Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LXXXIII No. 2, September 2011
 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC

Scanlon on Moral Dimensions

thomas hill

University of North Carolina

T.M. Scanlon has again written a major work to which all moral philosophers should pay attention. His thinking is subtle, well-informed,
morally sensitive, and admirably systematic. He raises important objections to the doctrine of double effect, but attempts to explain its
appeal. He examines critically common interpretations of Kants
humanity formula, and he proposes an alternative explanation. Most
signicantly, he develops an account of blame and blameworthiness
that should set the agenda for discussion in this area for a long time.
Means and Ends
In Chapter 3 Scanlon examines the Kantian idea that we ought to
treat humanity as an end in itself and never merely as a means. As
often interpreted, this principle tells us to judge whether our proposed
action is permissible by considering our attitude and reason for acting. The Kantian principle, then, seems contrary to Scanlons major
thesis that permissibility generally depends on the reasons there are
for or against our acts independently of our attitudes and what we
take to be reasons. Scanlon argues, to the contrary, that we can
understand the Kantian principle in two ways, neither of which
makes permissibility in general depend on the agents attitudes and
beliefs. On the rst reading, (1) an action is permissible only if it is
consistent with the idea of rational nature as an end in itself.1 Here
what matters is what the reasons in fact are, which may be distinct
from what the agent takes to be reasons. This Kantian standard of
permissibility, Scanlon suggests, is plausible and can be formulated in
various roughly equivalent ways, including his own contractualist
formula that actions are right only if there is a principle permitting
1

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T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 5.

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them that no one could reasonably reject.2 A second reading that

Scanlon considers is (2) we should treat rational beings as ends in
themselves, with the understanding that I treat someone as an end
in herself only if I take the fact that she is an end in herself as giving
me reasons to treat her in some ways and not others.3 This principle, Scanlon argues, is not a plausible criterion of whether acts are
permissible. He cites Parts example: when a gangster buys a cup of
coee from a server, politely but with no concern for that person, he
may be using the person as a mere means but is not doing anything
wrong. Scanlon argues, however, that principle (2) is relevant to the
meaning that our acts have for our various relationships with others
and so can be relevant to judgments of blameworthiness.
Beyond the general Kantian criterion of permissibility, i.e. (1) above,
Scanlon considers the common thought that some acts are wrong
because they are just using someone or treating someone merely as
a means in a specic sense that is not the same as failing to treat a
person as an end in him- or herself. Often when this is a legitimate
complaint, someone imposes costs on another without the persons
consent in a context where, by (1), doing so would be permissible only
with that persons consent. In these special cases the agents attitudes
are part of the explanation for why their acts are wrong, but they do
not play a fundamental role in these explanations.4 What is fundamental is the general criterion of permissibility, i.e. (1) above, that
determines when actions involving others require consent. According to
this, acting with the willingness to use someone for purposes that have
nothing to do with concern for that person is not in itself wrong,
though it may be wrong in special contexts and blameworthy for what
it expresses.
These issues are complex, partly because interpretative frameworks
vary signicantly. There is no consensus on how Kants formulations
of the Categorical Imperative should be read, whether they are supposed to determine permissibility or moral worth, and whether they are
plausible. Here I will mainly just sketch my understanding of some
points, note places where this is apparently different from Scanlons
view, and then invite his comments about where he disagrees and why.
I begin with three relatively minor matters and then three larger questions.
Here is the way I see these matters. First, in Kants theory always
treat persons (or humanity) as an end in itself is a comprehensive
2

Moral Dimensions, p. 98.

Moral Dimensions, p. 99.

Moral Dimensions, p. 117.

