Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 124371

November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 modifying that of
the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City 2 declaring respondent Alicia
F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate
of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. 7 He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the fathers name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple
drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the
United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union
in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo
and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia had
no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did
not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their twentyfive (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house
and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the
personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay
Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will
and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the
order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
(sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R.
Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will
to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the
late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being
so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.
Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as
void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of
the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,
all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a

return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to
the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all
debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate
or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. 29 Amending its
decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate
child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, 36 the
issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial
court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons arebinding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven,
in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
"American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzos will.38

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law.
1wph!1

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the
will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well
lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of
this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her
is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he
was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of
Court.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., conc
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage
at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
1wphi1.nt

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's

alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40,
52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry

petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned,
can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;
xxx

xxx

xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which
type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although
an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof
of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of

the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to
her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it
in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; 53 (d) Exhibit "D"
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records; 54 and (e)
Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 55 (2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration
of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if

any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in
the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.