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Index Terms Deregulated electric power systems, power generation scheduling, market
behavior.
* Corresponding author
1
Introduction
In the last decade, the electricity industry has experienced significant changes towards
deregulation and competition with the aim of improving economic efficiency. In many places,
these changes have culminated in the appearance of a wholesale electricity market. In this
new context, the actual operation of the generating units no longer depends on state- or
utility-based centralized procedures but rather on decentralized decisions of generation firms
whose goals are to maximize their own profits. All firms compete to provide generation
services at a price set by the market, as a result of the interaction of all of them and the
demand.
Therefore, electricity firms are exposed to significantly higher risks and their need for
suitable decision-support models has greatly increased. On the other hand, regulatory
agencies also require analysis-support models in order to monitor and supervise market
behavior.
Traditional electrical operation models are a poor fit to the new circumstances since
market behavior, the new driving force for any operation decision, was not modeled in.
Hence, a new area of highly interesting research for the electrical industry has opened up.
Numerous publications give evidence of extensive effort by the research community to
develop electricity market models adapted to the new competitive context.
This paper focuses on electricity generation market modeling. Two main technical features
determine the complexity of such models: the product electricity cannot be stored and its
transportation requires a physical link (transmission lines).
On the one hand, these features explain why electricity market modeling usually requires
the representation of the underlying technical characteristics and limitations of the production
assets. Pure economic or financial models used in other kind of activities do a poor job of
explaining electrical market behavior. This paper deals specifically with those models that
combine a detailed representation of the physical system with rational modeling of the firms
behavior.
On the other hand, unless a high interregional or international capacity interconnection
exists or a very proactive divestiture program is prompted (and this is true for very few
countries), only a handful of firms are expected to participate in each wholesale electricity
market. Proper market models, in most cases, must deal with imperfectly competitive
markets, which are much more complex to represent. This paper focuses on these kinds of
models.
The aim of this paper is to help to identify, classify and characterize the somewhat
confusing diversity of approaches that can be found in the technical literature on the subject.
The paper presents a survey of the most relevant publications regarding electricity market
modeling, identifying three major trends: optimization models, equilibrium models and
simulation models. Although there is a large number of papers devoted to modeling the
operation of deregulated power systems, in this survey only a selection of the most relevant
has been considered for brevitys sake. An original taxonomy of these models is also
introduced in order to classify them according to specific attributes: degree of competition,
time scope, uncertainty modeling, interperiod links, transmission constraints and market
representation. These specific characteristics are helpful to understand the advantages and
limits of each model surveyed in this paper. Finally, the paper identifies which approaches are
most suitable for each purpose (i.e., planning studies or market analysis), including risk
management, which is an increasingly important market issue.
Four articles, Smeers (1997), Kahn (1998), Hobbs (2001) and Day et al. (2002), have
already addressed the classification of these approaches. The first points out how game
theory-based models can be used to explore relevant aspects of the design and regulation of
liberalized energy markets. It also introduces the application of multistage-equilibrium
models in the context of investment in deregulated electricity markets. Kahn (1998) surveys
numerical techniques for analyzing market power in electricity focusing on equilibrium
models, based on profit maximization of participants, which assume oligopolistic
competition. Two kinds of equilibria are mentioned in this survey. The commonest one is
based on Cournot competition, where firms compete in quantity. In contrast, in the Supply
Function Equilibrium approach (SFE), firms compete both in quantity and price. The
conclusion is that Cournot is more flexible and tractable, and for this reason it has attracted
more interest. More recently, Hobbs (2001) presents a brief overview of the related literature,
concentrating on Cournot-based models. Finally, Day et al. (2002) perform a more detailed
survey of the power market modeling literature with emphasis on equilibrium models. The
new survey presented in this paper does not offer a significantly different vision of the
existing electricity market modeling trends but rather a complementary and unifying one. It
constitutes an effort to organize and characterize the existing proposals so as to clarify their
main contributions and shortfalls and pave the way toward future developments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the classification scheme used in
3
the survey. Section III describes the publications related to optimization models, whereas
Section IV focuses on those related to equilibrium models. Section V presents the
publications devoted to simulation models. Section VI details the proposed taxonomy for
electricity market models. Section VII points out the major uses of each modeling approach
and, finally, Section VIII provides some conclusions.
2
Optimization
Problem for
One Firm
Electricity
Market
Modeling
Market
Equilibrium
Considering
All Firms
Exogenous
Price
Demand-price
Function
Cournot
Equilibrium
Supply Function
Equilibrium
Equilibrium
Models
Simulation
Models
Agent-based
Models
Research developments follow three main trends: optimization models, equilibrium models
and simulation models. Optimization models focus on the profit maximization problem for a
one of the firms competing in the market, while equilibrium models represent the overall
market behavior taking into consideration competition among all participants. Simulation
models are an alternative to equilibrium models when the problem under consideration is too
complex to be addressed within a formal equilibrium framework.
Although there are many other possible classifications based on more specific attributes
(see Section VI), the different mathematical structures of these three modeling trends
establish a clearer division. Their various purposes and scopes also imply distinctions related
to market modeling, computational tractability and main uses.
Mathematical structure: Optimization-based models are formulated as a single
4
optimization program in which one firm pursues its maximum profit. There is a single
objective function to be optimized subject to a set of technical and economic constraints. In
contrast, both equilibrium and simulation-based models consider the simultaneous profit
maximization program of each firm competing in the market. Both types of models are
schematically represented in Fig. 2, where f represents the profit of each firm
f {1,L ,F } ; x f are firm fs decision variables; and h f ( x ) and g f ( x ) represent firm f's
constraints.
