Ramirez vs.

CA
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation.
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to
impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private communication
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and communication were
interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
FACTS:
Imelda L. Salazar was employed as general system analyst at GMCR. Delfin Saldivar, with whom she was
allegedly very close, was also employed as manager for technical operations'. When reports that
company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing, GMCR made an investigation of the latter's activities. The report of the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave
Commercial andIndustrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering
Services (Elecon), asupplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. It also disclosed that Saldivar
had taken petitioners missing Fedders air conditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The air conditioner
was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interestsby signing as a
witness to the articles of said partnership and that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts
of the air conditioner but failed to inform her employer.The company placed Salazar under preventive
suspension for one month giving her 30 days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting
an explanation, she filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently
amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13thmonth pay and damages,
after petitioner notified her in writing that she was considered dismissed "in view of inability to refute
and disprove the findings.

The Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position and to pay
her full back wages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal
including payment of moral damages. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to
the reinstatement but limited the back wages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for
moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension
and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) Years back wages.
HELD:
Preventive suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the
charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection
of the company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by
the employee
GMCR had not violated Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the
fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's "giving her ample opportunity to

present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed
her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.
While loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest on some basis
which must be convincingly established. An employee should not be dismissed on mere presumptions
and suppositions. GMCR "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar"
and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this
Court's test.
While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on
the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
The report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, she might have
had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records. Also, the report is one sided since it came out after Saldivar
had already resigned and he does not have the opportunity to refute management's findings. Since the
main evidence dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar and without having had a chance to
voice his, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain if there existed independent
legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal.
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor
Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to his full backwages." Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo
est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does
the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds
for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.

Basbacio vs. DOJ

G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and
his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal,
petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of
compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioners presence at the
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that
there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the
convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was probably guilty. Petitioner
brought this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners contention has no merit. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with
the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted
because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to
compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his conviction was due to an error
in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on
the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos
G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the
second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is
not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already
required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but
also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it
has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section
17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers
as a result of recruitment violations or money claims. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond
and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit. Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed. It is a principle of legal hermeneutics
that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy.
On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992
FACTS:
[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative
district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars,
Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution
No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par.
(d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of
discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of
Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the
aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the
promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent
COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent. No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless,
much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for
being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not
having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large
in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the
full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

Salenillas vs. CA
G.R. No. 78687, January 31, 1989
FACTS:
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248,
issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso
and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the
Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso
spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a
daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104
of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered
by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975,
the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch,
Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119
of the Public Land Act.
HELD:
Yes. Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full: Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that there are only three classes of persons bestowed
the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the
contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners
do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through
inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of
the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a
child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of
"legal heirs," makes no distinction.
Furthermore, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would
be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner
Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that
allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which
better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue raised, the Court ruled that
the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.

Commendador Vs. De Villa

G.R. No. 93177 (G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948), August 2, 1991
Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However
he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial
proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held:
NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pretrial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of
the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus
and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition
is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
reversed and set aside. No costs.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA

G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA
project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted. Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter
are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep.
Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel
of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but
the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must
be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan

G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962
Ponente: REGALA, J.
FACTS:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground
that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel
who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the
rule of expressio unius, est exclusion alterius. The lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.
HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for
trial on the merits. The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact
that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law
reason and public policy, defendant-appellees contention that justices of the peace are not covered by
the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
expressio unius, est exclusion alterius in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not
covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of
the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule
of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al.
G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978
FACTS:
The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a
parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that
sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., et.al. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative
defenses in the answer of Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing
be held on those defenses. The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and
enjoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
respondents Aquial and Cordova.
HELD:
NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs. Considering
the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No.
8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open
to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the courts time and energies at the expense of other litigants.