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U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review


Board ofImmigration Appeals
Office ofthe Clerk
5 /07 /,eesburg Pike. Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 20530

OHS LIT.Nork Co. PrisonNOR


3400 Concord Road
York, PA 17402

Name: GOURZONG, GURSON OSWALD

A 038-201-760
Date of this notice: 6/12/2015

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,

DonrtL c

aAA)

Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Guendelsberger, John

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit


www.irac.net/unpublished/index/
Cite as: Gurson Oswald Gourzong, A038 201 760 (BIA June 12, 2015)

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Shagin, Craig R
Shagin Law Group LLC
Inns of St. Jude
120 South Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review


Board of Immigration Appeals
OOice
of
..
. the Clerk
5/07 l.eesb11rg Pike. S11ite 2000
Falls Church. I '1rg1ma 20530

OHS LIT./York Co. Prison/YOR


3400 Concord Road
York, PA 17402

Name: GOURZONG, GURSON OSWALD

A 038-201-760
Date of this notice: 6/12/2015

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision in the above-referenced case. This copy is being
provided to you as a courtesy. Your attorney or representative has been served with this
decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1292.S(a). If the attached decision orders that you be
removed from the United States or affirms an Immigration Judge's decision ordering that you
be removed, any petition for review of the attached decision must be filed with and received
by the appropriate court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the decision.
Sincerely,

DonrtL

ca.AA)

Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
GuendsbeeJohn
Userteam:

Cite as: Gurson Oswald Gourzong, A038 201 760 (BIA June 12, 2015)

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GOURZONG, GURSON OSWALD


A038-201-760
YORK COUNTY
3400 CONCORD ROAD
YORK, PA 17402

Decision ofthe Board oflmmigration Appeals

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review


Falls Church, Virginia 20530

File: A038 20 I 760 - York, Pennsylvania

Date:

In re: GURSON OSWALD GOURZONG

JUN l.92015

APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:

Craig R. Shagin, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF DHS: Jeffrey T. Bubier


Senior Attorney
CHARGE:
Notice:

Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] Convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude

Lodged:

Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony

APPLICATION: Termination
The respondent has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge's amended order dated
February 24, 2015, ordering his removal to Jamaica. The respondent's appeal will be dismissed.
The Board reviews an Immigration Judge's findings of fact, including findings as to the credibility of
testimony and the likelihood of future events, under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See 8 C.F.R.
1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter ofZ-Z-0-, 26 l&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015); Matter ofR-S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 629
(BIA 2003); Matter of S-H-, 23 l&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002). The Board reviews questions of law,
discretion, and judgment and all other issues in an appeal of an Immigration Judge's decision de novo.
See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
The respondent is a native and citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States since his admission as an immigrant on July 30, 1983. The record reflects that on
September 12, 1993, the respondent was convicted, upon a plea of guilty, by a Special Court-Martial
convened at Camp Pendleton, California, for the offense of Carnal Knowledge with a child under age 16,
in violation of Article 120(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") (Exh. 2). 1 In addition,
the record reflects the respondent was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, of 4 counts for the offense of Terroristic Threats, in violation of
18 PA.C.S.A. 2706 (Exh. 2). On the basis of these convictions, the respondent was placed in these
I

At the time of his conviction in 1993, UCMJ Art. 120(b), provided in relevant part that "[a] person
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice who, under circumstances not amounting to rape,
commits an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is not that person's spouse and has not attained
the age of 16 is guilty of carnal knowledge." See also IO U.S.C.A. 920(b).
Cite as: Gurson Oswald Gourzong, A038 201 760 (BIA June 12, 2015)

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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

