2 - Results Based Management in Dev Partners PDF

EASIER SAID THAN DONE
A REVIEW OF RESULTS - BASED MANAGEMENT

IN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS
Michael Flint
March 2003
This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Department

for International Development (DFID). The author is grateful to all those in
DFID, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, IDB, and the World Bank who assisted with
this study. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone,
and are not necessarily those of DFID.
Results-based approaches have continued to develop in the year since
work started on this report. The information in this report does not
therefore necessarily reflect the current situation in the institutions
covered.
Michael Flint & Partners

Wernddu
Pontrilas
Herefordshire HR2 0ED
United Kingdom
email: mf@mflint.co.uk
ii
CONTENTS
Summary
1. Introduction
2. What is results-based management?
3. The history of results-based approaches
4. Strategic planning
5. Monitoring and reporting
6. Managing
7. Issues in results-based management
8. Conclusions
Annexes
A. Strategic planning country level
B. Strategic planning corporate
C. References
iii
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARDE
AROE
ARPE
ARPP
CAS
CCF
CN
CIDA
CPIA
CPO
CSP
DAC
DER
DFID
IDA
IDB
IMEP
MDG
MDI
M&E
MTSF
MTP
MTSP
MYFF
OECD
OED
OVE
PCR
PRSP
QUAG
RBM
ROAR
SBP
SRF
TAPOMA
UNDP
UNICEF
UNIFEM
Annual review of development effectiveness

Annual report on operations evaluation
Annual report on projects in execution
Annual review of portfolio performance
Country assistance strategy
Country co-operation framework
Country note
Canadian International Development Agency
Country policy and institutional assessment
Country programme outline
Country strategy paper
Development Assistance Committee
Development effectiveness report
Department for International Development
International Development Association
Inter-American Development Bank
Integrated monitoring and evaluation plan
Millennium Development Goal
Multilateral development institution
Monitoring and evaluation
Medium term strategic framework
Medium term plan
Medium term strategic plan
Multi-year funding framework
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank)
Office of Evaluation and Oversight (IDB)
Project completion report
Poverty reduction strategy paper
Quality Assurance Group (World Bank)
Results-based management
Results orientated annual report
Strategy and business plan
Strategic results framework
Task force on portfolio management
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Childrens Fund
United Nations Development Fund for Women
iv
SUMMARY
1. The purpose of this report is to present a comparative study of the practice of
results-based management in a sample of five multilateral development
institutions: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United
Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM); Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); and the World
Bank. The report is based on a review of documents and a limited number of
interviews with head office staff in mid-2002. As such, it does not claim to be
definitive, nor necessarily fully up to date with developments since then.
2. The terms results and results-based management (RBM) are used in
different ways in different institutions. Section 2 of the report provides some
introductory definitions. Results are taken to include outputs, outcomes and
impacts, but with an emphasis on outcomes and impacts. RBM is similar to,
but not synonymous with, performance management.
3. All five institutions are, to a greater or lesser extent, engaging with resultsbased management. All have made a commitment to increase their resultsfocus. All have taken steps to, or are working on, improving the planning and
reporting of results. As befits their different histories, mandates and cultures,
there is enormous variety in their approaches and progress to the four main
components of RBM: strategic planning, monitoring, reporting and managing
(using).
4. The introduction and implementation of RBM within large institutions is never

quick and easy, as is shown by experience in the public sector in OECD
countries. The introduction of RBM to international development agencies is
even more challenging. Four particular issues can be identified:
developing country capacity

attribution
aggregation
incentives
5. Results-based management is the latest in a very long line of efforts to

improve the measurement, monitoring and reporting of effectiveness. This is
not to diminish its potential significance. Thinking about development in terms
of outcomes and impacts, rather than inputs, activities and outputs, is a
powerful idea that has major implications for how multilateral development
institutions operate.
6. Five conclusions emerge from this study:
i.
results-based management is easier said than done, particularly for

development institutions, and particularly given the new emphasis on
country and global results. Institutions should not underestimate the
challenge.
ii.
Multilateral development institutions work through and with developing

country governments to realise and measure results. This presents
development agencies with a double challenge: introduce RBM internally
and within partner country governments. One without the other is unlikely
to succeed. Greater support for the introduction of RBM in developing
countries, and associated public sector reform, is essential.
iii.
external accountability is driving much of the recent push for RBM. This
needs to be accompanied by a greater emphasis on using results
information for internal management.
iv.
RBM in development co-operation has to face up to the challenge of

attribution. For all practical purposes, development agencies have little
vi
option but to manage for outcomes in the medium- to long-term, but to

manage by outputs, indicators and other measures of performance (eg.
partnership, strategy and process) in the short-term.
v.
multilateral development institutions need to work to amend their internal

incentive structures in favour of results. This implies working to correct the
continued bias in favour of inputs and activities, as well as giving
substance to results-based budgeting. Resources and recognition needs
to flow to those individuals, units, sectors and countries with the best
record of managing for, and delivering, results.
7. Finally, this study has implications for those supporting and monitoring the
progress of results-based management within multilateral development
institutions. Assessing the quality and extent of management change is not a
straightforward task. Increasing support for the introduction of RBM will need
to be accompanied by a more sophisticated approach to its monitoring.
vii
1. Introduction
1.1 Recent interest in results-based management in multilateral development
institutions is the product of two related developments. The first was the
definition of, and agreement on, global development goals. This process
started in the mid-1990s, and culminated in the endorsement of the
Millennium Development Goals in September 2000 by all 189 United Nations
states. The significance of this event is that, for the first time ever, all
development agencies have a common set of results to which they are
working, and against which their collective performance can be judged. This
focus on results was confirmed at the United Nations Conference on
Financing for Development in Monterrey in March 2002, and is matched by a
broad consensus on development partnership and aid effectiveness. One key
feature of this consensus is the emergence of the country as the primary unit
of account.
1.2 The second development has been the drive to improve public sector
performance in OECD member states. One response in many countries has
been the adoption of results-based management (RBM) by public sector
agencies, including those responsible for development co-operation. OECD
countries are the major donors to the multilateral development institutions
(MDIs). It was therefore only a matter of time before the MDIs themselves
were influenced to embark upon a similar process of reform. This began to
happen in the late 1990s. References to results and results-based
approaches have become increasingly common among MDIs as a
consequence. However, these references often mean different things in
different institutions.
Study objectives
1.3 The purpose of this report is to present a comparative study of the practice of
results-based management in a sample of UN development agencies and
multilateral development banks. This was originally intended as background
to a DFID-sponsored workshop on RBM. Outline conclusions on the value of
RBM as currently practiced, and the reforms needed to realise its full
potential, were expected. In the event, DFID decided not to hold a workshop,
in part because of the similar World Bank sponsored workshop in June 2002.
1.4 Eight institutions were originally selected for study. With the agreement of
DIFD this was reduced to five:
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)
The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
The World Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
1.5 The consultant was ask to document and comment on the following aspects
of RBM for each institution: the length of experience; changes made over
time; organisation, effectiveness and timeliness; quality of information;
commitment of operational staff; use made by management; and the quality
of reports. This proved to be a hugely ambitious undertaking. RBM is a
management approach, not a simple technical instrument. There is a huge
difference between how it is meant to work on paper, how it is said to work,
and how it actually works. Understanding RBM basically means
understanding how these institutions are managed, both in head office and in
the countries where they operate. This was clearly impossible in the time
available (25 days in total). Each of these institutions would require this much
time to do them justice. Useful meetings were held with all the institutions
involved, but these could not really do more than scratch the surface. The
result is a report that is inevitably more superficial than was originally
intended, and which concentrates more on generic issues than on
institutional specifics.
1.6 The report begins with a discussion of the key terms: results and resultsbased management (section 2). Section 3 contains a brief history of RBM in
each institution. Sections 4-6 cover the main elements of RBM: planning,
monitoring, and managing. The report ends with a discussion of the main
issues in implementing and monitoring RBM.
2.
What is Results-Based Management?
2.1 Results-based management can mean many different things. The area is
bedevilled by different definitions. What one institution calls an outcome is
anothers output, intermediate outcome, or impact. Without agreement
about what exactly RBM is, it is very difficult to assess or monitor its
implementation. Some discussion of what these words mean is therefore
required at the outset.
Results
2.2 The recent OECD DAC glossary of key terms defines a result as the output,
outcome or impact of a development intervention (Box 1). While this is the
definition used in this report, it should be noted that this is a broader
definition than used by some of the leading exponents of results-based
management. According to the Treasury Board of Canada, a result is the
end or purpose for which a programme or activity is performed ... and refers
exclusively to outcomes. 1 Outcome in this usage covers both effects and
impacts - but not outputs - and may be immediate, intermediate or final.
2.3 This is a potentially important distinction. A key feature of RBM is the

requirement that managers look beyond inputs, activities and outputs, and
instead focus on outcomes. Some would argue that to see outputs as results
is therefore to weaken this fundamental shift in orientation towards
outcomes. Others argue that outputs are results, and that the important
feature of RBM is the link between these and changes at outcome level.
Results-Based Management Lexicon. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002).
Box 1 Results
OECD DAC definitions 2 :
Result : the output, outcome or impact of a development intervention.
-
Output : the products, capital goods and services which result from a
development intervention.
Outcome : the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an

interventions outputs.
Impacts : positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects

produced by a development intervention.
Effect : intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an

intervention
2.4 The other key feature of a result is that it should represent attributable
change resulting from a cause-and-effect relationship. In other words, there
has to be a reasonable connection, or at least a credible linkage, between
the specific outcome and the activities and outputs of the agency. If no
attribution is possible, it is not a result.
2.5 The accepted way of linking inputs to outcomes, and of demonstrating

attribution, is via a logical framework or results chain. An example of such a
results chain is shown below. Inputs are immediately measurable and under
the control of the MDI. Activities hopefully follow soon after the provision of
inputs, but are dependent on the commitment and actions of the government
and other development partners. The outputs, and even more so the
outcomes, that result are generated after a lag of several years, are subject
to many exogenous factors, and are only partly attributable to the inputs
provided by the MDI. Impacts are even more time-lagged, subject to
multidimensional causation, and are extremely difficult to attribute to one