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requirement. Never treat them merely as a means is narrower,

amounting to when treating persons as means, also treat them as ends
in themselves. By remaining callously indierent, as Kant says, we
can fail to treat persons as ends in themselves even when we are not
using them as means at all.5 Scanlons example is failing to make a call
to rescue a stranger in trouble. An even narrower requirement in
Kants system is the derivative duty to respect others (e.g. dont mock
them as worthless).6 On my reading, full and appropriate compliance
with the most comprehensive requirement would always satisfy the
narrower requirements.
Second, in common usage the complaint that we should not just
use someone often serves to warn us that how we are treating another
may be imposing burdens or gaining benets contrary to the persons
rights or in a way that expresses disregard for what is due to the person under various other moral principles. The charge of just using
someone, I think, can appeal to dierent background standards
depending on the context. For example, He just uses me as a means
to his sexual pleasure (but not as someone for whom he has due
respect) and They just use mine workers as a means to their prot
(without due regard for their safety). Scanlon suggests that the relevant background principles about what is permissible usually, if not
always, specify what we must not do without the consent of the person
on whom we rely or impose costs, but I suspect that the considerations
are more various and wide-ranging. Just using a person, it seems,
may sometimes be wrong as well as oensive because it is degrading
even though done with consent. In any case we apparently agree that
the various specic background principles should be regarded as ultimately dependent on more fundamental Kantian principle(s).
Third, there is a sense in which actions may be wrong (impermissible) independently of the agents intentions and beliefs. For example,
burning people at the stake is wrong even if intended to save the
victims immortal souls, and it is impermissible in this sense for a teacher to reward the class bully even though she mistakenly perceives the
bully as the most well-behaved class member.7 As Scanlon notes, Kant
identies the realm of law and justice (Recht) as basically concerned
with certain actions that are wrong in this sense, apart from the moral
quality of our ends and motives. Kants doctrine of law is about
actions that can be coerced whereas his doctrine of virtue is about
respecting and adopting ends. Kant implies that these attitudes cannot
5

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Ak.6:395.

Op. cit., Ak 6:467.

The rst example is from Kant, the second from Onora (Nell) ONeill.

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be coerced, but Scanlon poses a counter-examplea mobsters threat

that coerces someone to make it his end to protect the mobsters sister.8
Scanlon suggests charitably that Kant may have been referring only to
ultimate ends, but this move is unnecessary if we understand can
coerce as can rightfully coerce. The latter perhaps better ts Kants
division between law and virtue, where the doctrine of law is supposed
to give us the standards for what can be rightfully coerced by legal
threats as opposed to what the moral law within us prescribes as
obligatory ends.
Fourth, Kant encourages us to test whether we are permitted or forbidden to act as we propose by checking the maxim on which we
would be acting, where maxims express our understanding of what we
are about to do, our purpose and (sometimes) our reason for doing it.
The ideas of permitted and forbidden t well with the idea of a
moral law which, like traditional divine law, applies to our attitudes
and choices, not just to act-types in abstraction from what we perceive
as our options, aims, and motivating reasons. All of Kants formulas
of the Categorical Imperative, but especially the rst, seem to treat the
moral law for individuals (as opposed to legal systems) as primarily and
directly a test of subjective rightness, conscientious choice, or morally worthy motivation. This is not to deny that an application of the
Categorical Imperative also applies to the special domain of legal systems, which are concerned with state authority to make and enforce
laws about external acts. The idea here is also compatible with Scanlons view that apart from what the law can rightfully coerce us to do,
Kants fundamental principles can determine that some actions are
morally impermissible (and others not) in abstraction from the agents
intentions, attitudes, and beliefs in doing them. My question is whether
judging that an action is impermissible in this (Scanlons) sense is derivative from Kantian standards that are more directly concerned with
what is permitted (or not) in the dierent (primary) sense that choosing
(willing) it is (or is not) in accord with the moral law.
Why might we think so? Here is a view. Kants ethics is primarily
addressed to the question What ought I to do? asked by conscientious persons intending to decide and act as they should, given their
best understanding. What they primarily need, and Kants formulas
seem to provide, are standards for decision making. By their best
efforts to decide by these standards, they can act blamelessly and even
in a morally worthy way, but this is no guarantee that they will act
permissibly in Scanlons sense. They should aim to do so, of course,
rather than focusing self-righteously on the purity of their motives, but
8

Moral Dimensions, p. 220 n. 15.