Single-firm
Optimization Model
Optimization Program
of firm f
maximize :
( x)
subject to : h f ( x ) = 0
g f ( x) 0
Equilibrium Model
Optimization Program
of Firm 1
Optimization Program
of Firm f
(x )
maximize : 1 ( x1 )
maximize :
subject to : h1 ( x1 ) = 0
subject to : h f ( x f ) = 0
g (x ) 0
1
(x ) 0
f
Supply = Demand
Supply = Demand
Electricity Market
Electricity Market
Optimization Program
of Firm F
maximize :
(x )
F
subject to : h F ( x F ) = 0
g F ( xF ) 0
suitable to long-term planning and market power analysis since they consider all participants.
The modeling flexibility of simulation models allows for a wide range of purposes although
there is still some controversy as to the appropriate uses of agent-based models. The major
uses of existing electricity models are presented in more detail in Section 7.
3
grouped together into the single-firm optimization category. These models take into account
relevant operational constraints of the generation system owned by the firm of interest as well
as the price clearing process. According to the manner in which this process is represented,
these models can be classified into two types: price modeled as an exogenous variable and
price modeled as a function of the demand supplied by the firm of study.
3.1
Exogenous price
The lowest level of market modeling represents the price clearing process as exogenous to
the firms optimization program, i.e., the system marginal price is an input parameter for the
optimization program. Consequently, as the price is fixed, the market revenueprice times
the firms productionbecomes a linear function of the firms production, which is the main
decision variable in this approach. In view of that, traditional Linear Programming (LP) and
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) techniques can be employed to obtain the
solution of the model. Unfortunately, this type of optimization model can only properly
represent markets under quasi-perfect competition conditions because it neglects the influence
of the firms decisions on the market clearing price.
These models can again be classified into two sub-groups, depending on whether they use
a deterministic or probabilistic price representation.
Deterministic models: A good example is the model proposed in Gross and Finlay et al.
(1996).1 In this model, since the price is considered to be exogenous, it is shown that the
firms optimization problem can be decomposed into a set of sub-problemsone per
generatorresembling the Lagrangian Relaxation approach.2 As expected in a case of perfect
competition, deterministic price and convex costs, the simple comparison between each
1 Many later models are based on the same assumptions, thus leading to similar conclusions.
2 A large-scale problem with complicating constraints is amenable for a dual decomposition solution strategy,
commonly known as Lagrangian Relaxation approach.
6
generators marginal cost and the market price decides the production of each generator;
therefore, the best offer of each generation unit consists of bidding its marginal cost.
Stochastic models: The previous approach can be improved if price uncertainty is
explicitly considered. For instance, Rajamaran et al. (2001) describe and solve the selfcommitment problem of a generation firm in the presence of exogenous price uncertainty. The
objective function to be maximized is the firms profit, based on the prices of energy and
reserve at the nodes where the firms units are located, which are assumed to be both
exogenously determined and uncertain. Similarly to the Gross and Finlay approach, the
authors correctly interpret that, in this setting, the scheduling problem for each generating unit
can be treated independently, which significantly simplifies the process of obtaining a
solution, thus permitting a detailed representation of each unit. The problem is solved using
backward Dynamic Programming and several numerical examples illustrate the possibilities
of this approach.
A number of recent models represent the price of electricity as an uncertain exogenous
variable in the context of deciding the operation of the generating units and at the same time
adopting risk-hedging measures. Fleten et al. (1997; 2002) address the medium-term risk
management problem of electricity producers that participate in the Nord Pool. These firms
face significant uncertainty in hydraulic inflows and prices of spot market and contract
markets. Considering that prices and inflows are highly correlated, they propose a stochastic
programming model coordinating physical generation resources and hedging through the
forward market. They model risk aversion by means of penalizing risk through a piecewise
linear target shortfall cost function. More recently, Unger (2002) improves the Fleten
approach by explicitly measuring the risk as Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). Similar to the
models proposed by Fleten and Unger, another stochastic approach, which focuses on the
solution method, is presented in Pereira (1999). The resulting large-scale optimization
program is solved using the Benders decomposition technique, in which the entire firms
maximization problem is decomposed into a financial master-problem and an operation subproblem. While the financial master-problem produces financial decisions related to the
purchase of financial assets (forwards, options, futures and so forth), the operation subproblems decide both the dispatch of the physical generation system and the exercise of
financial assets providing feedback to the financial problem. The master-problem and subproblems are solved using linear programming.
3.2
In contrast to the former approaches in which the price clearing process is assumed to be
independent of the firms decisions, there exists another family of models that explicitly
considers the influence of a firms production on price. In the context of microeconomic
theory, the behavior of one firm that pursues its maximum profit taking as given the demand
curve and the supply curve of the rest of competitors is described by the so-called leader-inprice model (Varian, 1992). In such a model the amount of electricity that the firm of interest
is able to sell at each price is given by its residual-demand function.3 Electricity market
models of this type can also be classified in two sub-groups depending on whether a
probabilistic representation of the residual-demand function is used.
Deterministic models: The first publication on electricity markets based on the leader-inprice model is Garca et al. (1999). They address the unit commitment4 problem of a specific
firm facing a linear residual-demand function. Given that the market revenue is a quadratic
function of the firms total output, in order to allow for the use of powerful Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) solvers, a piecewise linearization procedure of the market
revenue is proposed. Likewise, Ballo et al. (2001) develop a MILP-based model focusing on
the problem of one firm with significant hydro resources. The Ballo model is more advanced
in that it allows non-concave market revenue functions by means of additional binary
variables. This approach is included in a recent monograph on new developments in unit
commitment models (Hobbs et al. 2001).