MDI. 3
Lower infant mortality
IMPACTS
Reduced infection
OUTCOMES
Immunisation coverage
OUTPUTS
Immunisation programmes
ACTIVITIES
Finance and skills
INPUTS
2.6 It follows that the requirement for describable or measurable attribution

presents a real challenge for development agencies as they move from
projects to programmes, and as their focus shifts to shared country and
global outcomes, as exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). The issue of attribution, and its implications for RBM, will be
returned to later (para.7.5).
Results-based management
2.7 The OECD DAC defines results-based management as a management

strategy focusing on performance and the achievement of outputs, outcomes
and impacts. This is a wide definition. In addition to the reference to outputs,
the definition also mentions performance. In doing so, OECD DAC is not
implying that RBM is the same as performance management. Performance
Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management. OECD DAC (2002)
Measuring Outputs and Outcomes in IDA Countries. International Development Association. February
2002.
3
should include measures of process and efficiency, not just results. RBM is
just one, albeit significant, approach to performance management.
2.8 Another definition of RBM is provided by the Treasury Board of Canada.

This rightly defines RBM as a comprehensive management approach which
emphasises outcomes throughout the programming cycle. As will be
discussed later, RBM implies and requires fundamental changes in
organisational culture and incentives.
Box 2: Results-based management

A comprehensive, life-cycle approach to management that integrates business
strategy, people, processes and measurement to improve decision-making and
drive change. The approach focuses on getting the right design early in the
process, implementing performance measurement, learning and changing, and
reporting performance.
2.9 The application of RBM varies from country to country, and from agency to
agency. However, there are four core elements to most RBM approaches 4 :
1. Strategic planning: defining clear and measurable results and indicators,

based on a logic model or framework.
2. Monitoring: measuring and describing progress towards results, and the
resources consumed, using appropriate indicators.
3. Reporting, internally and externally, on progress towards results.
4. Managing: using results information (and evaluation) for lesson-learning
and management decision making.
A much fuller discussion can be found in OECD DAC (2001) op cit
2.10 The experience and thinking of the five multilateral institutions with respect
to these four elements is considered below, having first briefly outlined the
history of results-based approaches in each.
3.
The history of results-based approaches
3.1 This section documents the history of results-based approaches in the five
institutions reviewed: UNDP, the World Bank Group, Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), UNICEF and UNIFEM. The practice of RBM
needs to be considered at three main levels 5 :
Project
Country
Corporate
3.2 In the context of development co-operation, RBM at the project level has the
longest history and is most well documented 6 . Work on introducing RBM at
country and corporate level is much more recent. It is at these levels where
the real challenge for RBM lies. This report will accordingly concentrate on
RBM at country and corporate level.
3.3 This does not mean that RBM at project level should be ignored, for two
reasons. First, despite the shift to a non-project development paradigm,
projects still dominate the aid landscape 7 . Second, RBM is most applicable,
and least problematic, at the project level. Despite this, the application of
RBM and logical frameworks to projects has not been particularly
successful. The limited success of RBM in the much simpler environment of
projects should, at the very least, give pause for thought. This issue is
discussed further below (section 7).
RBM is also applicable at a fourth, cross-cutting, level : the sector.

OECD DAC (2001) op cit
7
Development Cooperation and performance evaluation : the Monterrey challenge. OED, World Bank
Working Paper. June 2002. See also DFID DER.
6
3.4 It is important to emphasise that the degree to which RBM has been applied,
or is claimed to be, is not necessarily correlated with effectiveness. The fact
that most of the institutions have not yet adopted and implemented RBM in a
formal sense does not mean that they are not implementing parts of the
approach at some levels. It certainly does not mean that they are not
producing development results.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
3.5 UNDP has made the strongest commitment to RBM. It is the only institution
of the five to have begun to implement RBM as an organising principle at all
levels, and is the most advanced of all the UN agencies. Further advances
have been made since the information on which this section is based was
collected. 8
3.6 UNDPs advanced status has two origins. The first was the pressure of
declining core funds in the 1990s. UNDP knew that it had to change if it was
to recover the confidence of the donor community. In 1997 UNDP initiated a
set of change management processes, known as UNDP 2001. The UNDP
change process emphasised, among other things, the need for the
organisation to become more results-orientated 9 .
3.7 In parallel, UNDPs Evaluation Office (EO) had been working on developing
results-based monitoring and evaluation policies, methodologies and tools.
In 1997 EO commissioned a joint study with SIDA on results management 10 ,
and produced a handbook on results-orientated monitoring and evaluation
for programme managers 11 . In 1998 EO was given lead responsibility for
developing a framework for the measurement and assessment of
8
In a response to a draft version of this report, UNDP stated that this report does not take account of the
many, more recent advancements UNDP has made in internalising RBM.
9
Annual Report of the Administrator for 1997. UNDP (1998)
10
Measuring and Managing Results. Poate, D. (1997)
10
programme results. This step initiated the introduction of RBM in UNDP 12

and led to the Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF) in 1999. The MYFF
was a four-year funding framework (2000-03) encompassing a Strategic
Results Framework and a resource framework that integrated all financial
allocations.
3.8 Since then, UNDP has been working to ensure that assessing and reporting
on results is not a minority preoccupation but a way of doing business for the
organisation as a whole. 13 Having been piloted in ten countries, RBM was
introduced worldwide in only one year, with the first Results-Orientated
Annual Report (ROAR) produced in 1999. Strategic choices were made to
learn from others; to learn by doing; to tailor RBM to UNDP; to keep the
system as simple as possible; not to over-invest in indicators; and to
manage for (not by) results. The result is an approach that is still being
adapted, but which has been mainstreamed throughout the organisation and
its instruments. The next generation of RBM software is currently being
introduced.
Box 3: UNDPs Results-Based Management System
Planning Instruments:
Strategic Results Framework

Integrated Results Framework
Multi-Year Funding Framework
Country Office Management Plan
Reporting Instruments:
Results-Orientated Annual Report

Multi-Year Funding Framework Report
Country Office Management Plan Report
11
Results-orientated Monitoring and Evaluation: a Handbook for Programme Managers. UNDP (1997)
Results Based Management Overview and General Principles. UNDP.
13
The Multi-Year Funding Framework. UNDP (1998)
12
11
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

3.9 The history of results-based approaches within UNIFEM was not easy to
discern on the basis of published documents and a single interview. In
common with all the institutions in this study, the notion of results is not new
to UNIFEM. In the Consultative Committee (CC) Report for 1997 UNIFEM
reported on the introduction of RBM concepts into its programme. This work
was initiated with support from the Canadian Government. UNIFEMs
Strategy and Business Plan (SBP) for 1997-99 also clearly listed the results
that were to be achieved, and the SBP for 2000-03 includes a results
framework which lists expected outcomes and indicators.
3.10 Since 1998 the CC report has used a results orientated format for reporting
against the SBP. By virtue of its close association with UNDP, UNIFEM was
influenced by the UNDP 2001 change process and by the introduction of
RBM in that organisation. UNIFEM uses the Results and Competency
Assessment developed by UNDP, and has an interface with the UNDP
ROAR. However, UNIFEM has also been exploring, and been influenced by,
the RBM approaches of other multilateral and bilateral agencies.
3.11 According to the recent Report of the Executive Director, each of UNIFEMs
three programming objectives is measured and driven by a results-based
framework designed to create a learning and knowledge based institution.
14
However, it is acknowledged in the same report that new monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms are needed, with greater focus on assessing

progress towards results than completion of activities. Thus, while UNIFEM
has certainly become more results-orientated since 1997, the introduction of
results-based management tools and internal support has some way to go.
14
UNIFEM Report of the Executive Director. September 2002.
12
United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)
3.12 UNICEF is proof that a results-orientation is not necessarily new. While the
use of the term RBM may be new, UNICEF has been practising large parts
of the approach for at least twenty years. One of the best examples was the
child survival campaign launched in 1982. By insisting on strategic action,
measurable results, and clear accountability, the then Director of UNICEF
(J.P.Grant) spearheaded extraordinary improvements in child survival and
development over the following decade.
3.13 Over the last few years UNICEF has recognised the need to define more
clearly the results it seeks to achieve. In 1996, a new Mission Statement was
approved. This was followed by a Medium-Term Plan (MTP) for 1998-2001.
Although containing a statement of priorities, these were numerous and
wide-ranging, and were not mainstreamed within UNICEF. The MTP also
lacked clearly defined targets against which to measure achievement.
Significant progress was nevertheless made over the MTP period in
achieving a stronger results-focus in programming and reporting, and in
moving towards a more strategic approach.
3.14 In 2000, UNICEF produced a Multi-Year Funding Framework. This was seen
as an opportunity to strengthen results-based management within the
organisation. Analytical reporting on results linked to objectives and budget
was identified as a core element of the framework. The Executive Directors
Annual Report in the same year was the first to use a results-based format.
3.15 Most recently, UNICEF has produced a Medium-Term Strategic Plan

(MTSP) for 2002-2005, with results-based management as one of its guiding
principles. This represents a clear shift towards results-based programming
that goes beyond identifying broad goals and requires that specific results
for children be identified, measured regularly, and systematically reported.
13
UNICEF also recognises that its evaluation function needed strengthening 15 .

