Cayetano vs.

Monsod
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for him to assume such office
HELD:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. Atty. Monsod's
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Ask any law student to describe what practice of law means, and he or she will invariably quote the definition given
by the Supreme Court in Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et al. (201 SCRA 210 [1991]):
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23) (at p. 214)
The issue in the case was whether or not the respondent Monsod, a lawyer, was qualified for appointment as Chair
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), since Art. IX-C, Sec. 1[1] of the 1987 Constitution requires that, inter
alia, a majority of the COMELEC, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The Court, thru Justice Paras, stated that there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office (at p.212), determined that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court (at pp. 216-217) and pursuant thereto, found that Monsod was qualified for appointment as
COMELEC Chair:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsods past work experiences as lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (at pp. 225-226,
Italics supplied)
The Court cited its definition of practice of law in various other Decisions, calling the same as broad ( LimSantiago v. Atty. Sagucio [486 SCRA 10 [2006]; In Re Letter of UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity [AM
No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011]). In the latter case, it held that lawyers when they teach law are considered
engaged in the practice of law, primarily to underscore their ethical and professional responsibilities:

Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
What are less well-known, but very thought-provoking, are the opinions of Supreme Court Justices Padilla, Cruz,
and Gutierrez who dissented from the ponencia of Justice Paras in Cayetano v. Monsod. Justice Paras remarked
that the dissent of Justice Padilla:
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, Justice Padillas definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent. (at p. 227; Italics supplied. The dissent is at pp. 230-233)
With respect to the dissent of Justice Cruz, Justice Paras said that:
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making
uses of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers. (at p. 227; Italics supplied. The dissent is at pp. 234-236)
Parenthetically, the comment of Justice Paras about the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers appears to open the practice of law to non-lawyers. This brings to mind a priest (not Fr. Bernas) with a
penchant to pontificate about the law (civil, not canon) even though he is not a lawyer:
I have been informed that someone who has taken a perpetual vow to dislike me has asked why I am repeatedly
interviewed and asked for opinions on questions of law. I have never held myself out to be a lawyer. I do not need
the title. I do not make my living from representing the gripes of others in court, and engorging myself by others
quest for the vindication of their rights. It is not my doing that I am interviewed and he is not, that my opinions are
sought, and that none care for his! I have studied the law as a scholar of a discipline. For that, you do not need a
license. You need intelligence and diligence, and you need the recognition of fellow-academics that you know of
what you speak (Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, For the Sake of Rationality. September 30, 2013, Manila Standard Today)
Legal ethics is an oxymoron. It was not so much a swipe at the law as at lawyers, and the fact is that in the
Philippines, as well as in other jurisdictions as well, they suffer a trust-deficit. People it seems trust embalmers more
than they trust lawyers. This is no laughing matter, at least not for those who care passionately about serving the
ends of justice. x-x-x (Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, Legal Ethics An Oxymoron? June 17, 2013, Manila Standard Today)
The priests acts of rendering legal opinions very well fall within the broad definition of practice of law. As a nonlawyer, he is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, which constitutes indirect contempt (Rule 71, Sec.
3[e]; Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao, AM No. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTC [June 20, 2012];In re Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241
SCRA 405[1995]).
For some reason, Justice Paras did not address the dissent of Justice Gutierrez (at pp. 236-243):
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stated that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion; one on official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

x-x-x
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk from my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not
engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling
real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Thedeliberate choice of
words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in
the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
x-x-x
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary laymen accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. It is not satisfied with
having been a member of the Philippine Bar for at least ten years. (Italics supplied, underscoring ours.)
In his annotation to Cayetano v. Monsod (at pp. 244-252), Judge Nitafan raised concerns similar to those of the
dissenters, Justices Padilla, Cruz, and Gutierrez:
Practice of law is referred to no less than three times in Article VIII of the Constitution. First, in reference to the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court authorizing it to promulgate rules concerning xxx pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of lawxxx Secondly, it has reference to the qualification of
Members of the Supreme Court, who must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines. In both instances, the practice referred to has always reference to practice
in the courts, in fact the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under its rule-making power is called Rules of
Court of the Philippines. In the second instance practice of law is equated with judgeship in the lower courts. (Italics
supplied, underscoring ours)
The dissenters, as well as Judge Nitafan, were concerned about the broad definition of practice of law in Cayetano
v. Monsod, an interpretation affirmed by the Supreme Court (see Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio, In Re Letter of UP
Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity [supra]). The definition is now applied not just to the position of
COMELEC Chair or to other Constitutional offices, but to all government positions requiring practice of law as a legal
qualification for appointment thereto.
While the Court (at pp. 212-213) held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, common
sense requires that appointees/applicants to those positions involving the same which Justice Paras calls the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice (at p. 227), should have the necessary exposure to, if not
experience in litigation. As well as a practical, and not just theoretical/academic familiarity with the interplay between
substantive and procedural laws.

As the Court held in OCA v. Ladaga (350 SCRA 326, 331 [2001]), private practice of a profession, specifically the
legal profession, does not pertain to isolated court appearances; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. And in Maderada v.
Mediodea (413 SCRA 313, 325 [2003]), the practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the
exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and
as counselby rendering legal advise to others.
Otherwise, The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities
are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance or regulation. The possible exception is
the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions. (dissent of Justice Cruz, at p. 235)
But at the end of the day, appointment to these offices is essentially a political process.

