The Boys Have Lost Their Love For Land: Reparation Programs For Colombia's Displaced Population

Marcin Sliwa
The boys have lost their love for land:

Reparation programs for Colombias displaced population
Masters Thesis in Urban Ecological Planning

Trondheim, Norway
May 2015
Supervisors:
Professor David Sanderson
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Ph.D. Henrik Wiig
Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art
Department of Urban Design and Planning
Abstract
Over 5.7 million people were displaced in the ongoing Colombian armed conflict, the
majority of them from rural to urban areas. After 2010, the government initiated two largescale reparation programs for displaced population: Land Restitution and Free Housing. The
first initiative aims to restore the rights of victims to the dispossessed properties and
encourages their return to the countryside. The intent of the second program is to provide free
houses in cities where they settled after the displacement. This thesis examines how those two
programs affect the livelihoods of the displaced households in Northern Colombia, one of the
most affected regions by the conflict.
The empirical data and observations indicate that in the short term the Free Housing program
has had a positive impact on the beneficiary households as it allows affected people to sustain
and advance the livelihoods they developed in the city after displacement. On the other hand,
Land Restitution fails to preserve or improve the current livelihood situation of the displaced
households, as return to the depopulated rural areas and the reestablishment of agricultural
activities for many is not seen as an attractive and economically viable alternative. This is
especially true for the younger members of the displaced households, who, as one informant
said, have lost their love for land.
Key words: Livelihood, Housing, Land Restitution, Reparation, Social policy, Latin America,
Colombia
ii
Resumen en espaol
Ms de 5.7 millones de personas fueron vctimas de desplazamiento forzado en el marco del
conflicto armado interno en Colombia, la mayora de ellos de zonas rurales a urbanas.
Despus de 2010, el gobierno implement dos programas para la reparacin a las vctimas del
conflicto armado: Restitucin de Tierras y Viviendas Gratis. La primera iniciativa tiene por
objeto la restitucin de los derechos de las propiedades despojadas a las victimas e incentiva
su retorno al campo. La intencin del segundo programa es proporcionar a las vctimas
viviendas gratuitas en las ciudades receptoras, donde se establecieron despus del
desplazamiento. Esta tesis examina como esos dos programas impactan los medios de vida de
la poblacin vctima asentada en el norte de Colombia, una de las regiones ms afectadas por
el conflicto.
Los datos empricos y observaciones indican que en el corto plazo, el programa de Viviendas
Gratis ha tenido un impacto positivo a los hogares beneficiarios, porque les permite sostener y
elevar los medios de vida que han desarrollado despus del desplazamiento en la ciudad. Por
otro lado, la Restitucin de Tierras no ha logrado preservar o mejorar la situacin actual de
sustento, porque en general, el retorno a las zonas rurales despobladas y el restablecimiento de
actividades agrcolas no es considerado por la poblacin como una alternativa atractiva y
econmicamente viable. Eso es especialmente cierto en el caso de los miembros ms jvenes
de los hogares desplazados, quienes, de acuerdo con un informante, "perdieron el amor a la
tierra."
Palabras clave: Sustento, Vivienda, Restitucin de Tierras, Reparacin, Poltica social,

Amrica Latina, Colombia
iii
Table of Contents
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ viii
Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................. ix
1.
Introduction.........................................................................................................1
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
2.
Context ................................................................................................................7
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
3.
The Colombian conflict and forced displacement ..........................................7

IDP livelihoods and urban poverty ...............................................................10
The transition to peace ................................................................................11
Post-conflict reparation programs................................................................12
Motivations and challenges of carrying out a comparative study.................15
Research Methods............................................................................................18
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
4.
Significance of the Study ...............................................................................2

Research Question ........................................................................................3
Outline ...........................................................................................................4
Preliminary work ..........................................................................................19

Fieldwork .....................................................................................................20
Data analysis ...............................................................................................27
Research limitations ....................................................................................28
Literature Review and Theory .........................................................................30

4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
Knowledge gaps ..........................................................................................30

Migration, urbanization, and return ..............................................................31
Social networks ...........................................................................................34
Government interventions ...........................................................................35
5.
Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................42
6.
Comparison of the two programs: scope and scale .....................................45
7.
Case Presentation El Carmen de Bolvar ....................................................52

7.1.
7.2.
7.3.
8.
Case Analysis El Carmen de Bolvar ...........................................................63

8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
iv
The municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar....................................................52

Reparation initiatives in El Salado ...............................................................58
The process of Land Restitution ..................................................................59
The town......................................................................................................63
The countryside ...........................................................................................73
Summary .....................................................................................................82
9.
Case Presentation Barranquilla and Soledad .............................................85

9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
The metropolitan area of Barranquilla and Soledad ....................................85

The DINCS model .......................................................................................92
The process of Free Housing ......................................................................95
10. Case Analysis Barranquilla and Soledad ....................................................98

10.1.
10.2.
10.3.
10.4.
Don Bosco IV ..............................................................................................98

Nueva Esperanza ......................................................................................105
Villas de San Pablo ...................................................................................110
Summary ...................................................................................................116
11. Findings ..........................................................................................................119

11.1.
11.2.
11.3.
11.4.
11.5.
11.6.
IDPs prefer to stay in urban areas .............................................................119

Bad timing of Land Restitution...................................................................121
Challenges of property formalization .........................................................121
Land Restitution can cause new conflicts and can harm rural areas .........122
Both reparation programs raise ethical questions .....................................124
Importance of social movements ...............................................................124
12. Conclusions and Implications .......................................................................126

12.1. Implications for theory ...............................................................................126
12.2. Implications for practice .............................................................................128
13. Epilogue ..........................................................................................................136
13.1. Update on Land Restitution .......................................................................136
13.2. Update on Free Housing ...........................................................................137
13.3. Closing remarks ........................................................................................139
References .............................................................................................................141
Appendix 1 .............................................................................................................147
Appendix 2 .............................................................................................................148
Appendix 3 .............................................................................................................150
List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Village man in Villas de San Pablo ........................................................................ 2
Figure 1.2. Map of the Caribbean Region of Colombia ........................................................... 5
Figure 2.1. Forced displacement in Colombia ......................................................................... 8
Figure 2.2. Density of events of displacement by department ................................................. 9
Figure 2.3. San Javier district in Medelln (Antioquia) ........................................................... 10
Figure 2.4. Displacements and declarations of persons (1985-2012) ................................... 11
Figure 2.5. Cover page of The Victims Law........................................................................... 13
Figure 2.6. Promotional sign near Las Gardenias Free Housing project ............................... 14
Figure 2.7. Construction of Las Gardenias ............................................................................ 16
Figure 3.1. A tour of El Carmen de Bolvar ............................................................................ 22
Figure 3.2. Displacement and migration patterns of the interviewed households ................. 25
Figure 4.1. Urbanization in Colombia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the World ...... 33
Figure 4.2. An informal settlement in Bogot under consolidation ........................................ 38
Figure 4.3. Demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis ......................... 39
Figure 4.4. Popular District in Medelln (Antioquia) ............................................................... 40
Figure 5.1. Simplified theoretical model connecting the main themes................................... 43
Figure 5.2. Theoretical model ................................................................................................ 43
Figure 6.1. Distribution of Free Housing projects and Land Restitution zones in 2014 ......... 47
Figure 6.2. Beneficiary households (August 2014) ................................................................ 48
Figure 6.3. Claims and applications (August 2014) ............................................................... 48
Figure 6.4. Federal government funding in USD ................................................................... 49
Figure 7.1. Map of the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar................................................. 53
Figure 7.2. The town of El Carmen de Bolvar and the surrounding rural areas ................... 53
Figure 7.3. Abandoned cargo airport in El Carmen de Bolvar .............................................. 55
Figure 7.4. Construction of a traditional farmhouse .............................................................. 56
Figure 7.5. Celebrations of the Virgin of Carmen .................................................................. 57
Figure 7.6. El Salado ............................................................................................................. 58
Figure 8.1. Center of El Carmen de Bolvar........................................................................... 64
Figure 8.2. The street in front of Maras house in El Carmen ............................................... 65
Figure 8.3. Marketplace in the town of El Carmen de Bolvar ............................................... 68
Figure 8.4. The street in front of Andrs shop ...................................................................... 72
Figure 8.5. Farm in Vereda El Bonito .................................................................................... 74
Figure 8.6. David showing one of the abandoned fields in El Bonito..................................... 77
Figure 8.7. Abandoned property ............................................................................................ 77
Figure 8.8. Children of the countryside .................................................................................. 78
Figure 8.9. Access roads in rural areas ................................................................................. 79
Figure 8.10. Antonio from Vereda Carvajal ........................................................................... 81
Figure 8.11. Enriques son at their farm in Vereda La Borrachera ........................................ 81
Figure 8.12. Theoretical model for analysis of data from El Carmen de Bolvar. ..................... 83
Figure 9.1. Map of Barranquilla and Soledad ........................................................................ 86
Figure 9.2. Squatter settlement in Barranquilla ..................................................................... 86
Figure 9.3. Affluent district in the northern part of Barranquilla ............................................. 87
Figure 9.4. Satellite image of Nueva Esperanza ................................................................... 88
vi
Figure 9.5. Housing block in a traditional suburban settlement in Soledad ........................... 89

Figure 9.6. Housing block in Nueva Esperanza..................................................................... 89
Figure 9.7. Satellite image of Villas de San Pablo ................................................................. 90
Figure 9.8. Free Housing apartment blocks at Villas de San Pablo ...................................... 91
Figure 9.9. Houses from other subsidy programs at Villas de San Pablo ............................. 91
Figure 9.10. Playground in Villas de San Pablo .................................................................... 92
Figure 9.11. Prepaid electricity meters in Villas de San Pablo .............................................. 93
Figure 9.12. Grocery store in a ground floor apartment in Villas de San Pablo..................... 94
Figure 9.13. New apartment in Villas de San Pablo .............................................................. 96
Figure 10.1. Don Bosco IV neighborhood in Soledad............................................................ 99
Figure 10.2. Members of ADMUNE and their associates ...................................................... 99
Figure 10.3. Sra. Claudia ..................................................................................................... 101
Figure 10.4. Claudia and Sara at the opening event of the new bakery .............................. 102
Figure 10.5. Overview of the Nueva Esperanza Free Housing project................................ 105
Figure 10.6. Unisex hair salon in Nueva Esperanza............................................................ 107
Figure 10.7. Street corner near Carlos house in Nueva Esperanza ................................... 107
Figure 10.8. Empty spaces between housing blocks in Nueva Esperanza ......................... 109
Figure 10.9. Overview of the Villas de San Pablo Free Housing project ............................. 110
Figure 10.10. Housing blocks in Villas de San Pablo .......................................................... 113
Figure 10.11. Subsidized houses in Villas de San Pablo. ................................................... 115
Figure 10.12. Theoretical model for analysis of data from Barranquilla and Soledad ........... 116
Figure 11.1. Marketplace in Barranquilla. ............................................................................ 120
Figure 11.2. Villas de San Pablo ......................................................................................... 122
Figure 11.3. Vacant farm in El Carmen de Bolvar .............................................................. 123
Figure 12.1. Amended theoretical model ............................................................................. 127
Figure 12.2. Schematic illustration of the selected challenges in rural areas ...................... 130
Figure 12.3. Schematic illustration of potential responses to the challenges ...................... 130
Figure 12.4. Street in Nueva Esperanza.............................................................................. 132
Figure 12.5. Elemental affordable housing project Quinta Monroy in Iquique, Chile ........... 133
Figure 12.6. Quinta Monroy a few years after construction ................................................. 133
Figure 12.7. Siete de Abril neighborhood in the southwestern part of Barranquilla............. 134
Figure 13.1. Las Gardenias Free Housing project in Barranquilla. ...................................... 138
List of Tables
Table 3.1. Summary of informant interviews. ......................................................................... 22
Table 3.2. Summary of household interviews. ....................................................................... 24
Table 3.3. Summary of the focus group. ................................................................................ 26
Table 3.4. Summary of not classified interviews. ................................................................... 26
Table 3.5. Division of the case study analysis. ...................................................................... 28
Table 6.1. Distribution of Free Housing and Land Restitution projects by department .......... 46
Table 6.2. Scale and scope summary. ................................................................................... 51
All photographs were taken by the author, unless otherwise stated.
vii
Acknowledgements
There are many people who contributed to my work and I would like to express my immense
appreciation for their support. I am particularly thankful for the assistance given by my
supervisors: David Sanderson, Professor at the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology (NTNU) and Ph.D. Henrik Wiig, Senior Researcher and Manager of the
Colombia Land and Gender project at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional
Research (NIBR). I appreciate the support of Elena Archipovaite, who was the first person to
tell me about this research opportunity.
I would like to give my special thanks to Jemima Garca-Godos, human geographer and
Associate Professor at the University of Oslo, for her useful comments and tips. Advices
given by Professor Rolee Aranya, Research Assistant Vilde Ulset and Professor Hans Skotte
from the Department of Urban Design and Planning at NTNU have also been a great help in
the development of my thesis. I am very thankful to my friend Lisa Choi from University of
Oxford for constructive comments and for proofreading this work.
My investigation in Colombia would not be possible without the assistance of Professor Paola
Garca Reyes, from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the
Universidad del Norte in Barranquilla, as well as Beln Pardo, Laura Ochoa Guzman and
Judith Zableh Orozco, members of the Land Observatory research project. I would also like to
thank the administration of the Universidad del Norte for their hospitality and for providing
access to their facilities. Furthermore, I appreciate the friendship and all the comments and
ideas given by Pablo Arturo Yepes Carvajal, Assistant Professor at the Universidad del
Atlntico (Barranquilla).
I would like to express my gratitude to my contacts at the Mario Santo Domingo Foundation
and the Villas de San Pablo housing project, particularly Anahel Mara Hernndez Valega,
Karina Garca Uribe, Ronald David Silva Manjarrs and Mariam Ajami Peralta. I am also
grateful to Ella Del Castillo and Diana Carmona Nobles from the Land Restitution Unit
(URT) in Barranquilla for introducing me to the local context and Sra. Xiomara for her
assistance during my visits in El Carmen de Bolvar.
Last but not least, I would like to thank all the interviewees for taking their time to participate
in my project, my family for their unconditional support and my fellow students of the Urban
Ecological Planning Masters Programme at NTNU for all the comments and friendship.
viii
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADMUNE Association of Women of Nueva Esperanza
(Asociacin de Mujeres de Nueva Esperanza)
CLG Colombia Land and Gender project at NIBR
COP Colombian Peso
DANE National Administrative Department of Statistics
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadstica)
DINCS Integral Development of Sustainable Communities
(Desarrollo Integral de Comunidades Sostenibles)
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FMSD Mario Santo Domingo Foundation
(Fundacin Mario Santo Domingo)
GIS Geographic Information Systems
Ha Hectares
IDP Internally Displaced Person
(Desplazado Interno)
IDMC International Displacement Monitoring Centre
INCODER Colombian Rural Development Institute, formely Incora
(Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural)
Land Observatory of Restitution and Regulation of Agarian Propierty Rights
Observatory (Observatorio de Restitucin y Regulacin de Derechos de Propiedad Agraria)
MinAgricultura Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
(Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural)
MinVivienda Ministry of Housing, City and Territory
(Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio)
NIBR Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research
(Norsk institutt for by- og regionforskning)
SENA National Apprenticeship Service
(Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje)
UAF Agricultural Family Unit
(Unidad Agrcola Familiar)
UEP Urban Ecological Planning
UN DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
URT Land Restitution Unit
(Unidad de Restitucin de Tierras)
USD United States Dollar
ix
1. Introduction
The countryside is running out of people, without anyone working there...
I heard this statement from an administration worker at one of the new social housing projects
in Barranquilla, the largest city in Northern Colombia. A vast majority of households who
move into this housing project are former farming families, who lived peacefully in the
countryside until they were dispossessed of their belongings and thrown out of their houses by
rebels and criminal groups during the armed conflict. Millions of people fled rural areas and
settled in cities. Together with them came job seekers and those who believed that there are
more opportunities in urban areas. What they left behind was what appears to be a
depopulated countryside.
One might ask if there is any hope for agriculture and the rural lifestyle in Colombia. Would it
ever make economic sense to restore the farms? Do people still have any sentimental
attachment to the land they come from? Is it safe enough to return? Does the old community
still exist?
With a lasting peace agreement on the horizon after over 50 years of civil war, the Colombian
government is attempting to reestablish the pre-conflict order and ensure dignity and
prosperity for its citizens. Building new homes in cities and giving them to those displaced by
the armed conflict is one way of doing it, while bringing them back to their land in the
countryside is another. These initiatives symbolize not only the recovery of Colombia from a
very violent period in its history, but also the modernization of the country and its
transformation into a new age. But what age will that be? Will that be the age of city living or
the age of the countryside? Is it going to be the age of prosperity or the age of economic
stagnation?
In my thesis, I am examining the two largest, presently implemented reparation programs for
the displaced population. The first one is Land Restitution, which facilitates the return to rural
The boys have lost their love for land
Figure 1.1. Village man in Villas de San Pablo, a social housing project in Barranquilla.
areas by those displaced. The second, Free Housing, provides new homes for displaced
households in the cities in which they settled after the displacement. These interventions are
focused on satisfying the needs for improved shelter, ensuring access to land, and promoting a
sense of justice; however, what is less certain is whether those programs can help the
displaced get back on their feet and lift them out of the cycle of poverty. It is important,
therefore, to investigate how the Land Restitution and Free Housing processes change the
livelihood situations of the displaced families.
1.1. Significance of the Study

Armed conflicts played a key role in society building almost everywhere throughout the
history of human civilization. Most wars damaged communities, caused migration patterns
and affected the way in which the population was distributed within the country or region.
They also have an enormous impact on livelihoods, especially in case of those who were
forced to flee due to acts of violence. For this reason, studying the outcomes of conflicts in a
society should go beyond the narrow scope of political science or related disciplines. This study
approaches two post-conflict reparation programs for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 1
1
According to The Victims Law of 2011, an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) in Colombia is defined
as a person who was forced to migrate within the national territory, abandoned his or her place of
residence or normal economic activities, because his of her life, physical integration, security or
personal liberty have been violated or were directly threatened as a result of Human Rights violations
which occurred during the internal armed conflict (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2011).
Introduction
in Colombia from the perspectives of urban and rural development and livelihood
(re)generation.
Through case studies of Barranquilla, Soledad and El Carmen de Bolvar in Northern
Colombia, I discuss how the two government programs affect the living standards, incomegenerating activities and future plans of the displaced population. Research performed at this
early stage of implementation gives an opportunity to identify some weaknesses and strengths
of these programs, which may lead to proposals that improve design and budget allocation
considerations in the future.
The necessity for conducting a comprehensive study of government programs and public
policy concerning the IDPs is of significant importance not only for Colombia itself, but for
the international community in general. Conflicts that result in a large number of displaced
people are currently happening in many other countries, especially in the Middle East, Africa
and Eastern Europe. In fact, the current crisis in Syria is the biggest population shift since
World War II. Rapid population growth, urbanization and the effects of climate change will
likely harden the struggle for land and livelihoods all around the globe, which in the long term
may cause further displacements.
Therefore, the results of my thesis might be relevant to the global post-conflict resolution and
peacekeeping processes as well as constitute an unprecedented chance to change structures in
urban areas and the countryside. There is also a clear opportunity to point out potential policy
recommendations, especially in the areas of urban planning and design, land management,
agrarian development, and social welfare.
1.2. Research Question

The main empirical research question of this research is:
How do the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs affect the livelihoods of
IDP households in the Caribbean Region of Colombia?
Breaking the research question into parts helps to clarify key terms and concepts:
To date, Land Restitution and Free Housing programs are the two most significant
alternatives that the displaced households in Colombia can benefit from.
Livelihood is defined as means of supporting one's existence, esp. financially or

vocationally; living (Random House, 2010).
IDP households are those that declared displacement as a result of the armed conflict.
The focus is primarily on urban IDPs, as a vast majority of them migrated to towns
and cities.
In the context of my thesis, the Caribbean Region of Colombia consists of the most
affected departments in Northern Colombia, including Atlntico, Magdalena, and parts
of Bolvar, Cesar, and Sucre. These include my two main case study locations: The
metropolitan region of Barranquilla and Soledad, and the primarily rural municipality
of El Carmen de Bolvar in the Montes de Mara sub-region (Figure 1.2).
In addition to the research question, two supporting questions were developed throughout my
investigation. Answering the first sub-question helps me to understand the motives of IDPs
for choosing a place to stay and when applying for a particular reparation initiative:
What internal and external factors play a role, when IDP households decide to stay in
the city or return to the countryside?
The second question is more relevant for the discussion of implications (Chapter 12) and the
development of recommendations:
Which of the two initiatives proves to be more effective in responding to the livelihood
needs and demands of the IDP households in the short and long-term?
1.3. Outline
This thesis consists of 13 chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the historical background of the
Colombian conflict, forced displacements, and the peace-making process. It also discusses the
emergence of post-conflict reparation initiatives, including the Land Restitution ad Free
Housing programs. Chapter 3 presents my research methodology and explains how I applied
my chosen methods in the field. A critical review of related literature and a discussion of key
theories are provided in Chapter 4. In this section, I also identified the gaps in knowledge and
three main themes for further analysis: migration, social networks, and government
interventions. Relating those three themes to the context of forced displacement in Colombia
laid the foundations for the theoretical model presented in Chapter 5. This is where I also
explain how this model helped me in filtering the relevant information from my empirical
data. Chapter 6 presents the scale and scope of both government initiatives and compares their
progress using available data at the national level.
Introduction
Montes de Mara
Figure 1.2. Map of the Caribbean Region of Colombia and locations of case study areas.

Chapter 7 introduces my first case study location of El Carmen de Bolivar and discusses the
process of Land Restitution based on informant interviews conducted in that municipality.
This is followed by an analysis of the empirical data from household interviews collected in
the urban and rural areas of El Carmen in Chapter 8. Similarly, Chapter 9 presents the second
case study area of Barranquilla & Soledad and the Free Housing program through the data
gained from my informants, while Chapter 10 contains the analysis of household stories in
three locations within the case study area: the Don Bosco IV neighborhood and two Free
Housing projects: Nueva Esperanza and Villas de San Pablo.
Chapter 11 discusses the main findings from my investigation with an attempt to provide an
answer to the research question. Chapter 12 presents the conclusions and implications of my
research. It discusses, separately, theoretical implications in which I revise the applied
theoretical model, and implications on practice where I make an attempt to propose
recommendations for changes in the governments approach. Finally, Chapter 13 provides an
update on the progress of both initiatives and discusses some of the issues that emerged after
the empirical data in the field was collected.
2. Context
In order to get a better understanding of the specific situation of IDPs in Colombia, it is
important to take a closer look at the nature of problems responsible for massive
displacements and introduce the context in which the two discussed reparation programs
emerged.
2.1. The Colombian conflict and forced displacement

Since its independence from the Spanish Kingdom in 1810, Colombias history has been
characterized by a series of civil wars and political unrest that have never been fully resolved.
The current ongoing conflict may not have a single point of origin, but critical to its
development was the assassination of the Liberal candidate during the presidential election in
1947, Jorge Elicer Gaitn, which sparked La Violencia, a 10-year long war between the
supporters of the Liberal and the Conservative parties (Serres, 2000). A ceasefire agreement
was reached in 1958 but the conflict intensified again in 1964 when state forces attacked
groups of rural self-defense militia influenced by left-wing ideologies. Those events led to the
creation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Peoples Army (FARC), which is
the largest communist guerrilla organization involved in the conflict.
The inability of the Colombian state to take control over the situation led to the emergence of
a third actor in the conflict the paramilitary groups. Originally, the FARC and other guerrilla
groups claimed to be fighting for social justice and the rights of poor peasants, while the socalled paramilitaries defended the interests of large landowners from guerrilla aggressions.
Starting in the 1980s, both the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups engaged in drug
production and narcotrafficking in order to secure a steady income, which was necessary to
feed their military operations during what seemed to be a never-ending war (Serres, 2000).
Getting access to land for those activities and expanding areas of influence were therefore key
aspects in the armed conflict.
7
Figure 2.1. Forced displacement in Colombia. Source: Primiciadiario.com
Land grabbing has been attributed to both the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups, all of
which are accused of expropriation by force and illegal land transactions in the rural areas.
There was little leniency towards the civilian population and the human rights of victims have
often been violated (Amnesty International, 2009). As a result of those actions, a large part of
the rural population had to flee their properties. It is estimated that there are currently up to
5.7 million IDPs in Colombia, which is the second highest number in the world after Syria 2
(IDMC, 2015). On top of that, close to 400,000 victims of the conflict found refuge in other
countries, especially Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama (UNHCR, 2012). Altogether, the
displaced persons in Colombia account for over 12% for the countrys population, which is
around 48 million.
The amount of land that was abandoned or confiscated due to the conflict is up to 10 million
hectares, which accounts for 8.8% of the entire territory of Colombia (IDMC, 2010). The
most affected regions include the department of Antioquia and two departments on the
Caribbean coast: Bolvar and Magdalena (Figure 2.2). Of all IDPs, 63% are displaced within
the same department and 32% within the same municipality (Unidad de Vctimas, 2013).
2
According to IDMC (2015), the estimated number of IDPs in Syria is at least 7.6 million people. Other
countries with a significant number of IDPs include Iraq (~3.3 million), Sudan (~3.1 million),
Democratic Republic of Congo (~2.8 million), South Sudan (~1.5 million), Nigeria (~1.2 million) and
Ukraine (~1.2 million).
Context
Figure 2.2. Density of events of displacement by department.

Adopted from: Unidad de Vctimas (2013)

2.2. IDP livelihoods and urban poverty
Not surprisingly, a vast majority of the displaced population fled to towns and cities, often
hoping to find safety and support from family members or friends located there. However, the
struggle for most IDPs continued upon arriving, as they usually settled in informal settlements
on the peripheries of urban areas (Figure 2.3) where access to employment, education,
healthcare and social services was poor. In 2010, up to 82.6% of IDPs were classified as
living in extreme poverty (Albuja and Caballos, 2010).
To make things worse, many urban IDPs are still living in fear of aggression, as the civil war
has also been present in the urban areas (Naranjo, 2004). Violence, insecurity, and threats
instigated by armed groups in urban areas often caused further displacement, either within the
same city (CODHES, 2013) or to larger metropolitan areas such as Medelln and Bogot
(IDMC, 2006). Many of the unemployed and poor urban IDPs in those cities have themselves
been recruited by local street gangs, paramilitary groups, and other criminal organizations
(Davis, 2006).
According to Albuja and Caballos (2010), up to 93% of all IDPs in Colombia displaced from
rural to urban areas as a result of the armed conflict. Nevertheless, taking into consideration
the dynamic character of the displacements, it is difficult to reconfirm this figure.
Figure 2.3. San Javier district in Medelln (Antioquia) is largely inhabited by displaced families.
10
Context
2.3. The transition to peace
Law 387 of 1997 was the first national policy that recognized forced displacement in
Colombia, while the first official registry of IDPs took place in 2000 (Garca Ramrez et al.,
2013).
Today, the armed conflict is losing its momentum, as the paramilitary groups demobilized and
the guerrillas lose their military power and control over occupied territories (IDMC, 2014).
Although forced displacements are still happening today in some parts of the country, it is
much less intense than at its peak between 1999 and 2002 (Unidad de Vctimas, 2013). As can
be seen in Figure 2.4, since 2006 the number of people who officially declared displacement
is greater than the number of acts of displacement, which shows that the country entered into a
transitional period towards peace.
In 2012, the FARC entered negotiations for a reconciliation agreement with the Colombian
Government. The peace talks take place in Havana and are observed by diplomats from
different states, including the host country Cuba, with Norway as a neutral mediator. In
Colombia, the transition from the period of conflict into peace is reflected by the
implementation of different economic reforms as well as short and long-term reparation
programs for victims and the displaced population.
Figure 2.4. Displacements and declarations of persons (1985-2012).