Stochastic models: Unlike previous approaches, Anderson and Philpott (2002) do not
formulate the problem of optimal production but rather the problem of constructing the
optimal offer curve of a generation firm. In order to obtain the optimal shape of that offer
curve, the uncertain behavior of both competitors and consumers must be taken into account.
For this reason, they represent uncertainty in the residual-demand function by a probability
distribution. This approach constitutes an interesting starting point for the development of
new models that convert the offer curve into a profitable risk hedging mechanism against
From the point of view of one firm, its residual-demand function is obtained by subtracting the aggregation
of all competitors selling offers from the demand-sides buy bids. The term residual-demand function is also
known as effective demand function.
4
The Unit Commitment Problem deals with the short-term schedule of thermal units in order to supply the
electricity demand in an efficient manner. In this type of model the main decision variables are generators startups and shut-downs.
8
short-term uncertainties in the marketplace. The thesis of Ballo (2002) advances the
Anderson and Philpott approach by incorporating a detailed modeling of the generating
system which implies that offer curves of different hours are not independent.
4
Equilibrium Models
Approaches which explicitly consider market equilibria within a traditional mathematical
programming framework are grouped together into the equilibrium models category. As
mentioned earlier, there are two main types of equilibrium models. The commonest type is
based on Cournot competition, in which firms compete in quantity strategies, whereas the
most complex type is based on Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), where firms compete in
offer curve strategies. Although both approaches differ in regard to the strategic variable
(quantities vs offer curves), both are based on the concept of Nash equilibriumthe market
reaches equilibrium when each firms strategy is the best response to the strategies actually
employed by its opponents.
4.1
Cournot Equilibrium
The Hydrothermal Coordination Problem provides the optimal allocation of hydraulic and thermal
generation resources for a specific planning horizon by explicitly considering the fuel cost savings that can be
obtained due to an intelligent use of hydro reserves.
9
et al. (2001) state the market equilibrium using the equations that express the optimal
behavior of generation companies, i.e., by means of the firms optimality conditions. Unlike
both the Scott and Read model and the Bushnell model, the Rivier et al. (2001) approach
takes advantage of the fact that the optimality conditions can be directly solved due to its
10
Mixed Complementarity Problem6 (MCP) structure, which allows for the use of special
complementarity methods to solve realistically sized problems. Kelman et al. (2001) combine
the Cournot concept with the Stochastic Dynamic Programming technique in order to cope
with hydraulic inflow uncertainty problems. However, they do not mention how they deal
with the fact that the recourse function7 of the Dynamic Programming algorithm is nonconvex in equilibrium problems. Barqun et al. (2003) introduce an original approach to
compute market equilibrium, by solving an equivalent minimization problem. This approach
is oriented to the medium-term planning of large-size hydrothermal systems, including the
determination of water value and other sensitivity results obtained as dual variables of the
optimization problem.
Electric power network: Congestion pricing in transmission networks is another area in
which Cournot-based models have also played a significant role. Both Hogan (1997) and
Oren (1997) formulate a spatial electricity model wherein firms compete in a Cournot
manner. Wei and Smeers (1999) use a Variational Inequality8 (VI) approach for computing
the spatial market equilibrium including generation capacity expansion decisions. They model
the electrical network considering only power-flow conservation-equations since they omit
Kirchhoffs voltage law. This type of electric network model is known as transshipment
model.
More recently, Hobbs (2001) models imperfect competition among electricity producers in
bilateral and POOLCO-based power markets as a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). 9
His model includes a congestion-pricing scheme for transmission in which load flows are
modeled considering both the first and the second Kirchhoff laws by means of a linearized
formulation. This type of electric network model is known as DC model. In contrast to
previous models, the VI and LCP approaches are able to cope with large problems. In all
these models it is assumed that the generation units of each firm are located at only one node
of the networkwhich is, obviously, a particular case. Unfortunately, since in the general
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of any optimization problem can be formulated
making use of a special mathematical structure known as Complementarity Problem. A Mixed Complementarity
Problem (MCP) is a mixture of equations with a Complementarity Problem.
7
In the Hydrothermal Coordination Problem, the recourse function is known as the future water value.
A Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) is obtained when the KKT conditions are derived from an
case in which each firm is allowed to own generation units in more than one node, a purestrategy equilibrium does not exist, as it is pointed out by Neuhoff (2003).
Risk analysis: Finally, because of the difficulty in applying traditional risk management
techniques to electricity markets, only one publication has been identified that explicitly
addresses the risk management problem for generation firms under imperfect competition
conditions. Batlle et al. (2000) present a procedure capable of taking into account some risk
factors such as hydraulic inflows, demand growth and fuel costs. Cournot market behavior is
considered using the simulation model described in (Otero-Novas et al. 2000) which
computes market prices under a wide range of scenarios. The Batlle model provides risk
measures such as value-at-risk (VaR) or profit-at-risk (PaR).
4.2
10
In some respects, the models predicted prices are too high because they do not take into account some of
the external circumstances such as stranded cost payments, new entry aversion or regulatory threats.
12
assume that firms make conjectures about their residual demand elasticities, as in the general
conjectural variations approach, whereas Day et al. (2002) assume that firms make
conjectures about their rivals supply functions. In the context of electricity markets this
approach is already labeled as the Conjectured Supply Function (CSF) approach.
