g

Generation IV Design Concepts

GE Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor
S-PRISM

by

C. Boardman
GE Nuclear
San Jose, CA

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach
Design description and competitive potential
Previous Licensing interactions
Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM
What, if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

United States Energy Resources

Energy Content, TWy

2,138.
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

S-PRISM would provide

the U.S. with a long term
energy source without
the need for additional
mining or enrichment
operations.

2.85 TWy was used

238.
in the U.S. in 1994
1,900.
(w/o mining)
1,900. TWy from tails (w/o further mining)
- 193.1
+ 224. TWy by processing spent LWR fuel
+ 14. TWy by mining U.S. Reserves (< 130$/kg)
------------------------------------------------------------------2,138. TWy from U.S. Reserves w Fast Reactor
29.3
23.1
5.5
coal

oil

gas

ULWR

U - Fast Reactor

Indigenous U. S. Resources
Energy estimates for fossil fuels are based on "International Energy Outlook 1995", DOE/EIA-0484(95).
The amount of depleted uranium in the US includes existing stockpile and that expected to result from
enrichment of uranium to fuel existing LWRs operated over their 40-y design life. The amount of uranium
available for LWR/Once Through is assumed to be the reasonably assured resource less than $130/kg in
the US taken from the uranium Red Book.
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

Time Phased Relative Waste Toxicity (LWR Spent Fuel)

Actinide containing LWR spent fuel

remains toxic for millions of years

Processing to remove the fission

products (~3% of LWR spent fuel),
uranium (95%), and transuranics
prior to disposal shortens the period
that the wasteremains toxic to
less than 500 years.
The recovered U and TRU would
then be used as fuel and burned.
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

g Relative Decay Heat Loads of LWR and LMR Spent Fuel

Decay Heat
Decay Heat Load

Spent Fuel at
Discharge

Normal Process
Product After
Processing Spent Fuel

(Watts per kg HM)

LWR

S-PRISM

2.3

11.8

9.62

25.31

Pu from PUREX
Process for LWR

During
Duringall
allstages
stagesininthe
theS-PRISM
S-PRISMfuel
fuel
cycle
cyclethe
thefissile
fissilematerial
materialisisininaahighly
highly
radioactive
radioactivestate
statethat
thatalways
alwaysexceeds
exceedsthe
the
LWR
LWRspent
spentfuel
fuelstandard.
standard.

Pu + Actinides
from PYRO
Process
Weapons Grade Pu-239
ACRS Workshop

1.93
June 4-5, 2001

Diversions
Diversions
would
wouldbe
beextremely
extremelydifficult.
difficult.
5

Boardman

Phase 1:
Fresh fuel fabrication
Mining

Time

Skills,Knowledge,
Expertise

Diversion,
Detectability

Available Mass

Facility Access

Mass and Bulk

Chemical

Radiological

Isotopic

Stage of the Fuel Cycle

Detectability

Technical Barriers
Facility Unattractiveness

Material Barriers

Co-Located Fuel Cycle Facility

Milling
Conversion
Uranium enrichment
Plutonium storage
Transport
Fuel fabrication
Storage
Transport

Not required

Not required

Phase 2
All operations are
performed within
heavily shielded
enclosures or hot cells
at the S-PRISM site.

Not required
Not required

Phase 2:
Initial core loading
Storage of fresh fuel
Fuel handling
Reactor irradiation

Not required

Not required

Phase 3:
Equilibrium Operations
Fuel handling
Spent fuel storage
Head-end processing
Fuel processing
Fuel fabrication
Reactor operations
Waste conditioning
Waste shipment

ACRS Workshop

VL

VL

L
L
M
M
L
L
L
VL

VL

VL

VL
M
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL
VL

June 4-5, 2001

I
I
I
I
I
I
VL
VL

VL

Phase I
These opportunities for
proliferation are not
required for S-PRISM.

M
M
I
I
I
M
I
I

L
L
L
L
L
L
VL
VL

Phase 3
All operations are
performed within heavily
shielded and inerted
hot cells at the co-located
S-PRISM/IFR site.
6

Boardman

Key Non-Proliferation Attributes of S-PRISM

1.) The ability to create S-PRISM startup cores by processing
spent LWR fuel at co-located Spent Fuel Recycle Facilities
eliminates opportunity for diversion within:
Phase I (mining, milling, conversion, and uranium
enrichment phases) since these processes are not required.
and
Phase II and III (on-site remote processing of highly
radioactive spent LWR and LMR fuel eliminates the
transportation vulnerabilities associated with the shipment
of Pu)
2.) The fissile material is always in an intensely radioactive
form. It is difficult to modify a heavily shielded facility designed
for remote operation in an inert atmosphere without detection.
3.) The co-located molten salt electro-refining system removes
the uranium, Pu, and the minor actinides from the waste stream
thereby avoiding the creation of a uranium/Pu mine at the
repository.

