Does the political art imitate nature?

Teleology and natural science in Aristotles Politics

Presented at University of Dayton, April 11, 2015
By Thornton Lockwood
Quinnipiac University, Department of Philosophy

I) Leunissens central claims1

1) Specific and general biological knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for political science.
-Claim (1): Aristotles political science draws upon his natural science in much more than a
rudimentary or background way. Specific details of biological knowledge (for instance, that
humans are political animals and thus desire company) serve as constraints upon ethical
philosophizing. Further, arguments based on human function (EN 1.7) and human psychology
(EN 1.13) presuppose a general understanding of natural scientific concepts such as the scala
naturae of animate beings and soul partition.
-Thus, KNS shows
that Aristotle assumes students of political science to know rather specific facts (to
hoti) about life and nature, as can only be provided by the theoretical science of
biology, and in general, to be well-educated in the natural sciences so as to be able to
judge successfully what is said and what is said not well (PA 1.1.63915-6), without them
having to be expert natural scientists themselves. This type of knowledge of the natural
sciences is, as I will argue, a necessary condition if one wants to learn how to live well.
(KNS: 3-4)
-Analyses which support claim (1) [see further claim (3)]
-The account of human flourishing is delimited by a biological notion of humans as
political animals which are in need of other beings (KNS: 7-10).
-Natural teleology is pervasive in the Politics (see further below on 2A).
-The ethnological basis on which the political scientist selects citizens of the best
constitution (Pol 7.7) is grounded in the account of environmental causation found in
the biological works (NC).
1

In my paper I draw upon the following texts by Mariska Leunissen. Underlined text is my emphasis.
Explanation and Teleology in Aristotles Science of Nature. Cambridge, 2010. [ET]
Aristotle on Natural Character and its Implications for Moral Development. Journal of the History of Philosophy
50 (2012): 507-530. [NC]
Becoming Good Starts with Nature: Aristotle on the Moral Advantages and the Heritability of Good Natural
Character. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44 (2013): 99-127. [BG]
Aristotle on Knowing Natural Science for the Sake of Learning How to Live Well. In D. Henry and K. Nielsen (eds.),
Bridging the Gap Between Aristotles Science and Ethics. Cambridge, forthcoming. [KNS]
Perfection and the Physiology of Habituation in Physics VII 3. In M. Leunissen (ed.), Aristotles Physics: A Critical
Guide. Cambridge, forthcoming. [PP]
Biology and Teleology in Aristotles Account of the City. In J. Rocca (ed.), Teleology in the Ancient World: The
Dispensation of Nature. Cambridge, forthcoming. [BT]

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Does the political art imitates nature?
-The eugenic breeding program enacted in the best constitution (Pol. 7.16) and
Aristotles remarks about hereditary natural characteristics are grounded in biological
principles of hereditary (BG).
2) Aristotles Politics is a hybrid treatiseone which draws upon both natural science and
practical sciencewhich exemplifies the claim that (the political) art should imitate nature.2
Claim (2.A): The account of the city by nature in Politics 1.2 is a hybrid of biological and
ethical/political analysis (BT).
-Analyses which support claim (2A):
-The Politics draws upon concepts like primary/secondary teleology, etiological
explanation, and the principle that nature does nothing in vain (BT; ET: 41-42).
-The city by nature of Politics 1.2 is composed of two stages, one which is the result of
nature or primary teleology (i.e., individuals come together based on natural desires
to seek what is necessary for life), and one which is the result of legislative art or
secondary teleology (i.e., which seeks to establish what promotes living well).3
Claim (2.B): The political art imitates and perfects what nature seeks but does incompletely.
-Analyses which support claim (2B):
-The second stage of the account of the natural city in Politics 1.2, that which articulates
the legislative art which aims at living well, imitates the living well which is an aspect
of secondary teleology in the biological works. Thus the legislative art imitates
secondary natural teleology (BT: 10-11, 14).4
-In general, ethical habituation is a form of helping humans complete or perfect their
natures (PP: 255-256).
-The lawmaker of the best constitution draws citizens from the best ethnic peoples in
order to reproduce their natural characteristics, which by nature tend to be most
conducive to moral development (NC).
-The lawmaker of the best constitution proposes eugenic birthing proposals (e.g., best
age for women and men to reproduce, best season of the year to copulate, best bodily
characteristics) to facilitate natures tendency to transmit desirable hereditary
characteristics such as natural virtue (BG).