CATU v. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738, 546 SCRA 209, February 19, 2008
Administrative Case : Professional Misconduct for violating his Oath as a Lawyer and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility.
FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo Catu is a co-owner of a lot and building erected at Malate,
Manila. With his mother and brother, contested the possession of Elizabeth Catu and
Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa
in their barangay.
Respondent Atty Vicente Rellosa, as Punong Barangay summoned the
parties to conciliation meetings. But the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, thus, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action
in court.
Thereafter, Catu's mother and brother filed a complaint for ejectment
against Elizabeth and Pastor in the MTC. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. IBP
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to IBP, Respondent admitted
that as punong barangay he presided over the conciliation proceeding, however, he
represented the defendants in the ejectment case filed against them, and by doing so he
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Furthermore, as an elective official contravened the prohibition under
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. 6713 ( The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees).
"Sec. 7 Prohibited Acts and Transactions- In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
officials and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
XXX
XXX
XXX
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
XXX
XXX
XXX
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; XXX"
According to IBP, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. This was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE: WON the respondent can represent the defendant in the ejectment case while he
is an incumbent public official.
HOLDING: The SC ruled that respondent cannot be found liable for violation of rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer
who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service". Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the
time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that
provision.
The SC also ruled that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713 is a general law which
applies to all public officials and employees.Thus, not applicable to the case at bar.
However, Section 90 of R.A. 7160 ( The Local Government Code of 1992) governs the
practice of profession of elective local government officials. This is a special law with
definite scope, it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of R.A 6713.
Accordingly, the respondent as punong barangay was not forbidden to
practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by the civil service
regulations as stated in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

In the case at bar, the respondent as punong barangay should have

therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for said defendants.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing a written
permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also
violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. And for not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the
exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Vicente Rellosa is found guilty. He is therefore suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 6 months and sternly warned that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of
attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently,
the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment,
respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows
the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC,
the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the
candidate.
I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities
he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of
the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and with
the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its
members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath,
he was denied admission to the bar.

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a
time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as comfort women,
waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of
Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated
without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another persons work as ones own. In the
field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas and expressions,
including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial
system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is
a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select
portions of other legal writers works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under
the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the
Courts and no longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of
any mention of the original writers names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the primary sources
relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors writings and the effort they put into
finding and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes
together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional
evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work of organizing and analyzing those primary
sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This
is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution
and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the
Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that
the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, the main
source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual
slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek
remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the
contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it
into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility for
personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact.
That the petitioners were Filipino comfort women who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it

incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from
the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided
this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise
its power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous
disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal
profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to
attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the
very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would
only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest
for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether
collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision
must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of
administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the
profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law that:

1. The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach
of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
2. Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines
the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment
of legal precedents through dubious means;
3. The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
4. In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of
the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
5. The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares
drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

For disposition of the Court are the following:

(a) the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP)
law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and
(b) the Manifestation[2] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore
O. Te.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following
grounds:
GROUNDS
A.
THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL
DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS
BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS
SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.
B.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 107-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW
CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH
SUCH EVIDENCE.
C.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED
THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.[3]

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Courts Decision dated March 8, 2011 be
reconsidered and set aside and the respondents Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the
Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., joined by some faculty members of the
University of the Philippines school of law) effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded their full rights to
due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject of the Show Cause Resolution
dated October 19, 2010.[4]
Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter
as an administrative case, there was purportedly a findingthat respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1)
the mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly,[5] a case involving a contempt
charge; and (2) the references to respondents contumacious language or contumacious speech and conduct and to
several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct
directed against the courts done by any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect
contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx
(d)
Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.

A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine
or both.[6]
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a
member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. [7] In such disciplinary cases,
the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.
Contrary to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same
incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be
punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez,[8] for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements,
the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contemptand liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties
were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to
give due respect to the Court).
The full case title[9] of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen [10] and the sanction imposed indubitably show that the
proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few
principles and authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of lawyers,
Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and no
penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether or not respondent
lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was immaterial as the sole issue in his
disciplinary case concerns his professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the Court. [11]
Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto[12] was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to
remind Atty. Sotto that:
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.[13]

Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00 payable within
15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable reference to Atty. Sottos failure to observe his ethical duties
as a lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the disposition of the
case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should not
be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.
Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan[14] involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the
lawyers act of making public statements to the media that were offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members
relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required
respondent lawyer to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions. [15] In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found that

respondents act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only administratively
sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts,
the evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of
justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due
respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or
discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not
transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents contrary position in their motion
for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is
punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules
of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion
that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief
other than their own apparent misreading of the same.
With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011, respondents
continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted access to
the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The Decision already
debunked at length the theory that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their well founded concerns regarding
the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the administrative charges against
them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain was their contumacious, intemperate
and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity Statement, which most certainly
cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that Justice Del Castillo and/or his legal researcher committed
plagiarism.
To dispel respondents misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did not call the attention
of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del
Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue.
Still, he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and candidly
conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language of the Statement. This straightforward and honest
explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of
any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative
proceedings. This circumstance belied respondents justification for seeking access to the evidence and records of A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied their due process rights. For the same reason
that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of respondent law professors
in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court has found respondents guilty of
falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be
exonerated or none of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this administrative case. Again, the case of Prof.
Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered respondents submissions in this case before coming to a decision.
To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court erred in taking the
emphatic language in the Statement in isolation from the other statements evidencing the good intentions of respondents
and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in the Decision dated
March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents avowed noble motives

have been given due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken with respect to submissions of
respondents.
In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no substantial arguments to
warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their
motion.
As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that they support the Motion
for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1,
2011. The rest of the assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents
compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Lafortezas motion
for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the
same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the
Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.
SO ORDERED.