As the MTSP put it:
UNICEF must establish its organisational priorities, define objectives, define

the criteria of success for its work, strive to achieve its objectives,
systematically monitor progress (or lack of it) and evaluate its work so it may
learn how to maintain relevance, effectiveness and efficiency: this is resultsbased management. 16
The World Bank
3.16 The World Bank has been working to increase its results orientation for the
past ten years. In 1992, the World Bank was criticized by the Wapenhans
Report for giving more attention to the quantity of its lending than to its
quality: a product of the so-called approval culture. The World Bank
responded with a concerted effort to improve its focus on quality and results.
In 1993 the World Bank issued a new plan entitled Getting Results: the
World Banks Agenda for Development Effectiveness and initiated the Next
Steps reform programme. In 1994 Learning from the Past, Embracing the
Future was published, with a results orientation as one of its six guiding
principles.
3.17 This was followed by the Renewal Process in 1996. A raft of general and
sector-specific performance monitoring indicators, and the logical
framework, were introduced. In the same year, the Quality Assurance Group
(QUAG) was established to improve, and allow management to keep track
of, project design (quality-at-entry) and supervision. This added a significant
quality element to the traditional measures of lending approvals (number and
amount), project performance (projects at risk), and ratings of closed
projects (outcome, sustainability, and institutional development impact).
15
16
Report on the Evaluation Function in the Context of the Medium-Term Strategic Plan. UNICEF (2002)
Medium-Term Strategic Plan for the Period 2002-2005. UNICEF (2001)
14
3.18 1997 saw the launch of the Strategic Compact. The Compact aimed to
make the World Bank more effective and efficient in achieving its main
mission - reducing poverty and included a commitment to building a
performance assessment system and to making management more
performance based. This led to further improvements in performance
measurement and management, and to some increase in results-orientation.
For example, the 1998 Annual Report on Operations Evaluation (AROE)
concluded that while RBM had not been formally adopted as had been
recommended by the AROE in 1997 - operations are moving in that
direction.
3.19 A similar judgement was made in 2001. The Strategy Update Paper
summarised the situation in the following way :
We also are much more explicitly focusing on results, particularly on how
we can better measure, monitor and manage to achieve them. We have
come a long way in developing measures of operational inputs and their
quality, and these have helped us to make a steady improvement in Bank
performance over the last several years. We now need to ratchet up our
results focus, doing more to measure and explain how our work makes a
difference in terms of country outcomes. 17
3.20 Recent IDA-13 and Monterrey discussions have given renewed impetus to
the search for better ways of monitoring country outputs and the contribution
to country outcomes. Most of the improvements in the 1990s were aimed at
improving the quality of the design, implementation and monitoring of
projects. The World Bank accepts that more needs be done to increase its
results orientation, particularly in areas other than projects. Improvements
are planned in the planning and monitoring of country programmes, as well
as for sector and thematic strategies. Further work on implementing the
17
Strategy Update Paper for FY03-05: Implementing the World Banks Strategic Framework. Executive
Summary p.i. March 2002.
15
results agenda with respect to corporate reporting, staff incentives and

training, and risk management is also underway. 18
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
3.21 The IDB has not experienced the same level of external pressure for reform
and results, and the associated permanent management revolution, which
has characterised the World Bank over the last decade. However, concern
about the results-focus of the IDB has followed a broadly similar history 19 .
3.22 As with the World Bank, recent efforts to increase the results-focus of the
IDB originated from a critical review of the Banks portfolio. In 1993 the Task
Force on Portfolio Management (TAPOMA) found that the focus on the initial
approval of projects and the subsequent control of execution took the focus
away from managing for development results. It concluded that a concern for
results needed to be paramount.
3.23 The IDB Board and management endorsed this shift of focus and responded
in the mid-1990s with a series of improvements to the way projects were
designed and monitored. The overall aim was to promote a resultsorientated dialogue among Bank staff, executing agencies, and national
counterparts and an increased results-focus in project design, monitoring
and reporting. Improvements included the requirement for logical
frameworks, impact indicators, and project completion reports based on data
on the outcomes or impacts. The new US Administrations emphasis on
results throughout 2001, and internal changes in Office of Evaluation and
Oversight, gave fresh momentum to RBM within IDB.
18
Better Measuring, Monitoring and Managing for Development Results. Development Committee Paper.
World Bank. September 2002.
19
This section draws extensively on the Development Effectiveness Report. Office of Evaluation and
Oversight. IDB. February 2002.
16
3.24 Despite the increasing commitment of management to results, IDB accepts

that it has some way to go. A recent report by the Office of Evaluation and
Oversight concluded that IDB projects are still not being designed and
monitored so as to transparently demonstrate development results. Further
improvements to project and country results frameworks are under
consideration, as are changes to the incentive framework to help sharpen
the IDBs focus on results and development effectiveness. 20
20
Development Effectiveness at the IDB. Paper for the Board of Executive Directors. January 2002.
17
4.
Strategic planning
4.1 This section considers the extent to which strategic planning at the
country and corporate level has a results-focus. For institutions that are
implementing RBM, strategic planning should be about planning to
achieve outcomes: management for results. Plans should contain clear,
realistic and attributable results; defined indicators specifying exactly what
will be achieved by when; a results chain or logic model linking inputs,
activities, outputs and outcomes; and a strategy or strategies explaining
how and why inputs will lead to outcomes, including a discussion of risk.
Country-level planning
4.2 All the institutions are, to a greater or lesser extent, struggling with three
challenges. First, to align their programmes more explicitly to the
countrys own plans, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP). Second, to raise the sights of their programmes from the project
level to country level. And third, to define better country-level results
frameworks.
4.3 Annex A contains a summary assessment of country planning documents.

While most of the institutions now specify country-level results of some
sort, none of the institutions have developed logical frameworks for
country programmes as a whole. UNICEF comes closest with its
programme-level Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (para.4.12).
Unlike the others, UNIFEM plans regionally and sub-regionally rather than
at country level. The regional and sub-regional programmes are
developed within the framework of the Regional SBP. Logical frameworks
are a requirement at the programme level.
18
4.4 The 2002 Development Effectiveness Report (DER) provides a frank

assessment of country-level planning in the IDB. It found that, with few
exceptions, Bank programming does not establish ex-ante any specific
results that it is seeking to obtain in working with an individual country.
IDB country programmes described project-level outputs rather than
country level outcomes. The one area of activity where the IDB had
anticipated outcomes was structural reform. The experience in this area
shows very clearly the importance of an outcome-focus. IDB projects
have been very successful in producing the output of reform, but these
reforms did not produce the outcome of growth in productivity.
4.5 The three Country Papers reviewed 21 support this conclusion. The
Strategy Matrix is not a logical framework. Overall objectives are stated,
but these are very general and are not accompanied by any indicators or
targets. The Banks strategy then consists of priority areas, activities or
focuses under each objective, often referencing specific IDB programmes.
The performance benchmarks for the strategy are a mix of selected
program outputs and country outcomes. Examples from the Country
Paper for Chile are contained in Box 4. In all the Country Papers
reviewed, the link between strategy outputs and country outcomes is not
specified.
Box 4 : IDB Strategy Matrix examples

Objective
Poverty reduction, human capital formation and social inclusion
Strategy
Improvements in execution of preschool education programs
(Early Childcare Program)
Performance Recovery of net enrollment ratios in rural primary school to at
benchmark
least 87% by the end of 2003
4.6 Recent IDB guidance recognises the importance of including in Country
Papers (and distinguishing between) indicators that can be used to
monitor progress specific to the Banks programme (ie. outputs), as well
21
Brazil (2000), Ecuador (2001), and Chile (2001).
19
as the Banks contribution to country outcomes 22 . This is very much work

in progress, but one idea is to juxtapose IDB programme outputs with
associated country outcome targets.
4.7 Better anchoring of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) in the

countrys specific priorities and objectives is central to the World Banks
increased focus on results at country level. According to the Annual
Review of Development Effectiveness (ARDE) for 2001, results would be
improved if CASs included a logical framework (and results chains) linking
Bank instruments with country objectives. In 2002 the World Bank
reported that results-based CASs are to be piloted in several countries.
These will identify country outcomes (from the PRSP or similar) to which
the World Bank will contribute, along with intermediate indicators linked to
particular products and services that the Bank will provide 23 .
4.8 Current World Bank CASs 24 are similar to the IDB Country Papers. Most
include a Country Program Matrix detailing the main objectives or
priorities, and the Country Strategy/Key Actions. Progress benchmarks or
targets for each main strategy/action are given, but these refer country
outcomes rather than Bank outcomes or outputs. As with the IDB, country
strategies do not yet contain clear results frameworks or chains, nor
clear, monitorable indicators for evaluating the development
effectiveness of the Bank program 25 . This is not to imply that this is easy
to do. As recognised in an IDA-13 paper, part of the answer may lie in the
identification of early indicators of output performance which have good
eventual linkages to country outcome objectives 26 .
22
Country Paper Guidelines. IDB. February 2002

World Bank (2002) op cit, p. 10
24
Pakistan (2002), Chile (2002), and Belarus (2002).
25
Ten Features of a Good CAS. http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/cas/tenfeat.htm
26
Measuring Outputs and Outcomes in IDA Countries. IDA. February 2002.
23
20
4.9 Recent UNDP Country Programme Outlines (CPOs) include a results and
resources framework. 27 This lists intended outcomes and outputs (with
indicators) within strategic areas of support. Examples from the Malaysia
CPO are contained in Box 5. Note that the UNDP outcomes are lower
level outcomes (less ambitious and more attributable) than those
specified by UNICEF, IDB or the World Bank.
Box 5 : UNDP results framework examples

