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Perpetuity, Eternity, and

Time in Proclus Cosmos
HELEN S. LANG

ABSTRACT
Proclus composed 18 arguments for the eternity of the world and they survive
only because Philoponus, intending to refute Proclus arguments one by one,
quotes each; one copy of Philoponus work and so Proclus arguments too
survives. Because of their odd history, these arguments have received little attention either in themselves or in relation to Proclus other works, even though they
are intrinsically interesting and reflect his larger philosophical enterprise. I first
examine Argument XVIII, in which Proclus calls on perpetuity, eternity, and
time to argue that the cosmos must be eternal. This argument leaves unanswered two important questions. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself a god;
how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes that the cosmos
is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal; but what does this phrase and the
conclusion that it expresses mean? To answer these questions, I turn to The
Elements of Theology, a systematic progression of 211 propositions disclosing
the causal structure of all reality. Eternity and time, along with being perpetual, also appear here, particularly in propositions 40-55, to which I turn in the
second part of this paper. They are conjoined with what Proclus calls the SelfConstituted. I argue that by understanding the relation of the Self-Constituted
as a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we can also understand the
causal relation between god and the cosmos. The cosmos can be called divine
because, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and the cosmos are both
eternal; the cosmos is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal because via its
relation to god, the cosmos becomes what its cause is, and in this precise sense
an effect imitates its cause.

Introduction
Although widely circulated in antiquity, Proclus 18 arguments for the
eternity of the world did not survive as an independent work. His thesis
the cosmos must be eternal iterated (on Proclus view proven) in each
argument may have been anti-Christian and, as Europe turned to Christianity,
Christians may have intentionally destroyed this work.1 17 arguments,
Accepted September 2004
1
There has been much speculation on this point in the scholarship and Proclus
arguments are widely read as primarily anti-Christian. L. J. Rosn, The Philosophy of
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005
Also available online www.brill.nl

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however, survive in Greek because Philoponus, intending to refute

Proclus arguments one by one, quotes each; one copy of Philoponus
work, along with Proclus arguments too, survives, except for the opening pages, which are lost and contained the first argument, although it
does survive in an Arabic translation.2 Because of this odd history, these
arguments have received little attention either in themselves or in relation
to Proclus other works. This situation should be rectified in both regards:
these arguments are intrinsically interesting and clearly reflect his larger
philosophical enterprise.
I shall first examine Argument XVIII, in which Proclus calls on concepts of perpetuity, eternity, and time to argue that the cosmos must be
eternal. This argument raises questions about the cosmos that remain
unanswered in its context. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself a
god;3 how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes that
the cosmos is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal; but what does this
phrase and the conclusion that it expresses mean? To answer these
questions, I shall turn to Proclus most important work, The Elements of
Theology, which is a systematic sequence of 211 propositions that disclose
the causal structure of all reality. Eternity and time, along with being
perpetual, also appear here, particularly in propositions 40-55, to which
I shall turn in the second part of this paper. They are conjoined with what
Proclus calls the Self-Constituted. This conjunction, I shall argue in conclusion, provides important clues for interpreting his conclusions in Argument
XVIII.

Proclus: The Final Phase of Ancient Thought (New York: Cosmos, 1949) gives the
title of these arguments as Eighteen Arguments in Favor of the Eternity of the World
Against the Christians (Oktvkadeka Epixeirmata per Aidithtow to Ksmou
kat tn Jristiann), although there is little evidence. Rosn is often cited, e.g.,
Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science, (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1996) p. 318. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
reader of this paper whose constructive criticisms were very helpful.
2
H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899; reprint Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1984); recently a
bi-lingual text and translation has appeared of Proclus 17 Arguments surviving in
Greek, along with appendices that provide the Arabic text and translation of the first
argument and an edition of the most important of several Renaissance Latin translations: On the Eternity of the World: (de Aeternitate Mundi) trans. and ed. Helen S.
Lang and A. D. Macro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), hereafter
referred to as L/M.
3
Proclus was a devout worshipper of the ancient Greek gods and the god of this
argument clearly lies outside the Judeo-Christian tradition; therefore, I do not capitalize the first letter.

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On the Eternity of the World (de Aeternitate Mundi) has neither the
scope nor the systematic character of The Elements; rather, its unity rests
on the reiteration of a single thesis about the cosmos and the implicit claim
that all philosophical concepts, all true analysis, necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the cosmos must be eternal. Throughout these arguments,
Proclus conceives of the cosmos as the realm of becoming, first distinguished from being at Timaeus 27D6 and then identified with the all (t
pn) that forms the specific topic of Timaeus discourse.4 The language
of the all appears in Aristotle too, for example throughout the De Caelo.
The earth rests at its center and it is bounded by the circuit of the stars.
For Plato, this cosmos is made by god, the demiurge;5 but for Aristotle,
god is not a demiurge (a maker) but an absolutely unmoved mover, who
must be fully actual and who must act always in the same way, i.e. as an
object of desire, to move the circuit of the stars always and always in the
same way.6
Proclus shifts between Platos and Aristotles different conceptions of
the causal relation between god and the cosmos, using their distinct languages, as each argument requires. As a result, the arguments differ from
one another conceptually, but each bears on the same object and each
reaches the same conclusion: the cosmos must be eternal. Indeed, Proclus
may find the philosophical unity of Plato and Aristotle in the fact that different concepts of the causal relation of god to the cosmos, when properly understood, demonstrate a single conclusion. I turn to Argument
XVIII, preserved by Philoponus as the last of Proclus arguments for the
eternity of the cosmos.
I. Argument XVIII: God and The Cosmos
Argument XVIII breaks down into two parts, first Proclus constructive
account and then his reply to his opponents, Atticus and his coterie.7 In
his constructive account, he combines the claim from Platos Statesman
(269D5) that what is most divine must be ever uniform, unchanging and
self-identical with the identification of the demiurge as the maker of the

4
For some examples, cf. Plato, Timaeus 27A4 and C4, 28C4, 29C5 and D7, 30B5,
31B7, 32A8, 37D7, 41A5; for an interesting comparison, cf. Parmenides 128A8. All
references to Plato are to the O.C.T. Cf. below n. 28.
5
Plato, Timaeus 28A4-C3.
6
Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7. All references to Aristotle are to the O.C.T.
7
L/M 142.8.