4.3
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) showed that, in the absence of uncertainty and given the
competitors strategic variables (quantities or prices), each firm has no preference between
expressing its decisions in terms of a quantity or a price, because it faces a unique residual
demand. On the contrary, when a firm faces a range of possible residual demand curves it
expects, in general, a bigger profit expressing its decisions in terms of a supply function that
indicates the price at which it offers different quantities to the market. This is the supply
function equilibrium (SFE) approach which, originally developed by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989), has proven to be an extremely attractive line of research for the analysis of
equilibrium in wholesale electricity markets.
Calculating an SFE requires solving a set of differential equations, instead of the typical
set of algebraic equations that arises in traditional equilibrium models, where strategic
variables take the form of quantities or prices. SFE models have thus considerable limitations
concerning their numerical tractability. In particular, they rarely include a detailed
representation of the generation system under consideration. The publications devoted to
these models concentrate on four topics: market power analysis, representation of electricity
pricing, linearization of the supply function equilibrium model and evaluation of the impact
of the electric power network.
Market power analysis: The SFE approach was extensively used to predict the
performance of the pioneering England & Wales (E&W) Pool, whose revolutionary design
did not seem to fit into more conventional oligopoly models. The relatively unimportant role
played by the transmission network in this particular power system increased the relevance of
these studies. Green and Newbery (1992) analyze the behavior of the duopoly that
characterized the E&W electricity market during its first years of operation under the SFE
approach. It is assumed that each company submits a daily smooth supply function. The
demand curve faced by generation companies is extremely inelasticdemand-side bidding
was almost non-existentand varies over time since in the E&W Pool offers were required to
be kept unchanged throughout the day. Interesting conclusions were reached. For instance, in
the case of an asymmetric duopoly it is shown that the large firm finds price increases more
13
profitable and therefore has a greater incentive to submit a steeper supply function. The small
firm then faces a less elastic residual demand curve and also tends to deviate from its
marginal costs. This was previously pointed out by Bolle (1992), where the large generation
company suffers the consequences of the curse of market power and indirectly causes an
increase of its rivals profits.
Electricity pricing: The possibility of obtaining reasonable medium-term price estimations
with the SFE approach is considerably attractive, particularly when conventional equilibrium
models based on the Cournot conjecture have proven to be unreliable in this aspect mainly
due to their strong dependence on the elasticity assumed for the demand curve. Indeed, the
SFE framework does not require the residual demand curve either to be elastic or to be known
in advance. Based on the assumption of inelastic demand, further advances on the SFE theory
have been reported which increase its applicability. Rudkevich (1998) has obtained a closedform expression that provides the price for a SFE given a demand realization under the
assumption of an n-firm symmetric oligopoly with inelastic demand and uniform pricing.
Convergence problems due to the numerical integration of the SFE system of differential
equations are thus overcome. This approach also allows to consider stepwise marginal cost
functions, which is more realistic than the convex and differentiable cost functions typical of
previous SFE models.
Linear Supply Function equilibrium models: For numerical tractability reasons, researchers
have recently focused on the linear SFE model, in which demand is linear,11 marginal costs
are linear or affine and SFE can be obtained in terms of linear or affine supply functions.
Green (1996) considers the case of an asymmetric n-firm oligopoly with linear marginal costs
facing a linear demand curve whose slope remains invariable over time. An SFE expressed in
terms of affine supply functions is obtained. Baldick et al. (2000) extend previous results to
the case of affine marginal cost functions and capacity constraints. Solutions for the SFE are
provided in the form of piecewise affine non-decreasing supply functions. They use this
method to predict the extent to which structural changes in the E&W electricity industry may
affect wholesale electricity spot prices. Baldick and Hogan (2001) perform a comprehensive
review of the SFE approach. The authors first revisit the general SFE problem of an
asymmetric n-firm oligopoly facing a linear demand curve (no explicit assumption is made
concerning the firms marginal costs) and show the extraordinary complexity of obtaining
11
According to Baldick (2000), the precise description would be affine demand, whereas the term linear
solutions for the system of differential equations that results. In particular, they highlight the
difficulty of discarding infeasible solutions (e.g., equilibria with decreasing supply functions).
An iterative procedure to calculate feasible SFE solutions is proposed and extensively used to
analyze the influence of a variety of factors such as capacity constraints, price caps, bid caps
or the time horizon over which offers are required to remain unchanged.
Electric power network: In Ferrero et al. (1997), generation companies are assumed to
offer one affine supply curve at each of the nodes in which their units are located. Transaction
costs are calculated based on Schweppes spot pricing theory, including the influence of
transmission constraints. A finite number of offering strategies are defined for each
generation company and an exhaustive enumeration solution process is proposed. Berry et al.
(1999) use an SFE model to predict the outcome of a given market structure including an
explicit representation of the transmission network. Forcing supply functions to be affine
typically alleviates the complexity of searching for a solution. Different conceptual
approaches have been adopted to obtain numerical solutions for this family of models. In
general, no existence or uniqueness conditions are derived. Hobbs et al. (2000) propose a
model in which the strategy of each firm takes the form of a set of nodal affine supply
functions. The problem is structured in two optimization levels and therefore the solution
procedure is based on Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).
In spite of the variety of modeling proposals, it is possible to identify a number of
attributes that can be used to establish a comparison between different SFE approaches. Some
of these attributes refer to the market representation adopted by each author, such as the
possibility of considering asymmetric firms and the assumptions made about the shape of the
marginal cost curves, the supply functions or the demand curve. Others attributes refer to the
model of the generation system (e.g., capacity constraints) or the transmission network (e.g.,
transmission constraints). Finally, the solution method used by each author and the numerical
cases addressed are also two relevant features. In order to illustrate the evolution of this line
of research, Table 1 presents a summary of the works that have been reviewed in this section.