Adopted from: Unidad de Vctimas (2013)
11

2.4. Post-conflict reparation programs
Intermediate short-term initiatives
According to Law 387, the responsibility to attend to the victims and provide them with
humanitarian and emergency help was transferred to the local governments. The newly
arrived IDPs were eligible for three months humanitarian aid provided by the municipal
government after their registration.
This aid usually included access to food, shelter, clean water, sanitation, medical care,
transportation subsidies, as well as assistance with education for children under 15 years old
(Ibez and Moya, 2010a). Local authorities in some municipalities also provided
construction materials and financial support for families willing to build a house. Additional
help was also provided by local and international Non-governmental Organizations and the
Catholic Church (Meja, 2011).
In terms of livelihoods, most of the displaced households were left on their own. As noted by
Ibez and Moya (2010b), the few existing income-generating and training programs for the
IDPs were insufficient to address the persisting problems of unemployment and poverty
among the displaced communities. Their socio-economic situation did not improve and they
continued to live as a marginalized part of society (Garay Salamanca and Barberi Gmez, 2009).
The Victims Law and Land Restitution

The first large scale initiatives to provide integral reparation for the victims of the armed
conflict were drafted The Victims Law (Ley de Vctimas y Restitucin de Tierras y sus
Decretos Reglamentarios, Law 1448 of 11. June 2011), which introduced regulations and
policies that are meant to reduce the injustice and social inequality through economic and
moral reparation for the victims (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2011).
The main proposal of this law is to restitute land rights to the original owners who abandoned
their land by force or voluntarily as a result of armed aggressions, threats or general insecurity
during the conflict. The program aims at restoring respect to private property, establishing rule
of law, and bringing the displaced back to the depopulated countryside. This prevailing lack
of respect to constitutionally guaranteed property ownership rights was present in Colombias
rural areas ever since the illegal armed groups started to make large-scale land grabs and
conducted acts of terror against landowners. Therefore, Land Restitution has some attributes
of a land reform as it attempts to take decision making power from powerful landowners (who
12
Context
until now could use force accumulate land)
and guarantee legal property rights for the
landless poor (Garca-Godos and Wiig, 2014).
The Victims Law recognized the importance
of addressing the housing needs of victims.
The Law specified that the Ministry of
Housing, City and Territory (MinVivienda)
has authority over urban housing subsidy
schemes for the victim population and
restitution of properties in urban areas, while
the
Ministry
of
Agriculture
and
Rural
Development (MinAgricultura) coordinates

housing programs and the implementation of
Land Restitution in rural areas (Ministerio de
Justicia y del Derecho, 2011). Since most of
the property dispossessions took place in the
countryside and the majority of the displaced Figure 2.5. Cover page of The Victims Law.
households
fled
to
cities,
MinVivienda
Source: Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho (2011)
assumed responsibility of social housing schemes for the urban IDPs, while MinAgricultura
focused on implementing Land Restitution policies.
In order to facilitate the enforcement and coordination of the restitution program,
MinAgricultura established the Land Restitution Unit (URT), which opened a number of
regional branches across the country. Since 2012, the URT has been attending the displaced
households at their local offices and processing applications for the restitution of their lost
properties. In the first years, the URT is resolving cases of lands located in the selected socalled micro and macro-focalized zones that were approved by the military as sufficiently
secure. The number of those focalized zones is gradually expanding, allowing IDPs from
more areas to apply for restitution. The URT hopes to finish processing all cases by 2021.
Once property rights are restored, the URT supports the beneficiary household in their return
and reestablishment. The landowner is prohibited from selling the property in the first two
years after restitution (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2011). Except for Land Restitution,
The Victims Law also regulates the eligibility for indemnisation and psychological help as an
additional reparation measure for the victims of violence and their family members.
13

Social housing
The social housing schemes for the displaced population followed the recommendations of
The Victims Law, but developed independently from Land Restitution. After a short time of
preparations, MinVivienda announced the inauguration of its 100,000 Free Housing (100,000
Viviendas Gratis) program in 2012. Construction of the first projects started shortly after. The
success of the first stage of the program led to its extension with an additional 300,000 units.
The Free Housing projects are operated according to different financing schemes. Some of
them are funded entirely from the federal and local governments; others are subsidized by the
National Savings Fund or built in collaboration with private businesses and donors.
Regardless of the arrangement, MinVivienda set a limit for the construction costs to 70
minimum salaries 3 per unit. These are usually two-bedroom units in apartment blocks or
single-floor row houses.
The majority of the Free Housing developments are built in cities that received large numbers
of IDPs. Beneficiaries of the Free Housing program are drawn from different local waiting
Figure 2.6. Promotional sign near Las Gardenias Free Housing project in Barranquilla:
Here we are constructing 3,000 free houses.
3
In 2012, the minimum monthly salary in Colombia was $566,700 COP, the equivalent of around $312
USD. Subsequently, 70 minimum salaries were equal to $21,840 USD.
14
Context
lists for the displaced households and are supplemented by families classified as being in
extreme poverty and victims of natural disasters in local areas. It is estimated that the IDPs
constitute around 72.5% of all beneficiaries of the program (Minvivienda, 2014a). The units
are handed over to the displaced households literarily for free. The beneficiary families get
access to all the municipal services, including water, gas and electricity for which monthly
bills must be paid. Depending on the project, they may also be charged a symbolic
administration fee, whose exact amount takes into consideration their relatively low income
levels. To discourage misuse of the program, the beneficiaries cannot sell or rent out the units
in the first 10 years of ownership (El Congreso de Colombia, 2012).
2.5. Motivations and challenges of carrying out a comparative study

In my thesis, I attempt to compare the impact that Land Restitution and Free Housing
programs have on the livelihoods of the IDPs. The comparativeness of those programs is
based on the presumption that they share the same principle motivation. Both are large-scale
reparation initiatives that respond to massive displacements during the armed conflict. They
are part of the same political agenda represented by the President Juan Manuel Santos, and are
executed by the different ministries in his government which has been in power since 2010 to
the present day. Additionally, both initiatives have been characterized as being populist, as
they propose radical interventions based on intentions and principles, which seem hard to
disagree with (Cuervo, 2012, El Colombiano, 2014, El Espectador, 2012, Gilbert, 2013).
It needs to be clarified that these programs are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the sense
that those displaced may apply for Land Restitution and Free Housing at the same time.
However, the restrictions to in the use and transactions of the properties as well as the long
distances that separate the social housing projects from the rural areas in which most restituted
lands are located make it close to impossible for a single household to take full advantage of
both, at least in a way envisioned by the government.
There are also a few important differences in the nature of both programs that need to be taken
into consideration before evaluating their performance. As mentioned before, Land
Restitution is not only about giving people a chance to rebuild their livelihoods, but it has also
a more widespread goal to restore respect for private property and formalize land tenure in
Colombia once and for all, which might be seen as a land reform in the countryside (GarcaGodos and Wiig, 2014). It can also be argued that Land Restitution is not necessarily a
15

program that gives something for free, but rather it attempts to reintroduce justice by restoring
rights to properties that the victims already had in the past, but were taken away from them.
Free Housing, on the other hand, not only provides the victims of armed conflict and natural
disasters a brand new property which arguably elevates their living standards and ensures
dignity, but it also responds to the large shortage of housing in Colombias urban areas (El
Nuevo Siglo, 2014, FMSD, 2014) and gives a significant boost to the construction industry,
which results in the creation of thousands of new jobs (Minvivienda, 2014b).
The contribution of the two programs to the improvement of those issues is difficult to
quantify and compare and there is little doubt that both land reform and the alleviation of
housing shortages are among the issues that need to be tackled by the Colombian government.
However, in my further analysis, I am focusing on the difference those programs can make for
the livelihoods of IDP households.
It also needs to be clarified that since the majority of the displacements took place more than
ten years before the reparation initiatives were put in place, it is assumed that the
reestablishment of rural livelihoods for returning households means starting, literarily, from
Figure 2.7. Construction of Las Gardenias and other Free Housing projects in Barranquilla gave a
significant boost to the local economy.
16
Context
scratch, as both the physical assets and the rural community from before the conflict are in
many cases impossible to recover. For this reason I consider Land Restitution as an attempt to
establish a new rural livelihood that may build on the pre-conflict experiences and networks.
Alternatively, the aim of Free Housing is to establish new or reinforce existing urban
livelihoods that are potentially based on the living situation and networks that the IDPs
established after being displaced to the city.
17
3. Research Methods
My research methods have been largely influenced by the knowledge base and principles of
Urban Ecological Planning (UEP). UEP is a multidisciplinary approach to planning rooted in
urban and social ecology and the understanding of civil society, governance systems, and the
changing character of urban environments. Migration and displacement are among the most
related issues of interest of UEP researchers.
Territorialism is perhaps the most relevant UEP concept to my thesis, as it addresses the
strength in increasingly fragmented societies in terms of community, resources and skills,
land ownership relations and communal land, territorial urban-rural relations (Bjnness,
2013). Investigation within this framework implies an understanding of the past and present
informal and formal institutional structure (Bjnness, 2013), and is preoccupied primarily
with qualitative research methods.
My decision to utilize qualitative methods was not only influenced by the UEP approach, but
also by the particularity of my research question and the topic of investigation. During the
research process, it became clear to me that focusing equally on all projects within the
geographical scope of the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs, and using
quantitative data to describe them, would not be practical given the time constrains as well as
human and financial resources at my disposal. Therefore, I realized that the only reasonable
way to approach my research question was by performing in-depth investigations of a limited
number of carefully selected case study locations and projects.
According to Flyvbjerg (2006), the case study approach is an excellent method for researching
and learning, as it allows both beginners and experts to expand their knowledge by adding
another evidence-driven case to their areas of expertise. This is especially true considering the
multidisciplinary character of UEP and the diversity of topics within this field of study, which
assume that most readers may require a sufficient introduction before examining a particular
issue in greater depth. In his explanation of using case study methods, Flyvbjerg discourages
18
Research Methods
recounting, inordinate summarization, and over-generalization. Instead, he recommends
researchers to tell the story in its diversity, allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided,
complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that the actors in the case have told (Flyvbjerg,
2006). This position led me to apply an ethnographic approach to interviewing, which will be
discussed later in this chapter.
A lot of effort was put in planning research methods, yet at the same time, some allowance
had to be made to react to various situations in the field. Throughout my work, I followed
what the well known development practitioner Robert Chambers called the principle of
learning rapidly and progressively, which he defined as:
Conscious exploration, flexible use of methods, opportunism, improvisation, iteration
and crosschecking, not following a blueprint program but being adaptable in a learning
process. (Chambers, 1994)
These principles and theories on methodology helped me select and adopt different research
methods at all stages of my work, which are described below.
3.1. Preliminary work

The initial idea of developing a Masters thesis on a topic related to Colombia emerged in
December 2013, when I got to know Dr. Henrik Wiig, the lead investigator of the Colombia
Land and Gender (CLG) project 4 at the Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research
(NIBR) 5. The institute was inviting students to assist them with their investigation on the
peace-making process in Colombia and in particular, the implementation of the Land
Restitution program. The main requirement to participate in the project was the knowledge
and ability to communicate in Spanish. Throughout the entire duration of my investigation
between December 2013 and May 2015, NIBR assisted me with preparations and provided
comprehensive supervision of my work.
Preliminary work on my project started in January 2014. The focus of the first few months
was performing background research based on relevant online publications, previous
academic dissertations, chapters from books, as well as other documents from the NIBR
collection. Through the CLG project I also got to know Jemima Garca-Godos, human
geographer and Associate Professor at the University of Oslo, whose main area of expertise is
4
5
http://www.colombialandgender.org/
http://www.nibr.no/en/
19

transitional justice 6 in Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala. Conversations with her helped me get
a better understanding of key issues and prepare for the upcoming fieldwork in Colombia.
From an early stage, I tried to attract attention to my work and exchange opinions with other
researchers working in the field of urban planning or topics related to Latin America 7.
As suggested by Dr. Wiig, I started corresponding with Paola Garca Reyes, Assistant
Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the
Universidad del Norte (Barranquilla) and director of the local branch of the Land Observatory
(Observatorio de Restitucin y Regulacin de Derechos de Propiedad Agaria) 8 research
project. We agreed that it would be practical for me to focus on the same study area as the
researchers from Land Observatory since they allowed me to participate in their activities and
field trips during my visit. The defined subject area of investigation covered the Caribbean
region of Colombia, including my host city Barranquilla, and a number of urban and rural
municipalities identified by Ms. Garca Reyes as interesting cases for analysis, such as El
Carmen de Bolvar.
The finalized thesis proposal was delivered in May 2014. The aim of the project was to find
out whether the Land Restitution program increased the return rate of urban IDP households
to rural areas and contributed to the improvement of their livelihood situation. The proposed
research methods were focused around qualitative interviews with between 15 to 20 IDP
households that went through or are still in the process of Land Restitution as well as with key
informants from local NGOs, universities and public institutions. This would be supplemented
by relevant statistical and demographic data, policy documents and Geographical Information
System (GIS) files for mapping exercises. Materials would be requested from public authority
entities, such as the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), the Augustn
Codazzi Institute of Geography (IGAC), and the URT.
3.2. Fieldwork
Fieldwork in Colombia was conducted between June 9 and August 8, 2014. In the first few
weeks I focused on orienting myself in the region and establishing contacts with various local
6
The United Nations (2010) defines transitional justice as the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a societys attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.
7
Among other activities, I was invited to present my project at two seminars for Masters students
organized by the Norwegian Latin America Research Network (NorLARNet) in Oslo. In March 2014, I
presented my thesis proposal and in February 2015, I shared my preliminary findings.
8
http://www.observatoriodetierras.org/
20
Research Methods
organizations and stakeholders. As expected, I was invited to join the Land Observatory
project in their activities. Throughout the fieldwork, I collected an assortment of
documentation that was relevant to my thesis. In particular, I was interested in getting access
to data that is not available to the public on the Internet.
Progress during the first month of my fieldwork was slow 9. Most of the household and
informant interviews took place in the second month of my stay in Colombia. All of them
were conducted in Spanish (of which I am a fluent speaker).
Fortunately, there were no serious security concerns in the course of my fieldwork. During
some visits in areas which were considered dangerous, I was accompanied by a local resident
who guaranteed that I could perform my investigation without being bothered or intimidated
by a third party.
Local informants and stakeholders

Interviews with local informants and stakeholders were useful for my research for two
reasons. First, they were valuable sources of inside information and expert opinion. Second,
many of my informants referred me to households or other professionals who I could
approach for a meeting. All informant interviews had a semi-structured character. A list of
questions and topics for discussion was usually prepared beforehand and differed depending
on the area of expertise of my respondent.
An important turning point in my investigation was an interview with Pablo Yepes Carvajal,
Assistant Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Universidad del Atlntico in
Barranquilla. He told me about the popularity of the 100,000 Free Housing projects for the
displaced population in the region. I got interested in this issue and after performing an
extensive research on it, I decided to add the Free Housing program to my investigation and
compare its progress with Land Restitution.
Informant interviews were also performed in the town of El Carmen de Bolvar during the
trips organized with the Land Observatory researchers. The most extensive one was with a
legal adviser at a large agricultural corporation who was very familiar with the local Land
Restitution program. She also gave me a tour of their facilities and the town.
This was primarily attributed to the ongoing FIFA Football World Cup in Brazil, which diverted
attention of many Colombians away from everyday issues; at least until the very well performing
Colombian National Team was eliminated from the tournament.
21

Two other interviews were performed at the
town hall: one with the head of a unit that
attends and registers the displaced families,
and the second with the municipal Secretary
of the Interior. I also possess transcripts of
two interviews performed simultaneously
by the researchers at the Land Observatory
project: one with the Public Notary and one
with a municipal officer responsible for the
registration of land transactions.
In Barranquilla, I performed interviews with
four
employees
Domingo
at
the
Foundation
Mario
Santo
(FMSD),
which
manages the Villas de San Pablo Free

Figure 3.1. Researcher from the Land Observatory
project and a local informant at a tour in El Carmen.
Housing
project.
Their
support
was
particularly helpful, as they did not only
answer my questions, but also showed me around the entire development and introduced to a
several residents for interviews. My collaboration in research with the FMSD continued long
after the fieldwork was over. Finally, there was one interview with a senior officer at the Unit
for the Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims in their local branch in Barranquilla.
Overall, there were 10 informant interviews, five of which were performed in Barranquilla
and Soledad and five in El Carmen de Bolvar (Table 3.1). Given the sensitivity of the
provided information, names of the informant interviewees were kept anonymous, with an
exception of a few persons who gave me verbal or written consents to use their real names.
For a more detailed list of all interviewees see Appendix 1.
Table 3.1. Summary of informant interviews.
Position
Assistant Professor
Legal Adviser
Municipal officers
Administrative workers at
Villas de San Pablo
Senior officer
Institution / Organization
Universidad del Atlntico
Large Agricultural Corporation
Municipal Government
Mario Santo Domingo Foundation
Location
Barranquilla
El Carmen de Bolvar
El Carmen de Bolvar
Barranquilla
Date
Interviews
June 27
1
July 1
1
July 10-24
4
July 16-24
3
Unit for the Attention and Integral

Reparation of Victims
Barranquilla
Aug. 5
Total:
22
1
10
Research Methods
Except of the informant interviews described above, I also attended several meetings and
events that gave me an opportunity to exchange information with other informants and
stakeholders. These include, for example, meetings with the officers at the local URT branch
in Barranquilla, activities organized by the researchers of the Land Observatory project, and
multiple visits at the FMSD office in Villas de San Pablo.
Household interviews
The choice of household interviewing methods in my case study locations was based on an
assumption that the past life and the history of displacement and migration of my target
groups may potentially have a major impact on their future livelihood decisions. Application
of the ethnographic approach, in which the interviewer develops a respectful relationship with
the respondents and asks open ended questions (Sherman Heyl, 2001), allowed me to record
their life histories in detail and construct a cultural understanding of the investigated issues.
According to an American sociologist Barbara Sherman Heyl (2001) who pioneered research
on sensitive issues, such as prostitution, central to ethnographic interviews is the meaning
the interviewees place on their life experiences and circumstances, expressed in their own
language.
The ethnographic method implied the use of semi-structured interviews with some questions
and topics for conversation prepared beforehand, but with no fixed sequence (see Appendix
2). This strategy allowed my respondents to elaborate on issues they find more relevant and
important and stay away from anything they are not willing to talk about. Although it might
seem like a limitation, I found this flexible interview method to be necessary given the
sensitivity of the topic and the age difference between myself (26-year-old) and the majority
of respondents who were roughly between 50 and 70-year-old. In some cases, showing due
respect and expressing my truthful compassion resulted in gaining their trust, which made
them more comfortable opening up and sharing their bitter memories without me directly
asking.
The length of the interviews varied between ten minutes and three hours. This was determined
mainly by the character and confidence of the interviewee. Some of them were more
outspoken and wanted to share more details, while others preferred to answer my questions in
a short and precise way. In general, all of the interviewees were enthusiastic about my
investigation and they seemed to try their best to help me, for example, by referring me to
other people that could tell their story and contribute to my research. Using this so-called
23

snowball technique, it was fairly easy to perform five or more interviews in one day.
Everyone I interviewed gave me permission to record our conversation 10. Only two persons
(both elderly men) refused to give an interview, saying that they did not want to recall their
traumatic memories from the conflict and displacement.
The choice of locations for interviews allowed me to collect data from a wide ranging group
of displaced households who live in all kinds of environments including the most remote rural
areas, a small town, and a large urban center. The geographic representation of the
displacement and migration patterns of the interviewed IDP households (Figure 3.2) illustrates
the diversity of the different cases and highlights that most of them were moving within the
case study region from rural areas most affected by the conflict towards towns and cities.
The interviewed group is also diverse in terms of age and gender. At the moment of the
interview, the youngest of my respondents were in their late 20s, while the oldest were over
70 years old. 12 of them are women and 11 are men.
Access to victim households was facilitated by different people I came across during my
fieldwork. One of them was Beln Pardo, a researcher at the Land Observatory project. She
introduced me to various gatekeepers, such as members of the womens association
(ADMUNE) in Soledad, as well as our contacts in El Carmen de Bolvar. Some of my
interviews were conducted with the assistance of the researchers from the Land Observatory
project. Interviews in Villas de San Pablo were possible because of a close collaboration with
the employees of the FMSD in Barranquilla. In general, I collected data from 21 household
interviews (Table 3.2). Most of them took place in respondents homes.
Table 3.2. Summary of household interviews.
Description of the group
IDP households living in the town
IDP women, members of ADMUNE
IDP beneficiaries of Free Housing project Nueva Esperanza
IDP farming households living in the rural area
Land owners and farmers living in the town
IDP beneficiaries of Free Housing project Villas de San Pablo
Location
El Carmen de Bolvar
Soledad
Soledad
El Carmen de Bolvar
El Carmen de Bolvar
Barranquilla
Date
Interviews
July 1-10
4
July 3
3
July 3
3
July 9
4
July 9
3
July 23-24
4
Total:
21
Due to the sensitivity of the topic and a need to protect privacy of the respondents, all real
names were changed to fictitious. For more detailed information about household interviews,
see Appendix 1.
10
To record all interviews, I used a free recording application installed on my smart phone. After the
interviews, all audio files were copied to my personal computer and stored for transcription.
24
Research Methods
Figure 3.2. Displacement and migration patterns of the interviewed households. Source of data of the
events of displacement: Unidad de Restitucin de Tierras.
25

Focus group
The starting point for interviews in the rural area of El Carmen de Bolvar was a focus group
(Table 3.3) conducted in collaboration with the researchers at the Land Observatory project.
Our meeting took place at one of the participants properties and included the landowner
himself, along with five other male members of the farmers support group, ranging in age
from their early 30s to late 60s. The focus group discussion started with asking questions we
prepared beforehand. Over time discussions evolved into a more informal conversation and
exchange of opinions. The meeting took around six hours. Similarly to household interviews,
all names of the participants of the focus group were changed to fictitious.
Table 3.3. Summary of the focus group.
Focus group participants
Members of the informal farmers support group
Location
El Carmen de Bolvar
Date
July 9
Nr. of participants
6
Other interviews
Interviews not classified above included one with an IDP household and two with local
informants in the cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha (Table 3.4). The gained information
provided me with some useful background information about the general situation and living
conditions in those places. However, since the respondents were not directly involved in either
of the two initiatives that are the subject of my investigation, those interviews have less
relevance and therefore have not been used as much as the ones mentioned previously.
Similarly, there were a number of spontaneous, unrecorded conversations on the topic with
different people that definitely contributed to my knowledge about the situation.
Table 3.4. Summary of the not classified interviews.
Description of the group
Community activist
IDP household, not a beneficiary of any reparation programs
Local activist representing the indigenous Wayuu community
Location
Santa Marta
Santa Marta
Riohacha
Date
June 28
June 28
July 5
Total:
Interviews
1
1
1
3
Observations and photographs

Since my 2014 fieldwork trip was my first visit to Colombia, I tried to use my time as
efficiently as possible, both for the benefit of my investigation but also for of my own interest.
Extensive walks around different poor and affluent neighborhoods were performed on an
26
Research Methods
almost daily basis in Barranquilla and Soledad and periodically around the urban and rural
areas of El Carmen de Bolvar. Additionally, I visited various informal settlements in
Cinaga, Riohacha, Santa Marta, Medelln, Cali and Bogot.
The observations I have made there, combined with the photographs I took not only provided
me with good visual material that supplements my investigation, but also validated my
interview data. These methods helped me to get a good sense of the living conditions of the
victims in both urban and rural areas. On many occasions, I was invited to participate in
peoples everyday activities, such as eating, working and entertainment. When performing
observations, special attention was paid to the quality of building and infrastructure, access to
public services, sense of security, and the general satisfaction of the quality of life.
Throughout the visit, I kept a diary to record all these experiences. These fieldwork notes
helped me recall my observations later on.
3.3. Data analysis

After concluding the fieldwork, the main focus of my work was to organize and process the
collected data. The recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed. Writing the first drafts
of my thesis began in September 2014.
A prerequisite for performing comprehensive data analysis was a careful selection of the right
parameters for comparison according to the theoretical framework and the collected data.
Triangulation and the reconfirmation of the validity of the data were performed throughout the
process to ensure the credibility and relevance of my work and to maintain a strong
connection to the real life situation. In order to assure the integrity of the analysis, the
threshold time for the data used for the comparison of the scale and scope of the two programs
(Chapter 6) was set as the conclusion of my fieldwork (August 2014), by which all the
qualitative data has been collected. The update on the progress and a summary of more recent
issues that concern both initiatives is presented in the Epilogue (Chapter 13).
Since my area of investigation involves two different programs at two different locations, it
was important to develop an appropriate structure for the analysis and presentation of
empirical data. For this reason, the case analysis part of my thesis is divided into four
chapters, as shown in Table 3.5. In Chapters 7 and 9 I introduce the processes and the
problematic of Land Restitution and Free Housing programs and their corresponding areas of
investigations, El Carmen de Bolvar and Barranquilla and Soledad accordingly. Both of these
27

chapters are based primarily on informant and stakeholder interviews. Chapters 8 and 10 are
based on primary data from interviews with the affected urban and rural households in El
Carmen as well as the IDP households in Barranquilla and Soledad. These chapters also
include the information I could collect on the programs that were not the main focus in the
particular location. More precisely, it includes opinions of the urban IDPs in Barranquilla and
Soledad on Land Restitution and limited information on the housing situation in urban and
rural areas of El Carmen de Bolvar.
Table 3.5. Division of the case study analysis.
Location
Land Restitution
Chapter 7
Free Housing
Chapter 9
El Carmen de Bolvar - Chapter 7

Primary focus of investigation
Chapter 8
Limited information,
No focus of investigation
Barranquilla / Soledad - Chapter 9

Secondary focus of investigation
Chapter 10
Primary focus of investigation
Chapter 10
3.4. Research limitations

