To Build The ASEAN a New

By : Igor Dirgantara*

Regional security organizations have acquired a substantive role in peace and security affairs and over the
course of the past decade a number of promising regional approaches to security policy have developed. The
idea of security community[1] was kept alive mostly in the work of a handful of scholars working on regional
security organizations during the 2000s. ASEAN, along with European Union (EU), was one of them. Regional
organizations have taken on a wide spectrum of tasks, ranging from confidence building measures and crisis
mediation to sustained peace building operations. However, looking at the political practice, a number of
serious problems cannot be overlooked. A great deal of uncertainty marks the security outlook for southeast
Asia. Notwithstanding the positive aspects, especially in the developing world regional organizations such as
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are still facing critical challenges to celebrate
41th anniversary since Bangkok Declaration.
Managing Intra Regional Relations : An ASEAN Drama
By the late 1990s, ASEANs image had suffered a major setback. ASEAN had lost its appeal. To be sure,
ASEAN was never short of critics. They pointed to the persistence of intra ASEAN disputes ASEANs failure to
develop concrete institutional mechanisms and procedures for conflict resolution. The also cited ASEANs
tendency to deal with intra-mural conflicts by sweeping them under the carpet, rather than resolving them,
and its slow pace and modest record in developing economic cooperation, could be cited as further
testimony to the limitations of the ASEAN Way.[2] The internal role of the ASEAN has been fashioned in the
so-called ASEAN Way. This is a distinct pattern of habit consultation and consensus building which has
developed within ASEAN.[3] This turned out to be a key symbol of ASEAN, helping the grouping to overcome
intra-mural tensions especially during the crucial early years of ASEAN, when the grouping was most
vulnerable to such problems. Moreover, ASEAN had been criticized for not dealing effectively with human
right issues. The admission of Myanmar into ASEAN in July 1997 without conditions on democratic
development and national reconciliation was a watershed moment both for ASEANs internal relations and for
its external posture in the international community. Intra ASEAN differences over long standing norms such
as the principle of non interference, evident in the wake of the expansion its membership of ASEANs
weaknesses. Most aptly demonstrated by ASEANs ambivalent ASEANs decision to censure Myanmar for the
violence against Aung San Suu Kyis supporters at Depaying in May 2003. The ASEAN- led ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) was seen as little more than atalk shop, much like ASEAN itself. Structurally, the ARF is an
outgrowth of the as Post Ministerial Conference with dialogue partners.[4] The ARF is guided by ASEAN
approach to security management. The ARF contributes to the smooth functioning of the regional balance of
power. As might be expected, the ARFs early evolution has been characterized by two broad features which
derive from the ASEAN Way : Incrementalism and Soft Institutionalism.[5] Incrementalism, implying a stepby-step approach to security collaboration, is envisaged in three proposed stages of security cooperation :
confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The preference
for softinstitutionalism implies that the ARF would develop as a dialogue forum, rather than being given a
role in conflict resolution. In the meantime, however, ASEAN will continue to make a genuine effort to
develop the ARF as a valuable multilateral security institution. Obviously absent however from the ARF are
provisions for addressing the use of force conflict and conflict resolution.[6]
Certainly, Managing intra ASEAN relations has always been a challenge to the regional grouping from the
very beginning. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei tended towards a centralized, top-down and state
centered approach to their development agenda. The interest of the state is overriding and the rights of the
individuals have been secondary. The Philippines and Thailand, on the other hand, embarked upon an
experiment with a more open democratic system. Individuals are given a larger space to pursue and act
upon their own initiatives in pursuit of their own interests. The state power is held in check in order to give
more freedoms to the people. These two approaches reflected themselves also in the way ASEAN members
view their relations among themselves and with the outside world. The tension between these two
approaches came to a head when ASEAN decided to expand by admitting Vietnam (1993), Laos (1997) and
Cambodia in 1999. The expansion made ASEAN both attractive and divisive at the same time. It
was attractive because of its potentially enlarged and combined market of 500 million consumers and it
was divisive because of the further increased diversity among its members, adding pressure to the already
existing cleavage within the group prior to the expansion.[7] As we known, the less developed ASEAN
members, particularly Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) continue to struggle with challenges

