G.R. No.

L-48006

July 8, 1942

counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs.SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

FACTS: This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi
driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

ELCANO vs.REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province
of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest
from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages
to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless
in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding
(Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public
and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal
Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla,
the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on
page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by
the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact
makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of
Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable
only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
ISSUE: The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as
an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by
the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted
HELD: YES. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there
is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and
another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property
through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious
and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored
to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient
and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his

FACTS: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and
getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which,
when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
ISSUE: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with
and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
HELD: The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established
in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito
and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability
not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not
he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate
only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. A new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty.
Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it
is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance
with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
CINCO vs. CANONOY
FACTS: Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a
jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the
private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved
to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3
(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated
the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11,
1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage
to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal
case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the
Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R").
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November
14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
ISSUE: Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25,
1971. 3

HELD: From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that
the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in
the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and
said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct
causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above
quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action
has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons
but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict
in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or
property."
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES,
respondents.
ISSUE: whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
FACTS: On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass
of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with
the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in
his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur
expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her
several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which
same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her
parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to
marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good
and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However,
in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and
he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his
promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for
pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
HELD: PETITIONER CONTENDES The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same
room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED,
with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
DULAY vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD")
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by
respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under
Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction
of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 5559).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based
on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is
justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela
is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss
and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did
not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on
the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties.
Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law ( Rollo, p.
106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from,
quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the verified
complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195
[1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily
liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is
independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil
liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore
proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or
SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party . Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil
action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents'
argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action
under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was
done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in
this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded
on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause
of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis
Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the
plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for
their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon
Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As
far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should
be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the above
doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages
allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121
Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case ( supra), it was
held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal
negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that
they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having
been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela
and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to
make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general
rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants
if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v.
CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach
on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough
that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was
Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by
negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial
on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be
borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a
cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel
Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]).
Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow
them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This
decision is immediately executory.
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GARCIAvs.FLORIDO
FACTS: On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and
boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin,
and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the
purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and
bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W

Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a
result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their
medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German
C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the
collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil
Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the
accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson,
driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending
the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give
way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus
causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the
damages caused on petitioners.
ISSUE: The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent
Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be
filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability
of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding
the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because
Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of
the driver.
HELD: It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil
Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute
it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time
limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after
the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly
with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted
and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that
such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for
physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the
Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere
appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not
constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same
action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same
ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
It is evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover
them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be
involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution
of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute,
but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the
criminal case has disappeared.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in
defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge
to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the
neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to
forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the
company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
HELD: We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible
of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui
juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result
of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the
injury.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap,
and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect
between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo
cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of
responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are
snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without
fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor
decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court
below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the
court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first
instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
G.R. No. 179446 January 10, 2011
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. vs GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and
R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION
THE FACTS: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of
Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28,
2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North
Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes
from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in
Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

DAVID TAYLORvs.THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by
its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes
were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias
warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the
destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its
cargo.

FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric
light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig
River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by
crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.
Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of
P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount
of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

G.R. No. L-4977

March 22, 1910

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the
son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or
spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After
crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to
the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone
and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while
Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries
to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought
reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had
been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally
liable for the loss
ISSUES:
1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the
fact that the latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it
(Loadmasters)?
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters be
legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel?
Held: Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land,
through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the
carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the
general public. The distinction is significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a
contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between
Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and
exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of
Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering. It cannot be
considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.

Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods
being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of
their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733
of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their
own property or rights. This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of
goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the
goods have been lodged for shipment. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be
rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code
provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed
in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are
jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New
Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the
consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct
contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

time on appeal.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable
grounds. Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the
cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and
respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance
Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and
ordering both parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of
P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof
for attorneys fees; and c] the amount of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses.
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years,
and to pay damages as follows:
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused,
also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.
We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive
and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the
judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability
of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
The Issue:

It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters
whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted
within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.

Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly

arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasidelict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed.

The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit.

Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to
ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the
designated destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking
precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes.
Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship
between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides:
By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The elements of a contract
of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for
himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters
never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that
the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters
within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed
by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention
naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to
accept the appointment and act on it. Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case.
What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for
the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a
party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient
cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it
having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of
contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it
cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not
properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for
any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a compulsory
counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first

Main Issue: Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former
insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect,
petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government
may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.
[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil
liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have
the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been
sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that
[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner,
being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he
was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.e instant case
G.R. No. 74041

July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ROGELIO LIGON

FACTS: The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused,
Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by
the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of
Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of
the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the
underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for the
traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for

short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of
cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by
Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the
crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the
defense. It is not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales
clung to the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was
rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical
injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.
Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He
was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique
position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near
the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make
the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep
with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them " nakaaksidente ng tao."3
The two men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo
was able to overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while
the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen
Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his
companion, Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside
the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. 4 The three were all brought by the
police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab driver,
Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primicias were
taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan. 5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated
October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day,
but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6,
1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. 7 Six months later, however, or on June 28,
1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for
Robbery with Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on the basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio
Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly
witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983.10 These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to
before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.
HELD: However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. 17 The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him
from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from
which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both
prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we
find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of
calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the
chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent
the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter
clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat
acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These
proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or negligence, and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death,
P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss of
income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
HEIRS OF EDUARDO
SIMON VS CHAN
FACTS: That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for
value Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of
P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced
in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled
with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).[2] He alleged in
his complaint the following:
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review,[10] challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, [11] Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his alleged
civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and
that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its
decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code; that the CAs reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v.
Velez[14] stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precluding
the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[15]
In his comment,[16] Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners

used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil
action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his
separate civil action.
ISSUE: whether or not Chans civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 91500) was an independent civil action.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of
BP 22 can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,[17] holding:
xxx
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so
provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on
account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity
which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel
v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of
Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo,
19 Phil 265).
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money
for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused
the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of
the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases
results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.
To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even
the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching
the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection
which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.
xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately
the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no
filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.[18]
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and

trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
To repeat, Chans separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the
violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the
aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of
the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
[28]
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 91500 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay
City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on
October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD CO.,

FACTS: At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in
the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used
a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon
the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he
was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the
upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right
arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly
by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were
difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in
the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on
the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons
and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted
upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see
these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of
Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that
the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as
to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court
of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom
his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the
plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby

occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem
it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility
for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof
of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable
to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out
this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference
between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between
persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of
an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a
contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those
not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at
365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the
principle of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by
their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who
places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the
unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the
scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves
the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has
never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant,
taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his
purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons
to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage.
True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent
in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care
and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has
held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta,
20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of
the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to
the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the
negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete
accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article
1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants
or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not
based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has
its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members,
or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon
all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental

distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that
in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the
vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who
acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed
to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in
the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their
status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was
due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of
the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or
agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of
servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance
of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch
to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he
is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which
involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant
whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy
practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be
true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If
one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence
of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of
liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due
care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere
incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November
20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of
the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected
defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as
those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to
carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault
was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain
safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by
plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop
before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore,
important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are
not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is
too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the
train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within
six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever
in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the
passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the

vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting
the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are
less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist
clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a
fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that
he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital
services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12163

March 4, 1959

PAZ FORES, petitioner, vs.IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.

FACTS: Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle
was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it
to swerve and to his the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the
passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He
was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of
operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed
into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the
trial, it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to
the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found, among other things, that is carried plate No.
TPU-1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that
the vehicle even had the name of "Doa Paz" painted below its wind shield. No evidence to the contrary was
introduced by the petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to
the scene of the incident.
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the
accident happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen
Sackerman.
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may be formulated thus "Is the approval of the
Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying
therewith the authority to operate the same?" Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals
answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be
unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the previous approval and
authority of the Commission previously had
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(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or
any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with
those of any other public service. The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and
after hearing the persons interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable
grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the sale,
alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the same are not detrimental to the public
interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in the order
of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction
from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any
public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs.
Ignacio, * 50 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 108; Timbol vs. Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955, and Medina
vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 10, p. 4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made
without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the
responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. Petitioner assails,
however, the applicability of these rulings to the instant case, contending that in those cases, the operator
did not convey, by lease or by sale, the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. This line of
reasoning does not find support in the law. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale,
alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part
thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the
protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the
vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of
the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent
the transaction from being negotiated or complete before its approval", means only that the sale without the
required approval is still valid and binding between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The phrase "in
the ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by
any public service of any of its property". As correctly observed by the lower court, could not have been
intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be
conceivably disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare
parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only general supervision and regulation of, but also
full jurisdiction and control over all public utilities including the property, equipment and facilities used, and
the property rights and franchise enjoyed by every individual and company engaged i the performance of a
public service in the sense this phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108). By virtue of the