15
Klemperer, 1989
No
Convex
Concave
Green, 1992
No
Quadratic
Linear
Green, 1996
Yes
Linear
Linear
Supply Functions
Twice Continuously
Differentiable
Twice Continuously
Differentiable
Affine
Capacity
Constraints
No
Yes
No
Solution
Method
Necessary
Conditions
Numerical
Integration
Closed-form
Expression
Exhaustive
Enumeration
Closed-form
Expression
Transmission
Network
Numerical
Application
No
No
No
E&W Pool
No
E&W Pool
Yes
IEEE 30-bus
System
No
Pennsylvania
Ferrero, 1997
Yes
Affine
Inelastic
Affine
Yes
Rudkevich, 1998
No
Stepwise
Inelastic
Differentiable
Yes
Baldick, 2000
Yes
Affine
Linear
Piecewise Linear
Yes
Heuristics
No
E&W Pool
Baldick, 2001
Yes
Affine
Linear
Piecewise Linear
Non-decreasing
Yes
Heuristics
No
E&W Pool
Berry, 1999
Yes
Affine
Linear
Affine
Yes
Heuristics
Yes
Four-node Case
Hobbs, 2000
Yes
Affine
Linear
Affine
Yes
MPEC
Yes
30-node Case
In conclusion, the SFE approach presents certain advantages with respect to more
traditional models of imperfect competition. In particular, it appears to be an appropriate
model to predict medium-term prices of electricity, given that it does not rely on the demand
function12, as the Cournot model, but on the shape of the equilibrium supply functions
decided by the firms. In addition to this, firms strategies do not need to be modified as
demand evolves over time. Quite the opposite, supply functions are specifically conceived to
represent the firms behavior under a variety of demand scenarios. This flexibility, however,
is accompanied by significant practical limitations concerning numerical tractability. To date,
only under very strong assumptions have SFE problems been solved when applied to real
cases. Given that SFE shortcomings are well documented, only the main disadvantages will
be cited here. Firstly, in general multiple SFE may exist and it is not clear which of them is
more qualified to represent firms strategic behavior. Secondly, except for very simple
versions of the SFE model, existence and uniqueness of a solution are very hard to prove.
Thirdly, closed-form expressions of a solution are very rarely obtained. Consequently,
numerical methods are needed to solve the system of differential equations, thus increasing
the computational requirements of this approach. Moreover, some of this systems solutions
may violate the non-decreasing constraint that supply functions must observe. This leads to
ad hoc solution procedures that usually present convergence problems. Needless to say,
transmission constraints are only considered in extremely simplified versions of the SFE
12
In general, SFE-based approaches model the demand function as inelastic, which is the most suitable
model. Nevertheless, research efforts have recently produced encouraging results that may
ultimately increase the applicability of this approach.
5
Simulation Models
As indicated above, equilibrium models are based on a formal definition of equilibrium,
5.1
In many cases, simulation models are closely related to one of the families of equilibrium
models. For example, when in a simulation model firms are assumed to take their decisions in
the form of quantities, the authors will typically refer to the Cournot equilibrium model in
order to support the adequacy of their approach.
Otero-Novas et al. (2000) present a simulation model that considers the profit
maximization objective of each generation firm while accounting for the technical constraints
that affect thermal and hydro generating units. The decisions taken by the generation firms are
derived with an iterative procedure. In each iteration, given the results obtained in the
previous one, every firm modifies its strategic position with a two-level decision process.
First, each firm updates its output for each planning period by means of a profit maximization
problem in which market clearing prices are held fixed and a Cournot constraint is included
limiting the companys output. Subsequently, the price at which the company offers the
output of each generating unit in each planning period is modified according to a descending
rule. New market clearing prices are calculated based on these offers and on the evolution of
17
5.2
Agent-Based Models
Simulation provides a more flexible framework to explore the influence that the repetitive
interaction of participants exerts on the evolution of wholesale electricity markets. Static
models seem to neglect the fact that agents base their decisions on the historic information
accumulated due to the daily operation of market mechanisms. In other words, agents learn
from past experience, improve their decision-making and adapt to changes in the environment
(e.g., competitors moves, demand variations or uncertain hydro inflows). This suggests that
adaptive agent-based simulation techniques can shed light on features of electricity markets
that static models ignore.
Bower and Bunn (2000) present an agent-based simulation model in which generation
companies are represented as autonomous adaptive agents that participate in a repetitive daily
market and search for strategies that maximize their profit based on the results obtained in the
previous session. Each company expresses its strategic decisions by means of the prices at
which it offers the output of its plants. Every day, companies are assumed to pursue two main
objectives: a minimum rate of utilization for their generation portfolio and a higher profit than
that of the previous day. The only information available to each generation company consists
of its own profits and the hourly output of its generating units. As usual in these models,
demand side is simply represented by a linear demand curve. This setting allows the authors
to test a number of market designs relevant for the changes that have recently taken place in
the E&W wholesale electricity market. In particular, they compare the market outcome that
results under the pay-as-bid rule to that obtained when uniform pricing is assumed.
18
Additionally, they evaluate the influence of allowing companies to submit different offers for
each hour, instead of keeping them unchanged for the whole day. The conclusion is that daily
bidding together with uniform pricing yields the lowest prices, whereas hourly bidding under
the pay-as-bid rule leads to the highest prices.
6
6.1
Degree of Competition
Markets can be classified into three broad categories according to their degree of
competition: perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly.
