POSITION PAPER

FOR THE COMPLAINANT

PARTIES
COMPLAINANT Anna Geronimo, 35 years old, married to Raul Geronimo and an
accountant.
RESPONDENT Peter Pascual, 36 years old, close friend of Anna and Raul since
college, single and a sales manager.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case for the annulment of contract with damages filed by the complainant
against the respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Anna and Raul Geronimo have been friends with Peter Pascual since their college days.
Raul sold the one-bedroom condominium unit to Mr. Pascual without her consent.
Sometime in 2008 she learned that she was having a baby, and decided with her
husband to buy a house to make a room for the nanny and all the baby stuff they need. Her
husband bought their condominium unit in 2001 when he was single, and live there since they
got married. In Januray 2009, she mentioned their plan to Mr, Pascual. He said that he would
love to buy the condo unit since he has been living in an apartment for several years, and

thought that it might be a good idea to invest and buy his own condo unit should they finally
decide to sell it.
In April 2009, Anna called Mr. Pascual and informed him that they finally found a house.
She told him that they were now selling their condo unit. Since he was still interested in buying
it, she offered it to him at P2 million. Mr. Pascual then accepted her offer and immediately asked
a lawyer to prepare the necessary deed of sale. He also prepared a managers check for P2
million. Sometime in June 2009, he met up with Mr. Geronimo and told him that the sale could
not have come at a better time since he was getting married and will use the condo unit as their
conjugal home. After he handed him the managers check, Raul Geronimo signed the deed of
sale.
In May 2009, Anna left for the United States, to give birth. While she was in US she
decided not to sell the condo unit anymore and thought it would be better to keep it in the
meantime as an investment.
In June 2009, Raul Geronimo called Anna and said that he already signed the deed of
sale and that he already has the managers check. Anna returned in the Philippines sometime in
September 2009, she called Mr. Pascual and explained that they were no longer selling the
condo unit. She even offered to return his money in cash. But at that time Mr. Pascual told her
that they cant back out now because the sale had been consummated. He was able to get the
certificate of title under the name of Mr. Geronimo. She said that the condo unit was their
property and since there was no valid consent from her end, she will have the deed of sale
annulled. And according to Mr. Pascual she told him that she wasnt happy that he was getting
married and was going to use the condo unit as their conjugal home. He thinks that she might
be jealous because he always thought her to be extremely nice sweet to him. And thats absurd.
Shes already married and we have been really good friends.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the contract is valid.

2. Whether or not the sale of property without marital consent is valid.

DISCUSSION/ARGUMENTS

First Issue: On the Validity of the Contract

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE COMPLAINANT AND THE RESPONDENT IS

VOIDABLE
The contract of sale between Anna Geronimo and Peter Pascual is voidable as
provided by:
Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1390. The following contract are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those were one of the parties
is incapable of giving consent to a contract; (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Art. 1458. of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be keeping with good
faith, usage and law.
Art. 1458. By contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other top pay

therefore
a
price
certain
in
money
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.

or

its

equivalent.

Contract of sale is an agreement whereby one of the parties obligates himself to

deliver something to the other who, on his part, binds himself to pay therefore a sum of
money or its equivalent.
In the instant case, sometime in April 2009 the complainant and the respondent
had mutually agreed to the sale of the condominium unit for P2 million. While the
COMPLAINANT was in the United States to give birth the RESPONDENT handed him
the managers check to Mr. Geronimo (complainants husband) and he signed the deed
of sale.
In the case of Visayan Sawmill Company vs CA, 219 SCRA 381 (1993), the
Supreme Court held that:
Consequently, the obligation of the petitioner corporation to sell did not
arise; it, therefore, cannot be compelled by specific performance to comply with
its prestation. In short, Article 1191 of the Civil Code does not apply; on the
contrary, pursuant to Article 1597 of the Civil Code, the petitioner corporation
may totally rescind, as it did in this case, the contract. Since the refusal of
petitioner to deliver the scrap iron was founded on the non-fulfillment by the
private respondent of a suspensive condition, it cannot be held liable for
damages.
In the instant case, the contract between the COMPLAINANT and the
RESPONDENT is valid because in the first place they both agree to the stipulations to
the contract therein.
Whereby, the COMPLAINANT told the RESPONDENT that they finally found a
house asked him if he is still interested in buying their condo unit. When the
RESPONDENT told the COMPLAINANT that he was still interested the COMPLAINANT

informed the RESPONDENT that they were giving it for P2 million. The RESPONDENT
accepts the offer and immediately necessary deed of sale. The RESPONDENT met up
with Mr. Geronimo (husband of the complainant), he told him that the sale could not
have come at a better time since he was getting married and will use the condo unit as
their conjugal home. After the RESPONDENT handed down the managers check, Mr.
Geronimo signed the deed of sale.

