THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION, 15(1), 5161

Copyright 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

RESEARCH

Responses to the Mystical Scale by

Religious Jewish Persons:
A Comparison of Structural Models of
Mystical Experience
Aryeh Lazar
Department of Behavioral Sciences
College of Judea and Samaria, Ariel, Israel

Shlomo Kravetz
Department of Psychology
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

This study examined various structural models of mystical experience. Confirmatory

factor analysis of the responses of a sample of 191 religious Jewish persons residing in
Israel to the Mystical Scale (Hood, 1975) was used to examine and compare various
models of mystical experience. In general, multidimensional models provided a
better fit to the relations between the Mystical Scale items than did a unidimensional
model. Models based on Staces (1960) conceptualization of mystical experience that
associates ineffability with interpretive religious experience fitted the data more
closely than did Hood and Williamsons (2000) conceptualization that associates this
feature with noninterpretive dimensions of mystical experience. Finally, models in
which the unity relevant features were independent of the interpretive dimension fitted the data more closely than did models that did associate unity features with the interpretive dimension. The latter finding provided support for the purported universality of Staces unity thesis.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Aryeh Lazar, Department of Behavioral Sciences, College of
Judea and Samaria, P.O. Box 3, Ariel, 44837, Israel. E-mail: lazara@yosh.ac.il

52

LAZAR AND KRAVETZ

In his classic study of religious experience, James (1902) identified four basic qualities of this experience. First, these experiences are ineffable. Second, religious experiences have a noetic quality (i.e., they are experienced as a reliable source of
valid knowledge). Third, religious experiences are transient and last only a short
time. Finally, all religious experiences are passive and convey a sense of being controlled by outside forces. According to James, these qualities define core religious
experience.
Stace (1960) expanded these four qualities into the following eight qualities: a
feeling that all things are part of a whole and that one is part of this unity; a feeling
of timelessness and spacelessness; a noetic quality; a sense of joy and happiness; a
feeling of the sacred and the holy; a logic defying paradoxical quality; ineffability;
and a loss of the sense of self. Because Staces list of, putatively universal, aspects
of mystical experience emphasize the immanent type of mystical experience,
Hood (1975) constructed the Mystical Scale (M-Scale) to measure the eight components of Staces conceptualization. These components were identical to those
already mentioned with the exception of the paradoxical quality, which Hood
dropped, and the perception of an inner subjectivity and consciousness within all
things, which he added.
According to Stace (1960), the experience of unity with all things is central to
mystical experience. Furthermore, Stace claimed that this unifying quality of mystical experience is independent of the more interpretive quality of mysticism. This
latter quality refers to the numinous facet of mysticism that stresses a sense of the
presence of a holy other (Hood, 1975). Thus, because the experiential aspect of
mystical experience appears to be less a function of socio-cultural differences between the adherents of different religions than the interpretative aspect, the experience of unity with all things should be relatively independent of socio-cultural
differences. Hood (1997) termed this argument, the unity thesis.
Regarding the claim of the centrality of the unity theme to mystical experience,
not all scholars agree. One of the foremost authorities on Jewish mysticism,
Scholem (1978), stated,
The term unio mystica, or mystical union, with God has no particular significance.
Numerous mystics, Jews as well as non-Jews, have by no means represented the essence of their ecstatic experience, the tremulous uprush and soaring of the soul to its
highest plane, as a union with God. (p. 5)

Scholem also limits the boundaries of the unio mystica and concludes that even
when there is an intimate union and conformity of the human and the divine will,
there is still a distance between God and man termed incommensurateness. Schafer
(1992), in referring to Scholems assessment of the unio mystica, concluded that
this feature is not common and apparently applies only to the highest stage of mystical experience.