As in all other investigations, my methodology is not without certain limitations. Some of
those potential weaknesses have been identified before embarking on fieldwork, allowing me
to make the necessary preparations and neutralize them. For example, I was aware that
certain organizations and institutions might have particular biases and agendas which they
want to promote; therefore I tried to make sure to use diversified sources to collect
information and opinions about particular issues whenever possible.
Nevertheless, avoiding the perception of bias during my interviews was perhaps the single
biggest challenge to overcome, especially when I was accompanied by my local contacts.
Whenever I felt this was the case, I explained that I am a foreign student researcher not
affiliated with any local political organization or activist group. I also tried to avoid any
loaded questions to show my neutrality and willingness to obtain honest and unbiased
opinions 11.
There were also logistical challenges that forced me to further narrow down the study area.
After spending several days investigating the situation in different places in the first month of
my fieldwork, I realized that trying to focus on multiple locations at the same time was not
11
Interviews in the two Free Housing projects illustrated that the presence of a local informant that was
known to the respondents did not have an impact on their answers. All interviewees in Nueva
Esperanza (where I was alone) and Villas de San Pablo (when I was accompanied by a local
administration worker) had very similar opinions about the living situation in their respective housing
projects.
28
Research Methods
feasible, even though they were all within the same region. The main obstacles were long
distances between the selected areas of interest (even up to a five hour drive from my base in
Barranquilla), time constrains (only two months of fieldwork), lack of trusted contacts and
entry points to the local community, and the resulting inability to provide equal attention to
the different locations without prioritizing some over the others. Therefore, I decided to
narrow down my study area and select two main focus locations for a more in-depth study: the
Metropolitan area of Barranquilla & Soledad and the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar.
Another limitation that requires acknowledgement is related to the selection of interviewees.
Since in most cases, my informants determined access to other household interviewees, it was
not possible to achieve an optimal balance between the different types of households that were
subject to my investigation. In particular, it was very difficult to find IDPs that benefited from
the Land Restitution program and returned to their original properties. Although opinion of
this type of households might have provided a valid contribution to my investigation, the
inability to locate them is also very meaningful, as it confirmed my hypothesis that this group
is very small in number, compared to, for example, those who are still in process of Land
Restitution but are not considering the eventual return or those who returned regardless of the
restitution verdict. I sought to overcome this limitation by further triangulation and
interviewing more households than originally planned.
Nevertheless, if I were given an opportunity to come back or prolong my fieldwork in
Colombia, I would have probably invested more time in trying to find and investigate those
that appear to be underrepresented cases. In addition, inspired by the positive experience from
the focus group discussion, I would try to organize more such meetings whenever possible
and apply this technique to allow the respondents compare their experiences between
themselves.
In regards to getting access to the relevant documentation, my objective was largely
accomplished, even though my financial resources were limited and some of the desired
information (i.e. GIS files) was not available for free. Also, most of the statistical data and
maps on topics related to my thesis were at the national scale and it was difficult to find this
kind of information focusing specifically on my case areas. For this reason, the comparison of
scale and scope of both initiatives (Chapter 6) is based on the available data on the national
level.
29
4. Literature Review and Theory

The aim of this chapter is to identify gaps in knowledge in order to validate the relevance of
the research question and motives of my investigation. Through the review of literature and
related theory, three main issues for further analysis have been identified: migration and
urbanization patterns, social networks, and government interventionism.
4.1. Knowledge gaps

To date, little research appears to have been undertaken which addresses or compares both the
Land Restitution and the Free Housing programs and evaluates their impact on the livelihoods
of the beneficiaries. As explained by Carrillo (2009) and Crisp et al. (2012), literature on
displacement is generally focused on humanitarian aid, refugee camps, and migration. More
specific works on urban IDPs in Colombia emerged relatively recently and are mainly
concerned with socio-demographic pressures and integration in specific large cities, such as
Bogot (Human Rights Watch, 2005, Zea, 2010), Medelln (Snchez Mojica, 2013, Gmez
Builes, 2010), Cartagena (Pollock, 2013), as well as Buenaventura, Tumaco and Soacha
(Aysa-Lastra, 2011, CODHES, 2013). Nevertheless, according to Crisp et al. (2012), urban
planners, demographers, and development specialists have not addressed significantly the
relationship between displacement and urbanization. Albuja and Caballos (2010), who
placed the displacement in Colombia in the context of rural-urban migration, came up with
similar conclusions, suggesting that local governments and planners can do much more to
address the challenges faced by urban IDPs.
With regards to publications and studies carried out on the two reparation initiatives
separately, the Land Restitution program has received significantly more attention than Free
Housing. Interest in the former emerged a couple of years before the initiative was officially
introduced in 2011. Some of the authors who critically evaluated the proposals and attempted
to predict the effectiveness of Land Restitution include Garca-Godos (2010), Lid (Garca30
Literature Review and Theory

Godos and Lid, 2010), Saffon (2010) and Wiig (2009). Research conducted since the launch
of the program leaves no doubts that it is performing slower than originally expected and does
not meet with its main objectives (Garca-Godos and Wiig, 2014, Gutirrez Sann, 2013,
Medina, 2012). Authors who analyzed The Victims Law from a gender perspective concluded
that it fails to improve the situation of women, who are arguably among the most vulnerable
groups affected by the conflict (Garca-Godos and Wiig, 2014, Rodrguez Rodrguez, 2014).
Various international organizations, such as Amnesty International (Amnesty International,
2009, 2012), the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2010), the United
Nations Development Programme (PNUD, 2011), and Human Rights Watch (2005, 2013)
have also developed reports in which they shared their concerns about the different aspects of
Land Restitution that correspond to the issues they are advocating for.
On the contrary, the Free Housing program has not attracted much attention from academics
and researchers before its implementation. This is because the planning phase was relatively
short as the program was based on similar social housing schemes in Colombia. This is
gradually starting to change as the program is expanding, making it one of the largest of its
kind in the world. In regards to general publications on the Free Housing program, Gilbert
(2013) questioned the idea of providing dwellings for free and claimed that the implications
will not be as positive as the government may expect. lvarez Vsquez et al. (2014)
concluded that by the first quarter of 2013, various Free Housing projects failed to meet the
originally established standards for the financing, design, and provision of services to its
residents.
Literature on the general situation of centrally planned housing in Colombia is focused on
emphasizing the qualitative and quantitative shortage of affordable and social housing in
urban areas (Balln Zamora, 2009, Escallon G, 2011, Faras Monroy, 2014, Insuasty Delgado,
2013, Pecha-Garzn, 2011).
4.2. Migration, urbanization, and return

One of the recurring topics in the works mentioned above is the issue of urbanization in
relation to population movement during and after the conflict. From this point of view, there is
a direct relation between the reparation initiatives and rural-urban migration patterns.
It is important to note that forced displacement caused by the Colombian conflict overlapped
with a massive rural-urban migration trend in South America, which today is among the most
31

urbanized regions in the world. As indicated by the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs (UN DESA) the growth of urban population in Colombia in the last 50
years followed the same patterns as in other countries on the continent, and today, has reached
80% (UN DESA, 2014). It is difficult to assess whether a hypothetical situation of no conflict
would have had a significant impact on the rural-urban migration process in Colombia, but the
comparison with other Latin American countries suggests that rapid urbanization was
happening in all states in the region, regardless of their political and economic situation (UN
DESA, 2014). Therefore, in some cases it may be problematic to make a clear distinction
between the displaced populations and those who voluntarily migrated into the cities, for
example to seek employment or education opportunities 12.
From a demographic point of view, The Victims Law is an indirect attempt to reverse the
process of rural-urban migration 13. At the same time, the Free Housing projects (of which a
vast majority is built in cities) are based on the idea that the urbanization process in Colombia
is still proceeding and that there is an urgent need to address the shortage of housing in urban
areas while little demand for new housing is expected in the depopulated countryside. FMSD
is one of the providers of subsidized and free housing units which officially acknowledged
and incorporated this assumption into their strategy for the development of new projects
(FMSD, 2014).
As a result we can see how these two reparation initiatives represent very different ways of
thinking about the migration processes: one being a romantic idea of returning to the
countryside and engaging into a rural livelihood that was lost due to the conflict, and the
second, which accepts that once people move from the rural to urban area (forcibly or
voluntarily), they are likely to adapt there and stay permanently.
Further literature on rural-urban migration worldwide raises serious concerns about the ability
of the state to change the course of urbanization 14. This process is often described as being
one directional and there is little indication that this may change anytime in the future. The
idea of the inevitability of urbanization was discussed as early as the 1940s when more than
12
Typically, one of the main differences between the displaced people and those who voluntarily
migrated to urban areas is that the former usually bring no savings which would enable them to start a
new livelihood in the city, while the later come prepared, with a certain amount of cash that facilitates
their survival, at least in the first few weeks or months of their stay. As a result, the IDPs are much
more likely to enter into extreme poverty than economic migrants.
13
Land reforms and property restitution programs that intended to redistribute land and repopulate
rural areas have been tried in a several countries. Wiig (2009) mentions the examples of Bosnia, East
Germany and Peru where land restitution initiatives have been performed with mixed results.
14
An interesting case is Cuba, where the population reforms and restrictions of movement to cities
under the communist government did not prevent rapid urbanization (Ebanks, 1998).
32

70% of worlds population was still living in rural areas (Tisdale, 1942). Later, a number of
different authors agreed that urbanization is an inevitable, irreversible, or a natural
process globally or in reference to particular regions (Castels, 2002, Doxiades and
Papaioannou, 1974, Friedmann, 1969, Parnwell, 1993).
Those theories might apply very well to the situation in Latin America where a massive
migration of rural populations to cities continued despite various agrarian reforms which
aimed at improving the distribution of land in the countryside, and has only slowed down
during the economic recession in urban areas in 1980s (Gilbert, 1994). The UN DESA
predicts that urbanization in Colombia, as in the rest of the world, will go on for at least a
couple of decades to come (UN DESA, 2014), as shown on Figure 4.1
The transition of Colombia from a primarily rural to an urban society had significant
implications on the economic development of the country. The importance of the export of
agricultural products was taken over by the products and services provided by Colombias
growing urban system dominated by four major cities: Bogot, Cali, Medelln and
Barranquilla (Samad et al., 2012), all of which received large numbers of IDPs.
Indeed, there have been a several articles and studies which suggest that the majority of the
displaced population in Colombia is not willing to return to the countryside. Over a decade
ago, Naranjo (2004) wrote that when the IDPs arrive in an urban area, they are not thinking of
Figure 4.1. Urbanization in Colombia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the World between 1950
and 2050. Adopted from: UN DESA (2014)
33

it as a temporary stage, but for most of them the main priority is to establish themselves and
seek new livelihood opportunities there. Albuja and Caballos (2010) made similar
conclusions, arguing that despite the extreme poverty and lack of recognition from the state,
most IDP households are looking for a more permanent asylum in urban areas. According to
those authors, the provision of governmental programs for the displaced populations should be
focused around their places of reception, which in most cases are the informal neighborhoods
on the peripheries of the biggest cities (Albuja and Caballos, 2010, Naranjo, 2004). Pollock
(2013) claimed that the state should be focusing on long term IDP urban integration rather
than return to communities of origin.
A survey conducted between 1997 and 2004 by the Catholic Church on 43,587 displaced
households in different departments of Colombia showed that not more than 11% of the
respondents wanted to return (Arias et al., 2014). According to another national survey
conducted in 2008 by the Commission for the Monitoring of the Public Policy on Forced
Displacement, only 2.9% of the 8,100 surveyed households claimed they would like to return
back to their place of origin and up to 78.7% would like to stay in the receptor city, while
about 12.2% considered moving somewhere else, including emigration to another country
(CSPPDF, 2008).
Both Naranjo (2004) and Arias et al. (2014) stressed that social networks are very important
when it comes to decisions about staying at the current location or returning. Naranjo (2004)
noted that after arriving in the city, new contacts are crucial for displaced households to start a
new life and find safety, while Arias et al. (2014) claimed that social networks gained through
membership in peasant organizations and collective land ownership increase the desire to
return.
4.3. Social networks

Wasserman (1994) defines a social network as a structure that consists of a finite set or sets
of actors and the relation or relations defined on them. The different positions of the actors
(i.e. individuals and organizations) and the relations between them are among the main
subjects of analysis in sociology. This analysis is helpful in identifying patterns, getting a
better understanding of the power relations between actors, and the network dynamics in a
defined social group. In this study, social networks are analyzed in the context of urban and
rural livelihood development before, during and after the displacement.
34

Jacobs (1961) was one of the first writers to emphasize the importance of social networks in
reference to community development and housing. A broader term to describe network
relations was later provided by Putnam (2001) who tied social networks to his definition of
social capital, alongside social values (such as trust) and moral obligations and norms. Those
elements of social capital, according to him, are central to human life, make us feel more
secure, and give hope for the future (Putnam, 2001). Studying social capital and household
relations is especially relevant in research on urban poverty reduction strategies and
livelihoods, as these are among the main assets the poor have at their disposal (Moser, 1998).
As argued by Putnam et al. (2004), the failure of the state or its indifference usually fosters the
necessity for the public to develop new social capital structures as a strategy for survival and
mobility. In those cases, they usually take forms of informal networks, which involve first and
foremost extended family members and their closest friends who are bounded by trust and
solidarity.
An extensive literature review on conflict and displacement in Colombia indicates that social
networks played an important role for the survival and satisfaction of basic needs of conflicts
victims in the absence of effective governance (CODHES, 2013, Naranjo, 2004, Pollock,
2013). The inability of state forces to ensure safety in the countryside led to massive
massacres and displacements, further resulting in the complete destruction, erosion, or at best,
the severe damage of pre-conflict social networks in rural communities. This may be one of
the main reasons why so few displaced households are willing to return, as observed by Arias
et al. (2014). The recovery of those rural communities (if it is possible at all) requires stability
and a guarantee of safety, which may take many years to achieve.
When IDP households are forced to sell or abandon their properties out of fear, it is primarily
the social network in areas that are considered safer (usually in the largest cities) that
determine their favored destination (del Pilar Castillo et al., 2009). In the absence of a strong
government structure, provision of shelter, employment, education and other support services
were typically distributed through informal and often illegal channels (Naranjo, 2004).
4.4. Government interventions

It took several years before the chaotic period of civil war, fear, and massive displacements
that caused illegal squatting in the largest urban areas, transitioned into a more peaceful era
when the state was ready to intervene. In 2010, Garca-Godos and Lid claimed that after a
35

few failed attempts to provide transitional justice in the previous years, the Colombian
government was now in a favorable position to take actions that aim at restoring or
compensating for what the IDPs have lost as a result of the conflict. Therefore it is important
to investigate the Land Restitution and Free Housing initiatives from the point of view of topdown governance and answer what intended and unintended impacts the state made through
their interventions and active involvement.
Historically, Latin American countries were characterized by the presence of a relatively large
informal sector, which was reflected primarily in monetary transactions, the labor market,
governance systems, and of course housing and property rights, the later being the most
relevant for my analysis. According to the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto, who
pioneered research on formalization of tenure rights, in Latin America 80 per cent of all real
estate was held outside the law (De Soto, 2000). De Soto argues that the developing
countries of the South cannot succeed economically, because they lack an integrated system
of formal property rights which would allow the creation of invisible capital that adds
surplus value to goods and properties through recognizing them not only as physical
commodities, but also as assets that can operate in virtual financial systems (De Soto, 2000).
These issues are very relevant to Colombia, where there is not a complete, accurate and
updated information system on property and many areas of the country have never been
registered (Saffon, 2010). Out of all rural properties which have been included in the last
national registry in 1994, by 2007, 54% had not been updated (Saffon, 2010). Due to
historical inability of the Colombian state to ensure security and establish the rule of law in
the countryside, and due to the normalization of informal property ownership, it was relatively
easy for the guerrilla and paramilitary groups to appropriate enormous amounts of rural land
and to create their own systems of governance and production.
When the Colombian government started to take control over the security situation in the last
few years, a number of large-scale interventions had been proposed to prevent the repetition
of crimes and kick start the economic recovery of the country. A plan for massive
formalization of property rights, as well as labor rights, is among the proposals that are
discussed at the ongoing peace negotiations in Havana (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la
Paz, 2014). This also includes the creation and update of the cadastral database of all rural
properties in Colombia, the reestablishment of the presence and credibility of the state in the
countryside, the redistribution of land that has been abandoned, underused or formerly
devoted for illegal uses (i.e. production of drugs), as well as a general modernization and the
36

provision of the necessary infrastructure. One of the goals of those measures is to close the
enormous gap between the urban and rural world (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la
Paz, 2014).
Accordingly, the Land Restitution process has the potential to make huge contributions to the
formalization of agricultural land and accelerate economic and infrastructure investments in
the rural areas, complying with the ideas put forth by De Soto (2000). Most importantly, the
program enables massive land surveying and registration at a scale that has not been seen
before in Colombia. The new database does not only include properties that have been
claimed by the victims, but also many others that lay within the micro and macro-focalized
zones. Nevertheless, IDMC (2010) recommended that the government should go one step
further and take this opportunity to update the land registry for the entire country, not only the
properties that are within the jurisdiction of the URT.
Another important aspect of the Land Restitution program is the formalization of land rights
of properties that had unregulated ownership situation, which is the case for many parcels that
are now under investigation (Garca-Godos and Wiig, 2014). Nevertheless, successful
formalization campaigns and the creation of a comprehensive land registry at a large scale
will require a long-term financing strategy and political stability, which at this moment is still
uncertain in Colombia.
Just as Land Restitution provides an opportunity for property formalization in rural areas, the
Free Housing initiative has a hidden effect of formalizing tenure arrangements for many urban
IDPs. Even though formalization is not an aim in itself, technically the Free Housing scheme
brings thousands of IDPs from informal housing agreements into the formal sector. A family
that moves into such a house receives full property rights (with some restrictions on selling)
and connection to all the necessary municipal services (electricity, water, gas, sewage), for
which they receive bills on a regular basis.
Although De Soto was quite successful in convincing policymakers in different parts of Latin
America to initiate property formalization programs, different researchers have challenged his
ideas. Alan Gilbert (2002), who studied property transactions in Bogots informal settlements
(Figure 4.2), questioned the benefits of formalization and claimed that De Soto exaggerated
the impact of titling programs in property markets, tenure security, access to credit, and
capital accumulation. Gilbert does not believe that giving legal property titles to the poor is a
bad thing, but he concluded that it may bring additional unexpected costs, such as property
taxes, higher living expenses, or rising rent (Gilbert, 2002), that may ultimately negatively
37
Figure 4.2. Informal settlement in Bogot under consolidation.
affect the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, including the displaced and victim
households.
Another criticism of large scale formalization was given by Robbins (2008), who argues that
property is not merely a thing or a right, but a local and contextual social arrangement.
As property means different things to different people, any attempt to perform formalization
initiatives should take these local meanings into consideration. There is, therefore, not a
universal model for property formalization which contributes to poverty alleviation (Robbins,
2008).
Evidence to Robbins theory was provided by Fernandes (2011), who claimed that
regularization programs in informal settlements in Latin America had mixed results and their
success largely depended on those local contexts and the applied methods. His report
concluded that the De Sotos model of formalization, which was implemented on a large scale
in Peru, has not been financially self-sustainable, has not helped the poor get access to
credit (at least as much as formal employment does), and does not result in further
improvements in their housing conditions. Therefore it should not be replicated in other
places. On the contrary, a more comprehensive approach, where tenure formalization was
accompanied by infrastructure upgrading and socio-economic programs that were
38

implemented in different favelas of Brazil, proved to be more sustainable in the long-term
(despite being more costly per capita), and contributed to the improvement of living
conditions and tenure security (Fernandes, 2011).
Such incremental infrastructure improvements and gradual formalization approaches to
property formalization was advocated by John F. C. Turner, an architect who studied housing
in villages and urban squatter settlements in Peru. Just as Gilbert (2013) disagreed with the
idea of giving free housing to the poor by the Colombian government, Turner (1976) was very
critical of large-scale state provision of massive subsidized housing projects as a replacement
for self-built incremental dwellings, which are typical to squatter and informal settlements.
According to Turner, large-scale housing projects are almost never successful. First of all,
managers and designers of those projects focus too narrowly on short-term solutions and such
aspects as sustainable management, financing, and maintenance are too often ignored.
Secondly, there is often a mismatch between what is provided and the actual necessities and
demands of the residents. Finally, placing the same social groups into fixed housing without
making provisions for mobility and social mixing leads to the further socio-economic
segregation of the population (Turner, 1976). The most famous case of such a failure was the
Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis, Missouri (USA), which quickly turned into a
ghetto and was entirely demolished 20 years after its construction in 1950s (Figure 4.3) due
Figure 4.3. Demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis. Source: Bristol (1991)
39

to serious problems such as crime, poverty and rising vacancy rates (Bristol, 1991). Other
examples of such failed social housing projects include the Regent Park development in
Toronto and the Bijlmermeer district in Amsterdam 15.
Turner claimed that good housing like plentiful food, is more common where it is locally
produced through network structures and decentralizing technologies, arguing that it is
social networks, not top-down government structures that should remain responsible for the
provision of housing (Turner, 1976). The model for the improvement of living conditions of
the urban poor proposed by Turner was therefore based on the principle of autonomy in
housing. Housing economy and equity, he writes, can only be achieved if householders
and their local communities are responsible for what is build and how it is used and
maintained (Turner, 1976).
Figure 4.4. Popular District in Medelln (Antioquia). Gradual regularization of property rights,
investment in community infrastructure and extension of public transportation routes are some of the
strategies applied by the local authorities in informal settlements like this.
15
The Regent Park public housing project in Toronto, Canada is being gradually demolished to allow
for a staged relocation of the residents into the new buildings in the area. The idea is to mix social and
market housing and add commercial spaces to create a mixed-income and mixed-use community
(Rowe and Dunn, 2015). In case of the Bijlmermeer district in Amsterdam, the entire housing project
was completely redesigned and redeveloped in order improve living conditions, security, and
accessibility to jobs and services (Helleman and Wassenberg, 2004).
40

Nabeel Hamdi (1995) followed up on these ideas, arguing that top-down, massive
construction of housing by both the state and private sector fails to produce good quality
design solutions and is not an efficient way to solve housing problems, especially in the
Global South where money and useful statistical information are scarce. According to Hamdi
(1995), good housing can be achieved locally through practitioners enablement, participatory
design and the ability to adapt to changing situations.
Although Turner did not address centralized interventions in rural land distribution directly, it
can be deducted that the limitations imposed by the URT to the restored property (i.e.
regulating the rights to sell or rent out to others) are in conflict with the principles of
autonomy that would allow households to decide where and how to live.
According to Turners way of thinking, the government should 1) allow the affected groups of
people to stay where they live, and 2) support them in a gradual improvement of their
dwellings. This process can be accompanied by a systematic infrastructure upgrading, service
provision, and formalization coordinated by the state (Figure 4.4). The recommendations
proposed by Gilbert (2013) in regards to Colombias Free Housing program are not much
different. He concluded that instead of spending money on new housing units, the government
could instead subsidize housing improvements, water bills, public transportation, education,
and health services for the poor or even food and paychecks of the low-income earners
(Gilbert, 2013).
41
5. Theoretical Framework
In the review of relevant literature and theory, I identified three main themes that are central
to the situation of Colombian IDPs who are eligible for either of the two governmental
initiatives. The first one includes the historical rural-urban and potential urban-rural migration
patterns. The second are the social networks before, during, and after displacement and the
third one is the degree of government interventionism in response to the crisis situation. As
explained before, my analysis builds on the assumption that the social networks of the
displaced households and the benefits (or their lack) provided to them by the state influence
both the migration patterns in the initial phase of displacement and the willingness or the
ability to return and restore rural livelihoods at a later stage (Figure 5.1).
Each theme raises some important questions, but the real gaps and issues that require further
investigation can be identified by placing them in the context of the Colombian conflict and
post-conflict situation, and by presenting them on a timeline. Figure 5.2 is a more detailed
visual model showing my understanding of the situation of IDPs before, during, and after
displacement. This model brings the two reparation initiatives into a wider theoretical context
based on the discussion brought up in the previous chapter. It also helps me to identify the
most relevant information for comparison from the collected data and provides the necessary
vocabulary for data analysis and the presentation of findings.
Livelihood in this model is divided into urban (grey) and rural (green). The first one
includes all kinds of income generation activities that are typical to towns and cities, including
employment in commercial, service and industrial sectors. Rural livelihood refers to the
countryside living and all kinds of agricultural activities that require large amount of land,
such as crop cultivation and livestock farming.
Population movement patterns (orange) represent voluntarily migrations of rural households
to cities in the first stage, alongside with forced displacement during the conflict, and the
eventual relocation decisions of the displaced families in the present or in the future.
42
Theoretical Framework
Figure 5.1. Simplified theoretical model connecting the main themes. Developed by the author.
Figure 5.2. Theoretical model in which the main themes were applied to the situation of the two
reparation initiatives in Colombia. Developed by the author.
Social networks (blue), as it was explained before, usually comprise of relatives, friends, and
the local community. In times of conflict, victims who did not receive sufficient protection
from the government were much more dependent on their social networks as a mean for
survival and satisfaction of basic needs. This caused a massive migration movement
(displacement) into the cities, which were considered significantly safer than rural areas. As a
result, communities were torn apart, leading to major changes to the existing social networks,
and the establishment of new networks as a survival strategy.
In the next stage, the government 16 (red) makes an intervention in an attempt to improve
living situation of the displaced households and launches two large-scale reparation measures
for the victims of the armed conflict. The first alternative is providing Free Housing to allow
16
In this sense, the government does not only include the ministries and institutions directly operated
by the state, but also all sorts of entities and organizations that have been affiliated and established by
it. Among them are the URT, the Victims Unit (Unidad de Victimas) and all sorts of local administration
offices.
43

the victims to stay within the same urban area (no return migration) and to engage in urban
livelihood. The second alternative, Land Restitution, implies returning (migrating back) to the
countryside and engaging in agriculture. Therefore, choosing the preferred government
initiative is crucial for defining the future place of living and livelihood. What is also
significant for many displaced households is that both initiatives would bring them into the
formal property system administered by the state.
The interconnection of the three themes (migration, social networks and government) poses
two more specific questions that are relevant to the main objective of the study. First of all, it
will be important to find out to what extent the two state interventions can affect the migration
patterns of the displaced households after the conflict, especially for the urban IDPs who are
in the process of Land Restitution. Do they want to return or will they stay in the city
regardless of Land Restitution?
Another question is how social networks in places of origin and places of reception affect the
IDPs decisions of whether to stay or return. Is the presence of a strong social network a good
enough motive to stay or return? Those questions are helpful in the identification of the main
themes and components for discussion and are used to support the analysis of the collected
primary data (Chapters 8 and 10).
The main framework for case study analysis involves interpreting stories of each of the
interviewed IDP households separately and explaining their situation through the process
illustrated on the theoretical model (Figure 5.2). This is done in stages, beginning with the
characterization of the livelihood situation before and during the displacement. The next step
is defying the current socio-economic status and comparing it to their previous living
situation. This is followed by the extraction of opinions and justification of preferences for the
reparation programs. At all of those stages, special attention is paid to the attractiveness of
benefits offered by each of the two governments reparation programs and the strength of
social networks in the places of origin and reception to discuss how these factors affect
current and future livelihood decisions. The objective of this analysis is to generate
conclusions which would provide answers to my research questions presented in the
Introduction chapter.
It is important to keep in mind that the situation of many IDP households that seek reparation
may potentially reflect some variations or modifications of the model. An in-depth analysis of
those cases is particularly important, as it highlights reasons why the outcome of the two
initiatives is different than what was intended, at least for those specific situations.
44
6. Comparison of the two programs: scope and scale