Likewise in the case of Song Fo and Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co. 22 it was held that:
A delay in payment for twenty (20) days was not a violation of an essential
condition of the contract which would warrant rescission for non-performance. In the
instant case, the contract is bereft of any suggestion that time was of the essence.
On the contrary, it is noted that petitioners allowed private respondents' men to dig
and remove the scrap iron located in petitioners' premises between May 17, 1983
until May 30, 1983 or beyond the May 15, 1983 deadline for the opening of the Letter
of Credit. Hence, in the absence of any indication that the time was of the essence,
the eleven-day delay must be deemed a casual breach which cannot justify a
rescission.

Sale of property without

marital consent
Posted on August 12, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr Posted in Civil Law Tagged conjugal property

Is marital consent required for the sale by the husband of property he purchased under
a conditional contract to sell executed while he was still single but title of which was
transferred when he was already married? The Supreme Court faced this issue in Sps.
Lita De Leon, et al. vs. Anita B. De Leon, et al., G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009.
Sometime in 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase
on installment of a parcel of land. Three years later, Bonifacio married Anita.
After full payment of the purchase price for the lot, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a
Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677
was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single.

Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject land to his sister, Lita, and her
husband. Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas). The Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of
Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. Bonifacio died in 1996.
The Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They
secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register
of Deeds. Anita and her children then filed an action for reconveyance against the
Tarrosas.
The Regional Trial Court, on the finding that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her children.
The Court of Appeals held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption
that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal.
In their petition before the Supreme Court, the Tarrosas assert that, since Bonifacio
purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land was
Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were
paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage.
The Supreme Court ruled that the property is conjugal:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio
and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of
Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHCBonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to
a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the
vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained
by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a
contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The conditional contract to sell
executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that ownership
over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed
of sale which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price. . .
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully
paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more
than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the

property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the
property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence. There must be clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
The Supreme Court also ruled that the fact that the transfer certificate of title was in the
name of Bonifacio did not change the conjugal nature of the property:
Petitioners argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacios exclusive property, since it
was registered solely in his name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the
time when the property was acquired.
As Anita never gave consent to the sale, the Supreme Court ruled that the sale was
void:
. . . the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or
encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator,
must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in
several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any
showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The
nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the
mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this
mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity.
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the
Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
The Supreme Court held that Bonifacio cannot sell his portion of the conjugal
partnership:
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in
the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse
is limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is
finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal
partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the

husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Tarrosas should be reimbursed for the amount
they paid to purchase the property.

Marital Consent in Deed of Sale | Philippine Laws

Most persons owning or buying real estate will be familiar with this from the spousal consent form that is
required to be signed for sales and mortgages. For couples with unsuccessful marriage faces this hard
reality. Philippines Family code and several family or marital laws strongly promote and encourage family
reconciliation, especially among separated spouses.
1. Marital consent is required
a. when the property relations between the spouses in one of absolute community; or
b. when the property relations between the spouses is one of conjugal partnership and the property
involved was acquired by onerous titles during the marriage at the expense of the common fund.
Effect of NO CONSENT
(Art. 96, Art. 124, FC)
If one spouses acts without the written consent of the other or without court authority, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be VOID.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continiuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Period to file questionin transaction by the wife

Within FIVE (5) years from the date of contract

1. Marital consent is NOT necessary
a. when the property relations between the spouses is one of absolute separation; or
b. when the property relations between the spouses is one of conjugal partnership and the property
involved:
1. was brought into the marriage by either of the spouses (property nonemclature: husbands capital,
wifes paraphernal);
2. was acquired by either of the spouses by inheritance; or
3. was acquired with exclusive funds of wither of the spouses.

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ

C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the husband of
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto
agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was
signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on
surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the

authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written
consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the
subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may
have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to
demonstrate consent.