Strategic area of
Sustainable human development
support
Intended outcome
National policies more effectively address the social
impact of economic liberalisation
Indicator of
Explicit analyses of the impact of global liberalisation on
outcome
human resources development integrated in key national
plans and policies
Output
Increased capacity to assess and predict human
development needs and to monitor in relation to
competitiveness
4.10
This is an advance on earlier UNDP Country Cooperation
Frameworks (CCFs). These had merely listed the areas of support and
made no mention of results. 28 More recent CCFs had listed key results
under each strategic area of support, but had not distinguished between
outcomes and outputs, nor included indicators 29 .
4.11
UNICEF Country Notes (CNs) describe overall objectives for the 5-
year programme, plus specific objectives for each programme (eg. to

reduce infant and child mortality by 25%). No overall results framework is
presented for the country programme. However, a very detailed
Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (IMEP) is then developed for
each of the constituent programmes (eg. health, early education, etc.).
27
India CPO (2002); Malaysia CPO (2002). UNDP consider that the Malaysia CPO is not a good example
from the RBM perspective.
28
Mongolia CCF (1997)
29
Malawi CCF (2001)
21
Examples from the Health Programme IMEP for Malawi (2002-06) are
contained in Box 6.
Box 6 : UNICEF Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plan examples

Overall
To create a conducive environment to realise rights to survival,
objective
development, protection and participation of children and women.
Program
To eliminate or decrease the major killers of children in UNICEF
objective
impact areas
Specific
To improve access to, and the quality of healthcare at health
objective
facilities
Output
Health workers at health facilities trained in IMCI case
management and obstetrical care
Baseline
10%
Target
80%
Critical
Adequate number of qualified staff available
assumption
Corporate planning
4.12
There is a tension between corporate and country level objectives.
Allowing priorities to be set at country level reduces the extent to which

institutions can develop corporate-level results frameworks. In most cases
this tension is resolved by restricting corporate planning to the definition of
broad goals, priorities and principles. Few institutions have attempted to
develop ex ante results frameworks at corporate level. A summary of the
corporate plans for the five institutions is contained at Annex B.
4.13
UNDP is well aware of the tension between top-down and bottom-
up planning, but has gone further than any of the other institutions in
determining a corporate results framework. The Strategic Results
Framework (SRF) for 2000-03 lists 7 goals, 24 sub-goals, 142 outcomes
(with indicators), and 84 strategic areas of support. Box 7 contains
examples from the SRF.
22
Box 7 : UNDP Strategic Results Framework examples

Goal
To create an enabling environment for sustainable human
development.
Sub-Goal
Strengthen capacity of key governance institutions for peoplecentred development and foster social cohesion
Strategic
Reform and strengthen the system of justice, including legal
area of
structures and procedures
support
Intended
Independent and efficient system of justice, accessible to all
outcome
strata of the population in particular the poor.
Indicator
Number of countries in which there has been a decrease in time
required for disposal of civil and criminal court cases
4.14
In practice, only the goals, sub-goals and strategic areas of support
are used to guide country-level programming. Outcome and outputs are

determined at country level. The utility of the corporate level outcomes
within the SRF is therefore unclear.
4.15
UNIFEMs Strategy and Business Plan for 2000-03 followed a
similar structure to that of the UNDP SRF, but without the sub-goals. 120
outcomes and indicators were listed. As with UNDP, no means of
verification were given for the indicators. An example is given below.
Box 8 : UNIFEM Strategy and Business Plan examples

Objective
Increase options and opportunities for women.
Thematic
Economic empowerment and rights
area
Strategic
Strengthening womens economic capacity, rights and
area of
sustainable livelihoods as entrepreneurs, producers and homesupport
based workers
Intended
Reduction in the number of women in poverty through
outcome
participation in viable economic activities
Indicator
Number of small and medium scale enterprises owned by women
23
4.16
UNIFEM has subsequently revised and strengthened their results
framework. In 2001 UNIFEM introduced a results indicators framework. In

2002, it consolidated the numerous outcomes of the SBP into a more
logical and focused Outcome Framework with indicators and suggested
means of verification. This reduced the number of outcomes to 48. 30
4.17
The UNICEF Medium Term Strategic Framework lays out 5
organisational priorities (plus targets and indicators) and 89 core

intervention areas. Each of the organisational priorities is related to
relevant long-term international goals, such as the MDGs. Examples from
the MTSF are given below.
Box 9 : UNCEF Medium Term Strategic Plan examples

Organisational Fighting HIV/AIDS
priority
Long-term
UN Special Session on HIV/AIDS Declaration of Commitment
international
goals
MTSP target
By 2005 ensure that national policies, strategies and action
plans are under implementation to prevent parent-to-child
transmission of HIV in all countries affected by HIV/AIDS
Indicator
Number of countries with national strategies and action plans
under implementation
4.18
The IDB and World Bank have not yet attempted to develop
corporate plans to this level of detail. The IDB Institutional Strategy

merely sets out four priority areas 31 . Two overarching objectives poverty
reduction and social equity, and environmentally sustainable growth
were added after a long debate. The Banks contribution to these
objectives is to be measured through its contribution to country level
30
How are we doing? Tracking UNIFEM progress in achieving results for management and learning.
Briefing Note. UNIFEM (2002)
31
Renewing the Commitment to Development: Report of the Working Group on Institutional Strategy. IDB
(1999)
24
outputs and outcomes. Sector strategies are in the process of being

finalised.
4.19
The World Bank takes a similarly minimalist approach to corporate
planning. The Strategic Framework Paper acknowledges that the MDGs

frame the World Banks strategy and provide a results-based framework
for the international community. 32 However, no attempt is made to specify
global outcomes or outputs for the Bank. Rather, the aim is to maximise
the impact on poverty reduction through greater selectivity within
countries, across countries and in global programmes. The main focus of
planning and activity will remain at country level, but with strong corporate
guidance on principles and practice. As the Strategic Framework
observed, given the tension between bottom-up country driven needs
and more top-down imperatives, this is inevitably a difficult and iterative
process". 33
4.20
This demonstrates the main difference between the UN agencies
and the multilateral development banks (MDBs). All the UN agencies

have, to a greater or lesser extent, defined global goals and outcomes.
The challenge for all of them will be to show that these are monitorable
and attributable. The MDBs have (so far) avoided global results
frameworks, and have instead concentrated on strategy in broad support
of the MDGs. This is now changing as all institutions feel the pressure to
deliver and demonstrate results at the country and global level.
32
33
Strategic Framework. WBG, January 2001.

Strategic Framework. World Bank Group. January 2001, p. 7
25
5.
Monitoring and reporting
5.1 This section should be as much about monitoring as about reporting. Not
everything that is monitored is reported, or needs to be. However, the limited
duration of this study meant that little information could be collected on
monitoring per se. Time constraints also meant that no country-level reports
were examined.
5.2 The distinctions between monitoring and reporting, and between internal and
external reporting, are important. Many institutions are under pressure to
report externally on results. While this is important for accountability, internal
reporting to management, and monitoring more generally, are arguably at
least as important. RBM is intended to improve both management
effectiveness and accountability.
5.3 It is also important to stress that accountability for results implies more than
just reporting results. Many results (eg. outcomes) will not be attributable to
a single institution. Because of this, reporting needs to demonstrate several
things :
i.
that the agency is managing for outcomes, not just activities and outputs.
ii.
that improved outcomes are being achieved;
iii.
that the agency has contributed to these outcomes;
iv.
that the design and implementation of the results strategy is sound and
effective;
v.
that the results over which the MDI has a significant degree of control, and
is aiming for, are being achieved.
26
Annual reporting should concentrate on short-term results that show meaningful

change over the reporting period; are attributable to the interventions being
supported; and bear a significant relationship to longer-term objectives. 34
5.4 None of the reports reviewed yet approach this standard. Most concentrate
on the second and last task reporting on outputs and outcomes but
without either analysing the strength of the link between the two, nor the
effectiveness of the management strategy.
5.5 The UNDP Results Orientated Annual Report (ROAR) represents the most
ambitious and comprehensive corporate results report. The third ROAR
(2001) presents key findings for each of the six SRF goals, together with indepth analysis of three selected sub-goals. Aggregated global figures for the
percentage of annual outputs fully or partially achieved, and the percentage
of outcomes where there was positive progress, are presented in the text,
together with the number or percentage of country offices active in each
area. Comparative figures are sometimes given for achievements in the
previous year. One of the general observations made is that there is still a
sizeable gap ... between impressive results at the output levels achieved
within each goal and their contribution to realising outcomes. 35
5.6 The ROAR process includes an independent assessment of the extent to