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cosmos (Timaeus 28C2-29A3).8 This conjunction of texts (and terms) from

Plato specifies the being of the demiurge in a way not found in Plato;
indeed, it makes the demiurge of the Timaeus resemble Aristotles
unmoved mover;9 the identification of gods being as unchanging taken
together with the causal relation of the demiurge to the cosmos, allows
Proclus to argue from the necessary characteristics of the demiurge, as
cause, to the necessary character of the cosmos, gods effect again, an
argument that makes the language of Platos Statesman and Timaeus
resemble arguments about god and the cosmos in Aristotle, particularly
Metaphysics XII.10 (Later in the argument, Proclus uses nrgeia, a word
strongly identified with Aristotles argument for the unmoved mover and
the eternal motion of the heaven.)11 As a result, Argument XVIII exemplifies the philosophical project of Neoplatonism: it combines texts from
Plato to form an argument and to reach a conclusion that, though not
found in Plato, looks thoroughly Platonic (as Proclus reads him).12 At the
same time, Aristotles account of the unmoved mover, god, is implicitly
identified with Platos view as Proclus, by combining and interpreting
texts of Plato, produces an argument that silently calls to mind texts of
Aristotle (for those who know them and thereby enter into this project).13

8
L/M 140.10-12. This phrase from the Statesman, or variations on it, occur frequently in Plato; for some examples, cf. Timaeus 29A1; Phaedo 78C6; Sophist
248A12; Laws X, 898A8. Also cf. Plotinus, Ennead VI, 2, 7.30-31. All references to
Plotinus are to Enneads, 7 vols. trans. and ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966-1988).
9
In Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072a23-1072b8, Aristotle argues that the first heaven
must be eternal and goes on to conclude that its mover, being unmoved and fully
actual, cannot in any way be other than it is.
10
Cf. also, Aristotle, Physics VIII, 6 and 10.
11
L/M 142.22. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072a25; 1072b16.
12
Of course, Plato can be made to say different things all of which look thoroughly Platonic by selecting or emphasizing different texts. Proclus view of the
demiurge as making always and the cosmos as always becoming begins with the first
distinction in Timaeus account, i.e. the distinction between that which always is and
that which always becomes (Timaeus 27D6-28A1).
13
It is important to keep in mind that Neoplatonism itself is a response to an earlier tradition of reading Plato, particularly the Timaeus. See for example, J. Dillon,
The Timaeus in The Old Academy, pp. 80-94 in Platos Timaeus as Cultural Icon,
ed. Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).
On Neoplatonism (with particular reference to Iamblichus and Proclus, as originating
in the Academy and in Aristotle, see Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism,
2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff:1960), pp. 221-231.

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Prima facie, Argument XVIII is not difficult. Because the demiurge is

(as Platos Timaeus says) the best of causes, eternal and most divine, he
must (as Plato says in the Statesman of what is most divine) also be
invariable;14 being invariable, he can change neither from making to not
making, nor from not making to making.15 If he cannot change from one
to the other, then the demiurge must either always make or never make;
but it is inconceivable that he never makes, for the very meaning of the
word demiurge is maker or producer. If he never makes, Proclus
asks, when would he be a demiurge?16 Therefore, the demiurge must
always make, always act, always produce order; and, consequently, his
effect, the cosmos, must always be produced; the cosmos can have neither a beginning nor an end of being acted upon by the demiurge but is
ordered always and always ordered in the same way.17
Proclus completes this argument for the eternity of the cosmos with a
series of conclusions about the character that the cosmos must have, given
that it is the effect of a god, who is the most perfect and invariable
cause.18 Therefore the cosmos must be a cosmos without beginning or
end, must be a cosmos without generation and without corruption, must
be a cosmos ungenerated and incorruptible.19 If we say of the cause the
demiurge acts always in the same way, then we must say of the effect
the cosmos must be ungenerated and incorruptible. A cause always
causing produces an effect always being effected. The meaning of generation and corruption appear clearly here. The cosmos is ungenerated and incorruptible in the sense of having neither beginning nor end;
it is caused, i.e. comes to be, in the sense of being ordered always by a
cause that makes always. Gods causality is also specified: the demiurge
makes always and invariably and to make means to produce order.20
Being ordered (by god) and ordered always, i.e. without beginning or end,
is the very essence of the cosmos.21 This conclusion, together with the
14

L/M 140.1-5.
L/M 140.16-20.
16
L/M 140.21-23.
17
L/M 140.24-30. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, 7, 1072b28-30; 1073a11.
18
The logic of this transition, i.e. the character of the cause yields the necessary
character of the effect, reflects both Plato, Timaeus 28C5-29B1 and Aristotle, Metaphysics
XII, 7, 1072b13-14; 1073a3-13; 10, 1075a11-23.
19
L/M 140.30-32.
20
Cf. Plato, Timaeus 30A2-6.
21
Cf. Argument XVI, 129, 1-3: But surely a cosmos is nothing other than order
and the ordered. Therefore, the cosmos is ungenerated and incorruptible. L/M, p. 131,
n. 19 suggest that this theme runs throughout Proclus; cf. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum
15