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the moral law can only demand that their will be in line with the rational moral imperatives that they are presumed to acknowledge and be
capable of following. The question is what determines that acts are in
fact (objectively) permissible insofar as this may dier from what
conscientious agents will to do? The natural Kantian thought is that
acts are permissible in that sense if they are what perfectly well-intentioned agents would will with full and accurate understanding. The idea
of what is really or in fact right, as it were, is a construct from
what anyone under the best conditions would judge (subjectively)
right. By contrast, Scanlon presupposes that rational moral persons
have intuitive access to reasons that exist independently of (and can
provide the grounds for) good willing. This is a way that Scanlons
view seems fundamentally dierent from Kants.
Fifth, Scanlon expresses an appropriate skepticism about interpretations of Kant that attribute to him the idea that by choosing (permissible) ends we create reasons for ourselves and others. Undeniably
Kant held that our choice of (permissible) ends gives others some reason to care about our achieving them, but this simply follows from his
principle of benecence, which is not an independent source of reasons
but is supposed to be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Do
I create reasons for myself, then, by choosing (permissible) ends?
Scanlon doubts this too, suggesting instead that our reasons to pursue
our ends are normally just the reasons there are for having the end in
the rst place. I suspect, however, that there is a middle way between
the voluntarist view that Scanlon rejects and his own acceptance of
intuitively accessible existing reasons. Briey, setting aside Kants
moral duties to oneself and to others, what are the relations between
my choosing ends and my having reasons?
Here is a possible Kantian answer. First, my inclinations and their
objects do not by themselves give me rationally compelling reasons,
though I can try to make my choice of ends intelligible to others by
explaining what my inclinations are and what there is about the objects
that I nd attractive. (In one sense, this is telling others what my reasons for choosing are.) Second, we choose new ends not in isolation
but within the context of a complex set of inter-related ends and policies that we already accept, and arguably rational principles prescribe
that we try to make our set of ends and policies coherent.9 For
example, if we know that the necessary means to a proposed new end
would frustrate our already accepted ends, an adjustment needs to be
9

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The hypothetical imperative to take the necessary means to ones ends or give up
the end is just one rational requirement for coherence. Others might be what John
Rawls calls counting principles in A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press,
1999), 3645.
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madewe have good reason to abandon the proposed end or revise

the initial set. When one of these options seems obviously unacceptable, we may simply say that we have good reason to do the other.
The deeper point, however, is that in this self-regarding area, by choosing ends, we do not create any rationally compelling reasons, only reasons relative to other chosen ends assumed to be revisable. It may be
an exaggeration to say that we literally choose all of our ends, but
the modest proposal here is just that when we set ourselves a goal we
have reason to pursue it and revise plans incompatible with itor else
to rethink and abandon the goal. Unlike Scanlons view, this does not
presuppose that certain facts just exist as reasons independently of
principles of rational willing.
Finally, I suspect that readers would welcome hearing more about
Scanlons own apparently non-Kantian understanding of practical
reasons. In What We Owe to Each Other he briey described his intuitive method for identifying reasons. Reasons are facts that count in
favor of actions and reason-responsive attitudes; for him, they are freeoating in the sense that they are not explained by reference to necessary features of rational agents or their principles. Hence, what reasons
each person has, and so what is morally permissible and appropriate in
various relationships, is largely left to reective common sense. Other
moral theorists aspire to explain practical reasons in a way that leaves
less to intuitive judgment about which particular facts are reasons in
various cases. Most Kantians, for example, do not understand rational
agents as agents that respond to reasons that exist and can be identied
independently of the principles that constitute rational agency. They
try instead to identify facts as practical reasons, partly or entirely by
their relation to principles that characterize rational choice and
thought. Many are skeptical about this Kantian ambition, but I remain
curious about why the otherwise Kant-friendly Scanlon rejects it. Is it,
for example, because he thinks the Kantian ambition is impossible to
achieve? Or because he believes that the general rational principles that
the Kantian aims to articulate must in the end be identied or justied
by a similar appeal to intuition? Or is it just that intuitive reasons are
sucient for his purposes in normative ethical theory, and so further
foundational questions can be left open? This question also confronts
the numerous contemporary moral philosophers who, like Scanlon,
accept that reasons oat free of rational principles.
Blame and Blameworthiness
In sum, Scanlons proposal about blame is this: [T]o claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action shows