Since microeconomic theory proves that a perfectly competitive market can be modeled as
a cost minimization or net benefit maximization problem, optimization-based models are
usually the best way to model this type of market. Similarly, a monopoly can be modeled by
the profit maximization program of the monopolistic firm (see Fig. 3). In these models the
price is derived from the demand function. In contrast, under imperfect competition
conditionsthe most common situationthe profit maximization problem of each participant
must be solved simultaneously. In addition, as discussed in the next subsection, the suitability
of each oligopolistic model depends on the time scope of the study.
19
Competition
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Perfect
Competition
Leader in
Price
Nash
Equilibrium
(Cournot and
SFE)
Nash
Equilibrium
(Cournot and
Stackelberg)
Medium Term
(Months)
Time
Scope
Long Term
(Years)
Fig 3. Theoretical electricity market models depending on competition and time scope
6.2
Time Scope
The time scope is a basic attribute for classifying electricity models since each time scope
involves both different decision variables and different modeling approaches. For example,
when long-term planning studies are conducted, capacity-investment decisions are the main
decision variables while unit-commitment decisions are usually neglected. On the contrary, in
short-term scheduling studies, start-ups and shut-downs become significant decision variables
while the maximum capacity of each generator is considered to be fixed.
As previously mentioned, under imperfect competition conditions, the time scope of the
model defines different market modeling approaches. To be specific, in the case of short-term
operation (one day to one week), the experience drawn from the literature surveyed in this
paper suggests that the best way to represent the market is the leader-in-price model from
microeconomics theory (Garca et al. 1999; Ballo et al. 2001; Anderson and Philpott, 2002;
Ballo, 2002). In the leader-in-price model, the incumbent firm pursues its maximum profit
taking into account its residual demand function that relates the price to its energy output. The
most controversial assumption of this theoretical model lies on the static perspective that the
residual demand function provides about other agents. An intuitive explanation about the
suitability of this conjecture in short-term models is that the shorter the time scope
considered, the more consistent this conjecture becomes.
In the medium-term case (one month to one year), the vast majority of the models are
20
based on both Cournot equilibrium (Scott and Read, 1996; Bushnell, 1998; Rivier et al. 2001;
Kelman et al. 2001; Barqun et al. 2003; Otero-Novas et al. 2000) and supply function
equilibrium (Green and Newberry, 1992; Bolle, 1992; Rudkevich et al. 1998; Baldick and
Hogan, 2001).
Finally, microeconomics suggests that the Stackelberg equilibrium may fit better than
other oligopolistic models with the long-term investment-decision problem due to its
sequential decision-making process. There is a leader firm that first decides its optimal
capacity; the follower firms then make their optimal decisions knowing the capacity of the
leader firm (Varian, 1992). Up to now, there are only a few articles (Ventosa et al. 2002;
Murphy and Smeers, 2002) devoted to represent investment in imperfect electricity markets.
In both publications, a comparison between the Cournot equilibrium and Stackelberg
equilibrium for modeling investment decisions is conducted. One conclusion is that although
from a theoretical point of view both models are based on different assumptions, from a
practical point of view there are minor differences in most results. The Stackelberg model of
Ventosa et al. turns out to have the structure of a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC) due to the fact that there is only one leader firm. In contrast, the
Stackelberg-based model of Murphy and Smeers has the structure of an Equilibrium Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) because more that one leader firm may exist. The EPEC
model is more general although it is also more difficult to manage.
6.3
Uncertainty Modeling
One of the most common applications of electricity market models is in the field of
forecasting the market outcome under a wide range of scenarios since prices depend on
random variables such as generators forced outages, hydraulic inflows and levels of demand.
Moreover, in a competitive context, new sources of uncertainty must be considered due to
both strategic behavior of competitors and fuel price volatility.
According to the manner in which uncertainty is represented, models can be classified into
probabilisticwhen the uncertain nature of random variables is incorporated using
probabilistic distributionsand deterministicwhen only the expected value of such
variables is considered. Needless to say, probabilistic models result in large-scale stochastic
problems that require complex solution techniques.
In regard to the representation of the stochasticity of demand within the context of
electricity markets, the best examples are those models based on the Supply Function
Equilibrium (SFE in Fig. 4) (Green and Newberry, 1992; Bolle, 1992; Rudkevich et al. 1998)
21
since they all consider uncertainty in demand. Based on a probabilistic version of the priceleadership model, the Ballo model (2002) not only considers the uncertainty in demand but
also in competitors behavior. Finally, Fleten (2002), and Unger (2002) models focus on
uncertainty in prices and hydraulic inflows under pure competition assumptions, while
Kelman (2001) considers a Cournot framework.
6.4
Interperiod Links
The time scope considered in planning studies is typically split into intervals commonly
known as periods. In electricity generation, there are many costs and decisions that, when
addressed within a certain time scope, involve the scheduling of resources in the multiple
intermediate periods. For example, long-term studies are typically oriented to derive optimal
annual management policies for hydro reserves that must consider the dynamic process of
inflows and thus take the form of a set of monthly or weekly operation decisions. Similarly,
short-term models must take into account the inter-temporal constraints implicit in thermal
unit commitment decisions.
SFE-based models do not usually consider these interperiod effects. In contrast, almost all
the rest of models reviewed in this paper, such as those devoted to optimal offer curve
construction, hydrothermal coordination and capacity expansion problems, focus on the
tradeoff of scheduling resources across time.
