International Journal of Humanities and Religion (IJHR)

www.humanitiesjournal.info
Online ISSN: 2319-5630
Article

Conception of Individuality and Collectivity in Hnayna and

Mahyna Schools of Buddhism
Ajay Verma
Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi India
email: ajayverma@jnu.ac.in, thinkajay@yahoo.com

Individually each one of us is different and unique. These differences have to be negotiated, glossed over or at
times given up to a desirable degree to form collectivities which in turn have their own characteristics and often
bound together by common aims and objectives and a common vision to achieve them. Buddhists both in their
Hnayna and Mahyna tradition reject any notion of permanent soul or self. Despite this metaphysical
rejection Buddhist Vihras were great places of learning and known world over as great storehouses of
knowledge and wisdom. Furthermore in unyavda School of Mahyna tradition even pramna system is
rejected. unyavdins do not even claim to advance any thesis. In such an epistemological vacuum, could they
have any notion of socio-political collectivities? If yes, what kind of notions regarding good governance and
good living could they advance? Such questions form the subject matter of the present paper.
Keywords: Buddhism, Hnayna, Mahyna, Buddhist ethics, Ngrjuna, Vimalkrti.

INTRODUCTION
The word individual (in-dividual) etymological means an undivided unitary entity. But in Buddhist philosophy
which emphasizes particular over universal and part over whole there is hardly any scope for such metaphysical
entity. Therefore in Buddhism individual is also treated in some way as dividual. Nevertheless it has to be some
kind of unitary entity that seeks liberation, suffers pain and so on. Therefore Individual is a problematic concept in
Buddhism and if the notion of individual is problematic, then the notion of social or religious collectivity has to be
even more problematic. It could be therefore interesting to see how these ideas pertaining to individual and
collective are taken into consideration in Buddhist philosophy both at metaphysical level and social level. This
forms the main subject matter of my present paper.
Before I actually begin with a discussion on these issues we should bear in mind that the ideas that we associate
today with the terms individuality and collectivity are not the same ideas that these terms used to connote
thousands of years back in Buddhism. Buddhists are not so much concerned about the creator of the world and
how that creator relates to the world and sustains it. They were more concerned about the ordinary human being
and her suffering at both socio-political and spiritual level. In order to understand Buddhist worldview, we have to
understand Buddhist view of virtue and equanimity. The main focus of Buddhist philosophy is ethics and
epistemology. Unlike many orthodox schools which are more concerned about the material basis of the world and
imperceptible forces that operate in the world, Buddhist thought is mainly informed by concern towards human
suffering and its eradication as stated in four noble truths. According to Buddhists the most inevitable truth about

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human predicament namely suffering applies equally to all human beings. Alleviation of suffering is a binding
force that provides solidarity to any human collectivity. It is in this background that we can make some sense of the
notions of individuality and collectivity in Buddhist philosophy. It is in light of this understanding that I intend to
discuss the conception of individual and collectivity in Buddhist Hnayna and Mahyna texts.

