On the Notion of "Disinterestedness": Kant, Lyotard, and Schopenhauer

Author(s): Bart Vandenabeele

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 705-720
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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On

the

Notion

of

"Disinterestedness":

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer
Bart Vandenabeele

The strangething, on looking back, was the purity,the integrity,of her

feeling for Sally. It was not like one's feeling for a man. It was completely disinterested,andbesides, it hada qualitywhich could only exist
betweenwomen, betweenwomenjust grownup.
-Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway
If the genuine aesthetic experience exists empirically-and it does-then
the definitionof its specific quality is at the core of any aesthetictheory thatis
concernedwith the particularityof aestheticappreciation.Firstly,I shall attempt
to providean acceptableinterpretationof this extremelyintricateissue in Kant
and, moreover,question the interpretationof two philosophers-Lyotard and
Schopenhauer-who both struggledwith the notion of "disinterestedness"and
provideda highly original(butoften misunderstood)interpretationof it in their
own aesthetictheories.I shall arguethatLyotardtook for grantedsomethingin
Kant's aestheticsthat Schopenhauer'saesthetic theory tries to resolve, that is,
the wide gap betweenthe agreeableandthe charmingon one side, andthe beautiful on the other.
Kant:DisinterestednessandExistence
The firstmomentof Kant'sAnalytic of the Beautifulassertsthatour liking
in the beautifulcannotoriginatefrom any interestand that in the beautiful"we
are not compelled to give our approvalby any interest,whetherof sense or of
reason"(? 5, 52).' But Kantalso insists thatthe liking in the beautifuldoes not
createany interestin the object either.
Kant, Critiqueof Judgment,tr WernerS. Pluhar(Indianapolis,1987), referencesto the
section numbersand paginationof the Pluharedition.

705
2001byJournal
of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc.
Copyright
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706

Bart Vandenabeele

Whatmay this mean?As Kantassertsin the beginningof section 5, it means

that "ajudgment of taste is merely contemplative,i.e., it is a judgment that is
indifferentto the existence of the object [indifferentin Ansehungdes Daseins
eines Gegenstandes]:it [considers]the characterof the objectonly by holdingit
up to our feeling of pleasureand displeasure[nurseine Beschaffenheitmitdem
Geflihlder Lust und Unlustzusammenhdlt]"(? 5, 51). The requirementthat a
purejudgmentof taste be devoid of all interestforms the foundationof Kant's
importantdistinctionbetweenaestheticliking andthe pleasurethatmay accompany moraljudgmentor action.2Kant'sanalysis of aestheticresponsecalls for
anotherdiscrimination,too: the separationof aestheticliking frommeresensory
pleasure,which is the distinctionthatwill occupy us here.
Objectsthatarousemere sensual pleasure,such as Belgian chocolates, are
said to "gratify" (vergniigen) someone, and are then called "agreeable"
(angenehm).An object "which one just likes" (was ihm bloJ3gefdillt)is called
beautiful.The incentive that correspondsto this object for thought is, respectively inclination(Neigung) or favor (Gunst). Favor,thus accordedthe beautiful, is "the only free liking" (das einzigefreie Wohlgefallen)(? 5, 52).3 Only
pleasurein the beautifulis free of a connectionwith an interest.Both inclination
and rationaldesire are connectedwith interest,and "all interesteitherpresupposes a need [Bediirfnij3]or gives rise to one; and, because interestis the basis
that determinesapproval [als Bestimmungsgrunddes Beifalls], it makes the
judgment aboutthe object unfree"(ibid.). As Paul Guyer rightly remarks,"in
defining the 'quality' of aestheticjudgmentKant is not making a phenomenological distinctionbetween differentkinds of feelings of pleasure,but a distinction between the ways in which differentinstances of pleasure may be occasioned."4WhatKantis suggesting is "thatthe presenceor absence of a connection to interestmay serve as a criterionfor the reflective classificationof given
pleasures"(ibid).
Section 3 aims to show that "a likingfor the Agreeable is connectedwith
Interest"(? 3, 47). Purefavor,which is connectedwith the beautiful,"cannotbe
an inclination,or else the beautifulwould be agreeableand there would be no
aesthetic pleasure."'Kant, therefore,makes a crucial (but often overlooked)
distinctionbetween two senses of "sensation."' In the sense of the Critiqueof
2

See Anne-MarieRoviello, "Du Beau comme Symbole du Bien," Kants Asthetik,Kant's

Aesthetics, L'esthetiquede Kant, ed. H. Parret(New York, 1998), 374-85; also Birgit Recki's
article "Das Sch6ne als Symbol der Freiheit"in the same collection, 386-402.
3 Jean-FranqoisLyotard,Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime,tr. ElizabethRottenberg
(Stanford,1994), 161.
4 Paul Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Taste(Cambridge,1997), 152.
5 Jean-FranqoisLyotard,Lessons on the Analyticof the Sublime, 161.
6 See
Jean-FrangoisLyotard,TheDifferend.Phrases in Dispute, translationby G. Van Den
Abbeele (Manchester,1988), 132, where the importantdistinction between the two kinds of
"sensation"has been elaborated.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

