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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

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ATTY. EVALYN URSUA 1 SEM SY 2009-2010
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (RA 386)
Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 2-18, Civil Code)
Art 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

o Taada v Tuvera (1986)

o Facts: original petition was for writ of mandamus; new petition was Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification
o Is publication a necessary requirement for a law to be effective? YES.
Due process, right to information.
The phrase unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted.
This clause does not mean the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
o Where and when should publication be done?
Published in full in the Official Gazette, immediately thereafter approval of
law. Why? The former is what is required by law (Art 2), although justices
recognize that newspapers of general circulation may better serve the
purpose of publication.
o What kinds of laws must be published?
The term laws should refer to all laws and not only those of general
application. To be valid, the law must affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable to only one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application,
city charters and private laws, and presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers must be
published. Same with administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is
to enforce or implement an existing law. Internal regulations, such as those
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency, need not be
published.
o EO 200: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. (Approved June 18, 1987. Took
effect immediately after publication in Official Gazette.)

o State Prosecutors v Muro (1994)

o Facts: On Aug. 13, 1992, Muro dismissed 11 criminal cases of violation of CB
Foreign Exchange Restrictions against Imelda Marcos, based on newspaper
reports on announcement by the President of the lifting by the government of all
foreign exchange restrictions (decided by the Monetary Board).
Muro
contended that there was no need to wait for the actual publication of the law
repealing the existing lawthe Presidents announcement was enough; the
new law deprived the court of jurisdiction over Imeldas cases.
o Should the judge have taken judicial notice of the newspaper announcement?
No. Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective.
Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
the matter must be one of common & general knowledge
it must be well & authoritatively settled, not doubtful & uncertain
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court
o Dadole v Commission on Audit (2002)
o Facts: RTC & MTC judges of Mandaue City were receiving 1,260, then 1,500 a
month. DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55, which declared allowances
in excess of 1,000 as conditional and also provided for its own immediate
effectivity. This circular prompted Mandaue City Auditor to issue notices of
disallowance & reimbursement. Judges protested, COA denied.
o Is LBC 55 issued by the DBM valid and enforceable, considering that it was not
duly published in accordance with law?
No. LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of ruling
in Taada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation.
o Republic v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008)
o Facts: DOE/ERB wanted Shell to pay not just underpayments and risk fees, but
surcharges, as per MOF Circular 1-85, as amended by DOF Circular 2-94.
MOF Circular 1-85 has been neither published nor filed at the Office of the
National Administrative Register.
o Is MOF Circular 1-85 rendered invalid by the subsequent enactment of a law
requiring registration at the ONAR?
As per Taada v Tuvera, MOF Circular 1-85 should have been published
since it is intended to enforce PD 1956.
It should also comply with the requirement stated in Sec 3, Chapter 2, Book 7
of the Administrative Code of 1987: filing with the ONAR in the UP Law
Center. Existing rules must be filed w/in 3 months of Admin Code, lest they
lose their effectivity.
Failure to comply with the requirements of publication & filing of
administrative issuances renders MOF Circ 1-85 ineffective.

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Art 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
o Kasilag v Rodriguez (1939)
o Facts: Emiliana Ambrosio & Marcial Kasilag entered into a mortgage
agreement, and then a verbal contract which gave Kasilag possession of the
land as well as the benefit of receiving the fruits of the land.
o Is the contract legal?
No. Possession of the land and enjoying its fruits is a contract of
antichresis, which is a lien and is prohibited by Sec 116, Act 2874.
o Given that the contract was illegal, could Kasilag be held accountable for its
illegality? Did he act in bad faith?
No. Court said that even if Kasilags contract was antichresis, it was made in
good faith. He was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by which it is invalidated. He was excusably ignorant as he was
neither highly educated nor a lawyer, and could not be expected to know and
properly interpret provisions of law.
o Alfonso-Cortes v Maglalang (1993)
o Facts: Judge Maglalang was charged with misconduct for failing to decide Civil
Case No. 3810, regarding foreclosure and sale of a Bataan fishpond, within the
90-day period prescribed by lawhe decided the case more than a year after
the case was submitted. Maglalang contends that the case was not submitted
as dated (April 10, 1986), that he had double his normal workload since April
14, 1987 because he was handling two courts (Branches 1 and 2 of RTC
Balanga, Bataan), and that the civil case involved difficult questions of law on
his part.
o Is the judge excused from noncompliance with the law requiring that civil cases
in RTCs be decided within 90 days?
No. It was held in Marcelino v Cruz, Jr. that failure to observe the rules
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.
In Diputado-Baguio v Torres, it was held that certain factors could mitigate a
respondent judges liability: congestion of docket, lack of personnel, detail in
other courts, and illness.
Art 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.
o People v Lacson (2003)
o Facts: In 1999, 11 members of Kuratong Baleleng were killed by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, led by Panfilo Lacson. In this case, he
prayed
o (1) that certain justices be inhibited from participating in deliberations (omnibus
motion): DENIED
o (2) for a motion to set the case for oral arguments: DENIED

o (3) for reconsideration of an earlier resolution regarding the prospective and

retroactive application of the time-bar under Sec 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: DENIED
Lacson contends that Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively and
retroactively without reservation because it is favorable to the accused. He
insists Sec 8 was crafter to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to
a speedy disposition of his casea check on the State to prosecute criminal
cases diligently, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. Rule
should have retroactive application because it is a procedural rule.
March 29, 1999: dismissal of cases by RTC
Dec. 1, 2000: RRCP took effect
Thus, cases were revived in the RTC beyond two-year bar, in violation of
his right to a speedy trial, in derailment of his Senate bid.
Petitioners contend that prospective application of Sec 8 is in keeping with
Sec5(5), Art 8 of the 1987 Constitution: rules of procedure shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantial rights. Sec 8 secures rights of the accused
but should not preclude the right of the State to public justice. If a procedural
rule impairs a vested right and work injustice, the rule may not be given a
retroactive application.
Lacson replies that State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases
before the two-year bar but failed to do so. The operational act was the
refilling of the Informations with the RTC on June 6, 2001, beyond the twoyear bar.
o Does the time-bar apply? NO.
The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to Sec5(5), Art 8 of Consti. The
Court is not mandated to apply Sec 8 retroactively simply because it is
favorable to the accused. The new rule was approved not just to reinforce
the constitutional right of the accused: time-bar was fixed by the Court for the
benefit of both the State and the accused. The State also has a right to due
process.
Time-bar: can only revive criminal cases one to two years after they are
provisionally dismissed. Supposed to be a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties.
The Court may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the
situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity of a rule is not
automatically determined by the Constitutional provision on which it is based.
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a
statute.
The Court intended Sec 8 to be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Cases are governed by existing rules, not by rules yet to exist. Petitioners
had until Dec. 1, 2002 to revive the cases. Cases were revived June 6,
2001well within the time-bar.
Statutes regulating procedure will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. It is in this sense
that procedural laws are retroactive.
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o Did Lacson fail to comply with requisites of Sec 8, Rule 117 of RRCP?
Lacson contends that CA case (double jeopardy for being charged with
murder in some cases despite dismissal of other cases) and SC case (if
prosecution of criminal cases was barred by Sec 8, Rule 117) are on different
issues and thus, any admissions he made in CA are not judicial admissions
in SC.
The Court held that the issues in the CA case and in the SC are the same.
Lacson invoked the same Sec 8, Rule 117 and the Constitution in both
cases.
Sec 4, Rule 129 of Revised Rules of Court: an admission made by a party in
the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
The Court held that when Lacson admitted that he did not move for dismissal
of some of his criminal cases in his motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the cases, he in fact admitted that one of the
essential requisites of Sec 8 Rule 117 was absent.
No need to remand the case to RTC. Judge Agnir could not have complied
with the mandate under Sec 8 because said rule had yet to exist.
o Sandoval-Gutierrez: Dissent: When a new law will be advantageous to the
accused, the same shall be given retroactive effect. Also, Sec 8 Rule 117 was
meant to protect the accused against protracted prosecution. Statement of Atty
Fortun during CA proceedingsthat the dismissal of Lacsons case was
without his express consentcannot be taken as a judicial admission.
o Ynares-Santiago: Dissent: State doesnt have rights, only powers. Rule should
be retroactiveprotect the individual.
o Harrison Motors Corporation v Navarro (2000)
o Facts: In June 1987, Renato Claros sold 2 Isuzu Elf trucks to Rachel Navarro of
RN Freight Lines, saying all taxes & customs duties had been paid for. In
September 1987, the BIR and the LTO entered into a MOA providing that prior
to LTO registration of any re-/assembled motor vehicle, a Certificate of
Payment should first be obtained from BIR. In October 1987, the Bureau of
Customs issued a Customs Memorandum promulgating regulations for
payment of duties and taxes on imported motor vehicles assembled by nonassemblers. In December 1987, BIR issued a Memorandum Order on the
procedure governing processing and issuance of the Certificate of Payment. In
June 1988, BIR, BOC and LTO entered into a MOA which provided that prior to
LTO registration, a CP should first be obtained from the BIR and BOC to prove
that all existing taxes and customs have been paid. In December 1988,
government agents seized and detained Rachel Navarros 2 Elf trucks. She
paid the taxes and customs duties and asked for reimbursement from Harrison
Motors, but was refused. RTC and CA both ruled that Harrison Motors needed
to reimburse Navarro.
o Harrison Motors contends that it was no longer obliged to pay taxes and duties
imposed by the Memorandum Orders and MOAs because these administrative
regulations only took effect after the execution of its contract of sale with

Navarro. Holding it liable for payment would violate the non-impairment clause
of the Consti and Art 4 of the Civil Code.
o Does the set of admin regulations violate the principle of retroactivity?
No. The admin regulations in question do not impose any new taxes. They
merely enforce payment of existing taxes and duties at time of importation.
The Court held that Harrison Motors is obliged to paynot because of the
administrative regulations but from the tax laws existing at the time of
importation. Even if Navarro now owned the trucks, it was still Harrison
Motors that was obliged to pay the taxes and duties.
o Morales v People (2002)
o Facts: Eulogio Morales, General Manager of the Olongapo City Water District,
sold a company-owned car to Wilma Hallare, Finance Officer, who in turn sold it
to Rosalia Morales, Eulogios wife. The car was valued at P75,000 and yet was
sold for only P4,000. The car was in good running condition. The sale was
done in violation of an existing Board Resolution, and no new board resolution
authorized the sale of the 1979 Gallant car Sigma. Sales Dept manager filed
the complaint.
o Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction? Is the Olongapo City Water District
a government-owned or controlled company? YES.
Feb. 20, 1984: Baguio Water District: water districts fall under the general
term government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
and are covered by the Civil Service Law
August 18, 1986: commission of crime
April 17, 1989: Tanjay Water District echoed Baguio Water District
May 16, 1990: Metro Iloilo Water District: water districts were private
corporations
Sept 13, 1991: Davao City Water District: returned to ruling in Baguio Water
Petitioners contend that Metro Iloilo should be applied because it was the law
in force at the time of the commission of the crime charged. The Court held
that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the crime. When the Information in this case was filed, it was
1992: the Davao City Water was the prevailing ruling, which makes Olongapo
City Water District a government-owned/controlled corporation, and thus,
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
o Other issues: The sale was grossly disadvantageous to the government,
because the book value was P75,000 when the sale value was P4,000. The
car was not junk, as petitioners contend, but was in good condition. It was the
second salethe sale to Rosalia Moralesthat violated Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law, as it is reasonable to suppose that Rosalia bought the car with
her husbands knowledge and consent.
o PNB v Office of the President (1996)
o Facts: A Marikina subdivision developer mortgaged its subdivision lots in favor
of PNB. Buyers of the subdivision lots were unaware of this and continued to
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pay for their lots and construct their houses. The subdivision developer then
defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, the bank got the lots. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) said that PNB could collect only the remaining amortization of
the lot buyers. The Office of the President affirmed this decision, invoking PD
957, which protects condo and subdivision lot buyers from fraud.
o PNB contends that PD 957 was enacted on July 12, 1976, while the mortgage
was executed on Dec. 18, 1975, and that PNB is not privy to the contracts
between the lot buyers and the subdivision developer.
o Is the application of PD 957 valid? YES
PD 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity, but this could be inferred
from the intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from unscrupulous
subdivision developers. Besides, PNB should have done their due diligence
in checking the foreclosed lots.
Sec 21, PD 957: In cases of lots sold prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it
shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condo
to complete compliance with its obligations within two years from the date of
this Decree.
Justice Cruz: A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally
modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a
proper exercise of police power, it will prevail over the contract.
o Can PNB take the developers place & accept remaining payment? YES
Sec 18, PD 957 obliges PNB to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid
amortizations of the lot buyers.
Art 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
o Far East Bank & Trust Co. v Marquez (2004)
o Facts: Arturo Marquez entered into a contract to sell a 52.5 sq. m. lot in
Diliman, which is a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 156254 (now
3833697), with Transam Sales & Exposition through the latters owner and GM,
Engr. Jesus Garcia. On May 22, 1989, TSE loaned P7,650,000 and mortgaged
the property covered by the TCT. TSE couldnt pay, so the bank foreclosed the
real estate mortgage and became the highest bidder in the subsequent auction
sale. Marquez had already paid P600,000 and his townhouse unit was under
construction. Marquez filed a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB on Jan 29, 1991 to compel TSE to
complete construction of his townhouse, prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure,
and have the TSE/FEBTC mortgage declared invalid, because the mortgage
violated Sec 18 of PD 957. The OAALA ruled in Marquezs favor, and so did
the CA, who found that the bank had known about the subdivision and that the
Certification against forum shopping attached to the Petition had not been
made under oath, in violation of the Rules of Court. Petition was denied, CA
ruling affirmed.

o Did the mortgage contract violate Sec 18 of PD 957?

Yes, even if the lot itself was just part of a bigger parcel of land.
PD 957 aims to protect innocent lot buyers, and Sec 18 addresses the
problem of fraud committed against buyers when the lot is mortgaged without
their knowledge. The lot was mortgaged in violation of Sec. 18 of PD 957.
Marquez was not notified of the mortgage before the release of loan
proceeds by Far East Bank. Sec 18 of PD 957 is prohibitory. Acts contrary
to it are void.
Far East Bank already knew about the subdivisionwhen they took on the
mortgage, it was not with good faith. They were negligent in finding out what
Marquezs rights really were as to the lot.
o Assuming there was a violation of PD 957, was the remedy granted by
HLURB/Office of the President/Court of Appeals the proper one?
The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the
President was proper only in its reference to the lot of Marquez. The
mortgage contract is void as against him. The rest of the land is none of his
business.
o Does the failure of the notary public to sign the Certification against forum
shopping provide sufficient basis for dismissal of the appeal?
SC upheld CA ruling; no more need to pass upon this issue.
CA ruling: certification had not been made under oath, and is thus in violation
of the Rules of Court.
o Republic v Court of Appeals (2003)
o Facts:
On Nov. 27, 1985, the DPWH Minister asked Marcos for P800 million for
dredging, flood control & related projects in Metro Manila, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Leyte. P615 million was allocated to 21 contracts, 4 of which
were with the Navotas Industrial Corp (NIC).
NIC says it did 95.06% of the work, but DPWH paid only 79.22%, so NIC filed
a complaint for sum of money (civil case). They were denied because (1) the
DPWH fact-finding committee discovered that the dredging contracts were
null and void, (2) NIC worked on the projects 5 to 6 months before they were
awarded the DPWH contracts, (3) NIC got the contracts without bidding for
them, and (4) NIC falsified documents so it seemed theyd worked when they
hadnt.
DPWH filed a case of estafa (criminal case) against NIC with the
Tanodbayan. Contentions were the falsification of documents and that the
former DPWH minister violated RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act).
Petitioner filed a motion to consolidate the collection and estafa cases,
because the cases arose from the same incidents and involved the same
facts. The consolidation petition and its reconsideration were denied.
The CA ruled that the RTC could not rule on the violations of RA 3019, and
that the Sandiganbayan could not rule over collection cases.
The
Sandiganbayan would have no authority to order the defendant in the civil
case to pay NIC their money.
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o Was the petition filed on time? YES
NIC said petition was sent by registered mail only on Sept. 12. Deadline for
filing was Sept. 11, a Sunday. However, Sec 1 Rule 22 of the Rules of Court
states that in this case, time shall not run until the next working day.
o Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the consolidation? NO
Consolidation happens only when the cases involve similar questions of fact
& law. Its purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, simplify the
work of the trial court, and so on.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over civil collection cases.
Rules of Court do not allow filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint
in a criminal case.
Normally, Article 31 of the Civil Code would apply: civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. However, when the action is based on a contract that is illegal, as
when the contract violates the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Art 31
does not apply. Under Section 3 of the aforementioned Act, entering into a
contract that is grossly disadvantageous to the governmentlike the
dredging contractsis unlawful. The act purporting to create the obligation
to pay NIC is assailed as a crime in itself. Thus, a contract executed against
the provisions of prohibitory laws is void, and if the contracts are illegal, then
no valid obligation to pay can arise from it.
o Petition denied, CA decision affirmed with modification. Civil case was
suspended until termination of civil cases to avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions on the validity of NICs dredging contracts.
o BPI v IAC (1998)
o Facts: Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife maintained a dollar savings account and
a peso current account at COMTRUST Bank, which was later absorbed by BPI.
Virgilio Garcia, COMTRUST Asst. Branch Manager, withdrew $1,000 from the
Zshornacks dollar savings account without the couples authorization.
o The Zshornacks had originally entrusted $3,000 cash for safekeeping, and this
agreement had been embodied in a document. Despite demands, the bank
refused to return the money. COMTRUST also did not deny the authenticity
and execution of said document.
o BPI argues that the document is a contract of depositum, which banks do not
enter into. Garcia was alleged to have exceeded his powers when entering into
that transaction. Thus, the bank could not be held liable under the contract,
and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
o Court held that COMTRUST could have denied under oath the due execution of
the document if it had so desired, according to the Rules of Court: they couldve
questioned the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation, and denied its
capacity to enter into such a contract. But they didnt, so the bank admitted
both Garcias authority and the banks power to enter into the contract in
question.
o Court held that the mere safekeeping of greenbacks is a transaction not
authorized by CB Circular No. 20, as amended by CB Circular No. 281, and