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

Incentive for Developing S-PRISM

Supports geological repository program:

deployment of one new S-PRISM plant per year for 30 years would
eliminate the 86,000 metric tons of spent LWR fuel that will be
discharged by the present fleet of LWRs during their operating life.

reduces required repository volume by a factor of four to fifty

All spent fuel processing and waste conditioning operations would be

paid for through the sale of electricity.

limits interim storage to 30 years

Reduces environmental and diversion risks

ACRS Workshop

repository mission reduced from >> 10,000 to <500 years

facilitates long term CO2 reduction

resource conservation (fossil and uranium)

allows Pu production and utilization to be balanced

utilizes a highly diversion resistant reprocessing technology

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM

Design and safety approach

Design description and competitive potential
Previous Licensing interactions
Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM
What, if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

Boardman

S-PRISM Safety Approach

Exploits Natural Phenomena and Intrinsic Characteristics
Low system pressure
Large heat capacity
Natural circulation
Negative temperature coefficients of reactivity

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

10

Boardman

ACRS Workshop

Key Features of S-PRISM

Compact pool-type reactor modules sized for factory

fabrication and an affordable full-scale prototype test for
design certification

Passive shutdown heat removal

Passive accommodation of ATWS events

Passive post-accident containment cooling

Nuclear safety-related envelope limited to the nuclear

steam supply system located in the reactor building

Horizontal seismic isolation of the complete NSSS

Accommodation of postulated severe accidents such that a

a formal public evacuation plan is not required

Can achieve conversion ratios less than or greater than one

June 4-5, 2001

11

Boardman

S-PRISM Design Approach

Simple Conservative Design
u Passive decay heat removal
u Passive accommodation of ATWS Events
u Automated safety grade actions are limited to:
containment isolation
reactor scram
steam side isolation and blow-down

S-PRISM
S-PRISMFeatures
FeaturesContribute
Contributeto:
to:
Simplicity
SimplicityofofOperation
Operation
Reliability
Reliability
Maintainability
Maintainability

Operation and Maintenance

u Safety grade envelope confined to NSSS
u Simple compact primary system boundary
u Low personnel radiation exposure levels

Capital and Investment Risk Reduction

Reduced
ReducedRisk
RiskofofInvestment
Investment
Loss
Loss
Low
LowCost
CostCommercialization
Commercialization
Path
Path

u Conservative low temperature Design

u Modular construction and seismic isolation
u Factory fabrication of components and facility modules
u Modularity reduces the need for spinning reserve
u Certification via prototype testing of a single 380 MWe module
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

12

Boardman

S-PRISM Design Approach (continued)

1.

Design basis events (DBEs)

- Equipment and structures design and life basis
- Bounding events that end with a reactor scram
- Example, all rod run out to a reactor scram

2.

Accommodated anticipated transients without

scram (A-ATWS)
- In prior reactors, highest probability events that led to boiling
and Hypothetical Core Disassembly Accidents were ATWS events
- In S-PRISM, ATWS events are passively accommodated within
ASME Level D damage limits, without boiling
- Loss of primary flow without scram (ULOF)
- Loss of heat sink without scram (ULOHS)
- Loss of flow and heat sink without scram (ULOF/LOHS)
- All control rods run out to rod stops without scram (UTOP)
- Safe shutdown earthquake without scram (USSE)

3.

Residual risk events

- Very low probability events not normally used in design
- In S-PRISM, residual events are used to assess performance
margins

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

13

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach

Design description and competitive potential

Previous Licensing interactions
Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM
What, if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

14

Boardman

Power Train
High Grade
Industrial Standards

Safety Grade

STEAM
GENERATOR

AIR

Redundant
Safety Grade
Isolation Valves
TG CONTROL

TURBINE
EMP

EM
PUMP

BYPASS
INTERMEDIATE
SODIUM
LOOP

IHX

AUXILIARY
VESSEL

Condenser

from
cooling
tower

AIR

ACS

AIR

RVACS
FEEDWATER
HEATERS

REACTOR

RVACS

92-275-08

Nuclear Steam Supply System

ACS

Condenser

Shutdown Heat Removal Systems

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

15

Boardman

S-PRISM - Principal Design Parameters

Reactor Module
- Core Thermal Power, MWt
- Primary Inlet/Outlet Temp., C
- Secondary Inlet/Outlet Temp., C

1,000
363/510
321/496

Power Block
-

Number of Reactors Modules

Gross/Net Electrical, MWe
Type of Steam Generator
Turbine Type
Throttle Conditions, atg/C
Feedwater Temperature, C