22
Interperiod
constraints
Single
Node
Probabilistic
Transshipment
Model
DC
Model
Deterministic
Interperiod
Links
AC
Model
Single
Node
Transshipment
Model
DC
Model
Probabilistic
AC
Model
Deterministic
Intraperiod
Constraints
Interperiod
Constraints
Transmission
Network
Fig. 4. Characterization of some electricity market models according to the modeling of uncertainty,
transmission network and interperiod links
6.5
Transmission Constraints
23
6.6
A high degree of realism regarding the physical modeling of generating systems involves
the representation of technical limits affecting generators as well as the consideration of
accurate production cost functions of thermal units.
As shown in Fig. 5, optimization-based models for individual firms achieve a high level of
accuracy in system modeling due to the powerful LP and MILP techniques available to solve
them. These models consider in detail the relevant technical constraints affecting generation
units. In addition, these models consider every individual generation unit of interest in a nonaggregated manner. For instance, medium-term models such as those proposed in Fleten et al.
(2002), Unger (2002) and Kelman (2001) consider not only the hydro energy constraints
implicit in the management of water reserves but also the hydraulic inflow uncertainty. On the
other hand, short-term models such as Garca et al. (1999) and Ballo (2002) consider in detail
inter-temporal constraints, such as ramp-rate limits, and incorporate binary variables to deal
with decisions such as the start-up and shut-down of thermal units.
In the case of equilibrium models two of the revised approachesthe Otero-Novas model
(2000), which combines a simulation algorithm with optimization techniques, and the Rivier
model (2001), which is solved by complementarity methodsreach a degree of realism
similar to that of optimization models. Both models are able to manage realistically sized
problems considering every generation unit as independent with its particular constraints.
Scott and Read (1996) and Bushnell (1998) are considered to have an intermediate level in
terms of generation system modeling since they take into account independent units but they
are not capable of solving large problems. Finally, it is very rare that SFE-based models
include a detailed representation of the generation system due to their numerical tractability
limitations.
24
Uncertainty
Exogenous
Price
Single-firm
Residual
Demand
Imperfect
Market
Equilibrium
Low
Probabilistic
Medium
High
Deterministic
Market
Modeling
Low
Probabilistic
Medium
Deterministic
Exogenous
Price
High
Single-firm
Residual
Demand
Imperfect
Market
Equilibrium
Generating
System Modeling
Fig. 5. Characterization of some electricity market models according to the treatment of uncertainty,
generation system modeling and market modeling
6.7
Market Modeling
The last attribute considered in this taxonomy is related to the market model under
consideration. Pure competition-based modelsFleten (2002), Unger (2002), Pereira
(1999)are the simplest in terms of market modeling since they consider the price clearing
process as exogenous to the optimization problem. Models based on the leader-in-price
conceptGarca (1999) and Ballo (2002)are considered to have an intermediate level of
complexity since they take into account the influence of the firms production on prices by
means of its residual demand function. Finally, the most complex market models are those
based on imperfect market equilibrium as they take into account the interaction of all
participants.
7
Major Uses
As mentioned in Section II, differences in mathematical structure, market modeling and
computational tractability provide useful information in order to identify the major use of
each modeling trend. This section summarizes the experience and conclusions drawn from the
publications referred to in Sections III, IV and V regarding the major uses of single-firm
25
optimization models, imperfect market equilibrium models and simulation models (see Table
2).
One-firm optimization models are able to deal with difficult and detailed problems because
of their better computational tractability. Good examples of such models are those related to
short-term hydrothermal coordination and unit commitment, which require binary variables,
and optimal offer curve construction under uncertainty, which not only needs binary variables
but also involves a probabilistic representation of the competitors offers and demand-side
bids. Usually, risk management models are also based on optimization due to their complexity
and size.
TABLE 2. MAJOR USES OF ELECTRICITY MARKET MODELS
Major Use
Risk Management
Unit Commitment
One-firm Optimization
Models
(Fleten, 2002; Unger,
2002; Pereira, 1999)
(Garca, 1999;
Rajamaran, 2001)
Short-Term Hydrothermal
Coordination
(Ballo, 2001)
Strategic Bidding
Simulation
Models
In contrast, when long-term planning studies are conducted, equilibrium models are more
suitable because the longer the time scope of the study, the lower the requirement for detailed
modeling capability, and the more significant the response of all competitors. Therefore, the
majority of models devoted to yearly economic planning and hydrothermal coordination are
Cournot-based approaches, which provide more realism in the representation of physical
constraints than SFE-based approaches, that have numerical tractability limitations.
As in the case of long-term studies, in market power analysis and market design, it is also
necessary to consider the market outcome resulting from competition among all participants.
26
Consequently, equilibrium models and simulation models are the best alternative to
traditional anti-trust tools based on indices such as Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) and
Lerner Index.
Finally, regarding the analysis of congestion management in transmission networks,
Cournot and SFE equilibrium models are able to simultaneously consider power flow
constraints and the competition of several firms at each node.
In conclusion, Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the most significant models
referred to in previous sections. The models are classified into eight categories depending on
their market model.13 Within each category, models are listed by year of publication. Other
columns are related to major use, main features of the model, numerical solution method,14
problem size15 of the case study and the regional market considered.
13
CSF: Conjectured Supply Function approach, and CV: Conjectural Variations approach.
14
EPEC: Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints, Heuristic: Ad hoc Heuristic Algorithm, LCP:
Linear Complementarity Problem, LP: Linear Programming, MCP: Mixed Complementarity Problem, MIP:
Mixed Integer Programming, MPEC: Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints, NI: Numerical
Integration, NLP: Non-Linear Programming, Simulation: Simulation Scenario Analysis, and VI: Variational
Inequality.
