Aristotelian Piety

Author(s): Sarah Broadie

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2003), pp. 54-70
Published by: BRILL
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Aristotelian Piety
SARAH BROADIE

ABSTRACT

Aristotle seems to omit discussing the virtue piety. Such an omission should surprise us. Piety is not covertly dealt with under the more general heading of justice, nor under that of philia. But piety does make a veiled appearanceat NE
X.8, 1179a22-32. Many interpretershave refused to take this passage seriously,
but this is shown to be a mistake.]

A. The problem

We should expect to find piety (eusebeia, hosiotes)' discussed in Aristotle's Ethics. Here are some reasonswhy.
In the firstplace, it is plausiblethatAristotleat least intendsto elucidate
the commonlyrecognized,commonlyesteemed,excellences, even though
his investigationof humanvirtuecertainlyaims to do morethanthat.And
pietywas a commonlyrecognized,commonlyesteemedexcellence.2Furtherin particularare widemore,his examinationsof the character-excellences
rangingand numerous.It is not clear thathe meansto be completelycomprehensive about them,3nor that he imagines such completeness even
possible. Of course,if this is what he aims for, it is all the more puzzling
that he should ignore piety. But in any case one would expect piety to
receive some attention in a treatmentthat proceeds by distinguishing
significantareasof humanlife and then identifyingthe practicaland emotional dispositionsthat are median,excessive and deficientfor each.
That this method,in his hands,distinguishesnumeroussuch sectors is
due, I think,not so muchto the desireto be comprehensiveas to the aimof
Accepted April 2002
' eusebes applies to persons and acts performed,while hosios also applies to actions
considered as what is performed.The former is more positive; the latter need mean
no more than 'not religiously forbidden'. (But according to the rhetoricianMenander
[3rd century CE], eusebeia is for the gods, hosioies for the dead.)
2 Cf. Euthyphro;Protagoras 329c-333b.
At NE III, 1115a.5, introducingthe discussions of the specific moral virtues, he
says: 'it will be clear too, at the same time, how many (posai) they are'. The words
can be taken either as a promise (which is not fufilled) to show for some numbern
that there are just n moral virtues, or as indirect speech for the exclamation 'what a
lot there are!'
(C KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2003
Also available online - www.brill.nl

Phronesis XLVIIIII

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ARISTOTELIANPIETY

55

providingpracticalguidancefor cultivatorsof character.On a high level

of generalityit is relativelyeasy to be comprehensive,saying something
that covers all cases, but easy, too, to ignore differencesthat that are significant for good practice.To take a single example: given that certain
ethical challengesor opportunitiesfacing the wealthy differ in kind from
any facing those more modestly placed, it is unhelpfulto speak simply
and abstractlyof 'excellence in managingand using economic resources'.
Aristotlehas so manytopics in the Ethicspartlybecausethereare so many
differentaspects of humanlife each requiringthe cultivationof the character trait suitablefor dealing appropriatelywith it. Since these traitsare
all parts of the one 'target' which needs to be made as clear as possible, not for theorizingabout but for aiming to realize in practice,4the
traitsthemselvesmust be likewise clarifiedtoo; and the Aristoteliandoes
this by focusing on the distinct field where each trait operates.(This is
analogousto clarifyingthe sense faculty by referenceto its objects.)5
So how could Aristotlehave ignoredthatvery distinctand publiclyrecognized field, the field of behaviortowardsthe gods, which is the province
of piety and its various possible opposites? I say 'various possible',
because piety can presumablybe exhibitedas midway between different
pairs of extremes;e.g., between contemptfor religion and superstitious
excess (cf. Theophrastus'sdeisidaimon):6or between casual or sluggish
observance and excessive zeal such as that of Euthyphro.The ease of
formingone or anotherplausibletriadfor piety is itself a reasonfor wondering why Aristotledoes not go this way. A furtherreason lies in the
fact that piety was alreadya focus of philosophicalattention:witness the
Euthyphro. But even without the evidence of that dialogue one can be
certainthat 'Whatis piety?' was a questionof particularinterestfor Plato
and other Socratics,given what had happenedto Socrates.
4 NE I, 1094a22-24; II, 1103b26-30. The aim is primarily that of the politikos.
Given that this leader/educator'sfunction is to promote virtue in the citizens (NE I.9,
1099b28-32; X.9 passim), it is perhaps not surprisingif the target includes, even in a
sense combines, virtues which should co-exist among citizens although they might be
incompatible in one individual, as may be the case with e.g. megaloprepeia and
eleutheriotes. (This prescinds from the togetherness-of-virtuesdoctrine endorsed by
Aristotle at NE VI.13, 1144b32-1145a2.)
On the Soul, II, 415al4-21.
6 Characters XVI. Theophrastuswas said by Porphyryto have defined eusebeia as
'the disposition to serve gods and daemons, being midway between atheism and superstition' (Stobaeus, 2.7.25).
7 See also the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, and the Platonic Definitions, 412e413a on eusebeia, 415a on hosion.