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implication that the cosmos must be eternal, completes the first, constructive,
moment of Proclus argument.
In the second moment of the argument, Proclus turns to his opponents
in order to refute their views and thereby draw out further implications of
the causal relation between the demiurge and the cosmos. Atticus and his
friends, Proclus asserts, contradict Plato for two closely related reasons:
they fail to read him rightly and they fail to grasp the causal relation
between god and the cosmos. First, Atticus fails to understand the textual
relation between the Timaeus and the Statesman a relation that, as we
have just seen, Proclus defines and exploits in his constructive account.22
Contra Atticus, Proclus now continues, Platos genius lies in making the
order or disorder of the cosmos a direct consequence of the presence or
absence of god (Timaeus), while also establishing the everlasting actuality of god and so too his everlasting presence to the cosmos (Statesman).23
Thus, god is always a cause of order and always present to the cosmos
as a cause of order.
Together these two points lead to the substantive issue for Proclus:
when we rightly understand the relation of the cosmos as an effect to the
most divine of causes, a cause that is always present to the cosmos, we
must conclude that the cosmos is necessarily ordered and necessarily ordered
always; therefore, it is neither generated nor corruptible: it is without
beginning and without end.24 The demiurge, god, is both the essential
maker of the cosmos and makes it eternally. Therefore, the cosmos was
necessarily ordered for unlimited time and will be ordered into unlimited
time. Proclus is emphatic: Platos truly divine contrivance is to establish gods everlasting actuality as the cause of the non-generation of the
cosmos (tn genhsan . . . to ksmou).25 Plato makes it clear even to
Commentarii, 3 vols. ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903-1906; reprint Amsterdam:
Hakkert, 1965), I, 387.27-28; II, 37.21; 41.7-9; III, 85.2-3.
22
L/M 142.2-12. Atticus was a follower of Plutarch; see Plutarch, De an. Proc.
1016F-1017A.
23
The notion of actuality (L/M 142.22) suggests that Aristotles account of the
unmoved mover, Metaphysics XII, 7, is also contributing to Proclus conception of
god.
24
L/M 142.21.
25
L/M 142.20-21. The noun genhsa is rare; it appears only three times in all
of Proclus, including this appearance, one other in the 18 Arguments for the Eternity
of the World (Argument XVI 128.18) and once in the Th. Pl. (5, 116.15); it is not
found in Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus. In Philoponus, it appears only in the context of
refuting Proclus arguments (de Aet. Mundi contra Proclum XVI, 562.17, XVIII
607.8, 634.15). The sole appearance in Simplicius is found at In Caelo 7.139.24.

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the obtuse that the paradigm is a being for all eternity while the cosmos comes to be completely and is and will be for all time.26 Therefore,
the cosmos, being temporally unlimited in both directions, is a copy of
the perpetuity of the eternal (mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow).27
Proclus clearly thinks that his position alone fulfills Platos purpose and
thereby truly explains the cosmos: time is like eternity and the cosmos is
like the eternal living being (t d avn z).28 And his quarrel with
Atticus is not only textual and metaphysical; it is also ethical. No one,
Proclus argues, pays more respect to the cosmos than Plato, for whom god
is uniform, unchanging and self-identical, while the cosmos, being the
effect of god, is ordered by god and ordered always. The perfection of
god, the eternal presence of god to the cosmos, and the causal dependence
of the cosmos upon god imply that either the demiurge and the cosmos
are both gods, or neither is a god. This point lays the ground for Proclus
final thrust against Atticus: if one pays great respect to god, then one must
do the same for the cosmos; conversely, to dishonor the cosmos is to dishonor god.29 Therefore, if being uniform, unchanging, and self-identical is
shared in common by everything divine, then we must affirm it of both
the demiurge, a cause always acting for the best, and the cosmos, the
effect ordered by the demiurge in a way that is always best. The conclusion is left implicit: like god, the cosmos must be eternal.
Argument XVIII is a model of efficiency. In about 100 lines of text,
Proclus (on his own view) establishes his main thesis: the eternity of the
cosmos, which is the effect without beginning or end of a god who orders
always. Proclus also claims to offer a true reading of Plato, in particular
the Timaeus, the Statesman, and the relation between them. From this platform, he explicitly rejects Atticus (and his followers), whom Proclus presumably takes to be his most important opponents. The coup de grace lies
in Proclus claim that his view alone expresses proper respect for god and
his effect, the cosmos, which Proclus also calls divine and a god.

26

L/M 144.1-4. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 27D6.

L/M 144.8.
28
Cf. Plato, Timaeus 37C6-38B5; Plotinus, Ennead VI, 6, 7.14-20. Both Plato and
Plotinus associate the eternal living being with the all. Also, Proclus, Comm. In
Tim. II, 53.25-54.5; 59.24-60.2; 80.33-81.11.
29
The notion of to pay respect (eseben 144.12; 146.8 in L/M) also appears in
Argument IV, 50.14.20 and may reflect Plotinus conclusion at Ennead III,2.7.42-43
that since the All is a single living being it is not respectful (esebw) to admit that
the lower parts are not well made. Cf. also Ennead III, 2.3.1-6.
27

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But the efficiency of Proclus argument comes at a price. It raises two