of modernization, nation and capacity building.[8] Therefore, one of the important issue is how can a group
of diverse political structures, different economic systems, varied socio-cultural value move in a direction of
common security framework? Clearly, a certain degree of shared sovereignty must be achieved first.
The world of 2008 is far different from the world of 1998. ASEAN member states realize that as well as
others. The Financial Crisis of 1997 had made them all aware that there can never be a truly independent
position on any issue any longer. No state could live in isolation from the rest of the world. The forest fires in
Indonesia affect its neighbors across the Straits, much as the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and
bird flu caused considerable damage to the regions economies. Violence of genocide and human rights
violation in one state could trigger a stream of refugees into another state. It is a borderless world. There can
be no Absolute domestic affairs any more. Some domestic issues could have spill over effects on
neighboring countries, it would be unrealistic and impractical to detach from each others affairs.
[9] Terrorism, Separatism, Environmental degradation, natural disasters, drug & human trafficking, ethnic
violence, money laundering, piracy, arms smuggling, illegal lodging & Fishing, and the other transnational
crimes, all these have negative implication across national borders.
The ASEAN Security Community
In October 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (or Bali Concord II) enunciated the plan to establish
an ASEAN Security Community (ASC),[10] which, together with an economic community as well as a
socio-cultural community, would provide the foundational pillars for an ASEAN Community. As envisaged
by the Associations leaders, the security community would, in the words of the concord, Bring ASEANs
political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with
one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.[11] One of the
most important steps in the field of the ASEAN Security Community is the endorsement of the Vientiane
Action Programme (VAP) 2015 by the ASEAN Leader at their 10 th Summit in Laos in July 2004. The VAP unifies
and links the strategies and goals of the three pillars of roadmap for the implementation of the ASEAN
Security Community particularly in the areas of political development, shaping and sharing norms, conflict
prevention and conflict resolution. Progress, however, is still lacking and no activities are yet being
undertaken in the field of post-conflict peace building, including an evidently controversial proposal to create
an ASEAN peacekeeping force which has led some to criticize the Associations members, with the exception
of Malaysia, for their collective failure to dispatch peacekeepers to assuage the unrest in Timor
Leste (2006). That ASEAN countries ought to also participate in helping to restore East Timor is
incontrovertible. [12]
The Vientiane Action Program (VAP) very clearly states that the concept of the ASC affirms ASEANs
adherence to comprehensive security as being central to its conceptualization and begins to get into the
realm of human security. Comprehensive security is a concept of security, which has always moved away
from the traditionally military outlook of the mainstream understanding of security.[13] The debate focused
on the shifting emphasis of the security discourse from military and political issues to concerns that reflected
the economic and social well-being of people and communities, from a primacy given to states to a focus on
people, and from national security to human security. Consequently,the nature of threats has been changing.
[14] The point is Human Security needs a clear commitment to a democratic environment and to the
promotion of human rights and obligations. The introduction of human rights a strategy towards political
development rather than as a goal in itself might weaken the commitment to human rights as a regional
norm, but it is a step in the right direction and unambiguously brings in human rights as something that
ASEAN is committed to. Its require a commitment to change within ASEAN itself, which, hopefully, will lead
to the betterment of the human condition in Southeast Asia. [15]
The ASEAN Charter
The ASC proposal was followed a year later with the announcement that in ASEAN Charter would be
established in due course, so as to confer a legal personality for the Association and provide the legal
framework for incorporating decisions, treaties and conventions engendered at the institutional level into the
national legislation of ASEAN member countries. Skeptics have expressed their doubt that the ASC
constitutes nothing but another ambitious plan of ASEAN that might not be fully implemented by member
states. ASEAN with other cases, the ASC agreement is not binding so that it does not provide any incentive
for member states to comply. Such pessimism is not without ground. Some past experiences do provide
reasons for skepticism. Two views are to be found within the current discourse and debate on the charter.[16]
The first view maintains that the ASEAN-charter should only server ASEAN a codification of the existing
principles, norms, values, and objectives of ASEAN. This view argues that ASEAN has functioned well with the
existing arrangement so that there is no need for a new, grandiose change that would undermine what has