Taking into consideration the total estimated long-term number of beneficiaries in the entire
country, both the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs have a comparable scale. Both
initiatives have presence in most of Colombias 33 departments with the exception of the least
densely populated areas in the southern and eastern part of the country (see Table 6.1 and
Figure 6.1). The biggest concentrations of Free Housing projects are in cities which received
largest numbers of displaced households, particularly Medelln (Antioquia), Bogot (Distrito
Capital), Barranquilla (Atlntico), Cali (Valle del Cauca), Cartagena (Bolvar), Ccuta (Norte
de Santander), Valledupar (Cesar) and Sincelejo (Sucre).
According to the URT, the potential capacity for Land Restitution in a long-term, 10-years
scope is to process applications from up to 360,000 households that abandoned or were
evicted from their properties, of which 160,000 cases would have been registered and settled
by the end of 2014 17 (Medina, 2012, Sabogal Urrego, 2013). Not all of those cases, however,
will result in a successful restitution and relocation of the household.
The Free Housing program presents similar numbers. The nearly completed first phase
includes 100,000 units built between 2012 and 2014, with plans to include another 100,000
dwellings added annually for at least the next three years (Economa, 2014), giving a total of
400,000 units, of which around 72,5% is given to the IDP households.
In regards to housing, the budget of the Land Restitution program provides funds for the
reconstruction of dwellings that have been destroyed or are not suitable for living. Therefore,
the priority of both initiatives is to provide dignified living conditions of a comparable
standard, yet for a different type of setting and livelihood: one being rural and the other one
more urban.
17
The estimated capacity of Land Restitution was presented only in the first two years of its
functioning when the program was still in the preliminary stage. Reconfirmation of these numbers later
in the process proved to be difficult which may suggest that the URT officers stopped using it as a
benchmark as they realized that this ambitious goal is out of reach.
45

Table 6.1. Distribution of Free Housing and Land Restitution projects by department in 2014.
Department
Amazonas
Antioquia
Arauca
Atlntico
Bolvar
Boyaca
Caldas
Caquet
Casanare
Cauca
Cesar
Choc
Crdoba
Cundinamarca
Distrito Capital
Guaina
Guaviare
Huila
La Guajira
Magdalena
Meta
Nario
Norte de Santander
Putumayo
Quindo
Risaralda
San Andrs y Providencia
Santander
Sucre
Tolima
Valle del Cauca
Vaups
Vichada
Capital
Leticia
Medelln
Arauca
Barranquilla
Cartagena de Indias
Tunja
Manizales
Florencia
Yopal
Popayn
Valledupar
Quibd
Montera
Bogot
Bogot
Inrida
San Jos del Guaviare
Neiva
Riohacha
Santa Marta
Villavicencio
San Juan de Pasto
San Jos de Ccuta
Mocoa
Armenia
Pereira
San Andrs
Bucaramanga
Sincelejo
Ibagu
Cali
Mit
Puerto Carreo
Total:
Nr of F.H. units
200
13,718
632
9,137
4,016
2,012
2,572
1,016
160
2,854
3,900
2,099
6,070
4,162
4,837
244
182
3,469
2,954
5,514
1,598
4,344
4,344
692
464
2,170
174
4,046
4,068
2,205
8,941
0
200
102,994
L.R. focalized zones

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
19 / 33
F.H. = Free Housing

L.R. = Land Restitution
Bold = departments within case study area
Sources: Urna de Cristal (2013) and Minagricultura (2014)
Analyzing the progress of implementation and budget allocation from the government gives
an interesting difference in numbers between the two programs. Three years after launching
the Land Restitution program, there have been 63,951 applicants in the entire country (Bolvar
Jaime, 2014), which includes applications through both individual and collective claims. This
is 14 times less than the estimated 900,000 households which are currently on the different
local waiting lists for a free house (Minvivienda, 2014e). In the summer of 2014, the demand
for Free Housing (based on the number of applicants) exceeded the final expected number of
built and planned dwellings more than twice.
46
Comparison of the two programs: scope and scale
Figure 6.1. Distribution of Free Housing projects and Land Restitution zones in Colombia in 2014.
Adopted from: Urna de Cristal (2013) and Minagricultura (2014)
47

Similarly, by August 2014 only 2,129 households received their property rights back through
the Land Restitution program (El Espectador, 2014), while at the same time, 26 times more
households benefited from the construction of 56,159 free housing units (Minvivienda,
2014c). Even after deducting the 27.5% of those who are eligible for the program but are not
formally registered as IDPs, the numbers remain in favor of the Free Housing program.
Both initiatives are still far from reaching their ultimate goals, but it seems clear that the
progress of the Free Housing initiative is as expected, while Land Restitutions targets for
2021 seem unrealistic. This situation is also predicted in a study by Gutirrez Sann (2013),
who developed quantitative models to estimate how long it would take to finish processing all
the received and potential Land Restitution claims 18. He calculated that at the current speed,
the URT will never be able to complete its work, and in the most favorable scenario, the last
property would be restituted after 93 years (Gutirrez Sann, 2013).
It needs to be clarified that not all the households whose property rights have been restituted
have returned to their land and have reestablished agricultural activities. Similarly, not all of
the beneficiaries of the Free Housing program have moved into their new dwellings. Although
the exact count of those households is unknown, it is assumed that at this stage those numbers
do not have a significant impact on the disparity in the execution of the two initiatives.
In terms of financing, the federal government allocated $29 million USD for operation of the
Land Restitution program for 2011-2021. On top of that, the URT received donations from
Figure 6.2. Beneficiary households (August 2014) Figure 6.3. Claims and applications (August 2014)
18
The model was based on the data on the speed at which the URT processed Land Restitution
claims between October 2012 and July 2013 in Montes de Mara sub-region, which also includes the
municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar.
48

various
international
organizations
and
foreign governments 19, whose estimated

contribution may be up to $200 million
USD (El Nuevo Siglo, 2012, Unidad de
Vctimas, 2014).
In case of the Free Housing program,
funding from the federal government has
been divided into phases. For the first
100,000 units built between 2012 and 2014,
the
state
spent
(Minvivienda,
$2.2
2014a).
million
Later,
it
USD
was
Figure 6.4. Federal government funding in USD
announced that additional funding of around (ongoing and planned projects as of 2014)
$320,000 USD will be provided for the
improvement of common infrastructure in those projects, including parks, schools, and

kindergartens (Flrez G., 2014). It is estimated that the upcoming phase with 300,000 new
units will cost Santos government around $6.9 million USD (Poltica, 2014). Altogether, the
estimated federal spending for the entire Free Housing program is around $9.4 million USD.
Land for construction of housing projects is usually provided by municipal and departmental
governments (El Colombiano, 2014).
Each Free Housing project may have a different financing scheme. In some departments, the
local governments are more involved in co-financing and administering the construction and
operation of the dwellings. There are also many projects that are subsidized by the National
Savings Fund (Fonvivienda). In other cases, funding and operational capacity might be
partially provided by private investors 20 and donors, such as the FMSD, which coordinates the
implementation of the Villas de San Pablo project in Barranquilla and Ciudad del
Bicentenario in Cartagena. Similarly to Land Restitution, therefore, the federal government
provides only a small part of the funding needed for the full implementation and operation of
the Free Housing projects.
19
Some of these donors include: the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), the European Commission, United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) the Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA) and the Spanish
Agency for International Cooperation (AECID)
20
As I was explained by one of my informants, various private sector real estate developers and
construction companies which are involved in the Free Housing program saw it as an opportunity for
money laundering and tax avoidance and took advantage of the benefits given by the government.
49

Calculating the federal governments spending on both initiatives per household proves to be
problematic, mainly because it is impossible to obtain numbers and estimate how much
funding for those initiatives comes indirectly through other programs and channels
coordinated locally by such entities as affiliated NGOs or municipal governments.
Nevertheless, a simplified comparison based on the publically available numbers shows that
Land Restitution can dispose over three times as much federal funding per one property claim,
than what the Free Housing builders can spend on one dwelling.
The numbers summarized in Table 6.2 suggest that the Free Housing project performs much
better in providing fast solutions for the displaced population. Even though it was launched
one year later, it quickly outnumbered the beneficiaries of the under-performing and slower to
implement Land Restitution. It seems that by August 2014, the construction of the Free
Housing units in the first phase of the program has been progressing according to plan and
there is a high probability that it will be completed on schedule and within the estimated cost.
On the other hand, analysis confirms that at the current speed, the Land Restitution program
will be far away from meeting its long-term objectives.
The information presented in this chapter is important for answering the research questions for
a number of reasons:
The demand for Free Housing is much larger than for Land Restitution.
The number of families who will truly benefit from the Free Housing program is also
going to be many times higher than from Land Restitution despite the fact that
originally both initiatives had a comparable scale in terms of the number of attended
displaced households.
Most of the households who applied for Land Restitution will likely be waiting for the
final verdict for many years to come and they have no guarantee that it will ever be
positive, which means that for the time being they will have to manage their
livelihoods on their own.
One Land Restitution case costs the federal government three times more than one
dwelling in the Free Housing program. At first, this may suggest that the utilities
provided through the Land Restitution program are a lot better, but if we consider how
much more demand there is for Free Housing, it can be concluded that the money is
better spend for the Free Housing, as building housing in cities is cheaper and faster
than restoring farms in rural areas.
50

Table 6.2. Scale and scope summary.
Program name
Land Restitution
Free Housing
Restitution of property rights

to agricultural lands lost or
abandoned due to the armed
conflict and assistance with
return
Partial land reform in rural
areas, restoration of respect
for private property
Households which prefer to
return to rural areas
Free housing units primarily in urban

areas for displaced due to the
armed conflict (~72.5%), natural
disasters and for families in extreme
poverty
Addressing shortage of housing in
urban areas, increasing employment
in construction industry
Households which prefer to
stay in receptor cities
2011 2021 (10 years)
2012 2018 (6 years)
160,000
100,000
360,000
400,000
63,951
~900,000
2,129
56,159
1.3%
56.2%
0.6%
14%
Federal funding
$29 million USD
$9.4 million USD
Federal funding
(per household)
$80 USD
$24 USD
Future plans
Extending the program to the

remaining parts of Colombia
Extending the program to add at

least 300,000 more housing units
Short description
Additional benefits
Target beneficiaries
Timeframe
Capacity for resolved
cases / beneficiaries
(by end of 2014)
Capacity for resolved
cases / beneficiaries
(final)
Claims / Applications
(August 2014)
Nr of Beneficiaries
(August 2014)
Short-term
progress (%)
Long-term
progress (%)
Explanation of calculations of selected figures is provided in Appendix 3.
51
7. Case Presentation El Carmen de Bolvar

Due to the high intensity of the conflict and large numbers of displacements in the Caribbean
region of Colombia, the Land Restitution Unit (URT) established a number of branches in the
area. In the departments of Atlntico, Magdalena and Bolivar, there are three local offices:
one in Barranquilla that covers the entire Atlntico department and a few neighboring
municipalities in Magdalena, one in Santa Marta which is responsible for cases in the rest of
Magdalena and one in Cartagena (Bolvar department) with a local branch to attend victims in
the town of El Carmen de Bolvar.
Within the region, there are a number of micro and macro-focalized zones with a big
concentration of them along the Magdalena River and in the northern part of the Bolvar
department, especially in the Montes de Mara sub-region, which includes the municipality of
El Carmen de Bolvar (Figure 7.1).
7.1. The municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar

The municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar was established in the late 18th century. An
employee of a large agricultural corporation, who lived and worked there for most of her life,
explained the historical context of the area to me in great depth. She told me it was a peaceful
and prosperous rural community until the early 1990s when the FARC established their
networks in the region. Some years later the Agrarian Fund (Caja Agraria) was liquidated and
many farmers no longer had access to credit, which made them more vulnerable to illegal
armed forces. The situation worsened with the arrival of the paramilitary groups in the area
around 1998.
Both the guerrillas and the paramilitary forces established their camps in different parts of the
municipality. They did not only fight with each other, but also terrorized local decision
makers and the rural communities. Murders, forced evictions, death threats, extortions, burned
52
Case Presentation El Carmen de Bolvar
Figure 7.1. Map of the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar with the main locations.
Figure 7.2. Town of El Carmen de Bolvar and the surrounding rural areas.
53

cars, robberies, and other criminal acts took place on a daily basis. The state forces took
serious measures to bring peace to the area. For instance, the movement within the
municipality was greatly restricted and a curfew was put in place whereby no one was allowed
to be outside their house between 6 pm and 6 am. Foreigners could not enter the region
without valid permission from the government.
El Carmen de Bolvar was one of the epicenters of the Colombian conflict 21. In 2000, there
were two big massacres in the municipality, both conducted by the paramilitary forces. The
first one took place in February in the town of El Salado, where around 60 local civilians were
tortured and killed. The second one happened a few months later in the township of Macayepo
and resulted in the death of 15 farmers and the displacement of around 200 families.
At first, it was the larger landowners who fled their properties, but within a few years, their
employees and other small-scale farmers followed them. As a result, thousands of Carmeros
abandoned their land and moved to the town of El Carmen or larger cities in the region such
as Cartagena, Barranquilla or Sincelejo. Some farmers were trying to sell their properties
before leaving. Not all of them succeed and those who did usually sold them under threat
and/or for a very low price. As I heard from my informant in El Carmen, the conflict had a
severe impact on agricultural production and local markets. The only larger employers that
remained were the tobacco plantations that hired primarily women. It took many years before
the state assumed control over the situation.
The economy started reawakening around 2007 when the conflict slowed down and large
agricultural producers started acquiring land for cultivation. Some of those corporations had a
hard time finding local labor willing to work in the fields, so they often recruited and brought
the workforce from other departments. Since then, there has been a major improvement in
safety and living conditions in El Carmen, but the municipality has yet to fully recover from
the violence it experienced.
On multiple occasions I heard that presently, the infrastructure in rural areas is in poorer
condition than it was before the worst period of the conflict. Many of the access roads and
lighting posts have never been repaired which makes transportation very difficult. I passed
many farms and dwellings that were run down and abandoned as a result of the conflict. One
particular object struck my attention a small cargo airport, located about 8 km south of the
21
It was also in El Carmen where then the Colombian Minister of Development, Fernando Arajo
Perdomo, was kidnapped by FARC and where one of the most important guerrilla leaders, Martin
Caballero, was killed.
54

town of El Carmen. I was informed that it was functioning well until it was taken over by the
paramilitary groups in late 1990s, and since then, it has been left in ruins. Bullets were still
visible in the walls of the main building (Figure 7.3). There are many other abandoned
buildings scattered around the municipality, including former health centers and schools.
The quality of housing is different from farm to farm. Some larger agriculturalists could
afford to erect a solid dwelling with brick walls and metal roofing, yet many poorer families
are building their houses according to traditional methods using locally acquired materials,
particularly wood and straw which does not allow sufficient protection from hurricanes
(Figure 7.4). Many farms still lack electricity and proper sanitation systems. Usually, large
landowners can afford to connect their parcels to services, but many farming communities are
unable to do that, or do it through informal means. For example, many rural households take
their water from self built wells which might be dry during some seasons.
My general observation is that rural dwellers in El Carmen needed to dedicate much more
effort to activities focused on satisfying their most basic needs than regular city dwellers,
including getting access to food, water, and shelter. However, this might have been affected
by the temporary climatic conditions in Northern Colombia during my fieldwork. There has
been no rain for several months proceeding the summer of 2014, leading to a very serious
drought that made crops cultivation almost impossible and caused the mass death of cows
Figure 7.3. Abandoned cargo airport in El Carmen de Bolvar
55
Figure 7.4. Construction of a traditional farmhouse in the rural area of El Carmen de Bolvar.
and other livestock. The effects of the drought received a lot of media attention in cities and
probably contributed to the general perception of the countryside as a place where survival is
challenging.
On the other hand, the main town of El Carmen de Bolvar 22 (about 60,000 inhabitants)
presents itself as a regional center with an active marketplace and rich tradition of cultural
activities. At the time of my visit, the cathedral that stands in the middle of the town had just
been renovated and the plaza in front of it was under reconstruction. The towns inhabitants
were busy preparing for a week-long celebration of the Virgin of Carmen that brings together
the residents, their extended family members, and many visitors from all over Colombia
(Figure 7.5).
In order to find out why the population of the town was still so active and growing despite all
the massacres and terror that prevailed in the region for so many years, I looked into the
Development Plan of the municipality (Miranda Len, 2012) and talked to the municipal
Secretary of the Interior. He told me that the demographic situation of the area was
completely determined by the intensity of the conflict.
22
In Colombia, rural municipalities are named after their main towns, which are often referred to as
cabecera municipal, which means municipal head.
56
Figure 7.5. Celebrations of the Virgin of Carmen, the patron saint of El Carmen de Bolvar.
El Carmen was not only a place from which a lot of people fled to other parts of the region,
but it also received many IDPs from the surrounding rural areas. The displacements during the
period of violence caused an almost complete depopulation of the countryside, while, the
population of the municipalitys main town has doubled in the last two decades. As noted in
the local Development Plan, the largest shift from a rural to urban population occurred in the
period between 1993 and 2005 with an annotation that this change is attributed primarily to
the forced displacement from the surrounding countryside.
According to the Secretary of the Interior, the official numbers do not reflect the magnitude of
the conflict in the area. In his opinion, in El Carmen, 100% of the population are victims of
the conflict. This is because there have also been many residents, like himself, that had no
other choice than to resist the violence and remain in the municipality. Even though today,
El Carmen de Bolvar is considered a relatively peaceful and safe place, the history of
violence and the tension to repair wrongdoings can be felt in the air. Therefore, it does not
seem surprising that Land Restitution is among the most important issues that concern the
local population.
57

7.2. Reparation initiatives in El Salado
El Salado is a small town in El Carmen de Bolvar, located around 18 km south of the
municipal capital. Before the massacre of 2000, there were around 5,000 people living in the
town and a few thousand more in the surrounding rural areas (de los Santos Alemay, 2013).
Despite various initiatives that aimed at the return of the displaced population, it is estimated
that there are only around 1,000 habitants who live in El Salado today (Figure 7.6).
Due to the scale of the massacre, its fame and the symbolic value of this place in the recent
history of Colombia, El Salado was chosen to receive special treatment to ensure the provision
of generous material, moral, and symbolic reparation measures for the local community. In
2011, El Salado was announced to be a pilot project for the Land Restitution initiative. The
Santos government donated additional funding to purchase lands for restitution, help the
returnees rebuild their houses and re-start agricultural production and in addition to that
restore the local football field, where many of the tragic events took place (El Pas, 2011).
The town of El Salado was also selected as one of the locations for new Free Housing units.
The Dreams of El Salado (Los Sueos del Salado) is the only such project in the
municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar. The initiative includes the construction of 100 new
houses, as well as various social programs for children and investments for the improvement
Figure 7.6. El Salado. A church and a football field in the centre of the depopulated town.
Source: lachachara.co
58

of community infrastructure and public spaces 23. This project is co-funded by the Semana and
Carvajal foundations (Minvivienda, 2014d).
As I learned from my informants, very little is done outside of El Salado to improve the
infrastructure in rural areas and tackle the housing shortage problem in the town of El
Carmen. As noted by the Secretary of the Interior, for the municipality it is physically
impossible to address the needs of the displaced. The budget, he said, is very low and the
only way there may be any reparation programs, is when the federal or departmental
government provides them with the necessary funding and capacity. Pilot projects in symbolic
locations such as El Salado receive a lot of media attention; therefore it is understandable why
the government prioritizes them over the other parts of the municipality.
7.3. The process of Land Restitution

In order to be eligible for Land Restitution and other benefits outlined in The Victims Law,
each household has to make a declaration and formally register as an IDP. A municipal officer
who attends the victim population of El Carmen told me that in the first half of 2014, there
were still around 1,500 of such new declarations, many of them concerning incidents and
displacements from 10 or 15 years prior.
There are also many IDPs who displaced to other departments, and today, they want to file
claims for their properties in their closest local URT branches. This, however, is not possible
as the rule is that the claimant has to do it at the local office that has the territorial jurisdiction
over the lost property. For example, someone who was displaced from El Carmen and settled
in Barranquilla cannot file his claim in Barranquilla, but needs to visit the local office in El
Carmen. This may be a burden for many households due to large distances and costs of travel.
Only claims for properties which lay within the identified micro-focalized zones can be
processed. When the applicant makes a request for the restitution of a property that lies
outside of the defined focalized zones, the claim is put on hold until the military forces
approve the area as secure and allow the URT to start working there. When this happens, rural
lands in this area receive a status of protection, which means that property transactions in the
zone have to be supervised by the URT until the protection status is revoked. In El Carmen de
Bolvar, the protection status has been in force since 2008.
23
Since Los Sueos del Salado project was still under construction during my visit it was too early to
find the actual and potential beneficiaries of this project. Therefore it was not used as a case for further
analysis.
59

When an individual or group claim for Land Restitution is well documented and meets all the
criteria specified in The Victims Law, the URT starts investigating the legal situation at the
specific site. Depending on the case, site visits, surveying, and interviews with the local
community might be necessary. If there are no oppositions and no other obstacles to restitute
the property, the URT passes the case to specialized restitution judges who give the final
verdict. The rest of the process involves the necessary administrative procedures to issue legal
property rights.
There are many ways in which The Victims Law attempts to ensure that the IDPs do not
misuse the benefits of the law and encourage claimants to return to their places of origin. For
example, a restituted property cannot be sold in the first two years after the verdict is given.
However, many people in El Carmen I spoke to still believe that most of those who submitted
their claim for Land Restitution do not actually wish to return, but that they would rather sell
the land as soon as it becomes possible.
This is especially true for the younger generation that grew up in the countryside. The
agricultural corporation employee explained that traumatic memories from the conflict
discouraged them to continue their family traditions. As she told me, the few who returned
were the old ones, while the boys have lost their love for land.
As I heard at the public meeting organized by the URT, its officers understand that
restitution is not equal to return. Nevertheless, monetary compensation is only provided if
full restitution of property is not possible, for example when the parcel was used for public
infrastructure investment instead. In those cases, the amount of compensation equals the
cadastral value of the property in the area. In all instances, however, the URT reminds
applicants that the main aim of the Land Restitution program is to facilitate the return of the
displaced households to their homes in the countryside.
The Land Restitution officers also like to remind applicants that if their farmhouse has been
completely or partially destroyed, the URT ensures its reconstruction to a similar or better
state than it was before the displacement in order to provide dignifying living conditions for
the returning household. On top of that, the institution has funds to support the
reestablishment of agricultural production whenever necessary. Security accompaniment and
a temporary salary are also provided to help the returnees in the transition period.
Although, historically, a vast majority of rural properties in El Carmen were in private hands,
it is also important to explain how the URT deals with cases of farmers who occupied and
60

cultivated land that formally belong to the state (called in Spanish baldo). The Victims Law
recognized that this was a common situation before and during the conflict, therefore special
provisions were made to facilitate restitution of those properties. Such claims are processed in
collaboration with the Colombian Rural Development Institute (INCODER), which is a
federal institution responsible for the coordination of rural development policies. When
INCODER adjudicates the land subject to restitution, the occupant (ocupante) has a right to
request full ownership rights (propietario) from the public notary, as long as the land is no
larger than one Agricultural Family Unit (UAF) 24. Occupation of a particular parcel can be
proved in many ways, for example, by demonstrating valid receipts or invoices. Testimonies
of witnesses or official documents may also serve as a sufficient proof of occupancy
(Minagricultura, 2012). This way, at least in theory, Land Restitution contributes to the
formalization of informally occupied rural land.
Processing Land Restitution cases becomes difficult when the legal situation of the property is
unclear and when current or former occupants oppose the claim. As several informants
confirmed, this was typical for most cases processed by the URT office in El Carmen. The
public registry officer at the municipality claimed that the biggest problem that complicates
Land Restitution and all other property transactions is the lack of legal knowledge and
illiteracy of the local farmers. In other cases, landowners deliberately skipped registration
procedures or falsified transaction documents in order to avoid paying legal fees or tax debts
that were accumulating on the property.
Moreover, I was told by my informant that many property transactions that are now subject to
investigation by the URT in El Carmen de Bolvar took place between 2006 and 2009, which
was considered a peaceful period when few acts of forced displacement or violence related to
the armed conflict were happening in the area.
A Public Notary, who authorized many of the land transfers at that time, noted in an interview
that property values in El Carmen were still very low due to the perceived dangers in the area
and the possible presence of unidentified landmines. According to him, the most problematic
cases which make the Land Restitution process so difficult, are not necessarily the ones where
larger corporations accumulated a number of individual parcels from small-scale farmers, but
those in which local farmers transferred land between themselves, mainly because they failed
24
Agricultural Family Unit (UAF) is the area needed for one rural household to sustain their livelihood.
The size of one UAF is defined by INCODER and may vary in different municipalities. Typically, it is
around 14-22 hectares of cultivable land.
61

to follow all the legal procedures which resulted in not issuing legally bonding property
documents that could serve as a proof in the case.
As a result, it is often difficult to find out who acts in good and bad faith and whether the
displacement took place at all. If it did not, there is a chance that the claimants try to take
advantage of The Victims Law and request rights to properties that they have simply sold
some years back. In other words, some applicants have to exaggerate their situation and
pretend they were displaced in order to get restitution of their property. Implementation of the
Land Restitution process, therefore, raises ethical questions in regards to who and how should
be repaired for the land that was lost or sold during the conflict.
62
8. Case Analysis El Carmen de Bolvar

In this chapter, I present and analyze the data from household interviews in the town and rural
area of my first case study area, the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar. The discussion of
the personal stories and opinions of my interviewees is followed by a brief summary
according to the three main themes of analysis.
8.1. The town

Walking around the town of El Carmen de Bolvar (Figure 8.1) gave me an impression of a
place that is rising up from ruins, like a patient recovering after suffering a serious injury. Few
people believed it will ever be as peaceful and as prosperous as before the conflict, but by
looking at the activity that is going on there, it seems that the town is making positive strides.
In order to find out how the displaced households cope with challenges and organize their
livelihoods in the town of El Carmen, I talked to several residents, all of which have in some
way been affected by the conflict. Land Restitution was one of the main topics of
conversation.
Sra. Mara
First, I had a conversation with Mara. She told me she comes from El Salado. During the
massacre in 2000 her family was accused by the paramilitaries of supporting the guerrilla
groups, which turned their life into hell for a several days:
They were celebrating in the midst of our pain. Every time they killed a person, they
were playing drums, they made people sing, they were drinking, cooking food
While we, over there, at that moment did not have anything to defend ourselves and
we were thinking that all of us would die. () And there were deaths, on poles, or by
stabbing, torture, hanging
63
Figure 8.1. Center of the town of El Carmen de Bolvar.
Among the murdered was Maras cousin. All the fear and hopelessness caused by the
massacre made Maras family decide to leave the area. Like many others, they left their land
with all their belongings and went to Barranquilla with the hopes of finding security:
Over there we started a new life, trying to survive so to speak, at that moment. There
we had thousands of jobs, thousands of difficulties in a region that no one knew; I
have always been accustomed to be here. New people, a big city for us, we had to get
used to it, there was no choice. At that time we had to stay there, because the wave of
violence did not allow us to return.
The fact that they did not have strong social networks in Barranquilla before moving there
made transitioning into life in the city much harder. After some time they received a subsidy
through one of the previous social housing programs, but instead of remaining in Barranquilla,
Mara and her closest family returned to El Carmen de Bolvar in 2008 to recover what was
theirs. Many of her other relatives stayed in Barranquilla, but as she said she missed their farm
and the community.
64
Case Analysis El Carmen de Bolvar
Figure 8.2. The street in front of Maras house in El Carmen.
Their 20 hectares of land in El Salado was left abandoned over the years so they had no
problem recovering it and did not need to go through the Land Restitution process. Despite
this fact, Mara and her husband decided not to move back to El Salado, but settled in the
town of El Carmen de Bolvar, where they still live today with their children.
Maras elderly parents who moved back there now use their land. However, the farm is not
profitable enough to sustain them, so Maras mother opened a small store, which is now their
main source of income. Unlike before the massacre, cultivation is now primarily a leisure
activity for them instead of a livelihood.
Mara also told me that her uncle had problems with his plot in El Salado, so he filed a claim
for restitution. He sold half of his 160 ha of land after the massacre, but when he returned
there some years later he realized that the owner took over the entire property. Now he is
trying to recover the 80 ha which he did not sell.
65

Sr. Juan & Sra. ngela
Juan is a 73-year-old farmer who lives with his wife ngela, their three children, and
ngelas elderly parents. They invited us to their house located in one of the central
neighborhoods in the town for the interview.
At the beginning they were very suspicious about who I was, what I do, and why I wanted to
meet them. Juan told me that ever since they were displaced, different government institutions
deceived them and that he no longer trusts them. As an example, he mentioned Colombia
Responds (Colombia Responde), which promised local farmers humanitarian help and
assistance with their land issues, but so far, unfortunately, it has only been a disappointment.
Juan told me that this institution took advantage of the landowners by assuming ownership of
their farms and whenever such a deceived farmer claimed it through Land Restitution, the
URT usually took the side of Colombia Responds:
Look, if the government is doing this, they should give it back. One is afraid to give
out information because one believes it is for the good, and suddenly it proves to be
for the bad.
Only after I clarified that I am a student investigating the local situation, Juan and ngela
started telling me their story. They lived on a farm with 22 ha of land in the Vereda Hato
Nuevo 25, located just a few kilometers away from the town. At that time, their household
consisted of the two of them and their twelve children, of which three died in accidents and
due to health conditions.
In 2000, the paramilitaries massacred many in Hato Nuevo where some farms burned down
and a several people were murdered. Jose and his family fled to the town of El Carmen where
they had a small parcel on which they were planning to build a house.
In the meantime, Juan and ngela bought a smaller piece of land of 2 ha where they worked
for some time until 2004. Apparently, up to 40 paracos 26 and a several guerrillas were killed
in a battle that took place that year on their property. Later, Juan noticed helicopters flying over
the area. They decided not to go back to the land, as they were afraid that the helicopters were
there to spray chemicals on their crops 27. Juan claimed that although they only commuted to this
plot from the town of El Carmen, the abandonment was their another displacement.
25
Vereda is a lower administrative unit that forms part of a municipality.