thus falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Pursuant to Art 5
of the Civil Code, the safekeeping of greenbacks is void.
o Because the contract was void, neither party can have a cause of action
against each other, according to Art 1411 of CC. The only remedy is to
prosecute the parties for violating the law. Thus, Zshornack cannot recover
damageshas no cause of action.
o Decision modified. BPI ordered to repay $1,000 to bank account and pay
damages.
o Nicolas v Court of Appeals (1987)
o Facts: Madlangsakay bought 3 parcels of land from Felipe Garcia in 1951. At
the time of the purchase, the petitioners were living on one of the lotsLot 8.
In 1958, Madlangsakay entered negotiations for the sale of Lot 8 to petitioners,
and Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them, but nothing
happened. In 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint in CFI Bulacan for
Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot 8, saying that in a 1958 affidavit, he had
agreed to sell the property to them at P0.70 per sq. m., and that he had
executed several deeds of sale transferring the land to the petitioners, plus an
affidavit to facilitate the registration of the deeds of sale. Madlangsakay had
filed criminal cases against the petitioners when they had cut and cleared
bamboo groves near their houses; petitioners countered with criminal
complaints of perjury. Madlangsakay said that all the deeds of sale and all
affidavits were forgeries. He said that the land was conjugal property,
registered under the Torrens system & mortgaged with PNB.
o Did the CA err in concluding that the deeds of sale were spurious? NO
There was evidence that the deeds of sale were falsified; the notary knew
nothing and could not actually vouch for credibility of petitioners.
Contract said the land was not registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
but it was.
The land was conjugal property & was heavily mortgaged with PNB.
The land was titled property, and any conveyance affecting titled property
must be registered under Act 496 and not under Act 3344, which is what the
petitioners did.
The very conspicuous absence of the wifes conforme to the disposition of
the property renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it contravenes
the mandatory requirements of Art 166 CC.
o Decision affirmed. Decision immediately executory.
Art 6: Rights may be waived, except when the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, good customs, or is prejudicial to a
third party with a right recognized by law.
o For a waiver of rights to exist:
o existence of a right
o knowledge of the evidence thereof
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o intention to relinquish said right
o A waiver must be a voluntary, intelligent and informed decisiona person
can only waive his/her rights if he/she has sufficient awareness of relevant
circumstances.
o Corpuz v Spouses Grospe (2000)
o Facts: Gavino Corpuz was a farmera beneficiary of the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program of DAR. Pursuant to PD 27, he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over 2 parcels of agricultural land. After
Corpuzs mortgage contract with Virginia de Leon expired, he mortgaged it to
Mrs. Grospe. They had an agreement (Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng
Lupang Sakahan) which allowed the Grospes to use or cultivate the land during
the duration of the mortgage. Before the DAR, Corpuz instituted action for
recovery of possessionthe Grospes had allegedly entered the land by force &
destroyed his palay.
o The Grospes claimed the Kasunduan allowed them to take possession of the
land until the loan was paid. Instead of paying the mortgage, Corpuz had
allegedly executed a Waiver of Rights. Corpuz denied having waived his
rights and interest over the land and said the signatures therein were forgeries.
o Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled that Corpuz had
abandoned and surrendered the land to Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had recommended the reallocation of the lots to
the Grospes, who were the most qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
o CA ruled that Corpuz had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as
a beneficiary. The waiver of rights and conformity to Samahang Nayon
resolutions are evidence of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his
rights as beneficiary under the land reform laws. Also, he failed to prove that
signatures were forgeries.
o Was appellate court correct in finding that the signatures were not forged?
YES. Petitioner failed to prove forgery.
o If signatures were genuine, was waiver null & void for being contrary to agrarian
laws? YES. Sale or transfer of rights over property covered by CLT is void,
except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through
hereditary succession. Thus, waiver was void.
o Did Corpuz abandon his rights, under PD 27?
NO.
There was no
abandonment because the waiver of rights was void.
o Did Corpuz forfeit his right as a beneficiary? YES.
Corpuz voluntarily surrendered his landholding.
PD 27: Title to land acquired pursuant to land reform program shall not be
transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government.
RA 3844 Sec 8: The agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished by
voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee.
The land was surrendered to the government, not to a private person. It was
the government that awarded the land to the Grospes.

o Spouses Valderama v Macalde (2005)

o Facts: In 1977, Albano acquired a lot in Tondo, Manila, that was being rented
by the Macaldes, who had an ancestral home on two-thirds of said lot. The
Macaldes leased the property from Albano and paid monthly rentals; the
remaining one-third of the land was leased by the spouses Valderama. In
1978, Marcos issued PD 1517 proclaiming Urban Land Reform Zones. A
subsequent Marcos proclamation included Albanos property in the Urban
Zones. In 1990, Albano offered to sell the property to the Macaldes. The
Macaldes offered to buy Albanos property but Albano did not respond; the
Macaldes continued paying rent. In 1991, Albano told Macalde she sold the
property to Valderama. Albano and Valderama rejected Macaldes offer to buy
the property on which their ancestral home stood. Macalde invoked PD 1517,
saying they had a preferential right to buy the property. Albano said the land
was not covered by PD 1517; the Valderamas said the Macaldes had waived
their preferential right since they failed to exercise it when Albano first offered
the property to them.
o Did the Macaldes waive their rights to the property? NO.
Sec 6, PD 1517: the Macaldes did have the right of first refusal.
The Macaldes exerted every effort to stop the sale to the Valderamas. There
was no intent to let go of the property.
Albano failed to respond to the Macaldes offer to buy, and concealed the
identity of the buyer of the lot from the Macaldes.
Under Sec 9, PD 1517, Albano was mandated to declare to the Land
Management Committee her proposal to sell the property, but she didnt
even the government was deprived of its preemptive right to acquire the
property.
Herminia Albano forged the signature of her dead husband for some of the
legal documents. LOL!
o Borromeo-Herrera v Borromeo (1987)
o Facts: Vito Borromeo died in 1952, leaving behind several properties in
Cebu. In 1969, the Regional Trial Court invoked Art 972 of the Civil Code
and listed 9+ heirs to the Borromeo estate. In 1972, Fortunato Borromeo, an
acknowledged illegitimate son, filed a petition praying that he be declared as
one of the heirs of the deceased. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate, asserting and
incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights, dated 1967 and supposedly
signed by the Borromeo heirs. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished to
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
o Is the Waiver of Hereditary Rights valid? NO.
o For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential.
o The intention to waive a right must be shown clearly and convincingly.
When the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should
be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of intent to, voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage such that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible.
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o In this case, the signatories to the waiver did not have clear and convincing
intention to relinquish their rights.

Art 7: Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, custom, or practice to
the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
o Look at the effectivity clause and the repealing clause of a law. Example:
Art 254 of Family Code is a repealing clause.
o Laws not usually followed:
o law against concubinage
o law against discussing cases pending in court
o law against premature marriage: widows are not allowed to marry within 300
days of the death of spouse or the end of the marriage
o Art 7 tells us of the hierarchy of laws:
o the Constitution is the fundamental law; all laws must conform to it as it is a
direct enactment of the people
o statutes and treaties must conform to the Constitution
o administrative orders and executive acts must conform to statutes
Art 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
o This is judicial/interstitial legislation.
o Follow the principle of stare decisis: judical decisions as precedents.
o Stare decisis is a matter of agreeing on what are relevant facts.
Art 9: No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of laws.

o Note also that we now have international human rights laws. Basic human
rights: liberty, privacy.
o Courts may use international human rights decisions in making their own.
o Treaties may also be used in determining a case.
o Van Dorn v Romillo: It was the Filipino who initiated divorce proceedings in the
US. When this case was decided, there was no Art 26 of the Family Code yet,
but the court did not refuse to rule. They ruled with the principle of equity as
their basis.
Art 10: In case of doubt in the determination or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

o This is a general principle of law.

o Van Dorn v Romillo: She cannot be discriminated against in her own country.
Art 11: Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy
shall not be countenanced.
Art 12: A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence.
Art 13: When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights
o Sec 31, Book 1, Executive Order 292: Instituting the Administrative Code
of 1987
o Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset
to sunrise.
o There is a conflict between the Civil Code and the Admin Code in the definition
of a year: follow the Civil Code. The Admin Code only applies to
administrative agencies; generally, the Civil Code applies.
o Non-working days and legal holidays are included ONLY according to
rules of procedure, such as the Rules of Court.
Art 14: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to
the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

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o Art 2, Revised Penal Code
o Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and
laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced
not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its
interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against
those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine
Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the
Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands
of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
o There are treaties, like the Vienna Convention, that exempt certain people, like
diplomats.
o Liang v People (2000)
o Facts: Liang was an ADB economist who uttered defamatory words against
his co-worker, Joyce Cabal. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
issued a warrant of arrest, as Liang was charged with 2 counts of oral
defamation. The DFA sent an office of protocol stating that Liang was
immune from the legal process, according to Sec 45 of an Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
o Does Liang have immunity from the legal process? NO.
DFAs determination that a person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary, which has no binding effect in courts. The DFAs advice to
dismiss the criminal cases, as well as the actual dismissal of the criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, violated the latters right to due
process.
Sec 45 of the Agreement pertains to immunity that is not absoluteit is
subject to the exception that the act was done in official capacity.
Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity of the Agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent
has immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, except in
cases relating to actions outside his official functions.
o J. Puno: concurring opinion:
Does Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to
diplomatic immunity?

A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international

conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of
immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.
Is an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts,
whether private or official?
The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the
foundation of international immunities are contained in the ILO
Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions, namely:
(1) that international institutions should have a status which protects
them against control or interference by any one government in the
performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are
responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which
all the nations concerned are represented;
(2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying
fiscal charges on common international funds; and
(3) that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States
Members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official
business customarily extended to each other by its individual member
States.
The thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in
character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of
individuals, but with the elements of functional independence
necessary to free international institutions from national control and to
enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of
all their members.
Is the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the
courts?
Positive international law has devised three methods of granting
privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations.
(1) by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907
(2) by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon
whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions,
recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by
unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure
the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this
situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions
is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine
at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome.
(3) by a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a
conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an international
organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and
general terms. The specific definition and application of those general
terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and
the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of
Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations.
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The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international

officials rest upon different legal foundations. Those immunities awarded
to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending stated based on
customary international law, those granted to international officials are
based on treaty or conventional law.
Is the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is
covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive
on the courts?
The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel
of international organizations to a minimum.
The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of
practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the
organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials.
There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to
immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity,
unlike international organizations, which enjoy absolute immunity.
In strict law, it would seem that even the organization itself could have
no right to waive an officials immunity for his official acts. This permits
local authorities to assume jurisdiction over and individual for an act,
which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the
organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own
immunity and appear in court, not the individual, except insofar as he
appears in the name of the organization.
The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant
jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.
Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official?
The trend is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act
as private or official in the courts of the state concerned.
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of immunity from every
form of legal process accorded to ADB as an international organization.
The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and
employees is restricted only to official acts.
The authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that
matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts
done in their official capacity.

o Bayan v Zamora (2000)

o NOTE: This case tells us that certain acts may be prosecuted under certain
laws, in certain jurisdictions.
o Facts:
March 14, 1947: RP and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement
formalizing the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military
personnel. The Agreement was due to expire in 1991.
August 30, 1951: Mutual Defense Treaty

September 16, 1991: RP Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation and Security which would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
1998: FVR approved the VFA.
October 5, 1998: Erap, through Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA.
October 6, 1998: Erap, through Exec Sec Zamora, officially transmitted to
the Senate the VFA for concurrence.
May 27, 1999: Senate approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote.
June 1, 1999: VFA officially entered into force.
o The VFA is considered a treaty in the Philippines; it has been ratified in
accordance with Philippine laws. The power to ratify is vested in the
President; the legislature is limited to giving or withholding its consent to the
ratification.
o It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, it is to be taken equally as a treaty.
o Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by US personnel? The Court did not answer this, but I think the
answer is YES.
Is the SC deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher? The Court did not answer this, but I think the answer
is YES.
o J. Puno: dissenting opinion:
o The absence in the VFA of the slightest suggestion as to the duration of
visits of US troops in Phil. territory, coupled with the lack of a limited term
of effectivity of the VFA itself, justify the interpretation that the VFA allows
permanent, not merely temporary, presence of US troops on Philippine
soil.
o The 1947 RP-US Military Bases Agreement was ratified by the Philippine
Senate, but not by the US Senate. In the eyes of Phil law, the Military
Bases Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the US, it was a mere
executive agreement.
o Fr. Bernas: require that the US Senate concur in the treaty because
under American constitutional law, there must be concurrence on the part
of the US Senate to conclude treaties.
o VFA doesnt fall under the category of an executive agreement made by
the US president pursuant to authority conferred in a prior treaty.
o The Court should not place a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the
same constitutional plateau as a treaty.
It falls short of the RP
constitutional requirement that the agreement allowing the presence of
foreign military troops on Philippine soil must be recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting state.
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Art 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.

o This law follows the nationality principlewhat applies is ones personal

national law, which is decided by his citizenship.
o An example of a condition of a person is his mental capacity.
o Art 26, Family Code: Any marriage abroad is valid in the Philippines, as long
as:
o the marriage is valid abroad
o the marriage complies with our laws
o Art 15 refers to absolute divorce, which terminates marriage, as opposed to
limited divorce, which suspends (Garcia v Recio).
o Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr. (1985)
o Facts: Alice Reyes, a Philippine citizen, married Richard Upton, a US citizen,
in Hong Kong in 1972. In 1982, the couple divorced in Nevada, US, and
Alice remarried in Nevada, to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed a suit against
Alice, stating that the latters business was conjugal property and asked for
an accounting of the business as well as the right to manage it. Alice moved
to dismiss the case, saying that in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court, Upton had acknowledged that he and Alice had no
community property. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, saying that the
property involved is located in the Philippines, so the divorce decree has no
bearing in the case.
o Is a foreign divorce valid and binding in the Philippines?
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in the
US. The decree is binding on Upton as a US citizen. Upton cannot sue
petitioner as her husband in any US state. What he contends in this case
is that the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is
contrary to local law and public policy.
Art 15 of the Civil Code: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, under American law, divorce dissolves the
marriage.
o Llorente v Court of Appeals (2000) (Paula Ll. v CA and Alicia Ll.)
o Facts: Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted US Navy serviceman who married
Paula on Feb. 22, 1937 at Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of
the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed at the
conjugal home in Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became
a US citizen. When he got back to the Philippines in 1945, he discovered
that Paula was pregnant and was living in with his brother, Ceferino. They

made a written agreement and Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California, San Diego County. The divorce became final
on Dec. 4, 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia. On March
13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, leaving everything to
Alicia and their 3 children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On Sept. 4,
1985, Paula filed with the RTC a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzos estate. The RTC gave due course to Paulas petition, without
terminating Alicias testate proceedings. Alicia appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which declared Alicia as co-owner of whatever conjugal properties
she and Lorenzo had. Paula brought the case up to the SC after being
denied by the CA.
o Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenze Llorente?
o Art 15: Lorenzo became an American citizen before and at the time of his
nd
divorce, 2 marriage, execution of will and death. Thus, this issue is
governed by foreign law.
o Our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
o Quita v CA: once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could lose her right to inherit
from him.
o Pilapil v Ibay-Somera: Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in RP civil law on persons.
o Thus, the divorce was legal.
o Art 17: The forms and solemnities of contracts shall be governed by laws
of the country in which they are executed.
nd
o The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his 2 wife and
children is manifest in the will he executed. SC has no wish to frustrate
his wishes, since he was a foreigner, and not covered by Art 15
(citizens of the Philippines).
o Is the will intrinsically valid? Who shall inherit from Lorenzo? These
issues are best answered by foreign law, which must be pleaded and
proved.
o Was the will executed in accordance with the formalities required? YES.
It fulfilled the necessary requirements of Philippine law, as per Art 16
(laws of the country in which they are executed).
o Garcia-Recio v Recio (2001) (Grace Garcia-Recio v Rederick Recio)
o Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They were divorced through an Australian family
court in 1989. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen,
and in 1994 married Grace, a Filipina. In their application for a marriage
license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. In 1998, Grace filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, on the ground of bigamy
Rederick allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time of their
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marriage. Rederick said he had legal capacity to marry, as the Australian
divorce was valid. While suit for declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick
secured an Australian divorce decree. The RTC ruled that the marriage was
dissolved, as the divorce issued in Australia was valid. RTC said the
marriage ended not because Rederick had a lack of legal capacity to
remarryrather, it was because of the new Australian divorce decree.
o Was the divorce between Rederick and Editha Samson proven?
o A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved by divorce obtained
abroad. Art 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
o Art 26 of the Family code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
o A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
o A writing or document may be proven as a public record of a foreign
country by:
o an official publication
o a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document
o If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be
o accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept
o authenticated by the seal of his office
o Was the divorce proven? NO. The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action. Redrick must prove the divorce according to
pertinent Australian laws. The divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
o There are two basic types of divorce:
o absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii: terminates marriage
o limited divorce or a mensa et thoro: suspends marriage, leaves the
bond in full force
o Was Rederick proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace? NO.
o Art 21 of FC: certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage
o Rederick did not have any evidence proving his legal capacity to marry
Grace.
o Case remandedneed more evidence.
o Roehr v Rodriguez (2003)
o Facts: Roehr married Rodriguez in Hamburg, Germany, on Dec. 11, 1980.
The marriage was ratified on Feb. 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. On
Aug. 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a declaration for nullity of marriage. On Dec.
16, 1997, Roehr got a decree of divorce from Hamburg-Blankenese.

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II.