A038 201 760


removal proceedings and charged with removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration
and Nationality Ac4 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as having been convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude; as well as having been convicted of a "Sexual Abuse of a Minor" aggravated
felony as defined under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), on account of the
respondent's 1993 UCMJ Carnal Knowledge conviction.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for three types of courts-martial: general, special, and
summary. 10 U.S.C. 816. A general court-martial is the highest court level and has jurisdiction to
try individuals for all crimes outlined in the UCMJ, including capital crimes. 10 U.S.C. 818. Special
courts-martial can try individuals for noncapital UCMJ offenses but are limited in the types of
punishment they may impose. For example, special courts-martial cannot require dishonorable
discharge. 10 U.S.C. 819. Summary courts-martial adjudicate relatively minor offenses and have
jurisdiction over enlisted individuals, not military officers. 10 U.S.C. 820.
The respondent's conviction by a special court-martial was entered prior to the enactment of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-639 ("IIRIRA"), which added the definition of "conviction" now
found in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. l 101(a)(48)(A). However, as noted by the
Immigration Judge (I.J. at 2), the portion of the pre-lIRIRA definition of "conviction" applicable in this
case and as set forth in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), is virtually identical to that now
found in section 101 (a)(48)(A) of the Ac4 and states that "[a] conviction exists for immigration purposes
where an alien has had a formal judgment of guilt entered by a court . .." Thus, even though the
respondent's conviction by a special court-martial was pre-IIRIRA, it does not affect our analysis.
As noted by the Immigration Judge (I.J. at 2), the Board has interpreted the entry of a formal
judgement of guilt in the context of a general court-martial, as requiring a genuine criminal proceeding,
i.e., a proceeding that is "criminal in nature under the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction."
See Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 24 I&N Dec. 484, 486 (BIA 2008) (quoting Matter of Eslamizar,
23 I&N Dec.684, 688 (BIA 2004)). However, even though we have not specifically addressed a
"special court-martial," in a precedent decision, we are guided by our analysis in
Matter ofRivera-Valencia, to find the differences between a general court-martial, and a special
court-martial are not so significant so as to warrant a different result.
As we observed in Matter of Rivera-Valencia, "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed
forces." Id at 487 fn.2 (quoting United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960)). Since
the adoption of the UCMJ, "Congress has gradually changed the system of military justice so that it has
come to more closely resemble the civilian system." Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.163, 174 (1994).
Thus, a person prosecuted either by general court-martial or a special court-martial possesses many of
the procedural protections afforded to civilian defendants, such as the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, UCMJ Art. 31, 10 U.S.C. 831 ( 1993); the right to representation by counsel at
public expense, UCMJ Art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. 838(b) (1993); and the right to call witnesses and present
2
Cite as: Gurson Oswald Gourzong, A038 201 760 (BIA June 12, 2015)

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The only issue raised on appeal is the respondent's challenge to the Immigration Judge's
determination that his 1993 UCMJ Carnal Knowledge conviction by a special court-martial qualifies as a
"conviction" under the Act, so as to support his conclusion that the respondent has been convicted of a
"Sexual Abuse of a Minor" aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act (emphasis added).

A038 201 760


evidence, UCMJ Art. 46, 10 U.S.C. 846 ( 1993). Moreover, like a general court-martial, in a special
court-martial, an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is established by legal and competent
evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt." See 10 U.S.C. 85l (c); see also RCM 920(e)(5)(A).

We are not persuaded by the respondent's appellate contention that there can be no "conviction"
entered in a special court-martial as it does not constitute a "court" because a military judge is not
required to be appointed by the convening military authority. Regardless of whether it is a general
court-martial or a special court-martial, the court-martial is convened by an order promulgated by an
authorized commander which designates the composition of the court. See United States v. Ryan,
5 M.J. 97 (C.M.A.1978); see also RCM 504(a) and (d). Pursuant to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
the qualifications of the "members detailed to a court-martial shall be those persons who in the opinion
of the convening authority are best qualified for the duty by reason of their age, education, training,
experience, length of service, and judicial temperament." See RCM 502(a)(l ). Significantly, the
Manual for Courts-Martial states that "[u]nless otherwise specified, the president of a special
court-martial without a military judge has the same authority and responsibility as a military judge. See
RCM 801(a); see also RCM 502(b)(2)(C). Nevertheless, as noted by the Immigration Judge (I.J. at 4,
fn.2) such situations are rare and the Manual for Courts-Martial permits a three-member panel only
where "physical conditions or military exigencies" prevent a military judge from being appointed, and
even then, the convening authority must provide "compelling reasons" why the trial cannot be
postponed. See RCM 201(f)(2)(B)(ii)(b). "The military justice system relies upon courts that must
take all appropriate means, consistent with their statutory jurisdiction, to ensure the neutrality and
integrity of their judgments." U.S. v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 9 17 (2009).
Consequently, we fail to find the possibility that a military judge may not be appointed by the
convening authority to a special court-martial serves to diminish the effect and undermine the validity of
the actions taken by the members of that adjudicative body, i.e., findings of a formal judgement of guilt
entered in a genuine criminal proceeding pursuant to the governing laws of the United States Armed
Forces, so as to also qualify as a conviction for immigration purposes. See Matter ofRivera-Valencia,
supra.
Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