707

Pure Reason this termdenotes"anobjectivepresentationof sense"(eine objective Vorstellungder Sinne),or a presentationavailablefor knowledgeof objects
(? 3, 47). The sensationof green,for instance,is an objectivesensation,because
it can become a componentin empiricalconcepts, such as thatof grass. When
the termis used in connectionwith aestheticpleasureanddispleasure,though,it
is related"solely to the subjectand is not used for cognition at all, not even for
thatby which the subjectcognizes himself' (ibid.). This kindof sensationmust
always remainpurelysubjective.Throughit no objectsare represented,though
on its account, objects are regardedas objects of delight. This distinction is
presumablymeantto avertthe problemsconsequentto the identificationof all
formsof delightwith sensation.Kantdoes not explainhow it does this, however,
and in fact this distinctiondoes not solve the purportedproblem.
Moreover,this importantdistinction does not establish a philosophically
acceptablebasis for discriminatingbetweenthe beautifulandthe agreeable.Instead of distinguishingbetween kinds of pleasure,what Kantsupplies is "a distinction between feelings of pleasureand all other kinds of sensation."7Kant
merely confirmsthe view thatpleasureconsists in some special kind of sensation. Further,aestheticjudgmenthas been arguedto dependuponan assignment
of one's own feelings of pleasureto theirpropersource, and that suggests that
aestheticjudgmentrequiresa form of self-knowledge. But here Kantseems to
deny thatthe feeling of pleasurecan be the basis of any formof knowledge,even
self-knowledge.
Fortunately,the failureof Kant'sdistinctionof kinds of sensationto separatekinds of pleasureis not damaging,for he has no need to disprovethe view
thatdelightalways consists of the same sensationof pleasure-the view, which
he himself generallymaintains.Firstly,the basic identityof all pleasuresdoes
not implythatpleasureis the only groundfor action-that would reallybe hedonism. Secondly, Kant's argumentin both the Introductionand ? 5 is perfectly
compatible with the thesis that ? 3 attacks. Section 5 makes it clear that to
distinguishbetweenthe agreeable,the good, andthe beautiful,we need to differentiate not kinds of pleasurebut ratherrelationshipsin which objects standto
the feeling of pleasure,or ways in which they may occasion this feeling. While
different objects, or differentuses of our own faculties (sense, reason,judgment), may all producethe same effect on our faculty of pleasure-namely, a
feeling of pleasure-there is still room for discrimination.Even if they involve
the same sensation,differentoccurrencesof pleasurecan be judged to differ in
precisely the way taste requires-in their grounds and in their intersubjective
validity.8 Basically, the distinction that Kant provides just seems to follow from
the essentially reflective character of pure aesthetic appreciation. The immediate
7 Guyer,Kant and the Claims of

Taste, 153.

8Ibid., 153.

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708

Bart Vandenabeele

judgment,i.e., aestheticfeeling (GefJihl),operateswithoutgiven rules or determinatecriteria,and "thuswithoutbeing able to anticipatethe kind of object or
the uniqueobjectthatcould providepleasure."'
Let us returnto Kant'sexpositionof the argumentsfor the disinterestedness
of aestheticappreciation.The last paragraphof section 3 arguesthat affirming
that something is agreeableexpresses an interestin it, because "thejudgment
arouses a desire for objects of that kind, so that the liking presupposessomething otherthanmy merejudgmentaboutthe object:it presupposesthatI have
referredthe existence of the objectto my state insofaras thatstateis affectedby
such an object"(? 3, 48). The agreeabledoes not merely please, it satisfies or
gratifies(vergniigt).Interestmeans notjust a simple delight in the existence of
the objectbut rathera desire for pleasurefrom objects of a certaintype. Agreeableness is interested,not just-as Lyotardbelieves-because it "gratifiesan
inclination,"'not because of how this pleasureis producedby its object (the
Belgian chocolate,say, which actuallysatiatesthe desire),butbecauseit creates
a desire for more such objects.More fundamentallystill, this argumentpresupposes thatdelightin the beautifulis disinterested,i.e., only relatedto the subject's
feeling of life (Lebensgeflihl),ratherthanprovingit. It presupposesratherthan
provesthatpureaestheticliking is directedto the representationof the object,as
opposed to the connectionbetween the subjectand the existence of the object.
So the argumentin ? 3 seems to introducea new conception of interest,as a
desire for satisfactionfrom objects of the same kind, and it also assumes what
still needs to be proven aboutpleasurein the beautiful.Only by makingthese
assumptionsdoes ? 3 imply a genuine contrastbetween the agreeableand the
beautiful."
The last (ratherSchopenhauerian)paragraphof section 4 arguesthe disinterestednessof pleasuremore successfully.Kantwrites that,despite all the difference between the agreeable and the good, "they do agree in this: they are
always connected with an interestin their object [dalf siejederzeit mit einem
Interesse an ihrem Gegenstandeverbundensind]. This holds not only for the
agreeable-see ? 3-and for what is good indirectly (useful)..., but also for
what is good absolutelyand in every respect [das schlechterdingsund in aller
Absicht Gute], i.e., the moral good, which carrieswith it the highest interest"
(? 4, 51). Moreover,andthis is preciselythe Schopenhaueriantwist in the argument, this resemblanceresides in the will, which sets aesthetic pleasureapart
from the rest. "Towill somethingand to have a liking for its existence, i.e., to
take an interestin it, are identical"(ibid.).

Lyotard,Lessons on the Analyticof the Sublime, 160.