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SARAH BROADIE

It is surprising,then, that neitherthe NE nor the EE (nor, for that matter, the MM)has a section beginningand ending in Aristotle'sway: 'Next
we must examine piety ... So much, then, for piety'.8
One mighttry to explainthe silence by supposingthatAristotle(1) discusses the excellences solely as componentsof eudaimonia,and (2) does
not regardpiety as necessaryfor eudaimonia.9But in the Politics he takes
it for grantedthat the polis, the necessarymatrixfor developinggood and
happyindividuals,will attendto the cults of the gods, and thatthis is one
of the most importantpublicduties.'"Thereis no indicationthathe regards
public religious activity as simply an instrumentfor social control,or as
somethingthat ought to wither away in states that approximatehis ideal.
It may be suggested,of course,thathe sees religionas indispensablepublicly but not for the enlightenedprivateindividual.However,if that individual is an Aristotelian,he or she presumablyaccepts the argumentof
MetaphysicsLambdathat the eternalmovementof the universeimplies a
PrimeMoverwhose life fits an enlighteneddefinitionof 'divine'. Even so
it might be suggestedthat this is a purelytheoreticalaccountof the causation of one kind of motion, and that the philosopherwho accepts it is
not commitedto religiousworshipof the Cause."In Aristotle'sview, then,
the trulyenlightenedpersoncould be one who, public appearancesaside,
does not honourgod or the gods (nor, of course,dishonoursthem either).
But this goes againstwhat evidencewe have. The primeexhibitis from
the end of the Eudemian Ethics:
What choice, then, or possession of the naturalgoods - whether bodily goods,
wealth, friends, or other things - will most produce the contemplation of god,
K
Nor is there mention of piety in the titles of the lost works, although apparently
they included a treatise On Prayer.
4 On this supposition Aristotle can consistently share the common perception of
piety as a human excellence. But it runs into difficultieswith passages where he treats
eudaimonia as involving 'complete' (in the sense of 'comprehensive')excellence; e.g.
NE VI, 1144a5-6; EE II, 1219a35-39.
VI, 1322b19-29;VII, 1328bll and 22; 1329a26-34; 1330a8; 1331b4-7 and 17-18.
However, it seems that part of what one accepts if one accepts the account, is
that the eternal motion itself expresses something akin to religious adoration on the

part of the primum mobile (or its soul or mind) for the divine enertgeia, which 'moves

as an object of love' (1 172b3). This of course does not imply that human minds
should, or (knowingly or not) do, revere this divinity. That, it might consistently be
held, is entirely the business of eternalbeings much higher than ourselves, even though
scientific speculation about them and their god is part of human business. It would be
as in Epicureanism,where (apparently)the enlightened human being allows for gods
but rejects (human) religion.

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57

that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard,but any that through
deficiency or excess hinders one from the service and contemplationof god (ton
theon therapeuein kai the6rein)'2 is bad . .. (EE, VII,1249b 19-21; Revised
Oxford Translationwith slight change).
See also:
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which
might puzzle one of those who need argument,not punishmentor perception.For
people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods or love
one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know
whether snow is white or not need perception (Topics I, 105a3-6; ROT);

It is difficult to believe that Aristotle was insincere about the propriety of

loving one's parents.
And see:
Aristotle excellently says that we should nowhere be more modest (verecundiores) than in discussions about the gods. If we compose ourselves before we
enter temples, how much more should we do so when we discuss the constellations, the stars and the nature of the gods, lest from temerity (temere) or impudence (impudenter)we should make ignorant assertions or knowingly tell lies
(Seneca, QN, VII xxx 1 = F14 R3; ROT);

See also:
Aristotle in writing to Antipatersaid: 'It is not just Alexander who has good reason to be proud (mega phronein) because he has power over many men: pride
is no less appropriateon the part of those who possess correct beliefs about the
gods' (Plutarch,de tranquillitateanimi, 472E = F 664 RI; ROT)

This last quoted remark sounds like an ethical observation rather than a
theoretician's applause for those who have mastered a difficult subject.
The pride that should go with correct belief belongs on the same spectrum of qualities as the temerity and impudence of those who make ignorant or lying assertions about the gods. (The comparison with Alexander
may suggest, among other things, that just as rulership confers power to
order well the lives of subjects, so correct belief about the gods qualifies
the philosopher to see better how human life should be ordered. But this
may be reading too much into it.)

12

kai is epexegetic; views differ as to whether the6rein here is transitive or intransitive.