Paraco refers to a member of a paramilitary group.
27
Spraying toxic chemicals over lands that potentially belonged or depended to the armed groups was
a common strategy of the government to discourage them from cultivating narcotics.
26
66

Since then, Juan has been working as a laborer on another farm closer to the town. Their old
land is still left abandoned and some years after the displacement they sold both their own and
his mothers properties (46 ha altogether) to a large agricultural corporation. As ngela said,
they were under pressure to sell the land, as there were rumors that not doing this may cause
them trouble.
Juan and ngela are now in the process of applying for Land Restitution and they are still
waiting for the final decision. Juan believes their chances are slim, as they need to face a large
corporation that already made their investments on the land. He thinks the corporations are in
a favorable position. They are not like us, they have means to defend themselves and we do
not he said. Again, Juan is skeptical about the fairness with which the Land Restitution
process is administered and the transparency of the URT:
Just as they are now dialoging with the guerrilla for an agreement, they should do the
same with the landowners who were buying properties. If any of them is truly bad,
kick him out! If anyone evicts anyone by force, kick him out of there! But, only if its
true.
When I asked Juan and ngela what would they do if they got the rights to their lands
restituted, they said they would probably cultivate it but at the same time they would like to
continue to live in the town. They expect some of their children to help them in the field, but
they are not sure how much they can rely on their help. ngela said that two of their youngest
sons declared willingness to return, but for the time being, they live in La Guajira department
and will continue to work there at least until the final restitution verdict is given. Others would
probably not be involved in the farm, as they have already established their livelihoods
elsewhere.
In regards to the smaller parcel where the fight took place, Juan told me he passed by it only
once since that brutal event. Apparently, one can still find skulls and skeletons of the dead
paracos and guerrillas in the soil
Sra. Isabella
My next interviewee was Isabella. Before the violence, her household consisted of herself, her
husband, and their four children. They were an affluent farming family which owned a rancho
on a few parcels in Vereda Cao Negro, which in total constituted 80 ha of land where they
bred several hundred cattle and calves. They also owned a house in the town of El Carmen.
67
Figure 8.3. Marketplace in the town of El Carmen de Bolvar is the busiest place in the municipality.
Isabellas husband, Miguel, stayed at the farm all the time while Isabella helped him during
the day and usually came back to the town at night. After graduating from local schools, all of
their children left to different cities to pursue their university educations.
Their problems began in 1998, when the paramilitary groups started terrorizing the local
community. At first, they demanded monetary contributions or livestock, but a few years later,
their activities evolved into regular murders, extortions, and land grabbing. Isabella and her
family were evicted from their property and they had no other choice than to flee.
They went to the Magdalena department where they had a business partner who offered them
help. However, the death threats did not stop so the family displaced again. At first, they came
back to El Carmen, but when they saw that the violence continued, they realized that they
could not stay. Like many other farmers in El Carmen, Isabella was also accused of
supporting the guerrilla groups, which she said they did not support. She told me that their
house at the farm was burned down, but she was not sure whether it was the paramilitaries or
the national army that set fires in the area.
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In 2001, the family fled to Cartagena, but because they did not know anyone there, they
struggled financially and returned to El Carmen de Bolvar once more. Miguel found a
temporary job and Isabella opened a small florist shop from their house in the town. Since one
of their plots was still abandoned, they went there in their free time to build a new ranch. The
ultimate condition for their return was that Isabella and her husband had to contribute one cow
per month to both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries: If you did not collaborate with them,
you could not be in the zone.
The armed groups gradually asked for more, and after some time, Isabella and Miguel were
unable to both meet their demands and sustain their own livelihoods. In September 2006,
Miguel was murdered. Isabella suspects that he was killed by the same people who accused
him of serving the guerrillas, but she could not tell for sure. After this tragic event, the
security situation in El Carmen de Bolvar improved. Despite her loss, Isabella was not
discouraged to continue farming. However, the florist business proved to be much more
profitable, so she now spends most of her time in the town.
Isabella did not use her rural properties for growing flowers; these are imported from
Medelln and Bogot. Moreover, due to her poor health, she cannot work in the fields, so she
hired a helper to take care of her farm. I continue in the business and live the business and
now the farm gives me nothing said Isabella. Later, she described how her farm is
primarily a source of fresh food for herself and her relatives, and she keeps it mainly because
of the sentimental attachment she has to this place. She told me that one day she would like to
live there again.
Another parcel that Isabella and Miguel owned was occupied by a third party and it is now in
the process of Land Restitution. Isabella expects a positive verdict as her case was well
supported by all the necessary documents and there were no oppositions, since the occupant
was evicted by the police in 2011. She told me she still felt insecure, but all the hardships she
went through shaped her character and made her resilient to any kinds of threats or rumors.
Once property rights to the remaining parts of her land are returned, Isabella aspires to return
to large-scale farming. She said that the cattle ranching business can still be profitable if
proper investments are made. Even cattles shit is worth something she laughed. She goes on:
Let me tell you one thing: not having money is not being poor. Not having aspiration,
one needs to have an aspiration, I tell you. I am not sure if we sound like dreamers, but
if you do not move forward, you are going backwards.
69

In the meantime, Isabella takes part-time classes to become a lawyer. She is attached to her
Vereda and would like to use her knowledge for the benefit of the local community: My
dream is that my zone becomes the same or better then what it was. Some of her ideas
include bringing electricity to Cao Negro and improving the local school, which she says is
in a very bad state. Isabella complained that the government is dedicated to El Salado, but
has forgotten about the rest of the municipality.
As an aspiring lawyer and a person who is directly involved in Land Restitution, Isabella has a
lot to say about the interpretation of The Victims Law and its implementation in El Carmen de
Bolvar. In her understanding, the law was created for the sellers, which means that those
who sold the property and request restitution are in a more favorable position than those who
bought it. According to her, the problem is that the URT does not make an effort to listen to
both the claimants and the opponents who currently occupy the land. For this reason many
people who acted in good faith are not given a chance to prove their innocence which may
result in them loosing the property. Fortunately for Isabella, there is no opposition in her case
and it is very likely that she will get the property rights back so that she can make her dream
come true.
Sra. Daniela
Daniela was the youngest of my interviewees. She was 29-year-old at the time I met her and
she already suffered two displacements, one in 2000 and one in 2002. She grew up in the
Mandat Vedera, but since the second displacement, she has been living in the town of El
Carmen.
In 1997, her grandmother bought 19.5 ha of land from a neighbor who was no longer
interested in staying there. In 2008, Daniela bought that property and rented it to another
farmer. Meanwhile, Daniela stays in the town where she takes care of her young children who
attend the local school.
Everything was fine until the family that originally sold the land in 1997 was approached by
the URT and filed a Land Restitution case against Danielas grandmother. When I asked
whether the claimants wanted to move back there, she said that there is no way someone who
has lived 20 years in Barranquilla and got used to the city living would want to go back to the
village.
70

If Daniela succeeds in defending her rights to the land, she would like to move there in the
future. The farm is electrified and there is a pond from which they can get fresh water. She
told me it is also important that the local school in Mandat Vereda has a good reputation.
Sr. Felipe
Felipe bought 10 ha of land in 1999. He said it was not displacement but a regular land
transaction. A few years later he sold it to another farmer and moved to the town. Apparently,
the son of the person who sold the land to Felipe was called by the URT and applied for
restitution, claiming that his father was displaced. Felipe told me that the claimants family
has no intention to return: How is that possible that they spent all that money, they drank it,
now they make a claim to sell it (the land) again?
Sr. Nicols
My other respondent Nicols told me that when he bought his plot in 2002, there has been a
misunderstanding at the public registry and the property owners name has never been
updated. The previous owner found out about this and used it as an argument in his Land
Restitution claim. Nicols wanted to pass the property on to his children, but if the verdict is
negative for him, he will lose it and his descendants will not inherit anything.
Sr. Alejandro
Alejandros case is just as intriguing. He bought a piece of land from his brother-in-law in
1991, which was long before the violence in the area started. He had livestock and a tobacco
plantation. During the conflict, he was robbed of some of his animals and then fled to
Barranquilla. Later, he took the rest of his livestock and belongings to a new farm in the
Tubar municipality (next to Barranquilla), which was considered a safe zone.
When the situation had calmed, Alejandro returned to El Carmen de Bolvar with the hopes of
recovering his lost land. He bought a house in the town and started building up a farm on his
property, but shortly after he was accused of collaborating with the guerrillas and was put in
jail for six months. He told me that since he was displaced, he has never received any help
from the government.
Today, he attempts to defend his rights in a Land Restitution case that was filed by his brother
in law, who declared that the land was not in fact sold, but rented out to Rafael for a period of
71

time, while Alejandro contends that it is his property. Alejandros family has just managed to
move back to the farm, but it seems that if they lose the land, they will need to stay in the
town or move somewhere else again.
Sr. Andrs
I visited Andrs at his shop where he sells grain, seeds, fodder and other agricultural products.
He told me that both him and his son bought land in the Cao Negro Vereda in 2001. Each of
them owned one UAF, which in El Carmen was equal to 19 ha. Andrs purchased the
property from a private owner who lived in Barranquilla while his son bought it from the rural
development institute Incora (today INCODER).
They both continued living in the town and commuted regularly to the farms. Both Andrs
and his sons properties have been claimed by their previous owners, who say that the land
transactions were falsified. To make things more difficult for Andrs and his son, the
government backs the opposing claimants in those two cases. Throughout our entire
conversation, Andrs tried to prove his innocence.
Figure 8.4. Street in front of Andrs shop.
72

The judges and tribunals need to come to the countryside to take the decision, or at
least good evidence with photographs () to confirm whether what is in their
documents is the same with what is here.
Andrs admitted that the reality of rural property ownership is that many transactions were
made under oral agreements, which should also be taken into consideration by the URT. The
most undocumented man that exists on the Atlantic coast is called the peasant. He has
nothing, just the possession that he has, but in documents he has nothing. he said.
8.2. The countryside

After hearing what the residents of the town of El Carmen de Bolvar had to say, I visited the
rural areas of the municipality and talked to the local farmers who also experienced
displacement or who are familiar with the local Land Restitution situation. I wanted to find
out more about the living conditions and livelihood opportunities of the farming families as
well as the prospects for the displaced households who are considering returning to the rural
area via the Land Restitution process. In particular, I was interested in knowing more about
the strength of the social networks after the violent events in the area, and the land tenure
situation in the face of restitution cases.
The Farmers Support Movement

With help of my informant from El Carmen de Bolvar and my colleagues from the Land
Observatory project, we arranged a meeting with six farmers who form an informal support
movement that represents the local community in defending their rights to land that they
bought in good faith. The meeting took place in one of the farms in Vereda El Bonito.
The farmers provided us with a very detailed explanation of their perception of the situation.
Their organization does not have any official name and is not registered with any public
authority. What the members of the support group have in common is that all of them own
parcels in the area that are now the subjects of Land Restitution cases. These farmers all claim
that they have documents to prove that they are the legal owners of those properties. They say
they did not displace anyone, but instead they bought the land through what they perceive as
legally bonding transactions. Some of them claim they are also victims of the conflict and
were forcibly displaced. However, the URT, treats them as offenders and dispossessors.
73
Figure 8.5. Farm in Vereda El Bonito where the meeting with the support group took place.
As I heard from the farmers, many restitution claims of lands that have afterwards been sold
are extremely difficult to resolve because of the inability to prove whether those transactions
were made under threat or coercion 28. Additionally, land transactions were commonly made
through verbal agreement, as it helped the farmers save on administrative fees.
The farmers told us that in El Carmen de Bolivar, the local office of URT is under pressure to
provide results and receive as many applications for restitution as possible in order to
secure long-term work (well beyond 2021) and meet the quota set by the head office in
Bogot. This is why they often call people who, at some point in history, owned land in the
area to encourage them to submit applications for Land Restitution even if the property
transactions were not made during the violent period and were previously proved by a local
notary. It seems that meeting the quota for the number of restored properties became such a
priority for the local URT office that they turned a blind eye to the fact that their main concern
is to serve the displaced households.
28
According to The Victims Law, those who committed the dispossession must prove the legality and
the good faith of their actions; otherwise land might be taken away from them (Saffon, 2010).
74

Sr. David
A good example of this is the case of David, one of the leaders of the farmers support group.
His family owned 35 hectares of land near the town of El Salado. In 1994, his father was
assassinated by the FARC and Davids family was forced to leave the property. They moved
to another parcel in the same area. However, after the massacre of 2000, they had to flee
again. David ended up at his uncles farm in Vereda La Candelaria. In the meantime, the
security situation had improved and his fathers plot was left abandoned. As the tax debt on
this property was accumulating, David decided to sell it to an agricultural corporation. He
received what he called a fair price which was enough to pay off all of the remaining debts
and make some investments in a new farm he just bought.
Now, the URT has been calling him to claim the land he sold and apply for restitution of
property rights on the basis that the transaction was made under threat and that he has been
displaced. But in no moment when I sold the land I felt displaced by the buyers said
David. Apparently the URT threatened him that if he does not apply for restitution, he will
lose rights to grants and allowances that correspond to him as a victim of the conflict. As he
explained:
This deal is done and I do not want to go back there. If the government wants to
consider us, they should relocate my brothers and sisters, but no, we do not want to go
back there and this is why we will not file a restitution claim.
Davids situation seemed even more absurd when he told us that he is not only a potential
claimant in one case, but at the same time, he had to defend and prove his innocence in a Land
Restitution claim for another parcel that he used to own many years back.
As I was told, the URT does not make enough effort to investigate the legality of the
transactions, the security situation at a given time, or how the displacement took place. They
do not challenge the claimants testimony with the current landowner. Such incomplete
information is then passed to the judges, who usually give decisions in favor of the claimant,
whereas the landowners who were in opposition in those cases are treated as criminals.
A new wave of displacement

As several interviewees confirmed, many transactions for parcels of land that are the subjects
of Land Restitution cases were conducted in times when there was no violence in the region.
But how do you prove it? asked the farmers. Through organizing themselves, they tried to
75

make their case visible, but instead, the treatment they received from government institutions
was rather negative. They were accused of being an anti-restitution group that acts on
behalf of cachacos 29 who attempt to sabotage the peaceful implementation of the law in order
to protect their interests. The farmers said that one of the meetings of their support group,
which was attended by close to 160 persons, was interrupted by an official of the URT branch
in El Carmen and police officers armed with rifles who intimidated the leaders of the group
and the speakers.
They say it is not just about the land. Their main objective is to avoid conflict and a
massacre between themselves, because as they say, one life is worth much more than all
those lands. According to the farmers, the URT should visit their farms to get to know their
real situation and verify that they are independent and they do not represent any corporate
interests. They would like to prove that they act in good faith, but they feel they are not given
a chance.
The farmers explained that although the conflict was present in the municipality of El Carmen
de Bolvar, in reality not that many people were displaced, with the exception of El Salado
and Macayepo. What was really happening, according to them, is that the farmers, afraid of
the security situation, were putting their properties up for sale and offered them to those they
knew for any price they could get. They only wanted to get rid of the land and move out of the
municipality due to the unstable situation in the area and the lack of state support for the
farmers, which made their work less profitable and more risky.
Another problem is that many productive farms cease to operate after the land rights are
returned to a person who is not willing to use it for productive purposes. This seems to be an
almost surreal situation, which may lead to what they call a new wave of displacement, as
the current occupants who never acted in bad faith would have to surrender the land to the
claimants, who may not even want to live there. Moreover, the protection status and lack of
security of tenure discourages many farmers from making any kinds of investments in their
houses, barns, and infrastructure, such as wells and solar panels. All this has a very negative
impact on the rural livelihoods. The war is because of lack of opportunities said the
members of the group.
Indeed, the farmers have a lot to lose because if they are declared offenders in a Land
Restitution case, they will not only lose the land but they would also not be eligible for any
29
Cachaco is a commonly used term in Northern Colombia to describe a powerful person from the
interior of the country, especially from the capital city of Bogot.
76
Figure 8.6. David showing one of the abandoned fields in El Bonito.
Figure 8.7. Restitution to this abandoned property was claimed by the previous owners.
77
Figure 8.8. Children of the countryside. Their father took over this abandoned farm after being
displaced from another property. Now the family is in danger of second displacement if the URT
restores property rights to the previous owner.
kind of help from the state. Land Restitution, therefore, causes not only physical destruction
of the countryside and livelihoods, but also has a devastating impact on the community and
the psychological state of the farmers, leading to new conflicts. Therefore, as David
explained, the main cause of the support group is:
To avoid the conflict that is now happening in Montes de Mara, at the regional and
national level, between farmer communities, afro-descendents, and the indigenous,
where the principal actor which is building up this conflict is the same government,
because it approved a Law to be enforced on the victimizers, but actually, it is applied
to the same victims of the conflict. They apply a Law in the middle of a conflict which
Colombia is living, where Colombia did not come out of a conflict which it suffers for
more than seven decades and now it is creating another one in the same agrarian sector.
For now, the support group attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully through petitions and
negotiations with government institutions. However, the farming community is gradually
losing patience as it continues to suffer injustice. Their hopelessness may lead them to use
violence to defend themselves. The participants of our meeting mentioned a few cases of
78

claimants who were murdered during the Land Restitution process. They told us that even
though their group is doing their best to avoid criminal acts, they might not resist using
physical force against those who want to take land away from them. We also heard about
suicidal attempts in the farming community. At some point, one of the farmers stood up and
shouted: Listen, I was hit by all the armed groups and now the government comes to hit
me I will kill myself with those sons of a whore!
The farmers are disturbed by what appears to be the common perception that many of the
potential beneficiaries of The Victims Law have no intention of moving back to the restituted
properties. As mentioned before, they would prefer to stay in whichever city or town they live
in and make profit of selling the plot, which would result in even more vacant properties in
the countryside. Of those who decided to keep the restituted land, many seem to be hobbyists
who are passionate about cultivating land out of their own interest or for recreation purposes.
Interviews with local farmers

After the meeting, we visited other local farmers in some of the most remote parts of the
municipality. Access to many of the farms was challenging, since most of the countryside
roads are not fit for motorized transport (Figure 8.9).
Figure 8.9. Many access roads in rural areas are not meant for motorized transportation.
79

What struck me the most were the harsh living conditions and the hopelessness of the farming
households. Many of them have to rely on the financial support that they receive from
relatives who moved to the cities. Most parents would like to send at least some of their
children to obtain a university education, as this is considered a long-term investment that will
eventually ensure financial security and the stability of the family.
Sr. Antonio who lives in the Vereda Carvajal criticized the Land Restitution officials for not
understanding the challenges of living in the countryside. He told me:
When someone goes away and spends two years in the city or in a town, he would not
return, he would not want to return. I would say to the (Land Restitution) judges: lets
change positions, you come here and I go there. They do not know how to do what I
do here and I do not know what they do there, and this is how they take arbitrary
decisions.
There are many different, complicated cases of Land Restitution that I heard about in my
interviews with other farmers, although after listening to the intriguing stories at the meeting,
I thought nothing else might have surprised me. I was wrong.
Sr. Enrique
One case was particularly mind-blowing. In 1997, Enrique and his family were displaced from
their property and settled in the municipal capital. However, Enrique wanted to return to the
countryside. At the same time, his elderly uncle owned another farm, located in Vereda La
Borrachera, but he made no use of it. As Enrique told me, in 2008, he convinced his uncle to
sell the land to a teacher who also lives and works in the town. Since, for the time being, the
teacher was not interested in moving to the farm, she rented out her new plot to Enrique. After
that, he has been living there with his wife, their five children, and his brother.
However, a few years later, Enriques uncle requested restitution to his plot through the URT.
Just a month before I spoke to him, the Land Restitution judge gave a favorable decision to
his uncle and gave Enrique three days to abandon the property. The teacher took her tenants
side in the conflict, but that did not help.
Not only was Enrique and his family in a hopeless situation, but he also became an enemy to
his own uncle. On top of that, Enrique suffered an accident as a result of which his leg was
amputated, so he may have a difficult time finding another occupation.
80
Figure 8.10. Antonio from Vereda Carvajal. According to him, the judges do not understand the
challenges of living in the countryside
Figure 8.11. Enriques son at their farm in Vereda La Borrachera.
81

Problems with The Victims Law
In El Carmen de Bolvar, I also came across farming households who were displaced from
other parts of the region and settled on properties that were abandoned or vacant. Now they
found out that the lands they currently occupy have been under investigation by the URT as
restitution applications have been filed by some of the previous owners. At the same time, the
current occupants, who would normally be eligible for restitution of their previous land, may
not be able to claim that lost property since they lie within areas that have not yet been microfocalized by the URT. This means that some victims themselves may be evicted from the
plots they currently occupy without being able to restore legal rights and return to the plot
they originally occupied before the displacement.
In general, the common opinion of the farmers in El Carmen de Bolvar is that The Victims
Law is not a bad initiative in itself, but it is not enforced properly and it cannot deal with the
specificity of some cases. First and foremost, they say that those who bought land during and
after the conflict should no longer be excluded from the category of a victim 30. One of the
solutions they proposed is a more individual approach to more complicated cases. For
example, the law should consider offering monetary compensation or a similar parcel in
another place when both the claimant and the current landowner of the property in dispute
prove that they acted in good faith. They say this would likely prevent further displacements.
The URT should be also more suspicious with regards to the potential abuses of the law or
bad intentions of the claimant. Also, many people claim that the Law should be focused more
on such aspects as education and health in rural areas, and it should do everything possible to
avoid any conflicts between the village men, which have emerged in El Carmen de Bolvar.
8.3. Summary
Stories from El Carmen de Bolvar revealed a lot of interesting information on the past and
current livelihoods of the displaced families that live in both urban and rural areas of the
municipality. This information and the recorded opinions relate primarily to the first of the
studied reparation initiatives Land Restitution. Analysis of those stories is conducted in
accordance with the theoretical model (Figure 8.12), in which three themes migration, social
networks and the government were identified as lenses for filtering information that is
later used to answer research questions.
30
According to Article 207 of The Victims Law, a person that holds status of a victim and who invades,
uses or occupies land that is designated for restitution, looses the benefits that correspond to him or
her as a victim (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2011).
82
Figure 8.12. Theoretical model for analysis of data from El Carmen de Bolvar. Developed by the author.
Migration
The migration patterns of my respondents in El Carmen de Bolvar are complex. Most of them
come from the rural areas of the municipality, particularly El Salado. After being displaced,
some families tried their luck in bigger cities in the region, such as Barranquilla, and
Cartagena with mixed success. Many of the younger members of the households stayed there
to work or pursue education, while their parents and some siblings returned to El Carmen. The
majority of those who returned did not settle in the rural area, but lived in the town.
The case of El Carmen illustrates that families that really wanted to move back to rural areas
did so regardless of Land Restitution. They either discovered that no one settled on their land
after they had left, or were able to buy a parcel in another place. Many of those who work in
the field have their permanent house in the town. The perception of insecurity in the
countryside is one of the reasons why many of Carmeros return to the town at night.
It is also evident that Land Restitution fails to bring the IDPs back to live in rural areas. The
program seems to be a good option for those who would like to use the land in their free time
as a recreational activity. This applies primarily to the elderly people that are experienced in
farming and have a sentimental attachment to the land. Those who resisted the displacement
or moved back to the almost depopulated countryside seem to be the most affected by Land
Restitution. Many of them need to defend their rights to land they now occupy and their
tenure is no longer secure. The stories we heard at the meeting with the farmers very clearly
demonstrated that the problems with Land Restitution go well beyond the bureaucratic
inefficiency and hopelessness in trying to bring the victims back to rural areas.
83

Social networks
Today, the pre-conflict social networks in El Carmen de Bolvar are weak, primarily due to
the fact that most displacements happened a long time ago and caused a significant population
migration into and out of the area. Many of the displaced families that returned to or stayed in
El Carmen did so because of their attachment to the place.
While Land Restitution failed to restore and reinforce the pre-conflict networks, it resulted in
the unintended creation of new social movements of farmers and landowners, such as the
described farmers support group. The situation explained by the members the group
illustrates the paradox of The Victims Law, whose lack of flexibility and sensitivity towards
individual cases often results in destroying the already weak social networks in the
countryside instead of reinforcing them and broadening livelihood options for farmers.
Government
Most of my respondents in El Carmen have little trust to the government and feel abandoned
by it. There are few governmental programs in the area and the infrastructure is insufficient.
Many residents told me that the municipality was more prosperous and there was more
support from the state before the violence emerged in the 1990s. The federal government is
interested mainly in pilot projects that receive a lot of media attention, such as El Salado.
Most of the people I spoke to in El Carmen have a negative opinion about Land Restitution.
Many of them mention examples of the program being misused and taken advantage of by
opportunists who have no intention to return. They say the URT is biased towards claimants
and that it does not make enough effort to listen to all the sides of the conflict. I came across
several landowners who call themselves victims of the conflict, and now they are unhappy
that they are treated like criminals. They see The Victims Law as a threat to their livelihood.
The governments interventions in the past land transactions also raise ethical questions. Even
if we accept that, as The Victims Law says, taking advantage of farmers desperate situation
and buying their land below market value was not morally correct, is eviction of the current
occupants and restoration of property rights to the previous owner who sold the land justified?
My interviews in El Carmen illustrate that Land Restitution weakens the trust for
governmental institutions and fails to provide a sense of justice in my case study area. All this
discourages people from farming, which results in further depopulation of countryside and
accelerates migration to cities with the hopes for finding better livelihood opportunities.
84
9. Case Presentation Barranquilla and Soledad