questions that remain unanswered at its end. First, Proclus concludes that
the cosmos must be eternal because it is the effect of god, an eternal
invariable cause; but he also concludes that the cosmos must be a god.
If god is the cause and the cosmos his effect, then does not calling the
cosmos a god confuse the cause with the effect, the relation central to
Proclus argument for the eternity of the cosmos? Second, he concludes
that the cosmos is a mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow (a copy of the
perpetuity of the eternal). This occurence of mmhma is unique in the 17
arguments for the eternity of the cosmos that survive in Greek; the same
may be said of dithw it is unique in these arguments. Proclus gives
no indication of what these words mean, of the causal relation signified
by them, or of the conceptual force of the expression as a whole. These
questions, I shall now argue, are answered in another text, and context,
The Elements of Theology. Of particular importance are the propositions
concerning eternity and time ( an ka xrnow) and the SelfConstituted (t ayupstatow).
But what justifies looking to The Elements for an answer to the questions raised by Argument XVIII? At first glance, these works seem quite
different. The Arguments for the Eternity of the World presents, with no
apparent internal order, 18 independent arguments that bear on only one
part and not the most important part of all reality and reach the same
conclusion: the cosmos must be eternal. The Elements of Theology is conceived as a theoretical whole of 211 propositions deductively organized
to establish (and exhibit) the formal and causal unity of all reality from
the Good, which is the highest reality, to beings that are the first effect of
the Good, to what relates to being and so to the Good only through a
process of coming-to-be.
These differences notwithstanding, there are important similarities between
The Elements of Theology and the Arguments for the Eternity of the World
and they should not be overlooked. Both works clearly imitate Euclids
use of proofs. Several of the Arguments for the Eternity of the World draw
a double conclusion, a characteristic of geometrical proofs discussed by
Proclus in his Commentary on Euclids Elements.30 The Elements of Theology
30
Cf. Proclus, Procli Diadochi in Primum Euclidies Elementorum Librum Commentarii
ex Recognitione Godofredi Friedlein (Leipzig, 1873) 207.4-13; this has been translated
as: Proclus, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclids Elements, trans. and ed.
Glenn R. Morrow (Princeton University Press, 1970; reprint with a forward by Ian
Mueller, 1992), p. 162. For several examples of a double conclusion, cf. L/M, Argument
IV, 50.8, 14; VI, 62.12, 18; VIII, 74.2, 7; XIV, 114.22, 24; XVII, 136.9, 10.

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imitates Euclids Elements in its name, its organization and its use of
propositions and proofs. Furthermore, both are independent works rather
than commentaries, and both are discursive philosophical works, as
opposed to hymns or other religious works, which Proclus also composed.
The Elements of Theology and The Arguments for the Eternity of the
World both express Proclus own conceptual commitments and so may be
related in a way that recalls his account of the relationship between the
Timaeus and the Statesman: together their arguments serve a larger project that yields a true account of the cosmos and, indeed, all reality.
Indeed, I shall argue that the causal relation analyzed in the Elements of
Theology is identical with that presupposed by Argument XVIII and in
this sense the two works share a common project. Consequently, an understanding of the one provides grounds for an answer to the questions raised
by the other.
II. The Elements of Theology: Systematic Cause/Effect Relations
At the outset of The Elements of Theology, Proclus establishes three principles that he analyzes to yield a unified system embracing all reality. The
first principle is the highest cause: The Good, a single, transcendent one
that possesses unqualified unity; since all things that are desire the Good,
it must be beyond things that are (prop. 8).31 Consequently, the Good is
superior to and a cause of things that are and these things are the second
causal principle; by their very nature they desire the good and so are selfsufficient (t atarkew);32 appetite for the good is a cause of their good
within themselves and so they have an intrinsic relation to the Good (prop.
31
This account of the Good combines the conception of good in Plato and Aristotle.
In Plato, cf. Resp. VI, 509B 6-10, the metaphor of the sun in which the good is
described as exceeding being in dignity and power (ll ti pkeina tw osaw
presbe& ka dunmei perxontow); in Aristotle, the claim that all things that are
desire the good (pnta t nta to gayo fetai) appears at E.N. I, 1, 1094a1:
Psa txnh ka psa myodow, movw d prjw te ka proaresiw, gayo tinw
fesyai doke . . . Cf. also Physics I, 9, 192a22-25. For the view that everything that
knows the good, desires it, cf. Plato, Philebus 20D7-10.
32
For a possible origin for the notion of the self-sufficient in Plato, cf. Timaeus
33D1-3. Of particular interest may be the spurious Definitiones 411A3-4: yew zon
ynaton, atarkew prw edaimonan: osa diow, tw tgayo fsevw ata.
412B6-7: Atrkeia teleithw ktsevw gayn: jiw kay n o xontew ato
atn rxousin. Again, there may be a silent call upon Aristotle, who closely associates what is self-sufficient with what is good. Cf. E.N. X, 7, 1177a27-28; Metaph.
XIV, 4, 1091b16, 18, 19; Pol. I, 2, 1253a1-2, 25-28; VII, 5, 1026b27-30.

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9). This intrinsic relation makes what is self-sufficient more akin to the
Good and superior to the third principle, what experiences participation
(t metxein) and so relates to the Good not through itself, i.e. immediately
and by appetite, but externally through another, i.e. through the self-sufficient
(prop. 9; 10-11).33 This triad, which at once represents descending degrees
of unity, of reality, and of causal efficacy, is the most general way of characterizing all reality.34 Consequently, to understand the causal relations
that define the descent through these principles is to understand the unified
causal structure derived from the Good that informs and thereby constitutes all reality.
The analysis of these principles in terms of their cause/effect relation
is the first resemblance between The Elements of Theology and Argument
XVIII insofar as this too rests exclusively on an analysis of this relation,
i.e. the causal relation between god and the cosmos. I shall argue in conclusion that the causal relation between the two lower categories, the selfsufficient, later called the self-constituted (t ayupstaton)35 and what
experiences participation (t metxein) bears a striking resemblance to the
causal relation between the demiurge and the cosmos.36 Therefore I turn
now to the cause/effect relation that defines these categories.
The first cause and principle of all reality is the primal Good (t
prtvw gayn) that is nothing else but good and absolute unity beyond
all things that are (prop. 8). A regular feature of Neoplatonism, this idea
of the Good originates in Platos Republic VI, the Good that surpasses
being in power and dignity, conjoined with the One that is not of the
first hypothesis of Platos Parmenides.37 But Proclus specifies the causal33

See Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 6, 1362a22-30; 7, 1364a5-10.

