Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

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Ecological Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

Bona diagnosis, bona curatio: How property economics claries the degrowth debate
Pascal van Griethuysen
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, CP 136, CH-1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 30 November 2010
Received in revised form 14 February 2012
Accepted 15 February 2012
Available online 7 March 2012
Keywords:
Degrowth
Property economics
Capitalist rationality
Eco-social rationale

a b s t r a c t
This contribution postulates that a theoretical explanation of the foundational conditions of economic growth
is a prerequisite for conceptually elaborating on the ways to foster degrowth. It suggests that reorienting the
current unsustainable and inequitable path and implementing the degrowth transition in an ecologically sustainable and socially equitable manner requires a shift in the hierarchy of social norms, from the propertybased economic rationale, where social and ecological considerations are subordinated to the specic requirements of capitalist expansion, towards an eco-social economic rationale, where economic activities
are subordinated to social and ecological considerations and imperatives. Such an eco-social rationale
could subordinate property capitalist expansion through the following, interrelated ways: limiting the
scope of the property domain, regulating capitalisation practices, orienting investments, distributing returns
and limiting the capitalist expansion of property. Nonetheless, getting out of the involutionary path of western development might require more radical alternatives, such as non-property, possession-based institutional arrangements and partnerships.
2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
A motivating body of literature has recently contributed to clarify
the meaning of the emerging notion of degrowth both as a scientic
concept and as a social movement. While Martinez-Alier et al.
(2010), in the line of Flipo (2009) and Gadrey (2010), investigate
the origins of degrowth in the elds of ecological economics, social
ecology, economic anthropology and eco-social activism, new clarications have been proposed on the relations between degrowth and
sustainable development (Abraham et al., 2011; Spangenberg, 2010)
and degrowth and steady state (Kerschner, 2010).
Interestingly, the relation between degrowth and growth, which
some consider as rather straightforward (Aris, 2007; Latouche,
2009), appears more problematic to others (Gadrey, 2010; van den
Bergh, 2011), who prefer the notion of a-growth or post-growth. Beyond this semantic debate (Kallis, 2011), the issue remains central:
Martinez-Alier et al. (2010: 1746) end their contribution by stating
that [t]he concept of growth is in itself vague and polymorphic,
thus bringing () ambiguity to the term de-growth. Unraveling
the notion of growth in complex coupled ecologicaleconomic systems should be a priority for enabling a fruitful dialogue towards
enriching the sustainable de-growth idea.
Mobilising property economics to interpret the notion of economic growth, this contribution aims to shed some light on this intricate
relation. My postulate here is that a sound theoretical appraisal of

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E-mail address: Pascal.vangriethuysen@graduateinstitute.ch.
0921-8009/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.02.018

the process of growth is a prerequisite for an adequate conceptualisation, development and implementation of a degrowth transition
(Abraham et al., 2011; Kallis, 2011) in a manner as sustainable, equitable and responsible as possible. In order to elaborate on this postulate, my paper is articulated as follows:
Section 2 presents how property economics explains the pressure
for economic growth. Elaborating on the potential of property to secure capitalisation processes, it describes the circular and cumulative
nature of property expansion through capitalisation and makes explicit how capitalist requirements, including the growth imperative,
shape capitalist economic rationality and orient the evolution of the
economic system. Based on this interpretation, Section 3 focuses on
the ways to limit the pressure for economic growth by acting on the
capitalist process: by limiting the scope of the property domain, regulating capitalisation and nancial practices, directing investments
and distributing monetary returns. However, getting out of the industrial capitalist system might require more radical alternatives, such as
non-property, possession-based institutional arrangements and partnerships, which are presented in Section 4. Section 5 offers a concluding discussion on the intimate relations between the different lines of
collective action that are elucidated by property economics.
2. Where Does the Pressure for Growth Come From? A Diagnosis
Sharing with most degrowth proponents the view that the road to
ecological sustainability and social equity requires a real bifurcation
from the present path of capitalist and industrial development, and
that such bifurcation requires a multi-faceted political project
(Abraham et al., 2011; Aris, 2007; Bernard et al., 2003; Gadrey,

P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

2010; Kallis, 2011; Latouche, 2009), I will look for the foundational
conditions for the emergence of economic growth as a pervasive imperative for economic activities in the institutional foundations of the
capitalist system, which, according to the property economic theory
developed by Heinsohn and Steiger (1996, 2000, 2006) and Steiger
(2006, 2008), or property economics, are organised around the constitutive institution of property. 1