'oIbid., 162.
" Guyer,Kantand the Claims of Taste, 158.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

709

Lyotardenthusiasticallyconcludes from this that"thedisjunctionbetween

the aestheticand the ethical seems final"and thatthis "disjunctionrespondsto
the heterogeneityof the two 'mental faculties' that are in play, the feeling of
pleasure and displeasureand the faculty of desire, respectively....There will
always be a differendbetween 'to taste'and 'to desire.' ",2 Schopenhauerwould
have loved this passage. But Lyotardplainly acceptsKant'sthesis that"thereis
no desire for the beautiful"without furtherqualification."3
He seems to ignore
that Kant's argumentstill fails to prove that our liking of the beautiful is not
connectedto any interest.For Kanthas shown neitherthatthe beautifulcannot
be an object of the will, nor that willing something and taking a delight in its
existence are identical. This is precisely the remarkableendeavor of Schopenhauer'sphilosophy-no matterhow differentthe latter'sconceptionof the
will may be.
It appearsto be easierto foundthe differencebetween the aestheticandthe
ethical in this respectthanto arguesuccessfully for the gap between the beautiful andthe agreeable. Before turningto Lyotard'sendeavorto tackle this problem, let us firstsummarizethe complex semanticsof"interest"in Kant.First,an
interestis always a concept of an object or action, which has a relationto the
faculty of desire:it is a cognitive representation,which is an incentive for that
faculty. Secondly,an interestis always connectedto the existence of an object,
for an incentiveof the will is always an incentiveto will the existence of something. Thirdly,interestis always connectedto delight, for an incentive to will
somethingis a promiseof pleasurein its existence.'4This brief surveyshouldbe
sufficient to show thatGeorgeDickie's claim that,accordingto Kant,"to view
something with an interestis to have a desire that that thing actually exist" is
overly simplistic.'5
For aestheticjudgment,a presentation( Vorstellung)of the object is all that
is required.In an interestedresponse to an object, its actual existence may be
involved. In a ratheramusing note taken from his Reflexionenfrom the mid1770s, Kantfurnishesexamplesof the sortsof interestin existence thatmustbe
excluded fromthe pureaestheticappreciation:
Taste shows itself if one does not choose merely on account of usefulness. Therefore,a porcelainbuttonis more beautifulthana silver one.

12

Lyotard,Lessons on the Analyticof the Sublime, 163-64.

'3 Ibid., 162: "Thereis no desire for the beautiful. It is either one or the other, desire or

beauty.Thatis to say: it is eitherthe faculty of desire or the facultyof pleasureand displeasure."

14For the sake of clarity,I leave aside here the fact that"to will something"can also be the
conformity of the object of the will to the moral law; see Paul Guyer,Kant and the Claims of
Taste, 166.
'~ George Dickie, Introductionto Aesthetics:An AnalyticApproach(New York, 1997), 22.

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710

Bart Vandenabeele
The beautyof lace consists in the fact thatit does not last long. Clothes
arethereforechosenof delicatecolors,becausetheyareperishable.Flowers have their beauty in their perishability.Naturehas given the least
beautyto thatwhich is enjoyablebecauseit nourishes:cows, bees, swine,
sheep;to thatwhich refreshesin enjoyment,somewhatmore:fruit;that
which smells nice, more:andthatwhich can merelyplease the eye, the
most. 16

Accordingto Guyer,"thispassagemisinterpretsthe requirementsof disinterestedness," as it not only separatestaste from practicaldependence,but in fact
Technicallyspeak"proposesanactualconflictbetweenbeautyandpracticality."'7
ing, Guyeris right.Disinterestedcontemplationdoes not logicallyimplyanasymmetryof beautyandpracticality.A kindof syncretismof bothremainspossible.
Thus Kantonly points out thatthere is quite often a real conflict between taste
and usefulness, or beauty and practicality,which can serve as a corroborating
fact aboutthe disinterestednessof the purejudgmentof taste. The inverserelationship between beauty and usefulness is not a necessary consequenceof the
judgment'sdisinterestedness,butthis logical fact does not subsequentlyruleout
the possibility of an actualconflict between both.
Analogous examples can be found in Schopenhauer'saesthetics(although
he adds,as is his custom,artisticexamples as well): "Talland fine trees bearno
fruit; fruit trees are small, ugly, and stunted. The double garden rose is not
fruitful,but the small, wild, almost scentless rose is. The most beautifulbuildings arenot the useful ones; a temple is not a dwelling-house"(WWRII, Ch. 31,
388).1' But Schopenhauerdoes not claim that this conflict necessarily follows
from the disinterestednessof aesthetic contemplationeither.He merely states
that"we rarelysee the beautifulunitedwith the useful"(sehn wir ... das Sch6ne
selten mit dem Niitzlichen vereint) (ibid.). The criterionof disinterestedness
hence demandsonly thatthe likingwe takein the beautifulbe purelycontemplative, andnot basedon any practicalor cognitive facts which may be involved in
the object's actualexistence.
Lyotard:The "Facultary"Interest
Lyotard'sinterestin the Kantiantopic of "interest"is foundedon at least
two crucialconcerns.Firstly,Lyotardpresentsthe disinterestednessof thejudgmentof tasteas a possible escape from"thetriumphof determinantjudgmentin
'6Reflexion 868, Ak. XV, 1, 382.
'~ Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Taste, 174.
8ArthurSchopenhauer,The Worldas Willand Representation,vol. II, ch. 31, 388. References areto the translationby E. F. J. Payne (New York, 1969), abbreviatedWWR.In a few cases
I have changed a word or two in quotationsfrom this source where it seemed necessary.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