PERSONS
CIVIL PERSONALITY: Art 37-47, Civil Code

GENERAL PROVISIONS
o Juridical capacity (Art 37) (AKA legal capacity, and personality)
o the fitness to be the subject of legal relations
o inherent in natural persons
o lost only through death
o aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights
o Capacity to act (Art 37)
o the power to do acts with legal effect
o is acquired
o may be lost
o aptitude for the exercise of rights
o Juridical capacity can exist without capacity to act, but the existence of the
latter implies that of the former.
o Art 38: There is no such thing as full capacity to act. Yet, restrictions on
capacity to act do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations,
such as those arising from his acts or property relations.
o Art 39: Some modifications or limitations on capacity to act: age, mental
capacity, physical capacity (state of being a deaf-mute), family relations,
alienage, absence.
NATURAL PERSONS
o Art 40: Birth determines personality
o Art 40 remains the same, although superseded by Article 5 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (PD 603, effective 6 months after Dec 10, 1974): The
civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception,
for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of
the Civil Code.
o Birth means the removal of the fetus from the womb (Tolentino). This may
take place either through natural or artificial means.
o Fetus is considered born alive if:
o completely delivered after seven months
o if less than 7 months, has to live for 24 hours (even if aided by medical
equipment)
o Test for life: complete respiration.
o The child need not be viable. It just needs to be alive for an instant.
o Personality of a conceived child is:
o limited: only for the purposes favorable to the child

o provisional: it depends on the child being born alive later (Art 41)
o It is presumed that a child is born alive.
o Art 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the
rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by
will.
o The estate continues personality.
o Art 43: Applies only when 2 people are called to succeed each other.
o Presumption of Death in the Rules of Court in the state of calamity: Who is
presumed to have survived?
o if both below 15: older
o if both over 60: younger
o if one is under 15 and the other is over 60: younger
o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are different: male
o if both over 15 and under 60, and the sexes are the same: older
o if one under 15, one over 60 and one in between: one in between
o Presumption of death is based on strength, age and sex.
JURIDICAL PERSONS
o Juridical persons (Art 44, 45):
o the State
o governed by specific laws
o public interest entities
o personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law
o governed by specific laws
o private interest entities
o juridical personality of entity is distinct from that of its individual
components
o may be constituted by 5 to 15 people, with the majority residing in the
Philippines
o created by filing in the Securities and Exchange Commission
o juridical personality begins when certificate of incorporation is issued by
SEC
o governed by laws of general application
o partnerships and associations are governed by the Civil Code provisions
concerning partnerships
o Art 46: Juridical persons may
o acquire and possess property of all kinds
o incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws
and regulations of their organization

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o Art 47: Upon dissolution of a public interest entity, their assets shall be
disposed of as according to law, or applied to similar purposes for the benefit of
the area that benefited from the entity during its existence.
o 1987 Constitution
o Art 2, Sec 12 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
o This state policy keeps the SC from declaring unconstitutional the antiabortion provisions in the Revised Penal Code.
o This was originally supposed to be in the Bill of Rights. It would have
changed the concept of persons.
o Art 2, Sec 13 (Principles and State Policies): The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
o Art 3: Bill of Rights
o RA 7192 (Feb. 12, 1992): Women in Development and Nation-Building Act
o Sec 14, Art 3, 1987 Constitution: The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities
equal to that of men (RA 7192).
o Sec 3, Sec 4, RA 7192: NEDA, with the assistance of the National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, has the mandate to affect the
participation of women in national development and their integration therein.
o Sec 5, Equality in Capacity to Act: Women of legal age, regardless of civil
status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in
every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. In all
contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married
women shall have equal rights.
o This repeals Par 2 of Art 39 of the Civil Code, which pertains to the
modifications and limitations on the capacity to act. Par 2 reads: A
married woman, 21 years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law.
o Sec. 13, Effectivity Clause: The rights of women and all the provisions of this
Act shall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
o Geluz v Court of Appeals (July 20, 1961)
o Facts: Oscar Lazo, husband of Nita Villanueva, instituted action against
rd
physician Antonio Geluz for giving his wife an abortion. It was Nitas 3

o
o
o
o

abortionthe first had been a baby conceived out of wedlock, the second
had been due to her work and because the husband was away in a province,
campaigning for an election. Lazo was aware of the first two abortions, but
not the third. He sued for damages on behalf of the fetus, and the CA gave
damages of P3000 to Lazo, citing Art 2206 of the Civil Code.
The SC said this was done in error, as Art 2206 does not cover the death of
an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. There is also no
defense in citing Art 40 of the Civil Code because the fetus must be born
alive, as per the conditions of Art 41.
The SC said that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the
fetus on account of its injuries, no such right of action could be transferred to
its parents or heirs. Even if a cause of action did happen on behalf of the
fetus, it was extinguished by its pre-natal death (Art 41).
No transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical
personality/capacity.
Does the fetus have legal personality? NO. It died before being born.
Can Oscar Lazo get damages on behalf of the fetus? NO.
Can Lazo get damages for himself? Normally, yes: moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, anguish attendant to its
loss, disappointment of parental expectations (Civil Code Art 2217). But in
this case, there was no factual or legal basis for the awarding of damages.
So, NO.

USE OF SURNAMES: Art 364-380, Civil Code

WHAT IS THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ONES NAME?
o Republic v CA (1992)
o It is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is the combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals, and it is how he is addressed
by the world at large. It is one method of indicating the identity of persons. It
is a right of personality (Tolentino).
o A name usually has two parts: the given name and the surname. The given
name, given at birth or baptism, distinguishes him from other individuals.
The surname identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The surname is fixed by law.
o A name has the following characteristics:
o absolute, intended to protect one from being confused with others
o obligatory, for no one can be without a name
o fixed, unchangeable, immutable: may be changed only for good cause and
by judicial proceedings
o inalienable and intransmissible: outside of the commerce of man
o imprescriptible

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o Only the name in the civil register can be changed. The name in the civil
register is considered the true name of an individual. (Yasin v Judge,
Sharia District Court)

o The purpose of statutory procedure authorizing the change of name is to have

a record of the change (Republic v CA). However, a clerical/typographical error
can be corrected, and a first name or nickname can be changed in the civil
registry, without need of a judicial order (RA 9048).

CHANGE OF NAME
o Valid grounds for change of name (Republic v Marcos, 1990):
o the name is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor
o the change of name is a consequence of a change in legal status
o the change is meant to avoid confusion
o being unaware of alien parentage (In the case of Josefina Ang Chay v
Republic, continuous use of the Filipino surname was also a valid reason
for change of name.)
o erase all former alienage (Uy v Republic: the alien name Uy caused his
business to suffer and made it difficult for him to entertain civil
organizations)
o NOTE: The change of name must not be for fraudulent purposes, and must
not prejudice public interest. It must not erase evidence of ancestry (Naldoza
v Republic), or create confusion in paternity and discredit the legality of ones
paternity (Padilla v Republic).
o NOTE: The change of name is meant to provide an opportunity to a person
to improve his personality and to provide his best interest (Republic v CA).
o A change of name does not alter family relations nor create new rights. What is
altered is only the label by which a person is known (Tolentino).
o Petition for a change of name must include all names and aliases; otherwise, it
defeats the purpose of publication (Telmo v Republic: title of case and order
setting for hearing were deficient, as Milagros Telmo did not say she wanted to
change her name to Thelmo).
o Sec 1, CA 142, prior to amendment by RA 6805: a person is allowed to use the
name with which he was christened of by which he has been known since
childhood. RA 6085 regulates the use of aliases; it was approved on Aug. 4,
1969 (Tan v Civil Registrar of Cebu City).
o CA 142 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases), before amendment, was
originally meant to stop confusion and fraud in business transactions. It is a
penal statute and should be construed in favor of the accused (Ursua v CA).
(Personal note: CA 142 happened because the Chinese businessmen kept
changing their names.)
o An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real
name (Ursua v CA).

o The State has an interest in the change of name for purposes of identification; it
is a matter of sound judicial discretion, and not a right. (Republic v CA)
MIDDLE NAME
o A middle name is not required by law. However, if it is already part of ones
name, it cannot be dropped (In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang).
o The question in the case of In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia (2005) was, Can an illegitimate child, upon adoption by the
natural father, use the natural mothers surname as her middle name? YES.
The Court held that the use of a surname is fixed by law, but the law is silent
as to the use of a middle name. However, the OSG pointed out that in
drafting the Family Code, the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
childs mother as his middle name was recognized. The committees approved
the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa commented that the use
of the surname of the father is mandatory, while the use of the surname of
the mother is permissive. Because the intention of the adoption process is to
make a child possess rights accorded to a legitimate child, and one of the rights
of a legitimate child is the right to bear the surnames of both parents, Steph is
entitled to use both her parents surnames. It preserves her filiation with her
mother, as she remains an intestate heir of the latter, and removes the stigma
of her illegitimacy. Also, adoption statutes are construed liberally in favor of
adoption: it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail (Art 10, CC).
USE OF NAME: CHILDREN
o Principally (but not exclusively) uses the surname of the father:
o natural child, but if recognized by only one parent, uses that parents
surname
o natural child by legal fiction
o legitimate and legitimated children
o Art 164, Family Code: legitimate children are those conceived or born
during the marriage
o Art 177, FC: legitimated children are those conceived out of wedlock, but
whose parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other. Legitimation takes place by a subsequent valid marriage between

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the parents (Art 178). This also pertains to children conceived before the
decree annulling a voidable marriage (Sutesta v Republic).
o Illegitimate children
o Art 165, Family Code: illegitimate children are those conceived and born
outside of a valid marriage
o Art 176, FC: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.
o Sec 1, RA 9255 (approved by GMA on Feb. 24, 2004): Article 176 of the Family
Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
o "Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child."
o Adopted child
o bears the surname of the adopter
o In Johnston v Republic (1963), Isabel Valdes-Johnston wanted to change
her adopted daughters surname to Johnston. However, the adoption was
made singly by her, so the SC ruled that the adopted daughter carry the
surname of the adopter. Using Johnstons name might mislead people as
to the status of family relationships and raise questions of successional
rights.
o Republic v CA: it may be inferred that the use of the surname of the
adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right.
USE OF NAME: MARRIED WOMAN
o A married woman may use her maiden name and add her husbands name, her
first name and husbands surname, or husbands full name:
o Grace Garcia-Recio
o Grace Recio
o Mrs. Rederick Recio
o In the case of Telmo v Republic (1976): A married woman cannot change her
husbands surname. It is the husband who must file the petition for change of
name.

o In the case of Legamia v IAC (1984), Corazon Legamia was accused of using
the alias Corazon Reyes, in violation of CA 142, which governs the use of
aliases. Corazon wasnt married to Emilio Reyesthey lived together and had
a child, but Emilio was married to someone else. The legitimate wife was the
one who filed the complaint. The Court ruled that Corazon was a wife in all
appearances, and that the use of the surname Reyes would be allowed,
especially for the benefit of the son.
The court did a culture-based
interpretation of the case, but Maam Ursua would have used legal principles,
such as Sec 14, Art 2 of the 1987 Constitutionon the equal rights of women
and men before the lawin order to decide this case.
o It is Maam Ursuas opinion that some laws, like the name change laws,
prejudice women. The RP entered a treaty on the anti-discrimination of
women, which forms part of international human rights laws; thus, the State has
an obligation to ensure the equality of men and women before the law (Sec 14,
Art 2, 1987 Consti).
o In the case of Tolentino v CA (1988), Constancia Tolentino tried to stop
Consuelo David from using the Tolentino name, as David and Arturo Tolentino
were divorced during the Japanese occupation, due to Davids desertion and
abandonment. However, David was using the Tolentino name with the consent
of both her ex-husband and his siblings. The Court ruled that NO, Constancia
could not stop Consuelo from using the name Tolentino, as the use of a name
is not a crime. Changing Consuelo David Tolentinos name would seriously
dislocate her; besides, Constancia suffers no injury, as there is no usurpation of
her namethere is no usurpation of her status as wife of Arturo Tolentino. The
Court also held that the legal possibility of bringing the action to enjoin the
divorced wife from using the surname of the former husband determines the
starting point of the period of prescription (Tolentino). The Court also held that
in his commentary on Art 370 of the Civil Code, Tolentino himself stated, the
wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot
be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it.
Art 371 of the same code is not applicable to the case at bar because it speaks
of annulment, not divorce. Annulment: it is as if there had been no marriage at
all; divorce: it is as if the husband has died.
o However, in the case of Yasin v Judge, Sharia District Court (1995), it was
held that Art 370 and 371 of CC show that the use of a husbands name is
permissive rather than obligatory. When a marriage no longer exists, there
is no need for judicial confirmation of a change in civil status in order to revert
to the maiden name.
o Romeros concurring opinion: No law prohibits a woman from continuing to
use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to
resume the same even as she uses her husbands family name during
matrimony.
o Vitugs concurring opinion:
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o It is mandatory that the husbands surname should be used during the
existence of the marriage.
o In the case of legal separation, the wife must continue using the names
employed before the decree of legal separation. She may not revert to her
maiden name.
o In the annulment of a marriage, refer to Art 371 of the CC.
o In case of death of husband, the widow may use her husbands surname
(Art 373, CC) or revert to her maiden name (general rule).
o In case of divorce, the rule is the same as that of death of husband (Tolentino
v CA).
o In case of declaration of nullity of marriage, the general rule applies: she
may use only her own maiden name.
o Maam Ursuas opinion is that there is no difference in legal effects because
annulment, divorce and death all end a presupposed valid marriage. She
agrees with the application of Art 371 in Yasin.
o Annulment (Art 371)
o if wife is guilty: she shall resume her maiden name
o if wife is innocent: she may resume her maiden name, or retain husbands
surname, except when
o court decrees otherwise
o one of them gets married again to another person
o Legal separation (Art 372)
o It is mandatory for the wife to use her name before the legal separation,
because legal separation does not dissolve marriage (Tolentino).
o Widow (Art 373)
o A widow may use husbands surname as though he were still living. The use
of the husbands surname is optional, not obligatory (Tolentino).
o Identical names (Art 374-375)
o if unrelated: younger person uses additional name to avoid confusion
o if related: son can use junior, other male descendants either add a middle
name or mothers surname, or add roman numerals
o Usurpation of name (Art 377): may be subject of action for damages.
Usurpation means: injury to the interests of the name owner, and confusion of
identity. The following are the elements of usurpation of a name (Tolentino;
Tolentino v Court of Appeals):
o there is an actual use of anothers name
o the use is unauthorized
o the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person
o Art 378: Unauthorized or unlawful use of another persons surname gives right
of action to the latter.
o Art 379: Pen names: permitted, provided done in good faith and there is no
injury to third persons. These cannot be usurped.
o Art 380: Except for pen names, no person shall use different names and
surnames.

EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY: Art 234 & 236, FC

AGE OF MAJORITY
o Art 234, FC: Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:
o By the marriage of the minor; or
o By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument
executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least
eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable.
o Sec 1, RA 6809 (Dec 13, 1989): Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the
Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
o "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
EMANCIPATION
o Art 236, FC: Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over
the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible
for all acts of civil life.
o Sec 3, RA 6809: Art 236 is also hereby amended to read as follows:
o "Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
o "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twentyone.
o "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twentyone years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code."
o Marriage of a person between 18 and 21 years old still requires parental
consent. Anomaly: an emancipated person still requires parental consent in
order to contract marriage (Tolentino).
o Another anomalous situation: Parental authority ceases at 18, while
responsibility for a childs torts continues until the age of 21 (Tolentino).
ABSENCE: Art 381-396, Civil Code

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o Tolentino: Absence is that special legal status of one who is not in his domicile,
his whereabouts being unknown, and it is uncertain whether he is dead or alive.
o 2 kinds of absences:
o ordinary absence: disappearance under normal circumstances, without
apparent danger
o qualified absence: disappearance under extraordinary circumstances, or
with apparent danger
o Stages of absence:
o temporary or provisional absence
o a person disappears
o whereabouts unknown
o no administrator of his property
o normal or declared absence
o judicially declared
o after 2 years since the last news was heard from him
o after 5 years if he left an administrator
o definite absence or presumptive death
o takes place when, after the period provided by law, a person is
presumed dead
PROVISIONAL ABSENCE
o When may a representative be appointed?
o no news of person who has disappeared after a reasonable period has
lapsed
o immediate necessity for his representation in specific, urgent matters
o Who may be appointed as representative for absentee? (Art 383)
o the spouse is preferred, when there is no legal separation and the spouse is
not a minor
o any competent person
o What rules govern the powers, obligations and remuneration of the
representative? Rules concerning guardians. (Art 382)

o those who may have some right, subordinated to the condition of his death,
to the property of the absentee
o When does a judicial declaration of absence take effect? (Art 386)
o 6 months after publication in a newspaper of general circulation
ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY OF ABSENTEE
o What authority does the wife-administratrix hold over the absentee husbands
property?
o She holds all administrative authority
o Art 142, FC: The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either
spouse may be transferred to the court to the other spouse (2) when one
spouse is judicially declared an absentee.
o Except in the sale or encumbrance of property.
o Art 388, CC: The wife-administratrix cannot alienate or encumber the
husbands property, or that of conjugal partnership, without judicial
authority.
o When does administration cease? (Art 389)
o when the absentee appears, either personally or through an agent
o when the absentees death is proven and the in/testate heirs appear
rd
o when a 3 person appears, showing by a proper document that he has
acquired the absentees property by purchase or other title
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
o When is an absentee presumed dead?
o for all purposes, except succession: after a 7-year absence
o for succession: after a 10-year absence
o for succession: if absentee is over 75 years old and has been absent for 5
years
o for re-marriage of spouse present: after a 4-year absence, if spouse present
believes absent spouse is already dead (Art 41, FC)

DECLARED ABSENCE
o When may absence be declared? (Art 384)
o after 2 years without any news, or since receipt of the last news
o after 5 years if the absentee has left an administrator
o Who may ask for the declaration of absence? (Art 385)
o spouse present
o testate heirs
o intestate heirs

o When is death presumed to have occurred?

o on the last day of the period of absence required by law
o starting date of period of absence: date of last receipt of news
o Art 391: MISSING PERSONS
o People to be presumed dead for ALL PURPOSES:
o 4 years since:
o loss of ship during sea voyageperson onboard
o loss of airplaneperson onboard

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o participation in war (all military operations or armed fighting)armed
forces
o disappearance, in danger of death and other circumstancescount from
the last day, ex. 3-day earthquake or expedition
o only 2 years, if for remarriage of spouse present (Art 41, FC)
o Presumptive date of death for missing persons: day of the occurrence of the
event, or if it cannot be fixed, the court determines the middle of the period in
which the event could have happened.
IF SPOUSE PRESENT WANTS TO REMARRY
o Art 41, FC: The spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
ABSENTEE APPEARS
o Art 392: Absentee can recover all his property in the condition it may be found
but cannot claim either fruits or rents. Others possession of property ceases
when absentee appears. IN CASE OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE, absentee
spouse has to terminate spouse presents new marriage. An affidavit of
reappearance has to be recorded in the local civil registry, under Art 42 of FC.
Without this, the presumption of death continues, regardless of absentees
reappearance.
ABSENTEES RIGHTS
o Art 393: An absentee must prove that he was actually alive at the time that his
existence was necessary for the acquisition of a right. Life is not presumed
before the date of presumptive death.
o Art 394: If an absentee stands to inherit something, his share goes to his coheirs, unless he has heirs, assigns or a representative. They shall all make an
inventory of the property.
o Art 395: The rights vested in an absentee, his representatives or successors in
interest shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription.
o Art 396: Whoever inherited anything shall appropriate the fruits receive in good
faith, so long as the absentee does not appear, or while absentees
representatives or successors do not bring proper actions.
FUNERALS: Art 305-310, Civil Code

o A corpse cannot be the subject of rights, because juridical personality is

extinguished by death. Neither is it property.
o Why does the State give juridical protection to corpses?
o to protect the feelings of those related to the deceased
o to avoid dangers to the health of the living
o to allow scientific investigation and study
o Chapter XXI, PD 856 (Code on Sanitation of the Philippines, December 23,
1975): Disposal of Dead Persons. A body can be scientifically investigated or
studied; for example, for health reasons.
o Burial grounds requirements
o Burial requirements
o Disinterment requirements
o Funeral and embalming establishments
o Licensing and registration procedures
o Autopsy and dissection of remains
o Donation of Human Organs for Medical, Surgical and Scientific purposes
o Use of Remains for Medical Studies and Scientific Research
o Special Precautions for Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive
Isotopes
o Responsibility of regional director, local health authority, and local
government
o Penal provisions
o Who have a duty and a right to make funeral arrangements?
o Art 305: The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a
relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under
Art 199 of FC.
o spouse
o direct descendants in the nearest degree, oldest preferred
o ascendants in the nearest degree, paternal preferred
o brothers and sisters
o NOT collateral blood relations
o No specific rule on legitimate v illegitimate children in the succession order.
o Art 306: Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the
deceased.
o Art 307: How shall a funeral be done?
o in accordance with expressed wishes of deceased, as long as these are not
contrary to law, or
o his religious beliefs or affiliations, or
o in case of doubt, it shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements, after consulting the other members of the family

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o Art 308: What if a person wanted to retain, inter, dispose of or exhume a
corpse?
o need consent of persons obliged to make funeral arrangements,
o except if utterly necessary: if it is in the public interest, or if it is required for
justice to prevail, then the law will prevail over the will of persons who have
a right to control the burial.
o RA 349 recognizes the validity of an authorization given by a person to use
parts of his corpse for medical, surgical and scientific purposes (Tolentino).
o Art 309: Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes
with a funeral, shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages both
material and moral.
o There is no specific provision on what constitutes disrespect for the dead.
o Art 310: The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part
of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership
property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
o In Eugenio, Sr. v Velez (May 17, 1990), the Court held that the petitioner could
not be considered a legal spouse of Vitaliana Vargas as he had no legal
capacity to marry her while she was alive, and thus, he had no right to her body
as a legal spouse. The body of Vitaliana Vargas went to the nearest of kin
her siblings.