Notion of Individual and Collective in Hnayna School

The structure and administration of a group that is described in Pli Vinay texts pertains to a special group namely
Bhikkhu sangha or Buddhist monasteries. How far it could help our understanding of society and polity of ordinary
human beings could be a moot point? But despite there being a lot of difference between Bhikkhu collectivity and a
group of common householders, the fact remains that both are collectivities. Notwithstanding other differences
Bhikkhu shangha is also sanghat (group or collective) and from that point of view gives us some important cues to
understand the relationship between individual and collective in ordinary lifeworld as well.
In this context lets first of all try to understand the definition of sangha or group according to Vinay text. According
to these texts there need to be at least four individual to qualify to be addressed as Sangha. Further, sangha is defined
as a group of individuals who are bound together by a common set of rules. The formation of sangha depends upon
following these set of rules and the common desire to attain liberation from suffering. The individual in a group
should have the same spiritual ideal namely alleviation of suffering of oneself and the world. There should be
solidarity among the individuals of a sangha based on such spiritual consensus. To achieve this whenever sangha is
formed and its administration begins, all the members of the sangha come together and express consensus regarding
the functioning of the sangha and only then the actual administration of the sangha begins. Therefore, common ideal,
solidarity in spirit and common conduct are the three pillars of collective life in sangha.
Another important thing to be noted here is that sangha is not an end in itself. It is only a means towards an
individual and collective end. Though each one of the sangha member is responsible for her spiritual upliftment,
sangha is qualified as a group of only such individuals.Therefore the dialectical relationship between individuality
and collectivity meets a synthesis in sangha.
At the level of metaphysics, one should not forget here that Buddhists maintain that there is no permanent entity like
soul. But though Buddhists deny the existence of any permanent entity like soul in the world, they do not deny the
samvrtti satya or the practical value of this concept. To signify an individual the term used by the Buddhists is
pudgala.According to Buddhism just as an individual is devoid of any permanent significance and is only a nominal
device to understand our worldly predicament so is the case with sangha too. From the point of view of metaphysics
both of them only have a nominal practical significance and are devoid of any permanent value. From the point of
nma-rpa and jada-etan, Buddhists believe that there are five factors that go into formation of them. These five
factors are called as updna-skandhas. Buddhists view an individual as an aggregate or conglomeration of some more
basic elements which include:
(i) Vedan
(ii) Saja (name)
(iii) Samskra (sense-impression)
(iv) Vijana (consciousness)
Further, Buddhists maintain that all things that are real always have causal efficacy (arthakriykritva). Further,
whatever has causal efficacy is also impermanent or momentary. Since all things on Buddhist account are momentary
so are the five skandhas enumerated by them. Despite being subject to arising and destruction these skandhas because
of their discreet nature give an appearance of continuity. Though this continuous chain (santati) belongs to skandhas,
this continuity itself is not a skandha. Skandhas themselves are point-instants and discreet and momentary. Though
inside an individual all these skandhas operate distinctly, during the cognition of an individual these skandhas are
cognized as a sanghta (in the sense of working aggregates) or as a continuant. An individual who is himself living at
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the level of continuant views such other continuants categorized in a cause and effect relationship. But since linguistic
categories are more permanent than the object designated by them, a sub-conscious belief starts making room in the
individuals psyche that things cognized are as permanent as the linguistic designations used to categorize them.
Thus this individual, who under the influence of linguistic conceptualconstructs looks at the objects around him as
endless continuants, is the locus of such reflexive conceptions of I-conscious, doership etc. Thus individual conceived
as pudgala is one such sanght amongst many which though composed of five skandhas is viewed as individual (individual), unitary and independently originated consciousness under the illusion of continuity. With such a
conception of individual, social collectivities are viewed as second order sanght or dependently originated units
which only have a practical value. Thus sangha is neither a separate new unit over and above its individual members
nor is it to be identified with them severally. It is a dependently originated unit with causal efficacy and has a
practical utility for individual strife towards Nirvna. Thus on Buddhist account the relationship between an
individual and sangha is that of mutual dependence or interdependence.
In Sthaviravada branch of Buddhism we find a slightly different account of notions of individuality and collectivity.
In Kathvattu of Abhidhammapitaka and in Milindpanha, we find aphorisms stating non-availability of pudgala. But
this should not be understood to mean that pudgala is an empty term. It only means that when we try to analyze our
conception of any individual, there is no counterpart of pudgala coming forth.
There are several types of division of padrtha suggested by Sthavirvdins. One of these divisions is formulated on
the basis of nma-rpa and prajpti. Nma and rpa refer to designation and form of an object whereas prajptis are
further divided into nmaprajpti and arthaprajpti. The word that is used to refer to an object is nmaprajpti and
the individual thus referred to is arthaprajpti. Latter amongst these are those entities which do not have a separate
independent existence but have a static appearance as a continuous chain or santati. Thus prajpti as defined by
Sthavirvdins has a peculiar ontological status. Since these are evolved out of five elements, they do not have an
independent essential nature. At the same time, we cannot call them to be non-entities either because completely nonexistent dharmas cannot be a means towards any end. In other terms non-entities never have causal efficacy. Similarly
pudgala is not a complete non-entity. Nevertheless it could be benedictory and is named kalyna-mitr or it could be at
times malefic and named ppa-mitr. Depending upon their locus, these pudgala could generate kuala-dharmas (good
properties) or akuala-dharmas (bad properties) in the person concerned. This way pudgala is upnishraya-pratyaya. Thus
from this we could conclude that pudgala is recognized as having samvittisatya in Sthavirvdi worldview because it is
endowed with practical efficacy. Just as in Platos republic an individual is seen as a prototype of society, on
Sthavirvdin account pudgala is a working sanghta at one level and society is a sanghata of such pudgalas in turn.
When we look at the relationship between the Bhikkhus and the sangha, then we realize that despite being a religious
group it informs our understanding of the individual and collectivity in the larger perspective of society as well.