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SARAH BROADIE

B. One suggested solution

Richard Bodeuis is one of the few scholars to have seen a problem in the
fact that the ethical treatises devote no special discussion to piety. His
solution is that Aristotle takes piety to be part of justice, hence deals with
it by implication in the treatment of justice.'3 That piety is justice in relation to the gods was the not unpromising account which Socrates suggested to Euthyphroin Plato's dialogue.'4 The idea was wasted on Euthyphro
because he could not give it coherent content: he did not see how to disentangle 'doing justice to X' (where this has the broad meaning of 'behaving appropriately towards X') from 'conferring benefits on X', which is
absurd as applied to the gods.'5
Now, Aristotle's treatment of justice is marked by his determination to
improve on such all-but-empty formulae as 'acting appropriately towards
each', 'giving each its due', and 'doing what is one's own'. (At that rate
one acts justly towards the sock by darning it, and perhaps the alimentary
system acts justly because it digests rather than respires.) One would
expect, therefore, that if Aristotle included piety under justice, he would
have something positive to say about what distinctively men offer the gods
when they 'give them their due'. That is, one would expect him not to
deal with piety merely by implication (an implication which he never even
points out) in a generic treatment of justice.
Even so, let us consider the possibility that piety for Aristotle is an
implicit part of justice. In NE V Aristotle first distinguishes justice in the
general sense, in which it is the same as 'complete excellence, only not
without qualification but in relation to another person', from 'particular'
justice, i.e. a specific excellence of character coordinate with courage, temperance and the rest.'6 He then concentrates on particularjustice. Let us
look in turn at general and particularjustice as possibly harbouring piety.
If Aristotle regards piety as included in 'complete excellence in relation to another person', it is inexplicable that he does not give it a separate treatment like the treatments he gives to courage, moderation, and the

'" See ch. 5 of BodMis,Aristote et la theologie des vivants immortels,Paris, 1992,

now translatedas Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals.(Page references
below are to this translation.)
1' Euthyphro, lIe ff. It was a well-entrenched idea: cf. [Plato] Definitions, 412e;
On Virtues and Vices, 5, 1250bl9-23 and 7, 1251a30-32; Diogenes Laertius, Aristotelian Divisions I. 4.
'"

Euthyphro, 13a-15a.

16

NE V, 1129 11-27; 1130al4-b9.

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59

rest. After all, the significanceof piety is hardlyexhaustedby the thought

that it is that part of complete excellence in relationto others in which
the paradigmatic'7'others' are the gods. One might as well claim that
everythingimportantaboutcouragehas been coveredby the statementthat
courage is the partof complete excellence towardsothers in which 'others' includes (a) fellow fightersand (b) those whom one is defending.If
such a claim were true, it might be reasonableto say virtually nothing
special to courageon the groundthatthe discussionof justice (in the sense
of completeexcellence) will take care of courageby implication.But this
leaves out what specific differenceis made to the soul of the courageous
personby the presenceof courage;it says nothingaboutwhat in him we
admireand long to emulate.Unless pious action,unlikecourageousaction,
is simply a matterof going throughthe motionswithoutknowing or caring whetherit contributes,on the agent's side, to personalperfection(not
that it could, when done in such a spirit),it is difficultto find good reason why Aristotle- no less pious, it would seem, than most of his neighbours - should omit to study piety in his anatomyof the elements of a
perfecthumanlife.
So far, I have objectedto the suggestionthat, for Aristotle,piety is a
partof generaljustice in the broad sense. Bodeus, however, forgoes this
route, maintainingthat Aristotelianpiety is includedin particularjustice.
Of the two branchesof this, distributiveand corrective,Bodeus places
piety underthe former.'8
Even if this were a plausibleclassification,we should still be left with
the question why Aristotle, one of the last philosophersone expects to
play hide and seek with their students,does not state it outrighthimself.
If we try to explain by assuming that piety to him is not an important
topic, we still have to explain why that shouldbe so. But these questions
aside, any bid to interpretparticularjustice in either branchas including
piety towardsthe gods comes up against the following observation:
The sphere of the just is persons who share in things generally (haplos) good,'9
and who have too much or too little of these; since for some beings, as per-

17 Paradigmatic, but not unique; piety was also appropriatetowards parents, the
dead, and the patria. One would think that this complexity (raising, e.g., questions
about analogical forms) calls for explicit discussion.
Bodeus, 139.
'" I.e.: but possibly not good for a given individual; cf. V, 1129bl-6. Such goods

IX

include honour (11 30b2, and 30-31), which is what should be accorded the gods: cf. 1,
I OlblO-l 102a4.

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SARAH BROADIE

haps for gods, there is no such thing as having too much of them, whereas for
others - the incurably bad - no amount of them at all is beneficial but all are
harmful, and for others again they are beneficial up to a point. It [sc. the just]
is, for this reason, something that applies only to human beings. (NE V, 1137a
26-30)20

Since Bodeus has it that the gods receive theirrightfulshareor sharesat

the hands of pious humandistributors,he must understand'applies only
to human beings' as meaning that only humans - not gods - can be just

or unjustagents of distribution(cf. NE X, 1178b 10-12). However, the

precedinglines do not distinguishthe partiesto just and unjust interactions; they treatagents and recipientsalike. It is thus naturalto take the
last remarkas saying thatjust action is essentiallybetweenman and man
(hence not directedby man towardsgod).
If one wanted to maintainthat Aristotleomits to discuss piety because
he sees it as containedin an explicitlydiscussedlargertopic, a morelikely
largertopic would be philia.2'Aristotleseveral times mentionshonouring
the gods alongsidehonouringparents(NE VIII, 1162a4-6;1163bl6-7; IX,
1165al5; 24; cf. EE VII, 1242bl9-21). These are standardexamples of
philia betweenunequals.It might be arguedthat Aristotlesees little to be
said about honouringgods over and above what is to be said about honouring parents,even though the cases are obviously different;and that
since honouringis the expressionof piety, and the case of parentsnaturally falls into the topic of philia, he sees no call for a separatediscussion of piety towardsthe gods. But again one wonderswhy, if this is correct,he didnotsignposthis intention.Therearemanypointsin thediscussions
of the character-excellenceswhen it would have been easy to mention
piety and say 'the examinationof this moreproperlybelongs in the examination of philia.'
C. NE X, 1179a22-32: rehabilitation

