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Pipeline Safety Management

UK Operators views on
working with the Regulator

Pipeline Safety Management

Pipeline Safety
Factors which affect pipeline safety
Management and Legislation
Current & future issues
Working with the Regulator

What is Pipeline Safety?


PSR:

Purpose is to ensure the safe management


and operation of pipelines.
MAHPs identify hazards, evaluate risks,
systems in place to manage risks at all stages
of the life cycle

Safety:

risk of pipeline failure must be ALARP.


Integrity must ensure pipeline is fit for
purpose to meet operational
needs with adequate safety margin

Integrity:

Quality and condition

Pipeline
Failures-UK

Yarm - 1971

Bushey Heath - 1984

Palaceknowe - 1993

Pipeline Failures - UK

Pipeline
Failures-USA

Edison, New Jersey, 1994

Carlsbad, New Mexico, 2000

Greenville, Texas, 2000

Sandy Springs, Georgia, 1998

Pipeline Failures - USA

Pipeline Incident Statistics

Incident

Repair
Leaks

Frequency per 1000km years


Benchmark

0.75

Major
Total

Ruptures
Casualties

UKOPA

0.045
0.6

(0.48)

0.33

(0.046)

0.011

0.16 (0.0)

0.0

Overall Incident Frequency


Leaks per 1000 km.yr
Period

Egig

Ukopa

1970 to 1993

0.57

0.34

1970 to 1998

0.48

0.28

1994 to 1998

0.21

0.06

Pipeline Safety
Conclusions:

Pipelines are safe


Need to use relevant data to evaluate risks
UKOPA database is relevant to UK pipelines
Data is sparse, so predictive techniques are required
to predict failure frequency

What Affects Pipeline Safety?


Most Common Failure Mechanisms:
Corrosion
Fatigue
3rd Party Activity (external interference)
Material & construction defects
Natural events (ground movement)

UKOPA Fault Database

Development of Overall Frequency


1
Egig ave to Year

Egig moving ave

Ukopa ave to Year

Ukopa moving ave

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

Year

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

0
1970

Frequency per 1000 km.y

0.9

UKOPA Fault Database

What affects pipeline safety?


Conclusions:
Failure mechanisms are known
Risk of Failure must be predicted
Management systems must target risk to
ensure it is ALARP

Management and Legislation


Controls for reduction of risk of failure
Operator Management Systems
Pipeline Safety Legislation

Engineering Management
Integrity
Damage Mechanism

Material/Construction
Defect

3rd

Party Activity

Corrosion
Fatigue

Ground Movement

Design
Standards &
Specifications

Construction
Inspection
QA
Testing

Route
Wall thickness
Protection
Depth of cover
Coating
C.P.
S-N Criteria
Route, Stress

O&M

Awareness, information,
surveillance and
Supervision procedures.
Inspection

Inspection
Cond. Monitoring
Pressure Cycle counting
Inspection

Special Procedures, Surveillance


Strain monitoring
Reinstatement

PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT


Hazard Identification

HS&E
Safety
Mngt
Training
and
Competencies

Engineering
Requirements

Integrity
(Control &
Maintenance)

Risk
Evaluation

Risk Levels
and
Mitigation

Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & Instructions


Accidents
and
Incidents

Performance Data
and Fault Reports

Audit

I&S
Risk

Review
and
Revise

PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT


Hazard Identification

HS(G)65

Policy

HS&E
Safety
Mngt

Engineering
Requirements

Risk
Evaluation

Planning &
Implementation

Training
and
Competencies

Integrity
(Control &
Maintenance)

Risk Levels
and
Mitigation

Organising

Monitoring

Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & Instructions


Accidents
and
Incidents

Performance Data
and Fault Reports
Audit

I&S
Risk

Review
and
Revise

Operator Systems
Management Systems

Design

Operation

Construction
and
Commissioning

Inspection
Modifications
and
Maintenance
Records

Emergency
Procedures

Training
and
Competency

Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions

PIPELINES SAFETY REGULATIONS 1996


MAPD
Safety Management
Management Systems

Roles
and
Responsibilities
Policies
and
Procedures

Design

Operation

Construction
and
Commissioning

Inspection
and
Maintenance

Modifications

Records
Emergency
Procedures

Training
and
Competency

Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions


Audit Arrangements

Management and Legislation


Conclusions:
PSR 96 provides a framework to secure the safety of
pipelines throughout their life cycle, taking into
account different levels of hazard.
PSR 96 provides a goal setting regime which
enables selection and development of different
approaches to achieve a safety level.

Current and Future Issues


Amendments to PSR 96 (Testing of pipeline
emergency plans, absolute vs reasonably
practicable duties)
EU Pipeline Safety Instrument (LUP legislation,
information to the public)
Hence we need an open relationship with the
Regulator in order to develop a practical legislative
framework which maintains the existing safety
record

Working with the Regulator


Current and future issues are open to
interpretation
There is no established compliance record
So we need:
Common understanding
Reasonable, practical approach
Transparency

Issue: Testing of Pipeline Emergency


Plans
Regulator
requirements:

Operator
concerns:

Demonstration that
plan is adequate

Requirements
are open to wide
interpretation

Joint Work (Operators/LAs/HSE):


Define Scope
Identify preferred method of testing
Develop ACoP

Issue: One Call System


Regulator
requirements:

Operator
concerns:

Compliance with Reg


15

Reg 15 is not
effective

Joint Work:
Develop effective method to reduce 3rd party hits
Develop efficient and cost effective implementation route
Involve all buried service operators

Issue: Pipeline Risk Assessment


Regulator
requirements:

Operator
concerns:

Validated
methodologies and
data

Not consistent
use by all
parties of
methodologies
and data

Joint Work:
Agree consistent and transparent methodologies
(risk and ALARP)
Agree use of representative data
Agree transparent criteria

Issue: Land Use Planning


Regulator
requirements:

Operator
concerns:

Public safety

Decisions not
transparent and
may not be
justified

Joint Work:
Risk based consultation zones for all products
Transparent, justified inner, middle and outer zones
Clear evaluation of allowed/not allowed developments,
including risk and economic factors.

Issue: Provision of Information


Regulator
requirements:

Operator
concerns:

Public awareness
and safety

What
information to
whom and how?
Security

Joint Work:
Identify information and parties
Agree mechanism for provision of information
Recognise security issues

Working with the Regulator

Conclusions
MHSC Working Group on Pipelines (WGP) now allows forum for
discussion and joint working
WGP Working Party Risk Assessment is developing a programme of
work for consideration
HSE provides advice and input to UKOPA Working Groups

Future?
Open discussions and joint work to establish agreed/accepted
approaches/methodologies/data for all aspects of pipeline legislation
Common understanding of base issues
Mutual respect for Regulator and operator positions

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