CIVIL REGISTER: Art 407-413, Civil Code

o Art 407: Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
o Art 408: The following shall be entered in the civil register:
o births
o marriages
o deaths
o legal separations
o annulments of marriage
o judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning
o legitimations
o adoptions
o acknowledgments of natural children
o naturalization
o loss or
o recovery of citizenship

o
o
o
o

civil interdiction
judicial determination of filiation
voluntary emancipation of a minor
change of name

o Art 409: In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial
orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the
court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been
registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the
civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning.
o Art 410: The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence.
o Art 411: Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized
alteration made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby.
EXCEPT: if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to
prevent the unlawful alteration.
o Art 412: No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a
judicial order.
o RA 9048 (March 22, 2001): An Act authorizing the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general to correct a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register without
need of a judicial order.
o This RA amends Art 376 (change of name, judicial order) and 412 (civil
register, judicial order) of the Civil Code.
o Sec 4, RA 9048: The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
o The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.
o The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that
first name or nickname in the community.
o The change will avoid confusion.
o Art 413: All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
o RA 3753 (Civil Registry Law, effective Feb. 26, 1931)
o Who is the Civil Registrar-General? The Director of the Bureau of the
Census and Statistics
o Who is the Manila local civil registrar? An officer of the Philippine Health
Service, designated by the Director of the said Service.
o Who is the local civil registrar for everywhere else? The treasurers.
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o What are the civil registrar books?
o birth and death register
o marriage register
o legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name, and
naturalization register
o Registration and certification of births
o Death certificate and register
o Registration of marriage
o Registration of legitimations by subsequent marriage
o Registration of acknowledgments of natural children by public instrument
o Registration of adoptions, changes of names, and naturalization
o Duties of local civil registrars
o Documents registered are public documents
o CA 625 (June 7, 1941): An Act providing the manner in which the option to
elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a
Filipino citizen.
o Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution1 shall be expressed in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
o Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may
make the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Philippine
Embassy or Consulate authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward
such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of
Manila.
o Section 3. The civil registrar shall collect as filing fees of the statement, the
amount of ten pesos.
o PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code, effective 6 months after Dec. 10,
1974): Article 37. The adoption shall be recorded in the local civil register and
shall be annotated on the record of birth, and the same shall entitle the adopted
person to the issuance of an amended certificate of birth.
o PD 651 (effective 45 days after Jan. 31, 1975): Requiring the registration of
births and deaths in the Philippines which occurred from January 1, 1974 and
thereafter.
o WHEREAS, government surveys reveal that every year twenty five to forty
per cent of all births and death occurring in the Philippines are not registered
in the office of the local civil registrar as required by Act 3753;
o WHEREAS, this big number of under-registration adversely affects the
program of government in promoting the health and social conditions of the
people especially the youth because of difficulty in gathering complete vital
statistics due to the under-registration of births and deaths;

o WHEREAS, to provide primary sources of vital statistics for use in various

population studies in order to formulate more effective health and social
plan for the country, the immediate registration of unregistered births and
deaths is imperative;
o Section 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of
babies referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60)
days from the date of effectivity of this decree without or fee or any kind.
Babies born after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the office
of the local civil registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth,
by the attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic
administrator or, in default of the same, by either parent or a responsible
member of the family or any person who has knowledge of the birth. The
parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth or
the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in
case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no attendant at birth,
or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the parents
or the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case
of failure to register the new born child.
o Section 5. Period of reporting and registration of deaths. The registration of
deaths referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60)
days from the date of effectivity of this decree without fine or fee of any kind.
Deaths occurring after the effectivity of this decree must be reported by the
nearest responsible relative or any person who has knowledge of the death
within 48 hours after death to the local health officer of the place of death,
who shall then issue the corresponding certificate of death and order its
registration in the office of the local civil registrar within thirty (30) days after
death. In case the deceased was attended to by a physician, the latter must
issue the necessary certificate of death within 48 hours after death and
submit the same to the local health officer of the place of death, who shall
order its registration in the office of the local civil registrar within the said
period of thirty (30) days after death.
o Section 8. Implementing official. The Civil Registrar General in (sic) hereby
authorized to issue rules and regulations, orders or circulars to implement
this decree.
o PD 766 (August 8, 1975): Amends Sec 2 and Sec 5 of PD 651
o Section 1. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 651 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
o "Sec. 2. Period of Registration of births. The registration of the birth of
babies referred to in the preceding section including those unregistered
births which occurred from March 17, 1975, to November 30, 1975, must
be done until December 31, 1975, without fine or fee of any kind. Babies
born after November 30, 1975 and thereafter, must be registered within
thirty (30) days from birth without fine or fee of any kind by the attending
physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospital or clinic administrator or, in

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default of the same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family
or any person who has knowledge of the birth.
"The parents or any responsible member of the family and the attendant at
birth or the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly
liable in case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no
attendant at birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or a maternity
clinic, then the parents or responsible member of the family alone shall be
primarily liable in case of failure to register the new born child."
o Section 2. Section 5 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as
follows:
o Sec. 5. Period of reporting and registration of deaths. The registration of
deaths referred to in the preceding Section including those unregistered
deaths which occurred from March 17, 1975, to November 30, 1975, must
be done until December 31, 1975, without fine or fee of any kind. Deaths
occurring November 30, 1975 and thereafter, must be reported by the
nearest responsible relative or any person who has knowledge of the death
within 48 hours after death to the Local Health Officer of the place of death,
who shall then issue the corresponding certificate of death and order its
registration in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar within thirty (30) days
after death, without fee or fine of any kind. In case the deceased was
attended to by a physician, the latter must issue the necessary certificate
of death within 48 hours after death and submit the same to the Local
Health Officer of the place of death, who shall order its registration in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar within the said period of thirty (30) days
after death, without fee or fine of any kind. The attending physician and
responsible member of the family or person who has knowledge of the
death are jointly liable to report the death to the Local Health Officer, for
registration by the Local Civil Registrar of the place of the death. If the
deceased was not attended by a physician or did not die in the hospital,
the responsible member of the family alone shall be responsible for failure
to submit the report of death to the Local Health Officer.
o Section 3. The same decree is amended by adding the following section
immediately after Section 5 thereof, which read as follows:
o "Sec. 5-A. Extension of Registration. The aforecited periods within which to
register unregistered births and deaths may be extended in meritorious cases
by the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority
upon the recommendation of the Civil Registar-General."

o Statistical Research and Training Center

o Other Statistics Offices
o Abolition of NEDA offices

o PD 1083 (effective Feb. 4, 1977): The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines
o EO 121 (Jan. 30, 1987): Reorganizing and strengthening the Philippine
statistical system and for other purposes. (Reorganization Act of the Philippine
Statistical System.)
o National Statistical Coordination Board
o National Statistics Office
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rd

III. FAMILY RELATIONS

o The definitions of marriage and family are not in the Constitution. We need
to refer to other laws.
o There is no Constitutional provision against the legalization of divorce.
o Remember that a family is not just an institution, but a unit composed of
individuals with rights.
o Old rule: Spousal Unity Doctrine: womans identity is absorbed into that of the
mans
o New rule: Separate Spheres Doctrine: home vs outside world
o Women used to be considered propertymerely objects of the law. But
international clamor for changes in the law, so that women may be recognized
as full human beings, prompted the creation of a gender equality provision in
the 1987 Constitution. Now, women are almost-subjects of the law.
o Classification based on sex is now held suspectthe strict scrutiny standard is
applied.
o 1987 Constitution
o Art 2: National Principles, State Policies
o Sec 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
o Sec 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
o Sec 14: The State recognizes the role of women
o Art 3: Bill of Rights
o Sec 1: Life, liberty, property, due process and equal protection
o Sec 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
o Sec 6: The liberty of abode, changing the same, and right to travel
o Art 15: The Family
o Filipino family as foundation of the nation
o Marriage as an inviolable social institution
o Malang v Moson (Aug. 22, 2000)
th
o Neng Malang v Judge Corocoy Moson, 5 Sharia District Court, et al
o Facts:
st
o Hadjis 1 marriage: Hadji Abdula Malang married Aida Kenanday Limba in
Maguindanao. He bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. He had 2
kids with Aida.
nd
o Hadjis 2 marriage: Hadji Abdula married for the second timeJubaida
Kado. They were childless.
st
th
o Hadjis 1 divorce: Aida had 1 more kid and, while pregnant with the 4 kid,
Hadji Abdula divorced her.

o Hadjis 3 marriage: 1965: Hadji Abdula married Nayo Omar. They were
childless.
th
o Hadjis 4 marriage: he married Hadji Mabai Adziz in Maguindanao.
They had a daughter named Fatima.
th
th
th
o Hadjis 5 , 6 , 7 marriages: Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai.
nd
rd
th
o Hadjis 2 , 3 , 4 divorces: He divorced his last 3 wives.
th
o Hadjis 8 marriage: 1972: Neng Malang, Cotabato City. They were
childless, but Hadji acquired lots of land (and rent) in Cotabato.
o December 18, 1993: Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will.
o January 21, 1994: Neng Malang filed with the Sharia District Court a
petition for the settlement of his estate, praying letters be issued in the
name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Neng Malangs claim:
o she was the wife of Hadji Abdula
th
o the other legal heirs were eldest son, second son and daughter by 4
marriage
o 5 of the 7 parcels of land he left behind are titled in his name as the
husband of Neng Malang
Eldest son Hadji Mohammads claim:
o legal heirs: all 4 surviving spouses, all surviving children
o he and the second son had helped Abdula in business, and were more
competent to be administrators of estate
Sharia District Court held:
o Eldest son as administrator of properties outside Cotabato City
o Neng Malang and second son as joint administrators of estate within
Cotabato City
Neng Malang filed with the SDC:
o all properties within Cotabato City were conjugal (Art 160, CC and Art 116,
FC)
o all properties outside of Cotabato City were exclusively Abdulas
oppositors contend:
o Abdula had no conjugal property with Neng Malang because his 8
marriages with different Muslim women violated the monogamous
marriage provided for in the Civil Code: a conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage
o Abdula had adopted a complete separation of property regime in his
marital relations
o presumption that properties acquired during marriage were conjugal
properties inapplicable: he was married to 4 women
o the descriptive phrase married to Neng Malang does not necessarily
mean the property was conjugal; if conjugal, property shouldve been in
both their names
Judge Corocoy Moson held:
o no conjugal partnership of gains between Neng and Abdula because
Abdula married 8 times: CC provision on conjugal partnership cannot be
applied if there is more than one wife
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o Abdula was breadwinner; also, found that Neng did not contribute to other
properties, unlike the other wives
o married to Neng Malang is just a description
o Civil Code: Assuming that Neng and Abdula had agreed that the property
regime between them will be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership property, the agreement would be null and void for it is against
the law, public policy, etc.
o Art 38, PD 1083: the regime of property relationship is complete separation
of property
o Neng Malang said the SDC erred in
o following the old rule: declaring that there was no conjugal property
because of the 3 existing marriages
o following the new rule: holding that property was not conjugal because of
Islamic law
PRIOR TO EFFECTIVITY OF MUSLIM CODE
o What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage before the effectivity of
the Muslim Code?
o All 8 marriages of Abdula happened under the Civil Code.
o Art 78, CC: Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the
non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall
be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be
obliged to comply with Article 92. However, twenty years after approval of
this Code, all marriages performed between Mohammedans or pagans
shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But
the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
the Interior, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by
proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Mohammedan
and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.
o This was negated by PD 1083, which took effect on Feb. 4, 1977.
o Are multiple marriages prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code considered
valid? How do the cases of People v Subano and People v Dumpo affect
Muslim marriages prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code?
o Prior to the Muslim Code, no law sanctioned multiple marriages.
o After the Muslim Code took effect, Art 186: Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the
time of their execution.
o The Civil Code upholds and nurtures monogamous marriages.
o People v Subano: polygamy is not sanctioned by law
o People v Dumpo: bigamy is not sanctioned by law
o What laws govern property relationships of Muslim multiple marriages, preMuslim Code?

o The Civil Code applies: it was the only law on marriage relations at the
time. Art 119, 135, 136, 142, 143 and 144 of CC apply.
o Laws governing property relations depends on
o when the marriages took place
o if parties lived together as husband and wife
o when and how the properties were acquired
o The Civil Code requires that the man and the woman live exclusively
with each other.
o According to Art 144 of the Civil Code, Abdula was not capacitated to
marry.
o Wives in marriages may prove property as exclusively theirs.
o Property acquired during a valid subsisting marriage is conjugal property.
AFTER THE MUSLIM CODE AND THE FAMILY CODE TOOK EFFECT
o What law governs the succession of a Muslims estate after these two Codes
took effect? What laws apply to the dissolution of property regime in cases of
multiple marriages before the Muslim Code, but dissolved after the Muslim
Code?
o Because Abdula died in 1993, it is the Muslim Code that will determine the
identification of his intestate heirs and succession. It is the Muslim Codes
provisions on legal succession that will apply.
o The status and capacity of each wife will depend on the law in force at the
time of marriage.
o The status and capacity of each child will depend on the law in force at the
time of conception or birth. Prior to Feb. 4, 1977, it is the Civil Code that
determines child legitimacy. From Feb. 4, 1977 to Abdulas death, it is the
Muslim Code that determines child legitimacy.
o Are Muslim divorces before the Muslim Code valid?
o RA 349 authorized absolute divorce from June 18, 1949 to June 13,
1969.
o 4 corollary issues
o Just one marriage was valid, because the CC applied.
o The children of the valid marriage are legitimate children.
o Properties:
o Properties acquired during a valid marriage are conjugal properties and
should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim
Code, as MC was in effect when Abdula died.
o Properties acquired from Aug 13, 1950 to Aug 2, 1988 are conjugal
properties and should be divided between the spouses under the Civil
Code.
o Properties acquired from Aug. 3, 1988 onwards are governed by the
Family Codes rules on co-ownership.
o Properties not covered by the above are exclusively Abdulas.
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o Abdulas legal heirs were his legal wife and legitimate children.
Succession will be governed by PD 1083.
o NOTE: even if the property regime was established before the effectivity of
the Family Code, the Family Code applies.
Case remanded for additional evidence.

MARRIAGE: Art 1-34, Family Code

WHAT IS MARRIAGE?
o Art 1: What is marriage?
o Special contract
o Permanent union
o Has to be in accordance with law
o Meant to establish conjugal and family life
o Foundation of the family
o Inviolable social institution (Art 15, 1987 Consti)
o Governed by law, not subject to stipulation
o May fix property relations within the limits provided by FC
o Maam Ursua says that the law heavily regulates marriage. The only things
left to the contracting parties are certain aspects of the family relationship and
property relations. On the whole, the law governs.
o The cases tell us that the law presumes marriage. Such is the order of
society. It is because of this presumption that, prior to the Family code, the
state policy in Art 2, Sec 12 of the 1987 Constitution was invoked whenever
spouses want to separate. However, thanks to Art 36, which is our de facto
divorce law, this bias in favor of marriage has lessened. A good example
is RA 9262, which defines violence against women and children, gives
protective measures for victims and prescribes penaltiesMaam Ursua says
that it has a provision against judges influencing women to stay married despite
the violence. (I couldnt find it though. I looked. It seems that the RA only
regulates courts administration of justice for the victims.)
o RA 9262: "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"
o SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this
act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other
necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the

purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any

disruption in the victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of
the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the
protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay
protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and
permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be
issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
o 1. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned
in Section 5 of this Act;
o 2. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly;
o 3. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of
the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently
where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the residence;
o 4. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and
designated family or household member at a distance specified by the
court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and
any designated family or household member;
o 5. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile
and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and
directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the
petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is
safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other
essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioners or
respondents removal of personal belongingness;
o 6. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to
the petitioner;
o Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or
her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondents
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the
woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of
support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of
court;

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o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o

8. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any

firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the
court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a
firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order
the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
9. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses,
childcare expenses and loss of income;
10. Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner
may need; and
11. Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems
necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any
designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even
in the absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall
not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a
TPO or PPO.
Sec 19. Legal Separation Cases. In cases of legal separation, where
violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family
Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and
other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any
application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be
conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
Sect. 24. Prescription Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f)
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to
5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
SEC. 33. Prohibited Acts. A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or
the court hearing an application for a protection order shall not order,
direct, force or in any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection
order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the
application for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts
Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is
sought under this Act. Failure to comply with this Section shall render
the official or judge administratively liable.