That art imitates nature is a claim found in Physics 2.2.194a21-23, 2.8.199a15-16. Cf. Aquinas, Prologue to his
commentary on the Politics and De Regno, I.3.
3
ET defines primary teleology as a process that involves the realization of a preexisting potential for form through
stages shaped by conditional necessity, where the fully realized form constitutes the final cause of the process
(18); secondary teleology is a process that involves a formal nature of an animal using materials for something
good, where those materials happen to be available in the animal, usually as a result of material necessity, and
are not strictly speaking the result of conditional necessity (19). Example of primary teleology: the substantial
being of birds requires them to have wings as something necessary to their existence; example of secondary
teleology: human hair comes about through material necessity, but it also serves to protect the human head from
sun and cold, and thus allows humans to live well.
4
Secondary teleology can be effected by immanent material causes (e.g., the development of teeth) or by external
efficient causes (e.g., the human cultivation of agriculture). Mariskas analysis of the city seems modeled on her
analysis of how winter rain is teleologically related to human agriculture. (See Phy 2.8.198b16-23; ET: 30-31)

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Does the political art imitates nature?
3) Understanding the natural science of humans makes the political task of ethical
development easier [point in support of claim (1)].
Claim (3): Although ethical and intellectual virtues do not exist by nature, their precursors or
foundation consists of natural characteristics (proto-ethical virtues) and natural capabilities
(proto-practical wisdom) that are, to some extent, predicable and the result of natural causes
which natural science can articulate. Good ethical development is easier in individuals which
possess good natural characteristics and capabilities. Therefore, understanding natural science
facilitates or makes easier ethical development. (BG: 100, 103-104, 116; NC: 511-12, 524, 527)
Texts which support claim (3):
In his ethnological account of natural characteristics, Aristotle claims:
Let us now discuss what sort of natural qualities [citizens] should have. One may
pretty much grasp what these qualities are by looking at those Greek city-states that
have a good reputation, and at the way the entire inhabited world is divided into
nations.The Greek race, however, occupies an intermediate position
geographically, and so shares bin both [Asian and European] sets of characteristics.
For it is both spirited and intelligent. That is precisely why it remains free, governed
in the best way, and capable, if it chances upon a single constitution, of ruling all the
others. Greek nations also differ from one another in these ways. For some have a
nature that is one-sided, whereas in others both of these capabilities are well
blended. It is evident, then, that both spirit and intelligence should be present in the
natures of people if they are to be easily guided (euaggous) to virtue by the
legislator. (Pol 7.7.1327b17-23, 29-38)5
Prior to his account of how a person becomes excellent, Aristotle claims:
We have already determined the sorts of natures people should have if it is to be
easy for the legislator to take them in hand (eucheirtous). Everything thereafter is
a task for education. For some things are learned by habituation, others by
instruction. (Pol 7.13.1332b7-11; cf. 7.15.1334b7-8)
In his account of controlled breeding in the best constitution, Aristotle claims:
Since, then, the legislator should see to it from the start that the bodies of children
being reared develop in the best possible way, he must first supervise the union of
the sexes, and determine what sorts of people should have martial relations with
one another, and when. (Pol 7.16.1334b29-32)
(4) Nature imposes limits on individual ethical development
Claim (4): Leunissen writes
Since, then, the human natural character traits form the foundation for the
development of moral virtues, regional differences between natural traits entail
differences in the moral development of the humans in question. As it turns out,
Aristotle believes that only very few humans possess the appropriate natural traits that
make the transition to moral virtue easy, or even possible. In other words, Aristotles
5

Translations to generally follow Aristotle Politics, C.D.C. Reeve trans. (Indianapolis, 1998) and Aristotle
Nicomachean Ethics, C.D.C. Reeve trans. (Indianapolis, 2013) with occasional emendation.

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Does the political art imitates nature?
environmental determinism regarding natural character has important ethical
consequences: habituation and moral education are successful mostly for those lucky,
freeborn men who are already naturally disposed toward the development of virtue.
(NC: 509-510; cf. BG: 115-116)
Qualifications to claim (4):
Natural characteristics (a.k.a. natural virtue) differ from full ethical virtue; whereas the
former are not up to us, in numerous places Aristotle insists that the latter are (NC: 507,
523; BG: 115; cf. EN 3.5.1144b34-35).
Although natural traits predispose an individual towards ethical development, ethnographic
natural traits are not permanent obstacles to ethical development: even barbarians may
be able to achieve happiness through early and significant ethical habituation and
instruction, although such is not the case for natural slaves (BG: 528).
There is no intrinsic or reliable connection between having a good natural character,
being well born (eugens), and natural talent (euphuia), even though there are hereditary
connections between them (NC: 115-116).
Children do not consistently bear the natural character of their parents and the production
of excellent men is subject to fluctuations (NC: 113, 125; cf. Rhet 2.15.1390b21-31)