which the self-reported results from the country offices are accurate and
complete. 71% of progress statements were fully verified, and a further 9%
were partially verified. The verification did not extend to the degree to which
UNDP outputs contributed to progress at the outcome level. The ROAR
does not make any claim that it is solely responsible for such progress, but
simply reports changes in outcomes that are clearly linked to UNDP
support.
34
Results-Based Management and Accountability for Enhanced Aid Effectiveness. A Reference Paper.
CIDA Policy Branch. July 2002.
35
Results-Orientated Annual Report, 2001. UNDP (2002), p.2.
27
5.7 While the ROAR is clearly a great advance on previous reporting, it lacks
transparency in two respects. First, there is no single table showing
coverage and achievements by goal and sub-goal for 1999, 2000, and 2001.
It would be possible to largely create such a table by extracting the figures
for 2000 and 2001 from the 67 pages of text, but the fact that the data is not
presented in an accessible format is strange. The ROAR badly needs a
straightforward summary. Second, although activities by goal and country
are tabulated in an annex, there is no presentation of the achievement by
outputs and outcome for each country office. This is a deliberate decision 36 ,
and may reflect a judgement that country-specific results would be
misleading given the wide variation in results, projects and countries.
5.8 For the last two years the Evaluation Office of UNDP has prepared a
Development Effectiveness Report (DER). This is largely based on
independent evaluation studies, and complements the ROAR by providing
summary findings on the impact and sustainability of UNDP interventions at
project and country level. The relative paucity of empirical data on the
development impact of UNDPs assistance was noted in both of the last
DERs.
5.9 UNICEF has used a results matrix to report on its Medium-Term Plan (MTP)
since 1999. The results cited are a mix of global outcomes to which UNICEF
made some contribution, or a description of what UNICEF has supported (ie.
activities). There is no assessment of what UNICEF has directly achieved in
terms of outputs, either against what was planned for the year in question or
over the four years of the plan. A comparison of the results matrix for 1999
and 2001 does not allow any conclusion to be drawn as to whether UNICEF
is more or less effective than it was, or whether its contribution is growing or
36
Results Based Management Concepts and Methodology. UNDP Technical Note (2000) p.17.
28
shrinking. The better definition of intended results in the MTSP for 2002-05
is likely to lead to improved reporting.
5.10 UNIFEMs Strategy and Business Plan (SBP) for 1997-99 included a
detailed list of activities under each objective. The new SBP for 2000-03
included a report on the previous plan that lists the specific and general
results achieved. However, it is not possible to match the results with the
activities originally listed in the SBP for 1997-99.
5.11 The annual Report of the Executive Director mentions that implementation
of each of [the SBP] objectives is measured and driven by a results-based
framework, but does not report against the intended outcomes listed in the
SBP for 2000-03. 37 This is done in the Consultative Committee Report,
which is an annual report of results against the objectives of the SBP, based
on data from the 6-month and annual reports submitted from each SubRegional Office.
5.12 The IDB prepares an Annual Report on Projects in Execution (ARPE) for the
Board of Executive Directors. This provides detailed information on the
status and performance of the Banks portfolio, including an assessment of
the extent to which ongoing projects in each country are likely to achieve
their development objectives. In addition, the ARPE provides an assessment
of trends and challenges, the issues affecting portfolio performance and
notes the Banks response to these challenges. In the last two years the
report has contained an analysis of the quality and compliance rate of
Project Completion Reports (PCRs), has provided information on good
practices noted, and highlighted lessons learned from both the Bank and
Borrowers.
37
UNIFEM Report of the Executive Director. Executive Board of UNDP. September 2002.
29
5.13 The Bank is in the process of revamping the PCR and the Project
Performance Monitoring Report (PPMR). The PPMR has been modified to
include historical project ratings, as well as greater attention to financial and
sustainability issues and lessons learned, and will be linked to other relevant
reports and monitoring systems. The last PPMR will also serve as a key
input for the preparation of the PCR, which will focus more on results and
comply with OECD/DAC guidelines for MDBs. It will include an evaluation of
both the Bank and Borrower performance, an assessment of the projects
contribution to institutional development, and an outlook on expectations
regarding the projects ability to deliver benefits in the medium and longterm.
5.14 Like UNDP, IDBs Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) has also
produced a Development Effectiveness Report. However, unlike in UNDP,
OVE is independent of management. One of the findings reported in the IDB
DER was that, for completed projects rated as highly likely to achieve their
development objectives, the majority of PCRs only discuss project outputs.
Although it is quite likely that all the projects made some contribution to
outcomes and impacts, this was very rarely documented in the PCR 38 .
5.15 According to Operations Evaluation Department (OED), the monitoring and

evaluation (M&E) in World Bank operations has been chronically deficient.
The Annual Report on Operations Evaluation (AROE) for 2000-01 went on to
say that, despite indications of increasing operational quality and project
performance, the Bank does not have a solid foundation to convincingly
demonstrate results on the ground. 39 According to one source, the Bank is
still years away from the systematic measurement of results.
38
39
Development Effectiveness Report. IDB (2002) pp.29-31

Annual Report on Operations Evaluation 2000-01. OED, World Bank (2002) p.18.
30
5.16 Part of the problem lies in the lack of monitorable outcomes in Country
Assistance Strategies (CAS), Sector Strategy Papers, and Project Appraisal
Documents. These and other problems have been the subject of a
comprehensive M&E action plan since 1999. Further improvements in M&E
such as a CAS completion report are underway. The methodological
challenges associated with measuring and attributing results are also very
real.
5.17 The Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP) produced by the

Quality Assurance Group (QAG) is the Banks primary operational
monitoring tool. At present this focuses on design and supervision quality,
rather than results. However, there are plans to broaden the ARPP into an
Annual Report on Portfolio Performance and Results. Subject to a
satisfactory solution to the problem of aggregation, there are also plans for
units to report annually on outputs and outcomes related to real-time
actions, but not program and country outcomes that will be realised only
after long and variable lags 40 .
5.18 The OED Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (ARDE) reports on

the outcomes, sustainability and institutional development impact of
completed projects, as well as providing a summary of country and sector
evaluations. It should be noted that the term outcome in this context refers
to the extent to which the projects relevant development objectives have
been (or are expected to be) achieved. These will be a mix of outcomes
(intermediate objectives such as skills and organisational capacity) and
impacts (long-term goals such as human and social development).
5.19 The ARDE provides a reliable measure of the extent to which completed
Bank projects are producing relevant results. Because OED has used a
40
World Bank. (September 2002) p.11
31
consistent methodology over the past few years, it also allows trends in
project performance to be monitored. What it does not attempt to do is to
quantify the specific results achieved or assess the contribution towards
higher goals, such as the MDGs. In this sense it is more of an aggregation of
results ratings rather than results. This is a practical solution to the problem
of aggregating across diverse results.
5.20 The World Bank acknowledges that there is scope to improve its reporting
on its results. The assessment of the Strategic Compact found that the
corporate scorecard was still incomplete, in part because of a lack of an
agreed methodology. Limited progress has been made on agreeing ways of
measuring and monitoring the impact of World Bank actions at country and
sector level. This missing second tier of the corporate scorecard is intended
to link internal bank measures (such as product quantity and quality) with the
International Development Goals (IDGs). The Strategic Framework
produced in 2001 also highlighted the need to link country and sector work
with the IDGs, but was not able to say how this would be done.
32
6.
Managing
...there is sufficient evidence that the key elements are well known to
donors and carried out to some extent. But in so many instances they have
failed owing to weaknesses in how the systems are used rather than what
its components are. They reflect the missing link between the measurement
procedures and the way in which the information is used the management
process 41
6.1 There are two primary uses, and motivations, for results information. The first
is for accountability: to demonstrate effectiveness to others. This aspect was
covered in the previous section. The second is to provide continuous
feedback and learning for management. To what extent are these institutions
really managing for outcomes? To what extent are they using information on
outputs and outcomes, and from evaluation, in decision making?
6.2 These are difficult questions to answer, particularly in this type of study. The
potential uses of results information extend throughout the institution, from
planning and budgeting to staff appraisal. The observations below are drawn
from a small number of interviews, and from the few reports that address this
issue.
Planning
6.3 Section 4 looked at the extent to which these institutions were planning to
achieve outcomes: managing for results. In an ideal world strategic planning
should also be about managing by results. Institutions should be amending
their plans on the basis of results and experience. In practice this is
something that few institutions are able or prepared to do. No development
41
Measuring and Managing Results. Poate, D. (1997) p.vi
33
institution has been implementing RBM long enough for the results of one
strategic planning cycle to inform to inform the next. 42
6.4 More fundamentally, given the time lags between programmes and
outcomes, let alone between programmes and data on outcomes, it is
doubtful whether management by outcomes or impacts will ever be a practical
proposition for development agencies. The best that can be hoped for is for
periodic reviews to examine the alignment of the programme in respect of
outcome trends. UNICEF have done this to some extent in their Medium
Term Strategic Plan by concentrating, for example, on countries with
particularly high child mortality rates.
6.5 Management by intermediate outcomes and outputs is more feasible on an

annual basis. This is the approach being adopted by UNDP, and being
investigated by the World Bank. The two drawbacks with this approach are,
first, that even outputs are a poor measure of the agencys recent efforts
because of the time lags involved. As observed in an IDA-13 paper, shortterm measures of outputs are likely to reflect the result of resources provided
many years earlier 43 . Second, early indicators of output or intermediate
outcome performance need to have good linkages with ultimate outcome
objectives. Unless they do, progress towards outputs and intermediate
outcomes will not necessarily be the same as, nor any guarantee of, progress
towards improved development outcomes. Institutions need to keep track of
outcome and impact trends, and ensure through evaluation that performance
in terms of outputs and intermediate outcomes is linked to these. This is the
challenge for UNDP.
42
This is not to say that the experience of one planning cycle has not informed the next. For example, the
UNIFEM SBP for 1997-99 certainly informed the formulation of SBP 2000-03.
43
Measuring Outputs and Outcomes in IDA Countries. IDA (February 2002) p. 5
34
Resource allocation
6.6 As with planning, resource allocation can mean allocating for results or by
results (or conceivably both). The World Bank is probably the strongest
exponent of budgeting for results. There is good evidence that aid has a
larger impact on growth and poverty reduction in the context of good policies
and institutions. In line with this thinking, the World Bank has for some time
used assessments of country policy and institutional (CPI) performance as a
basis for allocating IDA funding 44 . 45 Since the Strategic Framework, the Bank
has sought still greater selectivity and focus in its work.
6.7 Budgeting by results is altogether more controversial, and difficult to apply.