2.1. Property, Capitalisation and Self-expansion

The theoretical edice elaborated by Heinsohn and Steiger (1996,
2000, 2006) and Steiger (2006, 2008) rests on a conceptual distinction between two types of institutional regimes: those based on possession and those based on property. 2 In Heinsohn and Steiger's
terminology, possession rules dene the rights and correlated duties
towards the material use and yields of resources. In dening who,
in what manner, at what time and place, to what extent, and by exclusion of whom may physically use goods and resources (Steiger,
2006: 186), possession rules set a predictable institutional structure
for social reproduction. As such, possession regimes have existed
throughout history, albeit in a great variety of forms depending on
ecological and cultural conditions.
Property, in contrast, rests on the establishment of formal property
titles that contain a very different, immaterial economic potential: the
capacity for the proprietor to enter into credit relations. 3 Property titles provide their holders with long-term exclusive rights over resources, both tangible and intangible. Their intrinsic value relies on
the exclusion of non-proprietors, which is guaranteed by a set of
rules and organisations that altogether constitute, securitise and
shape the property regime. 4 This unique security, which Heinsohn
and Steiger (1996, 2000) call the property premium, is the key element
that can be engaged to secure capitalisation processes (Veblen, 1904),
in the primary form of the credit relation (Heinsohn and Steiger,
1996). When adequately titled, registered, protected and enforced
(Steppacher, 2008), property has two main effects: (1) it crystallises
power in the hands of an elite, the proprietors, whose material control
over resources is the raison-d'tre of the regime 5; (2) it allows for the
circular and cumulative expansion, accumulation and concentration of
power through capitalisation, the driving force of capitalism.
1
De Soto (2000) developed a similar line of thought, while Steppacher (1999, 2008)
elaborated on the ecological, social and institutional repercussions of the propertybased capitalist expansion.
2
The property economics' terminology should be differentiated from the one present in much of the property rights literature. In the latter, possession is generally
equated with physical control of resources (e.g. Bromley, 1989, 1992), while property
rights rest on social rules that dene rights and obligations, duties and sanctions, e.g.
with respect to access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation (Schlager
and Ostrom, 1992). In Heinsohn and Steiger's perspective, both possession and property correspond to institutional regimes that dene social relations (rights, obligations
and duties) towards resources, but only property, with the creation of formal and
transferrable property titles, establishes the foundational conditions for the emergence
of a genuine capitalist economy. However, as noticed by Steppacher (2008: 326), possession and property are ambiguous concepts that interact both in empirical and theoretical terms. Therefore, these concepts would benet from being considered as
Weberian ideal types so dened as to make explicit the crucial role of property in
the capitalist economy.
3
Property rights are de jure claims. They entitle their holders to immaterial (nonphysical) capacities which rst constitute economic activities: (i) to burden property
titles in issuing money against interest; (ii) to encumber these titles as collateral for
obtaining money as capital; (iii) to alienate or exchange including sale and lease, and
(iv) to enforce. (Steiger, 2006: 186).
4
The exclusionary nature of property rights (Bromley, 1992; Polanyi, 1944) reects
the dual nature of any institutional arrangement (Bromley, 1989). However, in the
property regime, the exclusiveness of rights is not limited in time, which makes the
reallocation of rights and duties an issue of a revolutionary nature, as this implies a
restructuring of the regime as a whole.
5
As Marx (1867) and Polanyi (1944) insisted, a property regime emerges out of
power asymmetries and violent social processes, such as previous human and natural
exploitation; what Marx referred to as primitive accumulation.

263

Unlike other types of ownership that dene possession rules towards economic resources, property titles are dissociated from the resources they refer to. The disconnection provides the proprietor with
the possibility to focus on the capitalist potential of the resource by
ltering out all the confusing lights and shadows of its physical aspects and its local surroundings (de Soto, 2000: 41-2). This potential
can be related to what Veblen (1904) called the potential earningcapacity, i.e. the capacity of any resource, both material and immaterial, to yield a future monetary return. 6 In order to express such an
earning capacity and thus to mobilise the capitalist potential of property, alternative options must be made comparable. Therefore, the
heterogeneous complexity that characterises the complex relations
linking economic resources to their ecological and social context has
to be homogenised and expressed in monetary terms, which corresponds to the property value's specic dimension. This disconnection
from the ecological and social context widens the range of potential
alternative actualisations and stimulates the proprietor to enter into
a world of abstraction where any combination of technological and
institutional expedients, both actual and future, can be conceived
and mobilised. The transformation of a coastal area devoted to traditional shing into a luxury resort illustrates how this abstract reasoning based on property can be disconnected from the local possessionbased rationale.
Possession does not disappear in the property-based economy, as
[e]very property title has a possessional side (Heinsohn and Steiger,
2000: 70). Thus property entails two different potentials: material
and nancial or capitalist. This dual potential can be actualised in parallel, since actualising the capitalist potential of property affects neither the physical features of resources nor their material yield. 7
Moreover, not only can both potentials of property be simultaneously
engaged, but the earning capacity of engaging property in a capitalisation process becomes an additional income stream to the concrete,
material exploitation of the property. Such a dual actualisation allows
for the circular and cumulative enrichment of proprietors, since a higher
material yield usually implies a higher earning-capacity through capitalisation, which can itself be invested in increasing material productivity, creating a cycle of accumulation. 8
The capacity for proprietors to enter that cycle of accumulation results in the self-expansion of property-based economies, which may
last as long as resources can be appropriated and capitalised. In this
process, any resource or instrument that presents a potential economic value is rapidly integrated into the dynamics of exclusive appropriation and capitalisation. This includes natural and human
resources, technology and know-how, patented as intellectual property, as well as intangible elements of political and economical
power (Veblen, 1904; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). The circular and cumulative causation that relates the two processes of commodication
and capitalisation the more resources that are appropriated, the
larger the basis for capitalisation explains why capitalist expansion
is accompanied by accumulation and concentration, a point Marx has
long insisted on, and why proprietors are constantly seeking new
ways of expanding their economic power both through appropriation
and capitalisation. 9
6
The value of any given block of capital () turns on its earning-capacity () not
of its prime cost or of its mechanical efciency. () But the earning-capacity which in
this way affords ground for the valuation of marketable capital (or for the market capitalization of the securities bought and sold) is not its past or actual earning-capacity,
but its presumptive future earning-capacity. (Veblen, 1904:152153).
7
During the period of the loan, lender and borrower continue the physical use of
the possessory side of their burdened assets. (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1997: 187). This
was already noticed by Veblen (1904: 163ff).
8
any increase of the aggregate money values () will afford a basis for an extension of loans (). The extension of loans on collateral () has therefore in the nature
of things a cumulative character. (Veblen, 1904: 105106).
9
The constant pressure for capitalisation emanating by ever more concentrated
property can be seen in the huge amount of liquidity in constant search for nancing
opportunities, a process that helps understanding phenomena such as the boom in nancial derivatives, the creation of subprime mortgages and the rise of carbon nance.