provisions of said Act, motor vehicles used in the performance of a service, as the transportation of freight
from one point to another, have to this date been considered and they cannot but be so considered- public
service property; and, by reason of its own nature, a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof places
it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental of its use, when he desires to transfer or carry his
effects, merchandise or any other cargo from one place to another, is necessarily a public service property.
(Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor co. vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil.,
244, that there may be a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the effect of having the approval retroact to
the date of the transfer; but such outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It appears
that no such approval was given by the Commission before the accident occurred.
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of
Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the
trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare
statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be
denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that
respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded
cannot be said to be excessive (see Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil Code of the Philippines). The attorney's fees
in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First
Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was
allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's
fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the
court deems it is just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code of the Philippines). We see no reason to alter
these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599;
Necesito, et al vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023, that moral damages are not recoverable in
damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
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Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud ( dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used
in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases
where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage dome. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206,
that entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11,
1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or
bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of
justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other
evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant,
as required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted
judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 49155, December 14,
1948 and Layda vs. Court of Appeals, 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicated upon our former law
of damages, before judicial discretion in fixing them became limited by the express provisions of the new
Civil Code (previously quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.
Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of
transportations explains, to some extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the
recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to established the fault of the
carrier, or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen
event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike
in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new civil code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado
vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).
The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially
extra contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions quasi ex
delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action
on tort. Neither can this action be taken as one to enforce on employee's liability under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, since the responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary, nor is there on record any
averment or proof that the driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even made a party to the suit.
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a
breach of the passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith,
justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would
always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed, and it would be
never accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the presumption is that common
carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in article 1733 and 1755.
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or

injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of damages
shall be equitably reduced.
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind
of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad
faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be
shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract
was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the
award of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. (Court of Appeals Resolution of May 5, 1957). In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCEvs.RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

FACTS: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued
to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first
class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a
hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. 3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed
in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9
A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one
party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from
which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary
facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts
with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact
that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or
even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate
the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or
such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by
it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of
the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to
alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of
the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket
was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats.

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that
the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment,
for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary
first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable
firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor
at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger
to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. 22
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail
over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said
witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment
of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding
in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this
policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that
its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of
Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the
trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an
airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If
only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued
is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat
the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court
of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a
first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no
"welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took
a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the
Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the
Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat?
Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's
plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until
plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant
furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence
were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist
Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by
defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already
seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought
by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip
from Madrid to Manila.32
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was
ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award
for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent
but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation
reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the
plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so.
It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff.

It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or
yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been
taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be
subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of
explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted
the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's
witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the
tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term
"bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only
prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he
forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the
Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with
the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the
plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class"
seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom
he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man"
had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for
which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.
43
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with
the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check
was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting
and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another
case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the
cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the
conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We
do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does
not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his
entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the
res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have
been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well
exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:

P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys'
fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere
with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts
and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PBSAvs.CA
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of
the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court
of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements
from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them,
as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the
ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
ISSUE: The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt
with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before the
respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's
orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
HELD:At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision
on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of
the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The
law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a
rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to
prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly
denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the
appellate court's ruling.

and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning
of July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that
on September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed
from its niche underground with the assistance of certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the
concrete vault was being raised to the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a
hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of
the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained out of the
hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset with concern
that the water which had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the
coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to
an authority granted by the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffsappellants with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic)
caused the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the following
became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of
total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp
and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the head and torso of the
deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the
deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also coated with
filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its obligation to deliver a
defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the
elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of
defendant-appellee's gross negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal
the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay
plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages
in the amount determined by the court, 20% of defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and
expenses of litigation and costs of suit. 2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not
guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the
Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father
himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with
water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also
accepted the explanation given by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had
to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would
be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill
up the grave." 3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the contract
allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable;
and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision 4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991. 5
ISSUE: At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault
of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private
respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent
has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners' dead.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article
21 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis supplied).

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned,
for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is
specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint,
the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a
determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila,
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIAvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK
CEMETERY, INC.
FACTS: On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-appellants
herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27,
1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia

HELD: With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana,
the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages
against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no
negligence.

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered
into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" 6 on August 27, 1969. That
agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence,
had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held
liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the
interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick
or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Association. 7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the
interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the grave which was
dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the
brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground in sealed
concrete vault." 8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not
waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While
this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot
be denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no
hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award

damages in favor of petitioners. AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
December 7, 1990. No
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
CALALAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an
Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula
with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she
would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
period.

foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in
law. We find this contention well taken.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided
in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of
fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas
contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going
to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the
Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of
his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the
accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract
of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on
the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

G.R. No. 173259 July 25, 2011

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which
Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney

FACTS: In its complaint, it is alleged that [respondent F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.] (hereinafter FFCCI)
opened savings/current or so-called combo account No. 0219-830-146 and dollar savings
account No. 0219-0502-458-6 with [petitioner Philippine National Bank] (hereinafter PNB) at
its Timog Avenue Branch. Its President Felipe Cruz (or Felipe) and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita
A. Cruz (or Angelita) were the named signatories for the said accounts.