been achieved so far. This view also warns that ASEAN, due to its own unique historical and condition, should
not try to emulate the experience of other regional organizations, such as the European Union. In short, for
the proponents of this view, the charter should serve ASEAN an instrument to preserve status quo, only in a
more legal sense. If this view is to be adopted, then the charter will certainly pose a serious problem for
ASEAN in its efforts to cope with the current and future challenges.[17] The second view argues that
the ASEAN-Chartershould not be merely a codification of the existing norms, values, principles, and
objectives of ASEAN. The charter in fact provides a golden opportunity for ASEAN to reinvigorate itself and
once again demonstrate its maturity and efficacy ASEAN a forward looking organization. The Kuala Lumpur
Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter itself affirms that the global and regional
economic and political environment has changed and is constantly changing thereby requiring ASEAN and
its community building efforts to evolve and adapt to these changes and challenges and that the Charter is
expected to serve as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN to support the realization of its goals and
objectives. Therefore, for ASEAN to move forward and engage in a meaningful cooperation in the future, this
opportunity should not be missed. In that context, the charter should be open to new ideas and forwardlooking; amenable to adjustments as the situation dictates; based on the ASEAN Community which already
provides a road-map for ASEAN; and be people-oriented.[18]
A Further Discussion for ASEAN : So far, So Good, So What ?
The discussion on the ASEAN-Charter has so far been very encouraging indeed. Members of the ASEAN
Eminent Persons Group (EPG), tasked to provide inputs to the drafting of the charter, appear to have been
more sympathetic to the second view. Even though the Kuala Lumpur declaration is meant to provide the
framework for the charter, it does not mean that the charter would only serve the purpose of providing the
legal basis for ASEAN. As the leaders themselves have reaffirmed, the charter is also meant to provide an
institutional framework of ASEAN. The principles and objectives of ASEAN need no radical change, but the
way they are implemented should take into consideration the actual internal and external context of the day.
At the same time, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration itself has included a number of new objectives of ASEAN
such ASEAN the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the strengthening of democratic
institutions.
On the much-debated principle of non-interference, ASEAN should continue to adhere to the principle. These
principles, however, should not become an excuse that hinders greater cooperation among member states in
addressing matters with security implications between ASEAN states. We saw how ASEAN ambivalent
censure of Myanmar has been seen by some as a brand of enhanced interaction, which constituted at best a
highly limited challenge to the non-interference principle, one that in no way, breaks with the Associations
longstanding diplomatic and security conventions. That said, it should be noted at no time along the windy
road to enhanced interaction in Manila 1998, as ASEAN members quietly debated non interference, did they
ever sought to dispel the principle altogether. Thailands call to replace ASEANs constructive
engagement policy (rooted in non-interference) to a more intrusive approach called flexible
engagement[19]met with resistance from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Most of
them claiming that the sacrosanct principle of non-interference embodied within the ASEAN declaration had
served the grouping well.[20] Only Philippines which support the Thailands concept above. However, these
principles should be employed in a flexible way so that it will enable ASEAN to exercise a cooperative
involvement in trans-boundaries issues (internal issues with clear regional implications) and issues with
identifiable humanitarian dimension (such ASEAN gross violations of human rights and in the event of
humanitarian crisis and the threat of terrorism) through an enhanced interaction and an agreed mechanism
by all parties concerned. So much is at stake that ASEAN cannot afford to remain uninvolved. [21] In other
words, ASEAN should exercise the principle of non interference in the context of interdependence among
states.
On the decision-making process, some changes are needed. While continuing to subscribe to consensus,
ASEAN should also begin to introduce the voting system.[22] On matters related to the ASEAN security
community, decisions should be made on the basis of consensus, expect in deciding crucial matters, when
consensus of all member states expect the Member State under consideration is required. Issues that can be
regarded ASEAN crucial matters, are, among other, when a government comes to power trough
unconstitutional means such as a military coup; when a democratically elected parties is unlawfully
prevented from constituting a government; when a government is engaged in a gross and sustained violation
of human rights; and when Member States fail to make financial contribution and pay their dues to ASEAN.
In order to be effective, the ASEAN-Charter should also address the issue of compliance and sanctions. AS
ASEAN began to strengthen the legal basis of the Association, there is a need to ensure greater compliance
by member states. In order to reinforce this necessity, ASEAN needs to establish a sanction regime.
Sanctions to be imposed on a Member State may include exclusion from participation in ministerial level
meetings; suspension from participation in all ASEAN meeting; limitation of government-to-government

