Principles & Defenses Involving Torts - Cases Full Text

TORTS Principles & Defenses Involving Torts_ Full Text 1
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3422
June 13, 1952
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and his wife, damages in the
sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed
two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not
provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance,
which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in
company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to
adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized
in this Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C.J.S., p. 455.)
The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to
children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).
Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive
nuisance?
The great majority of American decisions say no.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water,
streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65 C.J.S., p. 476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
In fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of Corpus Juris Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its decision was
promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as
follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger
children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool

on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an
"attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left
for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual needs no further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.
Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA
GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO,
DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT,
GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardian ad litem, of her minor
grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari praying that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. C.V. 04846, entitled
"Sofia Fernando, etc., et al. v. The City of Davao," be reversed and that its original decision dated January 31, 1986 be reinstated subject to the modification
sought by the ``````petitioners in their motion for partial reconsideration dated March 6, 1986.
The antecedent facts are briefly narrated by the trial court, as follows:
From the evidence presented we see the following facts: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao.
An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won
the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically
on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and
Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was
taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the
case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market
master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia"
caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in
hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter
inside the septic tank. (p. 177, Records)
On August 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 181)
From the said decision, the petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). On January 3, 1986, the appellate court issued
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the facts fully established and in the liberal interpretation of what the Constitution and the law intended to
protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the
indigent more entitled to social justice for having, in the unforgettable words of Magsaysay, "less in life," We hereby reverse and set
aside the appealed judgment and render another one:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Dionisio Fernando, Sofia Fernando and her minor children the following sums of money:

a) Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00
b) Moral damages P20,000.00
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs David Garcia and Anita Garcia the following sums of money:
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Rosalia Bertulano (sic) and her minor children the following sums of money
4. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff Primitiva Fajardo and her minor children the following sums of money:
5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Norma Liagoso, Nicolas Liagoso and Emeteria Liagoso and her minor grandchildren the
following sums of money:
The death compensation is fixed at P30,000.00 in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court starting with People vs. De la
Fuente, Nos. L-63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518 reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Nepomuceno, No. L-41412,
May 27, 1985. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 for the handling of the case for the 5 victims is also awarded.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)
Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. On January 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion for reconsideration of the defendant-appellee Davao City, the same is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of this Court dated January 31, 1986 is reversed and set aside and another one is hereby rendered dismissing the case. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:
1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?
2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof? (p. 72, Rollo)
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680).

Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil
Code). As to what would constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the answer, to wit:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. (emphasis supplied)
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He
must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has
been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the
claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties,
there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. InTaylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil.
8, 29-30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the situation:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced
the event giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the
plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of
the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence. (emphasis Ours)
Applying all these established doctrines in the case at bar and after a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We
affirm.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas
which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted
by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence was the
proximate cause of the fatal incident.
We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such
negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao
Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr.
Feliciano Bascon (TSN, May 24, 1983, pp. 22-25). The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public
toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The testimonies of Messrs. Danilo Garcia and David Secoja (plaintiffs'-petitioners' witnesses)
on this point are relevant, to wit:
Atty. Mojica, counsel for defendant Davao City:

xxx xxx xxx
The place where you live is right along the Agdao creek, is that correct?
DANILO GARCIA:
A Yes, sir.
Q And to be able to go to the market place, where you claim you have a stall,, you have to pass on the septic
tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Day in and day out, you pass on top of the septic tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact that everybody living along the creek passes on top of this septic tank as they go out from the
place and return to their place of residence, is that correct?
And this septic tank, rather the whole of the septic tank, is covered by lead . . .?
A Yes, sir. there is cover.
Q And there were three (3) of these lead covering the septic tank?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this has always been closed?
A Yes, sir. (TSN, November 26, 1979, pp. 21-23, emphasis supplied)
ATTY. JOVER, counsel for the plaintiffs:
Q You said you are residing at Davao City, is it not?
DAVID SEJOYA:
A Yes, sir.
Q How long have you been a resident of Agdao?
A Since 1953.
Q Where specifically in Agdao are you residing?
A At the Public Market.
Q Which part of the Agdao Public Market is your house located?
A Inside the market in front of the fish section.
Q Do you know where the Agdao septic tank is located?