711

the contemporaryworld."'"He will, therefore,incessantly stress (the importanceof) the absenceof conceptsin the aestheticjudgmentandupholdthe absolute discontinuitybetween aestheticreflectionandconceptualknowledge. Secondly,Lyotardarguesfor the irreparablegap betweenthe aestheticandthe ethical, between the beautifuland the good. "Thereis no interestat all, but, rather,
sentimentalimmediacy,in taste.Inethicsthereis interest... thatis 'mediatized'an implicitinterest. Interestis whatresultsin ethics. Disinterestis what initiates
in aesthetics."'"However,it is importantto note that,the momentLyotardintroduces the term"disinterestedness"in his Lessons on theAnalyticofthe Sublime
to arguefor the "differend"between the beautifuland the good, he also warns
for a too easy interpretationof this intricaterelationship."Theopposition,"he
cautions,is not "as radical"as one may think.2' The good is boundto an interest, accordingto Kant,butthatdoes notmeanthatpracticaljudgmentis "founded"
on any interest.As Lyotardrightly claims, "the law does not result from the
interestof the will in the good, it dictatesit.... If in moralitythe will aimedforthe
good as its object 'before' the good was prescribedto it, the will would be
subordinatedto this good object,just as it is to an empirical,desirable,agreeable, oruseful object.Therewould thenbe no transcendentaldifferencebetween
pathos and pure ethos" (ibid.). Lyotardis certainly right to countenancethe
transcendentaldifferencebetweenpathos andethos, but ourmainconcernhere
is with the differencebetween purely aesthetic sensation(purefeeling) and all
otherkindsof sensation.Insteadof arguingfor the differencebetweenthe agreeable and the beautifulwith respect to interest, Lyotardrestrictshimself to an
analogy in his Kantcommentary:"If in moralitythe will aimed for the good as
its object 'before' the good was prescribedto it, the will would be subordinated
to this good object,just as it is to an empirical,desirable,agreeable,or useful
object."Insteadof exploringthe distinctionbetween the feeling of the beautiful
andthe agreeable,he simply takes it for granted.Forthe differencebetweenthe
beautifulandthe agreeableis not as obvious as Lyotardwould like us to believe.
It is beyond doubtthat, accordingto Kant,the interestthe moral law has in its
object is not determinedby a priorconcept of the good, and the delight in an
object or actionjudged to be morally good results from the "presence"of the
rationalidea of absolutecausality.The pleasurefollows from the subsumption
of the objectundera moralconception,or practicallaw, andthe resolutionto act
underthe law. Respect(Achtung)is whatdeterminesthe will to realizemorality.
An agreeable object, however, pleases by means of a purely physiological effect

on the senses. If the experienceof pleasurein an agreeableobjectdependson the

senses alone, and "is due to a causal relationbetween propertiesof the object
not very clear whetherthis concern is mainly ethical or political; see Jean-Franqois
Lyotard,Peregrinations:Law,Form, Event (New York, 1988), 21.
20 Lyotard,Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 171.
21Ibid., 168.
19 It is

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712

Bart Vandenabeele

andone's own physiology,thenone may come to believe in a lawlikeconnection

between objects of that sort and the experience of pleasure-at least for oneself."22One's past experiences of agreeablenessmay thus be an incentive for
action towardsrealizationor possession of the object, e.g., the Belgian chocolate.
Pleasurein thebeautifulcannotproducean interestof thistype.Whatawakens
the feeling of the beautifulis, accordingto Kant,the form of the object alone.
"Theprivilegingof formprotectsthinking,"Lyotardclaims, "fromany interest
in the 'material' of the object and consequently from any interest in its real
presence."23 Fromthis it does not immediatelyfollow-although Lyotardexplicitly statesthis-that puretaste is disinterested.Imagination'sproductionof
formsis no longersubordinatedto the rulesandprinciplesof the understanding.
There is a kind of "competition"in the beautiful between the powers of the
imaginationandthe understanding.A kindof harmonious"freeplay"or "accordance"(Einhelligkeit)is established,but"eachis unableto overpowerthe other"
(CJ, ? 27, 115).24 This neitherimplies disinterestednessnor clarifiesthe meaning of it, but merely rephrasesKant'sdefinitionof aestheticreflection.An aesthetic appreciation"cannotbe made on the basis of introspectionof a single
sensationtakenin isolation,but requiresreflectionon the context and cause of
the feeling, or on its particular'relationto representation.'"'25
Moreover,the liking in the beautifulis not associatedwith any generalconcept underwhich the object may be subsumed,and cannotbe linked with the
predicatesdefiningsuch a concept.Unlike a determinantjudgment,tastejudges
without concepts and yet claims to be universallyvalid. This does not mean,
however, that aesthetic appreciationis caused by anythingotherthan an ordinary object of experience, as the idealist philosopherscountenance.Kant believes that naturecan provide far betteroccasions to experiencethe pure aestheticpleasureof beautythanartcan. The associabilityof sensualpleasurewith
the specific propertiesof, e.g., the Belgian chocolatemightmakethe representation of a Belgian chocolatean impetusfor me, butthereis no suchrepresentation
connectedwith the pleasurein beauty(ibid.). Whateverconcepts we can predicate of an object of aesthetic appreciationwill not serve to found an interest.
Beauty does not produceany interestof this kind.
Yet it remainstruethatthe disinterestednessof puretastecan only be argued
convincingly, if one is willing to accept Kant's thesis that an interestalways
requiresa general concept. Thus, Kant's argument"providesno reasonto believe that our response to the beautiful not only is independentof antecedent
determinationby concepts of desire but also has no effect on the faculty of
22 Guyer,Kant and

the Claims of Taste,167.

23 Lyotard,Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime,77-78.

24

FranqoisLyotard,Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, 100.

Taste, 103.