UNDP is particularly reluctant to contemplate results-based budgeting (RBB).
There is concern over using results information to reward countries that do
well, and penalise countries than do badly. As with the decision not to publish
country-level data, this may reflect an internal political judgement. Getting
staff to commit to results-orientated planning and reporting has been hard
enough. Adding a budget implication would have made the process still more
difficult. This implies, paradoxically, that RBM is more acceptable if it doesnt
actually change anything. This is clearly contrary to the spirit of RBM. If RBM
is to mean anything, it has to mean using office/unit performance as one
criteria for allocating resources. As far as could be ascertained, none of these
institutions yet do this. This may, in part, be due to the lack of a reliable
results-based indicator of office/unit performance.
6.8 This is not to deny that there is real question about how best to balance
need and results in resource allocation, particularly for country allocations.
44
45
It can be argued that CPI scores are themselves results of previous actions by governments and donors.
The World Bank is in effect budgeting on the basis of past results in order to increase the likelihood of
future results.
35
But this is not an either/or choice. Aid should be directed at countries in need
with good policy and institutional environments, and therefore the best
prospects for achieving results. It would appear that the World Bank does this
rather better than do the UN agencies. 46
6.9 Finally, results-based budgeting should have implications for how resources
are allocated. The 2001 ARDE included an analysis of which objectives World
Bank projects have been the most effective at achieving. This showed, for
example, much greater success with physical infrastructure than for public
sector institutional change.
6.10
47
Other things being equal, results performance should inform sectoral
allocations, both within countries and globally. As with country allocations,

there is a question about whether poorly performing sectors should be
penalised. For example, the DER showed that UNDP is performing relatively
poorly in relation to gender and institution building. This should mean that
UNDP should attempt to understand and address the causes of this underperformance, not immediately reduce its allocation to gender and institutional
activities. In the longer run, however, continued poor performance should
imply some reallocation of resources towards outcomes where the
institutions contribution will be greatest.
6.11
As with office/unit performance, results-based sectoral allocations are
dependent on reliable and acceptable indicators. This is a real challenge for

all institutions, requiring as it does comparability in the definition and
measurement of outputs and outcomes across sectors.
46
UNDPs allocations to good policy/bad policy countries (as measured by CPIA scores) became less
favourable over the 1990s.
47
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2001. OED World Bank (2002) p.20
36
Staff appraisal
6.12
It was not possible to ascertain the extent to which the assessment of staff
performance now includes a results component. According to UNDP, ROAR

results are now used in the assessment of Country Resident Representatives.
The World Bank is also making some progress at evaluating managers on the
basis of tangible results.
6.13
One obstacle to more results-based appraisal and to the application of
RBM more generally - is the time-lag between inputs and outcomes. Annual
appraisals can only hold staff accountable for very short-term results. Any
higher outputs or outcomes will be the product of resources and actions
provided years before. Equally, given the predominance of short postings,
most staff will be long gone by the time the outputs and outcomes of their
work become apparent. Making staff more accountable for planning for
results, and for reporting on results, would be a step in the right direction.
Managerial response
6.14
UNDP is aware that the real challenge for RBM is, and remains, to realise
a management value beyond external reporting. As the ROAR itself points

out, the unique benefits of the ROAR lie in the extent to which it can
generate managerial responses at all levels. The key question is the extent
to which a management response has been forthcoming. This is probably the
most critical, but difficult, question to answer. To what extent is RBM really
making a difference to the way the institution is managed? How much is
rhetoric, and how much is reality?
6.15
According to UNDP staff, RBM is beginning to transform the way UNDP
does business. Examples of this include :
37
6.16
Restructuring in some country offices in line with outcomes.
More outcome-focussed discussions with partners, and at Board level.
Improvements in country-level planning as a result of the SRF.
On the other hand, there has been some criticism of the limited response
of management to some of the key ROAR findings, such as the relatively poor
performance of UNDP in respect of gender. There is also reported to be more
commitment to RBM at headquarters rather than in the country offices, and
more at middle rather than senior management.
6.17
UNDP is well aware of the challenges involved in implementing RBM.
According to UNDP these include defining results consistently and in a

measurable way; building partnerships and assessing results together with
partners; convincing donors and local partners of the virtues of RBM; and
changing hearts, minds and capacities within UNDP.
6.18
None of the other institutions have attempted as rapid a transition to RBM
as UNDP. Any managerial changes are therefore both more incremental and
more difficult for an outsider to detect. The World Bank experience is a case
in point. Ten years of management reform, intended in part to increase the
results-focus of the organisation, have made some difference. The design,
outcomes, sustainability and institutional development impact of World Bank
projects have improved. However, as the Bank itself acknowledges, there is
much more that needs to be done to increase its results-orientation,
particularly at country, sector and corporate level. The Banks own
assessment of performance measurement under the Strategic Compact
concluded as follows :
... while the measurement of performance as well as several of its uses
have improved during the Compact period, performance measurement has
not yet been used systematically and consistently to make strategic
38
decisions on selectivity, mobilize resources, align staff motivation, and hold

managers accountable for the performance of their units. 48
6.19
The lack of senior management support for a stronger focus on results
measurement and management as evidenced by the failure to implement

the OED recommendation on RBM in 1997, and the weak support for the
corporate scorecard to date partly explains the slow progress. However, two
other factors have contributed :
6.20
the long period of time needed to implement fundamental change within

an institution
the difficulties associated with applying results-based management to a

development institution.
The other three institutions UNICEF, UNIFEM and IDB will face the
same challenges. It is noteworthy that IDB is in the process of recruiting a

Chief Development Effectiveness Officer to spearhead the process of culture
change within that institution.
48
Assessment of the Strategic Compact. Annex 9 Performance Measurement. World Bank (2001) p. 15
39
7.
Issues in results-based management
7.1 The introduction and implementation of RBM to large institutions is never

quick and easy, as is shown by experience in the public sector in OECD
countries. The introduction of RBM to international development agencies
is even more challenging. 49 The aim of this section is to discuss these
challenges, drawing on the findings of this survey and other literature.
Four particular issues can be identified :
developing country capacity

attribution
aggregation
incentives
Developing country capacity

7.2 The implementation of RBM in OECD countries was born out of the need
to improve the performance of national bureaucracies and deliver better
public services. RBM has been most effective when it has been designed
as part of wider public sector management reform, and in an affirmative
and stable policy and fiscal environment. 50
7.3 Aid agencies have come to recognise that development results depend on
developing countries. As the World Bank said recently: that is where
development outcomes are realised and measured and where the other
goals will be met, or not 51 . This presents development agencies with a
49
Assessing Development Effectiveness. Flint, M. and Jones, S. DER Working Paper 1. DFID Evaluation
Department (2001)
50
Measuring and Managing Results. Poate, D. (1997)
51
40
double challenge: introduce RBM internally and within partner country

governments. One without the other is unlikely to succeed 52 . As the focus
shifts from projects to sector programmes to countries, so development
agencies become critically dependent on partner governments to better
measure and manage results.
7.4 Experience in OECD countries suggests that RBM will not succeed
without a supportive policy, fiscal and institutional environment. As Poate
stated in 1997 even where aid agencies can tackle their own internal
measurement procedures and use of performance information,
advocating performance measurement to clients in isolation is unlikely to
lead to improved results because too many components are missing.
RBM requires and means full-scale public sector management reform in
developing countries. This is an altogether more challenging prospect
than attempting to implement RBM with development agencies.
Strengthening country capacity in parallel is an all important priority, but a
long-term task. Many countries not yet even have the systems to track
inputs and outputs, let alone outcomes 53 .
Attribution
7.5 Attribution is the extent to which a result is caused by the activity,

programme or agency: if there had been no agency activity, how would
the outcome have been different? As development agencies lift their
sights - from projects to programmes to countries to global so the
problem of attribution increases. RBM is based on the principle that
outcomes can be improved by increasing management focus on them.
This can work well at the project level, and for so-called hard outcomes.
It is much more difficult to apply at country and global level, and for soft
52
53
This would be akin to a car company introducing RBM in the major offices but not in its car plants.
Annual Report on Operations Evaluation 2000-01. World Bank (2002) p.34
41
outcomes. Table 1 draws on a discussion paper for CIDA to summarise

the differences.
Table 1: Characteristics of projects versus country and global programmes
PROJECTS
Largely self-contained, involving a
relatively limited and identifiable range of
actors, each of whom has relatively clearly
defined, complementary roles and interests
Produce tangible outputs
COUNTRY AND GLOBAL

Are not self-contained, involving a wide
network of actors who may have
overlapping or conflicting roles and
interests
Produce intangible outputs (eg. influence)
for which objective and relevant forms of
measurement are not available
Deal with systematic country-, region-wide
or global development issues
Deal with discrete and well-defined

development problems that have a defined
physical location
Progress from inputs to outputs to impacts
in a way that is relatively easy to observe
and quantify
Progress from inputs to outcomes or
impacts over a relatively confined period of
time
Have immediate cause and effect
relationships that are relatively easy to
observe and validate. There is a direct link
with development outcomes and impacts.
Have a design and direction over which the
agency has a high degree of control or
influence
Do not always progress in linear fashion

from outputs to outcomes to impacts.
Progress may be iterative.
Progress from inputs to outcomes or
impacts over a relatively long period of
time
Involve cause and effect relationships that
are difficult to observe and validate. Links
may be indirect and multi-causal.
Have a design and direction which the
agency, on its own, has a low degree of
control or influence
7.6 These are caricatures. For example, projects increasingly produce

intangible outputs. The table nonetheless helps explain why RBM is
becoming more difficult. Project-type interventions traditionally produce
clear, measurable impacts (changes) that result from linear processes;
the causes and impacts are easily attributable to a narrow range of inputs
and actors. The more you move towards country-type interventions the
42
more you push notions of measurable change and identifiable causality to

the limits of their validity.
54
7.7 Increasingly, donors (multilateral and bilateral) are seeking to work