Mahyna view of Individual and Society

Ngrjuna considers Abhyudya and Nireyasa as two purushrthas in his lesser known work Ratnvali.
First, I shall explain the dharmas causing happiness (abhyudaya),
Afterwards, I shall distinguish the dharmas generating liberation (nireyasa).
Beings place obtaining happiness as foremost,
And then afterwards pursue liberation.1
In this work Ngrjuna gives some implicit suggestions regarding the kind of social setup he envisages. Abhyudaya
according to him refers to rise in the worldly wellbeing of an individual including social position or status and
material possessions. Nireyasa on the other hand refers to spiritual wellbeing of an individual. Ngrjuna does not
see any opposition between the two. Abhyudaya is the antecedent of Nireyasa and also its locus and cannot stay
independently of Nireyasa. Abhyudaya is the worldly happiness and Nireyasa requires an optimum level of such
happiness. People who are interested in the pursuit of Abhyudaya including the ruler of the state, should develop the
virtues of dna (donating) and la (equanimity) according to Ngrjuna. In his description of Abhyudaya Ngrjuna

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nowhere seems to assume a condescending position towards good governance, material needs of an individual and
her relationship with other fellow beings. Even the state of Nirvna is viewed by Ngrjuna in terms of general good
of all beings. According to him good of all (sarvahita or lokahita) should be the desirable end of the one who has
achieved nirvna. Further Ngrjuna divides happiness into two kinds namely (i) physical or material and (ii) mental
or spiritual.
Although Universal Monarchs rule
Over the four continents, their pleasures
Are regarded as only two
The physical and the mental.
Physical feelings of pleasure
Are only a lessening of pain.
Mental pleasures are made of thought,
Created only by conceptuality.2
Further, he does not view them in terms of any hierarchy but only views the former to be the practical pre-requisite of
the latter. Further he says that both these kinds of happiness should be guided by the virtue of karun (compassion).
Ngrjuna further says in Ratnvali that raddh, in the sense of commitment which stays unflinching even in the case
of rga, dvea, bhaya and ajna, is the source of Abhyudaya and is one of the decisive factors for nireyasa. Arguing for
the middle path between self (sva) and other (par), pravtti and nivtti and emotion (bhvana) and reason (buddhi),
Ngrjuna suggests that an action is not in accordance with duty (dharma) unless it is devoid of any thought of
harming the other (pardroha) and not guided by lokahita (human wellbeing). raddha or faith which is a means towards
Abhyudaya3 is enlightened by praj and not blind faith. This faith combined with praj evolves into mahkarun or
compassion for all. In the wake of the above we could probably say that social setup envisaged by Ngrjuna in
Ratnvali is value based, syncretic and in accordance with the middle path. Tna or the desire principle which is
considered to be the seed of all evils and cessation of which is advocated by all other Buddhist schools has been
deemed by Ngrjuna as an Upya (skill in means) for the end towards happiness of all. According to him the
provision of the state and the ruler is only a means of larger good of collectivity and should have compassion as its
guiding force. Ngrjunas suggestion to the king is that even when he has to give a sentence to an offender, he
should be guided by the compassion for all not motivated by personal feeling of hate or repulsiveness for the
offender. Ngrjuna writes:
Just as deficient children are punished
Out of a wish to make them competent,
So punishment should be carried out with compassion,
Not through hatred nor desire for wealth.4
Ngrjuna cautions the king against telling lies because truth is defined by him as that which helps others. He writes
in Ratnvali:
Just as by themselves the true words of kings generate firm trust,
So their false words are the best means to create distrust.
What is not deceitful is the truth;
It is not an intentional fabrication.
What is solely helpful to others is the truth.
The opposite is falsehood since it does not help.5
Vairgya for Ngrjuna is not tantamount to embracing pain in the name of austerity. For a bodhisattva though pain
is undesirable but just as we need a thorn to remove another one, similarly bodhisattva takes pain upon himself for
the removal of pain of others. Pain in this context becomes desirable and a skill in means for the bodhisattva.
Just as it is explained in medicine
That poison can be removed by poison,
What contradiction is there in saying
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That what is injurious [in the future] can be removed by suffering?