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P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

2.2. Capitalist Requirements, Industrial Responses and Eco-social Crisis

transition in a way that is socially tolerable corresponds to the

degrowth challenge.

The possibility of getting cumulatively richer by capitalising

property is the primary reason why proprietors have constantly
pressed and I assume will always press the economic system
to grow. This leading pressure extends into the economic system
through the contractual obligations that economic agents must full once they have engaged their property in capitalisation processes. In a credit relation, the debtor must refund the loan and pay
the interest in due time. Likewise, a company that has increased
its capital through stock-option creation compels itself to pay regular dividends to its shareholders. Altogether these obligations impose the following requirements (Steppacher, 1999, 2008; van
Griethuysen, 2010): solvency, an existence condition that requires
monetary valuation of economic activities according to the
money of account (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2000) dened by the
creditor; protability, which makes costbenet analysis a routine
procedure; time pressure for income realisation, which permanently pressures the economic system to accelerate both production
and consumption.
The capitalist requirements of solvency, protability and time
pressure are essential features of property-based capitalist expansion. Agents who fail to meet these requirements are eliminated
(through the foreclosure or acquisition of their property), a process
that further concentrates economic power. Likewise, economic behaviours oriented by alternative motivations will be discouraged, if
not eliminated. Moreover, once engaged in the peculiar dynamics
of capitalist expansion, the property economy does not move backwards: once a matter of choice, recourse to capitalisation practices
becomes compulsory, as captured by Veblen (1904: 96), who pointed out that under the regime of competitive business whatever is
generally advantageous becomes a necessity for all competitors.
Those who take advantage of the opportunities afforded by credit
are in a position to undersell any others who are similarly placed
in all but this respect. In the nal analysis, the capitalist requirements of solvency, relative protability and time pressure, as well
as the associated pressures for growth, innovation, acceleration
and favourable institutional conditions become pervasive imperatives in a property economy (Harvey, 2007; Steppacher, 2008; van
Griethuysen, 2010).
In the past, property-based economies have responded to those
imperatives through trade, territorial expansion, property expansion,
appropriation by dispossession and over-exploitation of renewable
resources (Duchrow and Hinkelammert, 2004; Field, 1989; Harvey,
2003; Heinsohn and Steiger, 1996). With the advent of the thermoindustrial revolution (Grinevald, 1990) and the exploitation of fossil
energy, technological innovation has become the main channel for
responding to the growth mandate. Indeed, the potential of fossil energy for materialising exponential growth, as noticed by GeorgescuRoegen (1965), has so intimately matched the pressure for exponential growth induced by capitalist property expansion that this unique
combination has become the techno-institutional core of western development. 10 This specic combination, in which nancial and technological superiority reinforce each other in a circular and
cumulative manner (Steppacher, 2008), has provided the western
elite with an unprecedented power, and has created a process of institutional and technological lock-in (Unruh, 2000) together with a cumulative deterioration of ecological and social contexts (van
Griethuysen, 2010). It is from this involutionary development path
that humankind must escape, should it intend to continue inhabiting
the Biosphere for some time. In my understanding, managing such a

Addressing the need to foster the cultural (r)evolution that is

required as a basic support for the degrowth transition, many contributions elaborate on the ways to promote the transition in
terms of emancipating human values from mass consumerism
and materialism, by decolonising our imaginaries (Latouche,
2009), by political struggle (Aris, 2007) or ideological voluntarism
(Bernard et al., 2003). Others insist on the need to develop and
concretely implement alternative initiatives and experiences
(Gadrey, 2010; Martinez-Iglesias and Garcia, 2011). Having presented the growth imperative as a consequence of capitalist

10
For Veblen (1904: 1): [t]he material framework of modern civilization is the industrial system, and the directing force which animates this framework is business enterprise. See Steppacher (2008) for an analysis of the combination of property and
mineral-based industrial technologies.

11
All economic decisions and evaluations are hierarchically differentiated, integrated, balanced and centred according to the impact they are likely to have with regard to
the security, quantity, quality and value of property. (Steppacher, 2008: 336).