together in support of government designed and implemented policies
and programmes. Multilateral development institutions (MDIs) pursue
development outcomes indirectly, working with other partners and through
country governments. But the assumption built into RBM is that the
agency sets its objectives, pursues them and then reports on how well it
has done more or less independently. Again, this makes most sense in
the context of single donor projects and programmes.
7.8 Attributing development outcomes and impacts to individual MDIs is very

difficult in these circumstances. In most cases, the multiplicity of
influences, and MDIs relatively minor role, means that attempts to
establish causality will be of dubious validity. This has major implications
for RBM. There is a clear tension between the benefits of an outcomefocus, and the need for results to be results in the proper sense (ie.
attributable change) if management is to benefit from focussing on them.
The long time horizons for achieving outcomes and impacts (5 -10 years
plus), and the limited and lagged data availability, exacerbates the
problem.
7.9 One response is to say that what matters is improved development

outcomes, not whether they can be attributed to a particular MDI. This
misses the point. Attribution is fundamental to RBM. Development
outcomes like child mortality are useful if you want to measure and
manage the collective efforts of governments and donors. They are much
54
Results-Based Management and Multilateral Programming at CIDA a discussion paper. Mark Schacter.
Institute of Governance, Ottawa, Canada. (1999) p.4-5
43
less useful for measuring and managing the performance of a single

donor.
7.10
But equally, just because attribution is difficult, it would be wrong to
conclude either that identifying plausible association or credible linkages

between outputs and outcomes is impossible, or that RBM is a non-starter
for development agencies. Aiming for specific development outcomes and
impacts remains a powerful and useful principle. Development agencies
should manage for outcomes, and support developing countries in
measuring these. They should not, however, either claim these as their
results, nor be held individually accountable for progress or otherwise.
Countries themselves are responsible and accountable for development
outcomes. Development agencies should be responsible and accountable
for providing efficient and effective support. This implies a short to
medium-term management focus on outputs, leading indicators for
outcomes, strategies and processes, informed by longerterm evaluation
to ensure that these are contributing to positive changes in outcomes.
Aggregation
7.11
This is closely linked to the challenge of attribution. How do you
add up diverse results in order to present a summary picture of

performance, either at country or global level? Both UNDP and the World
Bank are grappling with this problem.
7.12
Aggregating actual results (eg. number of parliaments
strengthened) is not practical. Results are too numerous and diverse.

Aggregating outcomes (eg. maternal mortality rates) runs straight in to the
problems of attribution and data availability. Outcomes that are
uncertainly, partially and variably attributable to the agency (such as girls
enrolment rates) make little sense as corporate results. Logical
44
frameworks or similar may or may not help at country level, but are
unlikely to do so at corporate level. Aggregating the number of
programmes implemented in each results area as in the UNDP SRF
merely measures activities, not results or performance.
7.13
The solution probably lies in aggregating results and performance
ratings or scores. This is the approach already adopted by the World

Bank in the ARDE, and UNDP in the ROAR. At country level the agency
would measure its performance by aggregating intervention-level results
and performance scores, plus additional country level performance
measures (eg. partnership quality). At the corporate level the agency
would aggregate intervention-level and country-level results and
performance scores, allocated by priority area as appropriate. A key
requirement for this approach is reliable and comparable ratings. Once
again, this points to the need to strengthen country- and intervention-level
monitoring and evaluation systems if management information systems
and agency reports are to contain credible and useful information.
Incentives
7.14
It is tempting to see the relatively slow transition of large institutions
like the World Bank to more results-based approaches as simply proof of

how long it takes to effect fundamental change. While this is undoubtably
true, other factors are probably at work. RBM is just the latest in a very
long line of efforts to make development agencies improve the
measurement, monitoring and reporting of their effectiveness. Indicators,
logical frameworks, and evaluation studies all wax and wane in popularity,
but none quite makes the difference expected. Unless we can identify why
the track record of performance measurement and management is so
long and disappointing, RBM is unlikely to lead to a significant
improvement.
45
7.15
Two of the possible reasons have already been mentioned. First,
development agencies have been trying to implement improved

monitoring and evaluation in difficult and unreformed environments. RBM
needs to be part and parcel of public sector reform in developing
countries. Second, results-based approaches are more difficult to apply to
the work of international development agencies than to domestic OECD
government agencies. They can be applied, but this will require
adaptation and time.
7.16
The third possible reason has to do with incentives at both
institutional and individual level: specifically, the greater incentive to

spend money and implement activities than to deliver and account for
results. Much has been written about the need to get away from a focus
on inputs and activities, and to replace it with a focus on results. Actual
incentives may still point the other way. The literature suggests that
donors and recipients have a common interest in spending money, but a
mismatch of objectives, and a weak interest in monitoring and
demonstrating results.
7.17
55
Within donors, a persistent theme is that spending has continued to
be driven by an approvals culture that reflects a set of incentives to

donor-agency staff to maximise the volume of new spending without
taking adequate account of implementation risks. Mention has already
been made of the Wapenhans and TAPOMA reports in the early 1990s.
In spite of waves of managerial changes since, anecdotal evidence from
the World Bank and elsewhere suggests that not much has changed. 56
55
Killick (1997) and Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995) quoted in Shepherd, G. (op cit).
Delivering Project Aid in Old and New Ways: Institutions Matter. Geoffrey Shepherd. Workshop Paper
(May 2002) p.21
56
46
7.18
Several factors contribute to this incentive to spend money and
implement activities. For multilateral banks, lending plays an important

role in covering the running costs. Lending is what banks do. For other
development agencies, the amount spent is the easiest and most
immediate measure of its contribution to the global development effort. It
is much easier for an agency to say that it has spent more and will spend
more, than it is to demonstrate that it has achieved more. Agencies and
departments are criticised for under-spending their budgets. Furthermore,
the growing complexity of projects and programmes militates against
effective monitoring, while bureaucratic politics (ie. the bureaucratic
interest in the agencies) may favour [a] model of credible financial
commitment and non-credible implementation commitment. 57
7.19
Staff members face similar incentives. The amount spent and the
number of policy-consistent activities started are easy to measure and

report. More of both gets you noticed and promoted. Results on the other
hand are difficult to measure and attribute, and take years to appear. Most
staff will have moved to other posts by the time the result of their work
become evident (para.6.13). An emphasis on quality at entry may,
perversely, have further reduced staff interest in quality at exit. The fact
that far more time and effort is expended on project appraisal documents
than on project completion reports is indicative of the incentives that
exist 58 .
7.20
Recipient governments have a common interest in spending donor
resources, but a much weaker interest in any implementation conditions.

More importantly, one of the drivers of RBM in OECD countries a client
focus and democratic accountability for the quality of services delivered
may be weaker in many developing countries. Clientelistic politics, and a
57
Geoffrey Shepherd (op cit) p.26

Project appraisal documents do, of course, hold out the potential of changing things for the better,
whereas project completion reports can only report on what has or has not changed.
58
47
primary commitment to private and political ends rather than to poverty

alleviation, will further undermine interest in results. 59
7.21
The existence of these incentives does not mean that an improved
results-focus is not possible. It does, however, mean that it will not just
happen. Institutions and staff cannot be made individually accountable for
outcomes and impacts in developing countries. They can be made more
accountable for reporting more effectively on their processes, strategies,
and near-term results, and for evaluating their contribution. The
experience of the World Bank Quality Assurance Group (QUAG) shows
that it is possible to alter internal incentives. Similar mechanisms could be
used to shift incentives towards results-based management.
7.22
The other key to increasing incentives is for management to use
results information. There is little point, except for external image

purposes, in reporting results but not acting on them. The reticence of
some institutions to contemplate results-based budgeting needs to be
challenged. In the medium- to long-run, resources need to be directed to
individuals, departments, sectors and countries that can make the
greatest contribution to outcomes and impacts. Avoiding this may make
results-based approaches more acceptable in the short-term, but
ultimately it is self-defeating. RBM without resource implications is not
RBM.
59
Improving Aid to Africa. Van de Walle, N. and Johnson, T. Overseas Development Council, Washington
(1996) quoted in Shepherd, G. (op cit)
48
8.
Conclusions
8.1 Results-based management is the latest in a very long line of efforts to make
development agencies more effective. It is also the latest in a very long line of
efforts to improve the measurement, monitoring and reporting of
effectiveness. This is not to diminish its potential significance. Thinking about
development in terms of outcomes and impacts, rather than inputs, activities
and outputs, is a powerful idea that has major implications for how
multilateral development institutions operate.
8.2 All five institutions are, to a greater or lesser extent, engaging with resultsbased management. All have made a commitment to increase their resultsfocus, and all have taken steps to, or are working on, improving the planning
and reporting of results. As befits their different histories, mandates and
cultures, there is enormous variety in their approaches and progress.
8.3 Five conclusions emerge from this study. First, results-based management is
easier said than done, particularly for development institutions, and
particularly given the new focus on country and global results. The
application of RBM to development institutions is an attempt to stretch the
approach from one institutional context (government in developed countries)
to a very different one. It is also an attempt to stretch the approach from one
category of activity where is relatively easy to apply (projects) to one where it
is not (country and corporate). Institutions should not underestimate the
challenge.
8.4 Second, implementing RBM within multilateral development institutions is

only half the task, and probably the easier half at that. MDIs work through
and with developing country governments to realise and measure results. It
follows that greater support for the introduction of RBM in developing
countries, and associated public sector reform, is essential. Attempts to
49
implement RBM within MDIs alone, or within developing countries but without
a supportive policy and fiscal environment, are unlikely to succeed.
8.5 Third, there are tensions and trade-offs between the two uses of results
information: accountability and management. The reality is that external
accountability is driving much of the recent push for improved RBM.
Multilateral agencies are under pressure to demonstrate results. They are
under less pressure to manage for and/or by results. Unless this is corrected,
the result will be an over-emphasis on measuring and reporting results, and
insufficient emphasis on using results information for internal management.
The obvious risk is that so-called results-based approaches will lead more to
an increase in the results claimed by institutions, than an increase in the
results actually achieved.
8.6 Fourth, RBM in development co-operation has to face up to the challenge of

