Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu

strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has provenDespite the pace of global te
chnological change, the United States military-industrial complex may never be t
ruly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil

nearly impervious to smaller, more agile

those in Silicon Valley.

non-traditional

companies, particularly

Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil

Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust
inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved in ancient soil
Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-indu
strial complex may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much. We need a robust

inventory of purely
public defense platforms like warships, warplanes, and advanced munitions. And w
e need the defense base that can build them
that highly consolidated core of trad
itional prime
contractors working within a system that has proven nearly impervious to smaller
, more agile non-traditional companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley.
Silicon Valley companies face formidable barriers to entry across the entire fed
eral enterprise. The federal acquisition system is not just a national security
liability, but also a liability to
the overall effectiveness and responsiveness of government. The concept of acquis
ition reform neither resonates with the public nor sufficiently captures the asso
ciated national security
implications. The fundamental imperative for reform is sustaining our ability to
responsibly govern and defend the nation. start a national conversation to bett
er define acceptable levels of
risk for the taxpayer. In an excessively risk-averse, requirements-based, and co
mpliance-focused acquisition system, we have decreased competition and arguably
made few appreciable
improvements in cost, schedule, and performance. Fourth, it is time to come to g
rips with the need for difficult civil service reform. Cultural barriers to acqu
isition reform cannot be overstated,
and they are intrinsically linked to human capital. Fifth, we must restore some
semblance of certainty and rationality to the federal budget process. Fiscal ins
tability ultimately stifles innovation,
increases acquisition costs for major projects, and discourages new entrants fro
m competing.
Globalization and commercialization aren t going anywhere but forward. Absent chan
ge, the outdated defense acquisition system risks becoming even further displace
d from commercial norms,
as does the defense industrial base that operates within it. Despite a storied h
istory of game-changing innovations in the post-World War II era, weapons system
cost overruns, schedule delays,
and embarrassing failures to deliver promised capabilities continue to plague th
e Pentagon. Just as troubling, the Information Age has ushered in another danger
ous defense acquisitions
phenomenon: the delivery of capabilities to the field that have already been ecl
ipsed by faster-moving commercial technologies. This cycle must be broken lest w
e end up countering tomorrow s
threat with yesterday s technology. Breaking down barriers to entry for emerging t
echnology companies won t be easy, but it s the best place to start.
a neighborhood succumbing to rampant poverty
could stand out in an increasingly crowded global marketplace
LIKE most things deemed unthinkable, Greece s departure from the euro zone has bee
n thought about a lot
THE world s oldest tools are the size of massive fists, sharpened at the edges and
seemingly unblemished, having been preserved