ISSUE: Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by
the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to
Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence

The said signatories on separate but coeval dates left for and returned from the Unites States
of America, Felipe on March 18, 1995 until June 10, 1995 while Angelita followed him on
March 29, 1995 and returned ahead on May 9, 1995.

HELD: The petition has no merit.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of
the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver
Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death
or injury to passengers.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor
vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk
of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.[3] This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner should have

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS F.F. CRUZ

While they were thus out of the country, applications for cashiers and managers [checks]
bearing Felipes [signature] were presented to and both approved by the PNB. The first was on
March 27, 1995 for P9,950,000.00 payable to a certain Gene B. Sangalang and the other one
was on April 24, 1995 for P3,260,500.31 payable to one Paul Bautista. The amounts of these
checks were then debited by the PNB against the combo account of [FFCCI].
When Angelita returned to the country, she had occasion to examine the PNB statements of
account of [FFCCI] for the months of February to August 1995 and she noticed the deductions
of P9,950,000.00 and P3,260,500.31. Claiming that these were unauthorized and
fraudulently made, [FFCCI] requested PNB to credit back and restore to its account the value
of the checks. PNB refused, and thus constrained [FFCCI] filed the instant suit for damages
against the PNB and its own accountant Aurea Caparas (or Caparas).
In its traverse, PNB averred lack of cause of action. It alleged that it exercised due diligence in
handling the account of [FFCCI]. The applications for managers check have passed through
the standard bank procedures and it was only after finding no infirmity that these were given
due course. In fact, it was no less than Caparas, the accountant of [FFCCI], who confirmed the
regularity of the transaction. The delay of [FFCCI] in picking up and going over the bank
statements was the proximate cause of its self-proclaimed injury. Had [FFCCI] been
conscientious in this regard, the alleged chicanery would have been detected early on and
Caparas effectively prevented from absconding with its millions. It prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint.
Regional Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court ruled that F.F. Cruz and Company, Inc. ( FFCCI) was guilty of
negligence in clothing Aurea Caparas (Caparas) with authority to make decisions on and
dispositions of its account which paved the way for the fraudulent transactions perpetrated
by Caparas; that, in practice, FFCCI waived the two-signature requirement in transactions
involving the subject combo account so much so that Philippine National Bank (PNB) could
not be faulted for honoring the applications for managers check even if only the signature of
Felipe Cruz appeared thereon; and that FFCCI was negligent in not immediately informing
PNB of the fraud.
On the other hand, the trial court found that PNB was, likewise, negligent in
not calling or personally verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject
withdrawals considering that they were in huge amounts. For this reason, PNB had the last
clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCIs combo account. Thus, PNB
should bear the whole loss
The appellate court ruled that PNB was negligent in not properly verifying the genuineness of
the signatures appearing on the two applications for managers check as evidenced by the
lack of the signature of the bank verifier thereon. Had this procedure been followed, the
forgery would have been detected.
Nonetheless, the appellate court found FFCCI guilty of contributory
negligence because it clothed its accountant/bookkeeper Caparas with apparent authority to
transact business with PNB. In addition, FFCCI failed to timely examine its monthly statement
of account and report the discrepancy to PNB within a reasonable period of time to prevent or
recover the loss. FFCCIs contributory negligence, thus, mitigated the banks liability. Pursuant
to the rulings in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals[7] and The Consolidated
Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[8] the appellate court allocated the damages
on a 60-40 ratio with the bigger share to be borne by PNB.
From this decision, both FFCCI and PNB sought review before this Court.
On August 17, 2006, FFCCI filed its petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as
G.R. No. 173278.[9] On March 7, 2007, the Court issued a Resolution[10] denying said
petition. On June 13, 2007, the Court issued another Resolution[11] denying FFCCIs motion
for reconsideration. In denying the aforesaid petition, the Court ruled that FFCCI essentially

