Mind Association

Review
Author(s): Richard Swinburne
Review by: Richard Swinburne
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 100, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 406-408
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254946
Accessed: 03-07-2015 13:49 UTC

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406 BookReviews
withan accountofhowtogeta logicoutoffactsaboutdirectconfirmatogether
of
"ifp thenq" is thetruth
disconfirms
Whatdirectly
tionanddisconfirmation.
of (i) '--Ip. _ q' and
itis "thecombinedtruth
confirms
"p . _ q"; whatdirectly
a problem.
presents
(ii) 'p . q"' (p. 15). But thisaccountof directconfirmation
McLaughlindoesnot(andcouldnot)meanbythequotedaccountthatitis a con"ifp thenq". Whathe meansis best
whichwoulddirectlyconfirm
tradiction
graspedfromtheexamplehe gives,namely,"ifI startleHenry,he will swear".
according
thisconditional
confirms
(Henryis hunchedovera putt.)Whatdirectly
Henryandhe does
atone timeof"I do notstartle
toMcLaughlinis theobtaining
notswear",and at anothertimeof "I do startleHenryand he does swear".He
"-I p. _ q" and"p . q" hold
confirmed,
explainsthatwhen"ifp thenq" is directly
ofthesingleoccasionof whichthecondiphasesor segments
"duringdifferent
is thatitseems
tionalis saidtobe true"(p. 16).Theproblemwiththisexplanation
unirestricted
"ifI startle
Henry,he willswear"as an implicit,
torequiretreating
like"for
is, as something
thanas a conditional-that
rather
versalquantification
Henryatt,he willswearatt(orsoonafter)".
all tinthesingleoccasion,ifI startle
hewillswear"
Henry,
McLaughlininsiststhathedoesnotwanttoread"ifI startle
inthisway,butifhe wantstoread"-_p . _ q" and"p . q" insucha waythatthey
times,he needstodo moreexplaining
todifferent
canbe truetogether
byrelating
anyclearguidanceon thematter.
thanhe does.The readeris leftwithout
ofPhilosophy
Department
MonashUniversity
Victoria3168
Australia

FRANK JACKSON

ModernBiologyand NaturalTheology,byAlanOlding.LondonandNew
York:Routledge,1991.Pp. 181.?30.00.

andtheoa fairlypopularaccountof thephilosophical

Alan Oldinghas written
and
of
animals
of
the
evolution
account
by
the
Darwinian
raised
logicalproblems
showDarwinism,
humans.PartI setsthestage,bygivingan accountofpopular
inghowscienceneedsno teleologicalnotionsofdivinecreationorintervention,
problems.
to explainhow we gotwherewe are.PartII raisesthephilosophical
materialism
is true,talkof"evooutthatifreductive
Oldingbeginsbypointing
buta mere"heulutionbynaturalselection"is nottalkofa basicforceofnature,
risticdevice";therealforcesare thoseofphysics.He thenraisesthedifficulty,
beliefs,
ourscientific
thatwhileourbeliefsaboutthephysicalworld,including
theyneednotbe trueinordertodo so-they justneedto
mayhelpus to survive,
Darwinismcannotexplainwhywe have true
"work"in thelocal environment.
process.He goesontopointoutthattheDarwinian
beliefsabouttheevolutionary
including
is also unableto accountfortheevolutionofconsciousness,
apparatus
afterall,the
whether,
ourcomingtohavebeliefsat all. PartIII theninvestigates
therecentdiscoveriesof theextentof its
of theUniverse,including
orderliness
fromdesigntotheexistenceofGod.
allowsscopeforan argument
"fine-tuning",
His finalconclusionis thatthedisanalogiesare too great,betweenthepersons