A Yes, sir.
Q How far is that septic tank located from your house?
A Around thirty (30) meters.
Q Have you ever had a chance to use that septic tank (public toilet)?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, if you could remember?
A Many times, maybe more than 1,000 times.
Q Prior to November 22, 1975, have you ever used that septic tank (public toilet)?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times have you gone to that septic tank (public toilet) prior to that date, November 22, 1975?
A Almost 1,000 times. (TSN, February 9, 1983, pp. 1-2)
The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet
and the septic tank (TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank
was air-tight (TSN, ibid, p. 49). The only indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed emptying was when water came out
from it (TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 41). Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the
presence of people living near it or passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their personal necessities.
Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the city government and presented witnesses to
attest on this lack. However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses were not expert witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of
the city government testified and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and septic tank
have been complied with. He stated that the ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is
usually done in residential buildings (TSN, November 4, 1983, pp. 50-51). The petitioners submitted no competent evidence to corroborate their oral testimonies
or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada.
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN"
and "WOMEN" already in place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would
necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary
requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements. The testimony of Engr. Alindada on this matter is elucidative:
ATTY. ALBAY:
Q Mr. Witness, you mentioned the several aspects of the approval of the building permit which include the plans
of an architect, senitary engineer and electrical plans. All of these still pass your approval as building official, is
that correct?
DEMETRIO ALINDADA:
A Yes.
Q So there is the sanitary plan submitted to and will not be approved by you unless the same is in conformance
with the provisions of the building code or sanitary requirements?
A Yes, for private building constructions.

Q How about public buildings?
A For public buildings, they are exempted for payment of building permits but still they have to have a building
permit.
Q But just the same, including the sanitary plans, it require your approval?
A Yes, it requires also.
Q Therefore, under the National Building Code, you are empowered not to approve sanitary plans if they are
not in conformity with the sanitary requirements?
A Yes.
Q Now, in private or public buildings, do you see any warning signs in the vicinity of septic tanks?
A There is no warning sign.
Q In residential buildings do you see any warning sign?
A There is none.
ATTY. AMPIG:
We submit that the matter is irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor.
ATTY. ALBAY:
But that is in consonance with their cross-examination, your Honor.
COURT:
Anyway it is already answered.
ATTY. ALBAY:
Q These warning signs, are these required under the preparation of the plans?
A It is not required.
Q I will just reiterate, Mr. Witness. In residences, for example like the residence of Atty. Ampig or the residence
of the honorable Judge, would you say that the same principle of the septic tank, from the water closet to the
vault, is being followed?
A Yes.
ATTY. ALBAY:
That will be all, Your Honor. (TSN, December 6, 1983, pp. 62-63)
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.
The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering
the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware
of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the

job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and
Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do (emphasis
Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. Thus, the appellate court was correct to observe that:
. . . Could the victims have died if they did not open the septic tank which they were not in the first place authorized to open? Who
between the passive object (septic tank) and the active subject (the victims herein) who, having no authority therefore, arrogated unto
themselves, the task of opening the septic tank which caused their own deaths should be responsible for such deaths. How could the
septic tank which has been in existence since the 1950's be the proximate cause of an accident that occurred only on November 22,
1975? The stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to occurrence of the accident in 1975 no injury nor death was caused by the septic
tank. The only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the above is that the victims' death was caused by their own negligence
in opening the septic tank. . . . (Rollo, p. 23)
Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market master to supervise the area where the septic tank is located is a reflection of the negligence of the
public respondent.
We do not think so. The market master knew that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered that the bidding had just been conducted.
Although the winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which
befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the winning bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that the case was yet no
award to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work could not have started (TSN, September
13, 1983, p. 40). Also, the victims could not have been seen working in the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less
ten (10) meters away from the comfort room itself (TSN, ibid, pp. 38-39). The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the
market master or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to clean the septic
tank.
Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Article 24 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Said law states:
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid, therefore, there is
a total absence of contractual relations between the victims and the City Government of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligation,
much less, any liability on the part of Davao City." (Rollo, p. 24) The accident was indeed tragic and We empathize with the petitioners. However, the
herein circumstances lead Us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., C
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992

CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set
aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and
Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero,
Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and
Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and
Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain
Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents,
and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose
Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the
Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was
the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of
the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward
from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San
Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of
the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew
the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane,
on the said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the
spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide
seven (7) "footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete
with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its
left front portion was touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16)
"footsteps" away from the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right
front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the
truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per
hour.

As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award of
P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses,
P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102
prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for
the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in
the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George
McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the
following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air
Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus
traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where
Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane
of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to
consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by
Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose
Koh was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a
moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of
damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing
of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying
the motion for consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with
Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen
Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida
Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald,
Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered
several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman
Dayrit, and offered documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and
indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay
and indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc
the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing
her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to
pay the costs. 15

The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the court where the two
(2) civil cases were pending a manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and
unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of
P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby
dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned
to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the appellate court. The
appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition for its
review 23 was filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the Resolution of 20 April
1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040
and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendantsappellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and

D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and
G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P 114.20 to Muoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil
Case No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the
accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the
selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. 27This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth assigned error
as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN
SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who
were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck,
he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to
our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?

A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my
father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22,
1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed
before the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side
(sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it had already collided with the
car:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the accident.
As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman Dayrit,
who supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course of events people usually take the side of the person with whom
they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule, they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at
fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CAG.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured
persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the
trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according
to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees in
their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not included in the record. According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below,
said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that he
stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is straight and you
may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only about ten (10)
meters away from you for the first time?
xxx xxx xxx

A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10)
meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away,
with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to
avoid a collision on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper lane. The police
investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag, stated that he found skid marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the
truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were
found under the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck
were caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the
same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile
endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the selection of
their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees in their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have
methods of selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap.
If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He
proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge
his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply proven, but the items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent
Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12
November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984. 30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT
FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND
CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S
RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS,
CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT
IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO

PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER
CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY
(sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND
SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said Comment 33 was filed, petitioners
submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly complied
with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some observations on the procedural
vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the
trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate
Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law
or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from their minds as
Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice
with the least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two
(2) judges appreciating, according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter
rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or
Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the
recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final
judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the
denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no relevance or importance to
this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil
actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta vs. De
Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:

. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during
the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the
separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not
mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical
cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private
respondents were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case
private respondents' liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are
supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its
judgment. 43 The same is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the
conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension of facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom
are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane
gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for
the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across
the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who
were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed the truck,
he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come back to
our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my
father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46

Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what
was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that(reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamiliasof the
Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
(citing Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh.
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be
several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the
emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to
avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has
been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that
the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the
actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road,
which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's
negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in
width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk

which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of
meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the
translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The
law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private
respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by
the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed
before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side
(sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
Appellants' Brief) 54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened?
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped?
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car and it was already motionless. (tsn. 31,
April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which
was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. 56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the
doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury

results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been
grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware
of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d,
pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this
wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding
the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in
failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes
between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private respondents in Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477
and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29
November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was
convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete
reversal of the judgment below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of
the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place
where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake
and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the
oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old
man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the
impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota
Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the
wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival. 2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against
petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to
prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its
case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide thru simple imprudence and,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she should have stepped on the
brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the
death of a pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00. 4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would
a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." 6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed by another which
overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also
tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the jeepney
which was then parked along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into account the amount
of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to
analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her
car to the light without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the police 8 stating::
And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay
aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglangpagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng
magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances
narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to
act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She
had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated
above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their
right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for
the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
IRST DIVISON
G.R. No. 115024
February 7, 1996
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
G.R. No. 117944
February 7, 1996
RICHARD LI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found
by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling
along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if
needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she
parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was
standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987

Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff
was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other
medical and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was
affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite
direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming
vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the
area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on
the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped
the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff
was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved in the accident,
testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not
notice if there was an early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car
came approaching very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right
portion of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the
windshield of defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he
could "smell it very well" (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. It
ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until
the date of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00, a month for unrealized profits in plaintiff's two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this
decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No.
804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the
center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car
was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car." 1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was
improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near center of
the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed that:

Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by
eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June
24, 1990 when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk compartment; he
noticed the car of Richard Li "approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car was zigzagging", although there were no
holes and hazards on the street, and "bumped the leg of the plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of defendant's care, causing its
destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was pulled out from under defendant's car and was able to say "hurting words" to Richard Li
because he noticed that the latter was under the influence of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He
knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but did not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved
the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to
P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's
fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' counterclaims. 3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that
he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues
that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from
liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court. 4
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his
company in the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an
establishment located just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed, racing towards the
general direction of Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that he was standing in front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of
the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under
the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the
offending vehicle in order to survey the incident.7 Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that Valenzuela's car was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between Li's "self-serving" asseverations
and the observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his
testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial court's reliance on the
testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant's assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception
of speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt was made to question .his competence or the accuracy
of his statement that defendant was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. "P"). We see no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the
accident was across the street where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that
the accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is
registered in the name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the testimony that the
streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc.
Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he was
outside his establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17, 1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it was
no longer raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an
attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he
arrived at the scene only in response to a telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial

inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony that would impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to
affirm the trial court's acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his
version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident.
Against Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial. He
claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiff's car".
He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were
alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at
work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. 11 Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the
accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that
he was under the influence of alcohol.12 Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted
with approval by respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving along Aurora Blvd.,
out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him which was plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very
fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the
parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff
who was then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car in front of him, but that it failed
as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he
could have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily,
since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have
avoided hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident and
is, therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes but simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with
glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it
was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd.
is a double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the
right lane going towards Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to determine is whether or not
Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection.14 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela
ought to have conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally
applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not
require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. 15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required
to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. 17

Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the
street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given situation" to avoid
hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an
oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct
which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is
both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the
entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant
case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists
in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." 20 In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on
the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk. 21 The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuela's car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car
on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood
is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others."23It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.24 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want of care required by
the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It
bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is
ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing
conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the
highway, and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the
street, and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to negligence. 26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer. In denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the respondent
court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in connection with official matters. His functions as assistant manager
sometimes required him to perform work outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the
accident he came from BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the company" (pp. 25-26, ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the
company car was partly required by the nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a "benefit", apparently referring to
the fringe benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of which liability is
not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis
High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned
tasks, the Supreme Court has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An
employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act "indispensable to the business
and beneficial to their employer" (at p. 645).

In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the company to use the company
car "either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can be considered as using the company car in the service of his employer or on the
occasion of his functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official purposes would
appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
earlier quoted, there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion of their
functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of the company's business or its
interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail. 27
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of
the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable
for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon which respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and
its teacher's supervision of students during an extracurricular activity. These cases now fall under the provision on special parental authority found in Art. 218 of
the Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's
burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise
supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee's
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial
rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and
maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of service, or
after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given
the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the
car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility when an
accident involving a company-issued car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning
over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after
they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is,
like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited
in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to present
to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to
reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all
hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent.
As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably
and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective
buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service

car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paranaque
was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the
same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting
its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and
history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved
of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former
for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of moral
damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the
suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P800,000,00 by the Court of
Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.
Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic
technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic
devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age, menopause and aging.
Assuming she reaches menopause, for example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease
in calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,
changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount
of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury - physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent driving of his
Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

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TORTS Principles & Defenses Involving Torts_ Full Text 1

June 13, 1952

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

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G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

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G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

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DAVIDE, JR., J.:

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MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,

RICHARD LI, petitioner,

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