E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology: A Revised Text with Translation
and Commentary, 2nd ed., (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), refers Proclus use
of a triad here to Iamblichus, cf. Introduction p. xxii.
35
For the identification of what is self-sufficient with the Self-Constituted, cf. Prop.
40. Dodds comments on the apparent identity of these principles, p. 224.
36
See John Whittaker, The Historical Background of Proclus Doctrine of the AUYUPOSTATA in De Jamblique Proclus: neuf exposs suivis de discussions, Entretiens
sur LAntiquit Classique in vol 21 (Vandoeuvres-Genve 1974), pp. 193-230.
Whittaker argues that the Self-Constituted cannot be found before Iamblichus; he may
be following Doddss note, p. 224.
37
See Prop. 13; 20. Plato, Republic VI, 509B9-10 (see above, n. 31); Parmenides
137C4-5; 141E9-142A1. For an explicit identification of The Good and the One, see
Proclus Commentary on Platos Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M.
Dillon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 1097.14; for the Good as sunektikn, see Plato, Phaedo 99C5, which is cited by Proclus at in Parm. 1097.14.
34

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ity of the Good in a way not found in Plato. Every productive cause, of
which the Good is the first and most important, remains undiminished as
it produces its effects because of its completeness (absolute unity in the
case of the Good) and the overflow of its power (prop. 26-27). This is to
say that, as it produces its effects, the Good remains absolutely unified,
even exceeding the identity signified by being.
Proclus now makes the key point about cause/effect relations: every
producing cause brings forth things that are like itself before things that
are unlike (Pn t pargon t moia prw aut pr tn nomovn
fsthsin.)38 Every productive cause (and the Good first of all causes)
must be superior to its effects (the Good produces beings). Since the
effects can never be identical or equal in potency to their cause, they must
be diverse and unequal to it; hence, effects must be either altogether distinct from their cause or at once united with it and distinct from it. It must
be the latter: effects cannot be altogether distinct because then there would
be no association or sympathy between cause and effect. Consequently,
insofar as effects (in this case beings) are in their very being cognate and
sympathetic with their causes, . . . by nature dependent on them and desir[ing]
to be conjoined with them . . . it is clear that effects are more united to
their producing causes than they are distinct from them.39 In short, effects
are more like their cause than unlike it and so every cause produces effects
that are like itself before those that are unlike itself.40 Thus a cause/effect
relation rests on a likeness ( moithw) of the immediate effect to its cause
throughout any procession of causes and effects (prop. 29).
Likeness appears clearly in the case of the Good and its immediate
effect, the Self-Constituted. What is immediately caused by the Good must
be in its very being cognate and sympathetic to the Good because by
nature it depends upon and desires the Good immediately;41 therefore, it
38
Prop. 28, p. 32, 10-11. Doddss translation reads: Every producing cause brings
into existence things like to itself before the unlike.
39
Prop. 28, p. 32, 28-33. My translation differs slightly from that of Dodds. The
entire text reads: e on ka suggen tow atoiw kat at t enai ka sumpay
t p atn, ka jrthtai atn kat fsin, ka rgetai tw prw at sunafw,
regmena to gayo ka tugxnonta di tw ataw to rekto, dlon d ti
mllon nvtai tow pargousi t paragmena diakkritai p atn.
40
Prop. 28, p. 34, 1-2.
41
Cf., n. 39 above for the Greek of these phrases. The notion of by nature (kat
fsin) is widely associated with Aristotle, but here represents a Neoplatonic combination of Plato and Aristotle. For relevant examples of Platos use of this phrase, cf.
Timaeus 30B1, 6, and 31A1. In Aristotle, it appears throughout the de Caelo and is
apparently identical in meaning with fsei as defined in Physics II, 1.

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is more united to the Good than distinguished from it, more like than
unlike. Likeness characterizes the cause/effect relation because through it
the cause/effect procession preserves an identity between the engenderer
in relation to the engendered (. . . szei t tatn to gennhyntow prw
t gennsan . . .) such that what the cause has primarily (prtvw) the
effect has secondarily (deutrvw).42
An effect produced immediately by the Good and so like it is the SelfConstituted (prop. 40), i.e. the Self-Constituted is in its very nature sympathetic to and desirous of the Good. Therefore, the Self-Constituted
is secondarily what the Good is primarily: ungenerated (gnhton) and
incorruptible (fyarton) (prop. 45-46), simple (plon) (prop. 47) and
perpetual ( dion ) (prop. 49). Because anything Self-Constituted is
ungenerated and incorruptible, it transcends (jrhtai) all things that
are measured by time; therefore, the Self-Constituted can neither be measured by time nor does it subsist in time (n xrn fsthken) (prop.
51). In short, because the Self-Constituted is caused immediately by the
primal Good, it is an effect that most intimately resembles the Good: what
the Good as cause possesses in virtue of itself and independently of its
effect, its immediate effect, the Self-Constituted, possesses by virtue of its
dependence on the Good. And within this causal relation, insofar as the
effect is in its very nature like its cause, the effect imitates (mimetai)
its cause.43
I shall return to Argument XVIII below. But we may note already the
strong resemblance between these two arguments. Both rest on a cause/effect
relation in which the primary, independent character of the cause is reproduced in a secondary, dependent way in the effect. Consequently, the character of the cause produces and necessarily produces the character of the
effect: cause and effect are the same in content and differ only as primary
and secondary, independent and dependent. As in Argument XVIII, a
cause that is always causing produces an effect that is always being
effected.
The Self-Constituted (always and immediately caused by the Good and
so like it) is also a productive cause and its production follows the same
causal pattern.44 As a cause, the Self-Constituted is superior to its effect,
i.e. what depends upon another (props. 9, 40). But while the Good is an

42
43
44

Prop. 29, p. 34, 8-11. Dodds translates prtvw as primitively.

Prop. 25, p. 28.28; Prop. 26, p. 30.12, 18.
Prop. 64.