RESPONSES TO THE M-SCALE

53

This controversy regarding the centrality of the experience of unity as definitive

of mystical experience is especially pronounced in discussions of Jewish mysticism. As previously above, Scholem (1975) adopted an extreme position, denying
this centrality and even arguing that if we refer to mysticism as the direct, unmediated unification with God, then Jewish mysticism does not exist at all (p. 72).
Even Idel (1996), who disagreed with Scholem and claimed that the experience of
unity is a legitimate and significant component of Jewish mystical experience, referred to the reluctance of the Jewish mystic to treat this experience as a total absorptive union with God. Another aspect of the tendency to qualify the experience
of the unity with God in the Jewish mystical tradition is this traditions emphasis
on intellectual and speculative knowledge of the divine mysteries (Cohn-Sherbok
& Cohn-Sherbok, 1994).
However, a number of empirical studies seem to support the unity thesis and
show that the unity component of mystical experience loads on a factor independent from the interpretative factor. On the basis of responses to his M-Scale, Hood
(1975) uncovered a two-factor model of mystical experience. The first factor was
associated with five of Staces features of religious experienceunity in diversity,
inner subjectivity, timelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, and ineffabilityand was interpreted by Hood as an experiential factor. The second factor was
associated with three of these featuresnoetic quality, positive affect, and religious holinessand was identified by Hood as an interpretive factor. The discovery of these two independent factors, with such unity relevant features of mystical
experience as unity in diversity and inner subjectivity loading on the
noninterpretive factor, provide support for the unity thesis and for a differentiation
between the experiential and cognitive components of mysticism.
Additional research uncovered a three-factor model of mystical experience
(Hood, Morris, & Watson, 1993). In this model, there are two experiential factors.
One of these factors is related to three features of mystical experiencetimelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, and ineffabilityand has been labeled
introvertive mystical experience. The second factor is associated with two features
of mystical experienceunity in diversity and inner subjectivityand has been
labeled extrovertive mystical experience. As was found in previous research
(Hood, 1975), the interpretive factor contained the remaining three components.
A recent multicultural study by Hood et al. (2001) provided additional support
both for Hoods three-factor model and for the universality of the unity thesis.
Confirmatory factor analysis based on a sample of Iranian Muslims as well as on a
sample of American Protestants found the three-factor model to be superior to both
the unidimensional model of mystical experience and to the previously described
two-factor model.
Hood et al. (2001) also examined possible variations of the three-factor model.
Stace (1960) associated the quality of ineffability with the interpretive factor of
mystical experience. Hood and Williamson (2000) argued that the quality of in-

54

LAZAR AND KRAVETZ

effability could not logically be part of an interpretive factor of mystical experience because this quality refers to an inability to explain or to describe experience,
a theme that is inconsistent with the cognitively oriented interpretive factor. Some
support was found for this argument from a comparison of the Hood three-factor
model of mystical experience, which placed ineffability on the introvertive factor
of mystical experience, with the Stace three-factor model (Hood et al., 2001).
However, no such comparison was made with a two-factor model representing
Staces association of ineffability with interpretive religious experience.
The Hood three-factor structure and similar models have been examined for
various samples of Christians (Argyle & Hills, 2000; Caird, 1988; Hills & Argyle,
1998; Spilka, Brown, & Cassidy, 1992). More recently, these structural models
were compared for a sample of Muslims (Hood et al., 2001). However, they have,
as yet, not been examined for religious persons belonging to the Jewish faith. As
stated previously, scholars who deal with the Jewish mystical experience tend to
limit the phenomena of unity to unity with the divine and to deemphasize the experience of unity with nature (Oslow, 1995; Scholem, 1978). Therefore, for a sample
of Jewish religious persons, items that refer to the phenomena and experience of
unity may load on the interpretive factor.
Hood (1975) based his empirical work on Staces (1960) contention as to a core
of mystical experiences that is independent of the content of different religious traditions. However, his findings seem to have led him to believe that these experiences may have some cognitive content. Thus, Hood could not identify his second
factor with Staces concept of extrovertive mysticism because items representing
a unifying vision, expressed abstractly by the formula All is one (Stace, 1960,
p. 79) were not highly related to that factor. Apparently, Hood viewed the noetic
items that had high loadings on this factor as the key to conceptualizing it as cognitive oriented with positive affect as a consequence of knowing the holy and divine.
In keeping with his emphasis on the cognitive component of mystical experience,
Hood et al. (2001) could not logically include ineffability on the introvertive factor
of mystical experience.
This investigation attempted to address two research issues. These issues are related to the question of the generalizability of the structure of mystical experiences
across different religious traditions and to the subtle difference in Staces (1960)
and Hoods (1975) approaches to the phenomenology of mystical experience.
First, for a sample of religious Jewish persons residing in Israel, this investigation
examined the universality of the unity thesis by comparing models of mystical experience that include the unity features as a separate experiential factor with models that incorporate these features as part of an interpretive factor. This comparison
follows Hood et al.s (2001) recommendation to compare the mystical experiences
of individuals of various religious persuasions. In light of the previously mentioned controversy regarding the role of the unity experience in Jewish mysticism,
this comparison is especially appropriate. Second, this study tested Staces and