It is renowned [in Great Vehicle scriptures] that motivation determines practices
And that the mind is most important.6
One should also note here that just like in Jaina ethics the discipline required in case of householder is not as strict as
the Jaina ascetic, similarlywhen it comes to different householders in the state Ngrjuna does not advocate complete
renunciation of worldly pleasures from them. He allows them both physical and mental pleasure.7
From the metaphysical point of view Ngrjuna considers both the individual and the society as dependently
originated and therefore having only practical truth (samvtisatya). nyavda point of view is that anything that has
an independent existence cannot be held to have arisen from other external factors, therefore cannot be held to be
momentary or impermanent (anitya). Similarly if suffering were an independent fact in the world then we could not
at the same time hold that ignorance (avidy) and desires (tn) as the root cause of it. If that were the case then any
possibility of cessation of suffering would be precluded or foreclosed. From this account nyavdin concludes that
whoever wants to offer a truly ethical system has to maintain that bhva or psychological states are also dependently
originated which would further imply believing in nisvabhvat of all psychological states. Basically Ngrjuna here
means to say that there cannot be any bhva which is not dependently originated and is existent. Therefore for proper
understanding of suffering and its cause it is necessary that we understand them under the purview of nyavdin
theory of nisvabhvat. Thus overall view of nyavdinregarding the individual and society boils down to the
following:
(i) Since we cognize the existence of individual and society, it cannot be totally non-existent.Since we know it
therefore its existence at the level of prajpti cannot be denied.
(ii) Individual and society are not borne out of some essential nature. These are dependently originated,
mutually dependent or interdependent entities.
(iii) Since any view of society and individual based on one-sided view of eternal existence of ethical codes (as
held by Mmmsakas) or complete denial of them (as held by Crvka) would be based on dogmatic
(dtivdi) conceptions, therefore any socio-political system based on such metaphysical views would be onesided and fail to take a comprehensive account of balance between individual and society.
As opposed to above any socio-political theory based on nisvabhvat would view everything as devoid of essence
(svabhva). Such entities without essence could not give rise to any material aspirations or ego on the part of the
subject. Subsequently there would be less possibility of conflict of narrow interests in the society.
This clearly subverts any criticisms against Buddhist ethics as primarily based on prohibitions and as confined to
sangha ethics alone. Ngrjuna nowhere seems to oversee the human society and their overall interests as a
collectivity.
Another criticism that is often placed against Buddhist vision of social order is that there is no scope for pururthas of
kma and artha in it which are essential virtues for the growth of human excellence. It is a well-known Buddhist belief
that human species would always continue to exist, therefore bodhisattva vows to return eternally again and again to
serve the purpose of human spiritual excellence. Thus it would not really be appropriate to say that the kind of moral
imperative that Mahynists envision, hinges upon a ground cleared of artha and kma principles of moral life. It
rather advocates morality with inherent roles for artha and kma. Based on their tenets of middle way, Ngrjuna
does argue for avoiding extreme indulgence in either of these human needs but one should not conclude from it that
artha and Kma have not been assigned any value in Mahyna ethics at all. Mahayana like most of the orthodox
systems of Indian philosophy does not conceive of artha and kma as supreme goals like rvkas. In Buddhism the
seeker is supposed to fulfill his material needs through seeking alms from the householders, therefore the need of
artha is not overlooked but one cannot deny that there can be both moral and immoral ways of fulfilling ones
material needs and it is in this respect that Ngrjunas views hold importance.
Ngrjuna even argues that goodness and badness are not intrinsic properties or characteristics of any object or any
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action. So there is nothing on this account which is eternally good or eternally bad. Ngrjuna writes in
Vigrahvyvartan in this regard:
If the intrinsic nature of the good things originates in dependence upon the cause-condition complex, how can it,
being born of an extrinsic nature, be the intrinsic nature of good things? The same holds true of bad and other things.8
Another criticism leveled against Buddhist notion of individuality and collectivity is that any notion of an individual
requires some essential metaphysical notion of a unitary and permanent self. In the absence of such notion, no
concrete philosophical conception of individual and therefore of a collectivity could emerge. One might look for a
reply to this objection form VimalkrtisNirdeaSukta. Much in consonance with nyavda,Vimalkrti maintains that
both individuality and collectivity are dependently arisen and therefore lack essence. Thus from the point of view of
metaphysics both of them are unreal. Since Buddhists are against any notion of a permanent self, a concrete notion of
individual cannot be available in their belief system. Since the notion of permanent soul is unavailable that renders
the notion of society with a certain metaphysical nature unavailable too. If there is no permanent soul and
subsequently no essential nature of a person or a thing, then there cannot be any set of essential ethical rules either.
Thus Vimalkrti describes even bodhisattva as a free floating personhood for whom the only thing that matters is
alleviation of suffering without any worry about the how of it. He goes to the extent proclaiming about bodhisattva
that:
He may follow the ways of avarice, yet he gives away all internal and external things without regard even for his
own life. He may follow the ways of wickedness and anger, yet he remains utterly free of malice and lives by love. He
may hollow the ways laziness, yet his efforts are uninterrupted as he strives in the cultivation of root of virtue. He
may follow the ways of sensuous distraction, yet, having reached the transcendence of wisdom, he is expert in all
mundane and transcendental sciences.9
But if some minimal notion of commonality is essential for any concrete notion of collectivity, then Buddhists find a
basis for it in human existence in terms of its lived experience. Buddhist examination of human lived experience gives
us the following commonalities among individuals:
(i) All human beings are in a state of sorrow.
(ii) All human beings desire freedom from this state.
(iii) Al human beings have contempt for fear.
(iv) All human beings have contempt for death.
(v) All human beings are impermanent.
(vi) All human beings lack soul.
Thus one of the main distinctions between Buddhism and other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy is that
whereas orthodox schools try to look for some general principle that is followed by all the natural phenomena
signified by their notion of t, Buddhist enquiry begins with the assumption that no such permanent law is followed
in the universe. Furthermore, Buddhists even deny the possibility of some basic notion of enduring self subsequently
no concrete plausible notion of agency could be forthcoming in their system. In the absence of such notion possibility
of ethics seems to go away too. But since ethics is the core issue for all the different schools of Buddhism, this would
be a serious concern for the Buddhists. In reply to such concerns raised by other schools, Buddhists seem to argue
that precisely because no such pre-existing permanent essential feature seems to be observable in the universe, the
responsibility for ones own nirvana falls on ones own shoulders. Collectivity therefore should be based on such
principles which do not go into violation of individual regard for removal of suffering and liberation of all.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1