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absolute and uncaused first cause producing what is like itself, i.e. the
Self-Constituted, the Self-Constituted is itself an effect that depends on the
Good for its very nature as incorruptible, simple, perpetual, and not subsisting in time. Therefore, when the Self-Constituted acts as a productive
cause, its effect, i.e. what depends upon another, is immediately related to
a nature that is secondary and derivative; it relates to the Good, which is
primary, only through the mediation of the Self-Constituted (prop. 9).
The immediate effect of the Self-Constituted must be more like than
unlike its cause (because every cause produces the like before the unlike).
Since what depends upon another is first related to an effect of the Good,
rather than having a direct relation to the Good, it is at a further remove
from the Good than is the Self-Constituted. The difference between a
direct relation to the Good and a more remote relation to the Good will
be crucial to Proclus project, i.e. establishing a unified system that
embraces all reality.
Clearly, the causal relation between the primal Good and the SelfConstituted yields an effect that in its nature is like its cause: the SelfConstituted, having a natural appetite for the Good, relates to the Good
immediately and intrinsically. And when the Self-Constituted in its turn
acts as a cause, it too produces what depends immediately upon itself (and
upon the Good only through it); again, the effect must be like its immediate cause, the Self-Constituted. But now a further implication follows:
this effect must be more diverse and different from the Good than the SelfConstituted because it participates in the Good only via the mediation of
the Self-Constituted (prop. 9). What depends on another receives its characteristics not from the primary progenitor, but only from what possesses
them secondarily. Its indirect relation to the Good is reflected in how it
resembles the Good. The Self-Constituted, being intrinsically like the
Good, is perpetual and outside of time; what depends upon another, deriving its nature from what is secondary and relating only indirectly to the
Good, is neither perpetual nor outside of time. It can pass in and out of
being and is measured by time.
Here Proclus faces a serious problem. If something is measured by time,
then it possesses a distinct past and future, i.e. it was and will be and
so cannot be a simultaneous whole; rather, it can pass in and out of being
and it experiences the process of coming-to-be. Its cause, the Self-Constituted,
being immediately like the Good, is perpetual, a simultaneous whole, and
outside of time. Prima facie, the cause, the Self-Constituted, and its effect,
what depends upon another, look quite different and so violate the principle that an effect must be more like than unlike its cause. Hence Proclus

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must explain how what depends upon another (measured by time and coming-to-be) is like the Self-Constituted (perpetual, outside of time, and a
simultaneous whole).
Proclus turns to this task immediately by examining the relation
between eternity and time.45 In The Elements of Theology, the analysis of eternity and time occupies Propositions 52 through 55 and the relation between them is another variant of the causal relation that we have
seen here and in Argument XVIII. But this variant is considerably more
complex.
What is eternal (anion) always is (e n); to be always means
to have no becoming and so what is eternal must be simultaneously the
whole of what it is (prop. 52). And eternity is a cause of things that are
as wholes. The next proposition (prop. 53) draws out a striking implication
for Proclus account of the causal relation between the Self-Constituted
and what depends upon another: eternity exists prior (pro#prxei) to all
eternal things and time has subsisted (pro#fsthken) before all things in
time.46 Consequently, eternity and time each found a triad.47 There is (1)
an undivided Eternity that is a wholly unified source of (2) the eternity that
in its turn measures (3) eternal things; there is (1) a one Time, that is the
wholly unified source of (2) time that is participated in and so measures (3)
temporal things (prop. 54).
Proclus problem is now full blown: the task at hand in The Elements
is to deduce a unified system embracing all reality and this unity is in
large part expressed by a likeness between any cause and its immediate
effect; but the second and third principles, the Self-Constituted and what
depends upon another, seem neither like nor united because one is eternal and the other is in time.48 If his system is to be unified, Proclus
requires a mean (t mson) to unite into a single whole the two separate
triadic series founded by eternity and time.49 Establishing this mean and
45
Like all Neoplatonists, Proclus ultimately addresses Platos famous text at
Timaeus 37D7 where time is characterized as a moving image of eternity.
46
Prop. 53; p. 50, 24-25. I may note that Dodds translates this Proposition differently: Prior to all things eternal there exists Eternity; and prior to all things temporal, Time. The Greek reads: Pntvn tn avnvn pro#prxei an, ka pntvn
tn kat xrnon xrnow pro#fsthken.
47
In his commentary, Dodds criticizes Prop. 53 as an unfortunate development
and suggests that Proclus had a special reason for hypostatizing an and xrnow,
namely their importance in late Hellenistic cults and contemporary magic (p. 228).
48
A full analysis clearly lies beyond this paper, but a clear reference may be found
in Plotinus, Ennead III, 7.1.1-4.
49
It is very tempting to see this point as a reference to Platos Timaeus, where god

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its character (prop. 55) concludes Proclus analysis of eternity and time
by making explicit the causal relation between them the mean establishes a likeness between them as cause and effect. This analysis can then
be applied to the Self-Constituted and its effect, what depends upon
another, in order to clarify why and in what respects this cause and effect
too are like and so united. I shall suggest that it also explains why in
Argument XVIII the cosmos as an effect of god may be properly called
a god and a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal.
The crucial issue is the dependence of the effect upon its cause. In any
series of productive causes, the subsequent terms depend on the prior
terms insofar as they are like rather than unlike. Being like is the positive, or constructive, moment of the causal relation. But what comes to
be in time is different (unlike) and of a distinctly lower order than what
is eternal.50 Consequently, it is impossible for what comes to be in time
to attach directly, i.e. to be immediately related to, what is eternal and so
what is temporal cannot serve as the mean between the two triadic series
founded on eternity and time. Proclus requires something like, or shared
in common, to act as a mean between things that come to be for a time
and things that are perpetually. What comes to be always (t e ginmenon
enai) is like both: it attaches to the lower order, temporal things, by virtue
of its coming to be (t mn gnesyai); it attaches to eternal nature by virtue
of its always (t d e . . .); because what comes to be always is
coming to be forever it imitates the eternal nature and serves as the mean
between the temporal and the eternal.51
This analysis leads Proclus to distinguish between two kinds of perpetuity ( dithw): (1) eternal perpetuity, steadfastness concentrated in a
simultaneous whole, and (2) temporal perpetuity that is an endless process
unfolding as a temporal continuation.52 Perpetuity, he concludes, is the
common term by which we can understand that a perpetual endless