25 Guyer,Kant and the Claims of

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

713

desire."26Lyotard,however,does not discuss these matters-"for this pleasure

to be aesthetic,it mustbe independentof all interestin the materialof the phenomenon;it mustbe due only to the objects'form insofaras the formcan affect
the 'state'of thought."It must!Why?Lyotarddoes not provideus with any clear
arguments.He does not question this apparentlack in Kant's exposition and
barelyaccepts,or even promotes,the disinterestednessof the aestheticappreciation. He continuallystressesthe importanceof the purityanddisinterestednesswhich he mostly identifies--of the aestheticjudgment,probablyhopingthatthe
readerbecomes too weary to questionor oppose the claim.
For Lyotardis mainly concernedwith, whathe (ratherenigmatically)calls,
the "facultary"interestin Kant'scriticalphilosophy.This intricateissue cannot
be dealt with here exhaustively. One of the most fundamentalquestions of
Lyotard'sphilosophy is "how" it is "thaton a certain occasion (at the 'right
moment') understanding,or, rather,taste or perhapsthe will is exercised. How
as
is the divide betweenposse andesse crossed?"His answeris straightforward
well as complex: it "is crossed precisely by 'interest.'"27 In the famous interview with ChristinePries, he even suggests that there is "a kind of secretive
dynamicontology at work"in Kant'sphilosophy.28Whatcould this mean?Accordingto Lyotard,"theprimacyof interest"in Kant'scriticalphilosophy"beAs Kantwrites in his CritiqueofPractical Reason:
longs to practicalreason."29
interest
is
"every
ultimatelypractical"(CPR, 126).30In this sense, Lyotardsays,
one can speak of "a kind of facultary'will to be' (which would requirefurther
examination)."3' Even the interestof speculative reason is "only conditional"
(CPR, 126). "Whatactualizes knowledge, what promptsscientific research,"
Lyotardclaims,"thisvery thingis dependenton a transcendentalinterestrightat
These complex but
first, on a 'will to effect' the potentialof understanding."32
of
the
kernel
lead
us
to
Schopenhauer'sphilosophyof
fascinatingspeculations
will.
Schopenhauer:Disinterestednessas Will-lessness
In Schopenhauer'sphilosophy the world-inorganic and organic-is
describedas objectifiedwill. Everymovement,action,feeling or thoughtis purported to be nothing less than "the act of will objectified, i.e., translatedinto
perception"(objektivierte,d.h. in die AnschauunggetreteneAktdes Willens).33
26Ibid.,103.
27
Lessonson theAnal'ytic
Lyotard,
qf theSublime,173.
28 See "DasUndarstellbare-wider
dasVergessen.EinGesprichzwischenJean-Franqois
undGrossenwahn,
ed.
LyotardundChristinePries,"Das Erhabene.ZwischenGrenzerfahrung
C. Pries(Weinheim,1989),347.
29

Lyotard,Lessons on the Analyticof the Sublime, 176.

of PracticalReason,tr.LewisWhiteBeck(NewYork,1956),126.
30 Critique
31
32

Lyotard,Lessons on the Analyticof the Sublime, 177.

Ibid.

vol. I, ? 18, 100.

33Arthur
WWR,
Schopenhauer,

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714

Bart Vandenabeele

"Only in reflection,"Schopenhauersays, "arewilling and acting different:in

reality they are one" (in der Wirklichkeitsind sie eins) (WWRI, ?18, 100101).34The intellectcan do nothingmorethan"clearlyexaminethe natureof the
motivesfromeverypointof view."It is unableto determinethe will itself, for the
will is "wholly inaccessible to it" and "is for it inscrutableand impenetrable"
(WWRI, ? 55, 291). The will is a blind irrationalstriving "thatconstitutesthe
kernelandin-itself of everything"(WWRI, ? 56, 309). If somethingis "interesting" to someone, "it must [...] in some way excite [one's] will" (WWRI, ? 56,
314).
One immediatelynotes the Kantianconnectionof interestwith "will"in this
excerpt-no matterhow differentthe meaningsof the lattertermin theirrespective theoriesmay be. For Schopenhauer,"everytrueact of [the] will is at once
and inevitably a movement of [the] body. The act of will and the action of the
body are not two differentstates objectively known, connectedby the bond of
causality;they do not standin the relationof cause and effect, but are one and
the same thing"(WWRI, ? 18, 100). So the will is not the cause of some movement of the body: it is thatvery movement.The same holds true,Schopenhauer
says, of the knowledgeI have of my will: it is "animmediateknowledge,"but it
"cannotbe separatedfromthatof my body"(WWRI, ? 18, 101). Echoes of this
will be heard throughoutWittgenstein'sphilosophy,35e.g., in his Notebooks,
whereone canreada passagedated4 November 1916:"Theact of will is not the
cause of the actionbut is the action itself. One cannotwill withoutacting."36
This claim, thoughoften ignored,is centralto Schopenhauer'sphilosophy.
The will is not-as C. Rosset thinks-primarily a kind of hiddenmetaphysical
"thing"behind the "veil of appearances,"but is a sort of drive which can be
observed empiricallyin, e.g., bodily movements.37Willing is acting (and vice
versa) and every thought or affect is an individualmanifestationof and connectedwith the interestsof this will. "Thus,originallyandby its nature,knowledge is completelythe servantof the will" andas "itis the principleof sufficient
reasonthatplaces the objects in this relationto the body and so to the will, the
sole endeavorof knowledge,servingthis will, will be to get to know ...just those
relations that are laid down by the principle of sufficient reason, and thus to
follow their many different connections in space, time, and causality."
Schopenhaueradds most conspicuouslyto this: "Foronly throughthese is the
object interestingto the individual,in otherwords, has it a relationto the will"
34 "Reflection"invariablymeans "abstract
conceptualthinking"in Schopenhauer'stheory;
it has, of course, a completely differentmeaning in Kant.
and World
3 For Schopenhauer'sinfluence on Wittgenstein,see ChristopherJanaway,Self
in Schopenhauer' Philosophy (Oxford, 1989), 317-42, and Bryan Magee, ThePhilosophy of
Schopenhauer(rev. ed.; Oxford, 1997), 310-39.
Notebooks1914-1916, ed. G. H. von WrightandG. E. M. Anscombe
36 LudwigWittgenstein,
87
e.
(Oxford, 1979),
37ClementRosset, L 'esthetiquede Schopenhauer(Paris, 1969), 104.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