.Dharmamitra, Bhikshu (trans.) (2008), A Strand of Dharma Jewels A Bodhisattvas Profound Teachings On Happiness, Liberation, and the Path The

RjaParikathRatnval Composed by rya Ngrjuna for a South Indian Monarch, Washington: Kalavinka Press. p.30.
2.

Hopkins, Jeffrey (translator and editor) (2007), Nagarjunas Precious Garland Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, New York: Snow Line

Publication, p.140.

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Ajay Verma (2015) Conception of Individuality and Collectivity in Hnayna and Mahyna Schools of Buddhism

.Ngrjunas descriptions of the meaning of high status (abhyudaya, mngonmtho) suggest that it refers only to elevated states, i.e., the happinesses, of

humans and gods relative to animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings within the five types of lives in cyclic existence Hopkins, Jeffrey (translator and editor)
(2007), Nagarjunas Precious Garland Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, New York: Snow Line Publication, p.32.
4

.Hopkins, Jeffrey (translator and editor) (2007), Nagarjunas Precious Garland Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, New York: Snow Line

Publication, p.78.
5

.Ibid, p.80.

.Ibid, p.143.
.Ibid, p.131.

7
8

.Bhattacharya Kamaleswar& E.H. Johnston & Arnold Kunst (2005), Dialectical Method Of Ngrjuna: Vigrahvyvartan, Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass

Publishers, p.125.
9

.Thurman, Robert (1986), The Holy Teachings of Vimalkirti. University Park : University of Pennsylvania Press, p.64.

Source of Support: Nil

Conflict of Interest: None Declared.

How to cite
Ajay Verma (2015) Conception of Individuality and Collectivity in Hnayna and Mahyna Schools of Buddhism. Inter. J. Humanities &
Religion, 4(1): 017-023

February 2015

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