Salazar vs.

Mathay,

G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976

The Civil Service Commission: Appointments

Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the
Auditor General confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General,
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the
Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she
was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in
the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor
General that her services as confidential agent have been terminated as of the
close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General
uponfavorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an
appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by
the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the
position.On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service
requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent.
However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her
to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without
prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential
or not.(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was
validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether
or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting theposition of
Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil
Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In
the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment orfreedom from misgiving or
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us,
the provision of Executive Order No. 265,
declaring ...confidential agents in the
several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the
President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the aforementioned
executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS,
as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2) Yes. Her position being
primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her
services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily
confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure
of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be

misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position

holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted,
however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the the
same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term
for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed
removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main
difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter
is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not prefixed, but indefinite, atthe time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed
and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to
the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter isnot
removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired.

Laurel V vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195

FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed
his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the
Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and
confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of
Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting
Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional
appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service
Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his
brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism
under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of
consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided
therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be
considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the
career service.
Petitioners contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the
prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on
nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and
designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent
the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its
violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be
differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree,
career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or

temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is

necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes
the same purpose.

Ampong vs. CSC, G.R. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293
FACTS: Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public school teachers under the
supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later,
Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province,
where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
On July 5,1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil
Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET
Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel
noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture
Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was petitioner Ampong who took and
passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
ISSUE: What is the extent of the administrative jurisdiction the Civil Service
Commission have over courts and judicial personnel?
RULING: The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but the Court
rules against the petition on the ground of estoppel. It is true that the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined
under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative
authority, the CSC is granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the
Civil Service examinations.This authority grants to the CSC the right to take
cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

LABAN vs. Comelec, G.R. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004

FACTS: The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a

registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only
the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative
may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The
same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General,
Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime,
Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does
not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As
the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked
the COMELEC to disregard the same.
ISSUE: Is the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within
COMELEC jurisdiction?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a
matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than
the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the
Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great
objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends
that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of
the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The
Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority.
Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the
COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard
bearers or not.