forms body by finding a mean (t mson) between three numbers (31B4-32C4; cf. esp.
31C4-32A7).
50
For example, cf. Prop. 51, p. 50.1-2: All that is self-constituted transcends the
things which are measured by time in respect of their existence, which seems to
emphasize the difference between the Self-Constituted and what is measured by time.
51
Prop. 55, 52.27-29. For the Greek text, see n. 53.
52
Elements of Theology, Prop. 55, p. 52.30-31: k d totvn fanern ti ditt
n dithw, aniow mn llh, kat xrnon d llh. This distinction may answer
a question raised by Plotinus, Ennead III, 7.3.1-4: . . . what is everlastingness ( idithw)?
Is it the same thing as, and identical with eternity (t ani) or is eternity in conformity with it (kat atn an)? (Armstrong translation).

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process imitates the perpetuity of what is steadfast in a simultaneous

whole: It remains that the mean is that which perpetually comes-to-be:
which in virtue of its coming-to-be is attached to the inferior order, while
in its perpetuity it imitates the eternal nature.53 The meaning of it imitates appears unambiguously here and it is identical to that seen in the
relation of the Self-Constituted to the Good: the relation of an effect to its
cause whereby what is dependent and secondary is like rather than unlike
what is primary. And since every productive cause produces what is like
prior to what is unlike, imitation is the more direct positive relation of
any effect to its cause.
Perpetuity is Proclus solution to a serious problem: via perpetuity, what
is in time is like, and so united to, what is eternal and a simultaneous
whole; via perpetuity, what depends upon another, which comes to be in
time, is like what is Self-Constituted, which is outside of time. Although
the point is not made explicit, what depends upon another must have an
indirect relation to the Good because it depends directly on the SelfConstituted: a direct relation to what-is immediately grants coming-to-be
an indirect dependence upon and expression of the productivity of the
Good. By uniting these three principles, this solution furthers the larger
project of The Elements.
Although this distinction concludes Proclus discussion of time and
eternity, it does not conclude The Elements of Theology. He goes on to a
number of topics that seem less immediately relevant to the puzzles of
Argument XVIII. But in one of these topics, the infinite, perpetuity reappears and is unambiguously defined: All perpetuity is something infinite,
but not all infinitude is a perpetuity.54 It is clear, Proclus concludes, that
perpetuity is an infinitude; for that which never fails is infinite, and this
is what we mean by perpetuity, which involves an unfailing subsistence.55
That which never fails is perpetual, i.e. is forever. And this point returns
us to the cosmos, which, he concludes in his 18 independent arguments,
must be eternal.

Elements of Theology, Prop. 55, p. 52.27-29: lepetai ra t e ginmenon

enai t mson mfon, t mn gnesyai sunpton tow xerosi, t d e
mimomenon tn anion fsin.
54
Prop. 94, p. 84, 17-18: Psa mn dithw peira tw stin: o psa d
peira dithw. Dodds reads: All perpetuity is a kind of infinitude, but not all infinitude
is perpetuity.
55
Prop. 94, p. 84, 23-24: ti d dithw peira dlon: t gr mhdpote
pilepon peiron: toto d t e, tn pstasin nkleipton xon.
53

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How does an account that makes no reference to the cosmos or god,

an account that is situated within a series of formal ahistorical propositions, help answer questions about god, the cosmos, and the relation
between them, questions raised by a freestanding proof for the eternity
of the cosmos explicitly directed at an historical target, i.e. Atticus? Clues
for an answer to this question lie in the striking similarities between god
in Argument XVIII and the Self-Constituted in The Elements of Theology
as causes that are and are self-identical, between the cosmos in Argument
XVIII and perpetual coming-to-be in The Elements of Theology as effects
produced by what is self-identical, and in the analogous cause/effect relation at work in both texts. Indeed, as I shall now argue, these clues suggest a close conceptual relation between these two works.
III. Conclusion: The Cause/Effect Relation Between God
and The Cosmos
First the conceptual similarity of god and the Self-Constituted. In
Argument XVIII, god, being divine and the best of causes, is uniform,
unchanging and self-identical.56 In The Elements of Theology, The Good
is beyond being and cannot even be said to be self-identical; therefore,
god cannot be compared to the Good, even though they both are causes.
But the Self-Constituted always is and so has no becoming; because it is
unchanging, the Self-Constituted must be simultaneously the whole of
what is, unmeasured by, or outside of, time. And god in Argument XVIII,
as uniform, unchanging and self-identical, may be understood as like
the Self-Constituted, the second causal principle that is immediately subordinated to the primal Good in The Elements of Theology.57
The cosmos, which comes to be completely and is and will be for all
time in Argument XVIII, is not outside of time and so is not eternal;
being for all time, the cosmos is clearly temporal and is measured by
time. That measure is unlimited in both directions, meaning that the
56
Proclus constructive argument runs to some 35 lines and in it he repeats this
phrase, or a close variant of it, again and again: 140.2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 30, 33;
142.18-19, 27; 144.14-15, 28; 146.7, 11-12. Although the language is much more
Aristotelian, cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 76 and Prop. 77.
57
Merlan, p. 11, characterizes Proclus (and Iamblichus) work as an example of
multiple realism, i.e. a realism asserting the subsistence of more than one type of
non-sensibles and universals. Dodds makes it clear that the intermediate class, i.e.
the class of beings between the primal Good and that which is caused by another,
includes a wide range of beings and cites Th. Pl. I, xix.50. Cf. also, Prop. 127.