A FEW NOTES ON THE OLD CIVIL CODE, FROM TOLENTINO

o The Civil Code rule was that women could marry at 14, and men, at 16.
Marriage used to effect emancipation. However, the age of consent for
marriage was raised to 21 for both sexes in the Family Code. It is the age of
legal capacity to marry.
o The Civil Code rule was that a widow could not remarry 300 days after the
death of her husband, unless a child was born in the meantime. The Family
Code, however, recognizes the validity of the subsequent marriage of the
widow within 300 days after death of the husband, as Art 168 of FC provides for
this situation.
o Art 168, FC:
o child born x < 180 days after subsequent marriage and born 300 days after
termination of first marriage was conceived during previous marriage
o child born x > 180 days after subsequent marriage even if born within 300
days after termination of first marriage was conceived during subsequent
marriage
o The old Marriage Law was that the absence of parental consent did not
invalidate the marriage. However, under both the Family Code and the Civil
Code, the absence of parental consent renders a marriage voidable.
o Art 77 of the Civil Code says that In case two persons married in accordance
with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations of any
church, sect or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the
requirements of chapter I of this Title (for valid marriages) and any ratification
so made shall be considered as a purely religious ceremony. This was not
included in the Family Code, but it is generally held that this rule still applies.
o On period of absence and presumptive death for purposes of remarriage:
o Civil Code: 7-year absence for presumption of death
o Family Code: 4-year absence for presumption of death
o In extraordinary cases, Civil Code: 4 years and Family Code: 2 years.
Please see the section on Absence and Presumptive Death.
A NOTE ON EO 277
o EO 277 amended Arts 26, 36 and 39 of the Family Code. It became effective
when the Family Code became effective, even if it was issued on July 17, 1987.
MORE TOLENTINO
o What is marriage?
o procedure by which a man and a woman become husband and wife
o that act by which a man and a woman unite for life, with the intent to
discharge towards society and one another those duties which result from
the relation of husband and wife
o the change of status produced by the act
o a status involving duties and responsibilities that are the concern of the
State

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o the civil status of one man and one woman, legally united for life, with
rights and duties which, for the establishment of families and the
multiplication of the species are assigned by law to matrimony
o What is the purpose of marriage?
o reproduction
o education of offspring
o mutual help
o What are the characteristics of marriage?
o civil
o an institution of public order or policy
o natural
o What makes marriage a sui generis contract?
o only one man and one woman can enter into a marriage contract
o the law, and not an agreement with the force of law, fixes the duties and
rights of the parties
o cannot be terminated
o no damages for breach of obligations of a spouse
o What does marriage affect?
o personal and economic relations
o legitimacy
o family relationships
o penal laws affecting husband and wife
o No laws penalize breach of contract to marry.
sought if there has been
o an abuse of right
o unjust enrichment
/ TOLENTINO

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE?

o Essential requisites (Art 2)
o legal capacity of male and female
o REQUISITES:
o 18 and up (Art 5)
o Art 35[1] renders void any marriage of those below 18
o age of legal capacity is actually 21
o if 18-21, need parental consent, either by personal appearance before
local civil registrar, or affidavit of consent executed in the presence of 2
witnesses (Art 14), otherwise, marriage is VOIDABLE (Art 45, 47);
o if 21-25, need parental advice; unfavorable or zero advice delays the
issuance of the marriage license til after three months following the
completion of publication of the application (Art 15)
o not incestuous (Art 37)
o not collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree (Art 38)
o no subsisting prior marriage; no bigamy, no polygamy (Art 35[4]) (Art 41
renders subsequent marriages void, except in cases of absent spouse
presumed dead)
o psychological capacity (Art 36; incapacity renders marriage void)
o consent freely given in the presence of solemnizing officer
o conscious, intelligent, informed, real consent
o not vitiated by mistake, duress, fraud, drugs! :D
o not contracted through mistake of identity (Art 35[5])

However, damages can be

o Formal requisites (Art 3)

o authority of solemnizing officer
o WHO MAY PERFORM MARRIAGE?
o ONE: incumbent member of judiciary within courts jurisdiction (Art 7[1])
o TWO: any priest, rabbi, imam, minister duly authorized by church or
religious sect
o registered with the Civil Registrar General
o acting within limits of written authority granted by his church or sect
o provided that at least one contracting party belongs to the same church
or sect (all Art 7[2])
o THREE: ship captain or airplane chief (Art 7[3]; note that these guys HAVE
to have licenses to prove that theyre captains/chiefs) ONLY if marriage is
in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members while the ship is at
sea or the plane is in flight, or during stopovers at ports of call (Art 31)
o FOUR: military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned BUT
chaplain is absent, DURING military operation (Art 7[4]); IF marriage is in
articulo mortis between persons WITHIN zone of military operation,
whether members of the armed forces or civilians (Art 32)
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o FIVE: consul-general, consul, vice-consul (Art 7[4]) IF marriages are
between Filipino citizens abroad; consul also takes care of missing
marriage license, duties of local civil registrar and solemnizing officer (Art
10)
o SIX: mayors of municipalities and cities can solemnize marriages IF within
their cities/municipalities (Local Government Code)
o EXCEPT: solemnizing officer NOT legally authorized BUT either or both
parties believed in good faith that he did have authority (Art 35[2]). This is
a rule from the old Code which was removed in the new one, but which
was reinstated in the Family Code. The Family Code provides a
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested/acquired rights;
thus, it can validate the marriage in question and favors the validity of
marriage.
o valid marriage license
o DEFECTIVE if wrongfully obtained (Tolentino)
o DEFECTIVE if filed in a place different from habitual residence of either
party (Tolentino)
o DEFECTIVE if issued before the expiration of 10 days required for posting
(Art 17)
o DELAYED if
o 18-21 and no certificate from solemnizing officer or marriage counselor
that parties have undergone marriage counseling (Art 16)
o 21-25 and lack of parental advice, favorable or otherwise (Art 15)
o IMPEDIMENT is noted on the application for marriage license (Art 18)
o VALID for 120 days in any part of the Philippines, and shall be
automatically cancelled at expiration of the said period of the parties have
not made use of it (Art 20)
o IF FOREIGNER, must submit certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage, issued by diplomatic or consular officials in order to obtain
marriage license (Art 21)
o IF STATELESS, must submit affidavit stating the circumstances showing
capacity to contract marriage (Art 21); if stateless, legal capacity should be
determined by Philippine laws, and FC provisions apply (Tolentino)
o ISSUED by local civil registrar where either party habitually resides (Art 9)
after payment of fees prescribed by law or regulations, or be issued free of
charge to indigent parties, as long as the indigents prove that they have
insufficient income via affidavit or oath before the local civil registrar (Art
19)

o Need valid marriage license EXCEPT WHEN

o one: marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic
cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of a
marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their

o
o
o

customs, rites or practices (Art 33); Muslim marriages are governed by

PD 1083, since Feb. 4, 1977.
two: man and woman have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, without any legal impediment to marry; contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage (Art 34)
three: either or both of the parties are at point of death (Art 27; see
also Art 31 [ship captain/airplane pilot] and Art 32 [military])
four: if residence of either party is such that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before local civil
registrar (Art 28)
HOWEVER, for three and four, solemnizing officer must state in an
affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person
legally authorized to administer oaths that marriage was in articulo
mortis or barangay/barrio is such that there is no means of transportation
to enable the party to appear personally before the local civil registrar.
Affidavit must also state that officer took necessary steps to ascertain
ages, relationship of parties and absence of legal impediment to
marriage (Art 29).
o original affidavit from previous point, together with legible copy of
marriage contract, shall be sent by solemnizing officer to the local civil
registrar of municipality where it was performed within 30 days after
performance of the marriage (Art 30)

o marriage ceremony
o REQUISITES:
o appearance of contracting parties before solemnizing officer
o personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
o must be in marriage certificate, signed by parties and witnesses and
attested by solemnizing officer (Art 6[1])
o except in articulo mortis: witness can write name of party at point of
death, attested by solemnizing officer (Art 6[2])
o 2 witnesses of legal age
o no form or religious rite is required for the solemnization of the marriage
(Art 6)
o marriage has to be solemnized PUBLICLY (Art 8)
o chambers of judge or in open court
o church, chapel, temple
o office of consul-general etc
o EXCEPT in cases of marriages in articulo mortis
o EXCEPT if one of the parties is in a remote place with no means of
transportation (Art 29)
o EXCEPT if both parties request to the solemnizing officer, in writing, for
a different place (Art 8)
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o DEFECTIVE if solemnized in a place not provided for by law (Tolentino)
o DEFECTIVE if solemnizing officer fails to execute and issue marriage
certificate (Tolentino)
o Art 4: Absence of any essential or formal requisite renders the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Art 35[2]: if solemnizing officer NOT legally authorized
BUT either or both parties believed in good faith that he did have authority. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
o void
o if 1 essential requisite is absent
o declaration of nullity of the marriage
o marriage is void from the beginning
o declaration of the court terminates the marriage
o voidable
o if 1 formal requisite is defective
o petition for annulment
o marriage is valid until annulled
o action of the court terminates the marriage
o Art 11: Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
registrar
o Art 12: Documents required by local civil registrar as proof of age:
o original or certified copies of birth certificates
o in absence of birth certificates, original or certified copies of baptismal
certificates
o in absence of baptismal certificates, residence certificate or affidavit of two
witnesses
o NO DOCUMENTS NECESSARY IF
o parents of parties appear personally before local civil registrar and swear
to the correctness of the lawful age of parties (Art 12)
o local civil registrar can tell, just by looking at parties upon their personal
appearance before him, that they are of age (Art 12)
o a party was formerly married, but is widowed, divorced, or had a previous
marriage invalidated. However, need to present death certificate of
deceased spouse, judicial decree of absolute divorce, or judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity. If no death certificate, affidavit setting
forth his circumstance, actual civil status and name and date of death of
deceased spouse (Art 13).
o Art 22: Marriage certificate states:
o full name, sex and age of parties
o citizenship, religion and habitual residence
o date and precise time of celebration of marriage

o
o
o
o

proper marriage license has been issued according to law

parental consent, if 18-21
parental advice, if 21-25
marriage settlementscopy attached

o Art 23: Solemnizing officer has to distribute copies of the marriage certificate:
o original copy: either contracting party
nd
rd
o 2 and 3 copies: local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized, not later than 15 days after the marriage; the local civil registrar
has to send receipts
o 4th copy: goes to solemnizing officers files, along with original marriage
license and affidavit of contracting party regarding solemnization of marriage
in a place other than those in Art 8.
o Art 24: Duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents and administer
oaths
o Art 25: The local civil registrar shall enter all applications for marriage licenses
filed with him in a registry book
o Art 26:
o Foreign marriage is valid if
o provisions of foreign law are proven as fact
o that marriage is solemnized in accordance with those provisions is proven
as fact
o and valid here (not incestuous, etc)
o EXCEPTIONS: private international law (Tolentino)
o if marriage is deemed contrary to the law of nature and good morals as
generally recognized in Christian countries
o if marriages which the local law-making power has declared shall not be
allowed any validity
o Mixed marriage
o if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law (Art 26)
o from 1950-1988, if the Filipino citizen obtains the divorce, the divorce will
not be recognized in the Philippines, and the person cannot remarry under
our law (Art 15 CC)
o HOWEVER, in Van Dorn v Romillo, it was the Filipino who initiated
divorce. This was in 1985no FC yetbut the court used equity to
declare Van Dorn legally capacitated to remarry (She cannot be
discriminated against in her own country). Thus, Art 26 in the FC. Look
also at Republic v Orbecido III.
o Art 38[9]: Marriage is void if spouse, with intention to marry the other, kills the
other persons spouse, or own spouse. (LOL)

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CASES
ARTICLE 1
o Perido v Perido (March 12, 1975) (Leonora et al v Maria et al)
o On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition." Afterwards, the children
of the first marriage filed a complaint against the children of the second
marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship
and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots for them
alone. They alleged that they had been induced by the defendants to execute
the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and
fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat
were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of
Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The RTC annulled the extrajudicial partition
document. However, the RTC found that the five children of Lucio Perido
with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimat; that all the lots,
except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that
11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido
and his second wife. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
o HELD: The Court of Appeals found that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong,
died during the Spanish regime. Under the circumstances, Lucio Perido had
no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first
child in 1900. Lucio and Marcelina were presumed to have been married.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonioalways presume marriage.
o Selanova v Mendoza (May 19, 1975) (Administrative complaint)
o Administrative complaint in SC. Gross ignorance of the law. Saturnino
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of
the law for having prepared and ratifying a document extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of complainant and his wife Avelina
Ceniza.
o Conditions of liquidation:
o either
spouse
would
withdraw
complaints
for
adultery/concubinage theyd filed against each other
o waived their right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of
infidelity
o J. Mendoza said he knew document was invalid but did it anyway because
the spouses said theyd ask CFI Negros Oriental to approve the agreement.
He relied on Art 191 (4) of the CC: husband and wife may agree upon
dissolution of conjugal partnership of marriage subject to judicial approval.
His mistake was that the judicial sanction for dissolution should be
secured beforehand.

o HELD: The document was void because it contravenes Art 221 of the Civil
Code: any contract for personal separation between H&W, and extrajudicial
agreement for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains/propertyeven
before the new CC, Court held that extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains without judicial approval was void. Also, even if
adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are still crimes: a
contract legalizing them is contrary to law, public order, morals, etc.
and not judicially recognizable (Panganiban v Borromeo). Renouncing
rights and obligations, and not bearing witness against each other in crimes,
is ILLEGAL.
o Vda de Maraug v Silapan (March 29, 1984)
o This case is about the jurisdiction of a Sharia District Court over Muslims in
Davao.
o Sadin Maraug wanted to be administrator of estates of spouses Sangtan and
rd
Taraboka. Sangtans 3 wife, Manuela Vda de Maraug, said she wanted to
be administrator. The RTC judge dismissed this case, as it is not within the
RTCs jurisdictionaccording to PD 1083, it is within the Sharia Courts
jurisdiction. Manuela and Sadin said no, the RTC has jurisdiction.
o HELD: The dismissal was erroneous: at the time of the case, there were no
existing Sharia Courts. These had not yet been organized, even if Art 138
and 150 of PD 1083 establish the Sharia District and City Courts. The
dismissal was reversed; RTC ordered to proceed with intestate case. It
seems that RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with Sharia Courts.
o People v Mawallil (June 19, 1984)
o Sukarno Mawallil was convicted of parricide by the CFI. He argued that it
was not parricide, as he and Sophia were not married according to Art 17 of
PD 1083; Sophia had not divorced with her first husband in accordance with
the Code. The CFI held that Sophia divorced her first husband on March 7,
1977 before a Muslim leader, and that the divorce was valid according to
Muslim customs.
Her subsequent marriage to Sukarno was also in
accordance with Muslim customs; Sukarno had admitted to the marriage and
had referred to Sophia as his wife.
o HELD: Always presume marriage; every intendment of law/fact leans towards
marriage (Art 220 CC).
o Trinidad v CA (April 20, 1998)
o In absence of marriage contract and birth certificate, marriage and filiation
may be proven by showing a certificate from the Local Civil Registrar, and
records of births, deaths and marriages.
ARTICLE 6
o Martinez v Tan (Feb. 5, 1909)

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o Were Martinez and Tan married on Sept. 25, 1907, before the justice of the
peace, Jose Ballori, in Palompon, Leyte? YES.
o Evidence:
o expediente de matrimonio civil

mutual agreement to enter into marriage contract

asked justice to solemnize marriage

o signed document attesting to the truth of facts and witnesses
o CFI decided in favor of Tan (valid marriage), even if Martinez said she never
appeared before the justice and never marriedshe thought the document
she signed was a parental consent form:
o signed document
o Tan testified: Martinez, witnesses and justice were all together at
the named time and signed the document
o three other witnesses testified to the same, with one testifying that
s/he accompanied Martinez to justice after getting away from the
latters mother
o written evidence: 9 letters written by Martinez, with the last one corroborating
with one of the witnesses testimonies
o HELD: General Orders, no. 68, Sec 6 say that there is no form required
for the solemnization of marriage.
A marriage took place, as
supported by the following:
o justices certificate, signed by both parties
o it is presumed that the officer authorized the marriage, and parties
declared that they took each other as H&W
o both parties could read/write in Spanish, and knew the contents of
the documents they signed
ARTICLE 7
o Beso v Daguman (Jan. 28, 2000)
o Zenaida Beso v Judge Juan Daguman, Jr. Admin matter, SC. Neglect of
duty, abuse of authority.
o Dec. 12, 1997: Beso charged Daguman with solemnizing the marriage
outside his jurisdiction, not retaining a copy of the marriage contract, and not
registering the marriage contract with the Local Civil Register. It was alleged
that Zenaidas husband took all copies of marriage contract from Judge and
abandoned Beso.
o Judge said he had to marry them outside of his territory (Sta. Margarita,
Samar) because
o he was physically indisposed: he couldnt go to Sta. Margarita
o ambushed by Beso and husband: need to be married NOW
o parties had the appropriate documents
o Beso was an overseas Filipino worker who deserved more
attention than under current government policy
o also said: he had good faith
o marriage documents were nicked from right under his nose

o Besos husband had another girl: Lita Danguyan

o Calbayog, where the marriage was celebrated, was outside the jurisdiction of
the MCTC of Sta. Margarita
o Art 8, FC: when a marriage may be solemnized outside his chambers/sala:
o in articulo mortis
o residence is in a remote place
o both parties write the solemnizing officer to request a different
venue
o Art 23, FC: duty of a person solemnizing marriage to furnish either party
original certificate and send duplicate and triplicate copies to LCRno proof
that the husband, Bernardito Yman, took the documents
o HELD: Judge did not follow Arts. 7 (within the courts jurisdiction)
and 8 (marriage venue). It was held in Navarro v Domagtoy that judges
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate weddings only there.
This judge was careless.
ARTICLE 26, PAR 2
o In Republic v Orbecido III (Oct. 5, 2005), it was held that, given a valid
marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, with one party later naturalized as a
foreign citizen, if that party should obtain a valid divorce capacitating him/her to
remarry, then the Filipino spouse can also remarry. Art 26 of the FC applies,
because what is important is not the citizenship at the time of the marriage, but
the citizenship at the time of the divorce obtained abroad. Legislative intent is
to avoid a situation where the Filipino spouse stays married to alien spouse
who, after divorce, can remarrythis goes back to Van Dorn v Romillo, Jr.
o In San Luis v San Luis (Feb. 6, 2007), Felicisimo San Luis married 3 times
the first wife died in 1963 (leaving 6 kids), married the second in 1968 and got
divorced on Dec. 14, 1973 (got child custody), and the third he stayed married
to, from 1974 until his death in 1992. The third wife wanted to administer the
estate, but a son from the first marriage countered that she had no legal
personality to do so because she was just a mistressat the time of death, he
nd
contended that his father was still married to the 2 wife.
o HELD: Art 26 of the FC is just a codification of a judicial precedent (Van Dorn v
Romillo), so it applies to the case at bar. However, there was insufficient proof
of the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage. To prove foreign
law:
o official publication or
o copy attested by officer with legal custody of document;
o if no copy in Philippines, must be accompanied by certificate
issued by diplomat/consul and authenticated by his seal
o HELD: Even without marriage, the third wife was co-owner of properties
under Art 144 CC. Or, being a couple incapacitated to marry, Art 148 FC
applies.
o She was thus either a surviving wife (Art 26) or co-owner (Art 144, 148).
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VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES: Arts 35-54, Family Code
ARTICLE 34
o In Nial v Bayadog (March 14, 2000), it was held that the nature of
cohabitation pertained to in Arts 76 CC and 34 FC should be 5 years of legal
union, if not for the absence of marriageit should be characterized by
exclusivity, and for an unbroken period of time. There should be no legal
impediment to marriage. In the case at bar, Pepito and Norma did NOT have
the cohabitation contemplated by law, because the first wife died in 1985 and
they got married without a license in 1986only 20 months between the
dissolution of the first marriage and the beginning of the second. They were
therefore not exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, and thus, this
marriage was void ab initio. The kids from the first marriage wanted to file a
nd
petition declaring the 2 marriage of their deceased father void, but the Code is
silent on who can file a petition to declare nullity of marriage. Also, void
marriages were held to have no legal effects except with regards to property
and children. Ultimately it was held that no marriage existed between Pepito
and Norma.

o For purposes of MARRIAGE, MINOR means BELOW 21.