3
Cite as: Gurson Oswald Gourzong, A038 201 760 (BIA June 12, 2015)

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However, as also noted by the Immigration Judge (I.J. at 3-4), general courts-martial and special
courts-martial do differ in some respects. For example, general courts-martial attend to more serious
offenses under the UCMJ, and can mete out harsher sentences, whereas special courts-martial are limited
to non-capital cases under the UCMJ, and are restricted in the punishment that they may impose. See
1O U.S.C. 8 19. Additionally, the composition of a general court-martial differs slightly from a special
court-martial as it consists of a military judge and five members appointed by the convening authority.
Whereas a special court-martial consists of not less than three members appointed by the convening
military authority; a military judge and not less than three members, or a military judge alone. See
10 U.S.C. 8 16(2); UCMJ Art. 16(2); RCM 501(a)(2).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
3400 CONCORD ROAD, SUITE 2
YORK, PA 17402

IN THE MATTER OF
GOURZONG, GURSON OSWALD

FILE A 038-201-760

DATE: Feb 24, 2015

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

Shagin Law Group LLC


Shagin; Craig R
Inns of St. Jude
120 South Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101

. ... : .

J. :

UNABLE TO FORWARD - NO ADDRESS'f ROVIDED


A(t.e.,.JdJ ..
ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE"DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE. THIS DECISION
IS FINAL UNLESS AN APPEAL IS FILED WITH THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE MAILING OF THIS WRITTEN DECISION.
SEE THE ENCLOSED FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPERLY PREPARING YOUR APPEAL.
YOUR NOTICE OF APPEAL, ATTACHED DOCUMENTS, AND FEE OR FEE WAIVER REQEST
:.
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
MUST BE MAILED TO:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK


5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
". :f.
FALLS CHURCH, VA 20530

f; .

ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE AS THE RESULT


OF YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT YOUR SCHEDULED DEPORTATION OR REMOVAL HEARING.
THIS DECISION IS FINAL UNLESS A MOTION TO REOPEN IS FILED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 242B(c) (3) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 8 U.S.C.
SECTION 1252B(c) (3) IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS OR SECTION 240(c) (6),
8 u.s.c. SECTION 1229a(c) (6) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS. IF YOU FILE A MOTION
TO REOPEN, YOUR MOTION MUST BE FILED WITH THIS COURT:
IMMIGRATION COURT
3400 CONCORD ROAD, SUITE 2
YORK, PA 17402
OTHER:
DVQ
COURT CLERK
IMMIGRATION COURT
CC: DISTRICT COUNSEL, C/0 YORK PRISON
3400\ CONCORD ROAD
YORK PA, . 174020000

FF

)
)
)
)
)
)

IN THE MATTER OF
GOURZONG, Gurson
Respondent
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
Craig Shagin, Esq.
Inns of St. Jude
120 South Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101

IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
A038-201-760

ON BEHALF OF DHS:
Jeffrey Bubier, Esq.
Senior Attorney
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
York, PA 17702

AMENDED ORDER 1
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent is a native and citizen of Jamaica. Ex. 1. He entered the United States at New York,
New York on July 30, 1983 as a Lawful Permanent Resident. Id.
Respondent enlisted in the Marine Corp of January 29, 1991. On November 18, 1993 respondent
appeared before a special court-martial. Ex. 2, Tab C. On January 7, 1994, respondent was
found guilty of violating UCMJ Art. 92, Failure to Obey an Order, and UCMJ Art. 120, Carnal
Knowledge. Id. Respondent was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, six months
confinement, forfeiture of $550 per month for three months and reduction to private, pay grade
E-1. Id.
On April 7, 2006, respondent was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County
of Terroristic Threats, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2706(a)(l ). Ex. 2, Tab D.
On December 23, 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (OHS) filed a Notice to Appear
(NTA), charging the respondent as removable pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, as
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in section 10l (a)(43)(A) of the INA, a law
I