2
825/760
Helical Coil
TC-4F 3600 rpm
171/468
215

Overall Plant
-

ACRS Workshop

Gross/Net Electrical, MWe

Gross/Net Cycle Efficiency, %
Number of Power Blocks
Plant Availability, %

2475/2280
41.2/38.0
3
93

June 4-5, 2001

16

Boardman

ACRS Workshop

Super PRISM

June 4-5, 2001

17

Boardman

S-PRISM Power Block (760 MWe net)

Two
Two380
380MWe
MWeNSSS
NSSSper
perPower
PowerBlock
Block
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

18

Boardman

Metal Core Layout

Number of Assemblies
Fuel: 23 month x 3 cycles
Blkt: 23 month x 4 cycles

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

19

Boardman

Oxide vs. Metal Fuel

Attractive features of metal core include:

fuel is denser and has a harder neutron spectrum

compatible with coolant, RBCB demonstrated at EBR-II
axial blankets are not required for break even core
high thermal conductivity (low fuel temp.)
lower Doppler and harder spectrum reduce the need for GEMs for
ULOF (6 versus 18)

Metal fuel pyro-processing is diversion resistant, compact,

less complex, and has fewer waste streams than conventional
aqueous (PUREX) process
However, an advanced aqueous process may be
competitive and diversion resistant.
S-PRISM
S-PRISMcan
canmeet
meetall
allrequirements
requirements
with
witheither
eitherfuel
fueltype.
type.
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

20

Boardman

g S-PRISM - Three Power Block Plot Plan

Three Power Block Plant
2475 MWe (2280 MWe net)
420 m
420mete

13

11

FC
F

385 m

31

101

8
12
3

11

FCF
14

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

1 Reactor Building (2 NSSS/block)

2 Reactor Maintenance Facility
3 Control Facility
4 New and Spent Fuel Handling Facility
5 Assembly Facility
6 Cask Storage Facility
7 Turbine-Generator Facility
8 Maintenance Facility
9 Circulating Water Inlet Pump Station
10 Circulating Water Discharge
11 Waste Treatment
12 Parking Lot
13 Switch Yard
14 Fuel Cycle Facility

21

Boardman

S-PRISM - Seismic Isolation System

Characteristics of
Seismic Isolation System
Safe Shutdown Earthquake
- Licensing Basis
0.3g (ZPA)
- Design Requirement 0.5g
Lateral Displacement
- at 0.3g
7.5 inch.
- Space Allowance
o Reactor Cavity
20 inch.
o Reactor Bldg.
28 inch.
Natural Frequency
- Horizontal
- Vertical

0.70 Hz
21 Hz

Lateral Load Reduction > 3

Rubber/Steel Shim Plates
Protective Rubber Barrier
4 ft.
Seismic Isolators (66)

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

22

Boardman

Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS)

Air Inlet (8)
RVACS
Flow
Paths

32.75 ft
31.58 ft
30.08 ft
29.50 ft

Air Outlet
Stack

Grade

Reactor
Vessel (2 in)

Inlet
Plenum

Containment
Vessel (in)

Inlet
Plenum

Containment Vessel

CORE

Reactor Vessel
37 ' 0 "
Silo Cavity

ELEVATION

ACRS Workshop

Concrete

Collector
Cylinder (1n)

Overflow
Path
Normal
Flow Path

Reactor Silo

Ho Arg
t A on
ir R
Do Co
ise
wn ld
r
A
co ir
me
r

Vessel
Liner (1 in)

Containment

Collector Cylinder

37.00 ft

Thermal
Insulation (2 in)

Flow Annuli & Silo

Cross Section
96_250

June 4-5, 2001

23

Boardman

Passive Shutdown Heat Removal (RVACS)

1300

Level C

+2

1200
1100

1246F
1168F
1134F

1000

Startup Core
Equilibrium Core

900
800
700
600
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

TIME, hr.

70

80

Air Outlet (8)

Air Inlet (8)

RVACS
Flow Paths

Containment Dome

Reactor Silo
CORE

Cold Air
Down comer
Hot Air
Riser

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

24

Boardman

Natural Circulation Confirmed by 3 Dimensional T/H Analysis

Normal Operation

ACRS Workshop

Examples
Temperature and velocity distribution
at 4 and 20 minutes after loss of heat sink

June 4-5, 2001

25

Boardman

Decay Heat Removal Analysis Model

Spent Fuel

Core

Primary Coolant Loop

IHX

Vessel
Liner

ACRS Workshop

Reactor
Vessel
Containment
Vessel

June 4-5, 2001

RVACS Air Flow Circuit

NOTE: Elevations Are Not Represented In Figure

26

Boardman

700

RVACS Cooling - Nominal System Temperatures

700

650

Core Outlet Temp (C)