The main thesis of this paper is that althoughAristotledoes not discuss

piety anywherein the ethical treatises,thereis one place where this quality puts in an appearance and receives an implicit definition. It is where

he writes:

2' Translationsfrom the NE are by ChristopherRowe.

21

Cf. Bodeis, 141-58.

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61

. .. the person whose intelligence is active, and who devotes himself to (therapeuon) intelligence, and is in the best condition, seems also to be most loved by
the gods (theophilestatos). For if the gods have any sort of care for things
human,22as they are thought to do, it would also be reasonable to suppose both
that they delight in what is best and has the greatest affinity to themselves (and
this would be intelligence) and that those who cherish this most, and honour it,
are the ones they benefit in return (anteupoiein),

for taking care of what they

themselves love, and acting correctly and finely. And quite clearly, all these
attributesbelong most of all to the intellectually accomplished (sophos) person.
He, therefore (ara), is most loved by the gods. But it is reasonable (eikos) that
the same person should also be happiest; so that in this way too it is the intellectually accomplished person who will be happy to the highest degree. (NE X,
1179a22-32)

This, 'the theophilestatos argument', ends the NE investigation of the

nature of the highest good. The inquiry was launched with the observation that everyone will tell you what the highest good is: it is eudaimonia (I, 1095al5-9). Then eudaimonia was defined (I, 1097b22-1098a 20).
The definition generated discussion of the different levels of rational soul,
their respective types of virtue, and the many specific virtues falling under
these. The inquiry branched at times into studies of related topics such as
voluntariness, decision, continence, friendship and pleasure.23Then at X,
1176a31, it returned to eudaimonia. This new treatment first showed that
eudaimonia cannot consist in gross pleasures or idle amusements; it then
proceeded to distinguish two modes of human felicity, one practical and
political, the other theoretic, and to raise and answer the final question on
this topic: which of these two is the more blessed and perfect (X, 1177al21 179a32)? The theophilestatos argument completes Aristotle's response to
this question, and we hear no more of eudaimonia for what remains of
the NE. What follows has to do with implementing the human good, rather
than further explicating its nature.
One would not expect a false note at this climactic moment. Yet the
theophilestatos argument, according to a prevalent understanding, is nothing but a feeble bid for popular endorsement of the theoretic ideal.
Aristotle,. scholars point out, invokes the traditional belief that heaven

The subsequent argumentshows that the truth of this antecedent is assumed.

This summary assumes that the NE either was intended from the first to incorporate the Common Books (EE IV, V and VI = NE V, VI and VII), or (less likely)
originally had its own version, now lost, of this material. With many scholars today,
I take the EE to have been composed by Aristotle earlier, and to have been first home
of the Common Books.
22
23

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SARAH BROADIE

rewardsthose who love the gods and are good. Now, traditionalbelief
imaginesthe rewardto consist in thrivingcropsand herds,successfuleconomic and social ventures,a large healthy household.So Aristotle,it is
assumed,mustenvisage it thatway too. Yet Aristotlehimself cannotpossibly sharethe belief in thatform.In particular,he cannotpossiblybelieve
thatwealth is the god-givenrewardfor theoreticwisdom. Not only is this
a ridiculousbelief in itself, but (scholarssay) the idea of god or the gods
as now and then affectingan individual'slife contradictsthe Metaphysics
Lambdatheoryof thedivineunmovedmover(s).So, it is suggested,Aristotle
merely sings along with the vulgarhere;he does not mean the argument,
but traditionrequiresthe lip service.24
One mightwonderhow this fits with the Aristotlewhom Seneca reports
warningagainstthe temerityand impudenceof telling lies aboutthe gods.
Fortunately,however, we do not need to rely on fragmentaryevidence
from (at best) a differentAristoteliancontext to make a case againstthe
above way of interpretingthe theophilestatosargument.Its own context
suffices.Aristotlewas not playing to the vulgara page or two back in the
NicomacheanEthics, when he argued that divine activity is theoretic.25
Wouldhe not have lost any vulgarreadersor listenersalreadylong before,
if he ever had them? So why a last minute compromisefor their sake,
when they are not even there to be cajoled? And what advantagecould
See, e.g., Zeller, vol. 1, 422, n. 1: 'It is obvious that Aristotle is here arguing
from popular conceptions; he himself ascribes to god no external operation'; Burnet,
ad 1179a22: 'inconsistentwith Aristotle's view of the relationbetween God and Man';
Dirlmeier, ad loc.: 'not a piece of doctrine in the strong, philosophical sense ... the
usual incorporationof the traditionalviews'; Gauthierand Jolif, ad loc.: 'an appeal to
popularbeliefs designed to justify the philosopherto the masses'; Ronna Burger, 137,
ad 1179a24-29: 'only a common opinion of the most dubious sort' (presumably she
is referringonly to the antecedent of the conditional at 1179a24 ff.). Other scholars
have rejected 1179a22-32 as inauthentic;see Gauthier-Jolifad loc. For reasoned and
trenchant insistence on taking the passage seriously, see Bod6us, 10-11. (However,
Bod&is is on less firm ground in holding that the gods it refers to are 'those who are
honored in the city'.)
25 NE X, 1178b8-22. NB also his use nearby of the rathertechnical concepts 'the
composite' and 'separation' (1 178a20; 22) and of Anaxagoras's pronouncementat
1179al5: 'he would not be surprisedif the happy were to appear to most people (hoi
polloi) a strange sort (atopos tis)'. Aristotle, who follows this up with a comment on
the superficialityof hoi polloi, would hardlycite it in his own supportif he were about
to start addressingthe vulgar. Natali ad loc. sees that 1179a22-32 does not adduce the
gods as popularlyconceived, but since he holds that it does not adduce the Aristotelian
ones either, on the ground that these are the unmoved movers of the Metaphysics,he
remains perplexed.
24