RESPONSES TO THE M-SCALE

55

Hoods claims concerning ineffability by comparing both two-factor and

three-factor models representing these two claims. Accordingly, the following
seven structural models of religious experience were compared:
1. Unidimensional model: This model includes all of the M-Scale components
(noetic quality, positive affect, religious holiness, unity in diversity, inner subjectivity, timelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, ineffability) on one factor.
2. Hoods two-factor model: This is Hoods (1975) original model that differentiates between experiential mystical experience and interpretive mystical experience by placing the putative experiential components (unity in diversity, inner
subjectivity, timelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, ineffability) on the former
factor and the putative interpretive components (noetic quality, positive affect, religious holiness) on the latter factor. According to the Hood claim, ineffability is not
placed on the same dimension as are the interpretive components.
3. Hoods three-factor model: This model, uncovered by Hood and Williamson
(2001), adds a differentiation between an introvertive mystical experience factor
(timelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, ineffability) and extrovertive mystical
experience factor (unity in diversity, inner subjectivity) while retaining the interpretive mystical experience factor (noetic quality, positive affect, religious holiness).
4. Hoods two-factor interpretive-unity model: This model combines
extrovertive mystical experience of unity components together with interpretive
mystical experience components (noetic quality, positive affect, religious holiness, unity in diversity, inner subjectivity) on one factor while placing introvertive
mystical experience components (timelessness and spacelessness, loss of self, ineffability) on a second factor.
5. Staces two-factor model: This model is identical to Model 2 but associates
ineffability with the interpretive factor, according the Stace (1960) claim, rather
than with the experiential factor.
6. Staces three-factor model: This model is identical to Model 3 but associates
ineffability with the interpretive factor, according the Stace (1960) claim, rather
than with the introvertive factor.
7. Staces two-factor interpretive-unity model: This model is identical to Model
4 but associates ineffability with the interpretiveextrovertive factor, according the
Stace claim (1960), rather than with the introvertive factor.

METHOD
Research Participants
The sample consisted of 191 research participants enrolled in institutes of higher
Jewish religious education in Israel. Twenty-seven (14.1%) research participants

56

LAZAR AND KRAVETZ

were women and 164 (85.9%) were men. The age of the research participants
ranged from 17 years to 29 years. The average age was 20.8 years with a standard
deviation of 2.5 years. Eighty-three research participants (43.5%) were identified
as coming from Europe and North American descent and 108 research participants
(56.5%) were from North African descent such as Morocco, Yemen, and Egypt.
Measures

M-Scale. On the basis of Staces (1960) conceptualization of religious experience, Hood (1975) developed this measure of religious experience. Respondents
are requested to indicate on a four-point scale from 2 (definitely not true) to 2 (definitely true), the extent to which each of 32 statements is true of their own experiences. The respondent can also indicate that he or she is not able to decide about a
particular statement. After reversing appropriate items, these responses are then
converted to a five-point Likert scale, from 1 (low) to 5 (high), in which indecision
is scored as 3. These items are grouped into eight components of religious experience (positive affect, religious holiness, noetic quality, unity in diversity, inner subjectivity, loss of self, timelessness and spacelessness, and ineffability). Each component is based on four items, in which two items are worded in a positive manner
(e.g., I have had an experience in which I realized the oneness of myself with all
things; I have had an experience in which all things seemed to be conscious) and
two items are worded in a negative manner (e.g., I have never had an experience in
which something greater than myself seemed to absorb me; I have never had an
experience which was both timeless and spaceless).
Demographic questions. The research participants responded to questions
regarding their age, gender, ethnic background, and religious identity.
Procedure
This study was part of a larger investigation of religious Jewish persons living in Israel. After receiving permission to carry out the study in the various institutes of
higher Jewish education, a senior student in each school was enlisted by a research
assistant to recruit students who were willing to participate in the study. The senior
student distributed questionnaires to those students who agreed to participate in the
study. The research participants filled out the questionnaires at their convenience
and returned them to the senior student the next day.
RESULTS
For all analyses, the four items composing each of the components of the M-Scale
were first averaged (see Hood et al., 2001, p. 694), resulting in eight component