650

Vessel Midwall Temp (C)

600

Core Inlet Temp (C)

550
500

550

500

450

Temperature (C)

Temperature (C)

600

450

350

400

400

350
0

50

50

100

100

150

150

200
200

Time (hr)

250
250

300
300

350
350

400
400

Time (hr)

RVACS
RVACSTransients
Transients Are
AreSlow
SlowQuasi
QuasiSteady
SteadyState
StateEvents
Events
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

27

Boardman

RVACS Heat Rejection and Heat Load versus Time

10
Core Power (MW)

Spent Fuel Power (MW)

RVACS Heat Rejection (MW)

ACS Heat Rejection (MW)

Power (MW)

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Time (hr)

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

28

Boardman

g RVACS Cooling - Nominal Mixed Core Outlet Temperature

Nominal Peak Core Mixed Outlet Temperatures

RVACS Only
RVACS
Only
RVACS + 1 of 1 ACS
RVACS + ACS

600
600

500
500

Temperature (C)

Temperature (C)

700
700

400
400

300
300

200
200
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

50

100

150

Time (hr)

200

250

300

350

400

Time (hr)

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

29

Boardman

Damage Fraction

from

Six RVACS Transients

Peak Temperature & Damage
Fraction at Vessel Mid Wall
(nominal / 2-sigma)
Temperature C Damage Fraction
635 / 683

<0.002 / 0.002

Peak Temperature & Damage

Fraction at Core Support
(nominal / 2-sigma)
Temperature (C)
612 / 658

Damage Fraction
<0.002 / 0.002

Damage
Damagefrom
fromRVACS
RVACSTransients
TransientsIsIsNegligible
Negligible
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

30

Boardman

S-PRISM Approach to ATWS

Negative temperature coefficients of reactivity are
used to accommodate ATWS events.

Loss of Normal Heat Sink

Loss of Forced Flow
Loss of Flow and Heat Sink
Transient Overpower w/o Scram

These events have, in priorLMR designs, led to rapid

coolant boiling, fuel melting, and core disassembly.
S-PRISM Requirement:
Accommodate the above subset of events w/o loss of reactor
integrity or radiological release using passive or inherent natural
processes. A loss of functionality or component life-termination
is acceptable.

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

31

Boardman

ARIES-P Power Block Transient Model

ACS

ACS

Two-Reactors Coupled to a Single TG

Once-through Superheat

One Group Prompt Jump Core Physics

with Multi-Group Decay Heat

Control Systems:
- Plant control system (global and local controllers)
- Reactivity control system (RCS)
- Reactor protection system (RPS)
- EM pump control system and synchronous machines

RVACS/ACS

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

32

Boardman

Example ATWS - Loss Of Flow Without Scram

S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - ULOF - Core Power And Flow

Loss of Primary Pump Power w/o Scram

120
Core Power Fraction (%)
Core Flow Fraction (%)

Core Power Fraction (%)

Core Flow Fraction (%)

100

Loss of pump pressure allows GEM

feedback and fission shutdown

Percent Of Rated Value

80

Continuation of IHTS flow and

feed water water enhance primary
natural circulation to 10%

60

40

Excess cooling of core outlet

shortens CR drivelines and pulls
control rods slightly to balance fission
power with heat removal

20

0
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

Time (sec)

S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - ULOF - Reactivity Feedback

700

150

600

100

500

50
Reactivity Feedback (cents)

Temperature (C)

S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - ULOF - System Temperatures

400

300

Core Inlet Temperature (C)

Core Outlet Temperature (C)
IHX Inlet Primary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Outlet Primary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Inlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Outlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Inlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Outlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Water Inlet Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Steam Outlet Temperature (C)
Vessel Average Temperature (C)

200

100

0
0

500

ACRS Workshop

1000

1500

2000
Time (sec)

2500

3000

3500

0
Net Reactivity (cent)
Control Reactivity Insertion (cent)
Doppler Reactivity Feedback (cent)
Sodium Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Axial Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Radial Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Radial Thermal Bowing Expansion Feedback (cent)
GEM Reactivity Feedback (cent)
Control Driveline Thermal Expansion Reactivity Feedback (cent)

-50

-100

-150

-200
4000

June 4-5, 2001

500

1000

1500

2000
Time (sec)

2500

3000

3500

33

Boardman

4000

Example - 0.5 g ZPA Seismic Event Without Scram

S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - USSE - Core Power And Flow

Reactivity:

200
180

+ - 0.30$ at 3/4 Hz (horizontal core compaction)

160

Percent Of Rated Value

140

+ - 0.16$ at 10 Hz (vertical CR-core motion with

opposite phases)