II) Questions about Leunissens claims

Claim (1): Biological knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for political science.
Objections/questions:
Aristotles various discussions of the knowledge requisite for the legislator/audience of
EN/POL makes no reference to the study of nature; rather, if anything it focuses on the
study of empirical legislation (EN 10.9.118023 ff.) or a general musical education that also is
described as preparing one to judge well (Pol 8.6.1341a35-39).6 Indeed, the educational
program in Pol 7/8 has minimal scientific/academic content: whereas two years are
devoted to other studies, most of the teen years are devoted to preparation for military
duty (see appendix).7 Although the audience of the practical works is described as being
generally educated (EN 1.3.1094b27-95a2), there is no explicit evidence that that includes
natural science.
Aristotle is rather critical of the aloof naivet of Hippodamusone of the first city planners,
and one whom Aristotle explicitly notes was a student of the whole of nature (Pol
2.8.1267b28).
One of the most important methodological accounts in the Politics (4.1) likens the politikos
to a trainer who understands the regimen appropriate for different body-types. Although
the subsequent discussion of constitutions makes numerous reference to taxonomical

Aristotle does draw analogies between medical knowledge and political science which may offer additional
support for Mariskas position (see further KNS: 5-7). See W.W. Jaeger, Aristotles Use of Medicine as a Model of
Method in his Ethics. Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957): 5461.
7
Mariska examines Aristotles discussion of habituation/education in the last two books of the Politics (PP: 256258), but she doesnt relate them to the claims of KNS, viz. that education in natural science is a necessary part of a
citizens education in the best regime.

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Does the political art imitates nature?

principles reminiscent of the natural sciences, does a trainer require an understanding of

the material causes of the bodies he or she trains?
Does biology inform Aristotles discussion of autarkeia? Although one of the arguments in
EN 9.9 makes use of phusikoi logoi details (1170a13 ff.), the chapter presents several
arguments in support of that claim and most operate at the level of endoxa. Elsewhere in
the discussion of friendship Aristotle explicitly denies that the perspective of the phusikos is
relevant (8.1.1155b8-10; cf. EN 7.3.1147a24, EE 7.1.1235a10, Pol 1.5.1254a31).8 Is ta
phusika in EN 8.1 (1155b8)viz., the notion of philia as a cosmic force as discussed in
Empedocles or Heraclitusdifferent from the generalists knowledge of biology?
Although the function argument (EN 1.7) makes use of a scala naturae to determine the
idion human function, how much natural science does that presuppose? In Republic I
(352d-354a) Socrates proposes a version of the function argument that uses examples from
nature (horse, eye, soul) without drawing upon the scala naturae. Did Socrates argument
presuppose specific biological knowledge?
Apropos the political psychology of EN 1.13: it is striking that that account explicitly
brackets the question of the reality of the various parts in question (1102a28-32). A
reified partite psychology of EN 1.13 also appears at odds with De Anima (see DA I.4:
411c30-b5, III.9: 432a22ff).9

Claim (2.A): The account of the city by nature in Politics 1.2 is a hybrid of biological and
ethical analysis (BT).
Objections/questions:
Welcome (to me, at any rate) is buttressing the account of the best constitution (specifically
in 7.7 and 7.16) with a natural scientific basis. Developmental readings had dismissed the
account of the best constitution in Pol 7/8 as an exercise in youthful Platonism;
contemporaries (Miller, Kraut) lean towards treating it as a regulative ideal with no direct
practical relevance.10 If Mariska is right about the biological underpinnings of some of its
discussions, then developmental readings have it backwards: the best regime presupposes
rather than pushes against empirical tendencies.
But if Mariskas account pours cold water on the developmental readings, it still doesnt
explicitly address the problem which sparked the fire: although Aristotles discussion of
nature is pervasive throughout Politics 1, it is very rare outside of the Politics 1-7/8 strata
(and in Politics 7/8 it is generally below the surface). Do claims about the hybrid nature of
the Politics hold up when one turns to the problem of justice (in Politics 3)? The account of
diversity of constitutions (Politics 3, 4, 6)? The account of stasis (Politics 5)?
8