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BookReviews407
who makemundanemachinesand theGod who is supposedto maketheUniverse,torendertheexistenceofGod at all probable.
the
is fairlyloose.The questionwhether
Untilwe gettoPartIII, theargument
beliefsis an objectionto Darwinismis raised
factthatwe have truescientific
ratherthananswered.And theinabilityof theDarwinianapparatusto explain
of visual
consciousnessis foundedon an appeal to theevidentdistinctness
them,which-whileI amconfromthebraineventswhichunderlie
appearances
vincedthatit is correct-does need to be completedby some morethorough
philosophers.
ifitis toconvinceprofessional
argument
philosophical
The climaxofthebookis howeverobviouslymeantto be PartIII, andas my
todefendmyself.
I takethisopportunity
target
there,
area principal
ownarguments
order,
fromtemporal
Anargument
fromdesignhastwomainforms-anargument
fromspatialorder,
of laws of nature;and an argument
i.e. theregularoperation
of
ofcomplexorganisms,
viz. animalsandmen.Giventhetheory
theoccurrence
not
becauseoftheoperation,
thereareorganisms
evolutionbynaturalselection,
justof anylaws of naturebutof certainratherspecialones,and becauseof the
oftheUniverseatthetimeoftheBig Bang.Therecentworkon
initialconditions
range
tothefactthatonlya veryverynarrow
hasdrawnourattention
"fine-tuning"
willlead(onEarthoranywhere
elseintheUniverse)
oflawsandinitialconditions
Thesedata(lawsingeneral,orsuchlaws
totheevolutionofcomplexorganisms.
are,theproas leadtotheevolutionofcomplexorganisms)
andinitialconditions
butmuchmoreprobableif
claims,a prioriimprobable,
ponentof theargument
thereis a God whobringsthemabout,andhenceareevidencefortheexistence
from
ofGod.In mybookTheExistenceofGod I claimedthatwhiletheargument
fromspatialorderdid not.
force,theargument
orderhadconsiderable
temporal
convincedme
havehoweversubsequently
of"finetuning"
Therecentdiscoveries
fromspatialorder.
forcealso oftheargument
oftheconsiderable
fromdesignwilllead at mosteither
Now Oldingclaimsthatsucharguments
to deism(a God who startstheUniversegoingand thenleaves it to its own
thathap(a God whois thesolecauseofeverything
devices)ortooccasionalism
of thewayGod
pensin theUniverse,"laws of nature"beingmeredescriptions
advotheismhas normally
andpredictably).
Traditional
causes thingsregularly
toexercise
objectstheliability
cateda thirdview-thatGod conservesinnatural
inthewaysdescribed
by"lawsofnature".
andpredictably
theirpowersregularly
position.Ifthereis
Oldingclaimstobe unabletomakesenseofthisintermediate
a God,Oldingclaims,eithertheSunmakestheEarthmoverounditbecauseGod
ofSunandEarthwithcertain
powerstobeginwith,orGod
madetheconstituents
makestheEarthmoveon the"occasions"ofitbeingina certainpositionrelative
to theSun.
hasbeenposedbefore.Aquinasremarks
(SummaContra
Olding'sdichotomy
hownatural
forsomepeopletounderstand
that"Itseemsdifficult
Gentiles111.70)
bothto God and to a naturalagent".But,as Aquinasgoes
effectsare attributed
"Thesepointspresentno difficulty...
Thougha naturalthingproon to remark,
not
ducesitspropereffect...thenaturalthingdoes
produceit exceptby divine

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408 BookReviews
to thissituation
of somepower".Thereare plentyof mundanenear-analogies
initbysomething
else.Theflowofelecthinghavinga powerwhichis sustained
I may
bymyencouragement
triccurrent
givesa computer
thepowertogenerate;
of
andso on.Onlynear-analogies
conserveinyouthepowertokeepon running,
course,becauseGod conservesthepowerofnaturalobjectsas a basicaction,not
it.
byrelying
on otherthingstotransmit
thatthereis no sufficient
analogybetween
Oldingthenadducesthecriticism
thebasic actionsof humansin bringing
aboutbodilymovements
and thesupthepowersof naturalobjects,because
posedbasic actionof God in conserving
(p. 132)"itis notingeneralthecase withhumansthatbasicactionsflowdirectly,
as itwere,outoftheirintentions...
Quiteordinary
basicactionsinvolvecomplex
causalchainsinvolving
thenervousandmuscular
systems".
Humanbasicactions
caudo indeeddepend(inpart)fortheiroccurrence
on theoperation
ofscientific
sality;we succeed in movingour hands only because our nervestransmit
impulsesin certainways.Butthepointis thatwe havea conceptofbasic intenitfits,whether
or not
wherever
tionalactionreadyto be appliedto phenomena,
scientific
Mymovingmy
causalityis involvedinmakingourchoicesefficacious.
armis a basic actionbecausethatis whatI mostimmediately
setmyselfto do;
andmy"setting
myself'does cause themotionofmyarm,eveniftheoperation
ofnervesandmusclesis physically
(butnotlogically)necessaryformy"setting
So theconceptofa basicactionis readyforapplication
myself'tobe efficacious.
whereno scientific
causalityis involvedinmakingthe
byanalogytophenomena
of naturalobjectshavingand exerting
basic actionsoccure.g. thephenomenon
theircausalpowersinthewaydescribed
lawsofnature.
bythemostfundamental
brutefact(and an enormouscoincidence
Eithertheirso behavingis an ultimate
inthe
thattheyall behaveinexactlythesameway)orithas a further
explanation
aboutthephenomenon
actionofGod. In thelattercase bringing
wouldbe a basic
act of God, one fortheefficacyof whichno scientific
causalitywas needed
of all scientific
becauseitconsistedin thesustaining
causality.The groundsfor
believingthatGod is at workhereis thatGod wouldhavethepowerandreason
whichotherwise
cointobringaboutsucha phenomenon
wouldbe an enormous
cidence.Olding'sobjectionsdo notdenttheforceof thisancientand powerful
discoveries
of"finetuning".
further
argument,
strengthed
bytherecentscientific
OrielCollege
OxfordOX] 4EW
UK

RICHARD SWINBURNE

An Essay on Thoughtsand How WeAscribe

PropositionalAttitudes:
Press,1990.Pp. ix
Them,byMarkRichard.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
+ 275.

In thisfinebook MarkRicharddevelopsa theoryof thesemanticsof propositionalattitudeascriptions.The book is rathermoreconcernedwithhow we

attitudes
thanwiththeattitudes
themselves,
rathermore
ascribepropositional
ofmind.Butthereis muchthatshould
philosophy
oflanguagethanphilosophy

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