Whither Kashmir Policy

By Hussain
Mohi-ud-Din Qadri

In Pakistan, February 5 is observed as a Kashmir Solidarity

Day nationally every year. Seminars, workshops and
demonstrations are held to highlight the plight of the
Kashmiris suffering from the Indian occupation for last 63
years and tribute is paid to their undying courage and
determination for standing up to the overwhelming Indian
military might. The Day also symbolizes the natural
association and expression of support from the people of
Pakistan for their Kashmiri brethren. It also reminds the
international community of its commitment to enable the
Kashmiri people to get their right to self determination as
mandated by the resolutions of the United Nations, a
commitment that has not yet been fulfilled.

Instead of turning this Day into a mere ritual which it has,

we need to focus on its essential message and get our act
together. Some questions naturally come to mind. Can an
unstable and economically weak Pakistan project the case
of Kashmir in a befitting manner? Has Pakistan any
coherent Kashmir policy? Does Pakistan have the ability to
move beyond its traditional position in tandem with
demands of time and ground realities? Has Pakistan's
policy to use religious groups as a proxy in Kashmir
advanced the Kashmir cause? Why has Pakistan lost broad
international support on the Kashmir issue despite its
morally, legally and politically justified stance on it? Does
Islamabad's apologetic and reactive attitude vis-à-vis New
Delhi advance its strategic interest? Answers to these
questions represent a crucial test of our collective ability
to respond to the foreign policy challenges on the disputed
question of Kashmir. What options does the Pakistani
establishment have to change the status quo? While we
spend the day eulogizing the sacrifices rendered by the
Kashmiris, it is high time we also introspected ourselves
with utmost objectivity at our disposal with a view to
determining the pros and cons of our policy choices on the
Kashmir issues. Following points are instructive in that
regard:

The ongoing wave of political instability, economic

meltdown, and decay of state institutions is eating into the
vitals of our body politic. Islamabad's engagement in
eliminating domestic terror, though a step in the right
direction, is also producing a deadly backlash, thereby
upping the ante for the country. Unfortunately Pakistan
happens to be a classic case study in bad management,
personalized & unaccountable style of governance with no
rules of the game, nepotism & favouritsm, corruption and
unending power bickering between so-called political
parties and military-led establishment. To top it all,
Pakistan has a highly centralized political system with little
autonomy for the federating units. The clash between
federation and provinces over a whole range of subjects is
also at the heart of our weakening polity. Despite the
political system being parliamentary as declared by the
Constitution, it is presidential in essence, for most of the
powers are vested in the office of the president.

This sorry state of affairs Pakistan is mired in undermines

its negotiating power vis-à-vis India on Kashmir and other
disputed questions. It also sends a negative message to
the Kashmiris about the kind of political arrangement they
would have if they get to accede to Islamabad in case of
political settlement of the issue.

Pakistan's Kashmir policy has also been suffering from

systematic flaws in that it has been more whimsical and
less institutional. Every ruler of the day has had different
and incoherent approach to the Kashmir question dictated
more by his political compulsions than regional contexts.
There has not been much of civilian input into the policy,
which has been considered to be sole preserve of military
and intelligence apparatus to the exclusion of parliament.
The older generation of the Pakistani political and military
leaders has gradually lost space to India to maneuver the
international opinion in its favour by diluting Pakistan's
stated position. They have been less creative and more
status quo-prone wedded to the world of make-believe.
The ruling elites have also been found wanting in keeping
a pace with changing regional and international demands
and coming up with proactive response to cope up with
the new realities.

The establishment's policy to use religious groups as a

proxy to advance its interests in Kashmir has done more
harm than good to the Kashmir cause and Pakistan's
position on it. The 1989 Kashmir movement, which was
purely indigenous in character, represented the
demonstration of people's natural urge to determine their
political future and rise against the Indian military
domination. This movement won broad international
support besides highlighting the centrality of Kashmir as
the major factor in achieving stability in a highly volatile
region that is South Asia. It also put India on the defensive
on international diplomatic plane.

However, the intrusion of religious groups from across the

border provided India with a lever to justify its domination
and beat the drum about the irrelevance of the UN
resolution on Kashmir in the wake of change in "ground
realities". These groups ended up hijacking the indigenous
movement for freedom and self-determination. Their
patrons who collected finances and found new recruits
carved out a new role in the political landscape of the
country with the full connivance of the establishment,
which was ever eager to dilute the hold of mainstream
political parties. The newfound empowerment of the
religious parties enabled them to develop their own
agenda informed by their sectarian and ideological
associations. The "bleed India" policy of the extremist
groups was more than manifests in their oversees
operations. In hitting the Indian symbols of prestige and
power, they have not necessarily worked with the backing
of their patrons. In their attempts to expand their 'sphere
of influence', the militant religious organizations have also
tended to suppress and eliminate all symbols of resistance
from the Kashmiri nationalist forces who were
apprehensive of the intentions of these groups and saw in
their working the danger of a superimposed religious order
defined by strong sectarian connections.
Following the catastrophic events of 9/11, India was able
to invoke the international community's obsession with
terrorism and paint Pakistan as a breeding ground of
terror through its robust diplomatic offensive. This led to
evaporation of international support for Pakistan's
principled stand on Kashmir.

Now the questions arise: will Pakistan continue to ignore

its social and economic development by spending its
meager resources on its defence? Will the initiative to
pass the gospel word on Kashmir stay in the hands of
security establishment without the inclusion of elected
representatives? Is the UN still a credible institution
capable of delivering solution to the Kashmir issue in the
light of its resolutions after its total failure in reining in the
US in recent times? Do we have the imagination to think
out of box and agree to the resolution of the Kashmir
problem along lines different from what has traditionally
been put down our throats over the decades? Can Line of
Control be declared and accepted as international border?
Is settlement of Kashmir possible on the basis of
demography and religion? Is an independent acceptable to
India and Pakistan?

While we observe February 5 as Kashmir Solidarity Day

and rightly pay homage to the sacrifices of our Kashmiri
brethren, we should also do some soul-searching on our
past conduct. Only an economically strong, peaceful and
politically stable Pakistan can protect the rights of the
Kashmiris, force India to the negotiating table and evoke
international interest and role.

(The writer is a PhD candidate at an Australian

University)