raises questions of fact which are, as a rule, not reviewable under a Rule 45 petition; that
FFCCI failed to show that its case fell within the established exceptions to this rule; and that
FFCCI was guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, the appellate court correctly mitigated
PNBs liability.
On July 13, 2006, PNB filed its petition for review on certiorari which is the subject matter of
this case.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it found PNB guilty of negligence
HELD: PNB is guilty of negligence.
Preliminarily, in G.R. No. 173278, we resolved with finality[13] that FFCCI is
guilty of contributory negligence, thus, making it partly liable for the loss (i.e., as to 40%
thereof) arising from the unauthorized withdrawal of P13,210,500.31 from its combo
account. The case before us is, thus, limited to PNBs alleged negligence in the subject
transactions which the appellate court found to be the proximate cause of the loss, thus,
making it liable for the greater part of the loss (i.e., as to 60% thereof) pursuant to our rulings
in Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals[14] and The Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[15]
PNB contends that it was not negligent in verifying the genuineness of the
signatures appearing on the subject applications for managers check. It claims that it
followed the standard operating procedure in the verification process and that four bank
officers examined the signatures and found the same to be similar with those found in the
signature cards of FFCCIs authorized signatories on file with the bank.
PNB raises factual issues which are generally not proper for review under a
Rule 45 petition. While there are exceptions to this rule, we find none applicable to the
present case. As correctly found by the appellate court, PNB failed to make the proper
verification because the applications for the managers check do not bear the signature of the
bank verifier. PNB concedes the absence[16] of the subject signature but argues that the
same was the result of inadvertence. It posits that the testimonies of Geronimo Gallego
(Gallego), then the branch manager of PNB Timog Branch, and Stella San Diego (San Diego),
then branch cashier, suffice to establish that the signature verification process was duly
followed.
We are not persuaded.
First, oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary evidence.[17] Second,
PNBs own witness, San Diego, testified that in the verification process, the principal duty to
determine the genuineness of the signature devolved upon the account analyst.[18]
However, PNB did not present the account analyst to explain his or her failure to sign the box
for signature and balance verification of the subject applications for managers check, thus,
casting doubt as to whether he or she did indeed verify the signatures thereon. Third, we
cannot fault the appellate court for not giving weight to the testimonies of Gallego and San
Diego considering that the latter are naturally interested in exculpating themselves from any
liability arising from the failure to detect the forgeries in the subject transactions. Fourth,
Gallego admitted that PNBs employees received training on detecting forgeries from the
National Bureau of Investigation.[19] However, Emmanuel Guzman, then NBI senior
document examiner, testified, as an expert witness, that the forged signatures in the subject
applications for managers check contained noticeable and significant differences from the
genuine signatures of FFCCIs authorized signatories and that the forgeries should have been
detected or observed by a trained signature verifier of any bank.[20]
Given the foregoing, we find no reversible error in the findings of the
appellate court that PNB was negligent in the handling of FFCCIs combo account, specifically,
with respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the subject applications for managers
check which could have prevented the loss. As we have often ruled, the banking business is
impressed with public trust.[21] A higher degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative to
the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary business enterprise.[22] Thus, the degree
of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their officials and employees is far
greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in other enterprises.[23] In the case at
bar, PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required by the circumstances to
prevent the fraud. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals[24] and The
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[25] where the banks negligence
is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we
allocated the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio. We apply the
same ruling in this case considering that, as shown above, PNBs negligence is the proximate
cause of the loss while the issue as to FFCCIs contributory negligence has been settled with
finality in G.R. No. 173278. Thus, the appellate court properly adjudged PNB to bear the
greater part of the loss consistent with these rulings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2006 Decision and June 26, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81349 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 150898 April 13, 2011

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP. VS CUBACUB
FACTS: On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis
Hao (Hao), the companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks
where he lives free of charge.
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning
the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however,
he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he
could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga
to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the
Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from
the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with
Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that
they needed to talk to Bladimirs parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers June Matias and
Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.
At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parentsrespondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital
and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive
care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death
as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure,
septicemia and chicken pox.
ISSUE: Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, they
are not liable for damages
HELD: At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employeremployee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three
elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision
of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the
employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the
necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate
medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick
employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when
Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary assistance to ensure adequate and immediate medical . . .
attendance to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir
to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate
and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an
emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He
may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better
facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate
cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.[5]
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence
in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury
or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission.[6]
Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate
courts findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not
bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne
by the records. Nowhere in the appellate courts or even the trial courts decision is there any such definite
finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee
being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the
case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened.[7]
On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting
that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his last illness, holds that the certificate which he issued citing
chicken pox as antecedent cause deserves more credence.
There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate
cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications from pneumonia
per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in
both certificates were the same.[8]
Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending physician, he
having merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the Caybiga Hospital. He
thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock the following
morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he did not
personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.[9]
It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public
document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can
produce positive evidence establishing otherwise.[10] The QCGH death certificate was received by the City
Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate. Its
credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he
was not around at the time of death.
IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of
negligence.