SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, ANGEL G.

ROA and MELINDA MACARAIG,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second
Division), LABOR ARBITER EDUARDO J. CARPIO, ILAW AT BUKLOD NG
MANGGAGAWA (IBM), ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: On or about July 31, 1990, private respondents were served a
Memorandum from petitioner Angel G. Roa, Vice- President and Manager of
SMC's Business Logistics Division (BLD), to the effect that they had to be
separated from the service effective October 31, 1990 on the ground of
"redundancy or excess personnel." Respondent union, in behalf of private
respondents, opposed the intended dismissal and asked for a dialogue
with management. Accordingly, a series of dialogues were held between
petitioners and private respondents. Even before the conclusion of said
dialogues, the aforesaid petitioner Angel Roa issued another Memorandum on
October 1, 1990 informing private respondents that they would be dismissed
from work effective as of the close of business hours on November 2, 1990.
Private respondents were in fact purged on the date aforesaid. Thus, on
February 25, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners
for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practices, with a prayer for damages
and attorney's fees, with the Arbitration Branch of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint, and that respondent Labor Arbiter must defer
consideration of the unfair labor practice complaint until after the parties
have gone through the grievance procedure provided for in the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. The law in point is Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code. It is
elementary that this law is deemed written into the CBA. In fact, the law
speaks in plain and unambiguous terms that termination disputes, together
with unfair labor practices, are matters falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The sole exception to the above
rule can be found under Article 262 of the same Code. We subjected the
records of this case, particularly the CA to meticulous scrutiny and we find
no agreement between SMC and the respondent union that would state in
unequivocal language that petitioners and the respondent union conform to
the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to
voluntary arbitration. Section 1, Article V of the CBA, cited by the herein
petitioners, certainly does not provide so. Hence, consistent with the general
rule under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter properly has
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondent union on February 25,
1991 for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, In Its Own Right And In

Behalf Of CBTC EMPLOYEES Affiliated With It; CBTC EMPLOYEES
UNION, In Its Own Right And Interest And In Behalf Of All CBTC
Rank And File Employees Including Its Members, BENJAMIN GABAT,
BIENVENIDO MORALEDA, ELICITA GAMBOA, FAUSTINO TEVES,
SALVADOR LISING, and NESTOR DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. JUDGE ALFREDO M. LAZARO, CFI-MANILA BRANCH XXXV;
COMMERCLKL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES;
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; AYALA CORPORATION; MANUEL
J. MARQUEZ; ENRIQUE ZOBEL; ALBERTO VILLA-ABRILLE; VICENTE A.
PACIS, JR.; and DEOGRACIAS A. FERNANDO, respondents.
FACTS: On July 1, 1977, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, a
Philippine banking institution, entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the rank
and file of the bank with a membership of over one thousand employees,
and an affiliated local of the National Union of Bank Employees, a national
labor organization. The agreement was effective until June 30, 1980, with an
automatic renewal clause until the parties execute a new agreement. On May
20, 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank Employees,
submitted to the bank management proposals for the renegotiation of a
new collective bargaining agreement. The following day, however, the bank
suspended negotiations with the union. The bank had meanwhile entered
into a merger with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, another Philippine
banking institution, which assumed all assets and liabilities thereof. As a
consequence, the union went to the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided over by the respondent Judge, on a complaint for specific
performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against the private
respondents. Predictably, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground, essentially, of lack of jurisdiction of the court. On
November 26, 1980, the respondent Judge issued an order, dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction. According to the court, the complaint partook of
an unfair labor practice dispute notwithstanding the incidental claim for
damages, jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge had jurisdiction
HELD: No. We sustain the dismissal of the case, which is, as correctly held by
the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy
within
the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission. The claim
against the Bank of Philippine Islands the principal respondent according
to the petitioners for allegedly inducing the Commercial Bank and

Trust Company to violate the existing collective bargaining agreement in the

process of re-negotiation, consists mainly of the civil aspect of the unfair
labor practice charge referred to under Article 247 of the Labor Code. The
act complained of is broad enough to embrace either provision. Since it
involves collective bargaining whether or not it involved an accompanying
violation of the Civil Code it may rightly be categorized as an unfair labor
practice. The civil implications thereof do not defeat its nature as a
fundamental labor offense. As we stated, the damages (allegedly) suffered by
the petitioners only form part of the civil component of the injury arising
from the unfair labor practice. Under Article 247 of the Code, "the civil
aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include
claims for damages and other affirmative relief, shall be under the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.
The petitioners' claimed injury as a
consequence of the tort allegedly committed by the private respondents,
specifically, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, under Article 1314 of the Civil
Code, does not necessarily give the courts jurisdiction to try the damage
suit. Jurisdiction is conferred by law 6 and not necessarily by the nature of
the action. Civil controversies are not the exclusive domain of the courts. In
the case at bar, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70,
has vested such a jurisdiction upon the labor arbiters, a jurisdiction the
courts may not assume. Jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases,
moreover, belongs generally to the labor department of the government,
never the courts. The fact that the Bank of the Philippine Islands is not a
party to the collective bargaining agreement, for which it "cannot be sued
for unfair labor practice at the time of the action," cannot bestow on the
respondent court the jurisdiction it does not have.