o What are void marriages, apart from the ones enumerated in the FC?
o Tolentino says the following are void because they are wanting in some
basic element of marriage, even if the FC has not declared them to be void:
o no intent to marry
o marriages in jest
o common-law marriages
o marriages by proxy
o marriages between persons of the same sex
o VOID marriages
o petition for declaration of nullity of marriage can be filed by either husband or
wife
o can be attacked collaterally
o may be questioned even after the death of one of the parties
o cannot be ratified or confirmed
o assailed by anyone if the question becomes material
o no conjugal partnership or community property is formed
o Art 39: The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe (amended by RA 8533, approved Feb. 23,
1998).
o What is RA 8533? This law abolishes the prescriptive period for the annulment
of marriage regardless of whether or not they were contracted on or before
August 3, 1988 on the ground of psychological incapacity.
o VOIDABLE marriages
o petition for annulment of marriage can be filed by the parties listed in Art 47
o can be attacked only in a direct proceeding for annulment
o can no longer be attacked after one of the parties is dead
o made valid by ratification or confirmation, through continued cohabitation
o can be attacked only by a party to it
o upon declaration of nullity, dissolves and liquidates a community property or
conjugal partnership
o action for petition for annulment prescribes
What if 1 spouse is absent, and spouse present wants to remarry?
o Art 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the bases solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

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o Art 41: A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of previous
marriage is null and void, UNLESS
o prior spouse was ABSENT for 4 consecutive years
o spouse present had WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF that absent
spouse was dead
o if absent spouse disappeared in extraordinarily dangerous
circumstances (Art 391 CC), a 2-year absence will do
o To REMARRY, one must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of absent spouse.
o BURDEN OF PROOF to show that first marriage had not been dissolved is
nd
on the party attacking the validity of the 2 marriage.

o
o
o

What if absent spouse reappears?

o Art 42: IF ABSENT SPOUSE REAPPEARS, subsequent marriage is terminated
by recording of affidavit of reappearance.
o A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
nd
shall be recorded in local civil registry of parties of 2 marriage at
the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage.
nd
o OTHERWISE, 2 marriage will be held valid when it is contracted in good faith
and with a well-founded belief that absent spouse is dead (Tolentino).
o The de facto separation of the spouses in the first marriage would have the
same effect as LEGAL SEPARATION, where the marriage ties exist but the
rights, obligations and conjugal partnership or absolute community are
nd
extinguished, to be revived only after termination of the 2 marriage, which will
st
revive all effects of the 1 marriage (Tolentino).
What if one of the spouses dies?
o GENERALLY, effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise.
o IF BOTH ACTED IN BAD FAITH (Art 44), marriage is void ab initio, and Art 44
applies even if dissolution is by death of one of the spouses.
Who can file a petition for annulment, and when?
o Art 45 (& 47): A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
o party who wants annulment is below 21 and no parental consent

if 18-21 and no parental consent: can be filed by parents

or guardian who did not give consent within five years
after married party turns 21

if 18-21: parents or guardian, anytime before married

party turns 21
o party was of unsound mind

sane spouse, guardian: can file anytime before death of

either party

insane spouse: can file during lucid interval, or after

regaining sanity
consent was obtained by fraud

injured party can file within 5 years after discovery of

fraud
consent was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence

injured party can file within 5 years after

intimidation/undue influence disappeared or ceased
continuing and incurable physical incapacity to consummate
marriage

if continuing and incurable physical incapacity to

consummate marriage: injured party, within 5 years after
marriage
serious and incurable STD

if either party had a serious and incurable STD: within 5

years after marriage

o What is SANITY? Tolentino says that mere mental weakness is not enough
the party in question must be unable to understand the nature and
consequences of marriage, thus being unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations of a husband or wife. He also says that the law presumes
sanity, but once insanity has been proven to exist, it is presumed to
continue.
o What is DURESS? Force, coercion. It cannot be said to have induced a
marriage where the induced party had sufficient time and opportunity for
deliberation and reflection after the time when the alleged duress was exerted,
and before the time of celebration of the marriage ceremony (Tolentino).
o What is PHYSICAL INCAPACITY? Impotence: that physical condition of
husband or wife in which sexual intercourse with a normal person of the
opposite sex is impossible. It is the lack of power to copulate, or the absence
of functional capacity for the sexual act. It must:
o exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage
o continue to the time when annulments are being tried
o appear incurable
o be unknown to other party.
o What is STD? It must:
o exist at time of marriage
o be a serious disease
o be incurable
o be unknown to the other party at time of marriage

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o Art 46: What is FRAUD?
o NON-DISCLOSURE / CONCEALMENT; exists AT TIME OF MARRIAGE:
o of previous conviction by final judgment of other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude
o of pregnancy at time of marriage by someone other than husband
o of STD at time of marriage, regardless of its nature
o of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality, lesbianism.

o
o

inventory (Art 102 [1], Art 129 [1])

pay creditors (Art 102 [2] & Art 94; Art 129 [4] & Art 121 [2])

o partitionprocess where remaining properties will be divided into various

portions to be allocated to all parties (Art 43 [2])
o distributiondelivery to spouses and children of the shares or properties
allocated to them in the partition (Art 102, 129)

How may a voidable marriage become a valid one?

o A voidable marriage may become valid if ratified or confirmed by continued
voluntary cohabitation even after discovery or recognition of grounds for
annulment (Art 45). Ratification only cures a defect in CONSENT, and thus,
does not apply to the following cases:
o where one spouse is physically incapacitated
o where one spouse has an incurable STD
o where one party is of unsound mind, although the AM says
that if insane spouse, after coming to reason, freely cohabits with
spouse, then he/she cannot file a petition for annulment.
What happens during pendency of all cases of annulment or declaration of nullity?
o THE FISCAL HAS TO BE PRESENT.
o Art 48: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps
o to prevent collusion between the parties
o to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
o No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.
o THE COURT PROVIDES FOR SUPPORT.
o Art 49: During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. This happens also when the Court decides that the
provisions of a written agreement are insufficient (Tolentino).
o Court will also consider the moral and material welfare of said kids, and if they
are over 7 years old, their choice of parent (Title IX: Parental Authority, FC),
as well as visitation rights of other parent.

o donations propter nuptias (void marriages) by innocent spouse to spouse in

bad faith shall be revoked by operation of law and returned to innocent spouse
(Art 43 [3], 44)
o

if both spouses acted in bad faith then all donations by reason

of marriage from one to the other, and all testamentary provisions
made by one in favor of the other, are revoked by operation of law
(Art 44)

o children conceived or born before judgmenteither petition for annulment or

declaration of nullity of marriage under Art 36becomes final are considered
legitimate (Art 43 [1], 54); judgment provides for their custody and support (Art
50)
o presumptive legitime, which is considered an advance on the kids
inheritances when the parents die, shall be delivered in cash, property or
securities; under CC, legitime of legit kids is estate of parent (Art 51,102,
129)
o innocent spouse may revoke designation of the spouse in bad faith as
beneficiary in the formers insurance policy (Art 43 [4])
o spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified from testate and intestate
succession of estate of innocent spouse (Art 43 [5])
o conjugal dwelling and lot will be given to the spouse with whom the common
children choose to remain, unless the parties agree otherwise (Arts 102, 129)
o after all of that, the former spouses are free to remarry; otherwise, subsequent
marriage shall be null and void (Art 53)
Some of the actual provisions of law follow.

A marriage is annulled by final judgment. What are the effects?

Art 50: The final judgment provides for the following:

Art 43 (1) says that for VOID marriages, children of that marriage are considered
legit; their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a
proper proceeding.

o liquidation (Art 43 [2])

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Art 54 says that for both VOID and VOIDABLE marriages, children conceived or
born BEFORE the judgment of (1) annulment or (2) absolute nullity of the marriage
under Art 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children born under the subsequent marriage in Art 53after the judgment of
annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriageshall be legitimate.

o Pesca v Pesca: Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility are not psychological

incapacity.

What are the effects of bad faith?

o Dedel v CA: Sexual infidelity is not psychological incapacity.

o Choa v Choa: The totality of the evidence presented must be enough to

establish incapacity.

o Art 43 (2): forfeiture of his/her share in the net profits of the AC OR CP in favor
of the common children, the legit kids or the innocent spouse
o Art 43 (3): donations to spouse in bad faith are revoked by operation of law
o Art 43 (4): cannot be beneficiary in insurance policy
o Art 43 (5) disqualified from testate/intestate succession

o Republic v Quintero-Hamano: Abandonment is not psychological incapacity.

For Art 36 cases, there is no distinction between alien and Filipino spouses.

o And my personal favorite: spouse in bad faith can be sued for damages using
Art 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

o Carating-Siayngco v Siayngco: Art 36 is not meant to cover all cases of

psychosis.

CASES
o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
o Enrico v Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli
ARTICLE 36

o Tenebro v CA: Void marriages are not without legal effects. A second marriage
is still bigamous, even if declared void under Art 36.

o Buenaventura v CA: Psychological incapacity means NO moral damages, NO

exemplary damages.
o Republic v Iyoy
o Antonio v Reyes: the case of the pathological liar

o Salita v Magtolis: Art 36 is on a case-to-case basis.

o Republic v Melgar: The fiscal must appear on behalf of the State.

o Santos v CA: Gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability. Art 36 is not meant to

cover all cases of psychosis.

o Zamora v CA

o Republic v CA and Molina: MAIN GUIDELINES!

o Chi Ming Tsoi v CA: No sex (senseless and protracted refusal to have sex) =
non-fulfillment of essential marital obligation.
o Hernandez v CA: Alcoholism, sexual infidelity, perversionthese are not
psychological incapacities per se, but they are grounds for legal separation.
These must be manifestations of a disordered personality which make a person
unable to discharge essential marital obligations, if they are to be used in an Art
36 case.
o Marcos v Marcos: A personal medical exam is not a condition sine qua non for
Art 36 cases. The totality of the evidence must be sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity.
o Republic v Dagdag: This case failed to medically prove root cause.

o Republic v Tanyag-San Jose

o Tongol v Tongol: Petition under Art 36 must allege the complete facts.
o Paras v Paras: Marital obligations include obligations to children.
o Republic v Cubantug-Baguio
ARTICLE 40
o Domingo v CA: A marriage, though void, still needs a judicial declaration under
Art 40 FC. This ipso facto carries judgment for liquidation of property, and
custody and support.
o Bobis v Bobis: Art 40 requires prior judicial declaration of nullity.
o Mercado v Tan: Subsequently obtaining a declaration of nullity is immaterial.

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o Ty v CA: Prior to FC, no need for a judicial declaration (People v Aragon).
However, under the FC, a judicial declaration is needed.

ARTICLE 48
o Republic v Iyoy
LEGAL SEPARATION: Arts 55-67, Family Code

o Cario v Cario
ARTICLE 41

Tolentino characterizes legal separation as a kind of relative divorce.

o Republic v Nolasco: Gives the requisites for a judicial declaration of

presumptive death under Art 41 FC.
o Armas v Calisterio: Under the Civil Code, there was no need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death.
o Manuel v People:
presumptive death.

There is a need to present a judicial declaration of

o Republic v CA: This case failed to establish well-founded belief.

ARTICLE 46
o Buccat v Buccat
Godofredo Buccat requests the annulment of his marriage to Luida Mangonon de
Buccat on the grounds that, in consenting to the marriage, he did so because the
defendant had assured him that she was virgin.
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several meetings, both were
committed on 19 September the same year. On 26 November of the same year, the
plaintiff married the defendant in Baguio City. After living together for eighty-nine
days, the defendant gave birth to a child of nine months, on 23 February 1939.
Following this event, Godofredo abandoned his wife and never returned.
It is improbable that Godofredo had not even suspected the critical condition of
Luida, with her being in a state of advanced pregnancy. There is no room for the
fraud argued by Godofredo. His argument that it is not rare to find people with big
stomachs seems too silly to merit our consideration, more so because the plaintiff
was a novice in law.
Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To
dissolve it, clear and irrefutable evidence is necessary. There is no such evidence
in this case. Finding the original ruling in accordance with law, it must be confirmed;
as by this we confirm the lower courts ruling in its entirety, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

o Art 55: Grounds for legal separation:

o repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
o physical violence or moral pressure to change religious or political affiliations
o attempt to corrupt or induce, to engage in prostitution
o final judgment: imprisonment of more than 6 years; even if pardoned
o drug addiction or habitual alcoholism
o lesbianism or homosexuality
o contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage
o sexual infidelity (meaning, adultery or concubinage) or perversion
o attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent
o abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than one year
o IF IT HAD EXISTED AT TIME OF MARRIAGE, it is probably a ground for
annulment.
o IF IT OCCURRED ONLY DURING THE MARRIAGE, it is probably a ground for
legal separation.
o What is SEXUAL INFIDELITY? Sex. Even just once. Thats infidelity.
o What is ADULTERY? Wife has sex with anyone other than husband.
o What is CONCUBINAGE? Only 3 ways for this to happen:
o maintaining a mistress in the conjugal dwelling
o sex with other woman under scandalous circumstances
o cohabiting with other woman in any other place
o Secret sex, without scandalous circumstances, is not concubinage.
o Why such a distinction in sexual infidelity? Because of womans child-bearing
function (yeah great Tolentino, sure make us sound like robots thanks). If
woman produces child via sexual infidelity, the child is considered a legitimate
child.
o What is SEXUAL PERVERSION? All unusual or abnormal sexual practices
which may be offensive to the feelings or sense of decency of either husband
or wife where one spouse is coerced into the act/s.

o Aquino v Delizo: The wife was 4 months pregnant at the time of the marriage.

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o What is ABANDONMENT? One spouse leaves the other, without intent to
return. After three months, it is presumed that there is a lack of intent to return.
o Art 56: Grounds for denying legal separation:
o when party condoned, consented, connived, colluded
o when both parties have given grounds for legal separation (aka
recrimination?)
o when the action is barred by prescription
o What is CONDONATION? Forgiveness of a marital offense. Breach of
condition not to do wrong again will revive the offense as a ground for legal
separation.
o express: signified by words or writing
o implied: inferred from acts
o What is CONSENT? Agreement or conformity in advance of commission of
act. It may be express or implied, and must be freely given.
o test: the intent to pardon, based on knowledge of the offense,
must be clear
o What is CONNIVANCE? Agreement, express or implied, by both spouses to
the ground for legal separation.
o test: spouse must not actively provide the opportunity for the
wrongdoing
o What is RECRIMINATION? Counter-charge in a suit for legal separation,
saying that complainant is also guilty of an offense constituting grounds for
legal separation.
o What is COLLUSION? Agreement between husband and wife for one of them
to commit, or to appear to commit, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, in order for the other to obtain legal separation.
o Art 57: An action for legal separation shall be filed within FIVE YEARS from
the time of occurrence of the cause.
o Art 58: An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried BEFORE SIX
MONTHS shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
o This is meant to give the spouses a chance to RECONCILE.
o Art 59: No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps
towards the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such
effort, that reconciliation is highly improbably.

o Art 60: No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of

facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
o There must be PROOF of the offense, which must be specific as
to time, person and place. The offense may be proved by
circumstantial evidence.
What happens AFTER FILING THE PETITION for legal separation?
o Art 61: After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be
entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a
written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a
third person to administer the AC or CP. The administrator appointed by the
court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the
Rules of Court.
o Art 62: During pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Art
49 shall likewise applyin the absence of a written agreement between the
spousesto the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the
common children.
o What is ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE? Money that the court orders one
spouse to give to the other, most probably during the pendency of the petition
for legal separation. Is CONTINGENT upon the existence of a valid marriage.
What happens AFTER DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?
o Art 63: The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
o spouses shall be entitled to live separately
o BUT marriage bonds subsist
o AC or CP shall be dissolved and liquidated,
o BUT offending spouse shall have no right to any share as it is
forfeited in accordance with Art 43(2)
o custody of minor children goes to innocent spouse, subject to Art
213

Art 213: Court decides where kids go.

However,
paramount consideration is that everything must be in
the best interest of the child. Children under 7 stay
with the mother, unless the Court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
o offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession
o Art 64: After finality of decree of legal separation, innocent spouse may
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o
o
o
o
o

revoke donations made by him/her in favor of offending spouse

revoke designation of the latter as beneficiary in insurance
policy

this takes effect upon written notification to the insured

revocation shall be recorded in the registries of property in the
places where the properties are located
alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith
before the recording of complaint for revocation in registries shall
be respected
action to revoke donation must be brought within FIVE YEARS
from the time decree of legal separation becomes final

What happens if spouses reconcile?

o What is RECONCILIATION? Voluntary mutual agreement to live together
again as husband and wife.
o Under Civil Code, this could be in any form, express or implied.
o Under Family Code, it is necessary that spouses make a joint
manifestation signed by them under oath, which must be filed with
the court
o Tolentino says that revival of former property regime does not necessarily
restrict spouses to revival merely of former property regime. He says that the
spouses are placed in the same position as before the marriage, and can thus
establish the property regime they want, as though making a marriage
settlement. If they dont agree on any system, then by law, the regime of
separation of property will stand.

o recording of order in registries of property SHALL NOT PREJUDICE ANY

CREDITOR NOT LISTED/NOTIFIED unless debtor-spouse has sufficient
separate properties to satisfy creditors claim

CASES
o Pacete v Carriaga, Jr
o Sabalones v CA: Art 61: The wife can act as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the casewhile the court has not decided upon an
administrator.
o Gandionco v Pearada: No criminal proceeding of concubinage is necessary.
o Lapuz-Sy v Eufemio: Death abates legal separation and a declaration of nullity.
o Kiam v Ong
o Araneta v Concepcion: Proceedings for custody, alimony and support can
happen during the cool-off period of 6 months.
o Ocampo v Florenciano: A confession happens in court, or through a pleading.
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on such a confession.

o Art 65: Consequences:

o terminates legal separation proceedings
o sets aside final decree of legal separation
o BUT does not affect property unless spouses agree to revive
property regime
o Art 66: agreement to revive property regime
o shall be executed under oath
o specifies new properties
o specifies properties retained as separate
o specifies names of all known creditors, addresses and amounts
owed to each
o filed in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished
to creditors
o after due hearing, court shall take measures to protect the interest of creditors
and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries

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RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS: Arts 68-73, Family Code
o Art 68: The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
o These are the essential marital obligations as pointed out by
our cases.
o The right of cohabitation, or consortium, means that they shall
have a common life, under the same roof, to better fulfill the
obligations inherent in the matrimonial status. This includes the
domestic and sexual community of the spouses. However, for
the purposes of law, only the TANGIBLE and MATERIAL
aspect of cohabitation can be taken into account.
o Art 69: The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from
living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
o Grounds for legal separation are sufficient grounds for a spouse
to have a separate domicile, if the latter is preferred to the former.
o Civil Code: it was discretionary on the part of the court to exempt
the wife, in the face of just cause, from following the husband
abroad.
o Art 70: The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The
expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of
their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.
o Community property
o Income or fruits of separate properties
o Separate properties
o Art 71: The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with
the provisions of Art 70.
o Civil Code: Husband was responsible for support.
o The better rule is that contribution should be proportionate to the
properties of the spouses.
o Art 72: When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal
union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the
other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
o Civil Code: the court may counsel the offender to comply with his
or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper.