2.3. Degrowth as a Change in Economic Rationale

By deciding which activities to nance, creditors and investors
give the primary impulse to the capitalist expansion of the property economy. Therefore, as noticed by Steppacher (2008), economic
rationality in a property-based economy is primarily dened from
the point of view of the property of the creditor/investor. 11 This
focus on property and its monetary appraisal shapes the normative
hierarchy of decision making in the property economy, that is, the
capitalist economic rationality (Steppacher, 2008). In the capitalist
rationality, environmental and social considerations are subordinated to capitalist requirements such as monetary growth, time
pressure, monetary cost efciency, prot-based innovations and
favourable institutional conditions (Steppacher, 2008). Restraining
competitors by supporting adequately designed policies, establishing voluntary labels to increase sales income, or establishing new
property titles granting exclusivity over commonly possessed resources are among the situations where eco-social considerations
can comply with the property's specic requirements (van
Griethuysen, 2010). Elements that negatively impact property
tend to be externalised from the economic calculus of private
agents, i.e., strategically shifted to third parties, such as nonproprietors, powerless people, future generations and society as a
whole (Kapp, 1950), who do not hold property titles to raise in
defence of their rights.
In arguing that economic activities must be subordinated to ecological sustainability and social equity, the degrowth project (Aris,
2007; Kallis, 2011) proposes a very different hierarchy of social
norms. Indeed, it corresponds to a complete reversal in the normative hierarchy of social choices, from a property-based capitalist economic rationality that subordinates eco-social considerations to
capitalist requirements, to an eco-social economic rationale that explicitly subordinates economic decisions to ecological and social
considerations. Sharing that normative hierarchy with a variety of
social actors who condemn the dominance of capitalist decision criteria in social choices, the degrowth movement echoes particularly
the critiques and propositions that were elaborated during the 60s
and the 70s (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 1976; Illich, 1973;
Kapp, 1965, 1972; Meadows et al., 1972; Partant, 1978; Sachs,
1980), before conservative forces countered and reversed the tendency in the 80s, bringing neoliberal policies back to the top of
the political agenda, a dynamic that was accompanied and supported by sustainable development doctrine (Ll, 1991; van
Griethuysen, 2011a).
3. How to Foster Degrowth? A Curatio

P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

property expansion, I will leave to others the task of elaborating

on the ways to render the cultural context more favourable to
the degrowth transition and shed instead some light on what institutional changes might be worth mobilising in order to foster
the degrowth project.
In conformity with the conceptual appraisal of the capitalist expansion of the property economy I presented, I will consider how
the two interacting processes of appropriation and capitalisation
can be subordinated to eco-social considerations. Before investigating institutional alternatives to the property regime, which I address
in the next section, I focus here on the ways to limit the pressure
from growth that emanates from the capitalist expansion of property. Based on the conceptual analysis that I presented in Section 2, I
suggest that capitalist property expansion could be subordinated
to eco-social considerations through the following, interrelated
ways: (1) limiting the scope of the property domain; (2) regulating
capitalisation practices; (3) orienting investments, and (4) allocating monetary returns and distributing created wealth. Each of
these policies aims to frame the capitalist expansion of property in
a way that meets the overall objectives of ecological sustainability
and social equity (5).

3.1. Limiting the Scope of the Property Domain

As the expansion of property through capitalisation originates in
the exclusive and enduring rights provided by property titles to their
holders, delineating the scope and temporality of the exclusive sphere
of property is the most fundamental way to subordinate property expansion to eco-social considerations. It is also the most appropriate
level for collective action to take place, since most capitalisation processes emerge out of proprietors' nancial practices and prove difcult
to regulate afterwards.
While neoclassical economists favour private property and
market-based instruments as the means of integrating eco-social considerations into capitalist rationality, most critical institutional economists (e.g. Bromley, 1989; Commons, 1934; Kapp, 1976) insist on
the need to go behind market and scal instruments in order to adjust
the formal institutional framework in which economic agents operate. Legal regulation, in particular, by exogenously redening rights,
duties and obligations, could ensure that environmental or social
goals are met at least in principle. 12
But eco-social legislation has further consequences. Because the
reciprocal nature of institutions ensures that restraint for one is liberation for another (Bromley, 1989: 38), stricter eco-social obligations imposed on proprietors not only reduce the scope of
exclusiveness provided by property titles, but reduce the correlated
exclusion of non-proprietors as well. Thus, by increasing private
eco-social responsibility, legislation can restrain the tendency towards widening inequalities. Furthermore, additional obligations
not only limit the material uses of property that disrupt the environment or negatively impact people, but simultaneously reduce
the immaterial potential for capitalisation, and consequently, the
pressure for growth that would emanate from such capitalisation.
Simply put, eco-social legislation limits the expansion of the

12
Taxes and other scal instruments, whose impact on the price structure might be
signicant, are integrated into private agents' costbenets calculus, which induces
the risk that eco-social objectives will not be met whenever perceived as too costly
by private agents, a situation that legal regulation might avoid (Kapp, 1972). However,
by modifying the legal boundaries of economic activity, legislation also affects the
structure and amount of costs to be borne by private economic agents. As such, it impacts directly on relative protability and competitiveness, and therefore affects the
very heart of economic agents' institutional strategies (Bromley, 1989). Partly moulded
by such institutional strategies, reecting power asymmetries, eco-social norms are, in
practice, often far from reecting ecological and social imperatives (van Griethuysen,
2011b).