LORENZO C. DY, ZOSIMO DY, SR., WILLIAM IBERO, RICARDO GARCIA

AND RURAL BANK OF AYUNGON, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER
ALBERTO L. DALMACION, AND CARLITO H. VAILOCES, respondents.
FACTS: Said private respondent, Carlito H. Vailoces, was the manager of the
Rural Bank of Ayungon (Negros Oriental), a banking institution duly organized
under Philippine laws. He was also a director and stockholder of the bank.
On June 4, 1983, a special stockholders' meeting was called for the purpose
of electing the members of the bank's Board of Directors. Immediately after
the election the new Board proceeded to elect the bank's executive officers.
Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager, 3 Because of this
development, the Board, on July 2, 1983, passed Resolution No. 5, series of
1983, relieving him as bank manager. On August 3, 1983, Vailoces filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment against Lorenzo Dy and Zosimo Dy, Sr. The complaint was

amended on September 22, 1983 to include additional respondents-William

Ibero, Ricardo Garcia and the Rural Bank of Ayungon, and additional causes
of action for underpayment of salary and non-payment of living allowance. In
their answer, Lorenzo Dy, et al. denied the charge of illegal dismissal. They
pointed out that Vailoces' position was an elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Board's loss of confidence in him
brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his
duties; and that the Board's action was taken to protect the interest of the
bank and was "designed as an internal control measure to secure the check
and balance of authority within the organization." The Labor Arbiter found
favorably for the private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
HELD: No. There is no dispute that the position from which private
respondent Vailoces claims to have been illegally dismissed is an elective
corporate office. He himself acquired that position through election by the
bank's Board of Directors at the organizational meeting of November 17,
1979. 10 He lost that position because the Board that was elected in the
special stockholders' meeting of June 4, 1983 did not re-elect him. And when
Vailoces, in his position paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter, impugned said
stockholders' meeting as illegally convoked and the Board of Directors
thereby elected as illegally constituted, 11 he made it clear that at the
heart of the matter was the validity of the directors' meeting of June 4,
1983 which, by not re-electing him to the position of manager, in effect
caused termination of his services. The case thus falls squarely within the
purview of Section 5, par. (c), No. 902-A just cited. In PSBA vs. Leao, 12
this Court, confronted with a similar controversy, ruled that the Securities
and Exchange Commission, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction.

MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION, CO., INC., and/or LUCITA LU CARABUENA,

ROBERT L. CARABUENA, ELLEN LU CARABUENA, and MARTIN LU,
petitioners, vs. MILA MOVILLA, ERNESTO MOVILLA, JR., MILA JUDITH
C. MOVILLA, JUDE BRIX C. MOVILLA, JONARD ELLERY C. MOVILLA,
AND MAILA JONAH M. QUIMBO, surviving heirs of ERNESTO MOVILLA,
and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER of the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION-5TH DIVISION, respondents.
FACTS: Mainland Construction Co., Inc. is a domestic corporation, duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws, having been issued a certificate
of registration by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on July 26,
1977, under Registry Number 74691. Its principal line of business is the
general construction of roads and bridges and the operation of a service

shop for the maintenance of equipment. Respondents on the other hand, are
the surviving heirs of complainant, Ernesto Movilla, who died during the
pendency of the action with the Labor Arbiter. Records show that Ernesto
Movilla, who was a Certified Public Accountant during his lifetime, was hired
as such by Mainland in 1977. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of
Administrative Officer. Ernesto Movilla was registered with the Social Security
System (SSS) as an employee of petitioner Corporation. On April 12, 1987,
during petitioner corporation's annual meeting of stockholders, the following
were elected members of the Board of Directors, viz.: Robert L. Carabuena,
Ellen L. Carabuena, Lucita Lu Carabuena, Martin G. Lu and Ernesto L.
Movilla. On the same day, an organizational meeting was held and the Board
of Directors elected Ernesto Movilla as Administrative Manager. He occupied
the said position up to the time of his death. On April 2, 1991, the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted a routine inspection
on petitioner corporation and found that it committed such irregularities in
the conduct of its business. On the basis of this finding, petitioner
corporation was ordered by DOLE to pay to its thirteen employees, which
included Movilla, the total amount of P309,435.89, representing their salaries,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay differentials, unpaid wages and 13th
month pay. All the employees listed in the DOLE's order were paid by
petitioner corporation, except Ernesto Movilla. On October 8, 1991, Ernesto
Movilla filed a case against petitioner corporation and/or Lucita, Robert, and
Ellen, all surnamed Carabuena, for unpaid wages, separation pay and
attorney's fees, with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional
Arbitration, Branch XI, Davao City. On February 29, 1992, Ernesto Movilla
died while the case was being tried by the Labor Arbiter and was promptly
substituted by his heirs, private respondents herein, with the consent of the
Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment on June 26, 1992,
dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by
this decision, respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC ruled that the issue in the case was one
which involved a labor dispute between an employee and petitioner
corporation and, thus, the NLRC had jurisdiction to resolve the case.
ISSUE: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the
controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: a) between
the corporation, partnership or association and the public; b) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; c) between the corporation, partnership or association
and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and d) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves. 7 The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all

stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the
corporation does not necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the
jurisdiction of SEC. The better policy to be followed in determining
jurisdiction over a case should be to consider concurrent factors such as the
status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy. 8 In the absence of any one of these factors,
the SEC will not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow
that every conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would
involve such corporate matters as only the SEC can resolve in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi- judicial powers. 9 In the case at bench, the
claim for unpaid wages and separation pay filed by the complainant against
petitioner corporation involves a labor dispute. It does not involve an intra-corporate matter, even when it is between a stockholder and a corporation.
It relates to an employer-employee relationship which is distinct from the
corporate relationship of one with the other. Moreover, there was no showing
of any change in the duties being performed by complainant as an
Administrative Officer and as an Administrative Manager after his election by
the Board of Directors. What comes to the fore is whether there was a
change in the nature of his functions and not merely the nomenclature or
title given to his job.

PURIFICACION G. TABANG, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and PAMANA GOLDEN CARE MEDICAL CENTER
FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
FACTS: The records show that petitioner Purificacion Tabang was a founding
member, a member of the Board of Trustees, and the corporate secretary of
private respondent Pamana Golden Care Medical Center Foundation, Inc., a
non-stock corporation engaged in extending medical and surgical services. On
October 30, 1990, the Board of Trustees issued a memorandum appointing
petitioner as Medical Director and Hospital Administrator of private
respondent's Pamana Golden Care Medical Center in Calamba, Laguna.
Although the memorandum was silent as to the amount of remuneration for
the position, petitioner claims that she received a monthly retainer fee of
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) from private respondent, but the payment
thereof was allegedly stopped in November, 1991. As medical director and
hospital administrator, petitioner was tasked to run the affairs of the
aforesaid medical center and perform all acts of administration relative to its
daily operations. On May 1, 1993, petitioner was allegedly informed
personally by Dr. Ernesto Naval that in a special meeting held on April 30,
1993, the Board of Trustees passed a resolution relieving her of her position
as Medical Director and Hospital Administrator, and appointing the latter and
Dr. Benjamin Donasco as acting Medical Director and acting Hospital

Administrator, respectively. Petitioner averred that she thereafter received

a
copy
of
said
board resolution. On June 6, 1993, petitioner filled a
complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages, allowances and
13th month pay before the labor arbiter. Respondent corporation moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It argued that petitioner's position as Medical Director and
Hospital Administrator was interlinked with her position as member of the
Board of Trustees, hence, her dismissal is an intra-corporate controversy
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, contending
that her position as Medical Director and Hospital Administrator was
separate and distinct from her position as member of the Board of Trustees.
She claimed that there is no intra-corporate controversy involved since she
filed the complaint in her capacity as Medical Director and Hospital
Administrator, or as an employee of private respondent. On April 26, 1994,
the labor arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. He ruled that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the SEC,
pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. 1 Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was treated as an appeal by the labor arbiter who
consequently ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to
public respondent NLRC for appellate review. 2 On appeal, respondent NLRC
affirmed the dismissal of the case on the additional ground that "the
position of a Medical Director and Hospital Administrator is akin to that of
an executive position in a corporate ladder structure." hence, petitioner's
removal from the said position was an intra-corporate controversy within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC.
ISSUE: Whether NLRC has jurisdiction
HELD: No. The charges against herein private respondent partake of the
nature of an intra-corporate controversy. Similarly, the determination of the
rights of petitioner and the concomitant liability of private respondent arising
from her ouster as a medical director and/or hospital administrator, which
are corporate offices, is an intra-corporate controversy subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, a
medical director and a hospital administrator are considered as corporate
officers under the by-laws of respondent corporation. Section 2(i), Article I
thereof states that one of the powers of the Board of Trustees is "(t)o
appoint a Medical Director, Comptroller/Administrator, Chiefs of Services and
such other officers as it may deem necessary and prescribe their powers
and duties." 4 The president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer are
commonly regarded as the principal or executive officers of a corporation,
and modern corporation statutes usually designate them as the officers
of the corporation. 5 However, other offices are sometimes created by the