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63

this achieve thatwould be worththe correspondingrisk:i.e., of losing the

respectof serious,high-minded,contemporarystudents,who if they understood the argumentin this way would surely be as embarrassedabout it
as modem admirersof Aristotle?
It is importantto notice that if he does engage in the performancejust
described,this cannot be because he needs the theophilestatosargument
in orderto show that (SH) 'the sophos is happiest'(1179a31-32).Perhaps
one might expect desperatemeasuresif this conclusionwere in dangerof
eluding him. But he has alreadysecuredit as far back as 1178b32. The
theophilestatosargumentis gratuitousif intendedto prove that thesis. But
in fact what it proves is somethingnew. It is (SMG): 'the sophos is most
god-beloved'(1 179a30). That is what Aristotledeclares at the beginning
of the passage just quoted, and the argumentfor this thesis ensues with
gar, 1179a24, and ends at 30. Aristotlenow has an additionalreason to
assert SH, and he does so, passing to it from SMG (31-32).26 But we need

not think that the point of 1179a22-32was simply to add to the grounds
for SH.
For if the proof of SMG is put forwardas merely anotherreason in
favourof SH, why is it placed where it is, ratherthan earlier?Its natural
place, on that supposition,would have been next to the argumentthat
deduces SH from the premisethat divine activity is akin to humantheoretical intellection (1178b7-23); all the more naturalin that both arguments turnon this notionof affinityor kinship(to sungenes);see 1178b23
and 1179a26.The oddityof the theophilestatosargument'spositioning(on
the assumptionthat it just offers anotherreason for elevating theoretical
overpracticalor politicalwisdom)contributesto the impressionthatAristotle
did not mean it, and has even led some scholarsto doubtits authenticity.
This is in additionto problemsin the contentof the argument,to which
I now turn.I shall come back to the questionof position.
The argumentproceeds on the assumptionthat the gods 'benefit in
return.., those who cherish [intelligence]most, and honour it', since it
is what is 'best [in us] and has the greatestaffinityto themselves'. Two
main difficultieshave been found in this.27First:it is held to conflictwith
This move is signalled by the relatively weak 'eikos', whereas the inference to
SDG from its premisses in 22-30 is strongly nailed down by 'ara'.
27 It is worth mentioning a third difficulty,which Stewart'(ad loc.) thought he saw:
a conflict with the conception of the gods at 1178b9-18 as not engaging in activities
of the practical virtues. If we think of praxis as involving physical changes first and
foremost to the agent (these may include emotional changes, since 'physical' for
Aristotle covers the non-noetic aspects of the soul; see Parts of Animals 1, 641a2126

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MetaphysicsLambda'stheoryof the divineunmovedmoversof the heavens.