265

property economy at two distinct but related levels: the material

and the nancial one.
3.2. Regulating Capitalisation
Setting the frontiers of the capitalist expansion of property by regulating capitalisation practices appears to be an essential policy element of an integrated strategy for degrowth. In doing so, it is useful
to distinguish between rst-order capitalisation processes, such as
credit relations or stock-option creation, and second-order capitalisation practices, such as derivatives creation, securitisation and leveraging. 13 First-order capitalisation processes can be regulated in
accordance with the basic principles of sound banking, i.e., issuing
money not only against interest but also against good securities
and with sufcient capital of the issuing bank (Steiger, 2006: 188).
Yet, credit regulation should not only strengthen the resilience of
the banking system, a conventional justication for nancial regulation 14; it should also protect debtors against bankruptcy and socioeconomic exclusion. Too many historical and contemporary examples
illustrate how credit, in highly asymmetric nancial relations, has
taken defaulted debtors towards the trap of cumulative indebtedness,
exclusion and misery. 15
Strict regulation of the second-order capitalisation processes
should be implemented for various reasons. Firstly, while not anchored in concrete and secure institutional foundations, secondorder capitalisation processes have been the greatest contributor to
the monetary capital created in the last decades, resulting in the exploitation of human and natural resources in order to full the promises of articially high monetary returns. Secondly, with most of that
money being of a speculative nature, second-order capitalisation
practices have created a highly unstable nancial environment, the
volatility of which imposes dramatic losses for numerous economic
agents, individuals, households, enterprises and even countries. In
fact, the question remains whether second-order capitalisation
should be regulated as strictly as possible, or simply banned. In my
view, only rst-order capitalisation processes that lead to environmentally and socially sound investments are compatible with the
degrowth project.
Obviously, other measures, such as a taxation of capital transactions (Felix, 1994; Tobin, 1978) and other issues, such as the origin
of money to be invested and the role of tax havens and off-shore nancial centres, should be incorporated into an articulated strategy
aiming at delineating frontiers of capitalisation that are ultimately
compatible with the common goals of ecological sustainability and
13
By rst order capitalisation, I refer to nancial products derived from formally
institutionalised assets, such as credit loans based on formal property titles or stock options created by a corporation on behalf of its increasing capitalisation value. Secondorder capitalisation refers to nancial products that derivate from rst-order capitalisation, which reinforce the dissociation from real economic conditions and develop
further abstract and speculative practices.
14
Strengthening the resilience of banks and the global banking system is at the core
of the reform programme elaborated under the auspices of the Bank for International
Settlements. Referred as Basel III, that programme imposes stricter capital requirements, notably by raising the quality of the capital to be encumbered as banks' minimal
reserve, the creation of a counterfactual capital buffer and the introduction of a leverage ratio as a backstop to the risk-based capital and to contain excessive leveraging
(BCBS, 2010). Questions remain about the repercussions of that programme that aims
at a signicant increase in the capitalisation of the banking sector (Cecchetti, 2010:
1), notably in terms of concentration in the banking sector and safeguards manipulation
by the biggest nancial agents.
15
The social exclusion of indebted peasants after the introduction of property into
the possession-based regime of British India (Steppacher, 2008), the US subprime crisis
following the creation of mortgage contracts specically designed for the Ninja
(standing for No Income, No Job or Assets), the microcredit crises in India (Wright
and Sharma, 2010) all show how unsound capitalisation practices affect the most vulnerable agents, whose bankruptcy benets the richest. Most often, such processes depict cases of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003), where dispossession
happens indirectly, throughout sequential processes of commodication, capitalisation, insolvency and foreclosure.

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P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

social equity. 16 Yet, in all these cases, a global, collective authority

backed by strong political support would be required, which might
be seen at best in its infancy.
3.3. Orienting Investments
While the expansion of the property economy requires ever
higher and quicker monetary returns, the degrowth transition will require substantial outcomes in terms of social fairness and ecological
conditions. In that perspective, the major (r)evolution in investment
practices relates to the selection criteria which investments are decided upon. In particular, investment criteria need to depart from: (1)
the monetary criteria of the property economy, and rely instead on
an appropriate combination of eco-biophysical and socio-cultural criteria chosen to reect different aspects of social life 17; (2) the criteria
of relative protability of individual investments, and consider instead alternatives in terms of balances between social ends and
means 18; (3) the inherent bias towards short-term returns, and rely
instead on a differentiated appraisal of the various temporalities of
the human and ecological processes at stake.
Among the criteria of particular signicance for a degrowth policy,
I may cite here the importance of managing natural resources in a
way that accounts for the ecological and economic differences between biotic and mineral resources (Steppacher and van Griethuysen,
2008). A further consideration is the spatial organisation of economic
activities, as planning and regulation could be anchored in the local,
community-level (Hines and Lang, 2001), with subsequent levels
being organised through principles of self-reliance and subsidiarity
(Galtung, 1980), possibly leading to the emergence of a multilevel regime (van Griethuysen, 2002). Most sectors of production could be
reoriented in this way, such as the food sector, where investments
can be directed towards local, sustainable agriculture and breeding
practices. These changes need to be elaborated in interconnection
within the overall objective of reducing the economic throughput of
matter and energy, an issue of particular relevance for industrial sectors (Ayres and Ayres, 1996). Investments in sustainable agriculture
and renewable energy are worth mentioning as alternatives to the current path of world development, which has proven incapable of reducing its dependence upon fossil fuels (Unruh, 2000).
When elaborating criteria for adequate, responsible investment,
we should differentiate between the investing actors such as the public sector, private agents or institutional investors. Dening criteria
for responsible public investments requires substantial discussion
and widespread deliberation on the notion of quality of life, as dened by a social appraisal of heterogeneous ecological and social indicators, such as working conditions, education and health standards
and pollution levels (Kapp, 1972). Imposing criteria on private agents
in favour of responsible investments will require a radical change in
the power balance of business agents who, in the ongoing process
of property expansion, have little choice but to favour institutional
changes that are compatible with the capitalist requirements they
are subordinated to (van Griethuysen, 2010). Implementing alternative criteria into the practices of institutional investors, such as
16
Alternative nancial practices, such as outcome sharing, where investors share both
losses and prots with entrepreneurs, a practice existing in Islamic nance (El-Gamal,
2006), or alternative money-type devices for exchange, such as local currencies (Jacobs,
2000) can be mentioned here as alternative practices relying on possession-based economic rationales.
17
An important literature (e.g. Kapp, 1965, 1972; Miles, 1992) has addressed the importance of departing from monetary indicators and relying instead on real-life economic indicators to anchor a mode of development that respects both human and
natural reproduction.
18
According to Steppacher (1996), investments in an eco-social rationale are decided
upon a number of different aspects of social life, including cultural and environmental
considerations. Alternatives are balanced and centred on society's cultural pillars,
which usually leads to a collective investment in a combination of means in order to
reach a combination of ends.

