criminal
action for physical injuries suspends the proceedings in the civil action for damages until after the
criminal case shall have been disposed of, then it should be stated that such rule has been
abandoned, because it is settled that "in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party" and that "such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence."1 The civil responsibility arising from crime may be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the injured or offended party does not waive to it adjudged
or does not reserve his right to bring a civil action for damages against the defendant.2 But where the
injured or offended party reserves such right or actually brings an action for damages, the last action
has nothing to do with the criminal proceedings for the same cause upon which the civil action is
brought. The owner and operator of the jeep where the petitioners role as passengers may be held
liable for breach of contract for his failure to bring them to their destination safe and sound. The
owner and operator and the driver of the taxicab may be held liable for tort, even if driver be relieved
from criminal liability. Hence the respondents' apprehension that the resumption of the hearing and
determination of the action in the civil case may bring about "an anomalous situation where a party
declared by one court completely innocent and free from any civil liability may be held by another
court liable under the same set of facts," is groundless. The fact that one of the two drivers might be
acquitted and the other convicted is of no moment. Both may have been negligent and be convicted.
In the civil case the Court will determine who between them caused the accident. Unless and until a
competent court held by virtue of a final judgment that the event that is charged to constitute a law
transgression from which the civil obligation might arise did not take place, extinction of penal liability
does not carry with it the release from civil responsibility.3 The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in quasi-delicts is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code.4
The order suspending the hearing of the civil action is annulled and set aside and the respondent
Court is directed to resume and proceed with the trial, of the civil action and render judgment therein,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Felix, J.B.L., concurs in the result.

REYES. J. B. L., concurring:

I concur with the decision. I believe, however, that in the case of independent civil action is under the
New Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely
irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to me to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make
these actions "entirely separate and distinct" from the criminal action (Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2177).
Hence, in these cases, I think Rule 107, section 1(d) does not apply. Montemayor and Concepcion,
JJ., concur.