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something about the agents attitudes towards others that impairs the
relations that others can have with him or her. To blame a person is to
judge him or her blameworthy and to hold appropriately modied
attitudes.10 These judgments concern the meaning that actions express.
Scanlon does not deny the role of emotions but recognizes that blaming is primarily something that one does, a matter of adjusting how
one will treat a person who has failed to live up to the norms of their
relationship. All relationships in his sense have constitutive norms, but
not all are worthy of respect. Institutions and groups can be legitimately blamed only insofar as they are organized to act as persons
in relations to others, a point relevant to the legitimacy of blaming
groups dened only by ethnicity or heritage. We can blame someone
for an act even if that person was incapable of understanding why the
act was wrong. When someone has acted oensively, then, Scanlons
account invites us, not to engage in grading a persons record or
character, but to address the forward-looking question, What should
we do now? It is a non-utilitarian theory that, like utilitarianism, tries
to make sense of our practice of blaming without making heavy commitments in the perennial free-will debates.
In Scanlons view, it can make sense to blame those who impair important relationships even if those blamed lacked normal understanding,
self-control, and commitment to the relationship. Blaming of this sort
seems a common practice, and Scanlons account avoids the familiar
problems (seen, for example, in free will debates) generated by posing
impossibly ideal conditions for legitimate blame. The relevant conditions,
he acknowledges, vary with the context and type of blame involved. I am
left wondering, however, how he would regard an apparently common
idea of legitimate moral blame that poses signicant (but not impossible)
practical conditions of understanding, control, and shared values. Blaming of this sort is not simply assigning a bad grade for character or behavior, but also not merely a forward-looking, non-judgmental response to
How should we treat the offender now? This blaming, like Scanlons,
is a response to someones failure to meet the norms of ones relation to
fellow human beings, but it presupposes that the offender shares a basic
commitment to those norms as well as having the relevant understanding
and ability to conform.11
To express such blame is to say that the offenders did not adequately
try (or will) to live up to an important mutual commitment. It is

10

Moral Dimensions, p. 128 and p. 141.

11

Scanlon notes that we generally assume that even strangers will manifest
elements of mutual regard, but holds that they can be blameworthy even if they
lack all understanding of and concern for moral standards.

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aimed only at those we regard as one of us in a moral community

imperfect, but basically competent, morally committed, and able to
understand and meet our responsibilities. Expressions of this kind of
blame are expected to sting because they condemn the offenders actions
from a standpoint with which we assume they identify. This sort of
blame is obviously not appropriately addressed to sociopaths, the mentally incompetent or very young children.
The idea of a moral community presupposed here may seem analogous to the idea of a well-functioning sports team. The players share a
common goal, rules, standards, ideals of loyalty, and so on. They have
a relationship, in Scanlons sense, as members of a team. They are
aware that as players they have different capacities and knowledge of
the game, but there is a range and level of expectations to which they
all hold themselves and others. The shortest player is not expected to
jump as high as the tallest, but all accept the responsibility to resist the
temptation to get drunk the night before a game. By willingly accepting
these basic expectations as their own they forego any complaints about
being held to them, barring some standard excusing conditions.
All players are expected to be committed to the teams goals and values
and to be duly diligent and disciplined in doing their part. Outside critics can criticize their clumsy play, but if a player acts disloyally, players
have not just special standing to blame but a special kind of blame
availablea stinging player-to player charge that they have violated
mutual commitments, within their acknowledged capacity to meet, and
so are expected to be no less disappointed in themselves.
The world of actual moral agents, of course, is not quite like this.
Empirically, there is vastly more disagreement and agrant disregard of
moral standards than the analogy suggests, and even evidence that
some otherwise competent people are utterly immune to moral appeals.
Scanlon proposes one way to make sense of moral blame despite these
apparent facts. Kant proposed another way, which was in part to
accept for practical moral purposes what he took to be ordinary moral
agents view of their own agency and to extend this to more doubtful
cases. He suggests there are practical reasons, heavy theoretical
metaphysics aside, to attribute at least a basic moral disposition to all
rationally competent persons, refusing to regard them as utterly
unreachable by moral appeals and so unable to completely dismiss
expressions of moral blame as alien voices. Scanlon may view this as
practically unwarranted, an invitation to self-righteous moralistic blaming, or just a special case of blaming in his sense, but in any case it is
another apparent contrast with a Kantian perspective that might be
considered.

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