Now theremightbe a conflictif we assumethatLambdagives a definitive
accountof the divine or the divine role. But why shouldwe assume that?
Lambda,afterall, is not primarilyaimingto demonstratethe existenceand
natureof god.28If it were, one might perhapsbe justifiedin assumingthat
nothingcan be trueof Aristotle'sgod thatis not presentor prefiguredin the
theory in Lambda.Since god, accordingto such a theology, would have
a strictlycosmologicalfunction,it might indeed be difficultto find room
here for the sort of relationbetweenhumanintellectand god hintedat in
the theophilestatosargument.However,the purposeof Lambdais not primarily to demonstrategod or the gods, but to prove the existence and
natureof immutablesubstanceby showingthat,andwhy, thecelestialmotion
is eternal.It turnsout that the cause adequateto explain this effect must
be an infinitelydesirable,perfectlyactual,intelligence.Thiscomplexof attributes, ratherthanthe cosmologicalfunctionas such, is the immediatereasonwhy Lambdacalls thisbeing'god'. Lambda,then,leavestheAristotelian
logically free to predicate 'god' of something not cosmological, or of
somethingthat presentsitself to us otherwisethan cosmologically.29
The second stumblingblock to takingthe theophilestatosargumentseriously is the childishnessof the traditionalbelief thatthe gods rewardthose
who love them (or, as Aristotleactuallysays: cherishmost what has most
affinityto them). But this need not detain us long. Nothing in the text
requiresthat this endoxon, in the presentcontext, be given a traditional
interpretationin terms of flocks and herds multiplyingand ships coming
home. It is reasonableto suppose,instead,thatwhat Aristotlehas in mind
as vindicatingthe endoxon is a familiar fact of intellectualexperience:
devotedthinkingresults,often enough, in burstsof understanding.
This is
blO, and cf. On the Soul I, 402a5-7), an Aristoteliandivinity is not practical;but this
hardly excludes to antieupoiein as interpretedin the next paragraphof the main text.
28 The appearance that this is the aim is appreciably reduced if at 1072b28 we
accept the MSS' 'phamen de', which seems to report an endoxon about god, instead
of 'phamen de' (with Ross, following Themistius), which seems to introduce a doctrinal claim. On this point, and the entire question, see the excellent discussion by
Bod6us (op. cit., ch. 1).
29 This leaves open whether, in the predicationin question, 'god' would apply to the
cosmic unmoved mover(s) in virtue of some attributeor function not postulated by
cosmology, or to some divine being(s) existentially distinct from the cosmic mover(s).
Again, one should not assume (as apparentlyBodeus does, op. cit., 11; and perhaps
Natali [see n. 241) that the lattermust be the 'gods of the city'. Primafacie it is neither
as civic divinity nor as cosmological principle that god rewards the human sophos.

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65

the rewardto the human thinkerfor intellectionengaged in just for its

own sake (cf. 1177bl-4; 13-15), which Aristotleequates with service to
the god that is nous or 'something beyond

nous'.30

Let us now consider the argument'sposition. The bulk of X.7-8 has

just concludedwith an argumentfeaturingthe similarityof humanhappiness (which in its most perfectform is excellent contemplation)to divine
activity.By way of balance,Aristotlenow addssomeobservations(1 178b331179al7) about the materialgoods necessaryfor humanhappiness.The
mainpointis thatmodestamountssuffice.ForconfirmationAristotleinvokes
Solonian and Anaxagoreansketches of the 'happy man'; worldly goods
figurelow in each.3'(This passagerendersparticularlyineptthe suggestion
that in the theophilestatosargument,which will begin just six lines on,
Aristotlemeanshis audienceto think- thoughnot all to take it seriouslyof the gods showeringthe sophos with materialrewards.)Anaxagorasis
presentedas saying thathis figureof the happymanwould seem a strange
one to hoi polloi, an observationwhich Aristotleendorses.32
He now winds
up the addendumon modest materialgoods with the remark:'The views
(doxai) of the wise (sophoi),then, seem to be in agreementwith the arguments (logoi)' (1 179al6-17). From this, there are two naturalcontinuations, and I believe that Aristotledecides to use both. Lackingfootnoting
devices or parentheseshe simply puts them one (1) after the other (2).
Continuation1 (1179a21-32) respondsto a thoughtimplied by the attitude of hoi polloi. This is the thoughtthat since what Aristotlecalls happiness does not entail wealth and power, it does not entail that the happy
person is favouredby heaven. (Thus the questionof who is favouredby
heaven is alreadyin the offingat this point.)AlthoughAristotlewould not
expect to convince hoi polloi that they are mistaken,here as sometimes
elsewherehe cares enoughabouttheirview to reactto it philosophically.33

30 F 49 R3.
3' Solon: 'moderately well equipped with external things'; Anaxagoras: 'not a rich
[man], or a politically powerful one'.
32 'because they judge only by externalthings, having eyes only for these' (I 179a1516). Since the indicative krinousi shows Aristotle endorsing this explanation of the
strange-seemingness,presumablyhe agrees with Anaxagorason what is being explained.
33 Cf. his reply in NE IX, 1168a28-1169b2 to the vulgar condemnationof self-love.
And more generally: he cannot at this stage in the NE afford to dismiss without argument vulgar views that seem to contradict his own: for he himself has allowed that
vulgar hedonism reflects a very importanttruthabout the value of pleasure (X, 172b910 and 35-1173a2; cf. VII, 1153b25-8).

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On this occasion he reactswith the theophilestatatosargument.However,

given that the addendumends with a summarizingreferenceto hai to6n
sophon doxai (1179al7), it naturallyalso promptsa differentnext step
(continuation2): this is the invocationof a contrastingand ultimatelydecisive type of corroborationin terms of ta erga and ho bios:
These sorts of considerations [i.e. the views of the wise] too, then, do carry a
certain conviction; but in the practicalsphere the truthis determinedon the basis
of the way life is actually lived (ek ton erg6n kai tou biou); for this is decisive.
So when one looks at everything that has been said up to this point, one should
be bringing it to bear on one's life as actually lived (epi ta erga kai ton bion),
and if it is in harmony with what one actually does (tois ergois), it should be
accepted, while if there is discord, it should be supposed mere words (logous)
(1 179al7-22).