contacts and other similar measures; and any other measures agreed upon by the ASEAN Summit. One issue
that is still being debated is whether or not ASEAN should recognize the members right to withdraw from the
Association.[23]
Afterwards, some institutional adjustments are needed. Three issues are crucial for consideration in this
matter. The first is the need to streamline the existing structures with a view to prevent the proliferation of
uncoordinated meetings within ASEAN, and the need to confer a greater role and authority to the ASEAN
Secretary-General. The secondis the mechanism, which will allow greater inputs, and participation by the
society in the ASEAN processes. The third the need for a more institutionalized and legal mechanism for
dispute-settlement in political and security areas, especially in settling inter-state disputes among ASEAN
member states. The high council of the treaty of amity and cooperation in South East Asia (TAC) provides a
regional alternative for a peaceful dispute settlement mechanism, despite the fact that the High Council has
until now never been utilized.[24]

Does ASEAN has a future ?

It is true that even with a charter, there is still no guarantee that ASEAN will move forward quickly in a pace
that many are expecting. Nevertheless, one should not easily undermine the ability of ASEAN to adjust itself
and respond to the new environment and challenges. Past experiences have also demonstrated that ASEAN
is capable to find ways not only to improve itself but also to undertake bold measures to respond to
challenges facing the Association. As ASEAN is now once again in the period of transition, it would be too
early to judge that ASEAN has no future.[25] ASC is a logical evolution of ASEAN itself. It will require a lot of
imagination and patience on the part of its leaders and its people. After a long journey of four decade, it is
not too ambitious to aspire for a more cohesive community for Southeast Asia Societies. The member of
ASEAN Countries will face many obstacles on the road to ASC. Therefore, the process will have to be gradual
and incremental. The people of ASEAN must also feel the ownership of the process of community building. It
cannot remain a top-down exercise with only the elites participating. The common people will have to be
involved emotionally as well as experiencing the practical benefits of such a security community. Some early
harvest items must be identified so that popular support can be generated ; items on promotion of public
health, prevention of international crimes cooperation on cleaner and safer environment containment and
resolution of conflicts.[26]
To win a region wide popular support there is a need for some early harvest items for their benefit soon.
Travel facilitation, educational exchanges, ease of border crossing, etc. Should be promoted so that the
general people can enjoy practical utility of ASEAN.[27] In this sense, ASEAN should transforming it self into
a people oriented entity. The active involvement of Parliamentarians through the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Organization and the involvement of civil society organizations, such as the ASEAN Peoples Assembly, and
the ASEAN civil society conference, also provide significant contribution towards the establishment of the
ASEAN Security Community. In the case of the ASC this goes hand in hand with the very explicit commitment
to a more democratic environment and to the promotion of human rights and obligations. In fact, the
majority of ASEAN governments are not democratic at all, most have no good human rights records, and the
non interference principle suits their agenda well.
For a security community to be established there must be a strong economic base as a result of regional
economies. In fact, deeper political-security cooperation would provide a stronger basis for greater and
deeper economic integration. Vice versa, deeper and greater economic integration should make it easier for
ASEAN countries to widen and strengthen political-security cooperation.[28] In other words, as ASEAN
matures, it should pay equal attention to both economic and political security cooperation. According to
liberalism theories, economic interdependence may significantly facilitate the development of security
communities. It require a high degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition of
peaceful relationships.[29] In this case, how to monitor compliance with the rules of economic arrangements
like AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), ASEAN + 3 and how to create a single market as a purpose of ASEAN
economic community has to carry on. In consequence, it facilitates further degree of market integration so
that ASEAN would be increasingly attractive as an area of trade and investment in the global economy. This
is the meaning of the open regionalism approach adopted by ASEAN. [30] Taken together, it is likely ASEANs
political and security cooperation would no longer be on a primarily bilateral basis, but would be conducted
on an increasingly multilateral level. This is not to imply bilateral ties no longer matter ; they clearly do and
would remain so.[31] Perhaps, theres also views that multilateral approach on security cooperation was very
sensitive politically and irrelevant ; because the political interest tend to influence states within a region.
[32] Managing the uncertainties in the future direction of major power relations will serve as a major
challenge for ASEAN in the years to come. Therefore, external pressure must be minimized and external
stability must be achieved in order to allow the ASC to grow.