pension or mutual funds, may be relatively easier. In the ongoing climate of ecological, social and nancial crises, a rising public awareness might result in higher demands on investors, both institutional
and commercial, for more responsible investments not only in
terms of nancial security but also in terms of ecological and socioeconomic repercussions (Sparkes, 2008).

3.4. Allocating Returns and Distributing Created Wealth

Dening the modalities of an equitable distribution of the wealth
created by both self-organised capitalisation processes and
collectively-oriented investments could be an essential policy instrument towards social equity, both at the intra- and inter-generational
level. While cases of social justice within a generation are to be
counted as historical exceptions, taking future generations into account in a fair distribution of resources and other means of development should still be strived for as a long-term objective. This would,
however, require a cultural maturity that is a far cry from the current
individualist and consumerist propensity actively promoted by business actors competing within a self-expansionary property economy,
as already noticed by Veblen in 1904.
Nonetheless, allocating part of the wealth created by capitalisation
processes to specic activities, funds or populations through various
instruments and policies remains a central part of an integrated
degrowth strategy. In case of monetary returns on property capitalisation, scal and other monetary instruments can be mobilised. 19
Should the created wealth circumvent the monetary dimension and
relate to non-monetary assets, ad hoc procedures and policies could
be elaborated to insure a fair redistribution of such wealth. This
would be especially important should property titles be involved. Finally, it must be recalled that distributive policies do not only concern
the allocation of monetary returns, but also the initial distribution of
rights, obligations and duties towards natural and human resources.
Therefore, reducing property expansion and concentration through
distributive policies is closely linked with reducing the scope of property's exclusive sphere by embedding it in a wider institutional set-up.

3.5. Framing Property's Capitalist Expansion

The policy proposals presented above share the common objective
of subordinating the expansionary path of the property economy to
an eco-social economic rationale, where economic activities are subordinated to ecological and social considerations and objectives. A reection on how to articulate these proposals into an integrated
strategy towards ecological sustainability and social equity will be
needed, though it can only be proposed here at the conceptual level.
Instead of relying on the property-based normative hierarchy that
subordinates environmental and social considerations to the capitalist requirements of solvency, protability and time pressure, the
degrowth project implies a shift to an institutional framework that
is driven instead by a set of environmental and social standards.
Such an institutional framework involves a redenition of the social
relationships, responsibilities, rights and obligations of the various
members of the social structure, in conformity with the normative hierarchy of that eco-social rationale. Proponents of eco-development
(Kapp, 1972; Sachs, 1980; Riddel, 1981) already suggested this path
in the 70s. In practice, maximum environmental thresholds and minimum social standards, much in the same vein as Kapp's (1965) ecological maxima and existential minima, can set an eco-social framing
for property expansion and act as the dynamic frontiers of a
19
The Basel III framework imposes constraints on discretionary capital distribution,
like dividend payment and bonuses in specic periods of nancial and economic stress
(BCBS, 2010). That policy might be generalised and expanded in scope within a distributive policy.