Even if it is not immediatelyclear preciselyin which directionwe are to

look when we turn to ta erga kai ton bion,4 the force of the contrast doxail

erga virtuallyrequiresthat mentionof erga follow mentionof doxai with

nothing substantialintervening.Hence the theophilestatosargumentgets
postponed,the appeal to erga and bios being tucked in before it parenthetically.The resultis a juxtapositionof seeminglyunconnectedpassages
The question is: whose deeds and life give the final corroboration?Hardly those
of Solon and Anaxagoras, as has sometimes been suggested, since something more
should then have been said about this pair to address the possibility of their lives failing to bear out their views. Not those of people in general, since the values expressed
in most of their lives are rejected by Aristotle. The reference must be either to his
own life and deeds or (taking them singly) to those of each memberof the group comprising him and any listeners who have come with him thus far. Given the immediately preceding context, we are presumablyto focus on the materialmodesty of these
lives, but given the reference to Anaxagorasand the immediatelysubsequentargument
about the sophos as theophilestatos, we must also be meant to focus on the importance for those lives of theoretical activity. (This does not entail that the listeners are
mostly, like Aristotle himself, theoretical researchersrather than political leaders or
prospective leaders, since one can show respect for theoreticalresearchby deeds other
than the engaging in it.) In any case, the point takes us back to I, 1095a2-11, on the
disciplined quality Aristotle expects of his audience. They are not to be like acratic
people (9), but are to be such that if, when they have followed all the argumentsfor
and explanations of a certain ideal, they find it at odds with their own lives and practice, this finding of theirs constitutes their rejection of the ideal as false, and of the
arguments and explanations as collectively unsound. On this interpretation,the issue
of Aristotle's and his companions' sincerity is so near the surface at 1179al6-22 that
an'insincere' reading of the adjacent theophilestatos argumentis absolutely ruled out
(except on the assumption that the entire stretch is the result of editorial patchwork).
It is not surprisingthat commentatorswho cannot take the theophilestatos argument
seriously also generally miss the self-reference of ta erga kai ho bios.

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67

(1 179a17-22, pistin . . . hupolepteon, and 22-32, ho de kata noun ...

eudaimon).Conceptually,however,they are held togetherby 1179al6-17:
'The doxai of the sophoi, then, seem to be in agreementwith the logoi'.
For this simultaneouslyevokes the immediatelyfollowing contrastwith
erga etc., and the almost immediatelyprecedingreferenceto the views of
the vulgar (1 179al5), to which the theophilestatosargumentis a reply.35
D. NE X, 11 79a 22-32: interpretation

It is time to defend the thesis that the theophilestatosargumentsupplies

the missing account of piety. Against the backgroundof the Euthyphro,
we know, as Aristotlewould have knownhis audiencesto know, that(necessarily) the pious and only the pious are loved by the gods.36From the
same source,he, we, and they also know that an accountsaying what the
gods love about the pious will be an accountof the natureof piety (provided, of course, it gets beyond the Euthyphronictrivialityof saying that
piety is what they love). So Aristotleis saying that piety towardsgod is,
in its truestform, the dispositionfor intellectualactivity engaged in as by
the sophos, i.e. purelyfor love of the activity itself.37'3
In supportof this interpretation
one can point to two passages near the
theophilestatosargumentwhere piety is a half-hiddentheme. Its presence
in these places would surely have been noticed as non-coincidentalif the
theophilestatosargumenthad been taken seriously and seen as filling a
lacuna on the topic.39First therewas the referenceto Anaxagoras:
35 David Sedley has made me think twice about this somewhat complicated explanation for the position of the theophilestatos argument(although I am not convinced,
either, that the complicated explanation is wrong). Sedley pointed out that Aristotle
could have been following what seems to have been Plato's tendency to culminatewith
a point about dearness to the gods. (Or perhaps both philosophers were following a
religious norm. Cf. Isocrates' placement of just this point at the end of the Antidosis.)
Certainly that would explain why Aristotle's theophilestatos argument comes at the
end of his exposition of the natureof the human good. See Sedley, 'The ideal of godlikeness', in Gail Fine, Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato, II (Oxford, 1999),
p. 314. (Sedley's paper discusses inter alia NE X.8, 1179a22-32, taking the argument
seriously.)
36 Euthyphro9e- 11b; 15b-c.
17 Aristotle does not say that this is the spirit of the sophos, but clearly it must be,
since the sophos can hardly be supposed to misunderstandthe point of engaging in
the activity typical of him, nor to engage for wrong reasons.
3X Cf. a version of the same thought at EE VII, 1249bl9-21 (quoted above).
19 These clues would certainly have been picked up if we had been dealing with a
text of Plato's.

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Anaxagorastoo seems to have taken the happy man not to be rich one, or a politically powerful one, when he said he wouldn't be surprisedif the happy were to
appear to most people a strange sort (tis atopos) .. . (1 179a13-15).