Since the Caribbean Region of Colombia was severely affected by the armed conflict, several
large Free Housing projects are being built there. Out of the 100,000 units that were planned
for the first phase of the nationwide program, 13,363 are in the departments of Atlntico,
Magdalena and Bolvar, with the biggest concentration in the two metropolitan areas which
received the largest numbers of IDPs. There are 4,912 units in Barranquilla, 1,561 in Soledad,
3,382 in the city of Cartagena and an additional 1,535 in municipalities outside of
Barranquilla. Almost all of those units are now completed. Projects outside of those cities are
located in smaller towns and typically do not exceed 300 units 31.
9.1. The metropolitan area of Barranquilla and Soledad

Spanish colonizers established Barranquilla and its sister city Soledad in the late 16th and early
17th centuries. Soledad is slightly older, but over time, it lost its dominant position to
Barranquilla. Both cities are strategically located at the mouth of Colombias largest river,
Magdalena. Historically, the region has been the major gateway for immigrants coming to
Colombia by boat from Europe and other parts of the world. Many newcomers settled here
permanently and contributed to Barranquillas image as a vibrant and multicultural city.
Similarly, Barranquilla and Soledad were places where many victims of the armed conflicts
found their refuge after being displaced from rural areas. Since there was very little guerrilla
and paramilitary activity inside these urban areas, it was considered a safe and peaceful harbor
for displaced people. The strong and diversified industrial sector and a large market in
Barranquilla attracted many job seekers and also contributed to the very rapid urban growth of
both cities. Today, with close to 1.4 million inhabitants, Barranquilla is the largest city in the
Caribbean Coast and fourth largest in Colombia. Soledad has about half the population of
31
An example of such a small Free Housing project was the already mentioned Los Sueos del
Salado in the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar.
85
Figure 9.1. Map of Barranquilla and Soledad with the main locations.
Figure 9.2. Squatter settlement in Barranquilla, near Las Gardenias in the south-western part of the
city.
86
Case Presentation Barranquilla and Soledad
Figure 9.3. Affluent district in the northern part of Barranquilla.
its neighbor, but in recent years it has been the fastest growing municipality in the country.
Altogether, the Barranquilla metropolitan region has over 2 million inhabitants.
Like in many other Latin American cities, there is a clear division between affluent and poor
areas in Barranquilla and Soledad. The more established and higher income families tend to
live in the northern side of the metropolitan area (Figure 9.3), while the low income and IDP
households settled in the south and southwestern areas 32 (Figure 9.2). Primarily middleincome families inhabit the central districts.
Due to a significant deficiency of urban housing and large numbers of registered IDP
households, the municipalities of Barranquilla and Soledad were among the most logical
locations for new Free Housing projects. The biggest is the Las Gardenias project (Figure
2.7), which has around 19,000 residents living in 4,080 apartment units. Of the four other Free
Housing projects in the area, two were selected for a more in depth analysis: the Nueva
Esperanza in Soledad and Villas de San Pablo in Barranquilla. The main reason for this choice
is that both are much different in terms of their built form and management approach.
32
I was told by Prof. Pablo Yepes that it was a common practice in most large cities in Colombia that
after displacing to the city, the IDP households typically settled in the south-western peripheries of
urban areas. That way, it was easier for the newcomers to find communities that were in similar
situation.
87

Nueva Esperanza
Nueva Esperanza (Figure 9.4) is located at the southwestern periphery of the town of Soledad,
next to an area that was established primarily by the displaced populations. The project is
composed of 1,561 single family, two-bedroom attached houses, each with a patio and a small
garden. The grid street layout and the design of the houses are similar to the traditional,
suburban single-floor concrete row houses (both formal and informal) settlements in the area
(Figure 9.5), although the lots in Nueva Esperanza are significantly wider (Figure 9.6).
The new development was divided into three sections for housing. In between there are large
open spaces that will eventually be filled with parks, schools, health centers and other
community infrastructure. During my visit, it was an empty field with a wild plantation where
cows were grazing. At that time, the residents of the project had to commute to the
surrounding neighborhoods to access education, employment and other necessary services that
were not yet provided in Nueva Esperanza.
Figure 9.4. A satellite image of Nueva Esperanza. Adopted from: Google Maps (2015)
88

One of the first things that can be noticed in Nueva Esperanza is that many of the families
customize their houses and open up new businesses that serve their local community, such as
grocery stores, clothing boutiques, hairdressers, mobile phone retailers, and even metal
workshops. Although according to the regulations, these types of uses and alterations to the
buildings are not allowed, the administration of Nueva Esperanza is not strict in enforcing this
rule. This is because it could limit the already narrow livelihood opportunities of the local
community, which could then cause significant unrest.
Figure 9.5. Housing block in a traditional suburban settlement in Soledad.
Figure 9.6. Housing block in Nueva Esperanza.
89

Villas de San Pablo
Villas de San Pablo is a housing development located about 5 km outside of the built area of
the city, surrounded by a semi-deserted landscape (Figure 9.7). The project was built and is
still operated by the landowner, the Mario Santo Domingo Foundation (FMSD).
The entire development consists of two parts: 1) 832 units in apartment blocks that are part of
the 100,000 Free Housing project (Figure 9.8) and 2) 1,569 single-family houses built as part
of other subsidy programs designed for families with ability to save, earning between one and
two minimum wages 33 (Figure 9.9). At the time of my visit, the total housing capacity in
Villas de San Pablo was for around 10,000 people. However, not all of the units were
occupied yet and the estimated population of the area was around 4,000 people.
The apartment blocks are four floors each and have no elevators. Each unit has two bedrooms,
a living room, a bathroom, an open kitchen and a balcony. The distances between the
buildings are narrow, but the public spaces along the main access roads are wide enough to
accommodate future parks and gardens. Similarly to Nueva Esperanza, many residents opened
their own businesses from their houses or ground floor apartments.
Figure 9.7. A satellite image of Villas de San Pablo. Adopted from: Google Maps (2015)
33
In case of one of such subsidy schemes, the beneficiary families lease the house from the
government. By paying 30% of their monthly income, they gradually increase their ownership of the
property, which eventually gives them a chance to become full owners. Although allocation of these
houses is done differently than Free Housing, many of the beneficiaries are also IDP households and
their relatives.
90

The scale of the project and its isolation from the rest of Barranquilla gives an impression that
an entirely new, independent city is being built. The planned capacity of the entire project
after expansion in the next five or six years is up to 20,000 dwellings, but it was not known
how many of those units will be built through the Free Housing program and how many
through other subsidy schemes. At this stage it was too early to evaluate whether Villas de
San Pablo becomes a successful project, or turns into an enclave of poverty.
Figure 9.8. Free Housing apartment blocks at Villas de San Pablo.
Figure 9.9. Houses from other subsidy programs at Villas de San Pablo.
91

9.2. The DINCS model
The built form and the design are not the only major differences between the Villas de San
Pablo and Nueva Esperanza projects. What is also evident is the distinct approach to the
management of the projects and preparation of the area for future residents. While the focus in
Nueva Esperanza is placed on the provision of houses and basic infrastructure, the Villas de
San Pablo model includes a comprehensive process of accompaniment, training, and
empowerment of the residents before, during and after moving in. This is meant to help
newcomers adapt in their new home, coexist with the neighbors, start a better livelihood, and
mitigate any negative impacts which are common to similar social housing projects such as
socio-spatial isolation, unemployment, vandalism and crime. The model developed by the
FMSD is nationwide pilot project in Colombia and is worth taking a closer look at.
We as a foundation firmly believe that giving a house to the poor does not take them out of
poverty said Ronald Silva Manjarrs, the Social Awareness Director at FMSD in
Barranquilla. In our conversation, Ronald admitted that due to high costs of land in the city,
Villas de San Pablo project was developed in a poor location outside of the built area of
Barranquilla. Now, their mission is to get the best out of it and to make sure it is going to be
of a good quality, well organized and a sustainable project.
Figure 9.10. Playground in Villas de San Pablo.
92

The FMSDs model is called the
Integral
Development
Sustainable
of
Communities
(DINCS: Desarrollo Integral de

Comunidades Sostenibles). It is
based on a set of community
programs and activities that offer
social support and psychological
assistance before, during and after
moving into a new house, as well
as
better
integration
with
neighbors and newcomers.

In terms of social sustainability,
DINCS works in three different
dimensions: the dwelling, social
infrastructure
and
community Figure 9.11. Prepaid electricity meters in Villas de San Pablo.
support. The Foundation commits itself to support the community by ensuring security, and
providing health, education, sports, recreation, and cultural facilities (Figure 9.10). They help
the residents establish community committees that are responsible for each of those
components.
Environmental sustainability is another important aspect of the DINCS model. The FMSD
educates the residents of the project about the benefits of reducing energy consumption and
encourages solid waste recycling and water saving. Among the novelties are modern
electricity meters that work with prepaid cards that are charged like a mobile phone (Figure
9.11). As Karina Garca Uribe, the Community Management Coordinator at FMSD explained
to me, this experiment proved to be successful as the energy consumption per household was
significantly lower compared to the national average. The key to success, she said, was that
the residents see that by not wasting electricity, they can save a significant amount of money.
Achieving economic sustainability is perhaps the biggest challenge for all social housing
projects, and Villas de San Pablo is no exception. Among other initiatives, the FMSD
attempts to link the job-seeking residents to large employers in the area, gives them access to
computers with internet, ensures good transportation connectivity with other parts of the city,
and arranges training sessions with the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA).
93

Also, by mixing the poor displaced households from the Free Housing project with families
that earn more than one minimum salary in other housing subsidy schemes, the Foundation
hopes to avoid creating a ghetto and encourages a gradual improvement of living standards
and education, particularly for those living in extreme poverty. We will not be alone with the
displaced said Karina.
However, the problem is that at the time of my visit, there were no employment opportunities
within the Villas de San Pablo project. Because of its location outside of the built area of the
city, there is a large demand for retail business and locally produced commodities and
services. Those who offer them usually do it from their houses and apartments (Figure 9.12),
which implies certain risk, as this is not allowed according to the local development plan.
The design of the project did not provide for mixed-use commercial residential developments,
market places or areas where small-scale industry is allowed, at least in the first stages of
construction. The FMSD realized that those kinds of spaces are much needed in the area.
We are working on this said Karina.
Figure 9.12. A grocery store in a ground floor apartment in Villas de San Pablo (bottom left).
94

9.3. The process of Free Housing
Beneficiaries of the Free Housing program are usually drawn from a waiting list, which is
administered locally by one of the Family Compensation Funds (Cajas de Compensacin
Familiar). These organizations are responsible for distributing subsidies for social housing,
health, education and other services to households classified as low income 34. The Family
Compensation Funds work closely with the Ministry of Housing (MinVivienda), the
Department of Social Prosperity (Departamento de Prosperidad Social), and other federal
entities.
In Barranquilla, the waiting list of IDP households willing to participate in the program was
created in the Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims (Unidad para la
Atencin y Reparacin Integral a las Victimas) in 2007 35. This is one of the first entities
where displaced households can go after the displacement. The Unit is responsible for
registering the IDPs and gives them information about the different benefits that correspond,
or might be of interest to, all those who hold IDP status.
One of the senior officers at the Barranquilla branch of the Unit told me that similar to Family
Compensation Funds, the URT has also been visiting and giving presentations to inform the
displaced about the Land Restitution program since 2012, but according to her, interest in this
initiative has not been as big as the interest in registration for waiting lists for social housing
which took place in 2007. She told me that most of the displaced families that she attends
have always been asking primarily for housing subsidies and income-generation opportunities.
There have also been many displaced people who did not own land, but worked at someone
elses farm, and for them, the social housing schemes were the only large-scale initiatives they
could sign up for.
Alongside the displaced households that are in the majority, families that were victims of
natural disasters 36 and those that are classified as living in extreme poverty supplement the
waiting list.
34
Colombian society is divided into social strata in scale from 0 to 6, 0 being the extreme poverty and
6 being the richest households. Social benefits and subsidies are typically designated for families in
strata 0 (no income), 1 (lowest income) and 2 (low-middle income). Households in strata 3 (middle
income) may be eligible for credit subsidies for houses in such projects as Villas de San Pablo.
35
In 2007, the Free Housing program was not yet debated in the government, but there were already
some preliminary proposals to develop a social housing scheme that would address the need for
urban housing for the displaced households.
36
In the Atlntico Department, the priority for Free Housing as part of the waiting list designated for the
victims of natural disasters was given to households that were most affected by floods caused by an
unusually heavy rain (Ola invernal) in winter 2010/11.
95

It took several years before the Free Housing program was launched and the first projects
were under development. When the construction of one of these approaches completion, the
Family Compensation Fund creates a lottery in which the free houses or apartments are
allocated to a group of lucky households from the local waiting list. Those households are
then invited by the administrators of the corresponding Free Housing project to visit the
project location and sign up for a specific house or apartment. In Villas de San Pablo, the
priority for choosing units is given to families with disabilities, as they usually request ground
floor apartments.
When everything is ready, the family moves in, receives property rights, and connection to all
the municipal services. The new apartment or house is handed over unfinished, without
flooring and without being painted (Figure 9.13). Its size depends on local climatic conditions
and municipal norms. On average, units are around 50 m2, which according to my informants,
is a good standard for Latin America 37.
Figure 9.13. New apartment in Villas de San Pablo. Beneficiaries of the Free Housing program
receive their apartments in an unfinished condition.
37
Dwelling sizes in previous social housing programs in Colombia usually did not exceed 35 m2
(El Nuevo Siglo, 2014).
96

If a beneficiary household does not move in within a specified period of time, it may lose
access to the property. As mentioned before, new homeowners are not permitted to sell or rent
out the unit in the first 10 years after receiving property rights.
As I was told by my FMSD contacts, explaining and enforcing some of the basic rules to the
newcomers about what is allowed and not allowed in Villas de San Pablo is a challenging
task. For example, they mentioned cases of families that wanted to bring their farm animals,
such as chickens and pigs, which they kept at their previous house. In order to avoid any
conflicts with the residents, the administration tolerated some minor violations of the rules,
such as the temporary operation of business activities from the dwellings. I also heard that the
collection of the monthly administrative fee of around $6 USD proved to be difficult and for
the time being the FMSD does not discipline those who are unable or unwilling to pay. I
learned that the management of such a large project is difficult when the residents are not used
to living in formal housing.
97
10. Case Analysis Barranquilla and Soledad

Household interviews from my second case study areas in Barranquilla and Soledad are
presented and analyzed below. Similarly to Chapter 8, the case of each respondent is
explained separately. This is followed by a brief summary at the end of the chapter.
10.1. Don Bosco IV

My next encounter with the displaced households was in the Don Bosco IV neighborhood
(Figure 10.1) located in the peripheries of Soledad, right next to Nueva Esperanza. I was
invited by the Association of Women of Nueva Esperanza (ADMUNE) for the opening event
of their new bakery called Manos de Mujer (Womans Hands). In between tasting their
delicious food, I talked to a few of the displaced woman about their past lives and future
prospects.
ADMUNE is one of three associations of displaced women in the Barranquilla region who
support and help each other in their everyday struggles, particularly in terms of employment,
security, and legal issues. The organization came up with an idea to launch a bakery in Don
Bosco IV. They arranged training sessions at SENA and found sponsors who helped them
acquire the necessary machinery. They sell pastries, cakes, bread made according to the
traditional recipes, and of course, cold soft drinks. Since opening, all of the employees at the
bakery are displaced women or their younger family members (Figure 10.2).
Sra. Sara
My first conversation was with Sra. Sara, member of ADMUNE and one of the founders of
the bakery. Her family comes from La Mojana region in the Sucre department, where they had
a small farm. In 2003, they were threatened by an unidentified armed group and were forced
to leave. Sara and her family came straight to Don Bosco IV and settled there, like many other
98
Case Analysis Barranquilla and Soledad
Figure 10.1. Don Bosco IV neighborhood in Soledad is largely composed of displaced families.
Figure 10.2. Members of ADMUNE and their associates in the new bakery in Don Bosco IV.
99

displaced households at that time. I was told that finding a place to live did not seem like a big
challenge, but getting a job and establishing a livelihood that would support the family was
much more difficult in times when even the humanitarian assistance from the government was
poor. For someone to get something like this, he has to be very powerful and known she
said.
Sara and her family do not want to return. She did not consider applying for restitution of their
land in Sucre. Her family did, however, apply for a Free House in Nueva Esperanza. They are
now on a waiting list and are hoping that they can also benefit from the program. It was clear
that Sara really wants to stay in the neighborhood, even despite the insecurity and cases of
extortion that she experienced. When asked to compare the services and quality of life in La
Mojana and in the neighborhood where she lives now, she said that Don Bosco IV is a better
place to live. The settlement has finally been legalized. There is running water, gas, and many
other services are now being improved. The village, however, was better in terms of lifestyle
and food.
There are a lot of people who returned and it is cool. But I also know that many returned
with no guarantee said Sara. According to her, the reason why people go back is that they
are unable to find the opportunities in cities and they never get used to urban life. Saras
family found an opportunity and now they are better off than they were just after the
displacement. Proximity to her new job at the bakery and ties to the new community are some
of the reasons why they would be happy to stay in Soledad. A new house in Nueva Esperanza
would further improve her living conditions and allow her to preserve and cultivate her social
networks.
Sra. Claudia
Sra. Claudia has a similar story to Sara. She is a displaced woman who came to Don Bosco IV
from the Bolvar department together with her family. Today she is an active member of
ADMUNE and a founder of the bakery. I was told that in 1997, her husband suffered an
assault from members of one of the armed groups. He got hurt and needed an operation. They
decided to leave their farm and flee to Barranquilla, where Claudias family lived.
Before the assault, Claudia had already been coming to Barranquilla on a weekly basis for
work. For this reason, it was easier for them to establish themselves in the city after the
displacement. However, she debated returning to the village and engaging in farming again.
100

Her husband returned to the farm for longer
periods until 2004 when the criminal bands
knocked on his door and gave him 48 hours to
pack his belongings and leave the property. This
is when Ana decided to bring her husband and
children to the city and stay here. They did not
come prepared for work and with no documents
that
could
show
their
past
employment
experience and education. Moreover, Claudias

husband has been disabled since the assault and
could not engage in any physical work. This is
when Claudia discovered ADMUNE and joined
them for training to become a baker.
Figure 10.3. Sra. Claudia. Photo by Beln

Pardo.
Unlike Sara, Claudia told me they received significant support from the government after
being displaced. Their help was not only limited to humanitarian aid. Her husband has been
receiving a regular pension due to his disability. They also received monetary support to build
a new house on a plot that they received from Claudias mother.
After seven years on the waiting list, Claudia was notified that her family received a free
house in Nueva Esperanza. She is pleased to live there, even though the house is a bit smaller
than the one they had before. Claudias involvement in the local Christian community takes a
lot of her time and is one of the reasons why she wants to stay in the area:
It was important that my husband and I got a house in Nueva Esperanza. Over there
we help build a new church and we have a lot of people who help us in all this,
because they are also displaced of Christian faith and they are congregating with us.
Her family is no longer considering returning to the village,
Because there are no expectations, memories, commitments, community like later with
the congregation, like with the association (ADMUNE). We have a lot of
commitments here and it would not be easy to go there.
Claudia does not know whether anyone from her community has returned. They were
scared, she said, because they received death threats. It was horrible what they have gone
through. Land Restitution was also out of the question for Claudia. She says it is not worth
applying as they would not go back there anyway.
101
Figure 10.4. Claudia and Sara at the opening event of the new bakery.
Today, Claudia works for the foundation and volunteers at the church and the bakery.
Together with her coworkers, they help each other develop skills at their new profession and
they are thinking of ways they expand their business and perhaps open new branches.
We will do it step by step, because it is not easy said Claudia.
Sra. Diana
The bakery is not an isolated case. In fact, I came across a number of entrepreneurs that
experienced violence and displacement. Diana and her husband are good examples of that.
They owned a small parcel (2 ha) in the Cinaga municipality in Zona Bananera (Magdalena
department) where they cultivated bananas. Her father and siblings worked on a larger ranch
(15 ha) where they were raising cattle. She told me they had a good life. Things changed in
2000 when the paramilitaries assassinated her brother and gave them half an hour to leave the
property. Dianas family fled to Barranquilla where some of her relatives lived. Diana stayed
in the village to investigate what happened to her brother, but she had since received death
threats, and after a few months, she also left for Barranquilla. At first, the conditions were
rough in the first two years, there were seven families living under one roof. After becoming
more independent economically, Diana and her close family moved to Soledad.
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Diana is a community worker who obtained her degree in social management after moving to
the city. She works at an organization that offers training to vulnerable populations, including
IDPs. Privately, Diana and her husband run a small welding shop, which is something they
did before the displacement. They also attempted to open an ecological cooperative where
they would breed fish and shrimp, but they failed to get the necessary funding from the
government.
Diana sold her small parcel in Zona Bananera to a neighbor, but the property of Dianas father
is in the process of Land Restitution through the URT branch in Santa Marta. She is
responsible for running the case on behalf of her family. My father wants to go there
Diana said. He wants to cultivate or join other agriculturists. But he is disabled. How does
he want to return? Her father is a 70-year-old widow and as she told me, no one in her
family, including herself, wanted to go there with him. In her mind, in Zona Bananera:
It is not the same any more. The violence destroyed everything; we will never have the
same lifestyle which we had, of calmness, of peace No more. Now the people over
there are distrustful. There is no such thing as friendship, a feeling of love for each
other.
The case itself seems quite complicated. Shortly after being confiscated by the paramilitaries,
properties in Zona Bananera were sold to a big corporation that accumulated up to 500 ha of
land for their palm tree plantation. Other parcels were given out to individual colonists who
were connected to the armed groups. In the meantime, many of the properties changed hands
and have been merged and subdivided several times, which makes the process difficult to
investigate.
Diana started their restitution case in 2006 with Accin Social. After The Victims Law was
introduced in 2011, her case was passed to the URT like all other pending restitution requests.
She is still waiting for the final decision. In the meantime, Diana formed an association with
other victim land owners from Zona Bananera with the hopes that this would speed up the
process, but they still do not know whether it is better to make individual or group claims.
After eight years of fighting for what was theirs, they managed to recover only 3 out of 15 ha
of the property. This takes a lot of time. People are dying waiting for this! said Diana.
Indeed, her mother passed away a few years ago while waiting for the verdict.
If Diana had a choice, she would go for monetary compensation instead of Land Restitution.
That would give her family a chance to buy a house in Barranquilla and invest more money in
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the education of her kids. A faster verdict would also save her a lot of time traveling to Santa
Marta, where she has to go periodically to deal with the paperwork.
Diana appeared on the waiting list for a free house, but apparently the Family Compensation
Fund committed errors and her family was crossed out. She was trying to negotiate with
them so that they could still be considered in the project, but so far, she has not had success.
She told me that she knows many people who received a free house in different locations.
They are all pleased with their new homes, but Diana pointed out that the quality of living is
not the same in the different neighborhoods. Units in Villas de San Pablo and Las Gardenias
are all in apartment blocks that have smaller living spaces, especially for a big family of seven
or eight. Houses in Nueva Esperanza appear bigger even though they are of the same size as
the apartments in the other projects. Security concerns are a common issue for all Free
Housing projects and as Diana told me, not all of them have full-time surveillance.
In general though, Diana thinks that living in the city is better, although more expensive than
in the countryside:
Over there the services are deficient, but it was not as expensive and you had the
opportunities, if there was no water supply, you could take a bath in the river, ravine or
in the canal and take food from what you planted, cultivated and from the animals.
You could eat from the animals which you were breeding, but here you cannot. You
have to buy everything.
The future of her kids is perhaps the most important reason why she plans to stay in the city.
She explains that education and the proximity to services are some of the reasons why Diana
and her family will remain in Barranquilla. There are no universities and government
programs are over in rural areas. The only thing one can do after finishing education is
to get married.
Fourteen years after the displacement, Dianas family still may not have fully recovered in
terms of their financial and material situation, but at least they have been using their time to
build up their assets, which gives them good prospects for the future:
I tell you, I see it as my hope that we can escape I mean, from the poverty of the
pocket, because intellectual poverty, we are rich in that. Intellectually poor who does
not think, is the truly poor.
Dianas family is now actively looking for new opportunities, which, as she told me, you can
only find in the city.
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10.2. Nueva Esperanza
My next few interviews were performed in a quiet Free Housing development Nueva
Esperanza (Figure 10.5), which is literarily just across the street from the Don Bosco IV
neighborhood.
Figure 10.5. Overview of the Nueva Esperanza Free Housing project.
Sr. Jos
First, I came into a shoemakers workshop where I met Jos. His workplace was in what was
meant to be the living room of his house. We will barely have one year here. Seven years to
receive this roof said Jos. He showed me around the property, repeating how delighted he
was: We feel very happy to be here and the biggest happiness one can have is to have a
roof.
Jos comes from the municipality of Tiquisio in the southern part of the Bolivar department.
Together with some of his siblings, he worked on the farm owned by their father. His family
left due to the violence and instability in the region.
They came to Soledad, as Joss older brother had already lived here for over five years. They
also had some other relatives and acquaintances in the city. Jos admitted that when he arrived
there, he did not know anything that could be of any use, except for some carpentry skills. His
brother was a shoemaker, so they decided to work together:
It was the first time when my morale dropped and I went back to recover it and I said
yes I can, yes I can brother. So I went there, I worked with him for some years,
stuck with him, and from there I went to put up my own business. I became
independent, because I always liked to be independent, and, well, there we are,
fighting for living
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Since the property was left abandoned, part of his family returned to Tiquisio and recovered
their farm. Jos, however, does not want to go back there to work with his father again, as that
would be a step back. At the same time, Jos praised the government for doing a good job
at improving safety and stability in Tiquisio, although the general living conditions are still
better in the city, as long as someone has his work and employment he added. Similarly
to others I talked with, Jos also admitted that access to fresh food was better in the rural areas
and lamented that there are no conditions to raise his own animals where he now lives.
When asked if he heard anything about Land Restitution, Jos said he knows many displaced
people who participated in different meetings about it. They tell me it is not very nice said
Jos. Then he explained to me how the numbers of restituted land that the government
presents at those meetings are suspicious and that in reality, things do not work as they want
to show it. Nevertheless, if there was a program that would distribute rural properties to
landless farmers, he might have considered it.
Sr. Carlos
Next, I met Carlos, one of the community leaders in Nueva Esperanza. He told me he received
a house there in September 2013 and was one of the first ones in Barranquilla to benefit from
the program. He is a displaced person from a village called Los Venados in the Valledupar
municipality in Cesar department. In 1996, he was assaulted and received threats from armed
groups so he decided to flee to Barranquilla. He had not been there before, but he knew a
sister-in-law and a good friend who lived there. Carlos found a job at a telecommunications
company, and after a few months, he had enough savings to get some financial independence.
In the meantime, his family received further threats, so they also moved to Barranquilla.
Sometime after, Carlos needed quick money, so he sold his farm in Los Venados over the
phone for $600 thousand COP, which was very little considering that according to him, the
property is worth around $15 million COP now. Carlos knows that the URT also handles
restitution cases of transactions that were made under threat and below real market value, but
he is a man of honor. I will not reclaim it now, because I proposed to sell it he said.
What do I expect? That they give me some kind of compensation if they could or that they
offer me some help, so that I can continue to live here in Barranquilla.
Carlos job in telecommunications required visiting customers from all around the city and
gave him a chance to get to know the streets of Barranquilla and Soledad very well, so he later
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Figure 10.6. Unisex hair salon in Nueva Esperanza. Similarly to Jos, many other residents at the
project opened businesses from their houses.
Figure 10.7. Street corner near Carlos house in Nueva Esperanza.
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he got hired as a taxi driver. Well, about four years ago my sight started to go bad. I stopped
driving because otherwise I would kill someone said Carlos. After that, he decided to
retire and spend more time with his family.
When I asked about quality of living in Nueva Esperanza compared to the village where he
comes from, Carlos asked me to come with him. He gave me a tour around his house. The
quality of life is excellent. It is a lot better. Look, there are two TV sets! There is a football
game tomorrow and I have two TV sets! He showed me his two bedrooms, the kitchen, a
bathroom that he could not dream about in his house, and a garden where his wife planted a
papaya tree and some vegetables. Still a village man ideology he laughed. The houses
are made very well. How do I tell you, the countryside is not the same
In general, Carlos is very pleased with living in Nueva Esperanza. We have a dignified
living, he said. For now, his pension and savings from before are enough to maintain this
living standard.
Sra. Valentina
My last interviewee in Nueva Esperanza was Sra. Valentina. She could not wait until I started
asking questions, so she told me right away how happy she was with her new house: They
gave us all this, people of good heart.
Valentina is a displaced woman from Palmor, a village in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in the
department of Magdalena. Her family had to flee when a guerrilla group kidnapped their
underage son around 2004. Fortunately they released him later, but the fear the guerrillas
caused discouraged the family from returning. Valentina, her husband, and three sons found
shelter at one of their relatives homes in Villa Estadio in Soledad. She told me that the
government helped them a lot after being displaced. They received material help and medical
assistance in a clinic that was specially made for the displaced families. Unfortunately, there
were a lot of people who were not displaced and who took advantage of those services, so the
clinic was closed.
Valentinas husband and two sons work at the market, trading and selling fruit and taking any
other small jobs they can find. This is enough for them to survive. The important thing is
that one does not die of hunger and that God exists said Valentina. The family never
returned to the village and does not know anyone who did. The main reason for this is due to
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fear of repeated violence. This is why she would not consider applying for Land Restitution.
As she put it, just thinking about it makes her nervous.
Despite all the traumatic experiences, Valentina seemed happy. She had a big smile on her
face, even when she was talking about the problems they have experienced in her new house
in Nueva Esperanza:
All day without water, there comes a bit and it goes. It has kept us dry. Luckily we
have always got used to pour a little bit of water on the side to have something. You
got to be patient, because, what else can you do? Yesterday it was all day without
electricity.
Figure 10.8. Empty spaces between housing blocks in Nueva Esperanza. These are reserved for
future parks and community infrastructure projects. For the time being, local residents use them as
pasture for their cows.
One more look at Nueva Esperanza