Actually, The greatest promise of the ASC, however, lies in the commitment to strengthen the capacity of
conflict prevention. In this context, ASEAN member states have expressed the commitment to deepen
cooperation in six main areas;[33] (1) strengthening confidence-building measures, (2) strengthening
preventive measures, (3) strengthening the ARF process in support of the ASC, (4) enhancing cooperation on
non-traditional security issues, (5) strengthening efforts in maintaining respect for territorial integrity,
sovereignty and unity of member countries, and (6) strengthening cooperation to address threats and
challenges posed by separatism. If cooperation in these areas can be strengthened, then the future ASEAN in
bright indeed.
ASEANs potential to become a regional security community was widely acknowledged by scholars and
policy-makers from both within and outside the region. According to Karl W. Deutsch, a security community,
is a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of
community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread
to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainly over a long period of time.
Such communities could either be amalgamated through the formal political merger of the participating
units, or remain pluralistic, in which case the members retain their independence and sovereignty.
[34] ASEAN may be a security community in the sense that no member would consider the use of force
against another to settle disputes.[35] Its true that the absence of war among the ASEAN members since
1967 was certainly important. And the institution of norms of acceptable conduct and behavior among its
members as one of ASEANs great achievements. But, after four decades of progress in promoting peaceful
intra-regional relations, ASEAN-one of the most successful regional organizations in the developing worldnow is in serious need to reinvent itself. How to emerge a sense of we feelings is one of a kind. In the future,
it is expected that the principle stipulated in the ZOPFAN (Zone Of Peace, Freedom and neutrality) and
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), including its mechanisms, would also be effectively
utilized for conflict settlement. Norm building, however, must be followed up with proper ASEAN institutions
that will allow and facilitate the enforcement of these norms. The ASEAN attempts at community building
such as, One Southeast Asia, would be deemed unimportant in the absence of its development of concrete
institutionalized mechanisms for cooperation. Of course, the challenge implementation of the ASC lies in a
commitment of all ASEAN members. For ASEAN, perhaps, life just begin at forty one, and he has been
moving from noodle soup and golf diplomacy toward a legal international body. Now its time for us, the
people of ASEAN to build the ASEAN a new.

*
Lecturer of Southeast Asia Studies, International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences University of Jayabaya
[1]
The concept of security community originally was developed by Karl W. Deutch, it describes groups of
states which have developed a long term habit of peaceful international and ruled out the use of force in
settling disputes with other member of the groups. Transactionalism approach was used by Deutchs to
examined how increased communications and transactions among societies can redefine their perceptions
and relationships and lead to the establishment of security communities in which the use of force becomes
illegitimate as a means of problem solving, see Karl W. Deutchs, security community, in James Rosenau
(ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, Free Press, 1961, p. 98-99.
[2] Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community In South East Asia : ASEAN and the Problems of
Regional Order, London and New York, Routledge, 2001, p.5-6
[3] Zhang Tiejun, ASEAN Approach to Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation-in comparison with EU, handout,
2007, p. 6.
[4] The ASEAN dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, China, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, South
Korea, United States, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Mongolia and the EU.
[5] Amitav Acharya, p. 201
[6] Zhang Tiejun, p. 7-8
[7] Surin Pitsuwan, From Constructive Engagement to flexible engagement, in Erwin Schweisshelm (Ed.), The
ASEAN Security Community : Where will it go? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lemhannas, Gadjah Mada University,
2007, p.10.
[8] Further Discussion on ASEAN Enlargement problems, see Sukhumbhand Paribrata,From ASEAN Six to Ten
ASEAN the : Issues And Prospect, Contemporary Southeast Asia, (December 1994)

[9] Surin Pitsuwan, p. 12.