This amended order adds footnote 2 to the original order.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
YORK, PENNSYLVANIA

relating to sexual abuse of a minor, and section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, as an convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct. Ex. I .
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A conviction exists for immigration purposes where an alien has had a formal judgment of
guilt entered by a court, or if adjudication has been withheld, where all of the following
elements are present. . .
Id. As adjudication of guilt was not withheld in respondent's case, the relevant pre-IIRIRA
definition requires "a formal judgment of guilt entered by a court." Id. As section 101{a)(48)(A)
of the INA also requires a "formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court," the
pre-IIRIRA definition will not affect the court's analysis.
The Board has interpreted "formal judgment of guilt" to require a ..genuine criminal proceeding."
Matter of Rivera-Valencii!, 24 I&N Dec. 484, 486 (BIA 2008) {quoting Matter of Eslamizar, 23
I&N Dec. 684, 688 (BIA 2004)). A genuine criminal proceeding is a proceeding that is "criminal
in nature under the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction." Id.
While the Board has not issued a decision on whether a judgment of guilt by a special
court-martial, its caselaw on general courts-martial is informative.
A. Matter of Rivera Valencia

In Matter of Rivera-Valencia, the Board held that a judgment of guilt entered by a general
court-martial of the United States Armed Forces constitutes a conviction under section
10l (a)(48)(A) of the INA. 24 l&N Dec. at 486. The Board broke its analysis down into the two
requirements under 10l{a)(48)(A): (1) a formal judgment of guilt of the alien; (2) entered by a
court. Id. at 486-88.
(1) A formaljudgment of guilt of the alien
In Matter of Rivera-Valencia, the Board determined that the respondent's conviction by general
court-martial constituted a "formal judgment of guilt." The Board stated:

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As an initial matter, respondent raises a question as to the controlling definition of "conviction" at


the time of respondent's conviction. Respondent's conviction by special court-martial was
entered in 1994, prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, which added section I 0 1(a)(48) of the INA.
The pre-IIRIRA definition of "conviction" was set forth in Matter of Ozkok, 19 l&N Dec. 546
(BIA 1988). The portion of the pre-lIRIRA definition applicable to this case, however, is
virtually identical to that found a section 10 1(a)(48) of the INA:

There is no dispute that a general court-martial is a 'criminal' proceeding under the


governing laws of the United States Armed Forces, and the respondent's general

court-martial unquestionably resulted in the entry of a formal judgment of his 'guilt'


beyond a reasonable doubt.

Like a general court-martial, a special court-martial requires a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 10 U.S.C. 851(c). Further, like the respondent in Matter of Rivera-Valencii!,
respondent was a Private First Class in the United States Marine Corps at the time of his
court-martial. Based on the Board's analysis in Matter of Rivera-Valenci. respondent's
proceedings were criminal in nature, and the finding of guilt constitutes a "formal judgment of
guilt."
(2) Entered by a Court

Because the term "court" is not defined in the INA, the Board determined that it should be given its
"ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning," and applied the definition found in Black's Law
Dictionary: "[a] governmental body consisting of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate
disputes and administer justice." Id. at 487-88 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 378 (8th ed. 2004).
The Board noted that a military judge presides over each general court-martial, and that the
function of a general court martial is "'to try persons subject to [the UCMJ] for any offense made
punishable [thereunder]' and to 'adjudge any punishment not forbidden."' Id. at 488 (citing IO
U.S.C. 8 18). Thus, the Board held, a general court-martial satisfies the conventional definition
of a "court." Id.
Like a general court-martial, a military judge presides over a special court-martial. Further, the
function of a special court-martial is "to try persons subject to [the UCMJ] for any non-capital
offense made punishable [thereunder]" and to "adjudge any punishment not forbidden." IO
U.S.C. 8 19. Both special and general courts-martial try persons who violate the UCMJ, and
adjudge punishments. Accordingly, a special court-martial also satisfies the conventional
definition of a "court."
Pursuant to the Board's analysis in Matter of Rivera-Valencii!, a conviction by special
courts-martial, like a general court-martial, constitutes a "conviction" for immigration purposes.
B. Differences Behveen General and Special Courts-Martial
Special courts-martial differ from general courts-martial in just a few aspects. Generally, general
courts-martials hear more serious offenses, and can impose harsher punishments. A special
courts-martial is limited to noncapital offenses. 10 U.S.C. 8 19. Further, a special
courts-martial is limited in the punishment it may impose: Confinement up to one year, hard labor
without confinement for up to three months; forfeiture of two-thirds' pay per month for up to one