Before I left, I had one more informal conversation with Carlos and a few of his neighbors
and friends. They seemed optimistic about their future, although one of the things I learned
was that there are no jobs in the vicinity of the project, and thus they fear not being able to pay
bills and taxes without a steady income. In general, they had a hard time to adapting to this
new situation, when everything becomes so formal and regulated. Nevertheless, Nueva
Esperanza, which in Spanish means New Hope, is still a much better place for them to live
than the countryside or the makeshift houses in which they stayed after being displaced.
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10.3. Villas de San Pablo
I came to Villas de San Pablo every day for about a week. During that time, I had a chance to
visit and talk to some of the first residents of the project, of which almost everyone was victim
of the armed conflict.
Figure 10.9. Overview of the Villas de San Pablo Free Housing project.
Sra. Rosa
The first interviewee was Rosa who lives in one of the ground floor apartments. She told me
about the displacement her husbands family.
Rosas husband comes from a village called La Palmita in the municipality of San Jacinto,
which is located right next to El Carmen de Bolvar. They had a 100 ha property with cows
and other livestock. The area experienced violence around 2000 and the entire village decided
to leave. Initially, Rosas husbands family wanted to go to Bogot, but later they changed
their minds and went to Barranquilla where they had an uncle who received them at his big
house in the Las Nieves neighborhood. Of all the residents of La Palmita, only two people
decided to stay in the village.
Some years later, lvaro Uribe who was Colombias President at that time, declared that San
Jacinto area was safe and encouraged the victim families to return to their land. The
government promised that they would establish a military post and many people trusted them.
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Rosas brother-in-law was among the first people to come back to the village. While in the
process of cleaning up the house, the armed groups returned there and started terrorizing the
local population again. Rosas brother-in-law was killed before the rest of the family moved
back to La Palmita. For this reason they decided to stay in Barranquilla.
Rosas mother-in-law applied for the restitution of their land. She has all the papers necessary
to prove that the land was theirs, but the case is still in process. I believe it will be over in a
few months said Rosa. Her mother-in-law, however, does not want to go to San Jacinto
ever again because that would remind her of her son who passed away. They still do not know
what they will do with the land if they get the property rights back. Once the verdict is given,
it will be up to the family to decide.
Meanwhile, Rosas family, which includes herself, her husband, two daughters, and her
mother-in-law, moved in to the Free Housing project in January 2014. Rosa was running a
hair salon from her apartment but she had to close it, because she was reprimanded by the
administration and reminded that this was not allowed in Villas de San Pablo. Her husband is
the only employed person in the family. He works at a company that produces fodder. This is
not enough she said, I have a sister who lives well, so she helps me a lot.
Rosa is very happy with the new place: I live well here. I feel calm, it is fresh here and there
is no rain. She does have good memories of staying in the countryside where she could
really enjoy the nature, the landscape, and homemade wine, but in the end she said she prefers
to live in the city.
What is missing here is that someone plants more trees, so that there would be more birds.
In terms of quality of living, she claimed, It has never been better than this!
Sra. Gloria
Gloria comes from the Salamina municipality in the Magdalena department. Her family had a
big tomato plantation on close to 100 ha of land. Their problems started around 2001 when the
paramilitary groups terrorized the villagers in the area. They murdered several people,
including some of Glorias relatives.
One story is particularly horrific. The paramilitaries were after Glorias husband, who was a
well known and respected community leader. At the time when they came to their house he
was not there. The offenders got confused and found his cousin who has exactly the same first
and last names. They thought that this was the person they were looking for and killed him
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right away. After this unfortunate event, Glorias family decided to leave the village and move
to their relatives who lived in Barranquilla.
The family settled in the Los Trupillos neighborhood in Barranquilla. A few years later, they
opened a fast-food business that was expanded over time and is still open today. Gloria told
me that they are now established in the city. They have a steady income and managed to send
their kids to the local universities. There was a time when her husband wanted to return, but
since most of their family was already in Barranquilla and the business was going well, there
was no good reason for going back to Salamina.
Everyone stayed in the city except for her sister-in-law who returned to Salamina: They told
her that she could return, because everything was calm, but we did not do it because of fear.
Gloria came there for the first time since displacement earlier in 2014 to participate in the
elections, as she could only cast her vote in the place where her ID card was issued.
Gloria knows about the Land Restitution program, but she decided not to file a claim. She
heard that someone has been occupying their property and thinks they are unlikely to get the
land back. They had an opportunity to return when their plots were still abandoned, but no
one, except for her sister-in-law took advantage of it. Today, they would rather avoid any
potential conflicts with the new occupants:
How to investigate it? A neighbor of mine told me that in her village, someone bought
a large property to build and when this happened, she could see people rising to get it.
There were others who bought a plot in their village and those kinds of people took it
away from them. She had people working there and now what? She tells me, now
what?
When Gloria heard about the Free Housing project, she was also quite suspicious. She was not
convinced that the government would really give away houses for free. She thought at best it
would be a subsidy and the chosen families would have to cover some of the costs. Also, the
locations of the housing projects were not too attractive, but she still put her name on the
waiting list to see what would happen. After seven years, her family was told that they were
assigned a new apartment in Villas de San Pablo, which came to them as big surprise. They
have been very happy there, and today, they do not want to move out of Barranquilla:
We see our future in the city. At the moment the opportunities are greater here. Once
someone lives here, he wants to stay. What would they want in the countryside? They
want to advance and here there are more opportunities.
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Figure 10.10. Housing blocks in Villas de San Pablo.
Sra. Martha
My next conversation was with Martha. Unlike most other displaced persons I spoke to, she
was not displaced from the village, but from Buenaventura, a coastal city of over 360,000
inhabitants in the department of Valle del Cauca. Originally, both Martha and her husband
were from Barranquilla, but they moved first to Cali and then to Buenaventura in order to get
better jobs. There, they owned a plot where they wanted to build their new house, but in 2007
it was taken over by the so-called Bacrims 38. Buenaventura is a red zone. It is the most
important port in Colombia, a lot of drugs are handled there. People disappear said
Martha.
Martha could not get the plot back even though she had all the property documents. Not being
from Buenaventura made Marthas family an easy target for the local criminals who, at first,
threatened them and eventually asked them to leave the area. In Barranquilla, her family
received help from her relatives, particularly her brother-in-law, who lent them an empty
38
Bacrims is a term that refers to criminal bands, mafias and drug cartels that emerged after the
demobilization of the paramilitary groups in years 2002-2006. Many of their members include former
paramilitary and guerrilla leaders and combatants.
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piece of land where they could establish themselves. Nevertheless, their beginnings were very
harsh as they were all living overcrowded in a small house.
It was a coincidence that they registered themselves as IDPs. Shortly after arriving in
Barranquilla, Martha went to the city hall to apply for a new ID card which she needed in
order to access medical care for her ill son. There, she was told that she was a displaced
person and from then on, she was included in governmental programs for victims. She
received humanitarian help for three months and signed up for a waiting list for a free house.
In the meantime, her husband found a job as a moto-taxi driver, something that is quite
common among displaced men. Later, they spent some time at her mothers ranch in a village
in the municipality of El Copey, located in the Cesar department. In October 2013, Martha
was informed that they were chosen to receive an apartment in Villas De San Pablo. Her
mother passed away one month after, and in January the next year, they have moved into their
new home. Out of her four children, the two youngest are still living with them while the older
ones have already married and are living independently.
Martha is pleased to stay and she does not consider returning to Buenaventura. The security
situation in there is still difficult, and it is not known if it will ever be included as a microfocalized zone by the URT. Therefore, at this moment, the office would not even start
processing an eventual claim for property restitution. However, Martha has received offers
from two lawyers who are ready to help her with the paperwork: You give money to some
men who are those who return the lands. She was not sure whether to trust them. They told
me I could do it, I could submit my claim. Later, she admitted that she is happy at the
moment and she does not want to bother with Land Restitution. I tell you that since 2007,
this has been a drastic change we have had. This is the calmest moment I have ever had, even
though the apartment is quite small.
Sra. Valeria
Martha recommended that I talk to Sra. Valeria, who is an elderly woman with an intriguing
story of displacement. Valeria invited me to her apartment and started to tell me what
happened, step-by-step. She is from Villa de San Benito Abad in Sucre Department, one of
the poorest areas of the country, which was also one of the most affected by the conflict.
Before the violence, Valeria and her family had a small farm with animals and a metal
workshop. One day in July 2005, when Valerias husband was working outside of his house, a
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child gave him a note on behalf of the guerrillas. The note said they had to pay a tribute to the
guerrilla leader. At first they ignored the note but later they were asked to leave the village
since they did not want to cooperate. They were scared, as they knew that horrible things were
happening in the region. Many people disappeared or were murdered, including Valerias
brother-in-law. The family packed their belongings and, early in the morning, they left the
village.
Valerias family went to Soledad where their older son lived. In the first years, the conditions
were difficult there were twenty-one people living under one roof. Valerias husband made an
agreement with other family members and they soon opened a new metal workshop, which
still exists today. She said the government helped them to get back on their feet. For example,
Accin Social gave them financial support which they used to buy machines and tools for their
new workshop. Today, they live in one of the apartments in Villas de San Pablo. Valeria
seemed delighted to be given a new home:
Thanks to God and that he touched the heart of the president and the people Lets
say the government and whoever gave us this roof. Really, I do not know how to thank
for this Too beautiful
Another reason for Valerias happiness was that, one her daughters received a subsidized
house in the neighborhood (Figure 10.11), so they can see each other every day.
Figure 10.11. Subsidized houses in Villas de San Pablo next to the Free Housing apartment buildings.
Many relatives and old-time friends of the beneficiaries of the Free Housing project benefited from
these schemes.
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Valeria heard about the Land Restitution program, but last time they checked, they could not
apply since San Benito has not yet been declared a micro-focalized zone. She said they would
like to have a small parcel to cultivate fruits and vegetables, as they like the countryside
lifestyle. However, they would want not return to their old village because of bad memories of
violence. This is why they feel no urgency or need to take part in the restitution process.
When I asked about whether they wanted to stay in the city, Valeria introduced me to her two
daughters who lived with her. They were the youngest of her six children. The first one is
studying business administration and the other almost finished her degree in law.
Where would they go? Valeria asked rhetorically. I am already 62 years old. Tell me
10.4.Summary
Similarly to the case study of El Carmen de Bolvar (Chapter 8), empirical data from
households in Barranquilla and Soledad is analyzed according to the theoretical model (Figure
10.12). In this case, most of the collected information and opinions relate to the second
studied initiative the Free Housing program. The analysis is divided into three themes:
migration, social networks and government interventionism.
Figure 10.12. Theoretical model for analysis of data from Barranquilla and Soledad. Developed by the
author.
Migration
Migration patterns of respondents in Barranquilla and Soledad are relatively straight-forward.
All of them moved from the countryside, or in one case a smaller city, to Barranquilla or
Soledad where they settled permanently, which complies with my theoretical model. Some of
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them moved over night while for others, the process was more gradual. In all cases, the
displacements were caused by threats, violence, and extortions committed by the armed
groups. These horrific experiences are among the main reasons why all of my interviewed
households decided not to move back to their places of origin.
The interviewed city dwellers and beneficiaries of the Free Housing projects are happy to stay
in the urban areas, as they say it ensures proximity to all the necessary services and offers
greater employment and education opportunities for themselves and their relatives. Among
those whom I talked to, no one wants to return. Some have considered it in the past or may
consider it in the future as they miss countryside living, but due to fear, perception of
insecurity, and the lack of livelihood opportunities, they are unwilling to do so at this moment.
The few interviewed households that are in process of Land Restitutions are generally
unwilling to return, because they prefer to stay in the city. Free Housing, on the other hand,
allows the displaced households to preserve their livelihoods without the necessity of
migrating away from their actual place of living.
Social networks
Interviews in Barranquilla and Soledad indicate that the new social networks that developed
after displacement are currently stronger than the pre-conflict networks in rural areas. A few
of my respondents believe that the communities in rural areas that they come from no longer
exist and eventual return would imply starting everything from scratch. This contributed to the
decision of the IDP families to stay in the city.
The displaced households I came across seem very resourceful and entrepreneurial. As the
example of ADMUNE shows, the IDPs are often self-organized to support each other in
establishing income-generating and self-training projects. The displaced persons that I talked
to learned how to use their new networks in the city to expand their livelihood opportunities.
The provision of Free Housing projects in cities, which received large numbers of IDPs,
allowed the beneficiary households to maintain those new social networks and keep the same
jobs, which is something they seem very happy about. Such initiatives as the DINCS model
have a potential to encourage the further strengthening of the existing social networks, as well
as the creation of new ones, among the displaced, potentially leading to their increased
autonomy. However, since the examined Free Housing projects are relatively new, it is
difficult to assess what will happen to this social capital in the long-term.
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Government
My interviewees in Barranquilla and Soledad seem to trust the government institutions. It
comes to no surprise that the households that just received a free dwelling are very pleased
with the president Juan Manuel Santos and his government, as it delivered its promise and
provided them with what they call a dignified place to live. However, because my
respondents moved in relatively recently, they may still be in a shock period, and over time
their emotions may change. Unlike Land Restitution, the process by which households obtain
Free Housing is straightforward and did not cause much trouble, with the exception of one
interviewee who was disqualified from the waiting list.
The Free Housing builders such as the FMSD as well as community organizations like
ADMUNE, often collaborate with different government institutions to improve livelihood
opportunities for their target groups and members. It is important to notice however, that
through the Free Housing program, the government focuses on providing a shelter, not
livelihoods.
This is why the program is better fit for those IDPs who have a regular income, such as
pension or full-time job. Those who are the least likely to improve their living standard after
moving to a Free Housing project are the extreme poor, the unemployed, and those who did
not develop strong social networks. Their main challenge is adapting to what might be the
first formal housing situation in their life and coping with all the additional expenses and bills.
While opinions about Free Hosing were generally positive, my interviewees had mixed
feelings about Land Restitution. Many of them said it did not apply in their case, some
complained that it takes too long to process applications, while others mentioned that they
were discouraged by stories of others who had bad experiences with the program. Those who
applied for restitution of their land claimed that they did not want to return there. A few
respondents mentioned they would be more satisfied with monetary compensation from the
government as a reparation measure for the dispossession of their old properties.
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11. Findings
The stories and opinions from the respondents illustrate a complex situation in which the two
investigated reparation initiatives impact different people in different ways. Therefore,
answering my research question How do the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs
affect the livelihoods of IDP households in the Caribbean Region of Colombia? cannot be
done in a short and simple manner.
The main conclusion from my investigation is that, in general, the Free Housing program
allows the IDPs to sustain the means of livelihood they developed in towns and cities where
they settled after the displacement. This is one of the main reasons why the Free Housing
initiative has been so successful. Land Restitution, on the other hand, fails to preserve or
improve the current livelihood situation of the IDPs, as the return to rural areas and the
reestablishment of agricultural activities is generally not seen as an attractive and
economically viable alternative for the displaced population. Further analysis of the empirical
data identified several interesting patterns, exceptions and other findings that directly or
indirectly relate to the research questions.
11.1. IDPs prefer to stay in urban areas

My empirical data is in line with earlier studies that state that the IDPs in Colombia are
generally not willing to return to rural areas. Most of the interviewees from this study are
willing to stay in the towns and cities where they arrived after the displacement. Their proactivity and entrepreneurialism helped them find jobs or other income-generating activities,
and create new communities in urban areas. In other words, they adapted to city living by
establishing new livelihoods and social networks. The belief that the city has better future
prospects than the countryside is also reflected in the fact that many displaced parents are
sending their children to local universities as opposed to, for example, passing their farming
traditions on them.
119
Figure 11.1. Marketplace in Barranquilla. Many of the vendors who found employment there have
been displaced from rural areas and do not want to return.
There is a common perception that the pre-conflict social networks in the rural areas affected
by the conflict cease to exist and that there is no longer a true sense of community. Other
reasons for not returning include bad memories of violence, perceived insecurity, poor
infrastructure and services, and a lack of government presence in rural areas. Many of the IDP
households that submitted a claim for Land Restitution want to stay where they are and sell
the property as soon as they are able to.
The exceptional cases of IDPs who returned to their lands after their displacement are those
who were either unsuccessful in establishing new livelihoods in the city due to lack of social
networks, or those who returned due to their attachment to the land. They did so out of their
own initiative, regardless of Land Restitution. Interestingly, many of them did not move in to
their farms, but settled in towns within a close proximity to the rural property, such as the
town of El Carmen de Bolvar. Those landowners are usually not trying to make profit off the
land, but they would rather use it for recreational purposes or as a vacation house. Instead of
farming, they might still be engaged in typical urban occupations as their livelihood strategy.
This might also be the case for many IDPs who benefit from Land Restitution and are
unwilling to sell their properties. They may continue to live in urban areas and keep their land
without using it for productive purposes. In this case, they remain landowners but do not
contribute to the repopulation of the rural areas.
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Findings
11.2. Bad timing of Land Restitution
It seems that over the years after the violence and displacements occurred, many IDPs
accepted the new, post-conflict reality and now they adapt to the situation and organize their
new livelihoods on their own. This is especially true for small towns and rural communities
like El Carmen de Bolvar, where Land Restitution is seen as disturbing the rebuilding
process by bringing back old conflicts and enforcing formalization over properties that are
traditionally transferred informally through verbal transactions.
Moreover, many of the IDPs are now too old for physical work and they would rather look
forward towards their retirement than working in the field. It can be argued, therefore, that too
much time has passed since the displacement to expect that the IDPs would give up their
current livelihoods and return to the countryside to reestablish a productive farm.
On the other hand, the timing of the Free Housing program does not seem to be an issue. The
fact that many beneficiaries in the Nueva Esperanza and Villas de San Pablo projects waited
for the allocation of a free dwelling for over seven years did not affect their decision to move
into the unit. They simply perceive it as an upgrade of their living standards without giving up
the current livelihoods that they developed after the displacement. Nevertheless, the Free
Housing scheme seems to best suit households which had a regular income at the moment of
moving in. This is especially true for pensioners who are not impacted by the lack of
education facilities and employment centers in the intermediate proximity to the investigated
Free Housing projects.
The Free Housing program is therefore not outdated, as opposed to Land Restitution, which
attempts to restore the situation from many years before.
11.3. Challenges of property formalization

For many beneficiaries, the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs imply that IDPs
must enter the formal sector of property rights and land tenure. Customary land tenures
before, and illegal squatting after the displacement, were very common among IDP
populations. Moreover, many of them accessed water, electricity, and other services through
informal means and did not have to pay for them. For households that moved into the Free
Housing developments, the challenge is to afford paying bills and administration fees, as their
income is generally low. Therefore, entering the formal sector through this program may
increase the costs of living for its beneficiaries and add more pressure on their livelihoods.
121

In case of Land Restitution, the officers at
the URT investigate each claim in an
attempt to establish formal ownership
rights and add them to the property
registry.
However,
the
traditional
informality of land ownership in the

Colombian countryside makes the process
of restitution extremely difficult because
of the inability to trace who is or was the
rightful owner of a given property,
determine its real market value, and
assess whether there are any legally
bonding debts attached to it. This is a
very bureaucratic and time-consuming
Figure 11.2. Villas de San Pablo. For many residents,
this is the first formal housing they owned in their life.
process that further discourages IDPs

from returning to rural areas.
Nevertheless, by establishing a proper land registry and introducing the rule of law in the
countryside, the state will likely increase its presence and have more power to introduce
further land and agrarian reforms for the benefit of the existing farming communities. In that
sense, the success of Land Restitution does not need to be measured only by the number of
IDPs who return, but also by the amount of properties that are surveyed and inscribed in the
formal land registry.
11.4. Land Restitution can cause new conflicts and can harm rural areas
From the interviews, it is apparent that the process of Land Restitution as outlined in The
Victims Law is complicated and gives space for multiple interpretations, which cause farreaching problems, especially in the countryside. This does not seem to be the case of the Free
Housing program, as it is implemented according to a relatively simple and straightforward
process.
It is true that verifying the validity of the stories of households involved in Land Restitution
and proving whether they truly acted in good faith is difficult, since they present only one
perspective on their case. However, my case study situation illustrates that The Victims Law
does not seem to be fit to respond adequately to the variety of individual cases. This results in
122
Findings
a common perception of injustice and confusion among the farming communities, which are
largely composed of the displaced persons and the victims of the armed conflict.
Hasty implementation of the law without proper investigation and a general bias towards
claimants who request the land also opens opportunities for some groups of people to take
advantage of Land Restitution, for example by taking profit twice from the same land. This
leads to potential abuses of the law and creation of new conflicts, for example between the
current occupants of land who claim they acted in good faith and the IDPs who declare that
the same property was stolen from them. Many of these IDPs request Land Restitution even
though they are not willing to return to the land, a phenomena that contradicts the original
motivation for launching the program. By calling and encouraging more claimants to file a
case, the URT is further magnifying this problem.
Large corporations and organizations that were involved in land transactions in areas affected
by the conflict are also in a more favorable position to protect their interests in a Land
Restitution claim. On the other hand, individual farmers who resisted the conflict and stayed
in the depopulated countryside may not have means to defend a claim against them, which
results in them being re-victimized.
Land Restitution, therefore, leads to the further destruction of rural communities and their
livelihoods long after these areas have been designated as conflict free.
Figure 11.3. Vacant farm in El Carmen de Bolvar. In this case, the property rights have been
restored to the previous owner, but for the time being he is unwilling to return there.
123

11.5. Both reparation programs raise ethical questions
The question about whether it is ethical to give houses for free to the victims has already been
raised by Gilbert (2013). My data shows that all of the displaced families that benefited from
the program have been immensely happy about having received a property for free.
Nevertheless, given the amount of time that had passed since the displacement, at the moment
of receiving a free house, each household was in a different socio-economic situation. Some
of them had a higher income and better social networks than others. They might also have
owned another house in similar location or with comparable living standards. The selection
policy for beneficiaries does not recognize those differences, which suggests that the Free
Housing program does not always allocate dwellings to those who need them most.
Similarly, stories from the countryside show how, according to the way in which Land
Restitution is applied, the differences between a victim and aggressor, or between a person
who sells the land, and a person who is evicted from it, are becoming blurry. It appears as if
one person can play all these roles simultaneously. Making arbitrary decisions about the
eligibility for Land Restitution in cases of farmers who sold their land for a suspiciously low
price, rises further questions about the fairness of the process for all the involved parties.
Furthermore, there seems to be an ethical problem about the fate of the current occupants of
the land in question, regardless of whether they acted in good or bad faith. Is it fair to tolerate
their new displacement in order to facilitate a reparation measure for the previous
displacement of someone else?
Further examination of those cases is important from the point of view of transitional justice
and post-conflict peacemaking to ensure the fair and efficient distribution of reparation
measures and benefits to the people who truly deserve it, without spilling them over to third
parties or favoring some victims over the others.
11.6. Importance of social movements

Another finding from my research is that community organizations and social movements are
very important in the development and fight for IDPs livelihoods. The case of the womens
association in Nueva Esperanza (ADMUNE) illustrates how the displaced communities in
urban areas organize themselves in order to help each other and develop new incomegenerating activities. They are active in expanding their social network and engaging in
partnerships with various private and public sector organizations. Their trust of government
124
Findings
institutions was strengthened by the success of the Free Housing program, from which many
of the members of ADMUNE benefited.
This was not the case for the farmers support group in El Carmen de Bolvar. Their
emergence was motivated by the lack of trust of the state and the sense of injustice that the
Land Restitution program created in their rural communities. Members of the support group,
of which many are displaced themselves, protest the implementation of the initiative, fight to
defend their land, and aim to preserve their farming livelihoods.
Other community-oriented initiatives, such as the DINCS model in Villas de San Pablo, are
based on some progressive principles that showcase the good intentions of the Free Housing
project. However, its performance and impact on livelihoods is difficult to evaluate at this
early stage of investigation.
125
12. Conclusions and Implications

This study finds that in the short-term, the Free Housing program has a greater impact on the
livelihoods of Colombias IDPs, as it allows them to stay in the city and maintain their new
urban livelihoods developed after displacement. The rural livelihood opportunities
promised by the Land Restitution initiative are found unattractive to the displaced families, or
at least not attractive enough to convince them to give up their urban living and return to the
countryside.
These conclusions have significant theoretical and practical implications. Among other things,
this research provides another case study that confirms the significance of urbanization as a
process that irreversibly changes the way people live. Broadly, the results of this research
suggest that the success of such large-scale land reforms and housing programs depends on
whether the principles of these schemes work with or against the general rural-urban
migration trends and the livelihood choices of the target population.
Nevertheless, based on my empirical data, it is difficult to predict long-term impacts of both
the Land Restitution and Free Housing programs on the livelihoods of Colombia IDPs.
However, it is possible to raise some issues and concerns for the future and discuss a few
possible interventions that can mitigate potential problems and contribute to the socioeconomic reintegration of the IDPs in Colombian society. These recommendations are based
on real-life professional practice and the relevant literature introduced in Chapter 4.
12.1. Implications for theory