[10] A security community exists when a group of countries have forged a sense of collective identity,
meaning they will settle differences without resorting to force. The mantra here is renunciation of the use or
threat of force. In this regard, it is important for ASEAN to develop a higher degree of confidence and trust,
by which members no longer perceive threats as coming from within the community, see Makarim
Wibisono,Masyarakat Keamanan ASEAN, in Mohtar Masoed & Makmur Keliat (ed.), Tantangan Diplomasi
Multilateral, Jakarta, LP3ES., 2006, p. 202.
[11] Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), October, 7, 2003.
[12] See Seng Tan, Whiter ASEAN Political and security cooperation?, in Erwin Schweisshelm (Ed.), p.19-20.
[13] For an elaboration the term of comprehensive security, see Mutiah Alagappa,Comprehensive security :
Interpretations in ASEAN countries, in Robert A. Scalapino,et.al.,ed. ASEAN Security Issues ; Regional and
Global, Barkeley, Institute East Asian Studies, 1988.
[14] For a good analysis of National Insecurity and the Nature of Threats, see Barry Buzan,People, State, and
Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Sussex: Wheat sheat Books, 1983), chapter 3,
p. 73-83.
[15] Herman Joseph S. Kraft, The ASEAN Security Community and the Changing Concept Of Security, in Erwin
Schweisshelm (Ed.), p. 30-31.
[16] Rizal Sukma, The Future of the ASEAN security cooperation : is the ASEAN security cooperation
sufficient in Erwin Schweisshelm (Ed.), p. 52-53, for similar observation, Makarim Wibisono, Op. Cit, p. 201.
[17] Rizal Sukma, Ibid
[18] Ibid
[19] See Seng Tan, p. 24.
[20] Surin Pitsuwan, p. 11.
[21] Anwar Ibrahim, Crisis Prevention, Newsweek, July 21, 1997, p. 13. Furthermore Anwar Ibrahim said
that we should have nursed the baby, at least through its teething period. Thats why we need to consider
the idea of constructive intervention. Dr. Noordin Sopie also agree with this idea : As sure as the sun will
rise tomorrow, if ASEAN accepts a stance of interference will not celebrate our 40 th anniversary. Quoted in
C.P.F. Luhulima, Perluasan ASEAN : Dari ASEAN-7 ke ASEAN-10, in Bantarto Bandoro & Ananta Gondomono
(ed.), Satu Asia Tenggara, Jakarta, CSIS, 2002.
[22] Rizal Sukma, Op.cit, p. 53.
[23] Ibid
[24] Ngurah Swajaya, Implementing the ASEAN security community, in Erwin Schweisshelm (Ed.), p.17.
[25] Rizal Sukma, Op. cit, p. 53
[26] Surin Pitsuwan, p. 12
[27] Ibid
[28] It assume the notion of a spillover, or a belief that exchanges and cooperation among independent
national actors in areas of low politics such as economics and trade could incrementally create common
stakes among them in areas of high politics.
[29] See for example Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence Revisited,
International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), p.727

[30] Johannes D. Schmidt, Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia, Cornell UP, 2005, p. 3 for further
discussion see C. Fred Bergsten, Open Regionalism, Institute for International Economic Working Paper, or
see alsohttp://members.tripod.com/asialaw/articles/lawanasean23.html
[31] See Seng Tan, p. 25
[32] Gen Tan Sri Hashim Mohd. Ali, Prospect for Defense and security cooperation in ASEAN, strategy I, No. I
February, 1992, p.8. Discussion about the Major Power and Southeast Asia, see Narayan Ganesan, ASEANs
Relations with Major External Powers, Contemporary Southeast Asia : Journal of International & Strategic
Affairs, Vol. 22, Issue 2, August 2000.
[33] Rizal Sukma, p. 51
[34] Karl W. Deutchs, Op. Cit., p. 16.
[35] Sheldon Simon, The Regionalization of Defense in Southeast Asia, Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1999), p.
122. While Michael Leifer, agreed that ASEAN was a security community, he was more concerned with
finding out what kind of security community ASEAN had become. He distinguished a security community,
one which is able to prevent intra-mural conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation, from a political
community (a grouping of states which are committed ultimately to overcoming the sovereigns division
between them, in the manner of the EU) on the one hand and a defence community (a fully integrated
military alliance in the manner of NATO) on the other hand. See Michael Leifer, ASEAN as a model of a
security community ?, in Hadi Soesastro (ed.), ASEAN in a changed regional and International Economy,
Jakarta, CSIS, 1995, p. 129-132.