15
Small: less than 100 variables, Medium: between 100 and 10,000 variables, and Large: more than 10,000
variables.
27
Perfect
Competition and
Exogenous price
Leader-in-price
Authors
Year
Major Use
Main Feature
Solution
Method
Size
Intended
Market
1996
Generation Scheduling
Deterministic Prices
LP
Large
E&W
Fleten et al.
1997
LP
Large
Nord Pool
Pereira et al.
1999
Solution Method
Benders
Large
Rajamaran et al.
2001
Unit Commitment
Price Uncertainty
DP
Large
Unger
2002
Risk Modeling
LP
Large
Nord Pool
Garca et al.
1999
Unit Commitment
Thermal Modeling
MIP
Large
Spain
Ballo et al.
Non-Convex Profit
MIP
Large
Spain
NLP
Small
New Zealand
and Residual
Demand Function Anderson & Philpott 2002
Supply
Function
Equilibrium
Linear
Supply
Function
Equilibrium
Ballo et al.
2002
Practical Approach
MIP
Large
Spain
1992
Symmetric Firms
NI
Small
E&W
Bolle
1992
Symmetric Firms
NI
Small
E&W
Rudkevich et al.
1998
Closed-Form Solution
Analytic
Small
Pennsylvania
Green
1996
Market Design
Closed-Form Solution
Analytic
Small
E&W
Ferrero et al.
1997
Congestion Management
AC Network Model
Enumeration
Small
Berry et al.
1999
Congestion Management
DC Network Model
Heuristic
Small
Hobbs et al.
2000
Congestion Management
DC Network Model
MPEC
Medium
Baldick et al
2000
Heuristic
Small
E&W
Baldick et al
2001
Market Design
Non-Decreasing SFE
Heuristic
Medium
E&W
2001
Asymmetric Firms
Enumeration Medium
E&W
1996
Hydrothermal Coordination
Hydro-Interperiod Links
DP
Bushnell
1998
Hydrothermal Coordination
Analytic Modeling
DP
Medium
California
Radial Congestion
Heuristic
Medium
California
Batlle et al.
2000
Risk Analysis
Simulation
Large
Spain
Equilibrium
Otero-Novas et al.
2000
Agents Behavior
Heuristic
Large
Spain
Stochastic Inflows
DP
Large
Brazil
Spain
Kelman et al.
Rivier et al.
2001
Hydrothermal Coordination
Hydrothermal Modeling
MCP
Large
Barqun et al.
2003
Hydrothermal Coordination
Stochastic Inflows
NLP
Large
Ventosa et al.
2002
Investment Decisions
MPEC
Medium
2002
Investment Decisions
EPEC
Medium
Hogan
1997
Congestion Management
Network Constraints
NLP
Small
Spatial
Oren
1997
Congestion Management
Network Constraints
Analytic
Small
Cournot
1999
Congestion Management
Transshipment Model
VI
Large
Hobbs
2001
Congestion Management
DC Power Flow
LCP
Large
Price Forecasting
Fitting Procedure
LCP
Large
Spain
Stackelberg
CV
Europe
CSF
Day et al.
2002
Congestion Management
DC Power Flow
LCP
Large
E&W
Agent-based
2000
Market Design
Learning Procedure
Heuristic
Medium
E&W
28
there are three main lines of development: optimization models, equilibrium models and
simulation models. These models differ as to their mathematical structure, market
representation, computational tractability and major uses.
In the case of single-firm optimization models, researchers have been developing models
that address problems such as the optimization of generation scheduling or the construction of
offer curves under perfect and imperfect competition conditions. At present, they are working
on two different challenges. On the one hand, they are tackling the cutting edge problem of
converting the offer curve of a generating firm into a robust risk hedging mechanism against
the short-term uncertainties due to changes in demand and competitors behavior. On the other
hand, they are developing risk management models that help firms to decide their optimal
position in spot, future and over-the-counter markets with an acceptable level of risk.
Models that evaluate the interaction of agents in wholesale electricity markets have
persistently stemmed from the game-theory concept of equilibrium. Some of these models
represent the equilibrium in terms of variational inequalities or, alternatively, in the form of a
complementarity problem, providing a framework to analyze realistic cases that include a
detailed representation of the generation system and the transmission network. This line of
research has also provided theoretical results relative to the design of electricity markets or to
the medium-term operation of hydrothermal systems in the new regulatory framework. As in
the case of optimization models, the research community is now trying to develop a new
generation of equilibrium models capable of taking risk management decisions under
imperfect competition.
On the subject of market representation, there are recent publications devoted to the
improvement of existing Cournot-based models. They propose the conjectural variations
approach to overcome the high sensitivity of the price-clearing process with respect to
demand representation typical of such models. Obviously, there are still questions to be
resolved. For instance, even when the simple Cournot conjecture is assumed, pure strategy
solutions may not exist if there are transmission constraints. Another example is that nondecreasing supply functions may be unstable when generating capacity constraints are
considered.
The contribution of simulation models has been significant as well, on account of their
flexibility to incorporate more complex assumptions than those allowed by formal
29
equilibrium models. Simulation models can explore the influence that the repetitive
interaction of participants exerts on the evolution of wholesale electricity markets. In these
models, agents learn from past experience, improve their decision-making and adapt to
changes in the environment. This suggests that adaptive agent-based simulation techniques
can shed light on certain features of electricity markets ignored by static models and therefore
these techniques will be helpful in the analysis of new regulatory measures and market rules.
As a concluding remark, it should be pointed out that the impressive advances registered in
this research field underscore how much interest this matter has drawn during the last decade.
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