715

(WWRI, ? 33, 176-77). It is beyond doubt that, according to Schopenhauer,

perceptionandknowledgein generalalwaysremainsubordinateto the serviceof
the will. The brain"cameinto being for this service"(WWRI, ? 33, 177).
There is, however, an importantexception to this pictureof ordinaryperception.Now andthen,it is possible to "letourwhole consciousnessbe filled by
the calm contemplationof the [...] object actuallypresent"(WWRI, ? 34, 178),
and one then feels liberatedfrom the striving of the will and "the entire consciousness is filled andoccupiedby a single imageof perception"(WWRI, ? 34,
179). One can, of course, easily enumeratemany differences between Kant's
and Schopenhauer'saccountof aestheticresponse.But what is of interesthere,
is ratherthe strikingsimilaritiesthataretoo often overlooked.Manycommentators, e.g., Nietzsche and Heidegger, like to oppose both accounts and eagerly
stress Schopenhauer'smisunderstandingof Kant'saesthetictheory,especially
of the notionof disinterestedness.38
I have alreadypointedout thatSchopenhauer'suse of the term"will"is far
richerand subtlerthanNietzsche suggests in On the GenealogyofMorals. Accordingto Nietzsche, Schopenhauer'streatmentof aesthetic disinterestedness
would be a symptomof his being tormentedby his own sexualdesiresanddesiring releasefromthem.Althoughthis may possiblybe truefroma purelypsychological point of view, it remainshighly unsatisfactoryas a philosophicalexplanation of the problem of disinterestedness.39Nietzsche even maintains that
Schopenhauersays that aesthetic disinterestedness"counteractssexual 'interestedness', like lupilin and camphor."40This is, to say the least, extremely
exaggerated.Aestheticcontemplationreleasesnot only fromsexual interestbut
fromall merelyindividualinterestsas such. Moreover,Schopenhauerconsiders
sexual interestas one of the very few intereststhat are not purely individual.41
Schopenhauer'sminuteaccountof the aestheticexaltation,especially when applied to the experienceof music, is far more closely linked to Nietzsche's own
aesthetictheory in TheBirth of Tragedythanthe latteris willing to admit.42
Farmoreimportantto us now is Schopenhauer'sexplanationof the disinterestednessof aestheticresponseas an escape fromthe ordinaryway of perceiving
and estimatingan object. If one readsbetween the lines of Schopenhauer'sacein MiBverstindnisin der Geschichte der
38 See my "Schopenhauerund Heidegger.OUber
Asthetik,"Schopenhauer:Philosophie, Literatru;Medien, ed. W. Schirmacher,SchopenhauerStudien 7 (Vienna,forthcoming).
39See C. Janaway(ed.), Willingand Nothingness:Schopenhaueras Nietzsche's Educator
(Oxford, 1998).
40 FriedrichNietzsche, "Whatis the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?,"in On the Genealogy of
Morals, tr.W. Kaufmannand R. J. Hollingdale(New York, 1967), 104.
41 See
ClementRosset, Schopenhauer,philosophe de I 'absurde(Paris, 1989), 82: "De toutes
la
celles-ci, sexualite est la seule qui depasse radicalement1'interitde l'individu et la conservation de son etre et bien-etre,pourparticiperdirectementaux interits de 1'espece."
42 See Guyer, "Pleasureand Knowledge in Schopenhauer'sAesthetics," Schopenhauer,
Philosophy,and the Arts, ed. D. Jacquette(Cambridge,1996), 129.

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Bart Vandenabeele

count, one shall see that he providesjust the argumentwe need to clarify the
Kantian riddle of disinterested appreciation described above. The crux of
Schopenhauer'sargumentrests in his insisting on the fact that, ordinarily,all
perceptionandknowledgeis "subordinateto the principleof sufficientreasonin
all its forms"and that"theparticularthing"is always "in a particularplace, at
a particulartime,"andconstitutesa link "inthe chainof cause andeffect"(WWR
I, ?34, 179; see also ?36, 185), whereas in aesthetic contemplationwe "leave
entirelyout of sight our own interest,ourwilling, and our aims,"andbecome a
"pureknowing subject"(WWRI, ?36, 185-86). Common knowledge is only
interestedin the relationsof objectsto the individualwill, whereasthe aesthetic
subject "lingers"over the mere perception(WWR1, ?36, 187), for "it is only
when the will with its interests has forsaken consciousness and the intellect
freely follows its own laws, andas puresubjectmirrorsthe objectiveworld,yet
... is in the highest state of tension and activity [in h6chster Spannung und
Tdtigkeit],goadedby no willing, only thendo the color andformof things stand
out in their true and full significance" (treten in ihrer wahren und vollen
Bedeutunghervor) (WWRII, Ch. 30, 373; see also Ch. 31, 38; italics added).
This descriptioncan easily matchthe dynamic(Burkean)metaphorsof tension
(Anspannung),swing (Schwung), animation (Belebung), and feeling of life
(Lebensgefiihl)that aboundin Kant's CritiqueofJudgment.43
Contraryto Kant,Schopenhaueracknowledgesthe fact thataestheticpleasure is associatedwith the achievementof a special kind of cognition. Only in
aestheticcontemplationdo "thingsstandout in theirtrueand full significance."
This cognitive standconvincinglyaccountsfor an intrinsicandpositivepleasure
in the aestheticcontemplation,44 but it does not imply thataestheticcontemplation thereforeinvolves a generalconcept. Concepts,Schopenhauerincessantly
repeats,are of no use or value whatsoever in the realm of aesthetics.45In this
sense he obviously remains a true Kantian."Knowledge of the Idea," Schopenhauer claims, "is necessarily knowledge through perception, and is not
I, ?36, 186). Pure aesthetic perceptionclearly "outshinesthe
abstract"(WWR
colorless concepts"(WWRI, ?36, 190; see also WWRI, ?52, 260).
In aestheticperception,"things"areseen "withdifferenteyes,"Schopenhauer
argues, which means, first, that the things are now "no longer" apprehended
"accordingto theirrelations,"but as what they are in and by themselves, and,