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cosmos was ordered from unlimited time and will be ordered for unlimited time.58 Therefore, the eternity of the cosmos is not outside of time,
like that of god, or the Self-Constituted; rather, the eternity of the cosmos
consists in coming to be perpetually (and being neither generated nor corruptible in the sense of being without beginning or end). In short, within
time, the cosmos must be eternal and its eternity resembles that of the
mean, perpetual coming to be, in The Elements of Theology.
If we identify the cosmos of Argument XVIII with perpetual comingto-be, then we must also identify the cosmos of Argument XVIII with the
mean between the eternal and the temporal in The Elements of Theology.
Indeed, in light of Argument XVIII, the corollary to proposition 55 in The
Elements may be read with a very concrete meaning: . . . the perpetuity
we spoke of was of two kinds, the one eternal, the other in time; the one
[analogous to god] a perpetual steadfastness, the other [analogous to the
cosmos] a perpetual process; the one having its being concentrated in a
simultaneous whole, the other diffused and unfolded in temporal continuation (partasin); the one entire in itself, the other composed of parts
each of which stands separately in an order of succession.59
In The Elements of Theology the Self-Constituted is eternal while its
effect, what depends upon another, is in time and this apparent difference
presents a challenge for Proclus. Argument XVIII rests on a cause/effect
relation between god and the cosmos and so they appear not as different
but as alike, i.e. the characteristics of the cause are also found in the effect.
But this difference, due to the different contexts of the two works, cannot
hide the fact that the same cause/effect relation is at work in both texts. Indeed,
the two arguments are complementary and for this reason The Elements
of Theology suggests answers to the questions raised by Argument XVIII.
In Argument XVIII, what justifies calling the cosmos, which is an effect
of god, a god and divine? In The Elements of Theology, the mean
between the eternal and the temporal is like the eternal in one respect and
like the temporal in another. It is like the temporal insofar as it is not
being but coming to be. It is like the eternal insofar as it is perpetually,
i.e. always. Proclus designs Argument XVIII to prove that the cosmos,
which becomes, is perpetually or always; his proof rests on what God and

58

L/M 142.30-144.1.
Dodds refers the opening words the perpetuity we spoke of to Prop. 48: All
that is not perpetual either is composite or has its subsistence in another and Prop. 49:
All that is Self-Constituted is perpetual.
59

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the cosmos share in common via their cause/effect relation, i.e. how they
are like. Via their relation, they are like in at least one crucial respect:
both god and the cosmos are eternal. Taking god as the cause and the
cosmos as gods effect, the predicate eternal applies to both. Insofar as
the predicate eternal is the same and rests on a causal relation, the cosmos and god are like: the predicate that attaches to god as a cause attaches
to the cosmos as the effect. Consequently, in respect of this predicate,
being eternal or perpetual, the cosmos is not unlike but like god and as
like can be called a god and divine. In short, the cosmos can be called
divine because, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and the
cosmos are both eternal.60
We also have here the answer to the second question raised by
Argument XVIII: what does Proclus mean by the claim that the cosmos,
being ungenerated and incorruptible, is a copy of the perpetuity of the
eternal (mmhma . . . tw to anow dithtow)? In the Elements of Theology,
he explains the mean between the eternal and the temporal, saying . . .
in its perpetuity it imitates the eternal nature (t mson . . . t d e
mimomenon tn anion fsin). Again, likeness between cause and effect
underlies the notion of imitation. Imitation signals the causal relation of
an effect to its cause insofar as via their relation the effect is like the cause.
The first part of Argument XVIII argues from the nature of the cause, god,
to the necessary character of the effect, the cosmos. Because god, the
cause, is unchanging and eternal, gods effect, the cosmos, must also be
eternal. In his rejection of Atticus, Proclus turns to the cosmos more
directly and we see not the relation of god to the cosmos but the relation
of the cosmos to god. Imitation appears here. The relation of the cosmos
to god is identical to that of the mean to the eternal nature: via the cause/effect
relation an effect becomes what its cause is, and in this precise sense an
effect imitates its cause. Furthermore, as the positive moment of the
causal relation, imitation also signals an indirect relation to the Good.
When the cosmos imitates god, in respect to what it imitates it may be
called a copy of what god is: it is a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal
and, by being a copy, the cosmos too must be eternal.
In The Elements of Theology, Proclus argues that the primal Good produces as its immediate effect beings that are necessarily plural and less
unified than the Good itself (prop. 21). So while the primal Good is
60
Cf. the address of the demiurge to the heavens at Plato, Timaeus 41A7-8: yeo
yen, n g dhmiourgw patr te rgvn, di mo genmena luta mo ge m
ylontow. Proclus Argument VI (L/M 62) rests on this text.

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beyond being and self-identity, its first effect is Self-Constituted (prop. 43).
The causal relation between any originative principle and the series generated by it is always the same. In its turn, the causal relation between
any being and its effect can also be understood according to the same
causal model. Consequently, by understanding the relation of the SelfConstituted as a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we can
also understand the causal relation between god and the cosmos.
Dodds criticizes Proclus analysis of time and eternity. He regards it as
an unfortunate development [that] may be merely the result of . . . applying the same formula to all concepts indifferently.61 Alternatively, we
might understand Proclus as exploiting the power of this causal relation
in new and penetrating ways that are neither formulaic nor indifferent.
Indeed, his ways of exploiting this relation are exciting because (at least
on Proclus view), they exemplify fully the project of Neoplatonism, a
project that in Argument XVIII is at once textual and metaphysical and
that finds its ultimate tone of triumph in the ethical: honoring god and
honoring the cosmos because in the unity of their cause/effect relation both
are divine: both are perpetual, both are always and without fail.
Department of Philosophy
Villanova University

61

Dodds, p. 228; commentary on Prop. 53.