120
100
80

Power oscillations to 180%, short duration, not

supercritical

60
40

Core Power Fraction (%)

Core Power Fraction (%)
Core Flow Fraction
Core Flow Fraction(%)
(%)

20

Fuel heat capacity absorbs power oscillation

without melting

0
1.8

2.3

2.8

3.3

3.8

4.3

4.8

5.3

5.8

Time (sec)

Fuel releases heat to structures slowly and gives

small Doppler
feedback to reduce power peaks
S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - USSE - Reactivity Feedback

600

60

500

40

400

20

300

200

Core Inlet Temperature (C)

Core Outlet Temperature (C)
IHX Inlet Primary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Outlet Primary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Inlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
IHX Outlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Inlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Outlet Secondary Sodium Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Water Inlet Temperature (C)
Steam Generator Steam Outlet Temperature (C)
Vessel Average Temperature (C)

100

Reactivity Feedback (cents)

Temperature (C)

S-PRISM2 (MOX-Hetero) - USSE - System Temperatures

-20

Net Reactivity (cent)

Control Reactivity Insertion (cent)
Doppler Reactivity Feedback (cent)
Sodium Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Axial Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Radial Thermal Expansion Feedback (cent)
Core Radial Thermal Bowing Expansion Feedback (cent)
GEM Reactivity Feedback (cent)
Control Driveline Thermal Expansion Reactivity Feedback (cent)

-40

-60

ACRS Workshop

10

15

20

25
Time (sec)

30

35

40

45

50 2001
June 4-5,
0

10

15

20

25
Time (sec)

30

35

34

40

45
Boardman

50

S-PRISM Transient Performance Conclusions

S-PRISM tolerates ATWS events within the

safety performance limits
The passive safety performance of S-PRISM
is consistent with the earlier ALMR program

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

35

Boardman

S-PRISM Containment System

Upper Containment
for Reactor B

Maintenance
Enclosure

Rupture
Disk

Upper Containment
for Reactor A

Service Cell

Rupture
Disk

Upper Containment
for Reactor A

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

36

Boardman

Example - Large Pool Fire

Cel l - 1

10

Cel l - 2

Pressure
(psig)
Pressure (psi)

Cel l - 3

Cel l - 4

Cel l - 6

Cel l - 5

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
0

Ti me ( hr )

Time (hours)

Beyond
BeyondDesign
DesignBasis
Basis(Residual
(ResidualRisk)
Risk)
events
eventshave
havebeen
beenused
usedto
toassess
assesscontainment
containmentmargins
margins

---------------------

This
Thisevent
eventassumes
assumesthat
thatthe
thereactor
reactorclosure
closure
disappears
initiating
aalarge
pool
fire
disappearsatattime
timezero
zero
initiating
large
pool
fire
--------------------Note
Notethat
thatthe
thecontainment
containmentpressure
pressurepeaks
peaksatatless
lessthan
than55psig
psig
and
anddrops
dropsbelow
belowatmospheric
atmosphericpressure
pressureininless
lessthan
than66hours
hours
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

37

Boardman

Comparison of Emergency Power Requirements

Function

S-PRISM

l Shutdown Heat Removal

l Post Accident
Containment Cooling

Completely Passive

Redundant and Diverse Systems

Passive Air Cooling

of Upper Containment

Redundant and Diverse Systems

l Coolant Injection/Core Flooding

l Shutdown System

Emergency
EmergencyAC
ACPower
Power

ACRS Workshop

Generation III LWRs

N/A

Redundant and Diverse Systems

3/9 Primary or 2/3 Secondary Rods

Self Actuated Scram on Secondary Rods
Passive Accommodation of ATWS Events

Most Rods Must Function

Boron injection
N/A

<<200
200kWe
kWefrom
fromBatteries
Batteries

~~10,000
10,000kWe
kWe

June 4-5, 2001

38

Boardman

Layers of Defense
Containment
(passive post accident heat removal)

Coolant Boundary (Reactor Vessel

(simple vessel with no penetrations below the Na level)

Passive Shutdown Heat Removal

(RVACS + ACS)

Passive Core Shutdown

(inherent negative feedback's)

Increasing
Challenge

RPS Scram of Scram Rods

(magnetic Self Actuaed Latch backs up RPS)

RPS Scram of Control Rods

(RPS is independent and close coupled)

Automatic Power Run Back

(by automated non safety grade Plant Control System

All
AllSafety
SafetyGrade
GradeSystems
SystemsAre
AreLocated
Located
within
the
Reactor/NSSS
Building
within the Reactor/NSSS Building

Normal Operating Range_____

Maintained by Fault Tolerant

Tri-Redundant Control System

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

39

Boardman

Adjustments Since End of DOE Program In 1995

Parameter or Feature

1995 ALMR

S-PRISM

Core Power, MWt

840.