Family Code: Court has full freedom to determine the kind of relief
that may be given (Tolentino) BUT look at Arroyo vs Vazquez de
Arroyo.

o Art 73: Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only
on valid, serious and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide whether or not
o 1. The objection is proper
o 2. Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection

If benefit accrued prior to objection, the resulting

obligation shall be enforced against the separate
property of the spouse who has not obtained consent
o No prejudice to the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
o Family first.
CASES
o Goitia v Campos Rueda (Nov. 2, 1916)
o Jose Campos Rueda married Eloisa Goitia on Jan. 7, 1915. One month later,
Eloisa went home, because Jose wanted her to perform unchaste or
lascivious acts, and she refused. The CFI ruled that Jose Campos Rueda
could not be compelled to support Eloisa Goitia, except in his own house,
unless it was by virtue of a judicial decree granting Goitia divorce or
separation.
o Can a spouse be compelled to give support when the other spouse resides
outside of the conjugal domicile?
o HELD: YES, Rueda can be compelled to support Goitia, because failure to
live with the husband is NOT an instance in which the obligation to give
support ceases. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the
part of the husband to support the wife. The law permits no termination of
the obligations of marriage via his wrongful acts and in driving his wife to her
parental home. Also, the decree of support is not contingent on the ability to
grant divorce. The laws governing this marriage were Art 44 to 78 of Law of
Civil Marriage of 1870under this law and in this jurisdiction, the only ground
for divorce is adultery.
o Moreland concurs: the wife is still legally within the conjugal domicile, even if
she is physically outside it.
o Arroyo v Vazquez de Arroyo (Aug. 11, 1921)
o Mariano Arroyo married Dolores Vazquez in 1910. On July 4, 1920, Dolores
left the conjugal home; she wanted to live separately. Mariano instituted
action to make her come home. Dolores said he gave her cruel treatment;
she wanted a decree of separation, liquidation of conjugal partnership,
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The CFI
granted Dolores petition, giving her separation, alimony and costs.
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o SC found that Dolores was super jealous, and that her jealousy was the
cause of most of their conjugal misery. The exaggerated tales of cruelty do
not justify the wifes abandonment of the marital home.
o HELD: Art 142-143 of the CC say that the husband is obligated to maintain
his wife. This obligation is not conditioned upon divorce. Provision for
separate maintenance of wife should NOT be made, UNLESS continued
cohabitation has become impossible and separation necessary, through the
fault of the husband. In sum, the SC said the petitions of both Mariano and
Dolores could not be granted. Mariano, however, has done nothing to forfeit
his right to the marital society of his wife; she is obligated to return home and
cohabit with him.
o REAL QUESTION: What relief can be accorded to him by judicial decree?
NOTHING. The court cannot compel the spouse to cohabit and render
conjugal rights. Property rights, yes, but personal rights, no. In the end, all
the court could do was issue a judicial declaration that the wife absented
herself without cause and had a duty to return.
o Zulueta v CA (1996): The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence (to be) inviolable is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
lawful order (from a) court or when public safety requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
o The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him/her.
o The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.

husband and the enforcement of consortium. She wanted visitation rights

over her husband. The CA dismissed the application for the writ, but granted
her visitation rights.
o HELD: Can a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her? NO. Each of the spouses has freedom of
choice. There was no detention or deprivation of Potenciano that would
have justified the issuance of the writ. He cannot be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choicethis would deprive him of the right to privacy.
The Court thus ruled: NO visitation rights, and NO writ of habeas corpus.
o RA 9262
ARTICLE 69
o Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
o Punos concurring opinion
o Marriage ipso facto does not cause loss of domicile. The
husbands choice of a different domicile is what changes the
wifes domicile.
o It is Punos opinion that the wife reacquires her personal domicile
upon the death of the husband.

o Ilusorio v CA and Bildner (May 12, 2000)

o Erlinda Kalaw married Potenciano Ilusorio on July 11, 1942, and they had 6
kids. In 1972, they separated from bed and boardseparation in fact. On
December 30, 1997, 2 of their children said that Erlinda had given
Potenciano an overdose of 200mg of Zoloft (anti-depressant), instead of
100mg, while Potenciano was staying in Antipolo with the family. On Feb.
25, 1998, Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over Potenciano with the
RTC. On May 31, 1998, Potenciano returned to Makati, and Erlinda
subsequently applied for a writ of habeas corpus for the custody of her
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o
GENERAL PROVISIONS
o Art 74: The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in
the following order:
o By marriage settlements executed before the marriage
o By the provisions of this Code
o By the local custom.
o What are MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS?
o Ante-nuptial contract
o An agreement entered into before marriage, and in consideration
thereof, between an intended husband and wife, by which the
enjoyment or devolution of property is regulated. (Madden)
o A contract entered into by those who are about to be united in
marriage, in order to establish the conditions of their conjugal
partnership with respect to present and future property
(Manresa).
o Stipulations in marriage settlements that are contrary to
prohibitive laws are VOID.
o The nullity of one provision does not nullify the entire contract.
o Marriage settlements CANNOT be changed.
The only
changes that can be made must be made BEFORE
MARRIAGE, or through judicial separation of property.
o The Court will always protect the creditors.
o Art 75: The future spouses may choose any regime in their marriage
settlements. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the chosen regime
is void, the system of absolute community of property shall govern.
o FC: Default regime: ACP
o CC: Default regime: CPG
o What if the spouses stipulate in their marriage settlements that ACP shall not
exist between them, but do not state the rules or the regime by which their
property shall be governed?
o Spanish CC: dotal system
o FC: custom governs
o Follow the intention of the parties, then if that doesnt work out,
the court should adopt the most equitable system that is closest to
the practice of the parties, always protecting the creditors. Rules
on partnerships may also apply. (Tolentino)
o Art 76: Any modification in the marriage settlements are valid ONLY IF made
before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the following provisions:

o
o
o
o

66: reconciliation after legal separation, without revival of former

property regime
67: revival of former property regime
128: CPG: abandonment: aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for receivership, judicial separation of property or authority
to be sole administrator of conjugal partnership property
135: sufficient causes for judicial separation of property
136: voluntary dissolution of ACP or CPG and for separation of
properties

o Art 77: Marriage settlements and modifications thereof shall be in writing, signed
by the parties and executed before the celebration of marriage. They shall not
prejudice third persons unless they are registered
o NO EFFECT on third persons unless they are registered in the
local civil registry along with marriage contract, as well as in
registries of property.
When does one need parent/guardian to sign marriage settlements?
WHEN THERE IS A LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY OR CAPACITY TO ACT
o Art 78: A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute
his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons
designated in Art 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the
agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
o Minor here means below 21.
o The parents/guardians HAVE to sign the agreement.
o Art 14 says: father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or
persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned
o Title IX: minors are under the parental authority of father and
mother jointly.
o So which prevails? Art 14. Title IX may modify the precedence
of the father in certain cases.
o Art 79: For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon
whom civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other
disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent
court to be made a party thereto.
o Art 80: In absence of contrary stipulation in marriage settlements, property
relations shall be governed by Philippine laws, EXCEPT WHEN
o Both spouses are aliens
o Contracts affect property that is not in the Philippines and are thus
executed where the property is located
o Contracts affect property not in the Philippines but are executed
hereforeign countrys laws require different formalities for
validity of contracts
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o Philippine contracts do not apply to foreign property, no matter what (Art
16 CC, Art 80[3] FC, Tolentino).

o
o

o Art 81: Everything stipulated in the settlements, including donations BETWEEN

the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered VOID if the marriage
does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend on the celebration
of the marriage shall be valid.

o
o
o

DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

What are donations propter nuptias?
o Art 84: Donations by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration,
in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
o This EXCLUDES:

Donations made in favor of the spouses AFTER celebration

of marriage

Those in favor of spouses, before the marriage, but NOT in

consideration of the marriage

Those in favor of persons OTHER THAN the spouses

o Who may donate?

Spouses to each other

Parents to one or both spouses

Third persons to either or both spouses

o Art 83: Donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established
in Title III of Book III of CC, INSOFAR AS they are NOT MODIFIED by the
following articles.
What modifications do the provisions make?
o Donations propter nuptias do not require express acceptance by the done
o If made by minors (meaning, below 21), they must be with consent of those who
are required to consent to the marriage
o They cannot exceed 1/5 of the present property of the donor when made by
spouses to each other IF they have a regime other than ACP AND donations are
made in marriage settlements (Art 84)
o Can include future property, which will be governed by provisions on
testamentary succession (Art 84)
o Not revoked by subsequent birth or appearance of children
o Can be subject to encumbrances (Art 85)
o Amount for property < obligation: donor pays deficiency
o Amount for property > obligation: donee gets excess
o Revoked by non-performance of marriage (Art 86)
o Marriage is not celebrated (Art 81)
o Marriage is judicially declared void ab initio (see also Art 81)

Marriage takes place without consent of parents or guardian

When marriage is annulled and the donee acted in BAD FAITH
(Art 43)
Legal separation, donee being guilty spouse
If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied
with
When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified
by the provisions of the CC on donations in general

Donee comits some offense against donor, wife or

children

Donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense or act

involving moral turpitude

Donee refuses to support donor when he is

legally/morally bound to give support (Art 765 CC)

Art 87: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,

between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.s
o The law seeks to prevent exploitation in marriage.
o Matabuena v Cervantes
o Bottomline: The law generally does not allow donations inter vivos
of spouses to each other. Donations mortis causa are okay.

CASES
ARTICLE 85
o Mateo v Lagua
o Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be
reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained as per Art 908
of the new Civil Code: Deduct any payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death, and
add donations subject to collation.
o For donation to be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the
value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus
the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor.
ARTICLE 87
o Matabuena v Cervantes
o The prohibition on donation during marriage applies to common law
marriages as well.

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o The purpose of the law is to inhibit undue influence. The undue influence
would still be present even if they are categorically not legally married
intimacy of living as husband and wife is still present.

o Abandonment implies departure of a spouse with an intent never to return

again. It is a ground for judicial separation of property.
ARTICLE 134

o Calimlim-Canullas v Fortun
o Arcaba v Vda de Batocael
o A donation is void if it was granted during marriage, and it applies to persons
living as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
o Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one party
is no longer interested in sex due to old age. Cohabitation is the public
assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling
together as man and wife. (Bitangcor vs. Tan)
ARTICLES 105, 116
o Francisco v Francisco: Presumption of conjugality of property.
ARTICLES 121, 122
o Ayala Investment & Development Corp v CA
o When a spouse acts only as a surety or guarantormeaning, he did not
directly receive the money and services to be used for his own business or
professionthe conjugal partnership cannot be made answerable for the
debt, unless the creditor can prove that the debt actually redounded to the
direct and immediate benefit of the family. These benefits must be not
indirect, remote, incidental or speculative.
o Villaranda v Villaranda: Without the wifes consent, the husbands
alienation/encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of FC is
voidable only, not void.
ARTICLES 121, 124 (96)
o Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v Dailo: Must prove it, if claiming something
redounded to the benefit of the family.
o Uy v CA: No need for summary proceedings for administration of property if the
spouse is incapacitated or incompetent. However, the proper remedy is judicial
guardianship.

o Maquilan v Maquilan: COMAG is incompatible with the concept of a void

marriage.
ARTICLE 144
o Juaniza v Jose
o Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 requires that parties living together as
husband and wife not be incapacitated to marry. Eugenio is legally married to
Socorro, which is an impediment to marriage to Rosalia. Rosalia cannot be
co-owner of the jeepney since this belongs to conjugal partnership of
Eugenio with his legal wife.
ARTICLE 147
o Maxey v CA: Under Art 147, contributions in the household are considered as
actual contribution.
o Valdes v RTC: In a void marriage, regardless of the cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Art 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Art 50, 51, 52 are
explicit in its terms. They relate only to voidable marriages, and
exceptionally, to void marriages under Art 40.
o Mercado-Fehr v Fehr: Art 147 applies to void marriages.
ARTICLE 148
o
o
o
o

Agapay v Palang
Tumlos v Spouses Fernandez
Saguid v CA
Villanueva v CA

o Belcodero v CA: Property acquired during cohabitationshare of married party

goes to the conjugal property of subsisting marriage.
o Atienza v De Castro: Under Art 148, actual joint contribution must be proven.

ARTICLE 128
o Partosa-Jo v CA
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FAMILY: Arts 149-162, Family Code

o

Art 2035, CC
o No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

The civil status of persons

The validity of a marriage or a legal separation

Any ground for legal separation

Future support

The jurisdiction of courts

Future legitime

CASES
ARTICLES 150, 151
o

o
o

Magbaleta v Gonong
o While it is necessary that every effort towards compromise be
made before litigation ensues within a family, this is not a
prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger
to the family is a party therein.
Spouses Hontiveros v RTC
o The phrase members of the same family refers to husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sister whether full or half blood. Brothers and
sisters does not comprehend sisters-in-law.
Martinez v Martinez
o Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly. Hence,
a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. v Acua
o Article 151 applies only when the suit is exclusively among family
members, and it may be invoked only be a party who is the same
member of that family.

ARTICLES 152, 153, 155

o

Modequillo v Breva
o Can a final judgment of the CA in an action for damages be
satisfied by executing a family home constituted under the Family
Code? Yes, if the debt or liability was incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
Manacop v CA

ARTICLES 154, 159

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o
o

o
o
o

o
o

Patricio v Dario III

The family home is constituted from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From time of constitution and so long as any beneficiaries
reside therein, the family home continues as such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as allowed by law.
Law provides that occupancy of family home by beneficiaries must be
actual, not possible or presumptive.
3 requisites to be a beneficiary: 1)among relationships in Art 154 2) live in
family home 3) dependent on head of family for legal support
Tolentino says: No more beneficiaries at death? Then family home
dissolved. If there are beneficiaries then family home continues for 10
years unless there is a minor beneficiary in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary comes of age. Tolentino also says he
believes it will cease to be a family home if it is partitioned.
Obviously, the intent of the law is to protect the minor beneficiaries until he
reaches legal age and can support himself
Can the minor son of respondent be a minor beneficiary? He fulfills the
first 2 requisites for beneficiaries. He is a descendant, living in the family
home. However, he is not dependent on his grandparents for support, only
his parents. Father has means to support him and grandmother shows no
willingness to support him.

PATERNITY AND FILIATION: Arts 163-182, Family Code

o
o

o
o

Article 54, FC
Andal v Macaraig
o Emiliano may be said to be really physically weak during time at
issue, but experience shows that this does not prevent carnal
intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this
sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage
because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an
author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202).
RA 9255 (2004): An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use Surname of
the Father (Art 176, FC)
Rule on DNA Evidence
o Herrera v Alba

DNA testing is a valid probative tool in determining

filiation. Also, the motion to direct the petitioner to
undergo DNA testing is NOT a violation of his right
against self-incrimination. That right is a privilege that
applies only to testimonial evidence.
o Estate of Rogelio Ong v Diaz

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted

from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern,
or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the
sample is taken.

The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the

application of DNA testing, for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

CASES
ARTICLE 163
o

Tison v CA
o Presumption of legitimacy is universally recognized. It cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. Such action can be brought only by
the husband or his heirs within the period allowed. Upon
expiration of the period, the status becomes fixed and can no
longer be questioned.

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A declaration about pedigree is sufficient evidence for as long as
the declaration was made by the decedent whose estate is in
controversy.
Angeles v Maglaya
o Tison vs. Court of Appeals: A legitimate child is a product of and
therefore implies a valid and lawful marriage. A child is presumed
legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock. The presumption
of legitimacy in the FC actually fixes a status for the child born in
wedlock and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. Only
the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
The intent of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being uncertain.

of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child.

ARTICLES 172, 173, 175

o

Bernabe v Alejo
o Can the Civil Code Art 285 apply? Yes. Petitioner says Art 285
CC has been omitted by Art 172, 173, 175 of the Family Code
which outline how a child may establish legitimacy. Under new
law the action for recognition has to be brought within the lifetime
of the alleged parent, so putative parent can dispute claim. BUT
the FC cant prejudice rights that were already vested prior to
enactment of FC. Adrian, born in 1981, already had vested right
before the enactment of the FC.

Aruego v CA
o Illegitimate children who were still minors when FC took effect and
whose putative parent died during minority are given right to seek
recognition for a period of up to 4 years after they reach majority.
It is a vested right.

Tayag v CA
o Where a complaint for recognition was filed before FC, it should
be resolved under the provisions of the Civil Code.
o Article 175 of FC doesnt apply because it will affect adversely
Emilies and Chads rights which have been vested with the filing
of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in
applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in
holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
o Article 285 CC: The action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or
of the mother a document should appear in which either or both
parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be
commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
o Article 175 FC: Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
o Article 256 FC: This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as

ARTICLES 164, 166(1)(b), 167

o

Concepcion v CA
o To overthrow presumption of legitimacy based on Art 166 (1) (b),
it must be shown without reasonable doubt that the spouses
cannot possibly have access to each other. In this case, Mario
and Theresa lived within the same city, four kilometers away from
each other. Theresas claim that Jose Gerardo is illegitimate
cannot affect the latters legitimacy because he was born within a
valid marriage. She is not permitted by law to disavow her childs
legitimacy because maternity is never uncertain.
o Between Jose Gerardos birth certificate and the quasi-conclusive
presumption of law of his legitimacy, the latter should stand
because it bears more weight and is in consonance with the
purpose of the law.

ARTICLE 171
o

Babiera v Catotal
o The case doesnt apply to Art. 171, since it doesnt involve
impugning Teofistas legitimacy as Hermogenas child, but
whether or not Teofista is Hermogena and/or Eugenios child at
all.

Badua v CA
o A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any

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it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
o

Uyguangco v CA
o However, Graciano seeks to prove his filiation under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now
barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975.

ADOPTION

Mendoza v CA
o An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
"any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family
Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate,
a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

RA 8043 (1995): Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children

RA 8552 (1998): Domestic Adoption Act

A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, Sections 2 and 3

o Sec. 2. Objectives. (a) The best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and
adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and
Internationally, and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children
and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.

ARTICLE 176
o

Leonardo v CA
o An illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code
had no right to use his/her fathers surname, even if the father
admits paternity.
o Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.
o Prior to RA 9255, there was no remedy.