RESPONSES TO THE M-SCALE

57

scores. The means, standard deviations, Cronbach reliabilities, and

intercorrelations for these components are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the Cronbach reliability coefficients ranged from .39 for the
loss of self component to .73 for the unity in diversity component. Inter-component correlations ranged from .26 to .62 with a median reliability of .56. Using the
EQS 5.7b program (Bentler & Wu, 1995), the responses of the research participants were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis. The confirmatory factor
analysis results for the seven models tested and the comparison of the models are
presented in Table 2. As can be seen from this table, the various models were compared, using the following goodness-of-fit indexes: chi square and degrees of freedom for each model tested, the comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990), and the
nonnormed fit index (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). When models were compared, differences between these models are presented in the table along with tests of significance for these differences when appropriate.
As can be seen from Table 2, the various multidimensional models tested describe successfully mystical experience among the sample of Israeli religious
Jews. Both Hoods two-factor and three-factor solutions (Models 2 and 3) have
significant changes in chi-square in relation to the unidimensional model (Model
1). In addition, the Hood three-factor solution shows a significant chi-square
change in comparison to the two-factor solution. For both of these models the
comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990) is greater than .90 although the nonnormed
fit index (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) is slightly lower than this level. The .90 level is a
commonly accepted rule-of-thumb for the minimum level for most indexes of
goodness-of-fit which range from zero to 1 (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bryant &
Yarnold, 1997; Thompson, 2000). These findings are consistent with those reported by Hood et al. (2001) for both an American Christian sample and an Iranian
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach Reliability Coefficients, and
Intercorrelations for M-Scale Components
Component
LOS
UID
INS
TEMP
NOET
INEF
POS
RLIG

SD

Alpha

LOS

UID

INS

3.21
3.41
3.10
3.42
3.75
3.90
3.82
4.03

.83
1.00
.94
1.10
.81
.92
.88
.86

.39
.73
.56
.72
.44
.60
.56
.50

.49
.43
.48
.30
.30
.27
.26

.55
.47
.50
.25
.40
.37

.32
.33
.20
.30
.39

TEMP NOET

.42
.41
.33
.38

.45
.55
.59

INEF

POS

.41
.50

.62

Notes. All correlations were significant at the p < .01 level. LOS = loss of self; UID = unity in
diversity; INS = inner subjectivity; TEMP = timelessness and spacelessness; NOET = noetic quality;
INEF = ineffability; POS = positive affect; RLIG = religious holiness.

58

LAZAR AND KRAVETZ

TABLE 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Seven Models of Religious Experience

Model
0 Independent model
1 Unidimensional model
2 Hoods 2-factor model vs.
Model 1
3 Hoods 3-factor model vs.
Model 2
4 Hoods 2-factor
interpretive-unity model vs.
Model 1
5 Staces 2-factor model vs.
Model 1
6 Staces 3-factor model vs.
Model 5
7 Staces 2-factor
interpretive-unity model vs.
Model 1