charter or by-laws of a corporation, or the board of directors may be

empowered under the by-laws of a corporation to create additional offices as
may be necessary. 6 It has been held that an "office'' is created by the
charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors
or stockholders. 7 On the other hand, an "employee" usually occupies no
office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also
determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. 8 In the case at
bar, considering that herein petitioner, unlike an ordinary employee, was
appointed by respondent corporation's Board of Trustees in its memorandum
of October 30, 1990, 9 she is deemed an officer of the corporation.
Perforce, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which provides that
the SEC exercises exclusive jurisdiction over controversies in the election
appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of corporations,
partnerships or associations, applies in the present dispute. Accordingly,
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the SEC, and not in the Labor Arbiter
or the NLRC.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG,

respondent.
FACTS: "In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in
Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, a private banking corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal
offices at the PNB Financial Center, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. At the time, the
Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as
General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. At the time,
too, the Branch Office had two (2) types of employees: (a) expatriates or
the regular employees, hired in Manila and assigned abroad including
Singapore, and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied for employment as
Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective
upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her
eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President
of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O.
Cabansag, for the position. "On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a
letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as
Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and,
upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by
the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent
appointment. "Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed
office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the
employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she

was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an

Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide
contract worker for Singapore. "Barely three (3) months in office, Florence O.
Cabansag submitted to Ruben C. Tobias, on March 9, 1999, her initial
Performance Report. Ruben C. Tobias was so impressed with the Report
that he made a notation and, on said Report: GOOD WORK. However, in
the evening of April 14, 1999, while Florence O. Cabansag was in the flat,
which she and Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice-President and Deputy
General Manager of the Branch and Rosanna Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of
the said Branch, rented, she was told by the two (2) that Ruben C. Tobias
has asked them to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job.
Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of events and the
runabout way Ruben C. Tobias procured her resignation from the Bank. The
next day, Florence O. Cabansag talked to Ruben C. Tobias and inquired if
what Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna Sarmiento had told her was true. Ruben C.
Tobias confirmed the veracity of the information, with the explanation that
her resignation was imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank.
Ruben C. Tobias, likewise, told Florence O. Cabansag that the PNB Singapore
Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in
either way, Florence O. Cabansag had to resign from her employment. The
more Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias
that she be furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in
Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did
not submit any letter of resignation. "On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias
again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she
submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a
Chinese-speaking
Credit
Officer
to penetrate the local market, with the
information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and
will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted
her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the
notation DISMISSED spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer,
Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient
time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be
out of her employment by May 15, 1999. "However, on April 19, 1999,
Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly
ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20,
1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her
employment with the Bank. On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter
rendered
judgment
in
favor
of
the
Complainant
and
against
the
Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a
Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision, but
reduced the moral damages to P100,000 and the exemplary damages to
P50,000. In a subsequent Resolution, the NLRC denied PNBs Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether NLRC has jurisdiction

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in
Article 217 of the Labor Code. Based on the foregoing provisions, labor
arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all
workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).15 We are not
unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist
status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing
respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the
Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory
requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.16
Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the
country to first obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed
here. That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does
not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its
holder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country.1avvphil.zw+
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an
Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine
Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared
her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this
document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her
to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming
arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a
"direct hire" governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and
customs prevailing in Singapore17 she subsequently became a contract
worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies
upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally
terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.
Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing
business through a branch office in Singapore.18 Significantly, respondents
employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by Benjamin
P. Palma Gil,19 the president of the bank whose principal offices were in
Manila. This circumstance militates against petitioners contention that
respondent was "locally hired"; and totally "governed by and subject to the
laws, common practices and customs" of Singapore, not of the Philippines.
Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that
respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case
one deployed in Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application
of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO
CABLING, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were
dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993
currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, private
respondents filed with the NLRC a petition 1 for injunction. On April 3, 1995,
the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction 2 enjoining petitioner to
cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of
dismissal.
ISSUE: Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a
complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor arbiter, entertain an
action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine
Airlines, inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private
respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to
their previous positions?
HELD: No. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to
only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency
or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The
essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the
complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper
basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending
parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of
the plaintiff pending the litigation. 5 Injunction is also a special equitable
relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law. 6 From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the
NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon
application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision
in favor of such party." It is an essential requirement that there must first
be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter.
In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and
private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal
filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an
action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition
which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full
backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the

petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter. The jurisdiction
conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both
original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take
cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein enumerated.
The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree
to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code. On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article
217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal
dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain
the
private
respondents'
petition
for
injunction
which challenges the
dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not
provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs
of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary
labor disputes." 12 Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and
ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.