(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through
foster care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall:
(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of
his parents and is provided with love, care, understanding and
security for the full and harmonious development of his
personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no
appropriate placement or adoption within the childs extended
family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be
considered.
(ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions
in relinquishing their parental authority over their child;
(iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his
biological
parents;
(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to
promote
a
positive
environment
for
adoption;
(v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the
capacity to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption
applications and offer adoption-related services including, but not
limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling;
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(vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the childs

identity and culture in his native land, and only when this is not
available shall inter-country adoption be considered as a last
resort;
and
(vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their
parental authority and custody over their adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be
administratively or judicially declared so as to establish the status of the
child as legally available for adoption and his custody transferred to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed
and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be
authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Child is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
filing of the petition for adoption.
(b) A child legally available for adoption refers to a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly
licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the
parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of
adoption, his guardian or adopter(s).

cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent

upon the public for support.
(h) Neglected child is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not
attended to or inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his
parents or guardian.
(i) Physical neglect occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and
without proper shelter.
(j) Emotional neglect exists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated,
exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to
good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in
moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and
other
vices.
(k) Child-placement agency refers to an agency duly licensed and
accredited by the Department to provide comprehensive child welfare
services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption,
evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption
home study report.
(l) Child-caring agency refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited
by the Department that provides 24-hour residential care services for
abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed children.

(c) Voluntarily committed child is one whose parents knowingly and

willingly relinquish parental authority over him in favor of the Department.

(m) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and

Development.

(d) Involuntarily committed child is one whose parents, known or

unknown, have been permanently and judicially deprived of parental
authority over him due to abandonment; substantial, continuous or
repeated neglect and abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental
responsibilities.

(n) Deed of Voluntary Commitment refers to the written and notarized

instrument relinquishing parental authority and committing the child to the
care and custody of the Department executed by the childs biological
parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the childs legal
guardian, to be witnessed by an authorized representative of the
Department after counseling and other services have been made available
to encourage the biological parents to keep the child.

(e) Foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose

parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an
orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth
and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a foundling.
(f) Abandoned child refers to one who has no proper parental care or
guardianship or whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least
six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.
(g) Dependent child refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or
custodian or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good

(o) Child Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker
of the childs legal status, placement history, psychological, social, spiritual,
medical, ethno-cultural background and that of his biological family needed
in determining the most appropriate placement for him.
(p) Home Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker
of the motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to
provide a home that meets the needs of a child.

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o

(q) Supervised trial custody refers to the period of time during which a
social worker oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both
adopters and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
(r) Licensed Social Worker refers to one who possesses a degree in
bachelor of science in social work as a minimum educational requirement
and who has passed the government licensure examination for social
workers as required by Republic Act No. 4373.
(s) Simulation of birth is the tampering of the civil registry to make it
appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is
not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his true identity
and
status.

Republic v Valencia
o If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, w/c is indisputably substantial as well as
controversial, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature.
o However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. This court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

Cang v CA
o The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for
the validity of the decree of adoption. The requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
o In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child.
o Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.

Republic v Toledano
o Under Art 184 Alvin cant adopt. He is not part of the exceptions
listed in paragraph 3 of Art 184.

He is not a former Filipino.

Solomon isnt a relative by consanguinity nor a legitimate

child of his spouse.

(t) Biological Parents refer to the childs mother and father by nature.
(u) Pre-Adoption Services refer to psycho-social services provided by
professionally-trained social workers of the Department, the social services
units of local governments, private and government health facilities, Family
Courts, licensed and accredited child-caring and child-placement agencies
and other individuals or entities involved in adoption as authorized by the
Department.
(v) Residence means a persons actual stay in the Philippines for three
(3) continuous years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption
and which is maintained until the adoption decree is entered. Temporary
absences for professional, business, health, or emergency reasons not
exceeding sixty (60) days in one (1) year does not break the continuity
requirement.
(w) Alien refers to any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and
remains in the Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or travel
documents and visa.
CASES
o

Teotico v Del Val

o Under our law, the relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except
only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting
parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter
but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Tolentino: The relationship established by the adoption, however,

is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and
collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
which they may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not
extend to the relatives of either.

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Evelyn gave up citizenship when she was naturalized as
a US citizen.
Evelyn can adopt under p 3 Art 184, BUT Art 185 mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife. The spouses dont fall under the
exceptions of Art 185.
This rule is to promote joint parental authority over child and to
ensure harmony between spouses. PD 603 says spouses may
jointly adopt, but it was amended by E.O. 91, which says husband
and wife shall jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. The Family
Code reiterated by saying alien spouses must jointly adopt.

o
o

Republic v Miller
o Can aliens adopt Filipinos despite the prohibition under the
Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the petition
for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to
adopt? YES.
o The petition has become a vested right and the Family Code
cannot be made to apply retroactively in their case. The
jurisdiction of the court is dependent in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
o Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt
under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under
the law prevailing before the Family Code

Lahom v Sibulo
o May the subject adoption (decreed May 5, 1972) still be
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of RA 8552? NO.

ARTICLES 184, 185

o

Republic v CA and Bobiles

o Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the
petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit
of consent, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child. The declarations he submitted and his
subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to
make him a co-petitioner.
o The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by
arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the
form of pleadings.
o It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, as well as matters of
procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and

to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to

it as a result of the adoption.
The approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the
court and should be exercised in accordance with the best
interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents
over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving
official will not be disturbed.

Republic v Vergara
o Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. is an American and therefore an alien and
disqualified from adopting the minors because he doesnt fall any
under any of the exceptions under Paragraph 3 of Article 184 of
the Family Code

He isnt a former Filipino who wants to adopt a relative

by consanguinity

He doesnt seek to adopt his wifes legitimate children

Rosalina was no longer a Filipino citizen when the

petition was filed, and so he cannot adopt his wifes
relatives with her
o Rosalina cannot adopt her siblings; the law mandates joint
adoption by spouses. Art. 185 of the Family Code says,
Husband and wife must adopt, not may, as it had been phrased
in Art. 29 of PD 603

None of the exceptions apply; Maricel and Alvin are

Rosalinas siblings, not her children.
o Technically, Rosalina is qualified to adopt under Art. 184 (3a), but
Art. 185 disqualifies her because she cant adopt her siblings
jointly with her husband.

Republic v CA and Spouses Hughes

o While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt
under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3)
of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant
to paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Art
185 provides: Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the other.
o As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603,
had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt
when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.

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o

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article

185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the
spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the
subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article
186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts
the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

SUPPORT: Arts 194-208, Family Code

A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, Sections 2 and 3

Section 2. Spousal Support. - In determining support for the spouses, the
court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for
such period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on
their standard of living during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child
whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek
outside employment;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training
to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and
that spouse's future earning capacity;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including
their comparative earning abilities in the labor market;
(5) the needs and obligations of each spouse;
(6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including
services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career
building of the other spouse;
(7) the age and health of the spouses;
(8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;

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(9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into
account that spouse's earning capacity, earned and unearned income,
assets, and standard of living; and

CASES
o

Verzosa v Verzosa
o Future support operates outside the Civil Code and Family Code
provisions on the necessity of earnest efforts toward compromise.
Article 2035 provides that there can be no compromise on future
support.
o The right to support cannot be

Renounced

Transmitted to third persons

Compensated with what the obligee owes the obligor

Reyes v Ines-Luciano
o Adultery is a defense in an action for support, but it must be
sufficiently proven.
o Support from the conjugal property (or absolute community) is not
affected by allegations of adultery.
o It is the obligation of the husband to support the wife.
o In determining the amount for support pendent lite, mere affidavits
will do. There is no need to go fully into the merits of the case.

Canonizado v Ordonez-Benitez
o Can a judge be compelled by mandamus to issue a writ of
execution for payment of arrears in support? YES. Judgment for
support does not become dormant and a five-year period for
executing it by motion does not apply. The obligation is a
continuing one; a writ of execution is merely an enforcement of
vested rights.

Lam v Chua
o It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on
the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the
capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the
Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation of the child.

Mangonon v CA

(10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the spouse.
Section 3. Child Support. - The common children of the spouses shall
be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be
ordered to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and
education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise
consider the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial
parent and those of the child;
(2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her
special needs and aptitudes;
(3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to;
(4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make
toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from
the salary of the parent.

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PARENTAL AUTHORITY: Arts 209-233, Family Code

Art. 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered
city or large municipality.

Articles 356-363, CC
Art. 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and
intellectual development.

Art. 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or
guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished.
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children
the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, Sections 4, 5, 7

Art. 357. Every child shall:

(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute
parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.
Art. 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall
see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and
shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness,
love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of
life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For
this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious
instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or
guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
Art. 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of
children in the municipality. It shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children,
and secure their cooperation.

Section 4. Child Custody. - In determining the right party or person to

whom the custody of the child of the parties may be awarded pending the
petition, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and shall
give paramount consideration to the material and moral welfare of the
child.
The court may likewise consider the following factors: (a) the agreement of
the parties; (b) the desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and
loving relationship between the child and the other parent; (c) the child's
health, safety, and welfare; (d) any history of child or spousal abuse by the
person seeking custody or who has had any filial relationship with the child,
including anyone courting the parent; (e) the nature and frequency of
contact with both parents; (f) habitual use of alcohol or regulated
substances; (g) marital misconduct; (h) the most suitable physical,
emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment; and (i) the
preference of the child, if over seven years of age and of sufficient
discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The court may award provisional custody in the following order of
preference: (1) to both parents jointly; (2) to either parent taking into
account all relevant considerations under the foregoing paragraph,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit; (3} to the surviving grandparent, or if there are
several of them, to the grandparent chosen by the child over seven years
of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent is unfit or
disqualified; (4) to the eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age,
unless he or she is unfit or disqualified; (5) to the child's actual custodian
over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or (6) to any
other person deemed by the court suitable to provide proper care and
guidance for the child.

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The custodian temporarily designated by the court shall give the court and
the parents five days notice of any plan to change the residence of the
child or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it
does not prejudice the visitation rights of the parents.

o
o

David v CA
o A writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy to enable persons to
regain custody of minor children.
o Art 176, FC: Illegitimate children are under the parental authority
of the mother, who is also entitled to custody of the child. The
mother is entitled to an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
o The fact that the father recognizes the child is a ground for
demanding support, but NOT for the father to have custody of the
child.
o Being well-off is not a reason for giving the father custody and
depriving the mother thereof.
o The payment of support/allowance does not depend on the
custody of the child.

Tonog v CA
o In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is
the welfare and well-being of the child. In arriving at its decision
as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must
take into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.
o The parents right to custody is enshrined in the law: Art 220, FC.
o Even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of
unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.

Section 5. Visitation Rights. - Appropriate visitation rights shall be

provided to the parent who is not awarded provisional custody unless
found unfit or disqualified by the court.
Section 7. Order of Protection. - The court may issue an Order of
Protection requiring any person:
(a) to stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment
of the child, other parent or any other party, and to stay away from any
other specific place designated by the court;
(b) to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such child or the
other parent or any person to whom custody of the child is awarded;
(c) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an
unreasonable risk to the health, safety, or welfare of the child;
(d) to permit a parent, or a person entitled to visitation by a court order or a
separation agreement, to visit the child at stated periods;
(e) to permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified
period of time in order to take persona! belongings not contested in a
proceeding pending with the Family Court;
(f) to comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of
the child.

CASES
o

Sagala-Eslao v CA
o Parental authority is inalienable. It cannot be transferred or
renounced, except in the cases authorized by lawadoption,
guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution.
o When a parent entrusts custody of a minor child to another, it is
merely temporary custodyNOT a renunciation of parental
authority.

The right of the parents to the custody of the minor is one of the
NATURAL RIGHTS inherent in parenthood.

ARTICLES 211, 212, 214

o

Santos, Sr. v CA
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated
children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass
of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development,
as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is
no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.

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Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not
be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what
is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
o
o
o
o
o

Art 211: The law vests joint parental authority in the father and
mother.
Art 212: In case of the absence/death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority.
Art 214: In case of death, absence or unsuitability, the surviving
grandparent may exercise substitute parental authority
Wealth is not a deciding factor.
Trickery in spiriting away ones son is NOT a ground to wrest
custody, although such trickery is unjustifiable.

Bondagjy v Bondagjy
o The award of custody to the mother does not deprive the father of
parental authority. He still has visitation rights.

Laxamana v Laxamana
o Need evidence, not just findings of facts.

Briones v Miguel
o Art 176 applies: The mother has parental authority because the
son is an illegitimate child. The parents were never married so
the child cannot choose.

Pablo-Gualberto v Gualberto
o Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental
neglect or incompetence.
o It is not enough to show that the parent was a lesbianit must
also be demonstrated that she carried on the relationship in the
presence of her son.

ARTICLE 213
o

Medina v Makabali: Kid stayed with Dra Makabali. Best interest of the
child.

Espiritu v CA
o The rule: ALWAYS consider the best interest of the child.
o The SC affirmed the RTCs decision because it gave greater
attention to the choice of the child and it considered all relevant
factors.

While all actuations should be in the best interests of the child,

this is not to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of
the parent to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of
parents vis--vis that of their children are not antithetical to each
other; they must be respected and harmonized.

ARTICLES 218, 219

Perez v CA
o Art 213 applies when parents are separated. The law does not
distinguish between legal separation and separation in fact.

Cang v CA
o The law only confers on the innocent spouse (legal separation)
the exercise of parental authority. Having custody of the child,
the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights
with respect to his rearing and care.
o Parental authority may be waived (only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender), as in law it may be subject to a
compromise.
o Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason.

o
o

Article 2180, CC
Amadora v CA

PSBA v CA
o The rules on quasi-delict do not govern in this case, because
there is a special contract between students and their school.
The school, however, may avoid liability by proving that there was
no negligence on their part.

St. Marys v Carpitanos

o The negligent act in question must be the proximate cause of the
injurythere must be a causal connection to the accident.
However, in this case, the immediate cause of the death of the
student was the detachment of the steering wheel of the jeep.
There was no evidence that the school had allowed the other
minor student to drive; the minor student drivers parents may be
held liable. The school cannot be held liable as they had no
control over the incident. The registered owner of the vehicle
should also be held responsible for damages.
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P.D. No. 603 (1974): The Child and Youth Welfare Code

(10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family
as a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged
absence of the parents or solo parent.

RA 8972 (2000): Solo Parents Welfare Act of 2000

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the
family as the foundation of the nation, strengthen its solidarity and ensure
its total development. Towards this end, it shall develop a comprehensive
program of services for solo parents and their children to be carried out by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), the National
Housing Authority (NHA), the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and other related government and nongovernment agencies.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - Whenever used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean as follows:
(a) "Solo parent" - any individual who falls under any of the following
categories:
(1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against
chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the
mother keeps and raises the child;
(2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
death of spouse;
(3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the
spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at
least one (1) year;
(4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical
practitioner;
(5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1)
year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
(6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by
a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
(7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year;
(8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his
child/children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a
welfare institution;
(9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a
child or children;

A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming

benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no longer left alone with the
responsibility of parenthood, shall terminate his/her eligibility for these
benefits.
(b) "Children" - refer to those living with and dependent upon the solo
parent for support who are unmarried, unemployed and not more than
eighteen (18) years of age, or even over eighteen (18) years but are
incapable of self-support because of mental and/or physical
defect/disability.
(c) "Parental responsibility" - with respect to their minor children shall refer
to the rights and duties of the parents as defined in Article 220 of Executive
Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the
Philippines."
(d) "Parental leave" - shall mean leave benefits granted to a solo parent to
enable him/her to perform parental duties and responsibilities where
physical presence is required.
(e) "Flexible work schedule" - is the right granted to a solo parent
employee to vary his/her arrival and departure time without affecting the
core work hours as defined by the employer.
Section 4. Criteria for Support. - Any solo parent whose income in the
place of domicile falls below the poverty threshold as set by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and subject to the
assessment of the DSWD worker in the area shall be eligible for
assistance: Provided, however, That any solo parent whose income is
above the poverty threshold shall enjoy the benefits mentioned in Sections
6, 7 and 8 of this Act.
Section 5. Comprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare
Services. - A comprehensive package of social development and welfare
services for solo parents and their families will be developed by the DSWD,
DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA and DILG, in coordination with
local government units and a nongovernmental organization with proven
track record in providing services for solo parents.
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The DSWD shall coordinate with concerned agencies the implementation
of the comprehensive package of social development and welfare services
for solo parents and their families. The package will initially include:
(a) Livelihood development services which include trainings on livelihood
skills, basic business management, value orientation and the provision of
seed capital or job placement.
(b) Counseling services which include individual, peer group or family
counseling. This will focus on the resolution of personal relationship and
role conflicts.
(c) Parent effectiveness services which include the provision and
expansion of knowledge and skills of the solo parent on early childhood
development, behavior management, health care, rights and duties of
parents and children.

(1) Scholarship programs for qualified solo parents and their children in
institutions of basic, tertiary and technical/skills education; and
(2) Nonformal education programs appropriate for solo parents and their
children.
The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall promulgate rules and regulations for
the proper implementation of this program.
Section 10. Housing Benefits. - Solo parents shall be given allocation in
housing projects and shall be provided with liberal terms of payment on
said government low-cost housing projects in accordance with housing law
provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty line as declared by the
NEDA.

(d) Critical incidence stress debriefing which includes preventive stress

management strategy designed to assist solo parents in coping with crisis
situations and cases of abuse.

Section 11. Medical Assistance. - The DOH shall develop a comprehensive

health care program for solo parents and their children. The program shall
be implemented by the DOH through their retained hospitals and medical
centers and the local government units (LGUs) through their
provincial/district/city/municipal hospitals and rural health units (RHUs).

(e) Special projects for individuals in need of protection which include

temporary shelter, counseling, legal assistance, medical care, self-concept
or ego-building, crisis management and spiritual enrichment.

Section 12. Additional Powers and Functions of the DSWD. The DSWD
shall perform the following additional powers and functions relative to the
welfare of solo parents and their families:

Section 6. Flexible Work Schedule. - The employer shall provide for a

flexible working schedule for solo parents: Provided, That the same shall
not affect individual and company productivity: Provided, further, That any
employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the
DOLE on certain meritorious grounds.

(a) Conduct research necessary to: (1) develop a new body of knowledge
on solo parents; (2) define executive and legislative measures needed to
promote and protect the interest of solo parents and their children; and (3)
assess the effectiveness of programs designed for disadvantaged solo
parents and their children;

Section 7. Work Discrimination. - No employer shall discriminate against

any solo parent employee with respect to terms and conditions of
employment on account of his/her status.

(b) Coordinate the activities of various governmental and nongovernmental

organizations engaged in promoting and protecting the interests of solo
parents and their children; and

Section 8. Parental Leave. - In addition to leave privileges under existing

laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year
shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of
at least one (1) year.

(c) Monitor the implementation of the provisions of this Act and suggest
mechanisms by which such provisions are effectively implemented.

Section 9. Educational Benefits. - The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall

provide the following benefits and privileges:

Section 13. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - An interagency

committee headed by the DSWD, in coordination with the DOH, DECS,
CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA, and DILG is hereby established which shall
formulate, within ninety (90) days upon the effectivity of this Act, the
implementing rules and regulations in consultation with the local
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government units,
organizations.

nongovernment

organizations

and

people's

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN FAMILY LAW:

Arts 238-253, Family Code

ARTICLE 253
o

Armas v Calisterio: Under the Civil Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death for the present spouse to contract a
subsequent marriage, provided that the number of years required for the
presumption of death has lapsed.

Bobbie Reyes
UP Law D2013