1000.

Core Outlet Temp, C

499

510

454/153

468/177

Net Electrical, MWe

(two power blocks)

1243.

1520

Net Electrical, MWe

(three power blocks)

1866

2280

Seismic Isolation

Yes. Each NSSS

placed on a
separate isolated
platform

Yes. A single
platform supports
two NSSSs

Above Reactor Containment

Low leakage steel

machinery dome

Low leakage steel

lined compartments
above the reactor
closure

Main Steam, C / kg/cm

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

40

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach

Design description and competitive potential

Previous Licensing interactions
Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM
What , if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

41

Boardman

Optimizing the Plant Size

1988 PRISM

S-PRISM

Large Commercial Design

1263 MWe (net) from 3 blocks

9 NSSS (425 MWt each)
3 421 MWe TG Units
9 primary Na containing vessels
9 SG units/eighteen IHTS loops

1520 MWe (net) from two blocks

4 NSSS (1000 MWt each)
2 825 MWe (gross) TG Units
4 primary Na containing vessels
4 SG units and eight IHTS loops

1,535 MWe Monolithic LMR

1 NSSS (4000 MWt)
1 1535 MWe TG Unit
14 primary Na containing vessels*

(1000/500 MWt each)

------------------ --------Larger module (1000 vs. 425 MWt)
Once through superheat steam cycle

R
R

TG

421 MWe

R
R

RR

TG
SG

TG

421 MWe

SG

TG
TG

EVST

R
R

SG

SG

421 MWe

4 Shutdown Heat Removal Systems

(DHX/IHX units, pump, piping, and support systems)
- Redundant SHRS also required for EVST

SG

760 MWe

TG

(12 primary component vessels, reactor, and EVST)

6 SG units and 6 IHTS loops (667 MWt each)

SG

1535 MWe

SG

TG
TG

SG

760 MWe

Simplicity
Simplicityallows
allowsReduction
Reductionin
in
Commodities
Commoditiesand
andBuilding
BuildingSize
Size
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

42

Boardman

Scale Up - - LWR versus Fast Reactor

1600 MWt Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor 1600 MWt Light Water Cooled Reactor
Three 533 MWt Loops

SG

1535 MWe

SG

Two 800 MWt Loops

SG

TG

SG

SG

3600 MWt FR
Six 600 MWt Loops

SG

SG

SG

3600 MWt PWR

Two 1800 MWt Loops
SG

1535 MWe
TG

RV

SG

SG
SG

SG

Two Loops Viable Because:

Specific heat of water 5 x sodium
at operating temperatures

Rating Limited by:

IHTS Piping: < 1 m diameter

The
Thecomplexity
complexityand
andavailability
availabilityofofaaPWR
PWR isisessentially
essentiallyconstant
constantwith
withsize
size
Due
Duetotothe
thelower
lowerspecific
specificheat
heatofofsodium,
sodium,six
sixor
ormore
moreloops
loopsare
arerequired
requiredininaalarge
largeFR.
FR.

The
TheEconomy
Economyof
ofScale
ScaleisisMuch
MuchLarger
Largerfor
forLWRs
LWRs then
thenFBRs
FBRs
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

43

Boardman

Modular versus Monolithic (Fast Reactors)

SG

SG

To TG

SG

To TG

R
EVST

SG
SG
SG

Modular (S-PRISM)
Monolithic Fast Reactor

The
Theone-on-one
one-on-onearrangement:
arrangement:
simplifies
simplifiesoperation,
operation,
minimizes
minimizesthe
thesize
sizeof
ofthe
thereactor
reactorbuilding
building
improves
improvesthe
theplant
plantcapacity
capacityfactor
factor
reduced
reducedthe
theneed
needfor
forbackup
backupspinning
spinningreserve
reserve
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

44

Boardman

NSSS Size, ALMR versus S-PRISM

210 ft.
168 ft.
Non-isolated Side
Walls and Sodium
Service Facility

188 ft.

RV

Seismically
Isolated
RV

RV

RV

123 ft.
Seismically
Isolated
Nuclear Island
SG

SG

ALMR

SG

SG

S-PRISM
22
22 %
%More
MorePower
Power
from
from

Smaller
SmallerNI
NI

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

45

Boardman

Learning Effect Favors Modular Plant Designs

1.050

Unit
Cost
Factor
Cost
Reduction

1.000

0.950

0.900

Monolithic Plants
Monolithic
Plants
0.850

Modular Plants

Modular Plants
0.800

48000

46000

44000

42000

40000

38000

36000

34000

32000

30000

28000

26000

24000

22000

20000

18000

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

1000

500

0.750

Total Plant Capacity, MWe

Cumulative Plant Capacity, MWe

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

46

Boardman

g Modular vs. Monolithic Availability and Spinning Reserve

Monolithic Plant
6 Loops
Six Loops
Five Loops

83 %

87.0%

Average
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

86%

72.2%

100%

86.80%

Four Loops

67 %

Six Modules

81.10%

Power Level (%)