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Id. at 487 (citing 10 U.S.C. 85l (c); United States v. Verdi, 5 M.J. 330, 335 (C.M.A. 1978). The
Board further noted that because the respondent was a Specialist in the United States Anny at the
time of his court-martial, he was subject to the constitutional jurisdiction of the military justice
system. Id. (citing Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 358 ( 1970)).

fear; reduction in pay grade; and a bad-conduct discharge. Id. Special courts-marital may not
impose death, dishonorable discharge, or dismissal. Id.

The differentiations between general and special courts-martial should not affect the Board's
analysis in Matter of Rivera-Valencia. In Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Municipal Court's
jurisdiction extends only to summary offenses, and criminal offenses that are punishable by a term
of imprisonment not to exceed five years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1 1 23. Additionally, defendants
appearing in Philadelphia Municipal Court have no right to a jury trial. Id. Such limits on
jurisdiction and defendants' rights have not prevented this court from determining that a
conviction in the Philadelphia Municipal Court is a conviction for immigration purposes, and the
Board has upheld such determinations.3
Further, the Board has held that convictions entered by a municipal court are convictions for
immigration purposes. Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, 25 l&N Dec. 850, 852 (BIA 2012). In _
Matter of Cuellar-Gomez, the Board held that a conviction of a Wichita, Kansas municipal
ordinance is a conviction for immigration purposes because it was a formal judgment of guilt
entered by a court in a genuine criminal proceeding. Id. The Board determined that although the
respondent did not have a right to appointment of counsel or a jury trial, it was still a genuine
criminal proceeding where the prosecution proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
853; Compare Matter of Eslamizar, 23 l&N Dec. 684 (BIA 2004) (a finding of guilt of 3rd degree
theft in a proceeding that allows for a conviction by preponderance of the evidence and no right to
counsel or jury trial is not a conviction under the INA).
In a special courts-martial, the accused is at the very least entitled to an appointed military
attorney, and the charges must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, in a special
court-martial the accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is established by legal and competent
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. RCM 920(e)(5)(A). Accordingly, the jurisdictional
differences between general and special courts-martial should not prevent the court from
determining that a conviction by special courts-martial is one for immigration purposes.

At the master calendar hearing on February 23, 20 15, counsel argues that since a military judge is not required to
preside over a special courts-martial, that proceeding cannot be considered a "court," nor respondent's imposed
punishment be considered a "sentence." That is incorrect. The Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) only permits a three
members (jury) trial where "physical conditions or military exigencies" prevent a military judge to be appointed. The
Rule further clarifies that such a circumstance be "rare," and that the Convening Authority provide "compelling
reasons" why the trial cannot be postponed. R.C.M. 20l (f)(2)(B)(ii)(b). Even in such a rare circumstance, the trial
rroceedings must meet all other criteria set forth above. In short, respondent's concerns are inconsequential.
See, . Matter of Belliard, 20 1 2 WL 6968960; Matter of Raphael, 20 1 0 WL 9 1 5608; Matter of Escobar-Guerra,
2006 WL 3485830; Matter of Wilks, 2006 WL 3203533.

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Additionally, the composition of a special courts-martial differs slightly from that in a general
court-martial. Special courts-martial consist of not less than three members; a military judge and
not less than three members; or a military judge alone. 2 RCM 501 (a)(2). General courts-martial
consist of a military judge and not less than five members, or a military judge alone. RCM
50l (a){l ).

Based on the foregoing, I find that respondent s conviction by special courts-martial is a


conviction for immigration purposes.

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February 24, 20 1 5

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