P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

development corridor. Within such a corridor, human activities

might turn towards a harmonious co-evolution with their ecological
conditions.
Conning the path of the capitalist expansion of property within
ecological and social limits would imply a multi-step institutional
procedure (Kapp, 1965, 1972): (1) elaborating a set of indicators
and evaluation procedures designed to adequately apprehend the
complex, multidimensional nature of socioeconomic activities; (2)
collectively dening the ecological and social standards to be set as
social priority goals; (3) choosing amongst institutional alternatives
and policy options the combinations that present the best chances
of reaching those goals; (4) implementing evaluation procedures to
evaluate the transition process, notably through an eco-social multilevel monitoring; and (5) correcting any deviance in the process by
mobilising tools and instruments specically designed to redirect
the process, which might include a redenition of the initial objective.
Finally, such an overall procedure, which the degrowth movement
could get inspiration from, should be conceived as evolutionary in nature, as the social goals to be dened, the tools and procedures to be
implemented and the whole process itself should be permanently
revaluated in light of new knowledge (Kapp, 1972).
4. Elaborating Institutional Alternatives to Property
The preceding section implicitly postulates that the actualisation
of the capitalist potential of property, when adequately framed,
could turn out to be an economic tool to be managed for the common
good. However, the theoretical options for orienting property-based
expansion through adequate institutional reforms may be limited by
the concrete dynamics of the property economy itself, as property
acts as a power amplier that locks the institutional evolution into arrangements that favour ever more powerful proprietors (van
Griethuysen, 2010). Therefore, the degrowth project might require
institutional modalities that depart more radically from the property
regime.
Among the alternative institutional modalities to private property,
state property is worth mentioning here, as it corresponds to a radical
way of setting the ecological and social conditions in which resources
can be exploited. As a resource proprietor, the state can concede exploitation rights to socioeconomic organisations (corporations, communities, NGOs) and contractually x the eco-social conditions of
exploitation. 20 Moreover, institutional arrangements such as licences
and concessions allow for setting time limits on the rights conferred.
In such cases, more enduring rights create higher security on future
returns and, thereby, higher capitalisation value. However, as no formal titles can be transferred or alienated, the capitalist potential is
lower than in the private property scheme, where collateralised properties can be seized. 21
Distinguishing between possession and property regimes further
opens the domain of possible institutional arrangements regarding
resources. Thus, not only different types of property regimes (such
as state, collective or private property), but the whole range of nonproperty, possession-based institutional arrangements can be mobilised for possible implementation. This is especially important to
mention since the absence of formal property titles is often associated
with the absence of institutional arrangements, as illustrated by
Garrett Hardin's (1968) confusion between common regimes and
open access, an error that Hardin later recognised (The Ecologist,
1992).
20
State concessions do not guarantee that eco-social considerations will guide the
exploitation of resources, as demonstrated by many examples in logging, mining and
other sectors. Nonetheless, they show a possible compatibility with such principles,
when states are not themselves subordinated to the constraints of over-indebtedness.
21
Collective property, e.g. in the form of cooperative corporations, can only be mentioned here as an alternative way of organising the production sector in a manner that
takes account of both human and nancial considerations.

267

Among the possession-based institutional modalities that can be

conceptually distinguished (such as state, common or individual possession), the common possession regime is worth mentioning here.
Denominated as common property in the property rights literature
(whereas it can neither be encumbered, used as collateral nor sold),
common possession refers to a wide array of social contexts in
which the rights and obligations designed for regulating the material
disposition of natural resources arise from an authority that is jointly
assumed by the members of the society (Bromley, 1992; Ostrom,
1990; Polanyi, 1944).
Today, most common possession regimes face external pressures
and need to be protected by external actors such as states or international organisations in order to function. 22 Strengthening common
possession regimes and customary institutions through their formal
recognition by external actors, e.g., through the formalisation of institutional status for areas self-managed by communities, 23 is a way not
only to secure common-pool resources from dispossession, but also to
support social knowledge and economic rationales that differ from
property-based capitalist rationality. In addition, as common possession regimes generally rest on principles such as the indivisibility of
ownership, which prevents ownership from being formally divided
between community members, and exoinalienability, which prevents
the rights over resources from being alienated to non-community
members (Rouland, 1988), these regimes constitute concrete alternatives to property-based modalities that often lead to dispossession,
mismanaged credit operations, bankruptcy and economic exclusion.
Other approaches to resource co-management, where resources are
managed jointly by different actors such as public authorities, NGOs,
private actors or local communities, might be considered within the
degrowth project. 24
Interestingly, these different kinds of partnerships might combine capitalist economic rationality with a possession-based rationale, as in the state and community partnership depicted by
Hoffmann (2005) between the state water company of Cochabamba
and local communities. This partnership rests on sharing tasks and
associated costs in relation to the construction, operation and maintenance of a drinking water system. As illustrated by Hoffmann
(2005: 186188), the partnership mobilises both capitalist and
possession-based economic rationalities. First, the partnership mobilises the capitalist economic rationality: the sharing of tasks and
costs not only reduces the state company's overall monetary burden, making the refunding of contracted public debt easier, but
this sharing also allows the company to sell the water to the communities at a lower price, which meets up with the community's
limited solvent demand. Second, the partnership mobilises a
possession-based economic rationale: the internal self-organisation
of communities recognises both monetary and non-monetary contributions. This allows insolvent people to contribute for their
water consumption not by paying for it, but by contributing to
the overall burden, for instance by working on the maintenance
of the infrastructure. By valuing the non-monetary contributions
of insolvent community members, such partnerships possibly
meet both the capitalist constraints of solvency, by reducing the
overall monetary costs, while simultaneously meeting the social
goal of reducing exclusion, by economically satisfying the needs of
insolvent people and enhancing social participation.
22
The Indigenous and Tribal People Convention elaborated by the International Labour Organisation in 1989 to establish a formal recognition of customary institutions of
indigenous and tribal people is worth citing here. See Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2010)
for a review of the recent developments in the formal recognition of local communities'
customary institutions.
23
For a detailed description of these Community Conserved Areas, see BorriniFeyerabend et al. (2004).
24
For a panorama of experiences in a co-management setting, see Borrini-Feyerabend et
al. (2004), who propose approaches, methods and tools promoting the emergence of this
new type of collaboration.