df

553.22
105.17**
68.39**

28
20
19

55.83**

) df

CFI

)CFI

NNFI

)NNFI

36.78** 1

.838
.906

.068

.773
.861

.088

17

12.56**

.926

.020

.878

.017

104.80**

19

0.27

.937

.001

.759

.014

42.19**

19

62.98**

.956

.118

.935

.162

36.25**

17

5.94

.963

.007

.940

.005

91.26**

19

14.21**

.866

.028

.797

.024

Notes. CFI = comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990); NNFI = nonnormed fit index (Bentler & Bonett, 1980).
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Muslim sample. In a similar manner, both the Stace (1960) two-factor and
three-factor solutions (Models 5 and 6) show significant changes in the chi-square
compared to the unidimensional solution. In addition, although the change in
chi-square between these two models is not statistically significant, it did closely
approach statistical significance. For these two models, both of the indexes of
goodness-of-fit are above the .90 level.
From Table 2 it can also be seen that the interpretive-unity models (Models 4 and
7) are, in general, inferior to the models that do not associate the unity theme with the
interpretive dimension. For the unity-interpretive model based on Hoods (1975)
conceptualization, the chi-square change in comparison with the unidimensional
model was not significant and the indexes of goodness-of-fit did not reach the .90
level. For this model based on Staces (1960) conceptualization of mystical experience, the chi-square change in comparison with the unidimensional model was significant. However, both of the indexes of goodness-of-fit did not reach the .90 level.
Finally, the models based on the Hood et al. (2001) conceptualization (Models
2 and 3), in which the ineffability component is associated with the experiential
factor, can be compared to the respective models based on the Stace (1960) conceptualization (Models 5 and 6), in which the ineffability component is associated
with the interpretation factor. Table 2 indicates that for both the two-factor and
three-factor solutions, the Stace models are superior to the Hood models both in
terms of chi-square and in terms of the goodness-of-fit indexes.

RESPONSES TO THE M-SCALE

59

DISCUSSION
The structure of religious experience has been the subject of many empirical investigations. However, these investigations were performed predominately on Christian samples. More recently, the Hood three-factor structure and similar models
have been examined on a sample of Muslims (Hood et al., 2001). This investigation
examined the structure of religious experience on a sample of religious Jewish persons residing in Israel. As in previous studies, confirmatory factor analysis in the
present study showed that the various two-factor and three-factor models examined
produced more adequate solutions than did the unidimensional model. Thus, this
analysis provided additional support for the transcultural validity of the multidimensional nature of the structure of mystical experience.
Simultaneous with its test of the generalizability of the multidimensionality of
the structure of mystical experience, this investigation examined the unity theory
of mystical experience. According to this theory, the experience of unity with
some other (e.g., God, nature) is central to mystical experience and is independent
of the interpretation of that experience. As Hood et al. (2001) stated: Few would
disagree with the claim that an experience of unity is the central defining characteristic of mysticism (p. 691). In addition, Hood et al. claimed that this experience
of unity forms a common core of the mystical experience for persons belonging to
different mystical traditions and is independent of the interpretive aspect of this
experience. This latter disassociation between the experiential aspect of mysticism, with its emphasis on the experience of unity, and the interpretive aspect of
mysticism should be found in every mystical tradition.
This studys comparisons of structural models of mystical experience in which
the unity theme is an experiential dimension independent of the interpretive dimension to models that associated the unity theme with the interpretive dimension
showed a better goodness-of-fit for the former models on most of the goodness-of-fit indexes. These results for Israeli Jewish sample of research participants
were similar to that found by Hood et al. (2001) for a Protestant sample and for a
Muslim sample. Given the controversy surrounding the role of the experience of
unity in Jewish mysticism (Idel, 1996; Scholem, 1975), these findings would seem
to provide relatively strong support for the universality of the unity theme as an independent aspect of mystical experience. To paraphrase Hood et al., it would appear that Jews, Christians, and Muslims share common mystical experiences, at
least as far as an independent unio mystica experience is concerned.
An additional issue addressed by this research concerns the ineffable quality of
mystical experience. Hood et al. (2001) argued that ineffability cannot logically be
associated with the interpretation factor of mystical experience because the term
ineffability refers to a state of affairs that cannot be interpreted. Here too, the previously mentioned emphasis on intellectual and speculative knowledge of the divine
mysteries of Jewish mysticism (Cohn-Sherbok & Cohn-Sherbok, 1994) may have