This alludes to an anecdote in which the philosopher-scientist described

someone like himself when he spoke of the happy person as seeming
strange to most people:
And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was ... asking why
one should choose ratherto be born than not, by saying 'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe' (EE 1, 1216alO-14 1R071
cf. 1215b6-8).

Aristotle's NE audience cannot have failed to recall that Anaxagoras was

hounded with charges of impiety, and that these charges were levelled
against him for precisely the cosmological speculation in which his happiness consisted - that which for him made it worth having been born. In
light of the theophilestatos argument, with its implied definition of piety
and piety's relation to happiness, we can see Aristotle quietly executing
a move not unlike Plato's in vindication of Socrates (Apology, Euthyphro,
Crito): this man charged with impiety is a paragon of that excellence for
anyone with eyes to see. Aristotle, however, is vindicating not the person
Anaxagoras but the intellectual activity for which he stands.
The second passage is NE X, 1181al2-17:
But the sophists who profess such knowledge [i.e. the art of legislating] appear
to be nowhere near teaching it. For they don't have any knowledge at all even
of what sort of thing it is or what sorts of things it is about; if they did they
wouldn't put it down as the same as, or inferiorto, rhetoricalexpertise, nor would
they think legislating an easy thing for anyone who has collected together those
laws that are well thought of (tous eudokimountaston nomon) ...

This criticism targets a claim by Isocrates in the Antidosis. At Antidosis

79-83, Isocrates disparages legislation and elevates rhetoric:
... men who make it their duty to invent discourses [upon questions of public
welfare in a spirit worthy of both Athens and Hellas] should be held in higher
esteem than those who propose and write down laws, inasmuchas they are rarer,
have the more difficult task, and must have superior qualities of mind (81, tr.
Norlin, Loeb).

Aristotle's phrase, 'the laws that are well thought of' is a quotation from
Isocrates, who continues:
... those who have elected to make laws have had at their service a multitude
of laws already made (for they have no need to search for new laws, but only
to put forth the effort to collect those which are vell thought of in other states

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69

(eudokimountaspara tois allois), which anyone who so desires can easily do ...)
(83, Norlin, with a slight change).

What is easy to forget as one wades through the prolixities of the Antidosis
is that Isocrates has couched this apologia pro vita sua in the fictional
form of a self-defence against just the charges that were brought against
Socrates: corrupting the youth (30) and impiety (rebutted by implication
at 321). There are numerous echoes of Plato's Apology scattered throughout, and in the penultimate sentence, Isocrates, pretending to be under
threat from a capital charge, proclaims:
... I take it as a good sign that all my past life up to this day has been such as
befits men who are pious (eusebeis) and loved by the gods40(theophileis). (Antidosis, 322).

E. A remaining question
I have argued that it would be surprising if piety fails to figure in Aristotle's Ethics, and that figure there it does, not as a species of justice or
even friendship, but in its own right, though in veiled fashion. A final
question: why the veiling? Why, in treating of piety, does Aristotle depart
from his standard approach whereby he announces each of the virtues by
itself and always begins by tackling straight on the nature of its domain?
Now it may be the gods themselves, or it may be human attitudes towards
them, that constitute the domain of piety; but in either case several reasons make it understandable that Aristotle preferred not to delineate this
virtue in his usual open and systematic way. Firstly, his notion of piety
in its truest form is so closely tied to his theoretic account of perfect happiness that the latter seems the only possible locus for explaining the former. Secondly, the theological and religious revisionism of his account
was politically risky, especially for a philosopher at Athens with Aristotle's Macedonian affiliation. Thirdly, it is presumably pious as well as
politic to protect the truth concerning piety and the pious against scandal
and ridicule from outsiders which a plain formulation might incur. To
euphe?meinwould be the first casualty in such a confrontation. Ignorant
speakers would be provoked into unintentional blasphemy, and philosophers might be cowed into saying what they could not believe.4'
The University of St Andrews
I

Or 'god-loving', as Norlin.
Thanks to Christopher,Rowe, David Sedley, Roslyn Weiss, and ChristianWildberg for their comments.
41

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Modern References
Bod6us, Richard,Aristotle and the Theology of the Liv,ingImmortals,translatedby Jan
Garrett,Albany, 2000.
Broadie, Sarah and Rowe, Christopher,Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, 2002.
Burger, Ronna, "Ethical Reflection and Righteous Indignation: Nemesis in the
NicomacheanEthics",in Essays in AncientGreek PhilosophyIV, edd. John P. Anton
and Anthony Preus, Albany, 1991, 127-139.
Burnet, John, The Ethics of Aristotle, London, 1900.
Dirlmeier, Franz, Aristoteles, Nicomachische Ethik, Berlin, 1960.
Gauthier, R.A. and Jolif, J.Y., Aristote - L'EthiqueA Nicomaque, Paris, 1970.
Natali, Carlo, Aristotele, Etica Nicomachea, Roma-Bari, 1999
Sedley, David, "The ideal of godlikeness" in OxfordReadings in Philosophv, Plato II,
ed. Gail Fine, Oxford, 1999, 309-28.
Stewart, J.A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Oxford, 1892.
Zeller, E., Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, New York, 1962.

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