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P. van Griethuysen / Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 262269

5. Concluding Remarks
This contribution rests on the postulate that the degrowth project
requires rm theoretical foundations to be successfully implemented.
Mobilising the property economics theory initially elaborated by
Heinsohn and Steiger (1996), I presented a theoretical description
of the capitalist mode of development as a cumulative sequence of
appropriation and concentration of assets through capitalisation and
nance, which results in increasing inequities and widening ecological degradation due to the subordination of eco-social considerations
to capitalist imperatives. In this theoretical perspective, reorienting
the current unsustainable and inequitable development path and
implementing the necessary degrowth transition in an ecologically
sustainable and socially equitable manner requires a shift from the
property-based hierarchy of social norms, where social and ecological
considerations are subordinated to the capitalist economic rationale,
towards an eco-social rationale, where economic activities are subordinated to social and ecological considerations and imperatives.
While a general reorientation of the economic system is needed,
this contribution focuses on policies that could subordinate property
capitalist expansion to eco-social considerations.
Key elements for mitigating the pressure for growth that emanates from capitalisation processes are to limit the scope of the property domain, through eco-social legislation and the regulation of
capitalisation and nancial practices, distinguishing between rstorder capitalisation processes, such as credit relations or stock option
creation, and second-order capitalisation practices, such as derivatives creation, securitisation and leveraging. Another essential step
towards an integrative degrowth policy is an elaboration of criteria
for responsible private and collective investments, with the aim of anchoring economic activities in the local scale, using biotic resources
sustainably and managing mineral resources responsibly, while promoting a technological diversity that lowers the risk of future
locked-in situations. Furthermore, in order to meet the social objectives of ecological sustainability and social fairness, investment criteria have to switch from property-based, monetary evaluation
criteria, to social and ecological criteria, which corresponds to a turnaround in the normative hierarchy of economic decision making. Finally, allocating wealth in accordance with social and ecological
considerations can, with adequate distribution, positively affect the
environmental and social domains, while limiting the cumulative
process of exclusive accumulation and social exclusion.
In a more radical break with the capitalist expansion of the property economy, alternative institutional arrangements to the private
property regime, such as state property and common possession,
could be elaborated and implemented, with possible articulations
within a global, multilevel regime. Based on political and organisational principles such as self-reliance and subsidiarity, such a regime
could aim at regulating the use and control of common resources in
a way that aims at ecological sustainability, social equity and responsibility towards future generations. In such an organisation, new
kinds of partnerships, such as statecommunity partnerships should
be positively encouraged in an effort to anchor the multilevel institutional arrangements at the local scale.
All the policy options proposed above share the common goal of
setting governance modalities that promote eco-social objectives.
Similarly, they all require fundamental institutional changes, which
will entail a complete reversal in the hierarchy of social norms and
values. Obviously, such radical changes will face systematic opposition from the current socioeconomic system, as every option that
shows incompatibility with property requirements is discriminated
against in the ongoing process of worldwide property expansion
(van Griethuysen, 2010). Counterstrategies developed by powerful
economic agents are foreseeable, while the support of decisionmakers and external funding will be hard to nd. Therefore, the
most essential struggle the degrowth movement should involve itself

in is institutional in nature, and the outcome of that struggle will depend on the ability of the movement to nd allies and mobilise social
and political support. In particular, it will be crucial to establish strategic alliances that rest on mutual and cumulative support from diverse social actors who share with the degrowth project the
normative hierarchy that characterises an eco-social rationale. I thus
share Kallis' (2011: 878) interpretation of degrowth as a multifaceted political project that aspires to mobilise support for a change
of direction, at the macro level of economic and political institutions
and at the micro level of personal values and aspirations.
Favourable institutional evolution, both at the formal level of collective rules and entitlements, and at the more fundamental level of
social values and habits of thought, is at the very heart of the
degrowth challenge to establish a sustainable and equitable mode of
development. Such a struggle for ecological sustainability and social
fairness will not be successful without a fundamental cultural evolution towards social maturity and consciousness, both at the individual
and the collective levels. In such a process, property economics, when
adequately integrated into the framework of critical institutional and
ecological economics, might prove its usefulness in many ways: by
giving an adequate economic account of the manner in which
human activity, driven by capitalist economic rationality and powered by hydrocarbon-based industrial technology, has gone beyond
the resilience thresholds of the Biosphere; by identifying the urgency
of decreasing the depletion of natural resources and lowering the anthropic disruption of the Biosphere by drastically reducing economic
throughput; by explaining the institutional and technological
locked-in situation into which the western path of economic development, both capitalist and industrial, has led our societies; by helping
to elaborate a new institutional architecture based on an eco-social
rationale; by increasing the chances of success of the required reorientation by analysing the complex web of forces that act as inertial
factors impeding that reorientation; and nally, by making people increasingly aware and critical of that web through sound theoretical
explanations.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Giorgos Kallis who encouraged me to get this
paper started and nalised, Rolf Steppacher who prompted my interest in property economics and Julien-Franois Gerber for his inspired
comments. I also thanks participants at the Second International Conference on Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity
(Barcelona, 2010), who manifested their interest in this contribution,
as well as three anonymous referees whose comments improved my
text considerably. A token of gratitude also goes to Jessica Luna who
revised my English prose.

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