60

LAZAR AND KRAVETZ

led to the expectation that, for a sample of Jewish research participants, ineffability
would load on the experiential aspects of mysticism. However, the findings of this
investigation with a sample of Jewish research participants appear to provide support for Staces (1960) conceptualization of interpretative mystical experience.
According to the latter conceptualization, the ineffable quality of mystical experience is associated with experiences mediated by interpretation rather than with unmediated mystical experience.
These studys findings could be considered to support Kaufmanns (1972) critique of a number of major approaches to mystical experience. Kaufmann criticized those approaches that view ineffability as an essential correlate of this
experience. He argued that many mystics appeared to feel they could make clear
and adequate statements about their experiences and that some of these mystics actually spoke and wrote effusively about them. He also pointed out that even the
simplest subjectobject experience involves an element of acquaintance which is
not fully describable (p. 318). Finally, Kaufmann suggested that describing a
mystical experience as ineffable may be a consequence of an interpretation of
mystical experience as an essentially ineffable phenomena. In this sense, this interpretation would predate experiences that an individual identifies as mystical.
Evidence of the stability and generalizability of the psychometric properties of
a self-report measure of mystical experience may only have limited import for the
resolution of long standing controversies concerning the nature of this experience.
However, to the extent that such evidence can be used to clarify these controversies, this study, along with those of Hood (1975; Hood et al., 2001; Hood & Williamson, 2000) may have made a modest contribution to the clarification of issues
related to such controversies. Notwithstanding the controversy connected with the
centrality of the experience of unity for mystical experience, especially within the
three major monotheistic religious traditions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, the
previously cited investigations of responses to the M-Scale have revealed the experience of unity to be a meaningful component of extrovertive mystical experience for adherents of all of these religious traditions. Furthermore, despite
appealing logical arguments for characterizing introvertive mystical experience as
ineffable, this study suggests that the attribution of ineffability to an experience
may be a judgment of an experience rather than an experience in itself. Further research is required to provide an understanding of the difference between immediate and derivative mystical experience that will bridge the gap between scholarly
opinion and empirical reality.
REFERENCES
Argyle, M., & Hills, P. (2000). Religious experiences and their relations with happiness and personality.
The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 10, 157172.

RESPONSES TO THE M-SCALE

61

Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107,
238246.
Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit on the analysis of
covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588606.
Bentler, P. M., & Wu, E. J. C. (1995). EQS for Windows users guide. Encino, CA: Multivariate Software, Inc.
Bryant, F. B., & Yarnold, P. R. (1997). Principal-components analysis and exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. In L. G. Grimm & P. R. Yarnold (Eds.), Reading and understanding
multivariate statistics (pp. 99136). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Caird, D. (1988). The structure of Hoods Mysticism scale: A factor-analytic study. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 27, 122126.
Cohn-Sherbok, D., & Cohn-Sherbok, L. (1994). Jewish and Christian Mysticism. New York: Continuum.
Hills, O., & Argyle, M. (1998). Musical and religious experiences and their relation to happiness. Personality and Individual Differences, 25, 91102.
Hood, R. W., Jr. (1975). The construction and preliminary validation of a measure of reported mystical
experience. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 14, 2941.
Hood, R. W., Jr. (1997). The empirical study of mysticism. In B. Spilka & D. N. McIntosh (Eds.), The
psychology of religion (pp. 222232). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Hood, R. W., Jr., Ghorbani, N., Watson, P. J., Ghramaleki, A. F., Bing, M. N., Davison, H. K., Morris, R.
J., & Williamson, W. P. (2001). Dimensions of the mysticism scale: Confirming the three-factor
structure in the United States and Iran. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40, 691705.
Hood, R. W., Jr., Morris, R. J., & Watson, P. J. (1993). Factor analysis of Hoods Mysticism scale. Psychological Reports, 73, 11761178.
Hood, R. W., Jr., & Williamson, W. P. (2000). An empirical test of the unity thesis: The structure of mystical descriptors in various faith samples. Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 19, 222224.
Idel, M. (1996). Universalization and integration: Two conceptions of mystical union in Jewish mysticism. In M. Idel & B. McGinn (Eds.), Mystical union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (pp.
2757). New York: Continuum.
James, W. (1902). The varieties of religious experience (2nd ed.). New York: Longman Green.
Kaufmann, W. (1972). Critique of religion and philosophy (Harper Torchbooks edition). New York:
Harper & Row.
Oslow, M. (1995). Ultimate intimacy: The psychodynamics of Jewish mysticism. London: Karnac
Books.
Schafer, P. (1992). The hidden and manifest God: Some major themes in early Jewish mysticism
(Aubrey Pomerance, Trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Scholem, G. G. (1975). Explications and implications: Writings on Jewish heritage and renaissance [in
Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Am Oved.
Scholem, G. G. (1978). Major trends in Jewish mysticism. New York: Schoken.
Spilka, B., Brown, G. A., & Cassidy, S. A. (1992). The structure of religious mystical experience. The
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2, 241257.
Stace, W. T. (1960). Mysticism and philosophy. Philadelphia: Lippincot.
Thompson, B. (2000). Ten commandments of structural equational modeling. In L. G. Grimm & P. Y.
Yarnold (Eds.), Reading and understanding more multivariate statistics (pp. 261283). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.