the Sublime
43 See EdmundBurke,A Philosophical Enquiryinto the Originof our Ideas of
and Beautiful, ed. A. Phillips (New York, 1992); also HermanParret,"Kanton Music and the
Hierarchyof the Arts," TheJournal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism,56 (1998), 251-64.
* See Guyer, "Pleasureand Knowledge in Schopenhauer'sAesthetics," Schopenhauer,
Philosophy,and the Arts, ed. D. Jacquette(Cambridge,1996), 109-32. See also Michael Podro,
TheManifoldin Perception: TheoriesofArtfrom Kant to Hildebrand(Oxford, 1972), 100-106.
45 See my "Schopenhauer
on the Beautifuland the Sublime:A Qualitativeor GradualDistinction?,"Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch,82 (2001), 99-112.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

717

second, thatwe remain"wholly foreignto, and detachedfrom, the scene to be

contemplated,andnotbeing at all actively involved in it"(WWRII, Ch. 30, 37273). "Theindividualobject"of the aestheticcontemplation"appearsin so strong
a light thatthe remaininglinks of the chain, so to speak, to which they belong,
withdrawinto obscurity"(WWRI, ?36, 194). Pureaestheticperception"plucks
the object of its contemplationfromthe streamof the world's course,and holds
it isolated before it" (WWRI, ?36, 185). This contemplativeattitudeis itself a
source of pleasure.
This argumentis both interestingand disappointing.It is disappointingbecause it does not tacklethe specificityof aestheticdisinterestednessin a satisfactory manner.Thatsomeone be not at all actively involved in the scene or object
perceiveddoes not necessarilyrenderthe perceptiona purelyaestheticone. The
interestingand more convincing point is Schopenhauer'srepeatedand explicit
insisting on the neglect or absence of the relationsor causal connectionsof the
object that is aestheticallycontemplated.In ordinaryperceptionthe acknowledgment of the relationsof the perceivedobject with otherobjects and/orwith
the perceivingindividualis the norm.This is whattakingan interestin an object
is all about.To get a clearerview on this, though,we need to go back to Kant's
exposition.
Back to Kant
Kant not only says thatthe agreeablecreates interest;he also holds that in
the pathologicallyconditioneddelight in the agreeableit is notjust the object,
but its existence as well, thatpleases (CJ, ?5, 51). Beauty is the reflectionupon
the form of an object and reveals a sortof unity or harmony"which,as it were,
satisfies ourcravingfor cognitionwithoutofferingus any conceptuallydeterminate claims to knowledge."46Kant is very clear on this point: "thebasis of the
pleasureis posited merely in the formof the objectfor reflectionin general,and
hence not in a sensationof the object, nor with a referenceto any concept that
might involve some intentionor other"(CJ, VII, 30). The disinterestednessof
thejudgmentof taste is limitedby Kant'stheorythatsuch ajudgmentexpresses
a free harmonybetweenunderstandingand imagination.47
The full ramificationsof Kant'stheoryneed not concernus here. But one of
the main problems is that, according to Kant, the experience of beauty also
dependson the perceptionof an actualempiricalobjectjust as muchas does the
experience of sensory gratification.The only, but important,difference is that
the formerinvolves the harmoniousplay of the faculties and notjust the physiological reactionof the senses.48However,Guyeris rightin remarkingthatKant
46

Guyer,Kant and the Experienceof Freedomi,104.

47Ibid., 106.
48

Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Taste,177.

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718

Bart Vandenabeele

sometimes arguesas if the play of the higher faculties of knowledge excludes

ratherthandependson ordinarysense perception(ibid.).
The sameproblemcan be detectedin Schopenhauer'saesthetics.According
to Schopenhauer,aestheticperceptionis the perceptionof an Ideain andthrough
an ordinaryobjectof perception.49
I will not go into the statusof Schopenhauer's
of
the
which
bears
remarkable
similaritiesto Kant'saestheticIdeas,
Ideas,
theory
since I have done this elsewhere.5"But what should attractour attentionhere is
thatboth Kantand Schopenhauerseem to connect the qualityof disinterestedness with the non-empiricalor non-sensual characterof the aesthetic object.
Both Kantand Schopenhauer,however,not only wantto stick to the singularity
of the aestheticappreciationand of the objectthatoccasions it but also to avoid
a too sensualisticinterpretation.Kantassertsthatit is the design ratherthanthe
color of a painting,which is "thebasis for any involvementof taste."The colors
"belong to charm"(geh6ren zum Reiz) (CJ, ? 14, 71). Schopenhauer,on the
otherhand,althoughhe radicallyclaims thatthe depictionof "oysters,herrings,
crabs,breadandbutter,beer,wine" and "nudefigures"are totally inadmissible
in painting,becausethey may excite "lustfulfeeling in the beholder"(WWRI, ?
40, 208), does acknowledge the importanceof "eyes and color" in painting.
Color and eyes "contributea great deal to beauty" (ibid.). Moreover, Schopenhauermakes an importantdistinctionbetween "the real purposeof painting,"viz., to facilitatethe comprehensionof the Idea(which he sometimescalls
the "substantialform")and"aseparatebeautyindependentof this,"thatis "produced by the mere harmonyof the colors, the congenial aspect of the grouping
[Wohlgefdlligeder Gruppierung],the favorabledistributionof light and shade,
and the tone of the whole picture [den Tondes ganzen Bildes]" (WWRII, Ch.
36, 422). Schopenhauercompares"thisaccompanyingand subordinatekind of
beauty"to "whatdiction,meter,andrhymeare in poetry."Both are "notwhat is
essential,but what acts first and immediately"(ibid.).
Schopenhaueris absolutelyrightto stressthis moresensualcharacterof the
experienceof beauty.Kant'stendencyto oppose sense perceptionandpureaesthetic response is not a necessary consequenceof the disinterestednessof aestheticjudgment.For the criterionof disinterestednessdoes not requirethatthe
materialaspectof an object, say, the colors of a paintingby Gauguin,can never
procurepureaestheticliking, but only thatpureaestheticliking-the feeling of
beautyunderideal circumstances-cannot be based on an interestin the colors
of the painting.However, "all simple colors,"Kantthinks,"insofaras they are
pure, are consideredbeautiful;mixed colors do not enjoy this privilege"(CJ,