Aristotle also invokes physiological insights in the practical treatises: See EN 7.3.1147b8-9, 7.14.1154b8. De
Anima claims that the natural philosopher and the dialectician can give alternative and non-contradictory accounts
of anger: the former defines anger as the surging of blood and heat around the heart (identifying material
aspects of the phenomenon) and the later defines it as desire for retaliation (identifying its form or eidos). DA
I.1.403a29-b3; cf. EN 7.6.1149a25-33.
9
Mariska has a detailed response to these questions (KNS: 12-14; PP: 264) which goes beyond what I can address.
10
Ober is one of the few exceptions to that trend; he argues that that Aristotles city of ones prayers was a blueprint for colonists targeting Asia Minor in the 330s following Macedonian expansion

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Does the political art imitates nature?

What point does the account of the natural city in Politics 1.2 serve in the first place? Why
is it important for Aristotle that the city is natural? Is that a natural scientific fact
(analogous say to the account of the origin of cities in Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book 5)?
Or does it establish the basis for responding to the aporia which starts Politics 1.1, viz. how
to differentiate rule (see Cherry, Plato, Aristotle, and the Purpose of Politics [CUP: 2012])?

Claim (2.B): The political art imitates and perfects what nature seeks incompletely.
Objections/questions:
If Politics 1.2 presents a two-stage account of the natural city, one which draws upon both
primary and secondary teleology, there remain a few tensions with the nature/artifact
dilemma originally proposed by Keyt. First, if theres a firm division between the two
stages, does that imply that the first-stage natural city can somehow arise without lawgivers
as efficient causes? Im reminded of Humes criticism of the Lockean state of nature: surely
long before there was anything like a sovereign state brought into existence by the will of
the people there were tribes, warlords, and institutional structures that are proto-political.
Is there room for those structures in the two-tiered model? Second, if the first-tier account
of the city is indeed natural, and sopresumably, something that happens for the most
parthow does one make sense of the fact (of which Aristotle was quite well aware) that
the polis is a political institution which is structural and demographically different from
tribes, ethnic nations, and empires? If by natural one means usual or commonplace, then
the polis described in Politics 1.2certainly in the second stage, but arguably even in the
first stageis profoundly unnatural.
Claim (3): Understanding natural human biology makes the political task of ethical
development easier.
Objections/questions:
Politics 7.7 suggests that determining native qualities can be grasped by looking at those
Greek city states that have a good reputation (blepsas epi te tas poleis tas eudokimousas
tn Hellnn [1327b21]). Both Politics 2 and 7-8 make rather clear that places such as
Sparta and Cretepoliteiai of good reputation (see e.g. Pol 2.1.1260b31-32, 2.11.1273b2526; cf. 7.14.1333b6-7)were seriously flawed (Politics 7-8 describes the citizens of Sparta in
terms of being banausic or servile). Indeed, I have argued that the best regime in
Aristotles book on best regimes (viz. Politics 2) is actually Carthage, which is of course a
Phoenician, non-Greek city. Might Pol 7.7 have any ironic undertones?
Although its hard to argue against the claim that good natures make ethical development
easier, I think Mariska fails to bring out the extent to which natural virtue is itself
problematic for its possessor. For instance, although Mariska makes mention of the
discussion of natural virtue in EN 6.12-13 (probably the longest reflection on the subject in
the ethical treatises), I think she understates the ways in which natural traits actually make
ethical development more difficult.11 For instance,
11

Mariska seems to articulate this process in a three stage fashion, viz. moving from natural character traits to
natural virtues to character virtues (PP: 258-59). Im unsure what is the difference between the first and
second stages.

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Does the political art imitates nature?

About proto phronesis (i.e., cleverness) Aristotle writes:

There is, then, a capacity called cleverness (deinotta), and this is the sort of thing that,
when it comes to the things that further hitting a proposed target, is able to do these
and to hit upon them. If, then, the target is a noble one, this capacity is praiseworthy,
but if it is a base one, it is unscrupulous (panourgia). That is why both practically-wise
people and unscrupulous ones are said to be clever. (EN 6.12.1144a23-28)
About proto ethical virtue (i.e., natural virtue) Aristotle writes:
For virtue is also in much the same situation: as practical wisdom is related to
clevernessnot the same but similarso natural virtue is related to full virtue. For
everyone thinks that each character trait is possessed in some way naturally, since we
are in fact just, disposed to temperance, courageous, and the rest straight from birth.
All the same, we look for what is fully good to be something else and for such qualities
to be possessed in another way. For to both children and wild beasts these natural
states also belong; but without understanding (nous) they are evidently harmful. At any
rate, this much we can surely see: that just as a heavy body moving around without
sight suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it happens in this case too. (EN
6.13.1144b2-9)
In sum, the natural virtues present what I would call the Alcibiades problem of ethical
development. No doubt, excellence seems to presuppose some raw natural talent AND its
proper guidance. But Aristotles descriptions of natural virtue bring out that such traits are
profoundly dangerous to their possessors. If the closing pages of Platos Symposium are any
guide, training an Alcibiades for true virtue hardly seems like an easy venture (although
perhaps I play on an equivocation about what Mariska means by easier).

Claim (4): Environmental ethical determinism

Although Mariska qualifies her claim, I still stumble over the assertion that the human
natural character traits form the foundation for the development of moral virtue. What
does the term foundation mean here? Does it imply a limit to development? Putting
aside the cases of the natural slaves and women, is there a person whose natural character
traits preclude ethical development in the best regime?
Mariska cites (NC: 524, PP: 249) Aristotles remarks on ethos, phusis, and logos:
But surely people become excellent because of three things. The three are nature,
habit, and reason (logos). For first one must possess a certain nature from birth, namely
that of a human being, and not that of some other animal. Similarly, ones body and
soul must be of a certain sort. But in the case of some of these qualities, there is no
benefit in just being born with them, because they are altered by our habits. For some
qualities are naturally capable of being developed by habit either in a better direction or
in a worse one. The other animals mostly live under the guidance of nature alone,
although some are guided a little by habit. But human beings live under the guidance of
reason as well, since they alone have reason. Consequently, all three of these factors
need to be harmonized with one another. For people often act contrary to their habits
and their nature because of reason, if they happen to be persuaded that some other
course of action is better. (Pol 7.13.1332a39-32b8)

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Does the political art imitates nature?

Nature and habit seem fluid in Aristotles account of ethical development, which indeed
should be the case if art imitates or completes nature (one of Mariskas key insights).
Consider, for instance, the first instance of habituation which Aristotle recommends in the
best constitution:
It is beneficial, too, to habituate children to the cold right from the time they are small,
since this is very useful both from the point of view of health and from that of military
affairs. That is why many Barbarians have the custom of submerging newborn children in
a cold-river, whereas many othersfor example, the Celtsdress them in light clothing.
For whenever it is possible to create habits, it is better to create them from the start, but
to do so gradually. And because their bodily condition is hot, children are naturally suited
to being trained to bear the cold. (Pol 7.17.1336a12-21)
Aristotles first example of ethical habituation for his Greek best constitution draws upon
barbarian practices to alter the natural character of his presumably Greek native citizens.
The polarities of Greek/barbarian and nature/habit seem blurred.

Appendix: Aristotles age-class educational program (Politics 7.17-8.7)

Seven-year
age-classes
Birth to age
7 (Pol 7.17)

Sub-class
divisions
Birth to year
2 (in
household)
2 to 5 years
(in
household)

5 to 7 years
(in public)

Age 8 to
puberty (Pol
8.1-7)

No clear
breaks (in
public)

Puberty to
age 21 (Pol
8.4)

15-17
(in public)
18-21
(in public)

Bodily development
-Proper nourishment
and movement for
bodily development.
-Bodily exercise in
play and games.
-Crying and screaming
permitted to develop
lungs.
-Light but nonstrenuous exercise.
-No strict dietary
restrictions

-Continuation of light
exercise (?)
-Strenuous
paramilitary training.

Habituated
development
-Habituation to cold.

Intellectual
development
-No remarks

-Games should be
neither illiberal nor
onerous, but instead
imitate serious roles
for adulthood.
-Avoid slaves.
-Outlaw aischrologia.
-Censor unseemly
pictures and stories.
-Ethical development
through music.
-Development of
loving/hating .
-Drawing to facilitate
contemplation
-No remarks

-No learning
(mathsis) which
impedes bodily
growth.

-Attendance at
comedies and public
theatre (?).

-Serve as observer
which will learn in
second age-class.
-Reading/writing.
-Development of
judgment (krinein)
through instrumental
and choral music.
-Musical education
-Other studies
(natural science?)
-No studies:
strenuous physical
activity precludes
intellectual studies.