attribution. Outcomes and impacts are too distant in time and causality to be
the practical focus of management. For all practical purposes, development
agencies have little option but to manage for outcomes in the medium- to
long-term, and to manage by outputs, indicators and other measures of
performance (eg. partnership, strategy and process) in the short-term.
Technical challenges include developing simple, reliable and meaningful
leading indicators, and workable approaches to both credible contribution
and aggregation.
8.7 Fifth, multilateral development institutions need to work to amend their

internal incentive structures in favour of results. This is also easier said than
done. It implies working to correct the continued bias in favour of inputs and
activities, as well as giving substance to results-based budgeting. Resources
and recognition needs to flow to those individuals, units, sectors and
countries with the best record of managing for, and delivering, results.
50
8.8 Finally, this study has implications for those supporting and monitoring the
progress of results-based management within multilateral development
institutions. The clear message of this report is that RBM is not something
that has either been introduced or not. RBM implies far-reaching changes
throughout the institution. All of these five institutions are trying, in different
ways and with different degrees of success, to increase their results
orientation. The understandable temptation is to claim a greater degree of
change, and a greater impact, than may exist in reality. It follows that
assessing the quality and extent of management change is not a
straightforward task. Increasing support for the introduction of RBM will need
to be accompanied by a more sophisticated approach to its monitoring.
51
ANNEX A
STRATEGIC PLANNING COUNTRY LEVEL
UNDP
Document
Logical framework 63
MDGs
GOALS 64
Indicators
Targets
OUTCOMES
Indicators
Targets
OUTPUTS
Indicators
Targets
ACTIVITIES 65
INPUTS
UNIFEM
60
UNICEF
Country Programme
Outline
Country Note
61
WB
IDB
Country Assistance
Strategy 62
Country Paper
60
UNIFEM has regional and sub-regional programmes.

Detailed Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Plans (IMEPs) are prepared for each programme area.
62
CASs are very varied. This table is based on the CAS Program Matrix for Chile (January 2002).
63
Or results chain, logic model, etc..
64
Overall objectives (UNICEF)
65
Bank strategy and interventions (IDB)
61
52
STRATEGIC PLANNING CORPORATE
Document
Logical framework 66
MDGs
GOALS 67
Indicators
Targets
SUB-GOALS
Indicators
OUTCOMES
Indicators
Targets
OUTPUTS
ACTIVITY AREAS 69
INPUTS
ANNEX B
UNDP
UNIFEM
UNICEF
WB
IDB
Strategic Results
Framework 2000-03
Strategy and Business

Plan 2000-03
Medium Term Strategic

Plan 2002-05
Strategic Framework
Paper 2001
Institutional Strategy
I999
24
142
120 68
84
28
89
66
70
Or results chain, logic model, etc..

Organizational Priorities (UNICEF); Strategic Objectives (UNIFEM); Main Objectives (IDB)
68
In 2002 the outcomes of the SBP were consolidated into a more focused Outcome Framework contained in the document Tracking Progress. This reduced the
number of UNIFEM outcomes to 48.
69
Strategic Areas of Support (UNDP and UNICEF); Core Intervention Areas (UNICEF); Key Pillars (WBG); Priority Areas (IDB)
70
The relatively small number of activity areas for WB and IDB is misleading. The reality is a much larger number of areas of intervention.
67
53
ANNEX C
REFERENCES
CIDA Results-Based Management and Accountability for Enhanced Aid
Effectiveness. A Reference Paper. Policy Branch. July 2002.
Flint, M., and Jones, S. - Assessing Development Effectiveness. DER Working
Paper 1. DFID Evaluation Department. 2001.
IDA Measuring Outputs and Outcomes in IDA Countries. February 2002.
IDB Development Effectiveness Report. Office of Evaluation and Oversight.
February 2002.
IDB Development Effectiveness at the IDB. Paper for the Board of Executive
Directors. January 2002.
IDB Ecuador Country Paper. 2001.
IDB Brazil Country Paper. 2000.
IDB Chile Country Paper. 2001.
IDB Country Paper Guidelines. February 2002.
IDB Renewing the Commitment to Development: Report of the Working Group
on Institutional Strategy. 1999.
Killick, T. Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality. Journal of
International Development, Vol.9, No.4, 483-495. 1997.
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., and Toye, J. Aid and Power: the World Bank and
Policy Based Lending. Routledge, New York. 1995.
OECD Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management.
DAC. 2002.
OECD Results Based Management in the Development Co-operation
Agencies: A review of experience. Annette Binnendijk. DAC. 2001.
Poate, D. Measuring and managing results. Report for UNDP. 1997.
Schacter, M. Results-Based Management and Multilateral Programming at
CIDA a discussion paper. Institute of Governance, Ottawa, Canada. 1999.
54
Shepherd, G. Delivering Project Aid in Old and New Ways: Institutions Matter.
Workshop Paper. May 2002.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat Results-Based Management Lexicon.
2002.
UNDP - Annual Report of the Administrator for 1997. 1998.
UNDP Results-Orientated Monitoring and Evaluation: a Handbook for
Programme Managers. 1997.
UNDP Results Based Management: Overview and Principles.
UNDP Results Based Management Concepts and Methodology. Technical
Note. 2000.
UNDP Multi-Year Funding Framework. 1998.
UNDP First Country Co-operation Framework for Mongolia (1997-2001). 1997.
UNDP Country Programme Outline for India (2003-2007). June 2002.
UNDP Country Programme Outline for Malaysia (2003-2007). June 2002.
UNDP Second Country Co-operation Framework for Malawi (2002-2006).
2001.
UNDP Second Regional Co-operation Framework for Africa (2002-2006).
February 2002.
UNDP Results Orientated Annual Report, 2001. 2002.
UNICEF Report on the Evaluation Function in the Context of the Medium-Term
Strategic Plan. 2002.
UNICEF Medium-Term Strategic Plan for the Period 2002-05. 2001.
UNIFEM Report of the Executive Director. September 2002.
UNIFEM - How are we doing? Tracking UNIFEM progress in achieving results for
management and learning. Briefing Note. 2002.
Van de Walle, N. and Johnston, T. Improving Aid to Africa. Overseas
Development Council, Washington. 1996.
55
World Bank Development Co-operation and the Monterrey Challenge. OED

Working Paper. June 2002.
World Bank - Strategic Framework. 2001.
World Bank Strategy Update Paper for FY03-05: Implementing the World
Banks Strategic Framework. March 2002.
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for Brazil. May
2002.
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Chile. January 2002.
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Pakistan. June 2002.
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Belarus. February 2002.
World Bank Annual Report on Operations Evaluation 2001-01. OED. 2002.
World Bank - Better Measuring, Monitoring and Managing for Development
Results. Development Committee Paper. September 2002.
World Bank - Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2001. OED. 2002.
World Bank Assessment of the Strategic Compact. 2001.
56

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EASIER SAID THAN DONE

A REVIEW OF RESULTS - BASED MANAGEMENT

This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Department

Michael Flint & Partners

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Annual review of development effectiveness

4. The introduction and implementation of RBM within large institutions is never

developing country capacity

5. Results-based management is the latest in a very long line of efforts to

6. Five conclusions emerge from this study:

results-based management is easier said than done, particularly for

Multilateral development institutions work through and with developing

RBM in development co-operation has to face up to the challenge of

option but to manage for outcomes in the medium- to long-term, but to

multilateral development institutions need to work to amend their internal

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

The World Bank

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

What is Results-Based Management?

2.3 This is a potentially important distinction. A key feature of RBM is the

Results-Based Management Lexicon. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002).

Outcome : the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an

Impacts : positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects

Effect : intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an

2.5 The accepted way of linking inputs to outcomes, and of demonstrating

multidimensional causation, and are extremely difficult to attribute to one

Lower infant mortality

Finance and skills

2.6 It follows that the requirement for describable or measurable attribution

2.7 The OECD DAC defines results-based management as a management

2.8 Another definition of RBM is provided by the Treasury Board of Canada.

Box 2: Results-based management

1. Strategic planning: defining clear and measurable results and indicators,

A much fuller discussion can be found in OECD DAC (2001) op cit

The history of results-based approaches

RBM is also applicable at a fourth, cross-cutting, level : the sector.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

programme results. This step initiated the introduction of RBM in UNDP 12

Strategic Results Framework

Results-Orientated Annual Report

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

However, it is acknowledged in the same report that new monitoring and

evaluation mechanisms are needed, with greater focus on assessing

UNIFEM Report of the Executive Director. September 2002.

United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)

3.15 Most recently, UNICEF has produced a Medium-Term Strategic Plan

UNICEF also recognises that its evaluation function needed strengthening 15 .

UNICEF must establish its organisational priorities, define objectives, define

results agenda with respect to corporate reporting, staff incentives and

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

3.24 Despite the increasing commitment of management to results, IDB accepts

4.3 Annex A contains a summary assessment of country planning documents.

4.4 The 2002 Development Effectiveness Report (DER) provides a frank

Box 4 : IDB Strategy Matrix examples

Brazil (2000), Ecuador (2001), and Chile (2001).

as the Banks contribution to country outcomes 22 . This is very much work

4.7 Better anchoring of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) in the

Country Paper Guidelines. IDB. February 2002

Box 5 : UNDP results framework examples

This is an advance on earlier UNDP Country Cooperation