Power Level (%)

100 %

6 Module S-PRISM Plant

Five Modules

83%

Four Modules

67%

97.9%

Three Modules

50%

99.3%

Two Modules

33%

One Module

17%

100%

85.5%

0%

20%

40%

60%

99.95%

Average

80%

99.99%

100%

93 %

Percent Time at Load (%)

Percent Time at Load (%)

Seven
Sevenpoint
pointadvantage
advantagecaused
causedby:
by:
Relative
Relativesimplicity
simplicityof
ofeach
eachNSSS
NSSS(one
(oneSG
SGSystem
Systemrather
ratherthan
than6)
6)
Ability
Abilityto
tooperate
operateeach
eachNSSS
NSSSindependently
independentlyof
ofthe
theothers
others
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

47

Boardman

Comparison of Plant Construction Schedules

NOAK
Modular
NOAK
Modular Simultaneous
Simultaneous

NOAK
Modular
NOAK
Modular
- Staggered

1,520 MWe
S-PRISM Plant

Staggered

Firsrt
CommercialModularModular First
Commercial
Simultaneous
Simultaneous

First
Modular
FirsrtCommercial
Commercial Modular
Staggered
Staggered

Commercial
Large
FirstFirst
Commercial
Large
reactor
Reactor

Monolithic Plant - 1520 MWe

0

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

DURATION, Months
Duration,
months

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

48

Boardman

NSSS Size, CRBRP/ALMR /S-PRISM

CRBRP
350 MWe

ALMR
311 MWe

The
Thecommodities
commodities
required
requiredtotobuild
build
S-PRISM
S-PRISMhave
have
been
beenreduced
reducedby
by
aafactor
factorof
of >>55
ACRS Workshop

S-PRISM
760 MWe

June 4-5, 2001

49

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach
Design description and competitive potential

Previous licensing interactions

Planned approach to licensing S-PRISM
What , if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

50

Boardman

ALMR Design and Licensing History

1995
1989 - 1995

ALMR PROGRAM
1988

PRDA
1985 - 1987

PRISM

- $5M
Continue Trade
Studies

S-PRISM
GE Funded

- $ 42 M
- Advanced. Conceptual
& Preliminary Design

- Regulatory Review
- Economic Reviews
- Commercialization Studies
- Technology Development
($107 M Additional)

- $ 30 M
Competition for
National Program

1981 - 1984

GE PRISM
Program

$ 77 Million
DOE Program

GE Funded
Innovative Design Studies

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

S-PRISM
S-PRISM isissupported
supported
by
byaa100
100million
milliondollar
dollar
Data
DataBase
Base
51

Boardman

The
TheNRCs
NRCsPre-application
Pre-applicationSafety
SafetyEvaluation
Evaluationofofthe
theALMR
ALMR
(NUREG-1368)
(NUREG-1368)concluded:
concluded:
the
thestaff,
staff,with
withthe
theACRS
ACRSininagreement,
agreement,concludes
concludesthat
that
no
noobvious
obviousimpediments
impedimentstotolicensing
licensingthe
thePRISM
PRISM(ALMR)
(ALMR)
design
designhave
havebeen
beenidentified.
identified.
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

52

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach
Design description and competitive potential
Previous Licensing interactions

Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM

What , if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

53

Boardman

Detailed Design, Construction, and Prototype Testing

Year
Phase

1ALMR2
S-PRISM

13

Conceptual

42
53
Preliminary

58
7
96
Detail Design

10 7

11 8 12 913
Construction

10
14
15 12 16 13 17 1418
Prototype Test Certification

Standard Plant
FDA

Design

- NRC Licensing
- Design/Certification

SER
Conceptual

Certification

PSAR
Preliminary

Key Features Tests

Components
Subsystem Tests

Detailed Design

Safety Test
FSAR Plan Agmt.

Fuel Load
Authorization

Licensing Support

- R&D

Prototype Plant
PDA

Full
Power

Safety Test
Report Agmt.

- NRC Licensing
- Design/Certification

Preliminary

Detailed Design
Environ. Report

Authorization

Site Permits

- Site Permit/Environ. Impact

Start Construction

- Equip.Fab. & Site Construct.

Fuel Load Safety Test Report

- Safety Testing
Benchmark
Tests

- Comm. Power Generation

Comm.Op.