49

PatrickGardiner,Schopenhauer(Harmondsworth,1971), 206.

50 See my "WeWeep But Are Not Wounded:The Sublime Feeling in Schopenhauer'sAes-

thetics," Ttjdschriftvoor Filosofie, 61 (1999), 663-95.

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Kant, Lyotard,and Schopenhauer

719

? 14, 71). I will not go intothis matterin detail,since this would requirea minute
analysis of Kant's"formalism."51
Kant's basic idea is that of the contrast between the mere presentation
(Vorstellung)of an object and the full nexus of its causal relations.Both the
beautifuland the agreeableare of course causally relatedto us, but only in the
case of the lattercan we have empiricalknowledge of its causalbasis. A physiological response can be the subject of empirical investigationand empirical
causallaws. The agreeablenessof the objectmay be includedin the causalnexus
thatconstitutesthe real existence of the object.
Kant's examples of unacceptableanswersto a questionof beauty in ?2 of
the CritiqueofJudgmentmanifestinappropriateinterestsin the existence of the
object. Disapprovingof a palace because it was made "merelyto be gaped at"
(CJ, ?2, 45) depends on judging its causal history ratherthan the characterof
"ourmere contemplation(intuitionor reflection)"of it (ibid.). Preferring"the
eating-houses"in Paris to the palace, expresses a judgment not on the mere
presentationof the two places, but on the satisfactionor comfort to be had in
actually eating in one place or the other(ibid.). Each of Kant's examples contrastspleasurein the merecontemplationof an objectwith approvalof its existence, dependinguponjudgments about the causal connections comprisingits
actuality.
This does not mean thatone needs knowledge of causalconnectionsto feel
sensory pleasure,but thatjudgmentsaboutthe agreeablenessof an object may
takethe formof ordinaryempiricaljudgments.Beautycannotbe linkedwith any
determinateconcepts; thus judgments of beauty are not empiricaljudgments
aboutthe causal connectionsor existence of theirobjects. It is in this sense too
thatSchopenhauerassertsthatin the pureexperienceof beauty,when one "considers things without interest"(WWRI, ?38, 196), one forgets "the individual
thing", i.e., "the link of a chain to which we also belong" (WWRI, ?38, 198).
Schopenhauer'sconclusion, however,thatthe objectof an aestheticexperience
be, therefore,an Idea(andnot an individualthing) is fallacious.The disinterestedness of aestheticappreciationdoes not imply thatthe aestheticexperienceis
not dependent on the actual perception of an empirical object. But even
Schopenhauerdoes not always want to defend this claim, as he maintainsthat
the aesthetic contemplationof an Idea can be foundednot on concepts but on
intuitions."Knowledgeof the Idea,"he declares,is not abstractbut"knowledge

~' See Donald Crawford,Kant'sAesthetic Theory(Madison, 1974), esp. 93; also Jacques
Derrida,The Truthin Painting, tr.G. Benningtonand I. McLeod (Chicago, 1987), esp. 15-147;
and Kirk Pillow, "Formand Contentin Kant'sAesthetics: LocatingBeauty and the Sublime in
the Workof Art,"Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32 (1994), 443-459. See A. L. Cothey,
TheNatureofArt(London,1990),75; also ChristopherJanaway,Selfand Worldin Schopenhauer'
Philosophy (Oxford, 1989), 277.

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720

Bart Vandenabeele

throughperception"(Anschauung)(WWRI, ?36, 186). Again, the aesthetic

perceptionis perceptionof the Idea in and throughthe concrete individualobject.
Both Kantand Schopenhauermaintainthatan aestheticappreciationis logically singular.Both assert,moreover,thatthe beautifulis largelyconcernedwith
the form or the Idea of the perceived object, respectively.Thus they not only
hope to secure the "differend"between the beautifuland the good, as Lyotard
supposes, but they offer an acceptableaccountof the irreparablegap between
the beautifulandthe agreeable,withoutunderestimatingthe sensoryqualityof
the pure feeling of beauty.Disinterestedness,interpretedin this way, may perhapsserve as an antidoteto aestheticindifference.Beautyis the intenseandpure
feeling of an internalharmony,but-and this is fundamental-can only be engenderedby the contingentconfrontationwith a singularempiricalobject. By
"travelling"from Kant's theory to Lyotard'sand Schopenhauer'sand back to
the startingpoint, I hope not only to have clarifiedthe complex notion of disinterestednessfromdifferentvaluable(nineteenth-andtwentieth-century)
perspectives but also to have arguedagainsta too ideological or reductionistinterpretation, which has often contributedto an unwarrantedrejectionof (the autonomy
of) the aestheticstancealtogether.52
KatholiekeUniversiteit,Leuven,Instituteof Philosophy.

52 See, e.g.,
George Dickie's objections against the aesthetic attitude in his Art and the
Aesthetic:An InstitutionalAnalysis (Ithaca, 1974).

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