In order to engage in a discussion on the implications and contribution of my research for the
theoretical knowledge, I would like to revisit my theoretical model (Figure 5.2), in which the
three main themes for analysis social networks, migration patterns, and government
interventionism have been presented together in the context of displacement and urban and
126
Conclusions and Implications

rural livelihoods of the IDPs. The main assumption of that model was that social networks and
programs offered by the state are two complimentary forces which impact the migration
decisions of IDP households and thus have a significant impact on their current and future
livelihoods. In general, research confirms this model, but it also implies a few significant
alterations that are presented in the new model shown in Figure 12.1.
Figure 12.1. Amended theoretical model. Developed by the author.
The first finding concerns social networks during and after the displacement. The interviews I
conducted indicate that pre-conflict social networks and communities in rural areas affected
by the conflict are believed to be lost forever, which was one of the reasons why the IDPs are
not willing to take advantage of Land Restitution and return to rural areas. Some of the postconflict social networks that still exist in the almost depopulated countryside emerged due to
the necessity to fight for survival, yet the sense of community is still weak, as shown by
the case of farmers who see Land Restitution as a threat to their livelihoods.
On the other hand, the new social networks of households that displaced to cities proved to be
strong enough to provide new livelihood opportunities and discourage them from returning.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the perceived ability to build up or restore strong social
networks and communities is crucial in the migration and livelihood decisions of the poor.
Any government interventions that ignore these decisions and the local context are likely to
fail to meet their objectives.
Other aspects, such as the psychological impacts of conflicts on the displaced population and
the processes of continuous urbanization also proved to be more influential than the intensions
of large-scale government policies, such as Land Restitution. The economics of scale, access
127

to employment and education facilities as well as safety in urban areas proved to be superior
to the lifestyle and livelihood opportunities in the rural areas. This explains why most of my
interviewees who are in process of Land Restitution intend to stay in urban areas and do not
intend to return to the countryside.
A more widespread implication, therefore, is that mobilization of local communities, strength
of their social networks and the general rural-urban migration trends have to be taken into
consideration for the development of a successful public policy on local and national levels.
12.2. Implications for practice

One of the aims of this thesis was to evaluate the short and long-term effectiveness of the
Land Restitution and Free Housing programs in responding to the needs and demands of the
IDP households in Colombia. As explained previously, in the short-term, the Free Housing
scheme proved to be a better reparation initiative since it was successful in providing a
permanent shelter and improved the living conditions of a greater number of IDPs without
sacrificing their newly developed livelihoods. Land Restitution proved to be ineffective as it
costs the government a significantly more money per household and fails to bring the
expected number of IDPs to the countryside and restore their farming livelihoods.
The collected empirical data does not provide enough information to assess long-term
implications of both programs. Nevertheless, an attempt to identify issues of concern for the
future and propose some preliminary recommendations is made, based on educated
assumptions, theories, and relevant literature from the field.
Implications for Land Restitution

The lack of success of the Land Restitution program in the short-term implies that it will
likely also fail to deliver its promises in the long-term; however, this is difficult to predict, as
the policy may be amended over time to react to the present situation. As the empirical data
from this study shows, the process of Land Restitution is challenged by a number of internal
and external factors, of which some can and others cannot be directly influenced by policy
makers and the URT. Offering more alternatives and making the program more flexible will
likely contribute to a more peaceful and successful implementation of the program.
First of all, authors of The Victims Law should acknowledge that the majority of the displaced
households that would like to benefit from the Land Restitution program are not willing to
128

move back to their lands or establish a productive farm. Instead, many of them would consider
financial compensation as a sufficient reparation measure. Therefore, policymakers should
consider adding an alternative option of providing monetary compensation instead of the
restitution of land rights. Also, by removing the limitations on transactions for the restituted
land, The Victims Law would widen the choices of the IDPs and allow them to profit from
selling the land whenever they want.
In addition, in cases when both the claimant and the current occupant of the land prove that
they did not act in bad faith, the provision of a vacant property of similar size and with similar
qualities should be considered as an alternative form of compensation for one of the parties.
Applying those measures would likely prevent many unnecessary conflicts from happening
and allow faster and more efficient land redistribution, which would contribute to the
governments efforts to repopulate the rural areas of Colombia.
In order to avoid the re-victimization of landowners and mitigate the bureaucratic inefficiency
in Land Restitution, Garca-Godos and Lid (2010) suggest reconsidering negotiated
restitution, in which the victimizers voluntarily give back the land or compensate the victims
in exchange for legal and social benefits. This strategy has already been tried in Colombia
after 2003, when most of the Paramilitary groups have demobilized. The reconciliation in the
negotiated restitution process is likely to provide guarantees of security and non-repetition for
the victims. The disadvantage of this strategy, is that it is vulnerable, as it depends on the
proper identification of the victimizers and their willingness to cooperate (Garca-Godos and
Lid, 2010).
Another possibility is to follow the recommendations of International Displacement
Monitoring Centre, which suggest that Land Restitution should be turned into a large-scale,
comprehensive land reform applied to all parts of the country (IDMC, 2010). Such a land
reform would be focused on promoting small-scale agriculture and performing a nationwide
land surveying and digitalized registry in order to simplify formalization of rights to those
lands (IDMC, 2010). Within that framework, Land Restitution policies should be applied
locally in the areas affected by the conflict and modified depending on the local context
(IDMC, 2010). Moreover, as many of my interviewees suggested, Land Restitution should not
only focus on property rights, but also provide community services and contribute to the
improvement of infrastructure, education, and health care system in the countryside.
Schematic illustrations of some of the challenges of property ownership and Land Restitution
in rural areas as well as responses discussed above are shown on Figures 12.2 and 12.3.
129
Figure 12.2. Schematic illustration of the selected challenges in rural areas. Developed by the author.
Figure 12.3. Schematic illustration of potential responses to the challenges. Developed by the author.
130

In any case, the success of Land Restitution is also dependent on the security situation in the
rural areas. Yet policymakers and the URT can do very little to solve this problem. As long as
the perception of insecurity persists and there is no permanent peace agreement, it will be very
hard to convince anyone to return to the countryside.
Implications for Free Housing

The Colombian government takes credit for the intermediate success of the Free Housing
program, but there are no guarantees that the housing projects will make a lasting change in
the quality of life of the IDP population. As noted by Gilbert (2013), poor design and
construction of these developments, lack of social mixing, bad location and insecurity are just
some of the issues that may turn into serious problems in the future.
Indeed, the design of Villas de San Pablo and other housing projects built as part of the Free
Housing program are similar to the design of various unsuccessful public housing schemes
built in Europe and North America between 1940s and 1970s. Many of those projects failed to
improve the quality of life and livelihood opportunities of their residents in the long-term,
which resulted in necessary but costly interventions by the governments only a few decades
after initial erection 39. Therefore, it is important to put special importance to the quality of
design and construction of the future Free Housing developments and ensure proper
maintenance in order to prevent them from turning into ghettos.
The displaced families are especially vulnerable in terms of their livelihoods, which often
depend on the employment opportunities that are accessible to them by public transportation,
or in some cases, within a walking distance. Improving public transportation service,
allocating new social housing projects in better located areas of the city and creating socially
mixed and inclusive communities will likely mitigate some of the problems of ghettoization
and socio-spatial segregation. Madanipour (1998) suggested that one possible strategy to combat
those issues is building more inclusionary housing units for low- and moderate-income
households in neighborhoods they could otherwise not afford. Expanding community support
initiatives such as the DINCS model and linking job-seeking beneficiaries of the Free Housing
program to potential employers can further contribute to poverty alleviation and the real
improvement of the quality of life of the displaced households.
39
The already mentioned Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis, Regent Park in Toronto and the Bijlmermeer
district in Amsterdam are just few examples of public housing projects that were later completely
demolished or redeveloped by the corresponding governments.
131

Still, the assumption that the IDPs need to seek livelihood opportunities outside of their
housing developments does not have to be true for all cases. In both of my investigated Free
Housing projects, there was an obvious demand for all kinds of retail, services and even
small-scale production activities. This resulted in the emergence of such establishments in the
private apartments and houses, which the local planning bylaws consider illegal.
Inspired by Jane Jacobs (1961) who described the benefits of mixed-use development, I would
like to suggest providing more affordable and flexible spaces for commercial and small-scale
industrial activities within the Free Housing projects that can be rented out to residents. These
spaces would vary in size and location to allow a larger mixture of activities. Retail spaces
could be located along the main transportation corridors to encourage more activity on the
streets and social interaction among the residents. This all-day activity, as noted by Jacobs
(1961), contributes to the perceived and actual improvement of safety (Figure 12.4).
Taking it one step further, one might ask: Why not allowing the IDPs in social housing project
to operate their business activities from their dwellings? Although amending planning bylaws
might not be an option in this case, changing the design of new housing projects to facilitate
living and working activities in the same building could be a good way to enhance livelihood
development among the residents of the Free Housing projects.
Those new models for social housing that prioritize livelihood and income-generating
activities could be developed based on experiences from organically developed informal
settlements, where living-working spaces are common. They could also build upon the
success of more flexible social housing developments, such as the Elemental projects in
Chile (Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6).
Figure 12.4. Street in Nueva Esperanza. Introducing new and regularizing existing commercial and
small-scale industrial activities in social housing projects might not only widen livelihoods opportunities
of the residents, but also increase all-day activity which leads to increased security and interaction.
132
Figure 12.5. Elemental affordable housing project Quinta Monroy in Iquique, Chile after construction.
Source: Elementalchile.cl
Figure 12.6. Quinta Monroy a few years after construction. Residents of the project were able to
gradually expand and customize their houses. Source: Elementalchile.cl
133

General public policy implications
Looking at the big picture of how the two reparation measures address the real problems and
demands of the IDPs, one might wonder whether implementing the Land Restitution and Free
Housing programs was the right decision of the Colombian government, especially given the
amount of time which passed since most displacements took place.
Following this, findings of my research raise another question: if the Free Housing program
proved to be so successful because the IDPs prefer to stay in the city, then why would the
government not help them improve their current housing situation so that they would not have
to move at all? Perhaps, as suggested by Gilbert (2013), the popularity of the idea of
building new housing for the victims and giving them for free was among the reasons why the
Colombian government decided to choose this strategy, as opposed to, for example, a gradual
improvement and regularization of the informal neighborhoods in which many of the IDPs
live (Figure 12.7).
Gilberts (2013) recommendation to reallocate funding from the Free Housing program to
house improvement grants and different kinds of subsidies for the displaced households seems
especially valid in this context. Formalization and further investments in public infrastructure
in informal and squatter settlements according to the principles described by Turner (1976)
and Hamdi (1995) might not only be a less expensive, but probably also a more desired
alternative since it would allow the displaced households to maintain their current livelihood
situations without the necessity of relocation.
Figure 12.7. Siete de Abril neighborhood in the southwestern part of Barranquilla. Housing conditions
in this informal settlement have gradually improved, yet public infrastructure is still deficient.
134

At the same time, the inability of the Land Restitution program to improve the livelihood
situation in rural areas, as discussed in this thesis, contributes to the debate regarding whether
or not this program is worth continuing. Wiig (2009), who analyzed the situation before Land
Restitution was launched, claimed that:
The armed conflict might actually have speeded up a natural process of migration and
property transfers that would have taken place anyway, and the current structure might
have a higher potential for economic prosperity and wellbeing than the counterfactual
situation without conflict.
Therefore, the good intentions of the Santos government to provide transitional justice seem
to be in conflict with the natural economic recovery processes. In this sense, Land
Restitution as a government intervention in land redistribution may be counterproductive to
the development of Colombias countryside. Yet even if we agree that accounting for the
conflict takes priority over economic aspects, continuation of the program is still problematic
if we consider the difficulties in making a clear distinction between those who deserve
reparation measures and those who do not. Elster (2004) warned that issues of false
victimhood, normativity, populism and ethics have been challenging the application of
transitional justice measures in many places around the world throughout the history.
If a proper identification of the victims and provision of adequate reparation measures in
Colombia proves to be impossible, then perhaps the state should consider focusing its
attention and financial resources on general development and reforms in both rural and urban
areas for the benefit of the whole society, without trying to divide it into victims of the
conflict and the rest. This claim is especially relevant for such municipalities as El Carmen de
Bolvar, where, if we recall the words of the municipal Secretary of the Interior, 100% of the
population have in some way been victims of the conflict. In that case, the transition to peace
in Colombia would be reflected in a common acknowledgement of the impunity for the past
and the acceptance that it is not worth the time and money to scratch the old wounds.
Instead, the Colombian state can show that it looks into the future, towards a new period of
prosperity for all of its citizens.
Further elaboration on the implications and recommendations presented in this chapter go
beyond the scope of my thesis and require further investigation.
135
13. Epilogue
Writing the conclusion of this thesis took place several months after the empirical data was
collected. This is a lot of time considering the dynamics of the situation. The aim of this last
chapter is to provide an update of the progress of the Land Restitution and Free Housing
programs, and summarize the major issues that emerged in the meantime.
13.1. Update on Land Restitution

Processing Land Restitution claims is still slow although there have been signs of
considerable improvement. By April 2015, there were over 70,000 restitution claims, of which
around 26,000 involve properties located within the micro-focalized zones. To date, about
3,000 households benefited from the restitution of close to 100,000 ha of land
(Minagricultura, 2015d). In the municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar, 25 individual and
group restitution sentences were given so far (Beleo, 2015).
The number of families that returned to their restituted land is unknown, although the URT is
doing its best to encourage the repopulation of rural areas by supporting the beneficiaries in
rebuilding their houses and re-establishing agricultural production (Minagricultura, 2015c).
The program remains one of the top priorities for the government and President Juan Manuel
Santos himself, according to whom, Land Restitution was worth it (Minagricultura, 2015d).
Meanwhile, the URT works on promoting and facilitating the application process outside of
Colombia. To date, there are 12 sentences and over 800 claims from displaced persons who
live abroad, primarily in the USA, Venezuela, Canada, Ecuador, Spain, and Panama
(Minagricultura, 2015b). The good intentions and achievements of the Land Restitution
program have also been recognized by the World Bank, whose consultants visited Colombia
in March 2015 to make an evaluation of the process (Minagricultura, 2015a).
136
Epilogue
At the same time, President Santos admitted that his government is aware of the shortcomings
of Land Restitution and they are doing their best to make the process better and faster. The
revised goal is to finish processing all of the 24,000 claims from nine affected departments,
including the entire Caribbean Region, by the end of 2015. The government also recognized
that additional security measures are needed to protect the claimants and community leaders
involved in the process and ensure that no further displacement of the returnees takes
(Minagricultura, 2015d).
Furthermore, attempts are being made to provide alternative compensation measures to third
party occupants (Beleo, 2015). These are usually farmers who occupy land under
investigation by URT, who might also be victims of the conflict, and prove they acted in good
faith and were neither dispossessors nor dispossessed in that particular case. This will be a
relief for many of the interviewed households in the rural area of El Carmen de Bolvar.
There are, however, other serious issues that are widely known but that have still not been
properly addressed. The general bias towards the claimants in the Land Restitution process led
to the creation of criminal business networks and cartels of false victims (Vanguardia,
2015). In many of these cases, private lawyers offer advice to former landowners, help them
get through the restitution process, and recover rights to properties they have never been
displaced from, but which were sold voluntarily by them. In exchange, the lawyers charge an
agreed percentage of the land value as their commission (Semana, 2015a). Failing to respond
to this problem may have serious consequences, not only for the credibility of the Land
Restitution program, but it may also affect the peace-making process and the reputation of
Santos government. As noted in an editorial by Vanguardia (2015):
The situation has reached such limits, that there are unjustified abuses committed
against persons who acquired farms in good faith; a phenomenon which if multiplied,
may easily turn back into a conflict over land in the future.
13.2. Update on Free Housing

By April 2015, close to 90,000 Free Housing units were given out to the beneficiaries. As
mentioned before, the success of the program led to its expansion with an additional 300,000
units being built over the next few years. In early 2015, President Santos referred to
MinVivienda as the biggest driver of economy and secured funding of around $4 million
USD for the currently ongoing projects of the Ministry (El Pas, 2015a). These include the
137

construction of another 100,000 Free Housing units that are planned for this year, the
expansion of other subsidized housing schemes, and the improvement of water supply
systems. The focus of the second phase of the Free Housing program will be on smaller
municipalities which have less formality and less employment (El Pas, 2015a).
However, the great achievements and future plans of the program are being overshadowed by
critical debates about the design, implementation, and management of the already completed
housing projects. Some of the shortcomings pointed out by architects and urbanists include
poor location, overcrowding, use of cheap and prefabricated materials, lack of common
spaces, parks and commercial uses, as well as inadequate provision of common infrastructure
such as schools, health centers, and police stations (Correra et al., 2014). According to
Fernando Viviescas Moslave, Professor of Urban Studies at the National University in
Bogot, the government is part of a great error, assuming that the only thing the poor need
is a place to sleep. What they need, he said, is the same as everyone else: quality spaces for
dignified coexistence, interaction, and recreation, as well as safety and access to culture
(Correra et al., 2014).
Figure 13.1. Las Gardenias Free Housing project in Barranquilla.
138
Epilogue
Experts in the field have also criticized the most central concept of the program, which is
giving housing units for free. Their argument is that people do not take ownership of
something they get for nothing, but as long as they need to pay for it, they would be obliged to
take a better care for it (Correra et al., 2014). Moreover, just as in Land Restitution, there have
been cases of fraud in the Free Housing application process. In the past few months,
opportunists in different departments were caught selling false application forms to people
who are not eligible for the housing subsidy (El Pas, 2015b).
Meanwhile, as more displaced families are moving in to the Villas de San Pablo project, more
cases of crime and insecurity are being reported. Among other issues, there have been fights
between local street gangs and acts of vandalism. Stealing bicycles and other goods led to
requests for the installation of entrance gates to restrict access to some of the residential
buildings. There have also been similar cases in the Las Gardenias project, where bad
habits, such playing loud music and consuming drugs in common areas sparked new
conflicts between the residents (El Heraldo, 2015).
In order to improve the security situation, police surveillance has increased in both housing
projects (El Heraldo, 2015). More government funding is also being provided for the
improvement of community infrastructure, schools and health facilities (Flrez G., 2014).
13.3. Closing remarks

Colombia is perhaps the only country where far-reaching reparation programs for the victims
are being implemented before an official end of the conflict. However, hopes for a lasting
peace may still need to be postponed for the future.
A ceasefire agreement between the FARC and the Colombian forces declared in December
2014 was broken on April 15, when the guerrillas attacked a military patrol in the rural area of
Cauca department. On the army side, eleven were killed, and seventeen were wounded; while
the toll for the guerrilla side was two deaths and a several injured (Semana, 2015b). This
event will definitely complicate the peace negotiations in Cuba and affect the mindset of
millions of Colombians. Without a common perception of peace and stability, implementation
of any reparation initiative will be very challenging.
Many of the stories and issues discussed in this thesis are only the tip of the iceberg. They
unfolded a great deal of topics that require further investigation. For me, it would be
especially interesting to see the final outcomes of the Land Restitution and Free Housing
139

programs and find out how they contributed to the reintegration of the displaced population in
the society and impacted their livelihoods in the long-term. Another idea for further research
is performing a quantitative analysis of how the economic situation of the displaced
households was changing after choosing a particular reparation program.
140
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148
Appendix 1
List of interviews and respondents
#
Position / Institution / Description
Name
Int.
Location
Date
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A. Professor at Univ. del Atlntico

Legal Adviser at Agricultural Corp.
IDP
IDP
IDP
IDP
IDP
IDP
IDP
Focus group meeting with the
informal farmers support group
M
MBL
M
MB
M
M
M
M
M
MBL
Barranquilla, Universidad del Norte

El Carmen de Bolvar, Town
Soledad, Don Bosco IV
Soledad, Nueva Esperanza
El Carmen de Bolvar, Countryside
June 27
July 1
July 1
July 3
July 3
July 3
July 3
July 3
July 3
July 9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
IDP, Farmer
IDP. Farmer
Farmer
IDP, Farmer
Land Owner, Farmer
Land Owner, Farmer
Land Owner
IDPs, Farmers, Land Owners
MBL
MBL
MBL
MBL
MBL
MBL
MB
MB

July 9
July 9
July 9
July 9
July 9
July 9
July 9
July 9
19
20
21
Victims Attention Unit, Municipality

Secretary of the Interior, Municipality
IDP, Farmers
MB
M
MBL

July 10
July 10
July 10
22
23
24
25
IDP
Public Notary, Municipality
Social Awareness Director, FMSD
Community Management, FMSD
Information Management, FMSD
Relative of an IDP
IDP
IDP
IDP
Director, Villas de San Pablo, FMSD
Public Registry, Municipality
Senior officer, Unit for the Attention
and Integral Reparation of Victims
Pablo Yepes Carvajal

Anonymous
Sra. Mara*
Sra. Sara*
Sra. Claudia*
Sra. Diana*
Sr. Jos*
Sr. Carlos*
Sra. Valentina*
Sr. Cesar*
Sr. David*
Sr. Fernando*
Sr. Manuel*
Sr. Oscar*
Sr. Pedro*
Sr. Sebastin*
Sr. Santiago*
Sr. Antonio*
Sr. Enrique*
Sr. Andrs*
Sr. Nicols*
Sr. Felipe*
Sra. Daniela*
Sr. Alejandro*
Anonymous
Anonymous
Sr. Juan*
Sra. ngela*
Sra. Isabella*
Anonymous
Ronald Silva
Karina Garca Uribe
Anahel Hernndez
Sra. Rosa*
Sra. Gloria*
Sra. Martha*
Sra. Valeria*
Mariam Ajami Peralta
Anonymous
Anonymous
M
B
M
M

Barranquilla, FMSD office
Barranquilla, Villas de San Pablo
July 10
July 10
July 16
July 23
MA
MA
MA
MA
M
B
M

Barranquilla, Unit for the Attention
and Integral Reparation of Victims
July 23
July 23
July 24
July 24
July 24
July 24
Aug. 5
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Int. Interviewer(s) M = Marcin Sliwa B = Beln Pardo

Informant Interviews
Household Interviews
L = Laura Ochoa Guzmn
A = Anahel Hernndez
* Name has been changed to protect privacy of the respondent.
149
Appendix 2
A list of the most common questions used in household interviews
General questions
What is your name?
What is your age?
Where are you originally from?
Life before displacement

How was your life?
What did your household consist of?
Where is your land located?
Did you live there?
What type of work were you engaged in?
Was your income high enough to sustain your living?
How many hectares of land did you own?
How did you use the land?
What was the legal ownership status of the property?
Displacement
What was occurring in the municipality / neighborhood?
When did it happen?
What made you leave the property? Who was responsible?
Did you have any other options?
Did you sell or abandon your property?
Did you own any other properties?
Where did you displace first? Why there?
Did you know anyone there?
Did you declare displacement?
Did you receive any help from the state or other entities?
150
Current situation
How did you end up here?
What does your household consist of?
What work activities are you engaged in?
Is your income high enough to sustain your living?
Do you think your current situation is better than before the displacement?
Do you want to return? Why?
How do you see the future of your children?
Do you think they will be better off in the city or in the countryside?
Land Restitution
Are you familiar with the process of Land Restitution?
Did you apply for the restitution of your lost property?
What is the status of your case?
Do you still have the property documents?
What would you like to do with the property if you get it back?
Free Housing
Are you familiar with the Free Housing program?
Are you on a waiting list for a Free House?
How are living conditions in the new house?
Is it better than your previous place to stay?
What are you the most happy / unhappy about?
Is there anything missing?
Preferred alternatives
If you could choose, what alternative would you prefer best?
Restitution of your rural land
Similar property in another place
Free Housing in the city
Monetary compensation
151
Appendix 3
Explanation of calculations for Table 6 (Chapter 6)
The used currency exchange rate used for conversions from Colombian Peso to US Dollar
was for 31 of July 2014:
$1 USD = $1880 COP
The short-term progress (%) of Land Restitution was calculated by dividing the number of
beneficiaries (August 2014) by the number of expected resolved cases (2014):
2,129 / 160,000 * 100% = 1.3%
The short-term progress (%) of Free Housing was calculated by dividing the number of
beneficiaries (August 2014) by the number of expected beneficiaries (2014):
56,159 / 100,000 * 100% = 56.2%
The long-term progress (%) of Land Restitution was calculated by dividing the number of
beneficiaries (August 2014) by the number of final expected resolved cases:
2,129 / 360,000 * 100% = 0.6%
The long-term progress (%) of Free Housing was calculated by dividing the number of
beneficiaries (August 2014) by the number of final expected beneficiaries:
56,159 / 400,000 * 100% = 14%
Federal funding (per household) for Land Restitution was calculated by dividing the total
federal funding for the program by the number of final expected resolved cases:
$29,000,000 USD / 360,000 = $80 USD
Federal funding (per household) for Free Housing was calculated by dividing the total federal
funding for the program by the number of final expected beneficiaries:
$9,400,000 USD / 400,000 = $24 USD
152

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Marcin Sliwa

The boys have lost their love for land:

Masters Thesis in Urban Ecological Planning

Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Palabras clave: Sustento, Vivienda, Restitucin de Tierras, Reparacin, Poltica social,

The Colombian conflict and forced displacement ..........................................7

Significance of the Study ...............................................................................2

Preliminary work ..........................................................................................19

Literature Review and Theory .........................................................................30

Knowledge gaps ..........................................................................................30

Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................42

Comparison of the two programs: scope and scale .....................................45

Case Presentation El Carmen de Bolvar ....................................................52

Case Analysis El Carmen de Bolvar ...........................................................63

The municipality of El Carmen de Bolvar....................................................52

Case Presentation Barranquilla and Soledad .............................................85

The metropolitan area of Barranquilla and Soledad ....................................85

10. Case Analysis Barranquilla and Soledad ....................................................98

Don Bosco IV ..............................................................................................98

11. Findings ..........................................................................................................119

IDPs prefer to stay in urban areas .............................................................119

12. Conclusions and Implications .......................................................................126

Figure 9.5. Housing block in a traditional suburban settlement in Soledad ........................... 89

All photographs were taken by the author, unless otherwise stated.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

The boys have lost their love for land

1.1. Significance of the Study

1.2. Research Question

Livelihood is defined as means of supporting one's existence, esp. financially or

The boys have lost their love for land

The boys have lost their love for land

2.1. The Colombian conflict and forced displacement

The boys have lost their love for land

Figure 2.1. Forced displacement in Colombia. Source: Primiciadiario.com

Figure 2.2. Density of events of displacement by department.

The boys have lost their love for land

Figure 2.4. Displacements and declarations of persons (1985-2012).

The boys have lost their love for land

The Victims Law and Land Restitution

Development (MinAgricultura) coordinates

Source: Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho (2011)

The boys have lost their love for land

2.5. Motivations and challenges of carrying out a comparative study

The boys have lost their love for land

3.1. Preliminary work

The boys have lost their love for land

Local informants and stakeholders

The boys have lost their love for land

manages the Villas de San Pablo Free

particularly helpful, as they did not only

Unit for the Attention and Integral

The boys have lost their love for land

The boys have lost their love for land

Observations and photographs

3.3. Data analysis

The boys have lost their love for land

El Carmen de Bolvar - Chapter 7

Barranquilla / Soledad - Chapter 9

3.4. Research limitations

4. Literature Review and Theory

4.1. Knowledge gaps

Literature Review and Theory

4.2. Migration, urbanization, and return