Design
DesignCertification
Certificationwould
wouldbe
beobtained
obtainedthrough
throughthe
theconstruction
construction
and
andtesting
testingofofaasingle
single380
380MWe
MWemodule
module
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

54

Boardman

Topics
Incentive for developing S-PRISM
Design and safety approach
Design description and competitive potential
Previous Licensing interactions
Planned approach to Licensing S-PRISM
What, if any, additional initiatives are needed?

ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

55

Boardman

g
NAME
France
Rapsodie
Phenix
SuperPhenix
INDIA
FBTR
ITALY
PEC
JAPAN
Joyo
Monju
UK
DFR
PFR
USA
Clemetine
EBR-1
Lampre
EBR-2
Enrico Fermi
SEFOR
FFTF
Clinch River
USSR
BR-2
BR-5
BOR-60
BN-350
BN-600
BN-800
BN-1600
W. Germany
KNK
SNR-300
SNR-2
ACRS Workshop

Safety Review/Key Issues

Los Alamos
Idaho
Los Alamos
Idaho
Michigan
Arkansas
Richland
Oak Ridge

PURPOSE
OPERASHUTPOWER
POWER
FUEL
COOLANT
Safety
Methods
TIONAL
DOWN
(MWt)
(MWe)
Containment
Na
U02/Pu02
-40
-1967
Test
Na
U02/Pu02
250
560
-1974
Prototype
Core
energetic
potential
Na
U02/Pu02
1240
3000
-1985
Demonstration
Test
---of Design
42.5
12.4 SG (Pu+U)C
Na
Analysis
Basis
Leaks
Test
1981
-120
-U02/Pu02
Na
PRA
Test
1978
-100
-U02/Pu02
Na
Nuclear
Methods
prototype
1993
-714
300
U02/Pu02
Na
T/H
Test
1963 Methods
1977
72
15
U-Mo
NaK
Prototype
1976
-600
270
U02/Pu02
Na
Fuels
Research
1946
1953
0.025
-Pu
Hg
Research
1951
1963
1
02
Pu
Nak
Validation
of fuels
data-- base (metal/oxide)
Research
1959
1964
1
Pu
Na
Test
1964
-62.5
20
U
Na
Waste
Test
1965
1972
200
61
U-Mo
Na
Test
1969
1972
20
-U02/PuO2
Na
Test
1980
-400Treatment
-U02/PuO2
Na
Fission
Product
and
Disposal
Prototype
--975
380
U02/PuO2
Na

Obninsk
Obninsk
Melekess
Shevchenko
Beloyarsk
---

Research
Test
Test
Prototype
Prototype
Demonstration
demonstration

LOCATION

Cadarache
Marcoule
Creys Malville
Kalpakkam
Brasimone
Oaral
Ibarakl
Dounreay
Dounreay

Karlruhe
Kalkar
Kalkar

1956
1959
1969
1973
1980
---

--------

0.1
5
60
1000
1470
2100
4200

--12
150
600
800
1600

Pu
Pu
U02
U02/Pu02
U02/Pu02
U02/Pu02
U02/Pu02

Hg
Na
Na
Na
Na
Na
Na

More
Morethan
than20
20Sodium
Sodiumcooled
cooledFast
FastReactors
Reactorshave
havebeen
beenbuilt
built
Most
Mosthave
haveoperated
operatedas
asexpected
expected(EBR-II
(EBR-IIand
andFFTF
FFTFfor
forexample)
example)

The
1972 one --must be
58
21
U02/Pu02 viable
Na
Thenext
next
one-- must730
becommercially
commercially
viable
-327
U02/Pu02
Na

Test
Prototype
demonstration

--

--

3420

June 4-5, 2001

1460

U02/Pu02

Na

56

Boardman

Component Verification and Prototype Testing

Final component performance verification can be performed during

a graduated prototype testing program.
Example: The performance of the passive decay heat removal
system can be verified prior to start up by using the Electromagnetic
Pumps that add a measurable amount of heat to the reactor system
Licensing
Licensingthrough
throughthe
thetesting
testingof
ofaaprototypical
prototypical
reactor
reactormodule
moduleshould
shouldbe
bean
anefficient
efficientapproach
approachto
to
obtaining
obtainingthe
thedata
dataneeded
neededfor
fordesign
designcertification.
certification.
Defining
Definingthe
theT/H
T/Hand
andcomponent
componenttests
testsneeded
neededto
to
proceed
proceedwith
withthe
theconstruction
constructionand
andtesting
testingof
ofthe
the
prototype
prototypeas
aswell
wellas
asdefining
definingthe
theprototype
prototypetest
test
program
programwill
willrequire
requireconsiderable
considerableinteraction
interactionwith
with
the
theNRC
NRC
ACRS Workshop

June 4-5, 2001

57

Boardman